RAJANversusTHE STATE OF HARYANA
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1081
- Decided
- 2 September 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The conviction stands because the ocular testimony is reliable and the absence of the weapon does not vitiate the evidence, and the delay in uploading the judgment does not invalidate the High Court's order.
Summary
The appellant Rajan was convicted for murder under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act based primarily on the ocular testimony of two eyewitnesses, despite the alleged firearm not being recovered. He appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court’s delay of two years and five months in uploading its reasoned judgment and the lack of the weapon should invalidate the conviction. The Court examined the principles for appreciating ocular evidence and held that minor discrepancies or the non‑recovery of a weapon do not undermine reliable eyewitness accounts. It also noted that the delay in uploading the judgment, while concerning, does not by itself render the High Court’s order erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial and High Courts' findings and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether a delay of two years and five months in uploading the High Court's reasoned judgment warrants setting aside the conviction
- Whether the non‑recovery of the firearm alleged to have been used by the appellant defeats the ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses
- Whether the trial and appellate courts correctly appreciated the ocular evidence in a murder case
Legislation cited
- Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 27
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 319
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the courts below convicting and sentencing the appellant for offence punishable u/ss.302/34 IPC and ss.25, 27 of the Arms Act; and delay at the instance of the High Court in uploading the judgment after a period – ss.302/34 – Arms Act, 1959 – ss.25, 27 – Murder – Appellant and one co-accused guilty of the alleged offence of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment – One co-accused absconded and three other co-accused acquitted of all the charges – High Court
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 744 : 2025 INSC 1081
Rajan
v.
The State of Haryana
(Criminal Appeal No. 3904 of 2025)
02 September 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the
courts below convicting and sentencing the appellant for offence
punishable u/ss.302/34 IPC and ss.25, 27 of the Arms Act; and
delay at the instance of the High Court in uploading the judgment
after a period of about 2 years 5 months.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302/34 – Arms Act, 1959 – ss.25, 27 –
Murder – Appellant and one co-accused guilty of the alleged
offence of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment – One
co-accused absconded and three other co-accused acquitted
of all the charges – High Court upheld the order passed by
the trial court – Correctness:
Held: Trial court and the High Court well appreciated the oral version
of the two eyewitnesses in its true perspective and correctly – All
other relevant aspects of the matter looked into threadbare – Just
because the firearm alleged to have been used and fired by the
appellant not recovered or discovered u/s.27 of the Evidence Act
at any point of time during the course of the investigation would
not render the ocular version of the two eyewitnesses doubtful –
Once the case of the prosecution is based on direct evidence,
motive pales into insignificance – Despite there being a delay of 2
years 5 months in uploading the judgment by the High Court, the
oral testimony of the two eyewitnesses inspires confidence and
nothing on record in the form of any intrinsic evidence to render
their testimony doubtful. [Paras 30, 35, 40, 42, 45, 48]
Judicial deprecation – Delay at the instance of the High
Court in uploading the Judgment after a period of about 2
years 5 months – Is a matter of grave concern – Serious
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 745
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
cognizance taken of the delay at the instance of the High
Court – Practice of few High Courts to pronounce the operative
part of the order without the reasoned judgment and after a
substantial length of time uploading the reasoned judgment,
has been deprecated – This practice deprives the aggrieved
party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal
more particularly in criminal matters wherein the appeal is
dismissed affirming the judgment and order of conviction
passed by the trial court – Thus, there should be no delay
at the end of the High Court in uploading the reasoned order
more particularly after the operative part of the judgment is
pronounced. [Paras 41, 43, 48]
Evidence – Ocular evidence – Principles for appreciation of
ocular evidence in a criminal case – Stated. [Paras 32-34]
Case Law Cited
Balu Sudam Khalde and Another v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 6
SCR 851 : (2023) 13 SCC 365; State of Punjab and Ors. v. Jagdev
Singh Talwandi [1984] 2 SCR 50 : (1984) 1 SCC 596; Zahira
Habibulla H. Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [2004] 3
SCR 1050 : (2004) 4 SCC 158; Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana
[2008] 2 SCR 80 : (2008) 7 SCC 96; Ajay Singh and Anr. v. State
of Chhattisgarh and Anr. [2017] 1 SCR 286 : (2017) 3 SCC 330;
Balaji Baliram Mupade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
(2021) 12 SCC 603; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State
of Gujarat and Ors., 2024 INSC 801 : [2024] 10 SCR 2227; K.
