Holding

A compromise order not grounded in law is not an order in rem nor a binding precedent and cannot be extended to other similarly situated persons, thus no violation of Article 14 occurs.

Summary

The case concerned recruitment of 4,000 ITI Helper (Trainee) vacancies in Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd (TANGEDCO). After a series of litigations, the Madras High Court’s Division Bench entered a compromise order appointing 84 candidates based on a settlement, not on merit or statutory rules. Subsequent candidates, who were similarly situated but had not been parties to the compromise, claimed that denying them the same benefit violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court examined whether such a compromise order could be treated as a precedent or an order in rem and whether the principle of negative equality barred its extension. It held that the compromise was not grounded in law, had no precedential effect, and therefore could not be extended to other candidates; the doctrine of negative equality prevents multiplying a benefit conferred without legal basis. Consequently, the appeals of the aggrieved candidates were dismissed, while TANGEDCO’s appeals were allowed, and no costs were awarded.

Issues considered

Whether a compromise order, not based on merit or statutory authority, can be treated as a precedent or an order in rem for the purpose of extending its benefit to other similarly situated persons.
Whether denial of the benefit of the compromise order to other candidates violates the equality clause (Article 14) of the Constitution.
Whether the doctrine of negative equality applies to prevent multiplication of a benefit conferred without legal justification.
Whether laches, delay or acquiescence can bar subsequent claimants from invoking the benefit of a prior compromise order.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art. 14

Subjects

Service lawPublic employerCompromise orderEquality clauseArticle 14Negative equalityLachesRecruitmentITI HelperTANGEDCOSupreme Court

Judgment

[2022] 1 S.C.R. 577 577

R. MUTHUKUMAR & ORS. . A
v.
THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR TANGEDCO
& ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1144 of 2022 ) B
FEBRUARY 07, 2022
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
BELA. M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
Service Law: Concession-based orders – Public employer
C
conceding in course of proceedings to a compromise – Such
compromise, when not justified – Held: Fairness demands that public
bodies, as model employers, do not pursue untenable submissions
– In such cases, a concession, which is based on law, and accords
to a just interpretation of the concerned law and/or rules, is
sustainable – However, it is altogether another thing for a public D
employer, whose conduct is questioned, and who has succeeded on
the merits of the case before the lower forum to voluntarily agree,
in an unreasoned manner, to a compromise – The harm and
deleterious effect of such conduct is to prioritize the claim of those
before the court, when it is apparent that a large body of others,
E
waiting with a similar grievance (and some of whom probably have
a better or legitimate claim on merits to be appointed) are not parties
to the proceedings – In such cases, a compromise is not only
unjustified, it is contrary to law and public interest – Compromise/
Settlement.
F
Constitution of India: Art. 14 – Negative equality – Held: A
principle, axiomatic in this country’s constitutional lore is that there
is no negative equality – If there has been a benefit or advantage
conferred on one or a set of people, without legal basis or
justification, that benefit cannot multiply, or be relied upon as a
principle of parity or equality. G
Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer
(2013) 14 SCC 81 : [2013] 8 SCR 227; Chandigarh
Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745 : [1995] 1 SCR
126; Anand Buttons Ltd. v State of Haryana (2005) 9
SCC 164; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. (2006) 3 SCC H
577
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A 581 : [2006] 1 SCR 342; Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab
(2010) 11 SCC 455 : [2010] 7 SCR 317; Chaman Lal
v. State of Punjab (2014) 15 SCC 715 : [2014]
6 SCR 311; and The State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar
Senapati 2019 SCC Online SC 1207 – relied on.
B Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Aravind Kumar Srivastava &
others (2015) 1 SCC 347 : [2014] 12 SCR 193; C.
Channabasavaiah v. State of Mysore [1965] 1 SCR 360
and Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & Ors. v.
Rajubhai Somabhai Bharwad & Ors. 2015 (7) SCC 663
: [2015] 8 SCR 263 – referred to.
C
Case Law Reference
[2014] 12 SCR 193 referred to Para 14
[1965] 1 SCR 360 referred to Para 21
[2015] 8 SCR 263 referred to Para 21
D
[2013] 8 SCR 227 relied on Para 24
[1995] 1 SCR 126 relied on Para 24
(2005) 9 SCC 164 relied on Para 24

