Supreme Court of India
R. RAJENDRANversusKAMAR NISHA AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1304
- Decided
- 10 November 2025
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order directing DNA testing was unlawful because the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act remained unrebutted and there was no requisite nexus between DNA testing and the offences, making the direction a violation of the appellant's right to privacy.
Summary
The appellant, a doctor, was alleged to have had an extramarital affair with respondent No.1, resulting in the birth of a child in 2007 while she was married to Abdul Latheef. Respondent No.1 filed criminal complaints for cheating and harassment and sought a DNA test to establish the appellant as the biological father, arguing that this would support the charges. The High Court directed the appellant to undergo DNA profiling, which he refused, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, the requirement of proving non‑access, and the constitutional right to privacy, concluding that the presumption remained unrebutted and no compelling nexus existed between DNA testing and the offences. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeal, holding that DNA testing could not be compelled in these circumstances.
Issues considered
- The High Court's direction for DNA testing of the appellant, respondent No.1, and the child was justified under the statutory and constitutional framework.
- Whether the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act can be displaced by the respondent's allegations.
- Whether Sections 53 and 53A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, permit compulsory DNA testing in the present criminal proceedings.
- Whether compelling DNA testing violates the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.
- Whether an adverse inference can be drawn against the appellant under Section 114 of the Evidence Act for refusing DNA testing.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 53, s. 53A
- Constitution of Indias. Article 20(3), s. Article 21
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 112, s. 114(g), s. 114(h)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 417, s. 420
- Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Acts. 4(1)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration The High Court directed the appellant to appear before a Hospital for collection of blood samples for DNA profiling. Whether the High Court was justified in directing the appellant to undergo DNA testing. Headnotes† Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – Penal Act – Respondent no.1 married one AL in the year 2001 – AL requested the appellant-doctor to refer his wife-respondent no.1, to a Gynaecologist, for the necessary treatment – However, instead of referring respondent no.1, the appellant developed physical relations with
Subjects
EvidenceDNA testingDNA profilingPaternity of childBodily autonomyEthical and psychological dimensionsIllegitimization of the childPrinciples Governing DNA ProfilingAccess and non-access between the spousesLegitimacy of a childPresumption of legitimacyFundamental right to privacyCriminal lawSection 112 Evidence Act
Judgment
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 1304
R. Rajendran
v.
Kamar Nisha and Others
(Criminal Appeal No. 1013 of 2021)
10 November 2025
[Prashant Kumar Mishra* and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The High Court directed the appellant to appear before a Hospital
for collection of blood samples for DNA profiling. Whether the High
Court was justified in directing the appellant to undergo DNA testing.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – Penal Code, 1860 – Tamil Nadu
Women Harassment Act – Respondent no.1 married one AL in
the year 2001 – AL requested the appellant-doctor to refer his
wife-respondent no.1, to a Gynaecologist, for the necessary
treatment – However, instead of referring respondent no.1,
the appellant developed physical relations with her, resulting
in the birth of a child on 08.03.2007 – When the child was
approximately one and a half years old, the appellant continued
his extramarital relationship with respondent no.1 – Upon
learning this, AL allegedly deserted her – Appellant refused
to marry respondent no.1 – FIR registered u/ss.417 and 420
of the IPC and s.4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment
Act – Respondent no.1 filed writ petition finding no appreciable
advancement in the investigation and sought for conducting a
DNA test of her child, allegedly born through the appellant –
After various rounds of litigation, the Division Bench of the
High Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 10.05.2017
directed the appellant to appear before the Hospital for
collection of blood samples – Correctness:
Held: Respondent no.1 in the present case seeks a direction for
DNA testing precisely to dislodge the statutory presumption of
legitimacy that safeguards the child, and to establish the appellant
as the biological father so as to sustain the criminal charges of
cheating and harassment – In the case at hand, the child was
* Author
124 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
born on 08.03.2007, during the subsistence of a valid marriage
between respondent no.1 and AL, solemnized in the year 2001 –
The statutory presumption u/s.112 of the Evidence Act operates
in favour of AL being the legitimate father of the child – This
presumption can be displaced only by proving non-access between
the spouses – It is the case of respondent no.1 that AL deserted
her sometime in 2008-2009, well after the child had attained the
age of approximately one and half years – No material has been
placed on record by respondent no.1 to substantiate her claim of
desertion, which remains a bare assertion unsupported by any
evidence – It is also not the case of respondent no.1 that AL was
suffering from any physical incapacity or impotency – Respondent
no.1 has not indicated any circumstance even remotely, suggesting
that AL was physically absent during the relevant time when the
child could have been conceived – At its highest, respondent no.1’s
case is one of simultaneous access, that she had physical relations
with the appellant while still married to AL – Mere simultaneous
access does not negate the husband’s access, nor does it suffice
to displace the statutory presumption u/s.112 of the Evidence Act –
DNA test would not serve the best interests of the parties – In the
present case, this balance weighs decisively against ordering DNA
testing – Such a direction would constitute a significant intrusion
into the privacy and dignity of both, the appellant and the child,
implicating the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed u/Art.21 of
the Constitution of India – The child has now attained majority – At the
time when the FIR was registered and the direction for DNA profiling
was issued by the High Court, the child was still a minor – In such
circumstances, the best interests of the child ought to have been
a paramount consideration before any intrusive forensic procedure
was contemplated – The paternity of the child is collateral to the
primary allegations of cheating and harassment – The FIR itself
reveals that the gravamen of the allegations bears no nexus to the
paternity of the child – The offences alleged do not, by their nature,
necessitate ascertainment of paternity or any forensic determination
through DNA analysis – Thus, the impugned judgment of the High
Court cannot be sustained. [Paras 42, 35, 45, 51, 53, 58]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – Birth during marriage, conclusive
proof of legitimacy – Presumption:
Held: It is evident from the statutory language of the provision, that
it establishes a conclusive presumption in favour of legitimacy of a
child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage – Embedded in
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 125
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
this presumption is the legal recognition that the husband is deemed
to be the father of the child born to his wife – This presumption
also operates as a safeguard against unwarranted intrusion into the
legally protected status of legitimacy, thereby ensuring stability in
familial relationships and the protection of child’s legal and social
identity. [Para 23]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – “Access” or “non-access”:
Held: “Access” or “non-access” u/s.112 of the Evidence Act must
be understood in a very narrow and specific sense, referring to
possibility of sexual relations between the spouses – Non-access
denotes the impossibility, not merely the absence or lack of such
opportunity – Even where cohabitation exists, non-access may arise
due to impotency, serious illness, physical incapacity or absence
during the relevant period – Conversely, the lack of cohabitation
alone does not establish non-access, nor does the existence of
extramarital relations, separate residences, or non-communication.