Madan Mohan Rao v. Bheemrao Baswanthrao Patil and Ors., 2022
INSC 1025 : [2022] 7 SCR 425; Anil Rai v. State of Bihar [2001]
Supp. 1 SCR 298 : (2001) 7 SCC 318 – relied on.
Indrajeet Yadav v. Santosh Singh and Another [2022] 3 SCR
73 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 461; State through the Inspector of
Police CBI, ACB, Chennai v. S. Murali Mohan & Anr., decided
on 01-10-2024; State of Rajasthan v. Arjun Singh and Others
[2011] 10 SCR 823 : (2011) 9 SCC 115; Krishna Mochi and
Others v. State of Bihar [2002] 3 SCR 1 : (2002) 6 SCC 81;
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by Lrs. [2001] 1
SCR 948 : (2001) 3 SCC 179; Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State
of UP and Ors., 2025 INSC 1039 : [2025] 8 SCR 1525; State
of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi [1984] 2 SCR 50 : (1984) 1
SCC 596 – referred to.
746 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Arms Act, 1959; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Delay of 2 years 5 months in uploading the Judgment; Oral
testimony; Absconded; Ocular version of the eyewitnesses; Direct
evidence; Motive; Appreciation of ocular evidence; Evidence of
an injured witness; Evidence of the eyewitnesses; Discovery or
recovery of weapon.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3904 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.02.2016 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No. 443 of 2003
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Tarannum Cheema, Sanjay Jain, Akash Singh, Akshay
Nagarajan.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Deepak Thukral, A.A.G., Samar Vijay Singh, Aman Dev Sharma,
Ms. Sabarni Som, Sandeep Saxena, Gorav Arora, Gaj Singh.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. This appeal arises from the Judgment and Order passed by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 18-2-2016
in Criminal Appeal No.D-443-DB of 2003 by which the appeal filed
by appellant – herein against the Judgment and Order of conviction
passed by the Trial Court came to be dismissed.
4. It appears from the materials on record that a First Information
Report came to be registered with the City Sirsa Police Station dated
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 747
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
22-7-1998 for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) respectively and Sections
25 and 27 of the Arms Act respectively. The FIR came to be registered
by one Balbir Singh, an injured eyewitness to the incident.
5. The FIR reads thus:-
“The statement of Shri Balbir Singh son of Shri Chanan
Singh Rajput resident of Dhudhiawali now residing at
14/949. Addl. A.D.C. Colony, that I am working as an
agriculturist in village Dhudhiawali, Shiv Dutt Singh and
Bishan Singh, the sons of my uncle (Tau) Narain Singh
reside in A.D.C. Colony, Sirsa. Today in the morning, I
had also arrived at Sirsa from village Dhudhiawali. I had
gone to meet Shiv Dutt Singh and Bishan Singh in A.D.C.
Colony, where Bishan Singh met in the house when I
enquired from Bhishan Singh about the whereabout of
Shiv Dutt, Bishan Singh had told me that Shiv Dutt has
gone to National College, Sirsa to get admitted Amrinder
Singh son of Amar Singh resident of band gate, Sirsa in
B.A. Part-I and he asked me to accompany him there to
meet him. I and Bishan Singh then reached at National
college where Singh and Raj Kumar sons of Pokhar Dass,
resident of Talwara Khurd came across on enquiry, Shiv
Dutt Singh told that Amrinder Singh would get admission
and he offered tea to us in the canteen thereupon, I Bishan
Singh, Shiv Dutt, Sirsa and Raj Kumar proceeded to the
canteen to take tea. At about 2.05. P.M. when we reached
on the corner of building of Science block and Shiv Dutt,
was going ahead of us and we were following him at some
distance. Naresh Godara, resident of Kheowali carrying a
DBBL gun of .12 bore in his hands, Vikas Kukna of D.C.
Colony, Sirsa armed with a DBBL gun of .12 bore, Rajan
son of Shao Ram, resident of Bajekan armed with a pistol
and Rajdeep Singh son of Harbhagwan Singh resident of
Canal colony, Sirsa armed with a sword arrived there from
the opposite directions and on seeing Shiv Dutt Naresh
Godara have exhorted him to be cautious that they would
teach him a lesson for inflicting injuries to his brother
Hanuman and for opposing them in the college elections.