E [2006] 1 SCR 342 relied on Para 24
[2010] 7 SCR 317 relied on Para 24
[2014] 6 SCR 311 relied on Para 24
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1144 of
2022.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No.574 of 2017.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 1145-1155, 1156-1179, 1180-1187 and 1188-1214
G of 2022.
Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv., D. Kumanan, Sheikh Fakhruddin Kalia,
Ms. Shruti Gupta, Gautam Narayan, Ms. Asmita Singh, G. Anandkumar,
Abhinav Agrawal, Rajiv K. Virmani, Gaurav Jain, Atul Malhotra, Ms.
Swati Bhardwaj, Rajesh Kumar, K. S. Govinda Prasad, T. Harish Kumar,
H T. R. B. Sivakumar, Advs. for the appearing parties.
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 579
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO

The Order of the Court was passed by A
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Special leave granted. With consent of counsel for parties, these
appeals were heard finally. The appellants (hereby also referred to as
“the aggrieved candidates”) in four sets of appeals1 are aggrieved by a
common judgment and order dated 02.08.2018 of the Division Bench of B
the Madras High Court. In another appeal2 the management of Tamil
Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. (hereafter
“TANGEDCO”) is aggrieved by another judgment of the said High Court,
whereby it was directed to appoint the respondents (writ petitioners who
had approached the court, hereby called “respondent applicants”) as
ITI Helpers based on a previous order dated 14.10.2015 in W.A. No. C
81/2015.
Brief facts
2. In proceedings before this court3, orders were issued appointing
late Mr. Justice Khalid, a former Judge of this court, to consider and
recommend better methods for filling up of vacancies by accommodating D
existing workers on the one hand, and skilled workers on the other. Justice
Khalid’s report stated, inter alia, that:
“110. How to select the remaining workers and where to place
the ITI workers is the next question to be answered.
Throughout my report, I have emphasized the fact that my E
function is to evolve a workable method to accommodate the
existing workers without seriously affecting the Board’s
decisions and activities. It is not my intention to completely
ignore the skilled helpers. They should find a place in the
scheme of things. 7,000 ITI helpers have already been
F
1
SLP(C) 19059/2019; SLP(C) 15629-39/2019; SLP(C) 22044-67/2019 and SLP(C)
22036-43/2019 – directed against a common judgment and order dated 02.08.2018 (in
WA No.574/2017; WA Nos. 1450/ 2017, 1452/ 2017, and 1454-1462/ 2017; W.P. Nos.
36656/ 2016, 36658/ 2016, 36890/ 2016, 42792-94/2016, 39782-85/ 2016, 42613-14/
2016, 35135-37/ 2016, 35926-30/ 2016, 35932-35/ 2016; WA Nos.990/ 2016 and WA
Nos. 1696-1702/ 2018), delivered by the Madras High Court. G
2
Arising from SLP(C) 3183-3209/2020 (directed against a common judgment dated
29.04.2019 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 1071, 1072 of 2016, Writ
Petition Nos. 8150,10266, 10267, l7997, 17998, 29113, 29114, 29115, 29116, 33743,
33744, 33745, 39292, 39673, 41609, 41610 of 2016, and Writ Petition Nos. 13948
13949, 13950, 13951, 13952, 13953, of 2017, Writ Petition Nos. 1808, 18576, 18624
of 2018.
3
S.L.P. No. 1820/1990 H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A recruited. Others are waiting. The Supreme Court has
appointed me to give a final decision which shall be binding
on the parties. It is therefore necessary in the interests of fair
play and justice that I take into account the claims of not
only the existing workers but also the skilled workers who
are not before me. After giving my anxious consideration, I
B
decide that after the issue of appointment orders to 7,000
existing workers, the Board shall thereafter appoint the
remaining existing workers from the lists and skilled workers
in the ratios of 1:1. The existing workers will be selected by
the Selection Committee and the ITI helpers by the Board.”
C 3. Acting in compliance with the report, TANGEDCO, by order
dated 12.07.2012 called applications to fill up 4000 ITI Helper (Trainee)
vacancies, by direct recruitment through Employment Exchange. A
notification was sent to the Commissioner, Employment Exchange, Guindy,
to sponsor ITI Candidates in each category, according to their ratio with
D the Trade of Electrician and Wireman in the ratio of 1:5. The proceeding
dated 12.07.2012 reads, inter alia, as follows:
“2. Accordingly, the TANGEDCO hereby approved the
following orders:
a) 4000 ITI Helper (Trainee) with NTC/NAC (ITI) qualification
E in the trade of Electrician and Wireman be appointed by
Direct Recruitment through Employment Exchange, to minimize
the large number of Helper vacancies in TANGEDCO. The
4000 ITI Helper (Trainee) will be given 2 years training with
the consolidated pay of Rs.3250/- per month and after
F completion of training they will come under the regular pay
band of Rs.5400-20200 - 1900 (Grade Pay)
b) Considering the large number of persons to be recruited
within the short span of time and that the fact the recruitment
is for the lowest level category in TANGEDCO, the Board
G directs that there may not be any need for interview excepting
for testing their job fitness criteria. Hence, the TANGEDCO
directs that a list may be drawn from the employment
exchanges and all eligible candidates subject to their physical
fitness required for the job specification, be recruited duly
following other rules and regulations in force, so as to improve
H field level performance of the TANGEDCO.”
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 581
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

