PURUSHOTIAM DASHRATH BORATE &ANR.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 392
- Decided
- 8 May 2015
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- H L DATTU
Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the death sentences, holding that the case falls within the "rarest of rare" category and the mitigating factors do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Summary
The accused, a cab driver and his accomplice, abducted a young woman who was a night‑shift employee, gang‑raped her and murdered her in a pre‑planned, brutal manner. The prosecution proved the crime through a chain of circumstantial evidence, forensic findings and confessional statements, leading to convictions under IPC sections 302, 376(2)(g), 364, 404 and 120‑8 and the award of death sentences. The appellants argued that their age, lack of prior record and family circumstances were mitigating factors warranting commutation to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court examined the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, emphasizing the extreme depravity, breach of trust, and the threat to societal order, and applied the "rarest of rare" doctrine. It held that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the heinous nature of the offence and affirmed the death penalty. The appeal was dismissed, confirming the lower courts' judgments.
Issues considered
- The appropriateness of the death penalty under the "rarest of rare" doctrine for the accused.
- Whether the mitigating circumstances of age, family background and lack of prior criminal record outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
- Whether the convictions under IPC sections 302, 376(2)(g), 364, 404 and 120‑8 are legally sustainable.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 366
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-8, s. 302, s. 364, s. 376(2)(g), s. 404
Subjects
Judgment
[2015] 5 S.C.R. 1112
A PURUSHOTIAM DASHRATH BORATE &ANR.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal No.1439of2013)
B
MAYOS, 2015
[H. L. DATTU, CJI, S.A. BOBDE AND ARUN MISHRA,
JJ.]
c Penal Code, 1860: ss;302, 376(2)(g), 364 and 404 rlw
s. 120-8 - Rape and murder- Victim-deceased girl working
in night shift and commuted in cab hired by the company -
On fateful day, accused driver alongwith co-accused
committed her rape and murder - Conviction based on
D circumstantial evidence and imposition of death sentence -
Accused-appellants seeking commutation of sentence -
Held: The extreme depravity with which the deceased girl
was done to death coupled with the other factors including
the position of trust held by accused driver would tilt balance
E between aggravating and mitigating circumstances greatly
against accused-appellants - Accused No. 1 abducted the
deceased with help of accused No. 2, and subsequently they
raped and murdered her - They did not show any regret,
sorrow or repentance at any point of time during the
F commission of the heinous offence, nor thereafter, rather they
acted in a normal manner after commission of crime - The
manner in which the commission of the offence was so
meticulously and carefully planned coupled with the sheer
G brutality and apathy for humanity in the execution of the
offence, in every probability they have potency to commit
similar offence in future - Both the accused persons have
proved to be a menace to society which strongly negates the
probability that they can be reformed or rehabilitated - The
H mitigating circumstances were wholly absent in the present
1112
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1113
MAHARASHTRA
factual matrix - Interference with death sentence not called A
for.
Sentence/Sentencing: Death sentence - Aggravating
and mitigating circumstances - Discussed.
B
Criminal law: Rule of proportionality - Held: Criminal
law requires strict rule of proportionality in awarding
punishment and same must be in accordance with the
culpability of criminal act.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court c
HELD: 1. Protection of society and stamping out
.criminal proclivity must be the object of law which may
be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence.
Therefore, in this context, the vital function that this Court D
is required to discharge is to mould. the sentencing
system to meet this challenge. The facts and given·
circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the
manner in which it was planned· and committed, the
motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the E
accused and all other attending circumstances are
relevant facts which would enter into the area of
consideration. Based on the facts of the case, this Court
is required to be stern where it should be and tempered F
with mercy where warranted. [Para 23] [1128-F-H]
.Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh 2012 (3) SCR 630
= (2012) 4 SCC 257; Macchi Singh and Ors. v. state of
Punjab 1983 (3) SCR 413 = (1983) 3 SCC 470;
· Mahesh v. state of M.P. 1987 (2) SCR710 = (1987) 3 G
SCC80; SevakaPeromalv. StateofT.N.1991 (2)SCR
711= (1991) 3 SCC 471; Mofil Khan v. State of
Jharl<hand (2015) 1 SCC 67; B.A. Umesh v. High Court
of Kamataka 2011 (2) SCR 367 = (2011) 3 SCC 85 -
H
relied on.
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A 2. In the facts of the present case, age alone cannot
be a paramount consideration as a mitigating
circumstance. Similarly, family background of the
accused also could not be said to be a mitigating
· circumstance. Insofar as Accused No.1 is concerned, it
B has been contended that he was happily married and
his wife was pregnant at the relevant time. However, the
Accused No.1 did not take into consideration the
condition of his wife or his mother while committing the
said offence and, as a result, his wife deserted him and
C his widowed mother is being looked after by his nephew
and niece. Insofar as Accused No.2 is concerned, he has
two sisters who are looking after his widowed mother.
