RAJA @ RAJINDERversusSTATE OF HARYANA
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 312
- Decided
- 10 April 2015
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
A conviction based on a complete and corroborated chain of circumstantial evidence, supported by motive and admissible statements under Section 27, is valid.
Summary
The appellant Raja Rajinder was convicted of murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder under IPC sections 302, 201 and 34, based primarily on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution established that the deceased was last seen with the appellant, that a knife, blood‑stained clothes and burnt blanket were recovered at the appellant's direction, and that forensic analysis showed human blood on the items. The court also considered the appellant's motive—suspicion of an illicit relationship between the deceased and his wife—as a significant factor. The Supreme Court held that the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete, the motive credible, and the statements leading to the discovery of the weapon admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, despite the non‑examination of the tea‑stall owner. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction
- Whether the chain of circumstantial facts is complete and beyond reasonable doubt
- The relevance and sufficiency of motive in a circumstantial case
- The admissibility of statements made by the accused in police custody under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
- The effect of non‑examination of a material witness (tea‑stall owner) on the last‑seen theory
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 26, s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
[2015) 3 S.C.R. 947
RAJA@ RAJINDER A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Crimi~al Appeal No. 486 of 2010) B
APRIL 10, 2015
[DIPAK MISRA AND N.V. RAMANA,JJ.]
c
Penal Code, 1860: ss.302, 201 - Conviction based on
circumstantial evidence - Held: The evidence proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the deceased was last seen with the
accused - Recovery of knife, blood stained clothes and D
ashes of the bumt blanket of the victim-deceased was made
at the instance of the accused-appellant - The evidence
showed that accused-appellant was suspicious of
deceased's relation with his wife - This motive also
strengthened the case of the prosecution - Conviction E
upheld.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The case of the prosecution entirely hinged F
on circumstantial evidence. The circumstances that
were established by the prosecution were that the
deceased had accompanied the accused-appellant,
being called by him, from his house in the early part of
the evening on the date of occurrence. Thereafter, the G
appellant was seen at the tea stall with the deceased.
The brother of the deceased, PW-8 testified that he had
enquired from the accused as regards the whereabouts
947 H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 3 S.C.R.
A oftt.e deceased, for the deceased had accompanied the
accused and at that juncture the accused had replied
that at the tea stall a Sikh boy came and the deceased
went with him. As per the prosecution case, the
deceased and the accused were co-villagers. In his
B statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, the
accused-appellant totally denied to have accompanied
the deceased. The cumulative reading and apposite
appreciation of the said evidence proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the deceased was last seen with
C the accused. Another circumstance was about the
recovery of knife, blood-stained clothes and the ashes
of the burnt blanket. The seizure witnesses PW-7 and
PW-9 proved the seizure. The blood-stained clothes and
the weapon, the knife, were sent to the Forensic Science
0
Laboratory. Although there has been no matching of the
blood group, however, that would not make a difference
in the facts of the present case. The accused did not
offer any explanation how the human blood was found
E on the clothes and the knife. The doctor PW-1 clearly
opined that the injuries on the person of the deceased
could be caused by the knife and the said opinion had
gone unrebutted. Another circumstance was that PW-7,
a taxi driver, had deposed that on the fateful day while
F he wa!J going to Fatehabad for taking passengers, he
saw a bullock cart parked in front of the house of the
accused and certain persons were tying a bundle in a
"pa Iii". On query being made by him, the accused
persons told him that they are carrying manure to the
G fields. Though, this witness gave an exaggerated
version and stated differently about the time of arrest,
yet his testimony to the effect that '1e had seen the
accused with a bundle in "palli" at a particular place
cannot be disbelieved. The maxim "falsus in uno, falsus
H in omnibus", is not applicable in India. The court must
RAJA@ RAJINDER v. STATE OF HARYANA 949
make every attempt to separate falsehoods from the A
truth, and it must only be in exceptional circumstances,
when it is entirely impossible to separate the grain from
the chaff, for the same are so inextricably intertwined,
that the entire evidence of such a witness must be
discarded. Thus viewed, the version of PW-7 to the extent B
that was stated was totally acceptable and
credible.[Paras 7, 10 to 12, 15 to 17] [955-A-B; 956-D-F;
957-D-G; 958-A; 959-G; 960-A-b,E,G; 961-A-B,E-F]
2. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, c
motive assumes great significance as its existence is
an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive
reasoning. In the case at hand, it came in the evidence
that the accused-appellant was suspicious of the illicit
relationship between the deceased and his wife. The o
accused took the plea that he was never married. The
materials brought on record go a long way to show that
after the death of his brother he had entered into the
wedlock with his sister-in-law as per the tradition of the
community, that is, 'Kareva' marriage. The said facet of E
evidence has really not been assailed or shaken. Thus,
it was established that the.re was suspicion by the
accused that the deceased was having relationship with
his brother's wife and that had aroused his anger. The
said motive further strengthened the case of the F
prosecution. [Para 18] [961-G-962-A-D]
Padala Veera Reddy v. State ofA.P.1989 Supp (2) SCC
706; Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab 1995 Supp (4) SCC
259; Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 13 SCC 90: G
2007 (13) SCR 653; State of H.P. v. Gian Chand (2001) 6
SCC 71: 2001 (3) SCR 247; State of U.P. v. Deoman
Upadhyaya AIR 1960 SC 1125; State of Maharashtra v.
