RAHUL YADAV &ANR.versusM/S. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.AND OTHERS

                        [2015] 7 S.C.R. 978


A                      RAHUL YADAV &ANR.
                                  v.
       M/S. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.AND OTHERS
                   (Civil Appeal No.4909 of 2015)
B
                            JULY 1, 2015
          [DIPAK MISRA AND UDAY UM ESH LAUT, JJ.]
         Public distribution system - Dealership of petrol pump
c -    Grant of, in favour of appellant - In terms of the
    advertisement for the dealership, appellant bought land and
    executed long-term lease with the Corporation for 30 years
    at a monthly rent-As per letter of intent, Corporation was to
    provide certain facilities and develop the outlet for operating
D   the dealership - Subsequently, cancellation of dealership
    agreement in favour of appellant-Appel/ant refusing to hand
    over the possession - Eviction proceedings under 1971 Act
    by Corporation against appellant - Eviction order by Estate
    Officer-Appellate Judge as also Single Judge and Division
E   Bench of High Court upholding the eviction - On appeal,
    held: Dealership agreement and lease agreement are
    independent of each other- Appellant, was a dealer under
    the lessee-Corporation - In case there is a termination,
    dealership is bound to be can-celled and, if the lease deed is
F   treated to have been terminated along with the dealership, it
    would lead to a situation which does not flow from the
    interpretation of the instruments- Dealership agreement was .
    terminated because of the decision of this Court -
G   Consequence of cancellation of the dealership is a sequitur
    of the judgment - As a result appellant has to vacate the
    premises and Corporation has the liberty to operate
    independently or through another dealer-Appellant cannot
    cause obstruction or create impediments-Appellant cannot
H                               ~8
  RAHUL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD. AND 979
                      ORS.

retain possession on the basis of ownership of the land as A
the lease is in continuance - He is a trespasser- Thus, the
provisions of 1971 Act would apply-Appellant directed to
hand over the peaceful possession of the land and other
fixtures standing thereon to the Corporation - Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971- B
s. 9.
        Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1 The lease deed lays down that the lessee        c
                                 .
 has the freedom to sublet and appoint another dealer.
 The lease would remain in force till the dealership of the
 appellant continued and the licence remained in vogue.
 Clause 56 of the dealership agreement stipulates that
.notwithstanding anything to th~ contrary containing           o
 before the said clause, the Corporation would be at
 liberty to terminate the agreement forthwith upon any
time after happening of certain events. On a plain reading
of the said agreement, it is clear that it has no connection
whatsoever with the lease agreement. Both the                  E
agreements are independent of each other. The appellant
was a dealer under the lessee, that is, the Corporation.
The dealership is liable to be cancelled on many a
ground. In case there is a termination, dealership is
bound to be cancelled and at that juncture, if the lease       F
deed is treated to have been terminated along with the
dealership, it would lead to a situation which does not
flow from the interpretation of the instruments. The
dealership agreement was terminated because of ..the
decision in *Mukund Swarup Mishra's case. The                  G
consequence of cancellation of the dealership is a
sequitur of the judgment. The inevitable consequence
of that is the appellant has to vacate the premises and
the Corporation has the liberty to operate either              H
980        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A independently or through another dealer. The appellant
  cannot be allowed to cause obstruction or create an
  impediment. The dealership was availed of in an
  inapposite manner. In such a situation, consequences
  are to be faced by the appellant. [Paras 16, 17, 18] [993-
B F; 994-H; 995-A, D-H; 996-A]
          1.2 The respondent is a public sector undertaking.
      The appellant whose dealership has been cancelled,
      cannot claim possession to retain possession on the
c     basis of ownership of the land as the lease is in
      continuance. Therefore, he is a trespasser. Thus, the
      provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of
      Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 apply on all fours.
      [Para 19] [996-B-C]
D       1.3 It was submitted that as the termination was
  directed by the Corporation by virtue of the judgment of
  this Court and not because of any wrong committed by
  the appellant and thus, his case should be reconsidered
E for grant of dealership under the new policy. This Court
  does not intend to allude to the prevalent policy and issue
  any direction. Once there is a policy and any candidate
  fits in, needless to say, when there is an advertisement;
  he is at liberty to apply. If the policy permits, the appellant
F is at liberty to apply. However, the grant of liberty does
  not mean that the appellant would create an impediment
  for the Corporation to enter into and take possession
  and run the petrol pump on its own or appoint a dealer.
  The appellant is directed to hand over the peaceful
G possession of the land and the structure and other
  fixtures standing thereon to the Corporation after
  demolishing the wall else he would be liable for contempt
  of this Court. [Para 20, 21] [996-D-H; 997-A]
H        Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 673:
      2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 605; Common Cause, a Registered
  RAHUL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD.AND 981
                      ORS.