Lack of criminal antecedents also cannot be considered
as mitigating circumstance, particularly taking into
0
consideration, the nature of heinous offence and cold
and calculated manner in which it was committed by the
accused persons. [Para 33] [1136-B-E]
3. The "rarest of the rare" case exists when an
E accused would be a menace or, threat to and
incompatible with harmony in the society. In a case
where the accused does not act on provocation or on
the spur of the moment, but meticulously executes a
F deliberate, cold-blooded and pre-planned crime, giving
scant regard to the consequences of the same, the
precarious balance in the sentencing policy evolved by
our criminal jurisprudence would tilt heavily towards the
death sentence. Criminal law requires strict adherence
G to the rule of proportionality in awarding punishment,
and the same must be in accordance with the culpability
of the criminal act. In the instant factual matrix, accused
No.1 abducted the deceased with help of accused No.2,
and subsequently they raped and murdered her. They
H did not show any regret, sorrow or repe_ntance at any
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1115
MAHARASHTRA
point of time during the commission of th.e heinous A
offence, nor thereafter, rather they acted in a disturbingly
normal manner after commission of crime. It has been
established by strong and cogent evidence that after the
commission of the gruesome crime, accused No.2
accompanied accused No.1 for the second pick up and B
exited the cab only prior to reaching the gate of the
Company. Further, accused No.1 attempted to create
false record of the whereabouts of the cab and the cause
of the delay in arriving at the workplace. In addition, even
though the accused-appellants were seen by PW-12, that C
the deceased repeatedly questioned them of the unusual
route, or that the deceased was talking to a friend on the
phone during the journey, nothing deterred them from
committing the heinous offences. Both the accused
0
persons have been proved to be a menace to society
which strongly negates the probability that they can be
reformed or rehabilitated. The mitigating circumstances
are wholly absent in the present factual matrix. This
appeal is not a case where the offence was committed E
by the accused persons under influence of extreme
mental or emotional disorder, nor is it a case where the
offence may be argued to be a crime of passion or one
committed at the spur of the moment. [paras 34, 35, .36]
[1136-F-H; 1137-A-E, G-H; 1138-A] F
4. In view of the gruesome act of raping a victim
who had reposed her trust in the accused followed by a
cold-blooded and brutal murder of the said victim
coupled with the calculated and remorseless conduct G
of the accused persons after the commission of the
offence, the depravity of the appellants' offence would
attract no lesser sentence than the death penalty. In
addition to the above, it would be necessary for this Court
to notice the impact of the crime on the community and H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A particularly women working in the night shifts at Pune,
which is considered as a hub of Information Technology
Centre. In recent years, the rising crime rate, particularly
violent crimes against women has made the criminal
sentencing by the Courts a subject of concern. The
B sentencing policy adopted by the Courts, in such cases,
ought to have a stricter yardstick so as to act as a
deterrent. There are a shockingly large number of cases
where the sentence of punishment awarded to the
accused is not in· proportion to the gravity and
C magnitude of the offence thereby encouraging the
criminal and in the ultimate making justice suffer by
weakening the system's credibility. The object of
sentencing policy should be to see that the crime does
not go unpunished and the victim of crime as also the
0
society has the satisfaction that justice has been done
to it. [paras 37, 38] [1138-D-H; 1139-A]
5. It is true that any case of rape and murder would
cause a shock to the society but all such offences may
E not cause revulsion in society. Certain offences shock
the collective conscience of the court and community.
The heinous offence of gang-rape of an innocent and
helpless young woman by those in whom she had
F reposed trust, followed by a cold-blooded murder and
calculated attempt of cover-up is one such instance of a
crime which shocks and repulses the collective
conscience of the community and the court. Therefore,
in light of the said settled principle, this Court has no
G hesitation in holding that this case falls within the
category of "rarest of rare"~ which merits death penalty
and none else. The judgment and order passed by the
Courts below does not suffer from any error whatsoever.
lparas 39, 40] [1139-C-E, G]
H Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684;
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1117
MAHARASHTRA
Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal 1994 (1) A
SCR 37 : (1994) 2 SCC 220; Devender Pal Singh v.
State of NCT of Delhi 2002 (2) SCR 767 : (2002) 5
SCC 234; Aqeel Ahmed v. State of UP 2008 (17)
SCR1330: (2008) 16 SCC 372; Atbir Singh v. Govt. of
NCT of Delhi 2010 (9) SCR 993 = (2010) 9 sec 1 - B
relied on
Case Law Reference
(1980) 2 sec 684 Relied on. Para 14
c
1983 (3) SCR 413 Relied on. Para 14
1994 (1) SCR 37 Relied on. Para 14
2002 (2) SCR 767 Relied on. Para 14
2008 (17) SCR 1330 Relied on. Para 14 ·D
2010 (9) SCR 993 Relied on. Para 14
2012 (3) SCR 630 Relied on. Para 25
1987 (2) SCR 710 Relied on. Para 26
E
1991 (2) SCR 711 Relied on. Para 26
(2015) 1 sec 67 Relied on. Para 26
2011 (2) SCR 367 Relied on. Para 27
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 1439 of 2013
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2012,
13.09.2012, 24.09.2012, 25.09.2012 of the High Court of
G
Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 632 of 2012
Charu Mathur, Shovan Mishra for the Appellants.
Arun R. Pednekar, Aniruddha P. Mayee for the
Respondent. H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H. L. DATTU, CJI. 1. This appeal is directed against the
judgment and order, passed by the High Court of Judicature
for Maharashtra at Bombay in Confirmation Case No.1 of2012
B and Criminal Appeal No.632 of 2012, dated 12.09.2012,
13.09.2012, 24.09.2012 and 25.09.2012. By the impugned
judgment and order, the High Court has confirmed the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Court of
Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No.284 of 2008,
C dated 20.03.2012, whereby the learned Sessions Judge has
convicted the accused-appellants for the offence under
Sections 302, 376(2)(g), 364 and 404 read with Section 120-
B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, "the IPC") and
consequently awarded death sentence.
·D
2. The Prosecution case in a nutshell is: The deceased
was residing with her brother-in-law and sister, namely PW-
12 and PW-13 respectively, along with their minor son, in a flat
in Pune City. She was serving as an Associate in the BPO
E Branch of Wipro Company in Pune (for short, "the Company")
for about a year, where she used to work in the night-shift, i.e.
from 11 :00 p.m. to 09:00 a.m: The fateful day was to be her
last day since she had tendered her resignation one month
prior. The Company had arranged for and hired a private cab
F service to transport its employees from their residence to the
workplace and back at the conclusion of their respective work-
shifts. Further, to ensure the safety and security of its female
employees the Company imposed a mandatory condition,
upon the owner of the cab, that a security guard be present in
G the said vehicle, if a female employee was being transported.
3. On the fateful day, being 01.11.2007, the cab was
deputed to pick up the deceased from her residence at 10:30
p.m., following which the cab would collect three other
H employees df the Company. As per the usual practice, at about
PURUSHOTIAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1119
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATIU, CJI.)