Thereupon, Rajan has fired a shot from his pistol at Shiv
748 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Dutt Singh but Shiv Dutt Singh escaped unhurt. Thereafter,
Naresh Kumar and Vikas have fired one shot each from
their respective guns simultaneously at Shiv Dutt Singh
which hit him on the chest region and the abdominal region
on the front side and on receiving the firearm injuries, Shiv
Dutt Singh fell down on the ground, I, Bishan Singh and
Raj Kumar raised cries for help and then Rajan along with
his pistol, Naresh Godara along with his gun and Vikas
along with his gun ran away from the spot and Rajdeep
threw his sword at the spot and ran away. Naresh Godara
in furtherance of common intention of Rajan Vikas and
Rajdeep armed with firearms and sword have fired shots
at Shiv Dutt Singh to take avenge for causing injuries to
his brother Hanuman on account of which Shiv Dutt has
been rendered injured. I and Raj Kumar have shifted him
to Civil Hospital, Sirsa in the car of Naveen Kedia for
treatment where Shiv Dutt Singh has succumbed to the
firearm injuries after about half an hour of the treatment
by the doctor. Statement has been heard and the same is
correct. sd/ Balbir Singh Attested Kulwant Singh P/ASI P.
city, Sirsa dated 22-7-1998 police proceeding:- Today, I the
ASI along-with H.C. Kulbir Singh No. 127 constable Bhagi
Ram No. 373 and constable Raj Kumar No. 356, on receipt
of a medical memo have rushed to civil hospital Sirsa
where Shri Balbir Singh aforesaid happened to meet who
got recorded his aforesaid and after recording the same,
it was read over and explained to him who after admitting
the contents thereof, to be correct put his signatures in
English which I attest. The aforesaid statement discloses
the commission of an offence punishable under Section
102/34 of the IPC and Section 25/27s54/59 of the Arms
Act. Therefore, a memo is being sent to the police station
through constable Raj Kumar, No. 356 for registration of
a case. After registration of the case, the FIR number be
intimated and the special report of the case be got sent
to the higher authorities. I am busy in the investigation
in the Hospital sd/-Kulwant Singh.P/ASI P.S. City, Sirsa
dated 22-7-1998 at 4.30 P.M. at G.H. Sirsa. At the police
station, on receipt of the aforesaid memo, a case under
the aforesaid offences has been registered and the police
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 749
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
file along-with the original memo is being sent to Kulwant
Singh ASI through the commuter constable. The copies of
the FIR in the form of special report are being sent to the
higher authorities through constable Balwant Singh
No.867.”
6. The investigation was undertaken and three persons came to be
arrested, namely, Vikas, Naresh and the appellant – herein.
7. On completion of the investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed
for the offences enumerated above.
8. The Trial Court proceeded to frame charge against the appellant –
herein and other co-accused. They all denied the charge and claimed
to be tried.
9. In the course of the trial, the prosecution examined the following
witnesses:-
1. PW 1 Head Constable Subhash Chander
2. PW 2 Head Constable Ram Kumar
3. PW 3 Inspector Sube Singh
4. PW 4 Constable Satbir Singh
5. PW 5 SI Harbans Lal
6. PW 6 Constable Reghubir Singh
7. PW 7 ASI Kulwant Singh
8. PW 8 Balbir Singh
9. PW 9 Vijay Kumar, Clerk
10. PW 10 Bishan Singh
11. PW 11 Dr. Yogesh Sangwan
12. PW 12 Charan Singh
13. PW 13 Dr. G.S. Somani
14. PW 14 Inspector Raghbir Singh
10. The prosecution also relied upon few pieces of documentary evidence.
11. Upon closure of recording of the oral evidence, the further statements
of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the
750 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The appellant – herein
claimed to be innocent and said to have been falsely implicated in
the alleged crime.
12. The Trial Court in the course of recording of the oral evidence
summoned one more accused invoking Section 319 of the CrPC. It
appears that a supplementary charge-sheet was filed against two
other co-accused. So, in all six individuals were put to trial including
the appellant–herein.