Damu (2000) 6 SCC 269; John Pandian v. State (2010) 14
SCC 129; Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 81: H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 3 S.C.R.
A 2002 (3) SCR 1; Yogendera v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 12
SCC 399; Kundu/a Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. v. State
of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 2 SCC 684: 1993 (2) SCR 666 -
relied on.
B Case Law Reference
1989 Supp (2) sec 706 relied on. Para 7
1995 supp (4) sec 259 relied on. Para 8
c 2007 (13) SCR 653 relied on. Para 9
2001 (3) SCR 247 relied on. Para 10
AIR 1960 SC 1125 relied on. Para 12
D (20001 6 sec 269 relied on. Para 13
(2010) 14 sec 129 relied on. Para 15
2002 (3) SCR 1 relied on. Para 16
E (2013) 12 sec 399 relied on. Para 17
1993 (2) SCR 666 relied on. Para 18
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 486 of 2010.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 07 .09.2009 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No.
770 of 2006.
G M. M. Kashyap, Advocate for the Appellant.
Vikas Sharma, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The present appeal is directed
RAJA@ RAJINDER v. STATE OF HARYANA 951
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
against the judgment and order dated 7 .09.2009_of the High A
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 770-DB of 2006, whereby the Division Bench
has confirmed the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Sirsa in Sessions Case No. 357 of 2003 convicting the B
present appellant for the offences punishable under Sections
302 and Section 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) and sentencing him to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for life and payment of fine of Rs.5000/- under
Section 302 and rigorous imprisonment of three years and C
fine of Rs.1000/- under Section 201 read with Section 34
IPC with default clause for the fine amount in respect of
both the offences with the stipulation that both the sentences
would be concurrent.
D
2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the prosecution case,
as has been unfurled is that on 18.1.2003 about 6.30 p.m.,
Het Ram, the deceased, had left his home with the accused-
appellant and did not return till the morning of 19.1.2003.
The family members of the deceased searched for him at E
various places and made enquiries from the relations but
despite their best efforts, he could not be found. In course
of that enquiry it was revealed by the owner of a tea-stall
that on 18:01.2003 about 8.30 p.m. the appellant and the F
deceased had taken tea together and thereafter they had
left that place. Being so informed by the tea stall owner,·
Subhash, PW-8, brother of the deceased along with Pala
Ram and Ramesh went to the house of the accused-
appellant, and came to learn from his father Krishan Kumar, G
the co-accused, that Raja had gone to village Kharia but
could not be contacted as the telephone number of village
Kharia was out of order. Thereafter, Subhash, PW-8, the
informant returned to his house and waited till night for the
return of Het Ram. When the deceased did not come till H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 3 S.C.R.
A night, Subhash along with his relati_ons again proceeded to
the house of the appellant who was present in the house,
and informed them that in the night of 18.01.2003 he and
the deceased had taken tea together but when they were
returning to their houses, a Sikh boy met them and Het Ram
B went with that boy on his motor cycle. After getting the said
information, when the informant and others were returning
from the house of the accused, they noticed blood stains in
the street in front of the houses of Mohan and Mahender
Singh. It aroused suspicion of the informant that his brother
C might have been murdered by the appellant and the dead
body could have been disposed of. The motive behind the
incident, as mentioned, was that the appellant was indulged
in consuming poppy husk and the father of the appellant
had a suspicion that the deceased was instrumental in
0
making his son a drug addict. On the basis of the aforesaid
allegations, an FIR No. 45 dated 20.1.2003 was lodged at
the police station Rania. After the criminal law was set in
motion, the investigating agency went to the place where
E blood stains were found and prepared the site plan and
seized the bloodstained earth. On the next day, police went
to village Bani ih connection with the investigation and blood
stains were found on the stairs, platform and wall of a well
situated in the old Abadi of the village. The police collected
F the bloodstained bricks from there and noticed a bundle
inside the well and eventually recovered the dead body of
Het Ram which was found inside the said bundle. The
investigating agency sent the dead body for post-mortem to
the General Hospital, Sirsa and arrested the accused on
G 22.1.2003. During the investigation the appellant suffered
disclosure statement, Exh. P. EE, to the effect that he had
taken Het Ram to the tea stall and thereafter to his 'Nohra'
on a false pretext, where he had caused a blow with a knife
on the neck of Het Ram about 10.00 P.M. on 18.01.2003.