Society v. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 530: 1996 (6) Suppl. A
SCR 719: Mukun:J Swarup Mishra v. Union of India (2007) 2
SCC 536: 2007 (1) SCR 825 - referred to.
                  Case Law Reference

    2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 605       referred to.    Para 3     B

    1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 719       referred to.    Para 4

    2007 (1) SCR 825              referred to.    Para 4

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
                                                             c
4909 of 2015.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2014 in
Letters Patent Appeal No. 665 of 2014 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.                          D

   Kapil Sibal, Ranjeeta Rohtagi, Gurmehar Sistani, Jaya
Khanna for the Appellants.

    MeenakshiArora, Rahul Narayan, Mala Narayan, Mohit E
Singh for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    DIPAK MISRA, J,. 1. Leave granted.
                                                             F
     2. The appellant is the owner in possession of the
premises being land measuring 2571 sq. yards on Rewari-
Palwal-Delhi Road, Rewari and Khewat No. 1139/941,
Khatauni no. 1380, Rectangle No. 117, Kila No. 2412/2 (2-0),
Khewat No. 1125/930 mm, Khautani No. 136 mm, Rectangle G
No. 117, Kila No. 24/211 (1-9), Rectangle N. 150, 6/80 share
Le. 6 maria out of Kila No. 411 (4-0) total measuring Kanai 5
maria in 3 kittas thereabouts. The respondent no.1, namely,
Indian Oil Corporation (for short, the 'Corporation') issued an
advertisement in the newspaper on 6.10.2000 for retail outlet H
982            SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A dealership in the state of Delhi and Haryana for which the
  appellant applied and was selected. Letter of intent was issued
  in his favour on 6.7.2001. It was stipulated in the said letter of
  intent that the appellant was required to own a suitable plot of
  land and entered into a long-term lease with the Corporation
B at the rate acceptable to the respondent. To meet the mandate
  of the letter of intent, the appellant bought the land in question
  for the purpose of getting dealership agreement. On
  23.10.2001, the appellant executed a long-term lease of 30
  years in accordance with the terms of the advertisement and
C the letter of intent in favour of the Corporation at the monthly
  rent of Rs.10, 0001-. After completion of formalities, a dealership
  agreement was entered into between the appellant and the
  Corporation on 14.5.2002. Be it noted, as per the letter of
  intent, the Corporation was to provide certain facilities and
0
  develop the land as an outlet with an office building, storage
  tank and pump, etc. for operating the dealership and it was to
  charge the appellant a licence fee for the said facilities.

        3. The allotment of such petrol pumps by the competent
E authorities became a front page news item in Indian Express
  mentioning that there had been grant of retail outlets of petrol
  pumps to the near and dear ones of the political functionaries
  on account of political consideration. Number of cases were
F filed in various courts and all of them were transferred to this
  Court and a two-Judge Bench in Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of
  lndia1 , after referring to such earlier event that was the subject
  matter of Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union
  oflndia2, wherein it had been observed that for these kind of
G allotments, a transparent and objective criteria/procedure has
  to be evolved based on reason, fair play and non-arbitrariness,
  adverted to many a facet, namely, the criteria evolved for grant
      1
          c2003) 2 sec 673

H     2
          (1996) 6 sec 530
  RAHUL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD. AND 983
             ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

of dealership, the concept of probity in governance and the A
concept of public interest, the role of the executive and the
right of the public to know the circumstance under which their
elected representatives get the outlets and/or dealerships/
distributorships, and directed as follows:-
                                                               B
     "ln view of the aforesaid:

    /. We appoint a committee comprising Mr Justice S.C.
    Agrawal, a retired Judge of this Court and Mr Justice P.K.
    Bahri, a retired Judge of the Delhi High Court, to examine   c
    the aforesaid 413 cases. We request the Committee to
    submit the report to this Court within a period of three
    months.                             ~

    II. The Committee would devise its own procedure for D
    undertaking the examination of these cases. If considered
    necessary, the Committee may appoint any person to
    assist it.