[Para 25]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – Access and non-access between
the spouses – Allegations of multiple or simultaneous access
by third parties:
Held: Allegations of multiple or simultaneous access by third
parties do not negate the access between the spouses or establish
non-access – Likewise, infidelity on the wife’s part does not, by
itself, displace the presumption of legitimacy if the husband had
access – The focus remains on the child’s birth, while the time of
conception is relevant only to determine whether access between
the spouses existed. [Para 26]
Evidence Act, 1872 – Principles Governing DNA Profiling:
Held: This Court has consistently held that DNA testing cannot
be ordered as a matter of course and must be subject to stringent
safeguards to protect the dignity of individuals and the legitimacy
of children born during the wedlock – The power to direct such
tests must be exercised with utmost circumspection and only when
the interests of justice imperatively demand such an intrusive
procedure – Courts must remain vigilant against fishing inquiries
masquerading as legitimate requests for scientific evidence,
ensuring the sanctity of family relationships is not compromised
by speculative or exploratory investigations. [Para 28]
126 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – Where the legitimacy of a child
is questioned:
Held: In a case where the legitimacy of a child is questioned, the
degree of proof, to rebut the presumption u/s.112 of the Evidence
Act, is extremely crucial – The standard of proof required to
displace the presumption u/s.112 of the Evidence Act must be
higher than mere preponderance of probabilities, yet need not
reach the exacting criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt – The standard must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure that
there existed no possibility of child being conceived through the
husband – This intermediate threshold serves the twin objectives
of preventing the illegitimization of the child on the strength of mere
assertions or tilting of probabilities, while simultaneously guarding
against weaponization of the statutory presumption to defeat the
legitimate claims – The person seeking to rebut this presumption
must, therefore, adduce strong, cogent and unambiguous evidence
establishing non-access, failing which, the statutory presumption
must prevail. [Paras 33, 34]
Evidence Act, 1872 – Ethical and psychological dimensions
of directing DNA testing:
Held: The process (DNA testing) though scientific, is not without
profound ethical and emotional implications – The act of extracting
and analysing one’s genetic material intrudes into the innermost
sphere of personal identity, autonomy, and privacy – It can have
lasting emotional and social ramifications not only for children but
also for adults, as such testing often brings to surface intimate
aspects of familial and personal relationships – Judicial and ethical
prudence both require that autonomy, dignity and emotional well
being of the individual, especially of a minor, be safeguarded – A
direction for DNA testing without considering the ramifications
causes risks inflicting an irreversible psychological and social
harm. [Para 51]
Criminal law – Evidence – Paternity as a collateral factor to
criminal charges:
Held: A direction for DNA testing must have a direct and
demonstrable nexus with the offences under investigation – In
the absence of such nexus, compelling a person to undergo DNA
profiling, amounts to unwarranted intrusion into bodily autonomy
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 127
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
and privacy, contrary to the safeguards implicit in Arts. 20(3) and 21
of Constitution of India. [Para 54]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 53 and 53A:
Held: These provisions are intended to be invoked in the cases
involving offences where medical examination of the accused,
including the collection of blood, semen, hair samples, or nail
clippings, may furnish material evidence directly bearing upon the
commission of the offence – While these provisions contemplate
the use of modern scientific techniques such as DNA profiling,
their application is conditioned upon the existence of a clear and
proximate nexus between the examination sought and the alleged
offence. [Para 56]
Case Law Cited
K.S. Puttaswamy and Another v. Union of India and Others [2017]
10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1 – followed.
Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal and Another [1993] 3 SCR
917 : (1993) 3 SCC 418; Sharda v. Dharmpal [2003] 3 SCR 106 :
(2003) 4 SCC 493; Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor Secretary,
Orissa State Commission for Women and Another [2010] 9 SCR
457 : (2010) 8 SCC 633; Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Another v. Poshi
Ram [2001] 3 SCR 729 : (2001) 5 SCC 311; Ivan Rathinam v.
Milan Joseph [2025] 1 SCR 1009 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 175;
Inayath Ali and Another v. State of Telangana and Another (2024)
7 SCC 822 – relied on.
Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy [2014] 11 SCR 553 : (2015) 1
SCC 365; Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik and
Another [2014] 1 SCR 120 : (2014) 2 SCC 576 – distinguished.
Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, 2023 INSC 146 :
[2023] 4 SCR 680; Banarsi Dass v. Teeku Dutta (Mrs) and Another
[2005] 3 SCR 923 : (2005) 4 SCC 449; K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired)
and Another (AADHAAR) v. Union of India and Another [2018] 8
SCR 1 : (2019) 1 SCC 1 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; Constitution of India; Tamil Nadu Women Harassment
Act.
128 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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List of Keywords
Evidence; DNA testing; DNA profiling; Paternity of child; Bodily
autonomy; Ethical and psychological dimensions; Emotional
and social ramifications; Illegitimization of the child; Principles
Governing DNA Profiling; Access and non-access between the
spouses; Legitimacy of a child; Access or non-access u/s.112 of
the Evidence Act; Presumption u/s.112 of Evidence Act, 1872;
Presumption of legitimacy; Collection of blood samples for
DNA profiling; Cheating and harassment; Fundamental right to
privacy.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1013 of 2021
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.05.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras at Madurai in WAMD No. 521 of 2017
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Pulkit Tare, Sheikh F. Kalia, D.Kumanan, Ashwary Kathed, Suvendu
Suvasis Dash.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Balaji Subramanian, A.A.G., Ankur Prakash, M.P. Parthiban,
Sabarish Subramanian, Danish Saifi, Akash Kundu.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.
1. This Appeal calls in question the impugned judgment dated
10.05.2017 passed by High Court of Madras at Madurai in Writ
Appeal (MD) No.521 of 2017, whereby the High Court directed the
appellant to appear before the Dean, Government Rajaji Hospital,
Madurai on or before 19.05.2017, for collection of blood samples
for DNA profiling as ordered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.
(MD) No.15208 of 2016.