10:15 p.m., the deceased received a missed call from the A
driver of the cab, Purushottam Borate, namely Accused No.1,
informing her of the pick-up. The deceased called back the
Accused No.1 to pick her up in 10 minutes to take herto the
workplace, upon which PW-12 and his son went down from
their flat to drop her to the cab. At the time of the pick-up, B
Pradeep Kokade, namely Accused No.2, was sitting in the
rears.eat behind the driver. The next employee to be collected
by the cab was one Sagar Bidkar, i.e. PW-11, and the expected
time of the said pick up was at about 10:45 p.m.
c
4. During the journey, between 10:30 p.m. and 11 :00 p.m.,
the deceased received calls on her mobile phone by one
Jeevan Baral, a friend of the deceased residing in Bangalore,
namely PW-14, who heard the former questioning the Accused
No.1 as to where he was taking the cab, why he had stoppsd D
in a jungle and what he was doing. Thereafter, the phone call
between the deceased and PW-14 was abruptly disconnected
and subsequent attempts by the latter to call the deceased
were rendered futile as her mobile phone was found to be
switched off. Further, PW-14 was unable to contact either the E
Pune Police or the relatives of the deceased in Pune till the
following day.·
5. It is the case of the prosecution that the Accused No.1
and 2, being aware of the fact that the deceased would be F ·
travelling to her workplace that night and that she would be the
· first to be collected, under the guise of taking the deceased to
the said workplace, hatched a conspiracy to abduct her and
take her to a secluded spot. The prosecution has alleged that,
.in the time period between the abrupt end to the G
aforementioned phone call with PW-14 and the pick-up of PW-
11 at about 12:45 a.m., the Accused No.1 and 2 committed
the heinous offence of gang-rape and thereafter murdered her
by means of strangulating her with her own Odhani, slashing H
a
her wrist with a blade and smashing her head with stone.
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A Further, that the accused-appellants stripped the deceased of
her possessions and money and then left her body in the field
of one Kisan Bodke.
6. Thereafter, the cab in question, containing the Accused
B No.1 and 2, arrived at about 12:45 a.m., i.e. delayed by nearly
two hours, to pick up PW-11 from his residence. At the time,
the deceased was no longer present in the cab. The Accused
No.1 informed the PW-11 that neither the deceased nor the
other employees had come for work that day and the cause of
C the delay was on account of a punctured tyre. The Accused
No.2 vacated the cab shortly before the Accused No.1 brought
the PW-11 to the workplace.
7. On the following morning, being 02.11.2007, one
o Pankaj Laxman Bodke, i.e. PW-8, noticed the dead body of
a female on the boundary of the field of Kisan Bodke and
therefore informed one Hiraman Bodke, i.e. PW-1, of the same.
PW-1, after verifying the information, informed the Police
Station, Talegaon Dabhade, where an FIR was promptly
E lodged. Therefore, an offence under Section 302 of the IPC
was registered and the spot panchanama was prepared in
the presence of PW-3. Inquest report and panchanama was
also prepared in the presence of PW-2 and thereafter the body
of the deceased was sent for post-mortem examination.
F Furthermore, bloodstained stone, a pair of ladies sandal,
bloodstained blade, soil mixed with blood and sample soil was
seized from the spot of the incident. The clothes found on the
body of the deceased, after the post-mortem examination,
were also duly seized. Dr. Waghmare, i.e. PW-16, who
G performed the post-mortem examination, gave the opinion that
the cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage due to
grievous injuries to vital organs with skull fracture involving
frontal, left temporal, parietal bone with laceration to brain with
H fractured ribs, right lung ruptured with strangulation. Further,
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1121
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATTU, CJI.]
on the basis of the report of the Chemical Analyzer, PW-16 A
gave the opinion that the deceased was a victim of the offence
of rape prior to her death.
8. In the meanwhile, on 02.11.2007 itself, due to the fact
that the deceased had not returned home the next day, her B
sister, i.e. PW-13, started to make enquiries as to her
whereabouts. PW-13 was informed by the Company that the
deceased had not reported to the workplace on the previous
night. Further, PW-13 received information, from PW-14, about
the events pertaining to the telephonic conversation with the C
deceased between 10:30 p.m. and 11 :00 p.m. on that fateful
night. Therefore, a missing persons report was immediately
filed that evening itself in the Chatushringi Police Station.
9.0n 03.11.2007, PW-12 and PW-13were informed that o
a dead body has been recovered within the jurisdiction of the
Talegaon Dabhade Police Station. Consequently, the said PW-
12 and PW-13 reached the Police Station and on the basis of
a photograph of the body of the deceased and the clothes that
were seized, they confirmed the identity of the deceased. E
Furthermore, the PW-12 and PW-13 also confirmed that the
body atthe morgue was that of the deceased.
10. After the aforesaid FIR, dated 02.11.2007, was
registered, the Police duly initiated an investigation and made F
inquires with the Company. Consequently, the Accused No.1
and 2 were taken into custody, at about 05:30 a.m., on
03.11.2007. Thereafter, based on confessional statements of
the accused-appellants, the police were able to recover the
stolen items belonging to the deceased, from their respective G
houses, namely sim card, mobile phone, ear ring, watch, gold
ring. The vehicle in which the deceased was taken by the
accused-appellants was also seized and the panchanama was
prepared. Further, the Test Identification Parade was
conducted, on 14.01.2008, wherein the PW-12 identified the H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A Accused No. 1 and 2 as the persons in the cab with the
deceased.
11. Pursuant to the investigations, a charge-sheet was
duly filed by the police. On 05.03.2009, the charges were
B framed under Sections 364, 376(2)(g) and 302 read with 34
and 404 read with 34 of the IPC. On 03.04.2010, the charge
was altered and the independent charge of conspiracy under
Section 120-8 of the IPC was added. Additionally, the charge
under Section 120-8 of the IPC was added with the charge
C under Sections 302, 376(2)(g), 364 and 404 of the IPC. The
accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges
and thus, the case was committed to trial.