    Ill. We direct the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas,
    Government of India and the four oil companies to render E
    full, complete and meaningful assistance and cooperation
    to the Committee. The relevant records are directed to
    be produced before the Committee within five days.
    IV. We direct the Ministry to appoint a nodal officer not    F
    below the rank of a Joint Secretary for effective working
    of the Committee.
    V. The Central Government, State GovernmenUUriion
    Territories and all others are directed to render such G
    assistance to the Committee as may be directed by it.

    VI. The oil companies are directed to provide as per the
    Committee's directions, the requisite infrastructure, staff,
    transport and make necessary arrangements, whenever H
984            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2015] 7 S.C.R.


A            so directed, for travel, stay, payments and other facilities
             etc.

             VI/. In respect of any case if the Committee, on preliminary
             examination of the facts and records, forms an opinion
s            that the allotment was made on merits and not as a result
             of political connections or patronage or other extraneous
             considerations, it would be open to the Committee not to
             proceed with the probe in detail."

c     4. It is necessary to state here that certain transferred
  cases were finally disposed of and certain transferred cases
  were directed to be listed after receipt of the report. After
  reports were received, certain interim applications were filed
  by the persons who were aggrieved by the report of the
D committee appointed by this Court. In Mukund Swarup
  Mishra v. Union of lndia 3 , the Court refe,rred to Onkar Lal
  Bajaj (supra) and while dealing with the plea of promissory
  estoppel opined thus:-

E             "We are also not impressed by the argument of the
              petitioners that the doctrine of promissory or equitable
             estoppel would apply. May be that the petitioners have
             spent some amount. But once the allotment itself was
             found to be vitiated, obviously they cannot claim any benefit
F            as allotment was contrary to law. Moreover, such allotment
             has been made in remote past and even though an order
             of cancellation had been passed by the Central
             Government as early as in August 2002, the allottees have
             been protected by interim order passed by this Court. Even
G            after the decision in Onkar Lal Bajaj1, interim order was
             continued. In the circumstances, for more than four years
             interim order is in favour of allottees even though the
             allotment was found to be illegal or contrary to law. In our

H     3
          c2001) 2 sec 536
  RAHUL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD.AND 985
             ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    opinion, therefore, it is not open to the allottees whose A
    allotments have been found to be vitiated to plead equity."

     After so stating, the Court proceeded to delve into the
justifiability of the report and in that regard observed that:-
                                                                 B
    "In our opinion, the learned amicus curiae is right that the
    Committee had considered in detail individual cases and
    submitted the report. This Court, therefore; would consider
    a complaint of an allottee who can successfully put forward
    his complaint and may satisfy this Court that in the facts c
    and circumstances of the case, the finding of the
    Committee that the allotment was not on merits was not
    correct. But only in those individual cases, the Court would
    consider and may grant relief to such applicants. It,
    however, cannot be said that the report of the Committee D
    was without power, authority or jurisdiction or was uncalled
    for and liable to be ignored."

     5. It is apt to note here that the Court proceeded to
scrutinize the report State-wise where grants were made and E
as far as the States of Punjab and Haryana are concerned, it
has been held thus:-

    "State of Punjab

    36. In respect of the State of Punjab, .the Committee F
    considered thirty-seven cases referred to it. It found that
    seven allotments were on merit and twenty-nine allotments
    were not in consonance with the guidelines. Out of them,
    twenty-six have filed applications. We have been taken
    through the reasoning recorded by the Committee. So far G
    as cases of Shri Surinder Singh, Chander Kant Bhatia,
    Gurpreet Singh, Smt Kavita Rani, Smt Suman Lata, Ms
    Ruby Sekhri, Mr Manmohan Singh, Mr Rajesh Madan and
    Mr Tejinder Singh are concerned, they appear to be H
986          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015) 7 S.C.R.


A          borderline cases. In our view, it may not be appropriate to
           cancel the allotment in favour of these nine persons. Their
           applications are allowed. Rest of the cases do not call for
           interference and the applications are rejected. There are
           six applications by non-allottees. They are also rejected
B          as we are not concerned with non-allottees.

           State of Haryana

          37. In regard to the State of Haryana, the Committee
c         considered twenty-one cases referred to it. It found no
          irregularity in allotment in seven cases. It disapproved
          allotments in fourteen cases. Out of them, twelve have filed
          applications. We find no infirmity in the conclusions arrived
          at or reasons recorded by the Committee and no
D         interference is called for. The other applications are
                .
          rejected."