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 129
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. Respondent No.1 married one Abdul Latheef in the year 2001.
Abdul Latheef was suffering from a skin ailment and, therefore, he
approached the appellant, a doctor, for treatment. The appellant
successfully treated Abdul Latheef’s condition, which led him to
confide in the appellant regarding his lack of progeny. Abdul Latheef
requested the appellant to refer his wife, respondent No.1, to Dr.
Indira, the appellant’s first wife and a Gynaecologist, for the necessary
treatment. However, instead of referring respondent No.1 to Dr. Indira,
the appellant developed physical relations with her, resulting in the
birth of a child on 08.03.2007.
3. When the child was approximately one and a half years old, the
appellant continued his extramarital relationship with respondent
No.1. Upon learning this, Abdul Latheef allegedly deserted her.
Respondent No.1 then approached the appellant for assistance, as
her husband had deserted her. The appellant asked respondent No.1
to pay Rs.3,00,000/- to his second wife, Dr. Devi, in return for taking
her house on lease. Respondent No.1 complied, taking the house
at Door No.1, Thanjavur Road, Pattukkottai Taluk, Pattukkottai, on
lease from 20.08.2013.
4. According to respondent No.1, the appellant frequently visited her
house and spent time with her. She subsequently asked him to marry
her and make their relationship public. Upon his refusal, a quarrel
ensued on 09.05.2014. Thereafter, the appellant began avoiding her.
Unable to sustain herself, respondent No.1 approached “Z” Tamil T.V.
channel and appeared on a programme titled “Solvathellam Unmai”,
publicly narrating her complaint. This led to the registration of F.I.R.
No.233/2014 dated 24.06.2014 against the appellant for offences
under Sections 417 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and
Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Act.
5. Subsequent to the registration of the FIR, the Police moved an
application before the Judicial Magistrate, Pattukkottai, seeking
directions to send the appellant, respondent No.1, and the child
for DNA profiling. Directions were issued to the appellant to appear
before the concerned Medical Officer of the Government Hospital
for drawal of blood samples. However, the appellant failed to comply
with the said order.
130 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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FIRST ROUND OF LITIGATION
6. Respondent No.1, aggrieved by the lack of progress in the
investigation, filed W.P. (MD) No.7746 of 2015 seeking transfer of
F.I.R. in Crime No.233 of 2014 from respondent No.4/The Inspector
of Police, Pattukottai Police Station, Pattukottai, Thanjavur District
to the Superintendent of Police, C.B.C.I.D., Chennai. The learned
Single Judge vide order dated 08.06.2015 disposed of the writ petition
directing respondent No.3/Superintendent of Police, Thanjavur District
to transfer the pending investigation to any other investigation officer,
while directing him to monitor and supervise the investigation.
7. Respondent No.1, finding no appreciable advancement in the
investigation despite the judicial intervention, was constrained to
prefer another writ petition being W.P. (MD) No.15208 of 2016
seeking transfer of investigation from respondent no.4/The Inspector
of Police to the Superintendent of Police, C.B.C.I.D, Chennai. She
further sought an interim relief for conducting a DNA test of her child,
allegedly born through the appellant. The High Court, vide interim
order dated 20.10.2016, directed the appellant and respondent No.1
to appear before the Dean, Thanjavur Medical College Hospital,
Thanjavur on 01.11.2016, who in turn was directed to collect blood
samples of the parties to obtain a DNA report.
8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid interim order dated 20.10.2016 passed
by the learned Single Judge, the appellant filed W.A. (MD) No.1428
of 2016. The Division Bench of the High Court, upon consideration,
allowed the said writ appeal, noting that the interim order was passed
without affording an opportunity to the appellant. The High Court set
aside the order dated 20.10.2016 and remitted the matter back to
the Writ Court for fresh consideration.
SECOND ROUND OF LITIGATION
9. Pursuant to the remand by the Division Bench, the learned Single
Judge considered the matter afresh, after affording an opportunity
to the appellant, and vide order dated 24.04.2017 in W.P. (MD)
No.15208 of 2016, held that DNA profiling of the appellant, respondent
No.1 and the child, was essential for the investigation in Crime
No.233 of 2014. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge directed
respondent No.6/Inspector of Police, Sethubavachathiram Police
Station, Thanjavur District, to produce the appellant, respondent
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 131
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
No.1 and the child before the Dean, Rajaji Government Hospital,
Madurai on 10.05.2017 at 10:30 a.m. The Inspector of Police was
further directed to collect the F.T.A cards from the Forensic Science
Department and submit the same to the Dean, Thanjavur Medical
College Hospital on 10.05.2017, whereupon the blood samples
of all the three parties were to be collected and forwarded to the
Tamil Nadu Forensic Laboratory. The DNA report was directed to
be sent to the learned Judicial Magistrate, Pattukottai. The learned
Single Judge disposed of the said writ petition observing that the
investigation in Crime No.233 of 2014 would depend upon the result
of the DNA test.
10. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated
24.04.2017 in W.P. (MD) No.15208/2016, the appellant preferred Writ
Appeal (MD) No.521 of 2017. The Division Bench, vide the impugned
judgment dated 10.05.2017 dismissed the writ appeal, directing the
appellant to appear before the Dean, Government Rajaji Hospital,
Madurai on or before 19.05.2017 for collection of blood samples as
ordered by the learned Single Judge. Hence, this Appeal.
SUBMISSIONS
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is settled law that
DNA testing can be granted only in exceptional cases and it cannot
be permitted for mere roving and fishing inquiries, particularly when
such directions may have implications on the right to privacy of the
individuals involved.
12. He further contended that Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act,
18721 mandates that any person born during the subsistence of a
valid marriage between his mother and father shall be conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate child born out of the wedlock.
13. Learned counsel also placed reliance on Ivan Rathinam vs. Milan
Joseph2; Aparna Ajinkya Firodia vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia3; and
Banarsi Dass vs. Teeku Dutta (Mrs) and Another4.
1 For short, ‘the Evidence Act’
2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 175
3 2023 INSC 146 : [2023] 4 SCR 680
4 (2005) 4 SCC 449
132 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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14. He further submitted that the child has now attained the age of
majority, and therefore, the question arises as to whether she can
be compelled to undergo DNA testing without her prior consent. He
also drew our attention to the belated registration of the complaint,
submitting that the child was born on 08.03.2007 and the FIR came to
be lodged only on 24.06.2014 without an explanation for such delay.