13. The Trial Court upon appreciation of the oral as well as direct evidence
on record held Vikas and the present appellant guilty of the alleged
offence of murder and, accordingly, sentenced them to undergo life
imprisonment. It also appears that during the pendency of the trial,
a co-accused, namely, Naresh absconded and accordingly his trial
came to be separated.
14. The three co-accused, namely, Jasbir Singh, Kirpa Ram and Rajdeep
came to be acquitted of all the charges.
15. The appellant – herein being dissatisfied with the Judgment and
Order of conviction passed by the Trial Court went in appeal before
the High Court. The High Court ultimately dismissed the appeal,
thereby affirming the Judgment and Order of conviction passed by
the Trial Court.
16. In such circumstances, referred to above, the appellant is here before
us with the present appeal.
17. At this stage, it has been brought to our notice that the co-convict
Vikas had come before this Court seeking to challenge the very same
impugned Judgment and order passed by the High Court and his
Special Leave Petition came to be dismissed vide the Order dated
3-12-2018.
18. Naresh who had absconded later came to be apprehended and was
put to trial. At the end of his trial, he also stood convicted for the
offence of murder punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34
IPC respectively.
19. Naresh went in appeal before the High Court and his appeal has
also been dismissed by the High Court. However, Naresh has not
come before this Court with any Special Leave Petition.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 751
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
20. We heard Ms. Tarannum Cheema, the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant and Mr. Deepak Thukral, the learned counsel appearing
for the State of Haryana.
21. We take notice of the fact that the entire case of the prosecution is
based on direct evidence. The State examined two eyewitnesses,
i.e., PW 8 and PW 10, namely, Balbir Singh and Bishan Singh
respectively.
22. The principal argument canvassed on behalf of the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant is that the impugned Judgment of the
High Court deserves to be set aside because although the operative
part of the Judgment was pronounced on 18-2-2016, yet the main
Judgment came to be uploaded only after a period of 2 years and
5 months. According to the learned counsel, this has caused grave
prejudice to her client.
23. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on few orders passed
by this Court taking the view that if there is gross delay in uploading
the Judgment, then the matter should be remanded for fresh
consideration. The orders relied upon are as under:
(1) Indrajeet Yadav vs. Santosh Singh and Another : 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 461,
(2) Balaji Baliram Mupade & Anr. vs. The State of Maharashtra &
Ors decided on 29-10-2020 and
(3) State through the Inspector of Police CBI, ACB, Chennai vs.
S. Murali Mohan & Anr. decided on 01-10-2024.
24. At this stage, we should also look into the order passed by a coordinate
Bench dated 11-1-2019 which reads thus:-
“When the matter came up today for hearing, learned senior
counsel for the petitioner submits that Criminal Appeal
D-443-DB of 2003 was heard by the Division Bench of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court on 18.02.2016 and the
oral order dismissing the appeal was pronounced on the
same day. However, the judgment, in fact, was uploaded
on 18.07.2018 i.e. after 2 years and 5 months of dismissal
Sonae Venthe appeal. Learned senior counsel further
submits that the arguments advanced by him were also
not reflected in the judgment.
752 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
To verify this aspect, we direct the Registrar (Judl.) of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court to submit a report about
the alleged allegation to this Court.
List immediately after receipt of report from the Registrar
(Judl.), Punjab and Haryana High Court.”
25. The second argument of the learned counsel is that although the
appellant has been named in the FIR and a particular overt act
has also been attributed by the two eye-witnesses in their ocular
version, yet the presence of the appellant at the time of incident is
not established as there has been no discovery or recovery of any
firearm alleged to have been in the hand of the appellant herein.
26. In other words, the argument is that if it is the specific case of the
prosecution that the appellant herein had a firearm in his hand and
he fired a shot then in such circumstances the prosecution should
have produced the said firearm as a muddamal so that it could have
been sent to the ballistic expert for his report. In the absence of any
such firearm it is not permissible in law to hold the appellant guilty
of the alleged crime.
27. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
that there being merit in her appeal, the same may be allowed and
the matter be remanded to the High Court for fresh hearing of the
criminal appeal.
28. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State
would submit that no error not to speak of any error of law could
be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the
impugned Judgment. He would submit that there is no good reason
to doubt or discard the ocular version of the two eyewitnesses. The
Trial Court as well as the High Court have found their version to be
true, trustworthy and reliable.
29. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that although it is true
that there was a delay of 2 years and 5 months in uploading the
Judgment yet that by itself would not render the impugned Judgment
of the High Court erroneous or illegal in law.
ANALYSIS
30. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view that
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 753
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
we should not disturb the impugned Judgment passed by the High
Court. The Trial Court and the High Court have well appreciated
the oral version of the two eyewitnesses in its true perspective and
correctly. All other relevant aspects of the matter have also been
looked into threadbare.
31. There is no good reason for us to disbelieve PW 8 – Balbir Singh
and PW 10 – Bishan Singh respectively.
32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed
or straight-jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The
judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a
criminal case can be enumerated as under:
“I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that
impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the
Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping
in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed
out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find
out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence
given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of
the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence
had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general
tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court
which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to
the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless
there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not
be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor
variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.
III. When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite
possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts
should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies
in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with
the credibility of his version that the court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence.
IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching
the core of the case, hyper technical approach by taking
754 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
sentences torn out of context here or there from the
evidence, attaching importance to some technical error
committed by the investigating officer not going to the root
of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the
evidence as a whole.
V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations
falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the
evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements
of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial
scrutiny.
VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess
a photographic memory and to recall the details of an
incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the
mental screen.
VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken
by events. The witness could not have anticipated the
occurrence which so often has an element of surprise.
The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be
attuned to absorb the details.
VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An object
or movement might emboss its image on one person’s
mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.
IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by them
or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport
of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness
to be a human tape recorder.
X. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration
of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates
by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time
of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make
very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again,
it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies
from person to person.
XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events which take place in
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 755
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable
to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.
XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross
examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up
facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill
up details from imagination on the spur of the moment.
The sub-conscious mind of the witness sometimes so
operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or
being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful
and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.
XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent
with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to
amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has
the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later
statement is at variance with the former to some extent
it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See
Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat 1983
Cri LJ 1096 : (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of
Haryana AIR 1995 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State
of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)”
33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated,
the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required
to be kept in mind:
“(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time
and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless
there are material contradictions in his deposition.
(b) Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it
must be believed that an injured witness would not allow
the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.
(c) The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary
value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements
are not to be discarded lightly.
(d) The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted
on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or
minor contradictions.
756 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial
embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness,
then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment
should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not
the whole evidence.
(f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must
be taken into consideration and discrepancies which
normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of
time should be discarded.”
34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two
principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case,
it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in
such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts
deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently
improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these
considerations, circumstances either elicited from those witnesses
themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise
their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will
have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their
evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a
mere denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be
examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea
or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the
prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in
respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing
the value of the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khalde
and Another v. State of Maharashtra :(2023) 13 SCC 365)
35. Just because the firearm alleged to have been used and fired by
the appellant–herein was not recovered or discovered under Section
27 of the Indian Evidence Act at any point of time during the course
of the investigation would not render the ocular version of the two
eyewitnesses doubtful.
36. Discovery or recovery of the weapon as the case may be, if any,
could be brought in aid of the other evidence which the prosecution
has led at the time of trial.
37. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon few decisions
of this Court. In the State of Rajasthan v. Arjun Singh and Others
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 757
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
reported in (2011) 9 SCC 115, this Court observed in paras 17 and
18 respectively as under:
“17. Learned senior counsel for the accused persons
contended that in the absence of recovery of pellets from
the scene of occurrence or from the body of the injured
persons, it is highly doubtful as to the scene of occurrence
and whether such incident did take place in the manner
suggested by the prosecution. Learned counsel appearing
for the complainant pointed out that though there was an
entry in Malkhana Register (Ex. P31A) wherein it was stated
that a sealed packet containing pellets was deposited but
prosecution failed to lead any evidence on this point. It was
also pointed out that though a report was received from
the Forensic Science Laboratory, no evidence regarding
recovery of the pellets was produced.
18. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional
Advocate General appearing for the State that mere
nonrecovery of pistol or cartridge does not detract the case
of the prosecution where clinching and direct evidence
is acceptable. Likewise, absence of evidence regarding
recovery of used pellets, blood stained clothes etc. cannot
be taken or construed as no such occurrence had taken
place. As a matter of fact, we have already pointed out
that the gun shot injuries tallied with medical evidence. It is
also seen that Raghuraj Singh and Himmat Raj Singh, who
had died, received 8 and 7 gun shot wounds respectively
while Raj Singh (PW-2) also received 8 gun shots scattered
in front of left thigh. All these injuries have been noted by
the Doctor (PW-1) in his reports Exs. P-1 to P-4.”
(emphasis supplied)
38. In Krishna Mochi and Others v. State of Bihar reported in (2002) 6
SCC 81, this Court observed in para 37 as under:
“It has been then submitted on behalf of the appellants
that nothing incriminating could be recovered from them
which goes to show that they had no complicity with the
crime. In my view, recovery of no incriminating material
from the accused cannot alone be taken as a ground to
758 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
exonerate them from the charges, more so when their
participation in the crime is unfolded in ocular account of
the occurrence given by the witnesses, whose evidence
has been found by me to be unimpeachable.”
(emphasis supplied)
39. The learned counsel also laid much stress on motive. According to
her, there was no motive for the appellant – herein to commit the
alleged crime.
40. We find no substance in the aforesaid submission because once the
case of the prosecution is based on direct evidence, motive pales
into insignificance.
41. The delay at the instance of the High Court in uploading the
Judgment after a period of about 2 years 5 months is a matter of
grave concern. We should not overlook this fact. We have taken
serious cognizance of this delay at the instance of the High Court.
It is only keeping this in mind that inspite of dismissal of the special
leave petition filed by the coconvict-Vikas that we looked into the
oral evidence threadbare so as to satisfy ourselves whether there
is any infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court or
the High Court and whether any grave prejudice could be said to
have been caused to the appellant due to delay.
42. We have reached the conclusion that despite there being a delay of
2 years 5 months in uploading the Judgment, the oral testimony of
the two eyewitnesses inspires confidence and there is nothing on
record in the form of any intrinsic evidence to render their testimony
doubtful.
43. Over a period of time, it has been the practice of few High Courts
to pronounce the operative part of the order without the reasoned
judgment and after a substantial length of time the reasoned judgment
is uploaded. This practice has been deprecated by this Court in
many of its judgments and orders. This practice of the High Courts
deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further
judicial redressal more particularly in criminal matters wherein the
appeal is dismissed affirming the judgment and order of conviction
passed by the trial court. (See: State of Punjab and Ors. v. Jagdev
Singh Talwandi : (1984) 1 SCC 596, Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and
Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (2004) 4 SCC 158, Mangat Ram v.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 759
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
State of Haryana : (2008) 7 SCC 96, Ajay Singh and Anr. v. State of
Chhattisgarh and Anr. : (2017) 3 SCC 330, Balaji Baliram Mupade
and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. : (2021) 12 SCC 603,
Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. :
2024 INSC 801, K. Madan Mohan Rao v. Bheemrao Baswanthrao
Patil and Ors. : 2022 INSC 1025)
44. Almost two decades back, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar
reported in (2001) 7 SCC 318 had taken serious cognizance of the
aforesaid. This Court issued guidelines as contained in paras 9 and
10 respectively of the judgment which read as under:
“9. It is true, that for the High Courts, no period for
pronouncement of judgment is contemplated either under
the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code,
but as the pronouncement of the judgment is a part of the
justice dispensation system, it has to be without delay. In
a country like ours where people consider the Judges only
second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that belief of
the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates
the people to raise eyebrows, sometimes genuinely which,
if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in
the judicial system. A time has come when the judiciary
itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and
regards for the attainment of the rule of law. For the fault
of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary
cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and
purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts
are required to be made to come up to the expectation of
the society of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted
justice.
10. Under the prevalent circumstances in some of the High
Courts, I feel it appropriate to provide some guidelines
regarding the pronouncement of judgments which, I am
sure, shall be followed by all concerned, being the mandate
of this Court. Such guidelines, as for the present, are as
under:
(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue
appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where
the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column
760 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after
the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date
of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the Court
Officer concerned.
(ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their
administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/
Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to
furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where
the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the
period of that month.
