Holding

The appropriate Government may authorise any person, including a non‑government servant, to file a complaint under Section 34; the phrase "or under the authority of" has independent meaning and is not limited to government functionaries.

Summary

The Lt. Governor of Delhi authorized Raj Kumar Gupta, Patron of a workers' union, to file a complaint under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 against the employer for alleged unfair labour practices punishable under Section 25‑U. The employer challenged the order, and the Delhi High Court set it aside, holding that only the Government or its functionaries could file such a complaint. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the phrase "or under the authority of" in Section 34 permits the appropriate Government to empower a private person to file the complaint. The Court held that there is no limitation in Section 34 on who may be authorised; the Government may authorise any person, even a non‑government servant, to file the complaint, and the words are not merely clarificatory of Section 39. Consequently, the High Court's order was set aside, the writ petition dismissed, and the appeal allowed. The decision clarifies the scope of governmental authorisation under the Industrial Disputes Act for initiating prosecutions of offences.

Issues considered

Whether Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 allows the appropriate Government to authorise a private person to file a complaint for offences under the Act.
Whether the words "or under the authority of" in Section 34 are merely clarificatory of Section 39 or give an independent meaning.
Whether delegation of powers under Section 39 is distinct from authorisation to file a complaint under Section 34.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25-U, s. 26, s. 27, s. 28, s. 29, s. 30, s. 31, s. 33, s. 34, s. 39
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 129-A

Subjects

Industrial Disputes ActSection 34unfair labour practicegovernment authorisationdelegation of powerslabour lawprivate person complaint

Judgment

A RAJ KUMAR GUPTA
v.
LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 5, 1996

B [J.S. VERMA, K. RAMASWAMY AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]

Labour Law:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:

c S. 34-0rder of appropriate Government authorising Patron of
Karamchari Sangh to file a complaint for offence punishable u/s. 25U-
Held, valid-The appropriate Government may authorise some one other
than itself, even a non-Government servant to file the complaint.

Words and Phrases :
D
Words "or under the authority of" occurring ins. 34(1) ofIndustrial
Disputes Act, 1947-Meaning of
-
Respondent no.I, the Lt. Governor of Delhi, passed an order '
E under s. 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 authorizing the
appellant, the Patron of the Karamchari Sangh, to file a complaint
against the employer-Companies, their Directors and the Regional
Manager, the contesting respondents, for committing unfair labour
practice punishable under s. 25-U of the Act. The Directors and the
Regional Manager challenged the order before the High Court, which
F allowed their writ petition in terms of the earlier judgment* wherein
it was held that a complaint under s.34 of the Act could be filed
either by the Government or its functionaries. Aggrieved, the appellant
tiled the present appeals before this Court.

G It was contended for the appellant that there was no justification
for the High Court to read s.34 of the Act in a restricted manner. For
the respondent, it was contended that only a delegate of the
appropriate Government appointed under the provisions of s.39 of
the Act could be authorised to file a compilation under s. 34.

H Allowing the appeal, this Court
464
R.K. GUPTA v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI 465

HELD : 1.1. There is no limitation in s.34 of the Industrial A
Disputes Act, 1947 in regard to the party to whom the authorisation
may be given. It is the workman, the trade union and the employer
who are most concerned with offences under the said Act and neither
the terms ofs. 34 nor public policy require that they should be excluded
from making such complaints. At the same time, the provisions of s.
34 are in the nature of a limitation on the entitlement of a workman B
or a trade union or an employer to complain of offences under the
said Act. They should not, in the public interest, be permitted to
make frivolous, vexatious or otherwise patently untenable complaints,
and to this end s.34 requires that no complaint shall be taken
cognizance of unless it is made with the authorisation of the
appropriate Government. [470 H, 471 A,B) C

*Tobu Enterprises Ltd. and Ors. v. The Lt. Governor, Delhi, and
Ors, 53(1994) DLT 255, disapproved.

S.N. Hada v. The Binny Ltd., Staff Association, (1989) LAB. l.C. D
165, approved.

1.2. The words "or under the authority or' in s.34 necessarily
must be given due meaning and the meaning is that the appropriate
Government may authorise someone other than itself, even a non-
Government servant, to file a complaint under s. 34. It cannot be E
said that these words are only clarificatory and are implication of the
provisions of s.39. Section 39 empowers the appropriate Government
to delegate the powers exercisable by it under the said Act. This is
altogether different from the concept of authorisation to file a
complaint under Section 34. [471 C-El
F
lshwar Singh Bagga and Ors v. State of Rajasthan, [1987] I SCC
IOI, distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8417 of G
1994.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.11.93 of the Delhi High Court
in C.W.P. No. 1889 of 1991.