4. Some writ petitions4 were preferred for a direction to relax the A
upper age limit while filling up the vacancies to the post of ITI Helper
(Trainee) in TANGEDCO by direct recruitment. These writ petitions
were disposed of by the Madras High Court by a common order dated
01.11.2012. The court was of the opinion that since the vacancies had
existed for long, and an abortive attempt was made earlier to fill them, it
B
was in the interests of justice that TANGEDCO should relax the upper
age limit. Accordingly, by the common order dated 01.11.2012,
TANGEDCO was directed “to relax the upper age limit for these
I.T.I. Trade Certificate Holders so far as the current selection is
concerned.”
5. By an order/proceedings dated 04.07.2013, TANGEDCO C
relaxed the upper age limit for the on-going selection process in relation
to the said 4000 vacancies of ITI Helper (Trainee). As a result, a list
was drawn from the Employment Exchange and the selection was subject
to physical fitness required for job, and fulfilment of other requisite
criteria. Another order of this court5 had directed grant of preference by D
calling candidates who have undergone apprenticeship training in the
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board to attend only the interview for the post of
ITI Helper (Trainee) along with the other candidates sponsored through
the Employment Exchange. No marks were given to the candidates
who had undergone apprenticeship training by way of preference for
selection. Accordingly, an advertisement was given in two daily E
newspapers for apprenticeship candidates to enrol their names for the
purpose of attending the interview. In the said decision, Apprentices/
Trainees were exempted from the requirement of having to appear in
the written examination as they had acquired training under the same
management. However, they had to go through the process of viva- F
voce test. The preference was exercisable “when other things being
equal”, over direct recruits. Consequently apprentice-trainees had no
right per se, for appointment as a matter of course.
6. The Employment Exchange concerned sponsored about 13560
ITI candidates, of which only the qualified candidates were called for
interview. TANGEDCO, by proceedings (No. 15), dated 04.07.2013, G
directed as follows:
“A list may be drawn from the Employment Exchange and all
eligible Candidates subject to their physical fitness required
4
W.P. Nos. 24128/ 2012.
5
In C.A. Nos. 5285-5328/1996 dated 03.10.1996. H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A for the job specification be recruited duly following other
rules and regulations in force.”
7. Candidates who appeared for interview were evaluated with
85% weightage for academic marks and 15% towards performance in
viva-voce/interview. The process of interview was for assessing the
B candidate’s ability to do pole climbing and cycling with respect to physical
fitness. The ratio of 1:5 was followed in terms of G.O.Ms. No. 18, Labour
and Employment (N2) Department dated 25.02.2008, by which the list
of ITI qualified candidates were called for, from the Employment
Exchange. The candidates were required to have the qualification of
ITI (NTC/NAC). Appointments by direct recruitment were resorted to
C by following the ratio of 1:1,in terms of the Justice Khalid Commission
Report, as between contract workers and qualified ITI holders. 1455
candidates - who had completed one years’ apprentice training in
TANGEDCO with ITI qualification - were called for the interview. Among
15015 candidates, 10,728 candidates attended the interview. On scrutiny,
D based on their ITI/National Trade Certificate, 10357 candidates were
found to be eligible and 351 candidates, rejected as ineligible since they
did not possess the ITI Electrician/ Wireman Trade qualification, apart
from not possessing National Trade Certificate (NTC) issued by the
National Council for Vocational Training, New Delhi (NCVT).

E 8. 4000 ITI Helpers (Trainee) were selected in terms of the
Government Order in G.O.Ms. No. 65 Personnel and Administrative
Reforms (Personnel) Department, dated 27.05.2009. Appointment orders
were consequently issued to the selected candidates. Their selection
was based on marks scored by such candidates in ITI National Trade
Certificate/National Apprenticeship Certificate (85% weightage), and
F interview marks (15% weightage). The appointments also adhered to
the relevant prescribed reservation ratios and roster. The selection
combined eligible candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange
as well as Apprenticeship candidates.
9. Candidates who were not selected approached the Madras
G High Court, in a batch of writ petitions.6 Their main grievance was that
TANGEDCO acted contrary to law, and arbitrarily, by introducing a
viva-voce test, which it had in the first instance, resolved not to follow. It