15. Lastly, he placed reliance on the birth certificate, the school certificate,
and the school admission certificate, all of which record the name
of Abdul Latheef as the father and thus contended that there exists
no eminent need for directing DNA testing. Accordingly, he prayed
for setting aside of the impugned order.
16. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the
reliance placed by the appellant on Goutam Kundu vs. State of
West Bengal and Another5 and Dipanwita Roy vs. Ronobroto
Roy6 and similar decisions is misplaced. It was contended that
those cases arose in the context of matrimonial disputes, where the
Court’s primary endeavour is to preserve the institution of marriage
and protect the legitimacy of children. In contrast, the present case
arises out of criminal proceedings, where strict proof is essential for
establishing the guilt or innocence.
17. It was further submitted that where the woman herself seeks DNA
test, there is no element of imputing unchastity. As regards to the
apprehension of illegitimization of the child, it is stated that the child’s
present status is akin to that.
18. Respondent No.1 further relied upon Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik vs.
Lata Nandlal Badwaik and Another7 to submit that scientific
advancement prevails over archaic presumptions.
19. It was also contended that this Court may draw adverse inference
under Section 114(g) and (h) of the Evidence Act against the appellant
for his refusal to undergo DNA testing. In this regard, strong reliance
was placed on Dipanwita Roy (supra).
20. On the aspect of privacy, it was argued that the right to privacy, though
constitutionally protected, can be waived by the individual concerned.
5 (1993) 3 SCC 418
6 (2015) 1 SCC 365
7 (2014) 2 SCC 576
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 133
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
Where the person voluntarily seeks the test, plea of privacy cannot
be invoked. Reference was made to K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired) and
Another (AADHAAR) vs. Union of India and Another8, to submit
that once a person consents, the right stands validly waived, and
no breach arises from a judicial order directing such examination.
QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION
21. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for both the parties, the
question which arises for our consideration is — whether the High
Court was justified in directing the appellant to undergo DNA testing.
ANALYSIS
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: SECTION 112 OF THE
EVIDENCE ACT
22. This dispute arises from a complaint registered under Sections 417
and 420 of the IPC and Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women
Harassment Act. Respondent No.1 seeks to establish the charges of
cheating and harassment by demonstrating that the appellant is the
biological father of her child. Consequently, before examining whether
a direction for DNA profiling is legally sustainable, it is necessary
to evaluate the statutory framework governing the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born during the continuance of valid marriage,
as enshrined under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. For ease of
reference, Section 112 is reproduced below:
“112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.––
The fact that any person was born during the continuance
of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or
within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution,
the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive
proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless
it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no
access to each other at any time when he could have
been begotten.”
(emphasis supplied)
8 (2019) 1 SCC 1
134 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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23. It is evident from the statutory language of the provision, that it
establishes a conclusive presumption in favour of legitimacy of a
child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Embedded in
this presumption is the legal recognition that the husband is deemed
to be the father of the child born to his wife. This presumption also
operates as a safeguard against unwarranted intrusion into the legally
protected status of legitimacy, thereby ensuring stability in familial
relationships and the protection of child’s legal and social identity.
24. The presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act operates
as “Conclusive Proof” of the legitimacy of a child born during the
subsistence of a valid marriage, by presuming that the parents had
access to each other at the relevant time. Section 4 of the Evidence
Act defines “conclusive proof ” as follows:
“Conclusive proof”.––When one fact is declared by this
Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on
proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and
shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of
disproving it.”
This presumption endures unless it is affirmatively established, by
strong and unambiguous evidence, that the parties to the marriage
had no access to each other at any time when the child could have
been begotten, or following the dissolution of the marriage while the
mother remains unmarried. Since the law favours legitimacy and
frowns upon the illegitimacy, the burden is cast upon the person
who asserts “illegitimacy” to displace the presumption.
25. “Access” or “non-access” under Section 112 of the Evidence Act
must be understood in a very narrow and specific sense, referring
to possibility of sexual relations between the spouses. Non-access
denotes the impossibility, not merely the absence or lack of such
opportunity. Even where cohabitation exists, non-access may arise
due to impotency, serious illness, physical incapacity or absence
during the relevant period. Conversely, the lack of cohabitation alone
does not establish non-access, nor does the existence of extramarital
relations, separate residences, or non-communication.
26. Allegations of multiple or simultaneous access by third parties do not
negate the access between the spouses or establish non-access.
Likewise, infidelity on the wife’s part does not, by itself, displace the
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 135
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
presumption of legitimacy if the husband had access. The focus
remains on the child’s birth, while the time of conception is relevant
only to determine whether access between the spouses existed.
II. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DNA PROFILING
27. The next aspect of the matter that requires consideration is whether
the appellant can be subjected to DNA profiling to determine whether
he is the biological father of the child born to respondent No.1. It
becomes imperative for this Court to examine the legal framework
governing the DNA testing and its permissible scope, particularly in
light of presumption in favour of legitimacy enshrined under Section
112 of the Evidence Act.
28. This Court has consistently held that DNA testing cannot be ordered
as a matter of course and must be subject to stringent safeguards
to protect the dignity of individuals and the legitimacy of children
born during the wedlock. The power to direct such tests must be
exercised with utmost circumspection and only when the interests
of justice imperatively demand such an intrusive procedure. Courts
must remain vigilant against fishing inquiries masquerading as
legitimate requests for scientific evidence, ensuring the sanctity of
family relationships is not compromised by speculative or exploratory
investigations.
29. The foundational parameters governing such directions were
established in Goutam Kundu (supra) wherein this Court laid down
the following parameters :
“26. From the above discussion it emerges—
(1) that courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter
of course;
(2) wherever applications are made for such prayers in
order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test
cannot be entertained.
(3) There must be a strong prima facie case in that the
husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the
presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.
(4) The court must carefully examine as to what would be
the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will
136 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the
mother as an unchaste woman.
(5) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for
analysis.”
30. Following the principles laid down in Goutam Kundu (supra), the
approach to ordering DNA tests has been further refined in subsequent
decisions. In Sharda vs. Dharmpal9 it was observed:
“81. To sum up, our conclusions are:
1. A matrimonial court has the power to order a person to
undergo medical test.
2. Passing of such an order by the court would not be in
violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of
the Indian Constitution.