12. During the course of the Trial, the prosecution
o examined 29 witnesses of which 11 were examined on the
aspect of circumstantial evidence and 2 were doctors to
establish the factum of rape and murder. PW-1, the Police Patil
who registered the complaint personally, maintained his version
as stated in the FIR, dated 02.11.2007, that PW-8 was the
E person who found the body of the deceased and informed the
. complainant of the same. PW-12, the brother-in-law of the
deceased, deposed that he was the last person to see the
latter alive and that too in the company of the accused-
appellants. The statement of PW-14, that he was the last person
F to talk to the deceased between 10:30 p.m. and 11 :00 p.m.,
was supported by documentary evidence, i.e. call records. The
evidence of PW-12, PW-13 and PW-14, in respect of the
whereabouts of the deceased on the fateful night, and with
regard to the identity of the accused-appellants was found to
G be consistent and trustworthy. Furthermore, based on the
confessional statements of the accused-appellants, the police
were able to recover the vehicle, the items stolen from the body
of the deceased as well as the Odhani of the deceased, which
H was found to be one of the tools used to commit murder, i.e.
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1123
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATIU, CJI.]
by way of strangulation. The Odhani and clothes of the A
deceased that was recovered, after chemical analysis, was
found to contain semen stains of both the accused-appellants.
Further that, on the basis of the vaginal swab taken during the
post-mortem examination and the report of the Chemical
Analyzer, it has been shown that semen of both the accused- B
appellants was found in the said swab as well.
13. The Sessions Court, upon meticulous consideration
of the material on record and the submissions made by the
parties, observed that the evidence of the prosecution formed C
a chain so complete that it excluded any hypothesis other than
the guilt of the accused-appellants. It concluded that the
testimonies of PW-12, PW-13, PW-14, PW-1 and PW-11 are
true and reliable and that the same along with the evidence of
PW-16, the post-mortem report and the report of the Chemical D·
Analyzer support the case of the prosecution. The Sessions
Court has noticed that the evidence of PW-12, which states
that the deceased was last seen in the company of accused-
appellants, coupled with the lack of explanation for the same
by the accused-app,ellants in their statements under Section E
313 of the Code, provides a firm link in the chain of
circumstances. The Sessions Court observed that the
accused-appellants have failed miserably in discharging their
burden of proving that the deceased was not in their company F
or that their cab suffered a punctured tyre. Further, that the
recoveries made at the instance of the accused-appellants,
including the vehicle in question, the belongings of the
deceased in the respective houses of the accused-appellants,
the Odhani of the deceased which was used as a weapon of G
murder along with the medical evidence and testimony of PW-
16 establish the factum of commission of the crime by the
accused-appellants. The subsequent conduct of the accused-
appellants, where they continued to pick-up PW-11 and lied to
him about the cause of the delay and the whereabouts of the H
1124 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A deceased, has been found to be compatible with their guilt
and in consonance with their meticulously chalked out plan for
the commission of the offence of gang-rape and murder.
Therefore, in light of the aforesaid, the Sessions Court
concluded that the chain of circumstances evince beyond any
B reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants have committed
the heinous offence of rape and murder of the deceased.
14. With regard to the quantum of sentence, the Sessions
Court noticed the well-settled principles laid down by this Court
C in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684;
Macchi Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC470;
Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (1994) 2 SCC
220; Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2002) 5
SCC 234; Aqeel Ahmed v. State of UP, (2008) 16 SCC 372
D and Atbir Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 9 SCC 1.
Further, on due consideration to the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances present in the facts of the case, the Sessions
Court observed that the balance was clearly tilting against the
accused-appellants. After affording an opportunity of hearing
E to the accused-appellants on the question of sentence, the
· Sessions Court has awarded them death sentence and fine
of Rs.5,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section
120-B of the IPC, death sentence and fine of Rs.5,000/-each
F for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section
120-B of the IPC; imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5,000/-
forthe offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) read with
Section 120-B of the IPC; imprisonment for life and fine of
Rs.5,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 364
G read with Section 120-B of the IPC; and rigorous imprisonment
for two years and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each for the offence
punishable under Section 404 read with Section 120-B of the
IPC. The Sessions Court, in its order of sentence, has noticed
that the accused-appellants committed and executed the
H heinous offences in a pre-planned and meticulous manner
PURUSHOTIAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1125
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATIU, CJI.]
which showed the determination of both the accused to A
complete the crime and take away the life of the accused. The
Sessions Court observed that the extreme depravity with which
the offences were committed and the merciless manner in ·
which the deceased was raped and done to death, coupled
with the gross abuse of the position of trust held by the Accused B
No.1 and the lack of remorse or repentance for any of their
actions, would clearly indicate that the given case was fit to be
placed within the category of "rarest of rare" and the only
punishment proportionate to the brutality exhibited by the
accused-appellants would be the death penalty. C
15. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the
accused-appellants filed an appeal before the High Court
which was heard along with the Reference for confirmation of
death sentence under Section 366 Code of Criminal D
Procedure, 1973 (for short, "the Code") and disposed of by a
common judgment and order, dated 12.09.2012, 13.09.2012,
24.09.2012 and 25.09.2012.
16. The High Court has, vide the impugned judgment and E
order, elaborately dealt with the entire evidence on record and
extensively discussed the judgment and order of the Sessions
Court in order to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the
conviction and sentence awarded to the accused-appellants.
The High Court has carefully examined the evidence on record F
including testimonies of the Prosecution Witnesses and
recorded the finding that the said statements do not reflect
any discrepancy or inconsistency of facts and therefore must
be considered as cogent, reliable and incontrovertible
evidence. Further, that the medical evidence and the deposition G
by PW-16, i.e. the doctor who conducted the post-mortem
_examination, clearly indicates the commission of the offence
of rape and the brutal murder of the deceased. The High Court
has taken note of the statement of the PW-16 that the probable H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A cause of death was shock and hemorrhage due to grievous
injury to vital organs with skull fracture involving frontal, left
temporal, parietal bone with laceration to brain, fracture to the
ribs and right lung rupture with strangulation, and further that
the strangulation was committed by overpowering the
B deceased suddenly from behind. On the basis of the medical
report as well as the Chemical Analyzer's report, the High Court
has observed that the factum of commission of the offence of
rape bytheAccused No.1 and 2 has been conclusively proved.