H.K. Puri, Rajesh Srivastava and Ujjwal Banerjee for the Appellant. H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A S.K. Dholakia, Shiv Kumar and Pramod Dayal for the Responder.ts.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHARUCHA, J. On 16th April, 1991, the first respondent passed
the following order, acting under the provisions of Section 34 of the
B Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act"):

"Whereas it has been made to appear to the Lt. Governor of
the Union territory of Delhi that the management of
Mis. Garden Silk Mills Ltd. Bella Mill Compound, Outside
Seharagate, Surat (ii) Ms. Garden Silk Mills Ltd., 4959-
c Kucha Rehman, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-6 have indulged in
unfair labour practices as enumerated in the Fifth Schedule
ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereby contravened
section 26-T of the aforesaid Act which is an offence
punishable under section 25-D of the Act ibid.

D 2. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under
section 34 of the said Act read with the Government oflndia,
Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. 2/2/61-Judl.l
dated the 24th March, 1961 and after having· considered the
matter carefully, the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of
E Delhi, is pleased to authorise Shri Raj Kumar Gupta, Patron,
Garden Silk Mills, Karamchari Sangh (Regd), 5239-Ajmeri
Gate, Delhi to file a complaint in the court of competent
jurisdiction, against the above said establishment and the
following of its Officers, which is punishable under section
25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended up-
F to-date.

(i) Sh. Praful A. Shah Managing Director, Garden Silk
Mills Ltd,., Bella Mill
Compound, Outside Seharagate,
Surat.
G
(ii) Sh. S.J. Bhesania Whole time Director, Garden
Silk Mills Ltd., Bella Mill
Compound, Outside Seharagate,
Surat.
H (iii) Sh. J.P. Singh Regional Manager, Delhi.
R.K. GUPTA v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI [BHARUCHA, J.] 467

Garden Silk Mills Ltd., 4959- A
Kucha Rehman, Chandni Chowk,
Delhi-6."

The order was challenged by the employer (the third respondent) in
a writ petition filed in the High Court of Delhi. The writ petition was
allowed by the order under appeal, which reads thus: B

"In view of our judgment in C.W.P. No. 1715 of 1991
(Mis. Tobu Enterprises Limited and others v. The Lt.
Governor, Delhi, and others) the impugned order is bad in
law and is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Rule
is made absolute." c

This appeal by special leave is filed by the person to whom the
authorisation under Section 34 was given :

Section 34 reads thus: D
"34. Cognizance of offences-(1) No Court shall take
. cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or of
the abetment of any such offerce, save on complaint made
by or under the authority of the appropriate Government.
E
(2) No Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or
a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence
1 punishable under this Act."

In the case of M/s. Tobu Enterprises Limited, the only question F
which arose for consideration was whether a private person could be
authorised under Section 34 to file a complaint for an offence under Section
25-U of the said Act. Section 25-U prescribes the penalty for committing
an unfair labour practice. The Delhi High Court came to the conclusion
that under the provisions of Section 34, the appropriate Government could G
file the complaint itself or the complaint could be filed under its authority,
but there could not be two extremes, that is, either the appropriate
Government itself filed the complaint or it could authorise any private
party to do so. The complaint had to be filed either by the appropriate
Government or its functionaries. If the authority to file a complaint was
given to a private person it was likely to be abused. There would be no H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A check on the complainant to prosecute the complain\ with due diligence.
He would not be interested in a fair trial and might be actuated by personal
vendetta against the accused, frustrating a fair and speedy trial. The
appropriate Government had to have control over the whole of the
prosecution.

B The Delhi High Court found itself unable to agree with the view
taken to the contrary by a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in S.N
Hada v. The Binny Ltd. Staff Association, 1989 LAB. J.C. 165. The
indentical question had been raised before the Full Bench of the Karnataka
High Court and the Full Bench held that if the view was taken that only
the Government or its agent could file the complaint, then the provisions
C of Section 30, providing for the filing of the complaint by or on behalf of
a trade union or a business which was affected, would become redundant.
This could not have been the intention of the legislature. Viewed from any
angle, the Full Bench found it difficult to hold that under Section 34 a
private body or a person.other than an agent of the Government could not
D be authorised by the Government to file a complaint.

Section 30 reads thus:

"30. Penalty for disclosing confidential information.-Any
person who wilfully discloses any such information as is
E referred to in section 21 in contravention of the provisions
of that section shall, on complaint made by or ori behalf of
the trade union or individual business affected, be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
F rupees, or with both."

Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of the
Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court and submitted that there was no
justification for reading Section 34 in a restricted manner, as had been
G done by the Delhi High Court in the case of Mis. Tobu Enterprises Ltd.

Learned counsel for the employer submitted that the words "under
the authority of the appropriate Government" in Section 34 were only
clarificatory and an amplification of the provisions of Section 39.

H Section 39 reads thus:
R.K. GUPTA v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI [BHARUCHA, J.] 469

"39. Delegation of powers.- The appropriate Governments A
may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that any
power exercisable by it under this Act or rules made
thereunder shall, in relation to such matters and subject to
such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction,
be exercisable also-- .
B
(a) where the appropriate Government is the Central
Government, by such officer or authority subordinate to the
Central Government or by the State Government or by such
officer or authority subordinate to the State Government, as
may be specified in the notification; and
c
(b) where the appropriate Government is a State Government,
by such officer or authority subordinate to the State
Government as may be specified in the notification."