3. However, the court should exercise such a power if
the applicant has a strong prima facie case and there is
sufficient material before the court. If despite the order
of the court, the respondent refuses to submit himself to
medical examination, the court will be entitled to draw an
adverse inference against him.”
31. This Court in the case of Bhabani Prasad Jena vs. Convenor
Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women and Another10
held thus:
“21. In a matter where paternity of a child is in issue before
the Court, the use of DNA test is an extremely delicate and
sensitive aspect. One view is that when modern science
gives the means of ascertaining the paternity of a child,
there should not be any hesitation to use those means
whenever the occasion requires. The other view is that
the Court must be reluctant in the use of such scientific
advances and tools which result in invasion of right to
privacy of an individual and may not only be prejudicial to
the rights of the parties but may have devastating effect
9 (2003) 4 SCC 493
10 (2010) 8 SCC 633
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 137
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
on the child. Sometimes the result of such scientific test
may bastardise an innocent child even though his mother
and her spouse were living together during the time of
conception.
22. In our view, when there is apparent conflict between
the right to privacy of a person not to submit himself
forcibly to medical examination and duty of the Court to
reach the truth, the Court must exercise its discretion only
after balancing the interests of the parties and on due
consideration whether for a just decision in the matter, DNA
test is eminently needed. DNA test in a matter relating to
paternity of a child should not be directed by the Court
as a matter of course or in a routine manner, whenever
such a request is made. The Court has to consider diverse
aspects including presumption under Section 112 of the
Evidence Act; pros and cons of such order and the test
of “eminent need” whether it is not possible for the Court
to reach the truth without use of such test.”
32. We must now consider whether respondent No.1 has successfully
displaced the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the
Evidence Act by proving non-access, so as to warrant the ordering
of a DNA test.
III. REBUTTAL OF PRESUMPTION AND FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
NON-ACCESS
33. In a case where the legitimacy of a child is questioned, the degree
of proof, to rebut the presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence
Act, is extremely crucial. In Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Another vs.
Poshi Ram11 this Court observed as follows :
“11. Whether the burden on the husband is as hard as
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused in a trial
deserves consideration in the above background. The
standard of proof of prosecution to prove the guilt beyond
any reasonable doubt belongs to criminal jurisprudence
whereas the test of preponderance of probabilities belongs
11 (2001) 5 SCC 311
138 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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to civil cases. The reason for insisting on proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases is to guard against the
innocent being convicted and sent to jail if not to extreme
penalty of death. It would be too hard if that standard is
imported in a civil case for a husband to prove non-access
as the very concept of non-access is negative in nature. But
at the same time the test of preponderance of probability
is too light as that might expose many children to the
peril of being illegitimatized. If a Court declares that the
husband is not the father of his wife’s child, without tracing
out its real father the fallout on the child is ruinous apart
from all the ignominy visiting his mother. The bastardised
child, when grows up would be socially ostracised and can
easily fall into wayward life. Hence, by way of abundant
caution and as a matter of public policy, law cannot afford
to allow such consequence befalling an innocent child on
the strength of a mere tilting of probability. Its corollary is
that the burden of the plaintiff husband should be higher
than the standard of preponderance of probabilities. The
standard of proof in such cases must at least be of a
degree in between the two as to ensure that there was
no possibility of the child being conceived through the
plaintiff husband.”
34. Thus, it is clear that the standard of proof required to displace
the presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act must be
higher than mere preponderance of probabilities, yet need not
reach the exacting criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standard must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure that
there existed no possibility of child being conceived through the
husband. This intermediate threshold serves the twin objectives of
preventing the illegitimization of the child on the strength of mere
assertions or tilting of probabilities, while simultaneously guarding
against weaponization of the statutory presumption to defeat the
legitimate claims. The person seeking to rebut this presumption
must, therefore, adduce strong, cogent and unambiguous evidence
establishing non-access, failing which, the statutory presumption
must prevail.
35. In the case at hand, the child was born on 08.03.2007, during the
subsistence of a valid marriage between respondent No.1 and Abdul
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 139
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
Latheef, solemnized in the year 2001. Following the maxim pater
est quem nuptiae demonstrant (The father is the man whom the
marriage indicates), the statutory presumption under Section 112
of the Evidence Act operates in favour of Abdul Latheef being the
legitimate father of the child. As observed earlier, this presumption
can be displaced only by proving non-access between the spouses.
It is the case of respondent No.1 that Abdul Latheef deserted her
sometime in 2008-2009, well after the child had attained the age of
approximately one and half years. No material has been placed on
record by respondent No.1 to substantiate her claim of desertion,
which remains a bare assertion unsupported by any evidence. It is
also not the case of respondent No.1 that Abdul Latheef was suffering
from any physical incapacity or impotency rendering him incapable
of procreation nor has any challenge been raised to the validity of
the marriage itself. Further, respondent No.1 has not indicated any
circumstance even remotely, suggesting that Abdul Latheef was
physically absent during the relevant time when the child could have
been conceived.
36. The birth certificate dated 14.07.2009, the school transfer certificate
dated 01.06.2011, and the school admission record dated 09.06.2011
each record the name of Abdul Latheef as the father of the child.
These documents reflect a consistent acknowledgement of his
paternity. At its highest, respondent No.1’s case is one of simultaneous
access, that she had physical relations with the appellant while still
married to Abdul Latheef. Mere simultaneous access does not negate
the husband’s access, nor does it suffice to displace the statutory
presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.
37. What is most striking, however, is the complete absence of any specific
pleading by respondent No.1 establishing non-access between herself
and Abdul Latheef during the period relevant to the conception of
the child. This omission is not merely procedural but goes to the root
of the matter. The presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence
Act operates in favour of legitimacy, and proof of non-access at the
relevant period is the only mode of rebuttal recognised by law. In
absence of specific plea of non-access, supported by strong and
unambiguous evidence, the foundation for displacing the statutory
presumption simply does not exist. The presumption, therefore,
remains unrebutted, and Abdul Latheef must be regarded as having
had access to respondent No.1 during the relevant period.