           6. There is no cavil over the fact that the grant of dealership
      in favour of the appellant was cancelled by the Committee and
E     that received the stamp of approval of this Court. After the
      decision of this Court, the Corporation terminated the
      dealership and intended to take back the possession from
      the dealer with a view to appoint another dealer as specifically
      permitted in the lease deed as well as in the dealership
F     agreement. The appellant built a wall to stop the functioning of
      the retail outlet and refused to hand over the possession which
      constrained the Corporation to initiate a proceeding for
      eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
      Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short, "the 1971 Act") asa valid lease
G     deed existed between the appellant and the respondent, a
      public sector undertaking. The appellant participated in the
      proceeding and after hearing commenced, he sought to go
      for arbitration, but the said prayer was not accepted by the
      Estate Officer on the ground that the same was not permissible
H     under the provisions of the 1971 Act. After six years of
  RAH UL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD. AND 987
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

participation in the said proceeding, he initiated a civil suit A
alleging illegality in termination of the lease and prayed that
the proceedings under the 1971 Act to be kept in abeyance
which was not accepted. The competent authority, that is, the
Estate Officer passed an order of eviction in·exercise of
powers conferred on him under sub-section 1 of Section 5 of B
the 1971 Act, after rejecting all the contentions raised by the
appellant.

      7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant
 preferred Civil Appeal No. 92 of 2013 before the learned C
 District Judge, Rewari under Section 9 of the 1971 Act. It
was contended before the learned District Judge by the
appellant that the order passed by the Estate Officer was
passed on surmises and conjectures; that the Estate Officer
had failed to appreciate that the lease deed and the dealership D
agreement were interlinked and hence, the lease deed could
not survive after the cancellation of dealership agreement; that
the 1971 Act was not applicable to him as he was not in
unauthorized occupation, but is the owner of the premises; that
the competent authority had directed order of eviction to E
circumvent the eventual result of the pending suit; and that there
had been violation of the principles of natural justice.

     8. The learned appellate Judge, on the basis of the
material brought on record, came to hold that the respondent F
is a government company and the premises "'!-ere taken on
lease by it and hence, the premises fell within the meaning
and ambit of "public premises", as defined under .Section 2(e)
of the 1971 Act; that the submission that the lease was
contingent upon the appointment of the appellant as a dealer G
and upon his ceasing to be such the lease agreement became
extinct was sans substance, for the docum~_nt granting
dealership and the lease agreement were different documents
and they were neither interlinked nor interdependent; that the H
988       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 7 S.C.R.


A fact that the dealership agreement and the lease agreement
  had been executed separately would leave no room for doubt
  that they were independent and it could not be inferred from
  any one of the covenants agreed to between the parties that
  one agreement was to come to an end on the termination of
B the other; that it could not be construed that once the dealership
  stood terminated pursuant to the order passed by this Court,
  the lease agreement also stood terminated; that the
  submission to the effect that the proceeding under the 1971
  Act had been initiated to circumvent the suit instituted by the
C appellant was too spacious to be accepted. Being of this
  view, the learned appellate Judge recorded the conclusion
  thus:-

        "As an upshot of the discussion foregoing, it can be safely
D       concluded that the appellant was running a retail outlet
        only on a leave and licence basis and the moment his
        dealership licence was terminated, he was bound to
        vacate the premises which, for all intents and purposes,
        are public premises. Needless to say that by virtue of
E       lease agreement the respondent is at liberty to run the
        outlet/petrol pump even through third and outside party
        without any restriction and objection from the appellant.
        So long as the lease agreement is intact and the civil court
        does not order eviction, the respondent has right not only
F
        to remain in possession but to oust any licencee/
        trespa~ser. The appellant may be the owner of the
        premises, but by virtue of the lease deed, it is the
        respondent who has the right to occupy premises."
G     9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the
  appellate court, the appellant preferred CWP No. 26287 of
  2013 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the learned
  Single Judge, after referring to the authority in Mukund
H Swarup Mishra (supra), came to hold that the Committee had
  RAH UL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD. AND              989
              ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

considered 21 cases and it had disapproved allotments in 14 A
cases and the dealership of the writ petitioner was one of them
and, therefore, proceeding under the 1971 Act was a sequitur
of the conclusions arrived at by the judgment of this Court, and
hence, the orders passed by the forums below did not warrant
any interference. Being of this view, the writ petition was B
dismissed by the learned Single Judge.            " ..