H Het Ram tried to escape but he chased him and when the
RAJA@ RAJINDER v. STATE OF HARYANA 953
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
deceased fell down in front of the house of Mahender Singh, A
he inflicted several blows with the knife on the chest and the
waist region of the deceased. Being unable to drag the dead
body back to his courtyard, he took the help of his father for
the disposal of the body. The blanket worn by the deceased
was burnt in the courtyard of the appellant. Thereafter, the B
bloodstained clothes of the appellant and the knife were
recovered by the police from the pit of latrine on the basis of
the statement of the accused-appellant. The parcels of
bloodstained earth, bloodstained clothes of the accused and
the deceased, the seized knife and other materials were C
sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban, for
examination and the report, Exhibit P.RR, was received by
the prosecution. During the investigation, statement of
Sukha, PW-7, was recorded on 21.1.2003 wherein he had D
stated that the deceased was murdered by the appellant as
the appellant was suspicious that the deceased had illicit
relationship with his wife. Similar statement was also made
by Nanak, PW-9. The investigating officer recorded
statement of number of witnesses and after completing the E
investigation, placed the chargesheet against the accused-
appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302
and 201 read with Section 34 IPC. The co-accused, Krishan
Kumar, was chargesheeted for the offence under Sections
201 read with Section 34 IPC. After the chargesheet was F
laid, the competent court committed the matter to the court
of Session for trial. The accused pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
3. The prosecution in order to substantiate the charges G
levelled against the accused persons examined as many as
13 witnesses. The principal witnesses are Dr. N.K. Mittal,
PW-1, who had conducted the post-mortem on the dead
body of the deceased, Sukha, PW-7, Subhash, PW-8, the
brother of the deceased and the informant, Nanak, PW-9, H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 3 S.C.R.
A Mahender, PW-10, who had seen the deceased and the
appellant having tea together in the tea stall and Kalawati,
PW-11, mother of the deceased who had witnessed the
deceased leaving the house in the company of the accused-
appellant.
B
4. The accused persons in their statements u/s 313 of
the Code of Crfminal Procedure (CrPC) denied the
allegations and pleaded false implication. They claimed that
accused-Raja was neither married to anyone nor addicted
C to opium and, therefore, the alleged motive to commit the
murder of Het Ram was totally baseless. They further denied
having made any disclosure statements to the police and
stated that the police had planted articles to create evidence
against the accused. The accused persons chose not to
D adduce any'evidence in their defence.
5. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the material
brought on record, came to hold that the whole case rested
on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution had been
E able to establish the chain in completeness against the
accused persons and accordingly convicted the appellant
and his father and sentenced them, as has been stated
hereinbefore. Being dissatisfied, the appellant and his father
had preferred the criminal appeal wherein the High Court
F had affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant
but as far as his father, Krishan Kumar, is concerned, while
maintaining the conviction, modified the sentence of Krishan
Kumar imposed by the trial Judge and restricted it to the
period already undergone without interfering with the
G quantum of fine. The present appeal has been preferred by
Raja assailing his conviction and sentence.
6. We have heard Mr. M.M. Kashyap, learned counsel
for the appellant and Mr. Vikas Sharma, learned counsel for
H
RAJA@ RAJINDER v. STATE OF HARYANA 955
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the State. A
7. As the factual matrix would show, the case of the
prosecution entirely hinges on circumstantial evidence.
When a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the Court
has to be satisfied that the circumstances from which an B
inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently
and firmly established; those circumstances should be of a
definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the
accused; the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form
a chain so complete that there is no escape from the C
conclusion that within all human probability the crime was
committed by the accused and none else; and the
circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must
be complete and incapable of explanation of any other
hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such D
evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the
accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. [See
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. 1]
8. In Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab', it has been E
laid down that:
"..... the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and those
circumstances must be conclusive in nature to connect F
the accused with the crime. All the links in the chain of
events must be established beyond a reasonable doubt
and the established circumstances should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and
totally inconsistent with his innocence. In a case based G
on circumstantial evidence, the court has to be on its
1 1989 Supp (2) sec 706
2 1995 Supp (4 sec 259 H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 3 S.C.R.