140 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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38. This Court must nonetheless consider respondent No.1’s prayer for
DNA testing, with due regard to the interests of all stakeholders. As
held in Bhabani Prasad Jena (supra), when there is an apparent
conflict between the right to privacy and bodily integrity on one
hand, and the Court’s duty to ascertain the truth on the other, judicial
discretion must be exercised with utmost care. Such direction can
be issued only after a scrupulous balancing of interests of all parties
and upon due consideration of whether, for a just decision in the
matter, DNA test is eminently necessary.
39. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the reliance placed by
respondent No.1 on Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik (supra) and
Dipanwita Roy (supra) to buttress her claim for a direction of DNA
testing. These decisions, however, are clearly distinguishable on
facts and do not advance the case of respondent No.1.
40. In Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik (supra), the DNA testing had been
conducted with the consent of all parties, and without objection from
the wife’s counsel. The results indicated that the husband was not
the biological father, and the re-test at the wife’s request yielded the
same result. The challenge based on Section 112 of the Evidence Act
was only raised after the test was conducted and the results were
already part of the record. The question before this Court, therefore,
was confined to whether such DNA test results, obtained pursuant to
a prior Court direction, could be admitted into evidence to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy. This Court held that where a DNA report
is available on record following a Court directed test, it cannot be
disregarded merely because it conflicts with the presumption. The
decision thus dealt with the admissibility of DNA evidence already
obtained, not whether a DNA test may be ordered against an unwilling
party at the first instance.
41. In Dipanwita Roy (supra), this Court directed a DNA test to be
conducted on the child. However, the direction was not issued for the
purpose of determining the legitimacy of the child. The proceedings
were in the context of a petition for divorce on the ground of adultery.
The DNA test was sought to establish the wife’s infidelity in order to
obtain a decree of divorce. The appellant’s objective was not to prove
that the child was illegitimate, that question arose only incidentally.
This Court expressly observed that while the issue of legitimacy
was incidentally involved, the DNA test would determine solely the
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 141
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
question of infidelity, and would not disturb the presumption under
Section 112 of the Evidence Act.
42. In sharp contrast, respondent No.1 in the present case seeks
a direction for DNA testing precisely to dislodge the statutory
presumption of legitimacy that safeguards the child, and to establish
the appellant as the biological father so as to sustain the criminal
charges of cheating and harassment. The decision in Dipanwita Roy
(supra) is, therefore, inapplicable to the facts of the present case.
IV. THE TWIN BLOCKADES TO DNA TESTING AND THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
43. This Court, in Ivan Rathinam (supra), has elucidated the
circumstances under which DNA testing may be directed, while
maintaining the balance between interests of the parties. It reads thus:
“47. First and foremost, the courts must, therefore,
consider the existing evidence to assess the presumption
of legitimacy. If that evidence is insufficient to come to a
finding, only then should the court consider ordering a DNA
test. Once the insufficiency of evidence is established,
the court must consider whether ordering a DNA test
is in the best interests of the parties involved and must
ensure that it does not cause undue harm to the parties.
There are thus, two blockades to ordering a DNA test :
(i) insufficiency of evidence; and (ii) a positive finding
regarding the balance of interests.”
44. In the present case, we find no insufficiency of evidence to
dislodge the presumption of legitimacy. The child was born during
the subsistence of a valid marriage and the documents on record
consistently record Abdul Latheef as the father. More crucially, there
is no pleading whatsoever by respondent No.1 alleging non-access
between herself and Abdul Latheef during the period of conception.
The existing evidence, therefore, stands sufficient.
45. At this juncture, this Court has to consider whether directing a
DNA test would serve the best interests of the parties involved or
whether it would occasion undue harm. The balance of interests
must account for the rights and welfare of all the stakeholders—the
appellant, the child who has now attained majority, and respondent
142 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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No.1 herself. In the present case, this balance weighs decisively
against ordering DNA testing. Such a direction would constitute a
significant intrusion into the privacy and dignity of both, the appellant
and the child, implicating the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
46. The contours of the right to privacy, as an intrinsic facet of Article
21 of the Constitution, were elaborated upon by this Court in K.S.
Puttaswamy and Another vs. Union of India and Others12:
“325. Like other rights which form part of the fundamental
freedoms protected by Part III, including the right to life
and personal liberty under Article 21, privacy is not an
absolute right. A law which encroaches upon privacy will
have to withstand the touchstone of permissible restrictions
on fundamental rights. In the context of Article 21 an
invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a
law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and
reasonable. The law must also be valid with reference
to the encroachment on life and personal liberty under
Article 21. An invasion of life or personal liberty must meet
the threefold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates the
existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate
State aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational
nexus between the objects and the means adopted to
achieve them.”
Forcefully subjecting an individual to DNA testing constitutes a grave
intrusion upon privacy and personal liberty. Such an encroachment can
be justified only if it satisfies the threefold test of legality, legitimate
State aim, and proportionality.
47. On behalf of respondent No.1, it is contended that she has voluntarily
relinquished her privacy and is willing to subject herself to DNA
testing. It is further asserted that the DNA testing would remove the
child’s stigma of illegitimacy by establishing the true parentage. These
contentions cannot override the legitimate privacy interests of the
other parties involved. Respondent No.1 is not the sole party whose
rights are implicated by the proposed DNA test. The appellant and
12 (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Privacy-9J.)
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 143
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
the child, who has now attained majority, possess independent and
equally inviolable rights to privacy and dignity. Respondent No.1’s
willingness to waive her own privacy does not extend to waiving the
privacy of others. The appellant has consistently refused to submit to
DNA testing, a refusal that is protected by the principles articulated
in Goutam Kundu (supra).
48. Furthermore, the assertion that the child is living as illegitimate is legally
untenable. In the eyes of the law, the child is the legitimate offspring of
Abdul Latheef through respondent No.1, as the statutory presumption
under Section 112 of the Evidence Act remains unrebutted. The
legal status of the child cannot be altered by mere assertions or by
subjective perception of respondent No.1. Turning to the requirements
enunciated in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) (supra), we find that
the proposed DNA test fails to satisfy the constitutional requisites.
There exists no legitimate aim that necessitates such an intrusive
procedure, since the criminal allegations of cheating and harassment
can be investigated and adjudicated on the strength of other evidence,
without delving into the question of biological paternity. The test of
proportionality is also manifestly not met; the invasion of privacy and
dignity of the appellant and the child far outweigh any conceivable
investigative benefit.
49. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the opinion that
neither the element of eminent need, contemplated in Bhabani
Prasad Jena (supra), nor the positive finding on the balance of
interests as articulated in Ivan Rathinam (supra), can be said to
have been satisfied in the facts of the present case.