 · - 10. The non-success in the writ petition compelled the
appellant to prefer LPA No. 665 of 2014 and the Division Bench
concurred with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge C
and declined to interfere in intra-court appeal.

     11. We have heard Mr. Kap ii Sibal, learned senior counsel
for the appellant and Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior
counsel for the Corporation, the first respondent herein.       D

      12. The controversy, as we perceive, raises two issues
though an attempt had been made by the appellant to create
an imbroglio before the appellate court wherein the order of
the Estate Officer was in assail. The thrust of the matter is E
whether the interpretation of the clauses of the agreement would
anyway suggest any kind of inextricable connection to place a
construction on them to the effect that once the dealership is
cancelled, the land owner who had parted with the land by way
of a long-term lease for a period of thirty years, can be allowed F
to retain possession over the land; and only the superstructure
which had been affixed on the land by the Corporation, can
only be removed.

      13. Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel forthe appellant has G
taken us through the advertisement issued on 6.10.2000. It is
urged by him that the appellant was compelled to purchase
the land as it was the basic requirement to meet the eligibility
criteria to get the allotment of dealership. It is his proponement
that there has to be a conjoint reading of the advertisement H
990          SUPREME COURT REl::>ORTS                  [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A issued by the respondent, the letter of intent and the lease deed
  and that would clearly establish that the appellant was to make
  available a suitable plot of land and transfer the land on a long-
  term lease to the Corporation for .the sole and exclusive
  purpose of running a retail outlet dealership of respondent-
s Corporation and hence, the said lease deed cannot be looked
  at as a sing-ular or solitary document, more so, when the
  appellant had agreed to give such highly valuable land to the
  Corporation on a nominal monthly rent of Rs.10,000/-.
  Emphasis is laid on the intention of creating the documents.
C To appreciate the said submission, we have carefully perused
  the advertisement and other documents. Relevant part of the
  advertisement reads as follows:

          "For locations for Retail Outlet Dealership and LPG
D         Distributorship. The applicant should furnish, along with
          the application, details of land/land for godown which he/
          she may make available for the dealership/distributorship
          considering the location of the land from the point of view
          of commercial and applica1nts willing to transfer the land
E         on ownership/long lease to the Oil Company at the rates
          acceptable to the Oil Company would be given preference
          if an applicant, after selection, is unable to provide the
          land indicated by him/her earlier, within a period of 2
          months the allotment of the dealership/distributorship
F
          made to him/her would be cancelled."

          14. In this context, we have to scrutinize the letter of intent
      dated 6.7.2001. The relevant paragraphs of letter of intent
      read as follows:-
G
          1.1 For enabling you to ope1rate the dealership said above,
          we will develop the Retail Outlet at Rewari, and provide
          the same to you with certain facilities such as suitable plot
          of land duly developed as an outlet with an office building,
H         storage tank and pump etc. for operating your dealership.
  RAHUL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD.AND 991
             ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    xxx                       xxx                            xxx      A

    1.7 This letter is merely a letter of intent and is not to be
    constructed as a firm offer of dealership to you. The
    dealership to you will, on your complying with the condition
    spelt out herein above, be confirmed/formalised by an B
    Appointment Letter followed by the signing of our standard
    dealership Agreement.                          -~

    xxx                       xxx                            xxx

    2. You have stated in your application form/during the            C
    interview that you are willing to transfer the land on
    ownership/long lease to the Indian Oil corporation Ltd. at
    the rates acceptable to Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.
    Acco!ilingly, you will make available a suitable plot of land     D
    as indicated by you within a period of TWO months from
    the date of this letter, after getting suitable clearance from
    us in writing for the particular plot of land. You are required
    to transfer the land on ownership/long lease for a minimum
    period of 15 years with one renewal option for next 5 years       E
    under such term and conditions as may be agreed upon
    between you and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. In case you
    fail to make available the· suitable land within 2 months,
    this offer is liable to be withdrawn. However, there is no
    commitment from India Oil Corporation Ltd. for taking the         F
    said land from you."