(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the
judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months,
the Chief Justice concerned shall draw the attention of the
Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice
may also see the desirability of circulating the statement
of such cases in which the judgments have not been
pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of
conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the
High Court for their information. Such communication be
conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three
months from the date of reserving it, any of the parties
in the case is permitted to file an application in the High
Court with a prayer for early judgment. Such application, as
and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned
within two days excluding the intervening holidays.
(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced
within a period of six months, any of the parties of the
said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the
Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw
the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for
fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant
the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems
fit in the circumstances.”
45. In the case in hand, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in Santosh
Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by Lrs. reported in (2001) 3
SCC 179 and few other orders to fortify her submission that the delay
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 761
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
in uploading the reasoned order by itself should be a ground to set
aside the same. It would be too much for this Court to say that the
delay by itself is sufficient to set aside the impugned judgment. It
would all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
This Court in Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of UP and Ors. reported
in 2025 INSC 1039 has issued appropriate directions to tackle this
problem. We quote the directions issued by this Court:
“10. It is not that the situation with which we are dealing
in these Appeals has arisen for consideration for the first
time. The directions have already been issued by this
Court in Anil Rai (supra). Therefore, what is required today
is of adherence to the principles laid down by this Court
in Anil Rai (supra). We reiterate the directions and direct
the Registrar General of each High Court to furnish to the
Chief Justice of the High Court a list of cases where the
judgment reserved is not pronounced within the remaining
period of that month and keep on repeating the same for
three months. If the judgment is not delivered within three
months, the Registrar General shall place the matters
before the Chief Justice for orders and the Chief Justice
shall bring it to the notice of the concerned Bench for
pronouncing the order within two weeks thereafter, failing
which the matter be assigned to another Bench.
11. The above direction is in addition to the guidelines/
directions issued by this Court in Anil Rai (supra).”
(emphasis supplied)
46. We may refer to a passage from State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh
Talwandi reported in (1984) 1 SCC 596, wherein expressing the
opinion for the Constitution Bench, Chandrachud, C.J. observed
thus:—
“30. We would like to take this opportunity to point out
that serious difficulties arise on account of the practice
increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of pronouncing the
final order without a reasoned judgment. It is desirable that
the final order which the High Court intends to pass should
not be announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for
pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final order
762 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
without a reasoned judgment is announced by the High
Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody
of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against
the other, or that a person accused of a serious charge is
acquitted, or that a statute is unconstitutional or, as in the
instant case, that a detenu be released from detention.
If the object of passing such orders is to ensure speedy
compliance with them, that object is more often defeated
by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this
Court against the order passed by the High Court. That
places this Court in a predicament because, without the
benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for
this Court to allow the bare order to be implemented. The
result inevitably is that the operation of the order passed
by the High Court has to be stayed pending delivery of
the reasoned Judgment. It may be thought that such
orders are passed by this Court and therefore there is no
reason why the High Courts should not do the same. We
would like to point out respectfully that the orders passed
by this Court are final and no appeal lies against them.
The Supreme Court is the final Court in the hierarchy of
our courts. Besides, orders without a reasoned judgment
are passed by this Court very rarely, under exceptional
circumstances. Orders passed by the High Court are
subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution and other provisions of the
concerned statutes. We thought it necessary to make
these observations in order that a practice which is not
very desirable and which achieves no useful purpose may
not grow out of its present infancy.”
47. In K. Madan Mohan Rao v. Bheemrao Patil C.A No. 6972/2022 decided
on 26.09.2022, this Court after considering Anil Rai (supra), held that
a party to litigation could not be expected to wait indefinitely for the
availability of reasons of the Order of the Court. The guidelines and
observations in Anil Rai (supra), remain fundamental to the course
of dispensation of justice in any case before the Court, and the
principle set out therein must be followed. This Court was concerned
with an issue where an order was pronounced but even after more
than three months, reasons were not forthcoming, and the Judgment
was not available to either of the parties.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 763
Rajan v. The State of Haryana
48. We hope that we may not have to come across any matter wherein
there is a delay at the end of the High Court in uploading the reasoned
order more particularly after the operative part of the judgment is
pronounced. Today all that we are doing is reiterating the directions
issued by this Court in Anil Rai (supra).
49. In view of the aforesaid, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
50. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
51. Registry is directed to forward one copy each of this judgment to
all the High Courts.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.