The High Court has recorded that the recovery of weapons of
C murder from the place where the body of the deceased was
located as well as from the house of the Accused No.1, the
latter being at the instance of a confession by the said accused,
has also been established beyond any shadow of doubt. In
D light of the chain of circumstantial evidence having been
estab~shed beyond any reasonable doubt, the High Court has
concluded towards the guilt of accused-appellants and
confirmed the judgment of conviction passed by the Sessions
Court.
E 17. With respect of the quantum of sentence, the High
Court has noticed the well-settled law laid down by this Court
and concluded that the present case falls under the category
of "rarest of rare". The High Court has observed that the heinous
F acts have been committed by the accused-appellants in a
diabolical and cold-blooded manner without any hesitation and
undeterred by its consequences. Further, that the manner of
commission of the offence coupled with their subsequent
conduct obliterates any chance of reformation and that there
G is no guarantee that the accused-appellants would not commit
the same or similar offence if they were released. Therefore,
the High Court confirmed the death sentence awarded by the
Sessions Court.
18. The accused-appellants, aggrieved by the aforesaid
H
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1127
. MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATIU, CJI.]
confirmation of death sentence awarded to them, are before A
us in this appeal.
19. At the outset, it would be pertinent to note that this
Court has issued notice on the limited issue of the sentence,
by order dated 04.07.2013. Therefore, the learned counsel B
would limit her case only to the question of determination of
quantum of sentence awarded by the Courts below and seek
for commutation of the said sentence.
20. Learned counsel for the accused-appellants would c
vehemently argue in favour of commutation of the death
sentence awarded to the appellants as the case did not fall
within the purview of "rarest of rare" cases. Further, she would
submit that, in the present case, the mitigating circumstances
outweighed the aggravating circumstances, namely that the D
age of the accused-appellants, the absence of any criminal
antecedents and the possibility that they could be reformed
and rehabilitated would reflect that a sentence of life
imprisonment would suffice the ends of justice. Per contra,
the learned counsel for the respondent-State would seek to E
support the judgment and order passed by the High Court and
Sessions Court.
21. We have given our anxious consideration to the
arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties to the F
appeal and also carefully scrutinized the evidence on record
as well as the judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the Courts
below.
22. We do not intend to saddle the judgment with the G
settled position of law in respect of the sentencing policy and
the principles evolved by this Court for weighing the aggravating
and mitigating factors in specific facts of the case. However, it
would be apposite to notice the decision of this Court in the
case of Bachan Singh (supra), wherein the constitutional H
1128 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS : [2015]5S.C.R.
A validity of the provisions that authorize the Tri_al Court to award
. death sentence for the offence punishable under Section 302
of the IPC and other offences was upheld. However, this Court
observed that there can be no strait jacket formula which can
be applied in each case and that while considering the
B sentence to be awarded, the Court must look into the
aggr?vating and mitigating circumstances. The ratio of the
decisicin in Bachari Singh (supra) has been followed in the
case of Machhi Singh (supra) wherein this Court held that the
manner of commission, motive for commission, anti-social
C nature of crime, magnitude of crime and personality of victim
ought to be kept in mind while awarding an. appropriate
sentence. It was held that a balance sheet of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so,
the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage
0
and a balance has to be struck.
23. It is an established position that law regulates social
interests and arbitrates conflicting claims and demands.
Security of persons is a fundamental function of the State which
E can be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law.. The
society today has been infected with a lawlessness that has
gravely undermined social order. Protection of society and
stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which
F may be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence.
Therefore, in this context, the vital function that this Court is
required to discharge is to mould the sentencing system to
meet this challenge. The facts and given circumstances in each
case, the nature of the crime; the manner in which it was
G planned and committed, the motive for commission of the
crime, the conduct of the" accused and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts Vfhich would enter into the
area of consideration. Based on the facts of the case, this
Court is required to be stem where it should be and tempered
H with mercywherewarranted. · ·
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1129
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATTU, CJI.]
24. In this context, it would be profitable to notice the A
manner in which this Court has considered the sentencing
policy vis-a-vis certain aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
25. In the case of Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, B
(2012) 4 SCC 257, this Court referred to the Bachan Singh
case (supra) and Machhi Singh case (supra) to cull out certain
principles governing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. It would be beneficial to refer to the same
herein below: c
''Aggravating circumstances
(1) The offences relating to the commission of heinous
crimes like murder, rape, armed dacoity, kidnapping,
.D
etc. by the accused with a prior record of conviction for
capital felony or offences committed by the person
having a substantial history of serious assaults and
criminal convictions.
(2) The offence was committed while the offender was E
engaged in the commission of another serious offence.
(3) The offence was committed with the intention to
create a fear psychosis in the public at large and was
committed in a public place by a weapon or device F
which clearly could be hazardous to the life of more than
one person.
(4) The offence of murder was committed for ransom or
like offences to receive money or monetary benefits. G
(5) Hired killings.
(6) The offence was committed outrageously for want
only while involving inhumane treatment and torture to
H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5S.C.R.
A the victim.
(7) The offence was committed by a person while in
lawful custody.
(8) The murder or the offence was committed to prevent
B
a person lawfully carrying out his duty like arrest or
custody in a place of lawful confinement of himself or
another. For instance, murder is of a person who had
acted in lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43
c CrPC.
(9) When the crime is enormous in proportion like
making an attempt of murder of the entire family or
members of a particular community.
D (10) When the victim is innocent, helpless or a person
relies upon the trust of relationship and social norms,
like a child, helpless woman, a daughter or a niece
staying with a father/uncle and is inflicted with the crime
by such a trusted person.
E
(11) When murder is committed for a motive which
evidences total depravity and meanness.
(12) When there is a cold-blooded murder without
F provocation.
(13) The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or
shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the
conscience of the society.
G Mitigating circumstances
(1) The manner and circumstances in and under which
the offence was committed, for example, extreme
mental or emotional disturbance or extreme
H provocation in contradistinction to all these situations
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1131
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATTU, CJI.]
in normal course. A
(2) The age of the accused is a relevant consideration
but not a determinative factor by itself.