V. ADVERSE INFERENCE
50. Further, this Court deems it necessary to address the contention
advanced by respondent No.1 that an adverse inference ought to
be drawn against the appellant under Section 114(g) and (h) of the
Evidence Act, on account of his refusal to undergo DNA testing. This
contention, however, is fundamentally misconceived. Without first
displacing the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112
of the Evidence Act by leading positive and cogent evidence of non-
access, respondent No.1 cannot seek refuge in the drawing of an
adverse inference against the appellant under Section 114 of the
Evidence Act. Unless the presumption under Section 112 is first
144 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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rebutted, no occasion arises for directing a DNA test. Conversely,
where the prerequisites for ordering such a test are not satisfied,
the question of drawing any adverse inference from the appellant’s
refusal to undergo it does not arise at all. A similar issue arose for
consideration before this Court in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia (supra)
wherein V. Ramasubramanian, J. in a concurring opinion observed
as under:
“26. There is another fallacy in the argument of the
respondent. It is the contention of the respondent that he is
seeking an adverse inference to be drawn only as against
the wife under Section 114(h), upon the refusal of the wife
to subject the child to DNA test. But the stage at which the
wife may refuse to subject the child to DNA, would arise
only after the Court comes to the conclusion that a DNA
test should be ordered. To put in simple terms, there are
three stages in the process, namely, (i) consideration by
the Court, of the question whether to order DNA test or
not; (ii) passing an order directing DNA test, after such
consideration; and (iii) the decision of the wife to comply
or not, with the order so passed. The respondent should
first cross the outer fence namely whether a DNA test
can be ordered or not. It is only after he convinces the
Court to order DNA test and successfully secures an
order that he can move to the inner fence, regarding the
willingness of the wife to abide by the order. It is only at
that stage that the respondent can, if at all, seek refuge
under Section 114(h).
27. But today, we are actually at the outer fence in this case,
adjudicating as to whether DNA test can be ordered at all.
Therefore, the respondent cannot jump to the inner fence
by-passing the outer fence.”
As it is abundantly clear from the foregoing, and the exposition in
Aparna Ajinkya Firodia (supra), no occasion arises to draw an
adverse inference at the stage of considering whether a DNA test
ought to be directed.
51. Beyond the legal framework, it is also imperative to recognise the
ethical and psychological dimensions of directing DNA testing. The
process though scientific, is not without profound ethical and emotional
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 145
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
implications. The act of extracting and analysing one’s genetic material
intrudes into the innermost sphere of personal identity, autonomy,
and privacy. It can have lasting emotional and social ramifications
not only for children but also for adults, as such testing often brings
to surface intimate aspects of familial and personal relationships. In
the present case, it must be borne in mind that the child has now
attained majority. At the time when the FIR was registered and the
direction for DNA profiling was issued by the High Court, the child
was still a minor. In such circumstances, the best interests of the child
ought to have been a paramount consideration before any intrusive
forensic procedure was contemplated. Judicial and ethical prudence
both require that autonomy, dignity and emotional well-being of the
individual, especially of a minor, be safeguarded. A direction for DNA
testing without considering the ramifications causes risks inflicting
an irreversible psychological and social harm.
VI. PATERNITY AS A COLLATERAL FACTOR TO CRIMINAL
CHARGES
52. The significance of safeguarding individual autonomy, particularly of
children, in the context of DNA testing, was considered by this Court
in Inayath Ali and Another vs. State of Telangana and Another13.
In this case, it was examined whether a Court could direct DNA
testing of two minor children to facilitate the proof of offences under
Sections 498A, 323, 354, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860. The dispute primarily concerned dowry-related offences, and
the paternity of the children was not directly in issue. The complainant
sought DNA testing to establish that the children were born out of a
forced relationship with her brother-in-law. Rejecting this plea, this
Court held as follows:
“7. In the present proceeding, we are taking two factors
into account which have been ignored by the trial Court
as also the Revisional Court. The trial Court allowed the
application of Respondent 2 mechanically, on the premise
that the DNA fingerprint test is permissible under the law.
The High Court has also proceeded on that basis, referring
to different authorities including Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto
13 (2024) 7 SCC 822
146 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Roy [Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy, (2015) 1 SCC 365 :
(2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 495 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] . The
ratio of this case was also examined by the coordinate
Bench in the decision of Ashok Kumar [Ashok Kumar v.
Raj Gupta, (2022) 1 SCC 20 : (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 303] .
8. The first factor, which, in our opinion, is of significance,
is that in the judgment under appeal, blood sampling of
the children was directed, who were not parties to the
proceeding nor was their status required to be examined
in the complaint of Respondent 2. This raised doubt on
their legitimacy of being born to legally wedded parents
and such directions, if carried out, have the potential of
exposing them to inheritance related complication.
9. Section 112 of the Evidence Act, also gives a protective
cover from allegations of this nature. The said provision
stipulates:
“112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof
of legitimacy.—The fact that any person was
born during the continuance of a valid marriage
between his mother and any man, or within two
hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the
mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive
proof that he is the legitimate son of that man,
unless it can be shown that the parties to the
marriage had no access to each other at any
time when he could have been begotten.”
10. In our opinion, the trial Court as also the Revisional
Court had completely ignored the said factor and proceeded
as if the children were material objects who could be sent
for forensic analysis. The other factor, in our opinion, which
was ignored by the said two Courts is that the paternity of
the children was not in question in the subject proceeding.
11. The substance of the complaint was not related to
paternity of the children of Respondent 2 but the question
was whether the offences under the aforesaid provisions
of the 1860 Code were committed against her or not.
The paternity of the two daughters of Respondent 2 is a
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 147
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
collateral factor to the allegations on which the criminal
case is otherwise founded. On the basis of the available
materials, in our opinion, the case out of which this
proceeding arises could be decided without considering
the DNA test report. This was the reasoning which was
considered by the coordinate Bench in Ashok Kumar
[Ashok Kumar v. Raj Gupta, (2022) 1 SCC 20 : (2022)
1 SCC (Civ) 303] , though that was a civil suit. Merely
because something is permissible under the law cannot be
directed as a matter of course to be performed particularly
when a direction to that effect would be invasive to the
physical autonomy of a person. The consequence thereof
would not be confined to the question as to whether
such an order would result in testimonial compulsion,
but encompasses right to privacy as well. Such direction
would violate the privacy right of the persons subjected
to such tests and could be prejudicial to the future of the
two children who were also sought to be brought within
the ambit of the trial Court’s direction.”