6
W.P. Nos. 8829, 9125, 9126, 9319, 9923, 9927, 10589, 10598, 11785, 12003, 12004,
15512, 15636 & 15873/ 2014: S. Vijayakumar vs. Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution
H Corporation Limited.
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 583
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

was urged, in this regard, that introduction of interview/viva voce A
amounted to changing the rules of the game after its commencement.
TANGEDCO resisted the petitions, contending that conduct of interview/
viva voce was not arbitrary. It urged that interview was conducted for
assessing the candidates’ physical fitness, and was done in relation to
the job requirements. TANGEDCO said that the procedure was followed
B
in all recruitments from 2005 onwards. In terms of its proceedings in
Per.B.P.(FB) No. 40, dated 14.12.2005 and the Tamil Nadu Electricity
Board, Administrative Branch Memo No. 100459/265/G.57/G.572/2007
dated 03.02.2009, guidelines for the process of recruitment required viva
voce; the extract of those guidelines are as follows:
“3) The following guidelines may be adopted in the interview. C

a) Verification of ITI qualification NTC/NAC Certificates in
the field of Electrician and Wireman Trade.
b) Verification of Transfer Certificate for proof of age.
c) Proficiency test in Cycling and Pole Climbing. D
d) Weightage may be given for those with 2 Wheeler licence.
e) Weightage may be given to those who are already engaged
as Contract Labourers in the Board, if sponsored by the
Employment Exchange.”
E
The single judge who heard the writ petitions, reasoned that the
guidelines of 2005 had been followed previously; they were in accord
with the Khalid Commission Report, and that testing physical fitness
was a part of the job requirement, which TANGEDCO was competent
to insist. It was further held that the candidates had willingly participated
F
in the written test and interview, and therefore, could not allege
arbitrariness. On the strength of this reasoning, the single judge, by a
common judgment7, dismissed the writ petitions. The unsuccessful
candidates appealed to the Division Bench. Other unsuccessful
candidates, who had not approached by filing writ petitions, did so later
on. The appeals against the single judge’s order, as well as the fresh writ G
petitions, were taken up by the Division Bench.
10. Before the Division Bench, TANGEDCO indicated a
willingness to accommodate all the writ petitioners. This resulted in a

7
Dated 04.12.2014 H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A compromise between the parties. The terms of the compromise are
extracted below:
“MEMO OF COMPROMISE
The Appellants and petitioners filed writ petitions in W.P. Nos.
9125, 9126, 9319, 9923, 9927, 10589, 10598, 11785, 12003,
B 12004, 15512, 15636 and 15873 of 2014 challenging the
selection process to the post of 4000 ITI Helpers recruited by
the TANGEDCO Per (Per.) FB (TANGEDCO) Proceedings No.
14, dated 12.07.2012 and the same were dismissed by the
learned single Judge by an order dated 04.12.2014.
C Aggrieved by the same the Appellants have filed the above
Writ Appeals in W.A. Nos. 81, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 1018,
1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1023 and 1301 of 2015. Further
abovesaid three writ petitions in W.P. No. 22095, 33097 &
33098 of 2014, challenging the same selection of ITI Helper
(Trainee) came up for admission and this Hon’ble court has
D directed the registry to post the same along with the batch of
cases in W.P. No. 9125 of 2014 etc., But the said writ petitions
were not posted along with W.P. No. 9125 of 2014 etc., batch
cases during final hearing and the same are pending and
now posted along with the above writ appeals.
E The above first writ appeal came up for hearing before this
Hon’ble court on several occasions and finally on 02.09.2015
and in view of the judgement of the Apex court, the respondents
corporation accepted the proposals of the Appellants and
Petitioners numbering 84 who have filed the Writ Appeals/
F Writ Petitions before this Hon’ble court challenging the ITI
Helper (Trainee) and have stated that they will be
accommodated in the post of ITI Helper (Trainee) in the 1st
& 2nd respondents corporation under the following
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
G 1. The respondent corporation and the appellants &
petitioners mutually agreed that the respondent corporation
shall appoint the Appellants and Petitioners in the post of ITI
Helper (Trainee) in TANGEDCO Service within a time frame
fixed by this Hon’ble court.
H
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 585
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