In learned counsel's submission, only a delegate of the appropriate D
Government appointed under the provisions of Section 39 could be
authorised by the appropriate Government to file a complaint under Section
34. There was, in any event, an implied limitation in Section 34, having
regard to the nature of a criminal prosecution and the general policy that
a prosecution could only be at the instance of the Government. Learned
Counsel cited the judgment of this Court in Ish war Singh Bagga and Ors. E
v. State of Rajasthan, [1987] l SCC 101, upon which the Delhi High
Court had relied in the case of Mis. Tobu Enterprises Ltd.

Ishwar Singh Bagga's case related to the provisions of Section 129-
A of the Motor Vehicles Act, l 939, which dealt with the power to detain
vehicles used without certificate of registration or permit. Section 129-A F
provided, "Any police officer authorized in this behalf or other person
authorized in this behalf by the State Government may ...seize and detain
the vehicle .. " It was held by this Court that the expression "other person"
in Section 129-A had to be read ejusdem generis with the expression "any
police officer" which preceded it. The expression could refer only to an G
officer of the Government and not to an officer or employee of a statutory
corporation or any other private person. Having regard to the nature of
the power conferred by Section 129-A, it could not have been the intention
of the Legislature to confer such power on persons who were not officers
of the Government. If it had been so intended, the provision would have
so stated. Ordinarily, whenever a statute empowered the Government to H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A appoint persons to administer any of the provisions of a statute, the persons
who could be so appointed by the Government could only be persons
appointed in connection with the affairs of the State. In other words, they
would be employees or officers of the Government who were directly
subject to its administrative and disciplinary control. The powers of search,
seizure and detention of vehicles belonging to private parties under Section
B 129-A and of launching prosecutions in that regard were incidental to the
sovereign powers of the State and they could not ordinarily be entrusted
to private persons unless the statute concerned made express provision in
that behalf. It was a different matter if a private person, on his own, filed
a complaint before a Magistrate and wished to establish a criminal charge.
Jn such a case the private person would not be investigating into the crime
C with the aid of the statutory powers of search, seizure or detention.

In our view, the judgment in Ishwar Singh Bagga 's case is clearly
distinguishable. The provisions of section 129-A of the Motor Vehicles
Act deal with the power to seize and detain vehicles. This is the police
power of the State. It was in the context of this power that it was held by
D this Court that the "other person" would be exercising the sovereign powers
of the State and therefore, should be an employee of the State. This view
was reinforced by reading the words "other person" ejusdem generis with
the words "any. police officer" used in the provision just earlier. This
Court noted that a private person could file the complaint but he would
not be entitled to the powers of search, seizure and detention conferred by
E Section 129-A. It was, therefore, the nature of the power conferred by
Section 129-A which led this Court to hold that "other person" in Section
129-A meant an employee of the Government. •·
Penalties under the said Act are prescribed for the offences of illegal
strikes and lock-outs (Sections 26,27 and 28), of breach of a settlement or
F award (Section 29), of disclosing confidential information (Section 30),
of closure without notice (Section 30A}, and of altering conditions of
service pending proceedings (Section 31 read with Section 33). These
offences most closely concern workmen, the representative trade unions
and employers.
G .,
The provisions of Section 34 require that no court shall take
cognizance of any offence punishable under the said Act or of the abetrnent
of such offence save on a complaint made by the appropriate Government
or under the authority of the appropriate Government. There is no limitation
therein in regard to the party to whom the authorisation may be given. It
H is the workman, the trade union and the employer who are most concerned
R.K.GUPTA v. LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI [BHARUCHA, J.] 471

with offences under the said Act and neither the terms of Section 34 nor A
public policy require that they should be excluded from making such
complaints.

At the same time, the provisions of Section 34 are in the nature of a
limitation on the entitlement of a workman or a trade union or an employer
to complain of offences under the said Act. They should not, in the public B
interest, be permitted to make frivolous, vexatious or otherwise patently
untenable complaints, and to this end Section 34 requires that no complaint
shall be taken cognizance of unless it is made with the authorisation of the
appropriate Government.

The argument that the words "or under the authority of' in Section C
34 (I) are only clarificatory and an amplification of the provisions of
Section 39 must be rejected. Section 39 empowers the appropriate
Government to delegate the powers exercisable by it under the said Act.
This is altogether different from the concept or authorisation •o file a
complaint under Section 34. If the powers under Section 34 have been
delegated under Section 39, the delegate can file the complaint himself or D
authorise someone else to file it. Learned counsel's argument, if accepted,
would render the words "or under the authority of' in Section 34 otiose
and that is impermissible. These words necessarily must be given due
meaning and the meaning is that the appropriate Government may authorise
someone other than itself, even a non-Government servant, to file a E
complaint under Section 34.

Learned counsel submitted that, in any event, the writ petition should
be remitted to the Delhi High Court because contentions had been taken
therein which had not been dealt with in the order under "ppeal. We see no
good reason to do so, but we make it clear that it shall be open to those F
against whom the complaint is filed to take all available defence before
the criminal court.

In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set
aside. The writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court is dismissed. G
There shall be no order as to costs.

R.P. Appeal allowed.