.(3) The chances of the accused of not indulging in
commission of the crime again and the probability of
B
the accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
(4) The condition of the accused shows that he was
mentally defective and the defect impaired his capacity
to appreciate the circumstances of his criminal conduct. c
(5) The circumstances which, in normal course of life,
would render such a behaviour possible and could have
the effect of giving rise to mental imbalance in that given
situation like persistent harassment or; in fact, leading D
to such a peak of human behaviour that, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the accused believed
that he was morally justified in committing the offence.
(6) Where the court upon proper appreciation of E
evidence is of the view that the crime was not committed
in a preordained manner and that the death resulted in
the course of commission of another crime and that
there was a possibility of it being construed as
consequences to the commission of the primary crime. F
(7) Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely upon the
testimony of a sole eyewitness though the prosecution
has brought home the guilt of the accused."
G
26. Further, it has been held by this Court that undue
sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm
to the justice system by undermining the public confidence in ·
.the efficacy of law [See Mahesh v. State of M.P., (1987) 3
SCC 80; Sevaka Perumalv. State ofT.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471 H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A and Motil Khan v. State of Jharkhand, (2015) 1 SCC 67). To
give the lesser punishment for the accused would be to render
the judicial system of the country suspect. If the courts do not
protect the injured, the injured would then resort to private
vengeance. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award
B proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence
and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc.
27. In the case of B.A. Umesh v. High Court ofKamataka,
(2011) 3 SCC 85, the appellant was accused of a brutal rape
C and murder of a lady. It was found, by medical evidence, that
the deceased therein was a victim of a violent rape prior to
death and the death was caused due to as asphyxiation.
Further, the medical report found that the body of the deceased
has several abrasions and lacerations. This Court, noticing
D the brutal and violent manner of commission of the offences
confirmed the death sentence to the accused therein. It was
held that:
"84. As has been indicated by the courts below, the
E antecedents of the appellant and his subsequent
conduct indicates that he is a menace to the society
and is incapable of rehabilitation. The offences
committed by the appellant were neither under duress
nor on provocation and an innocent life was snuffed out
F by him after committing violent rape on the victim ...."
28. In the Sevaka Perumal case (supra), the counsel for
the appellants therein contended that considering the young
age of the accused, the same would be a strong mitigating
G factor in favour of commutation of death sentence. It was
contended therein that the accused were the breadwinners of
their family which consisted of a young wife, minor child and
aged parents. However, this Court, finding no force in the said
contention, observed that such compassionate grounds are
H present in most cases and are not relevant for interference in
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1127
. MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATTU, CJI.]
confirmation of death sentence awarded to them, are before A
us in this appeal.
19. At the outset, it would be pertinent to note that this
Court has issued notice on the limited issue of the sentence,
by order dated 04.07.2013. Therefore, the learned counsel B
would limit her case only to the question of determination of
quantum of sentence awarded by the Courts below and seek
for commutation of the said sentence.
20. Learned counsel for the accused-appellants would c
vehemently argue in favour of commutation of the death
sentence awarded to the appellants as the case did not fall
within the purview of "rarest of rare" cases. Further, she would
submit that, in the present case, the mitigating circumstances
outweighed the aggravating circumstances, namely that the D
age of the accused-appellants, the absence of any criminal
antecedents and the possibility that they could be reformed
and rehabilitated would reflect that a sentence of life
imprisonment would suffice the ends of justice. Per contra,
the learned counsel for the respondent-State would seek to E
support the judgment and order passed by the High Court and
Sessions Court.
21. We have given our anxious consideration to the
arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties to the F
appeal and also carefully scrutinized the evidence on record
as well as the judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the Courts
below.
22. We do not intend to saddle the judgment with the G
settled position of law in respect of the sentencing policy and
the principles evolved by this Court for weighing the aggravating
and mitigating factors in specific facts of the case. However, it
would be apposite to notice the decision of this Court in tl1e
case of Bachan Singh (supra), wherein the constitutional H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015) 5 S.C.R.
A validity of the provisions that authorize the Trial Court to award
.death sentence for the offence punishable under Section 302
of the IPC and other offences was upheld. However, this Court
observed that there can be no strait jacket formula which can
be applied in each case and that while considering the
B sentence to be awarded, the Court must look into the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The ratio of the
decision in Bachan Singh (supra) has been followed in the
case of Machhi Singh (supra) wherein this Court held that the
manner of commission, motive for commission, anti-social
C nature of crime, magnitude of crime and personality of victim
ought to be kept in mind while awarding an appropriate
sentence. It was held that a balance sheet of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so,
the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage
0
and a balance has to be struck.
23. It is an established position that law regulates social
interests and arbitrates conflicting claims and demands.
Security of persons is a fundamental function of the State which
E can be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. The
society today has been infected with a lawlessness that has
gravely undermined social order. Protection of society and
stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which
F may be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence.
Therefore, in this context, the vital function that this Court is
required to discharge is to mould the sentencing system to
meet this challenge. The facts and given circumstances in each
case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was
G planned and committed, the motive for commission of the
crime, the conduct of the accused and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the
area of consideration. Based on the facts of the case, this
Court is required to be stern where it should be and tempered
H with mercy where warranted.
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1131
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATTU, CJI.]
in normal course. A
(2) The age of the accused is a relevant consideration
but not a determinative factor by itself.
.(3) The chances of the accused of not indulging in
B
commission of the crime again and the probability of
the accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
(4) The condition of the accused shows that he was
mentally defective and the defect impaired his capacity
to appreciate the circumstances of his criminal conduct. c
(5) The circumstances which, in normal course of life,
would render such a behaviour possible and could have
the effect of giving rise to mental imbalance in that given
situation like persistent harassment or, in fact, leading D
to such a peak of human behaviour that, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the accused believed
that he was morally justified in committing the offence.
(6) Where the court upon proper appreciation of E
evidence is of the view that the crime was not committed
in a preordained manner and that the death resulted in
the course of commission of another crime and that
there was a possibility of it being construed as
consequences to the commission.of the primary crime. F
(7) Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely upon the
testimony of a sole eyewitness though the prosecution
has brought home the guilt of the accused."
G
26. Further, it has been held by this Court that undue
sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm
to the justice system by undermining the public confidence in ·
the efficacy of law [See Mahesh v. State of M.P., (1987) 3
. SCC 80; Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471 H
1132 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [2015]5S.C.R.