2. The respondent corporation and the appellants & A
petitioners mutually agreed that the appointment to the
appellants and petitioners shall be given only after
verification of the original certificates.
3. The respondent corporation and the appellants &
petitioners mutually agreed that the Appellants and petitioners B
shall be appointed in the post of ITI Helper (Trainee) on
production of original certified copy of the judgment of the
Hon’ble court along with covering letter affixing the
concerned appellant/Petitioner photograph from the counsel
on record in order to avoid any impersonation and future
litigation. No request for seniority, service & other benefits C
will be entertained.
4. As per the respondent corporation’s request, this order will
not apply to the persons, who did not approach this Hon’ble
court in time challenging the selection process and that this
compromise cannot be treated as a precedent as this order is D
binding as between the parties on the basis of the consensus
reached.
5. The respondent corporation and the appellants &
petitioners mutually agreed to bear their respective cost in
the above cases.” E

The above compromise became the basis of a direction by the
Division Bench which required the appellants and petitioners before it,
to be offered employment. The order of the Division Bench 8 (hereafter
“the compromise order”), thus did not decide the lis or the dispute, on its
merits; it merely recorded the terms of the compromise and directed F
TANGEDCO to recruit the appellants/petitioners. The compromise order
reads as follows:
“3. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case
and the submissions made by both the learned counsel, we
find it just and reasonable to pass orders in terms of memo of G
compromise.
4. In view of the joint memo of compromise filed by both the
parties, all these appeals and petitions are disposed of in

8
In W.A. No. 81/ 2015 and batch of cases dated 14.10.2015. H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A terms of the compromise memo. The memo of compromise shall
form part of the judgment and we direct the respondents 1
and 2 to comply with the stipulations in the memo of
compromise within a period of six weeks from the date of
receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs.
B Consequently, connected MPs are closed.”
11. After the compromise order, several other unsuccessful
candidates approached the High Court, claiming parity with the petitioners
and appellants, who were parties to, and had benefited from the order. A
single judge dismissed several of those writ petitions, holding that such
C candidates could not avail the benefit of the compromise order. In another
set of writ petitions, however, the single judge allowed the claims; this
led to TANGEDCO’s appeal before the Division Bench. By its common
judgment and order dated 02.08.2018 (the first set of appeals herein) 9
the candidates’ appeals were dismissed and TANGEDCO’s appeals 10
were allowed. The first set of appeals by aggrieved candidates is directed
D against that common order. The second set of appeals, by TANGEDCO,
is directed against the order which required it to offer employment to
similarly placed candidates who had not approached the court earlier,
but filed writ petitions in 2016, 2017 and 2018.
Contentions of the aggrieved appellants
E
12. On behalf of the aggrieved appellants, Mr. Gautam Narayan,
and Mr. T.B. Sivakumar, learned counsels urged that TANGEDCO acted
unfairly and in a discriminatory manner, in refusing to employ those who
were not parties in the proceedings that led to the compromise order. It
was highlighted that in terms of performance, the aggrieved candidates
F might well have secured better ranking than those 84 unsuccessful
candidates who were offered employment, by the compromise order.
13. The aggrieved appellants urge that there is no distinction
between them and those who were offered employment under the
compromise order. It was submitted that the only difference- and wholly
G immaterial one, is that the other candidates had approached the court
earlier. Counsel submitted that the initiation of litigation cannot be the
basis of any intelligible, or indeed legitimate differentia, as is sought to

9
In W.A. Nos. 574/ 2017, 990/ 2016 and 1696-1702/2018.
H 10
W.A. Nos. 1450-1462/ 2017.
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 587
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