    15. Keeping in view the aforesaid documents, it is
necessary to look atthe lease agreement dated 23.10.2001.
The relevant clauses of the lease deed are extracted below:- G

    ".. the Lessor/s do and each of them doth hereby demise
    unto the Lessee All that the said land and premises situated
    at Rewari, Tehsil & District Rewari in the Registration Sub
    District of Rewari District and more particularly described H
992     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A      in the. Schedule hereunder written TOGETHER WITH
      structure that may hereafter be erected thereon by the
       Lessee to hold the premises hereby demised hereafter
      for brevity's sake referried to as "the demised premises"
      unto the lessee for a term of 30 years commencing from
B     the date of lease signed, renewable and determinable as
      hereinafter provided yielding and paying therefore during
      the said term the monthly and the proportionately for any
      part of the month the rent of Rs.10,000/- per month
      (Rupees Ten Thousand only) to be paid on or before the
c     5th day of each and every calendar month, the first of such

      monthly rent to be paid from the date of commencement
      of lease deed proportionately and the subsequent rent to
      be paid on or before the 5t11 day of every succeeding month
      regularly (with increase in rent by 10% after every three
D
      year).
      xxxxx                       xxxxx                     xxxxx
      (d) The Lessee shall b1e free to use and the Lessor shall
      permit the use of demised premises by the Lessee for
E     itself and for all its associated concerns. The Lessee
      shall also be entitled to use the demised premises by their
      agents, sales representatives, distributors, local dealers,
      other licensees or representatives, customers and all other
      authorised persons.
F
      (e) The Lessee shall be entitled to assign, transfer, sublet,
      under let, or part with possession of the demised premises
      or any part thereof to any person abovenamed
      whomsoever it choose:s without the consent of the Lessor.
G
      (t) The Lessee shall be entitled to appoint remove, re-
      appoint change and substitute any dealers, agents,
      licensees and other authorised representatives on and in
      respect of the demised premises without the consent of
H     the Lessor.
  RAHUL YADAV &A~R. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD.AND 993
             ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    )()()(                        xxx                       xxx    A
    (i) The Lessee shall be entitled to excavate, dig or break
    open the surface of any part of the demised premises at
    any time, during or after the expiration of the term hereby
    granted and to remove any stone, sand, gravel, clay, earth
                                                                 8
    or other material therefrom for the purpose of erecting,
    laying, maintaining and/or removing storage tanks,
    containers, receptacles and other erections or installations
    for the purpose of the business of the Lessee or any other
    person.                                                      c
    (j) The Lessee for the purpose of the construction and
    erection mentioned in any of the preceding sub-clause
    shall be entitled to allow any, sub lessee, dealer, sub dealer,
    agent, person or other authorised representative or person D
    to enter upon the demised premises and to build and erect
    according to the Lessee's specifications requisite items
    herein mentioned without any let hindrance or obstruction
    from the Lessor/s or any other person claiming by, through
    or under him/her/them."                                         E
     16. We have referred to the clauses in extenso to highlight
that the lessee had entered into an agreement of lease with
the appellant with immense liberty and the lease deed does
lay down that the lessee has the freedom to sublet and appoint F
another dealer. The lease would remain in force till the
dealership of the appellant continued and the licence remained
in vogue. At this juncture, it is pertinent to reproduce certain
clauses of the dealership agreement which would clearly spell
out the purpose. They read as follows:-                          G

    "2. The Corporation do hereby grant to the Dealer leave
    and licence and permission for the duration of this
    Agreement to enter on the said premises and to use the
    premises and outfit for the sole and exclusive purpose of H
994       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A        storing, selling and handling the products purchased by
         the Dealer from the Corporation, Save as aforesaid, the
         Dealer shall have no right, title or interest in the said
         premises or outfit and shall not be entitled to claim the
       . right of lessee, sub-lessee, tenant or any other interest in
B        the premises or outfit, is being specifically agreed and
         declared in particular that the Dealer shall not be deemed
         to be in exclusive possession of the premises.

        3. This Agreement shall remain in force for five years from
c       141h day of May, 2002 and continue thereafter for
        successive periods of one year each until determined by
        either party by giving three months notice in writing to the
        other of its intention to terminate this Agreement, and upon
        the expiration of any such notice this Agreement and the
D       Licence granted as aforesaid shall stand cancelled and
        revoked but without prejudice to the rights of either party
        against the other in respect of any matter or thing
        antecedent to such termination provided that nothing
        contained in this clause shall prejudice the rights of the
E       corporation to terminate this Agreement earlier on the
        happening of the events mentioned in clause 56 of this
        Agreement.

        xxx                          xxx                        xxx
F
        7. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed
        to prohibit the Corporation from making direct and/or
        indirect sales to any person whomsoever or from
        appointing other dealers for the purpose of direct or
G       indirect sales at such places as the Corporation may think
        fit. The dealer shall not be entitled to any claim or
        allowance for such direct or indirect sales."