53. In the case at hand, the paternity of the child is collateral to the primary
allegations of cheating and harassment. The FIR itself reveals that
the gravamen of the allegations bears no nexus to the paternity of
the child. The child is neither a party to the proceedings nor is the
child’s status required to be ascertained to determine the commission
of the offences alleged. Directing DNA testing in such circumstances
would thus be wholly extraneous to the scope of the investigation
and disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved.
54. A direction for DNA testing must have a direct and demonstrable
nexus with the offences under investigation. In the absence of such
nexus, compelling a person to undergo DNA profiling, amounts to
unwarranted intrusion into bodily autonomy and privacy, contrary to
the safeguards implicit in Articles 20(3) and 21 of Constitution of India.
55. Having regard to the above legal position, reliance placed by the High
Court on Sections 53 and 53A of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 appears to be misplaced. In the present case, the learned
Single Judge of the High Court in the order dated 24.04.2017, invoked
these provisions to justify the direction for DNA testing, observing
that there was an eminent need to ascertain the paternity of the child
148 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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in order to unearth the truth. The Division Bench, in the impugned
judgment, while affirming the order of the learned Single Judge, did
not independently analyse their scope and applicability. The said
provisions are reproduced for ready reference:
“53. Examination of accused by medical practitioner
at the request of police officer.—(1) When a person is
arrested on a charge of committing an offence of such a
nature and alleged to have been committed under such
circumstances that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that an examination of his person will afford
evidence as to the commission of an offence, it shall
be lawful for a registered medical practitioner, acting at
the request of a police officer not below the rank of sub-
inspector, and for any person acting in good faith in his aid
and under his direction, to make such an examination of
the person arrested as is reasonably necessary in order to
ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence, and to
use such force as is reasonably necessary for that purpose.
(2) Whenever the person of a female is to be examined
under this section, the examination shall be made only by,
or under the supervision of, a female registered medical
practitioner.
Explanation.—In this section and in sections 53A and 54,—
(a) “examination” shall include the examination of blood,
blood stains, semen, swabs in case of sexual offences,
sputum and sweat, hair samples and finger nail clippings
by the use of modern and scientific techniques including
DNA profiling and such other tests which the registered
medical practitioner thinks necessary in a particular case;
(b) “registered medical practitioner” means a medical
practitioner who possesses any medical qualification as
defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Indian Medical
Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956) and whose name has
been entered in a State Medical Register.
53A. Examination of person accused of rape by medical
practitioner.— (1) When a person is arrested on a charge
of committing an offence of rape or an attempt to commit
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 149
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
rape and there are reasonable grounds for believing that
an examination of his person will afford evidence as to
the commission of such offence, it shall be lawful for a
registered medical practitioner employed in a hospital
run by the Government or by a local authority and in the
absence of such a practitioner within the radius of sixteen
kilometres from the place where the offence has been
committed, by any other registered medical practitioner,
acting at the request of a police officer not below the rank
of a sub-inspector, and for any person acting in good
faith in his aid and under his direction, to make such an
examination of the arrested person and to use such force
as is reasonably necessary for that purpose.
(2) The registered medical practitioner conducting such
examination shall, without delay, examine such person and
prepare a report of his examination giving the following
particulars, namely:—
(i) the name and address of the accused and of the
person by whom he was brought,
(ii) the age of the accused,
(iii) marks of injury, if any, on the person of the
accused,
(iv) the description of material taken from the person
of the accused for DNA profiling, and
(v) other material particulars in reasonable detail.
(3) The report shall state precisely the reasons for each
conclusion arrived at.
(4) The exact time of commencement and completion of
the examination shall also be noted in the report.
(5) The registered medical practitioner shall, without delay,
forward the report to the investigating officer, who shall
forward it to the Magistrate referred to in section 173 as
part of the documents referred to in clause (a) of sub-
section (5) of that section.”
(emphasis supplied)
150 [2025] 12 S.C.R.
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56. These provisions are intended to be invoked in the cases involving
offences where medical examination of the accused, including the
collection of blood, semen, hair samples, or nail clippings, may furnish
material evidence directly bearing upon the commission of the offence.
While these provisions contemplate the use of modern scientific
techniques such as DNA profiling, their application is conditioned
upon the existence of a clear and proximate nexus between the
examination sought and the alleged offence.
57. In the present case, no such nexus is discernible. The offences alleged
do not, by their nature, necessitate ascertainment of paternity or any
forensic determination through DNA analysis. Merely because such
testing is legally permissible in certain contexts does not justify its
use as a matter of course.
CONCLUSION
58. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are constrained to hold that
the impugned judgment dated 10.05.2017 cannot be sustained.
The statutory presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act
remains unrebutted, and the child continues to be, in the eyes of the
law, the legitimate offspring of Abdul Latheef. Section 112 embodies
a legislative policy of profound significance, it stands as a bulwark
against the casual illegitimization of children on the strength of
unsubstantiated allegations or mere suspicion. The presumption it
creates is not a procedural formality to be lightly displaced but a
substantive safeguard intended to protect the dignity, social legitimacy,
and the legal rights of children born within wedlock.
59. In summation, the direction for DNA testing, as affirmed by the Division
Bench, rests upon the fundamental misapprehension of both statutory
framework and constitutional safeguards. The offences alleged,
falling under Sections 417 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
and Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Act, are
neither of nature nor of a circumstance that warrant recourse to DNA
analysis. The High Court’s invocation of Sections 53 and 53A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, rests on a misconstruction of their
contextual ambit; these provisions contemplate medical examination
only where such an examination may directly yield evidence relating
to commission of the alleged offence. Absent that nexus, compulsion
of a DNA test transforms a lawful investigative power into an intrusive
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 151
R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha and Others
measure devoid of necessity, trenching upon the individual’s bodily
autonomy, privacy. Scientific procedures, however advanced, cannot
be employed as instruments of speculation; they must be anchored
in demonstrable relevance to the charge and justified by compelling
investigative need.
60. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 10.05.2017 passed by
the High Court in Writ Appeal (MD) No.521 of 2017 is set aside.
61. The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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