be projected by TANGEDCO. Once it decided to offer employment to A
unsuccessful candidates, despite their alleged poor performance in the
interview, that policy decision had to be implemented fairly and evenly.
Restricting the benefit of employment to those who approached the court
earlier, amounted to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
14. It was further argued by the aggrieved appellants, that B
TANGEDCO did not fill the vacancies in question for an inordinately
long period. The ratio of 1:1 prescribed by the Khalid Commission also
meant that timely recruitment had to be undertaken. The appellants were
placed at a disadvantage; some of them had to approach the court earlier,
to challenge TANGEDCO’s refusal to grant relaxation of the upper age
limit. That relief granted, TANGEDCO resorted to recruitment by C
introducing the alien procedure of interview, which it had committed
earlier to not following. Counsel relied on the decision of this court, in
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Aravind Kumar Srivastava &
others11 where it was held that a public employer is bound to extend
non-discriminatory treatment to all candidates, regardless of whether D
they approach the court or not, and offer employment to similarly situated
candidates and employees.
TANGEDCO’s arguments
15. TANGEDCO, which was represented by Mr. Joydeep Gupta,
learned senior counsel, submitted that the compromise order was not E
based on the merits of the case. The Division Bench merely followed
the compromise memo, and embodied it in its order. Thus, the order
could not have any precedential value; it was binding only on the parties,
and not those who had not approached the court. It was submitted that
though interviews were conducted in 2013 and the present appellants’ F
candidature was rejected, they waited till the compromise order, and
then approached the court belatedly.
16. It was urged that the compromise order was based on an
aberration, because TANGEDCO was bound to appoint only those
candidates who were successful. It could not have conceded and issued G
appointment to the 84 candidates. That error could not be the basis for a
mandamus or direction in a later case. Counsel stressed that courts can
only grant relief, based on legal provisions and their application of the
concerned laws and rules. In the present case, the compromise order
11
(2015) 1 SCC 347 H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A was not based on any rule or law, but on a mere concession. It did not
have any precedential value. Mr Gupta stressed upon the fact that the
compromise order was not one in rem; thus, it was devoid of any legal
basis. The rejection of the appellants’ representation, which was purely
based on the compromise order, was justified.
B 17. Counsel urged that unless it is shown that the concession made
before the court was based on merit, and the court upon its independent
consideration, was satisfied that such concession was justified, such an
order could not be the basis to compel a public employer to extend identical
relief. It was also urged that this court has held in numerous decisions
that a wrong committed on the basis of a wrong order, cannot compel
C the performance of an act which is not justified in law: there is no question
of parity or negative equality.
Analysis and conclusions
18. The facts of this case show that the advertisement or
D notification, calling for eligible candidates, to apply for the post of Helper/
trainee was issued in 2012. The first round of litigation, as it were, was
initiated on the ground that TANGEDCO wrongly denied relaxation of
upper age limit (to apply, for the candidates). This grievance was held to
be justified; the High Court directed grant of such exemption, which
TANGEDCO in turn, complied. When the recruitment process started,
E TANGEDCO clarified that it would conduct an interview, for which it
proposed to grant 15% weightage. Candidates including the present
appellants, and respondent applicants, participated. Those eligible, and
found to be suitable on a combined assessment of the marks obtained
and the viva voce, were appointed. Now, for the first time, some
F unsuccessful candidates approached the High Court. The single judge
rejected their writ petitions. The candidates appealed; others who had
not filed writ petitions in the court, did so, at that stage (in 2015). The
Division Bench, by its compromise order dated 14.10.2015, purely based
on the compromise terms between the aggrieved candidates and
TANGEDCO, directed appointment of 84 persons. The compromise order
G was not based on the merits, nor based on an independent assessment
of the merits of the case.
19. The present aggrieved candidates and several others sought
piggyback on the basis of the compromise order, arguing that they were
similarly situated. They approached the High Court, from 2016 onwards.
H These aggrieved candidates’ petitions were rejected, and their claim for
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 589
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

parity was turned down. They are now here before this court. Another A
set of candidates was more successful; their petitions were allowed;
TANGEDCO is here before this court, in its appeal.
20. A feature that stares at the face of the record before this
court, is that the Division Bench, in its compromise order, proceeded to
accept the terms proposed by the parties. The court did not examine - at B
least its order does not disclose any such consideration - the merits of
the case, and why such proposal was justified in the facts of the case. It
is one thing for a public employer, to concede in the course of proceedings,
to an argument, which it had hitherto clung to, but was untenable. Fairness
demands that public bodies, as model employers, do not pursue untenable
submissions. In such cases, a concession, which is based on law, and C
accords to a just interpretation of the concerned law and/or rules, is
sustainable. However, it is altogether another thing for a public employer,
whose conduct is questioned, and who has succeeded on the merits of
the case before the lower forum (in this case, the single judge) to
voluntarily agree, in an unreasoned manner, to a compromise. The D
harm and deleterious effect of such conduct is to prioritize the claim of
those before the court, when it is apparent that a large body of others,
waiting with a similar grievance (and some of whom probably have a
better or legitimate claim on merits to be appointed) are not parties to
the proceedings. In such cases, a compromise is not only unjustified, it is
contrary to law and public interest. E

21. This court, many years ago, in C. Channabasavaiah v. State
of Mysore12 faced a somewhat analogous situation. In that case, the
state government had appointed sixteen persons pursuant to a
compromise, which invited a charge of unfairness by it, from others who
did not secure such a benefit. The court held that: F

”1. By a notification dated September 26, 1959, the Mysore
Public Service Commission announced that a competitive
examination would be held for direct recruitment for Class I
and Class II posts relating to certain Administrative Services
and numerous applicants including the petitioners themselves G
as candidates. On September 5, 1960, the Public Service
Commission modified the earlier notification and instead of
holding an examination announced that the selection would