A and Mofil Khan v. State ofJharkhand, (2015) 1 SCC 67]. To
give the lesser punishment forthe accused would be to render
the judicial system of the country suspect. If the courts do not
protect the injured, the injured would then resort to private
vengeance. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award
B proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence
and the.manner in which it was executed or committed etc.
27. In the case of B.A. Umesh v. High Court ofKamataka,
(2011) 3 SCC 85,the appellant was accused of a brutal rape
C and murder of a lady. It was found, by medical evidence, that
the deceased therein was a victim of a violent rape prior to
death and the death was caused due to as asphyxiation.
Further, the medical report found that the body of the deceased
has several abrasions and lacerations. This Court_; noticing
D the brutal and violent manner of commission of the offences
confirmed the death sentence to the accused therein. It was
held that:
"84. As has been indicated by the courts below, the
E antecedents of the appellant and his subsequent
conduct indicates that he is a menace to the society
and is incapi!{ble of rehabilitation. The offences
. . committed by the appellant were neither under duress
nor on provocation and an innocent life was snuffed out
F by him after committing violent rape on the victim... :
28. In the Sevaka Perumalcase (supra), the counsel for
. the appellants therein contended that considering the young
. age of the accused, the same would be a strong mitigating
G factor in favour of commutation of death sentence. It was
contended therein that the accused were the breadwinners of
their family which consisted of a young wife, minor child and
aged parents. However, this Court, finding no force in the said
contention, observed that such compassionate grounds are
H present in most cases and arenot relevant for interference in
PURUSHOTIAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1133
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATIU, CJI.]
awarding death sentence. The principle that when the offence A
is gruesome and was committed in a calculated and diabolical
manner, the age of the accused may not be a relevant factor,
was further affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Mofil Khan case (supra).
B
29. In view of the aforesaid decisions highlighting the
approach of this Court, we would now consider the decision
of the Courts below, in the present case. The Sessions Court
has noticed a similarity with the present case and the decision
of this Court in the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee (supra). C
Therefore, in light of the same, the Sessions Court has held
· that the present case would merit a sentence of death penalty
and no less. The Session Court has observed:
"... In present case, accused driver alongwith co-accused o
committed rape and murder of helpless and
defenceless young girl who was reposing complete faith
and trust on them by carefully planning the crime and
executing it in barbaric manner. Taking the verdict in
the matter of Dhananjoy Chatterjee (supra) as yardstick, E
there is no hesitation to put on record that the case at
hand is the rarest of rare case warranting nothing else
but the death penalty to the accused persons. ... "
'
30. The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order, F
has concurred with the findings recorded by the Sessions Court
in respect of the chain of circumstances being clearly and
incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. With regard
to the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the High Court has, in addition to the finding G
and observations of the Sessions Court, held that the
aggravating circumstances far outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. Therefore, the High Court has recorded that
there is no alternative but to confirm the death sentence as
·awarded by the Sessions Courts. H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 5 S.C.R.
A 31. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to notice the
Dhananjoy Chatterjee case (supra). As noticed above, the
said case has been noticed by the Sessions Court, in the
present case, as bearing great similarity to the facts herein. In
the Dhananjoy Chatterjee case (supra), the accused was
B convicted for the brutal rape and murder of a young girl aged
about 18 years. The accused-therein was employed as a
security guard of the building where the deceased resided and
therefore was entrusted with the noble task of ensuring her
safety and security. The reasoning therein has been
C instrumental in moulding the sentencing policy of this Court
and therefore it would be gainful to reproduce the relevant
paragraphs from the said case below:
"15. In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a
D given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime;
the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and
unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate
punishment is the manner in which the courts respond
to the society's cry for justice against the criminals.
E Justice demands that courts should impose
punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect
public abhorrence of the crime. The courts must not
only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the
rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while·
F
considering imposition of appropriate punishment.
16. The sordid episode of the security guard, whose
sacred duty was to ensure the protection and welfare of
the inhabitants of the flats in the apartment, should have
G .subjected the deceased, a resident of one of the flats,
to gratify his lust and murder her in retaliation for his
transfer on her complaint, makes the crime even more
heinous. Keeping in view the medical evidence and the
state in which the body of the deceased was found, it is
H
PURUSHOTIAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1135
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATIU, CJI.]
obvious that a most heinous type of barbaric rape and A
murder was committed on a helpless and defenceless
school-going girl of 18 years. If the security guards
behave in this manner who will guard the guards? The
faith of the society by such a barbaric act of the guard,
gets totally shaken and its cry for justice becomes loud 8
and clear. The offence was not only inhuman and
barbaric but it was a totally ruthless crime of rape
followed by cold blooded murder and an affront to the
human dignity of the society. The savage nature of the
crime has shocked our judicial conscience. There are c
no extenuating or mitigating circumstances whatsoever
in the case. We agree that a real and abiding concern
for the dignity of human life is required to be kept in
mind by the courts while considering the confirmation
D
of the sentence of death but a cold blooded preplanned
brutal murder, w1lhout any provocation, after committing
rape on an innocent and defenceless young girl of 18
years, by the security guard certainly makes this case
a "rarest of the rare" cases which calls for no punishment E
other than the capital punishment and we accordingly
confirm the sentence of death imposed upon the
appellant for the offence under Section 302 /PC. The
order of sentence imposed on the appellant by the
courts below for offences under Sections 376 and 380 F
/PC are also confirmed along with the directions relating
thereto as in the event of the execution of the appeliant,
those sentences would only remain of academic
interest. This appeal fails and is hereby dismissed."
G
32. It would now be necessary for this Court to consider
the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the
accused-appellants has laid stress upon the age of the
accused persons, their family background and lack of criminal H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2015] 5 S.C.R.
P,. antecedents. Further, the learned· counsel has fervently
contended that the accused-appellants are capable of
reformation and therefore should be awarded the lighter
punishment of life imprisonment.