A guard to avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take
the place of legal proof and has to be watchful to avoid
the danger of being swayed by emotional considerations,
howsoever strong they may be, to take the place of
proof."
B
9. From the aforesaid it is clear as day that the Court is
required to evaluate the circumstantial evidence to see that
the chain of events have been established clearly and
completely to rule out any reasonable likelihood of the
C innocence of the accused. Needless to say whether the
chain is complete or not would depend on the facts of each
case emanating from the evidence and no universal yardstick
should ever be attempted [See Ujjagar Singh v. State of
Punjab3].
D
10. In the instant case, the circumstances that have been
established by the prosecution are that the deceased had
accompanied the accused-appellant, being called by him,
from his house in the early part of the evening on the date of
E occurrence. The mother of the deceased, Kalawati, PW-11,
has deposed in that regard. Thereafter, from the material
brought on record, it is clearly revealed that the appellant
was seen at the tea stall with the deceased. The said fact
has been deposed by Mahender, PW-10. Thus, from the
F aforesaid evidence, two facts are established, namely, the
accused and the deceased had left the house of the
deceased and were seen taking tea together at the tea stall.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that
the last seen theory as advanced by the prosecution is not
G acceptable inasmuch as the owner of the tea stall has not
been examined. When the testimony of the aforesaid two
witnesses deserve acceptance and receive corroboration
H 3 (2007) 13 sec go
RAJA@RAJINDER v. STATE OF HARYANA 957
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
from the other evidence on the record, no adverse inference A
should be drawn because of non-examination of the tea stall
owner, who, as has been submitted by the learned counsel
for the appellant, is a material witness. It is well settled in
law that non-examination of a material witness is not a
mathematical formula for discarding the weight of the B
testimony available on record, if the same is natural,
trustworthy and convincing [See State of H.P. v. Gian
Chand']. That apart, he was not such a witness who alone
was the competent witness to depose about a fact and his
non-examination would really destroy the version of the C
prosecution.
11. Another reason for acceptance of the last seen theory
is that the brother of the deceased, Subhash, PW-8, has
testified that he had enquired from the accused as regards D
the whereabouts of the deceased, for the deceased had
accompanied the accused and at that juncture the accused
had replied that at the tea stall a Sikh boy came and the
deceased went with him. As per the prosecution case, the
deceased and the accused are co-villagers. In his statement E
recorded under Section 313 CrPC, the accused-appellant
totally denied to have accompanied the deceased. Learned
trial Judge and the High Court have placed reliance on the
evidence of the mother, Kalawati, PW-11, the brother, F
Subhash, PW-8 and Mahender, PW-10. The cumulative
reading and apposite appreciation of the said evidence
proves beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was last
seen with the accused.
12. Another circumstance that has been proven is about G
the recovery of knife, blood-stained clothes and the ashes
of the burnt blanket. The seizure witnesses Sukha, PW-7
4 (2001) s sec 11
H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 3 S.C.R.
A and Nanak, PW-9 have proven the seizure. It is submitted
by the learned counsel for the appellant that police had
recorded the confessional statement of the accused-
appellant at the police custody and thereafter, as alleged,
had recovered certain things which really do not render any
B assistance to the prosecution, for the confession recorded
before the police officer is inadmissible. That apart, the
accused had advanced the plea that the articles and the
weapon were planted by the investigating agency. To
appreciate the said submission in proper perspective, we
C may profitably reproduce a passage from State of U.P. v.
Deoman Upadhyaya•:
"The expression, 'accused of any offence' in Section
27, as in Section 25, is also descriptive of the person
D concerned i.e. against a person who is accused of an
offence, Section 27 renders provable certain statements
made by him while he was in the custody of a police
officer. Section 27 is founded on the principle that even
though the evidence relating to confessional or other
E statements made by a person, whilst he is in the custody
of a police officer, is tainted and therefore inadmissible,
if the truth of the information given by him is assured by
the discovery of a fact, it may be presumed to be
untainted and is therefore declared provable insofar as
F
it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Even
though Section 27 is in the form of a proviso to Section
26, the two sections do not necessarily deal with the
evidence of the same character. The ban imposed by
G Section 26 is against the proof of confessional
statements. Section 27 is concerned with the proof of
information whether it amounts to a confession or not,
which leads to discovery offacts. By Section 27, even if
H 5AIR 1960 SC 1125
RAJA@ RAJINDER v. STATE OF HARYANA 959
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of A
information received, only that much of the information
is admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered."
13. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu 6 , while dealing
with the fundamental facet of Section 27 of the Evidence B
Act, the Court observed that the basic idea embedded in
the said provision is the doctrine of confession by subsequent
events, which is founded on the principle that if any fact is
discovered in a search made on the strength of any
information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a C
guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is
true. It further stated that the information might be
confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but if it results in
discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information and,
therefore, the legislature permitted such information to be D
used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion to the
minimum.
14. Thus, if an accused person gives a statement that
relates to the discovery of a fact in consequence of E
information received from him is admissible. The rest part
of the statement has to be treated as inadmissible. In view
of the same, the recovery made at the instance of the
accused-appellant has been rightly accepted by the trial
Court as well as by the High Court, and we perceive no flaw F
in it.
15. Another circumstance which has been taken note of
by the High Court is that the blood-stained clothes and the
weapon, the knife, were sent to the Forensic Science G
Laboratory. The report obtained from the Laboratory clearly
shows that blood stains were found on the clothes and the
6 (2000) 6 sec 259 H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 3 S.C.R.
A knife. True it is, there has been no matching of the blood
group. However, that would not make a difference in the
facts of the present case. The accused has not offered any
explanation how the human blood was found on the clothes
and the knife. In this regard, a passage from John Pandian
B v. State7 is worth reproducing:
"The discovery appears to be credible. It has been
accepted by both the courts below and we find no reason
to discard it. This is apart .from the fact that this weapon
C was sent to the forensic science laboratory (FSL) and it
has been found stained with human blood. Though the
blood group could not be ascertained, as the results
were inconclusive, the accused had to give some
explanation as to how the human blood came on this
D weapon. He gave none. This discovery would very
positively further the prosecution case."
In view of the aforesaid, there is no substantial reason
not to accept the recovery of the weapon used in the crime.
E It is also apt to note here that Dr. N.K. Mittal, PW-1, has
clearly opined that the injuries on the person of the deceased
could be caused by the knife and the said opinion has gone
unrebutted.
F 16. Another circumstance which needs to be noted is
that Sukha, PW-7, a taxi driver, has deposed that on
18.1.2003 about 11.00 p.m. while he was going to Fatehabad
for taking passengers, he saw a bullock cart parked in front
of the house of the accused and certain persons were tying
G a bundle in a "palli". On query being made by him, the
accused persons told him that they are carrying manure to
the fields. Though, this witness has given an exaggerated
H 7 (2010J 14 ~~cc 129
RAJA@ RAJINDER v. STATE OF HARYANA 961
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
version and stated differently about the time of arrest, yet A
his testimony to the effect that he had seen the accused
with a bundle in "palli" at a particular place cannot be
disbelieved. The maxim "fa/sus in uno, falsus in omnibus",
is not applicable in India. In Krishna Machi v. State of
Bihar8, it has been held thus: B
"The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no
application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded
as liars. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
(false in one thing, false in everything) has not received C
general acceptance .. . nor has this maxim come to
occupy the status of the rule of law. It is merely a rule of
caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases
testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be
disregarded." D
17. In Yogendera v. State ofRajasthan9 , it has been
ruled that the Court must assess the extent to which the
deposition of a witness can be relied upon. The court must
make every attempt to separate falsehoods from the truth, E
and it must only be in exceptional circumstances, when it is
entirely impossible to separate the grain from the chaff, for
the same are so inextricably intertwined, that the entire
evidence of such a witness must be discarded. Thus viewed,
. the version of PW-7 to the extent that has been stated F
hereinabove is totally acceptable and credible.
18. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive
assumes great significance as its existence is an enlightening
factor in a process of presumptive reasoning (See Kundula G
s (2002) a sec s1
9 (2013) 12 sec 399
H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 3 S.C.R.
A Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh 1U]. In the case at hand, it had come in the evidence
that the accused-appellant was suspicious of the illicit
relationship between the deceased and his wife. The
accused has taken the plea that he was never married. It is
B noteworthy that the materials brought on record go a long
way to show that after the death of his brother he had entered
into the wedlock with his sister-in-law as per the tradition of
the community, that is, 'Kareva' marriage. The said facet of
evidence has really not been assailed or shaken. Thus, it
C has been established that there was suspicion by the
accused that the deceased was having relationship with his
brother's wife and that had aroused his anger. The said
motive further strengthens the case of the prosecution.
D 19. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the
considered opinion that the appeal preferred by the appellant
is totally devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.
1o (1993) 2 sec 684
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