12
1965 (1) SCR 360 H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A be made solely on the results of a viva voce test. The
petitioners characterised this change as opposed to the
Mysore Administrative Service Recruitment Rules, 1957 but
during the hearing of these petitions this ground of attack
was abandoned perhaps in view of what happened later.
B 2. The Public Service Commission duly held the viva voce
interviews and on July 29, 1961 they published a list of ninety-
eight candidates who they announced were selected. After
the announcement of the results the State Government sent
for the consideration of the Commission a list of twenty-four
candidates and as the Commission approved of them they were
C also appointed on March 7, 1962. In giving their concurrence
the Commission purported to take power from a foot-note
added to sub-rule (3) of r. 4 of the Mysore Public Service
Commission (Functions) Rules, 1957. Sixteen candidates, who
were not selected, filed petitions under Articles 14, 15 and 16
D of the Constitution in the High Court of Mysore. On November
26, 1962 there was a compromise and the Government
undertook to appoint the petitioners before the High Court.
Of these thirteen had attended the viva voce test but three
had not been called for it. In this way there were three sets of
appointments: the first of ninety-eight candidates, the second
E of twenty-four candidates and the third of sixteen candidates.
There were in all 1,777 applicants who were called for the
viva voce test. A very large number of the applicants was not
called for the test and the High Court of Mysore in the petition
of the three petitioners who had not been called for the viva
F voce test directed the Commission to call them and the
Commission then called 203 candidates who were in the same
category as the three petitioners in the High Court. It may be
pointed out that at the first viva voce test eighty-eight
candidates and at the second test ten candidates were selected,
thus making the total number ninety-eight.
G 3. Encouraged by what had happened to those who had
petitioned to the High Court, the other candidates who had
not succeeded applied for writs under Articles 14, 15 and 16
of the Constitution. Their petitions were summarily dismissed
by the High Court.
H ********* ********* ******
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 591
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

9. Taking the case of the sixteen candidates first, it appears A
to us, that since most of these candidates had obtained fewer
marks than some of the rejected candidates it is impossible to
sustain their selection. To begin with it was wrong of the High
Court to allow a compromise of this kind to be effected when
it was patently obvious that three candidates had not attended
B
the viva voce test at all and there was nothing before the
High Court for comparing the remaining thirteen candidates
with those who had failed in the selection. There were
allegations of nepotism which had not been abandoned and
find now that most of these candidates do not rank as high as
some of the rejected candidates. In such a case the court C
should be slow to accept compromises unless it is made clear
that what is being done dose not prejudice anybody else. To
act otherwise opens the court itself to the charge that it did
something just as bad as what was complained against. In
our opinion, the appointment of these sixteen candidates
D
cannot be accepted and the petitioners are entitled to claim
that their marks should be compared with those obtained by
the petitioners and the selection made on merit and merit alone.
For this purpose, of course, the three candidates who were
not called for the test would have to be called and marks
given to them. Otherwise they cannot be considered at all.” E
In a more recent judgment, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
& Ors. v. Rajubhai Somabhai Bharwad & Ors.13 the question was
whether a sarpanch could enter into a compromise and agree to take
back an employee. This court decisively held that such a compromise
was not legal: F

“17. The purpose of our referring to the same is that the
parliament by the Constitutional amendment required the State
Legislature to bring their State laws in conformity with Part
IX of the Constitution, Power has been conferred on the
Panchayats so that they are able to function as an institution G
of self-Government. The State Legislature has also been
empowered to make provisions by which powers are given to
the Gram Panchayats. Once responsibility is given they are