       17. It is appropriate to mention here that clause 56 of the
H said agreement stipulates that notwithstanding anything to the
   RAH UL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD. AND                     995
               ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

  contrary containing before the said clause, the Corporation A
 would be at liberty to terminate the agreement forthwith upon
  any time after happening of certain events. The conditions
  are manifold. We may, for the sake of completeness,
. reproduce two conditions:-                          ~
                                                                    B
      "(h) If the Dealer does not adhere to the instructions issued
      from time to time by the Corporation in connection with
      safe practices to be followed by him in the supply/storage
      of the Corporation's products or otherwise.
                                                                        c
      (i) If the Dealer shall deliberately contaminate of temper
      with the quality of.any of the Corporation's products."

        18. On a plain reading of the aforesaid agreement, it is
  clear as noon day that it has no connection whatsoever with
                                                                        0
  the lease agreement. Both the agreements are independent
  of each other. The appellant was a dealer under the lessee,
. that is, the Corporation. The dealership is liaQle to be cancelled
  on many a ground. In case there is a termination, dealership
  is bound to be cancelled and at that juncture, if the lease deed      E
  is treated to have been terminated along with the dealership,
  it will lead to a situation which does not flow from the
  interpretation of the instruments. The dealership agreement
  has been terminated because of the decision rendered by this
  Court in Mukund Swarup Mishra (supra). The consequence                F
  of cancellation of the dealership is a sequitur of the judgment.
  The inevitable consequence of that is the appellant has to
  vacate the premises and the Corporation has the liberty to
  operate either independently or through another dealer. The
  appellant cannot be allowed to cause obstruction or create an         G
  impediment. The submission that the appellant entered into
  the lease agreement at a monthly rent of Rs.10,000/- as it was
  given the dealership is a mercurial plea, only to be noted to be
  rejected. The dealership was availed of as has been held by
  this Court in an inapposite manner. In such a situation,              H
996       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A consequences are to be faced by the appellant.

       19. The second issue which has been feebly raised by
  the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the 1971 Act
  would not be applicable has really no force. Admittedly, the
B respondent is a public sector undertaking. The appellant
  whose dealership has been cancelled, cannot claim
  possession to retain possession on the basis of ownership of
  the land as the lease is in continuance. Therefore, he is a
  trespasser. Thus, the provisions of the 1971 Act apply on all
C fours and accordingly we repel the said submission.

       20. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of
  another submission which has been alternatively and
  assiduously canvassed by Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel
o for the appellant. It is urged by him as the termination was
  directed by the Corporation by virtue of the judgment of this
  Court and not because of any wrong committed by the appellant
  and hence, his case should be reconsidered for grant of
  dealership under the new policy. Ms. MeenakshiArora, learned
E senior counsel for the Corporation has filed the prevalent policy.
  We do not intend to allude to the same and issue any direction.
  Once there is a policy and any candidate fits in, needless to
  say, when there is an advertisement; he is at liberty to apply.
  We are not disposed to advert to the policy at this juncture. If
F the policy permits, as we have said, the appellant is at liberty
  to apply. However, we must clarify that our grant of liberty does
  not mean that the appellant shall create an impediment for the
  Corporation to enter into and take possession and run the
  petrol pump on its own or appoint a dealer.
G
       21. In view of the aforesaid analysis, it is directed thatthe
  appellant shall hand over the peaceful possession of the land
  and the structure and other fixtures standing thereon to the
  Corporation after demolishing the wall on his own within four
H weeks hence, failing which he shall be liable for contempt of
  RAHUL YADAV &ANR. v. INDIAN OIL CORP. LTD.AND 997
             ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

this Court.                                                     A

    22. In view of the aforesaid premises, the appeal, being
sans substratum, stands dismissed with the directions
recorded in the preceding paragraph. Ordinarily, we would
have thought of imposing costs but we have refrained from B
doing so as we have directed the appellant to vacate the
premises within four weeks so the first respondent-Corporation
can operate either on its own or through any agent or dealer.
Nidhi Jain                                  Appeal dismissed.