13
2015 (7) SCC 663 H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A to be carried out with sanguine responsibility. A Sarpanch,
as we perceive in this case, by entering into a settlement has
not only acted contrary to the provisions of the Act and but
also the spirit of the responsibility cast on the local self-
Government.
B 18. In this context, we cannot be oblivious of a very significant
facet. The Labour Court as we find in a single line order has
accepted the settlement and has not made any endeavour to
even find out whether the Sarpanch was authorised with any
kind of resolution to enter into compromise/settlement by the
village panchayat. He should have borne in mind that it is
C not the Sarpanch who was the employer; that much of scrutiny
was required on the part of the Labour Court. It will not be a
hyperbole if it is said that it is the bounden duty on the part
of the presiding officer of the Labour Court to do so and we
say so without any hesitation, for court has a sacred duty to
D scrutinize whether a valid compromise has been entered into
or not. He has to be satisfied that the compromise is lawful.
19. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we allow the appeals
set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and
that of the Labour Court and remit the matter to the Labour
E Court for fresh adjudication.”
22. The lynchpin of the appellant’s submission was their reliance
on Aravind Kumar Srivastava (supra). In that case, this court after
reviewing several cases cited by the parties, had summarized the correct
approach in matters where concession-based orders could (or could not)
F be treated as precedent:
“23. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of
the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the Appellants as well
as the Respondents, can be summed up as under:
(1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is
G given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons
need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing
so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs
to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the
service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time
H
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 593
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated A
similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely
because other similarly situated persons did not approach
the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
(2) However, this principle is subject to well recognized
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as B
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same
and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that
their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in
time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot
C
claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of
similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would
be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the
acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
(3) However, this exception may not apply in those cases where
D
the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem
with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons,
whether they approached the Court or not. With such a
pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to
itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person.
Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the E
decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of
regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma and Ors. v. Union
of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the
Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said
judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and
F
such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can
be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the
judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said
judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their
petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or
acquiescence.” G
Before discussing the ratio of the judgment, it would be useful to
extract the factual context from which the dispute arose:
“9. The moot question which requires determination is as to
whether in the given case, approach of the Tribunal and the
H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A High Court was correct in extending the benefit of earlier
judgment of the Tribunal, which had attained finality as it
was affirmed till the Supreme Court. Whereas the Appellants
contend that the Respondents herein did not approach the
Court in time and were fence-sitters and, therefore, not entitled
to the benefit of the said judgment by approaching the judicial
B
forum belatedly. They also plead some distinguishing features
on the basis of which it is contended that the case of the
Respondents herein is not at par with the matter which was
dealt with by the Tribunal in which order dated June 22, 1987
were passed giving benefit to those candidates who had
C approached the Court at that time.”
23. It is thus, evident that in Aravind Kumar Srivastava (supra)the
previous orders of the tribunal and the court were based on merits
adjudication, and not based on concession; certainly not based on
compromise. It was in the background of such facts that denial of relief
D to similarly situated claims, was held to be unjustified. Most importantly,
for the purpose of this case, the court carved out an exception: that
subsequent litigants, wishing to benefit from orders made in others’ cases,
had to approach the courts in time, without delay or laches. In the facts
of this case, there is no question of any finality to the compromise order:
it cannot be treated, by any stretch of the imagination, as an order in
E rem, or as a binding precedent. Also, the aggrieved appellants, and the
contesting candidates (in TANGEDCO’s appeal) did not approach the
court in time. They woke up after the compromise order, claiming parity,
and filed petitions in the court. Clearly, therefore, they cannot claim any
benefit from the compromise order.
F 24. A principle, axiomatic in this country’s constitutional lore is
that there is no negative equality. In other words, if there has been a
benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of people, without legal
basis or justification, that benefit cannot multiply, or be relied upon as a
principle of parity or equality. In Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land
G Acquisition Officer14, this court ruled that:
“8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the
Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud,
even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases.

H 14
(2013) 14 SCC 81
R. MUTHUKUMAR v. THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING 595
DIRECTOR TANGEDCO [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

The said provision does not envisage negative equality but A
has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly
situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit
inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer
any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a
wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be
B
perpetuated.”
Other decisions have enunciated or applied this principle (Ref:
Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh15, Anand Buttons Ltd. v State of
Haryana 16, K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. 17; Fuljit Kaur v. State of
Punjab18, and Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab19 ). Recently, in The C
State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar Senapati 20 this court observed as
follows:
“If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour
of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order
has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke D
the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating
or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing
a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of
any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim
benefits on the basis of the wrong decision.”
E
25. In view of the foregoing, it is held that the aggrieved appellants,
and the respondent applicants (in TANGEDCO’s appeal) could not claim
the benefit of parity; their writ petitions were founded on the compromise
order, which cannot be justified in law. The appeals of the aggrieved
appellants, against the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the
Madras High Court dated 02.08.2018, has to fail; it is accordingly F
dismissed. For the same reasons, TANGEDCO’s appeals, (against the
order of 29.04.2019 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal Nos.
1071, 1072 of 2016, Writ Petition Nos. 8150, 10266, 10267, l7997, 17998,
29113, 29114, 29115, 29116, 33743, 33744, 33745, 39292, 39673, 41609,
G
15
(1995) 1 SCC 745
16
(2005) 9 SCC 164
17
(2006) 3 SCC 581
18
(2010) 11 SCC 455
19
(2014) 15 SCC 715
20
2019 SCC Online SC 1207 H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R.

A 41610 of 2016, and Writ Petition Nos. 13948 13949, 13950, 13951, 13952,
13953, of 2017, Writ Petition Nos. 1808, 18576, 18624 of 2018) succeed
and are allowed. In the circumstances of this case, there shall be no
order as to costs.

B Devika Gujral Directions issued.

C

D

E

F

G

H