B 33. In our considered view, in the facts of the present case,
age alone cannot be a paramount consideration as a mitigating
circumstance. Similarly, family background of the accused also
could not be said to be a mitigating circumstance. insofar as
Accused No.1 is concerned, it has been contended that he
C was happily married and his wife was pregnant at the relevant
time. However, the Accused No.1 did not take into
consideration the condition of his wife or his mother while
committing the said offence and, as a result, his wife deserted
him and his widowed mother is being looked after by his
D nephew and niece. Insofar as Accused No.2 is concerned, he
has two sisters who are looking after his widowed mother. Lack
of criminal antecedents also cannot be considered as
mitigating circumstance, particularly taking into consideration,
the nature of heinous offence and cold and calculated manner
E in which it was committed by the accused persons.
34. In our considered view, the "rarest of the rare" case
exists when an accused would be a menace or, threat to and
incompatible with harmony in the society. In a case where the
F accused does not act on provocation or on the spur of the
moment, but meticulously executes a deliberate, cold-blooded
and pre-planned crime, giving scant regard to the
consequences of the same, the precarious balance in the
sentencing policy evolved by our criminal jurisprudence would
G tilt heavily towards the death sentence. This Court is mindful of
the settled principle that criminal law requires strict adherence
to the rule of proportionality in awarding punishment, and the
same must be in accordance with the culpability of the criminal
H act. Furthermore, this Court is also conscious to the effect, of
not awarding just punishment, on th_e society.
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1137
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DADU, CJI.]
35. In the presentfactual matrix, Accused No.1 abducted A
the deceased with help of Accused No.2, and subsequently
they raped and murdered her. They did not show any regret,
sorrow or repentance at any point of time during the
commission of the heinous offence, nor thereafter, rather they
acted in a disturbingly normal manner after commission of B
crime. It has been established by strong and cogent evidence
that after the commission of the gruesome crime, Accused
No.2 accompanied Accused No.1 for the second pick up and
exited the cab only prior to reaching the gate of the Company.
Further, it has been brought on record that the Accused No.1 C
attempted to create false record of the whereabouts of the
cab and the cause of the delay in arriving at the workplace. In
. addition, it has been noticed that even though the accused-
appellants were seen by PW-12, that the deceased repeatedly
0
questioned them of the unusual route, or that the deceased
was talking to a friend on the phone during the journey, nothing
deterred them from committing the heinous offences. In fact
the Sessions Court has noticed that during the commission of
the offences, the accused-appellants were contacted by PW- E
11 seeking an explanation for the delay in picking him up,
however even this did not deter them.
36. Thus, the manner in which the commission ofthe
offence was so meticulously and carefully planned coupled with F
the sheer brutality and apathy for humanity in the execution of
the offence, in every probability they have potency to commit
similar offence in future. It is clear that both the accused persons
have been proved to be a menace to society which strongly
negates the probability that they can be reformed or G
rehabilitated. In our considered opinion, the mitigating
circumstances are wholly absent in the present factual matrix.
This appeal is not a case where the offence was committed
by the accused persons under influence of extreme mental or
emotional disorder, nor is it a case where the offence may be H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A argued to be a crime of passion or one committed at the spur
of the moment. There is no question of accused persons
believing that they were morally justified in committing the
offence on helpless and defenceless young woman.
B 37. Therefore, in view of the above and keeping the
aforesaid principle of proportionality of sentence in mind, this
Court is in agreement with the reasoning of the Courts below
that the extreme depravity with which the deceased was done
to death coupled with the other factors including the position
C of trust held by the Accused No.1, would tilt the balance between
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances greatly against
the accused-appellants. The gruesome act of raping a victim
who had reposed her trust in the accused followed by a cold-
blooded and brutal murder of the said victim coupled with the
D calculated and remorseless conduct of the accused persons
after the commission of the offence, we cannot resist from
concluding that the depravity of the appellants' offence would
attract no lesser sentence than the death penalty.
E 38. In addition to the above, it would be necessary for
this Court to notice the impact of the crime on the community
and particularly women working in the night shifts at Pune, which
is considered as a hub of Information Technology Centre. In
recent years, the rising crime rate, particularly violent crimes
F against women has made the criminal sentencing by the Courts
a subject of concern. The sentencing policy adopted by the
Courts, in such cases, ought to have a stricter yardstick so as
to act as a deterrent. There are a shockingly large number of
cases where the sentence of punishment awarded to the
G accused is not in proportion to the gravity and magnitude of
the offence thereby encouraging the criminal and in the ultimate
making justice suffer by weakening the system's credibility.
The object of sentencing policy should be to see that the crime
H does not go unpunished and the victim of crime as also the
PURUSHOTTAM DASHRATH BORATE v. STATE OF 1139
MAHARASHTRA [H. L. DATTU, CJI.]
society has the satisfaction that justice has been done to it. In A
the case of Machhi Singh (supra), this Court observed that
the extreme punishment of death would be justified and
necessary in cases where the collective conscience of society
is so shocked that it will expect the holders of judicial power to
inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion. B
39. It is true that any case of rape and murder would
cause a shock to the society but all such offences may not
cause revulsion in society. Certain offences shock the collective
conscience of the court and community. The heinous offence C
of gang-rape of an innocent and helpless young woman by
those in whom she had reposed trust, followed by a cold-
blooded murder and calculated attempt of cover-up is one such
instance of a crime which shocks and repulses the collective
conscience of the community and the court. Therefore, in light D
of the aforesaid settled principle, this Court has no hesitation
in holding that this case falls within the category of "rarest of
rare", which merits death penalty and none else. The collective
conscience of the community is so shocked by this crime that
imposing alternate sentence, i.e. a sentence of life E
imprisonment on the accused persons would not meet the ends
of justice. Rather, it would tempt other potential offenders to
commit such crime and get away with the lesser/lighter
punishment of life imprisonment.
F
40. In the result, after having critically appreciated the
entire evidence on record as well as the judgments of the Courts
below in great detail, we are in agreement with the reasons
recorded by the trial court and approved by the High Court
while awarding and confirming the death sentence of the G
accused-appellants. In our considered view, the judgment and
order passed by the Courts below does not suffer from any
error whatsoever.
41. Therefore, this appeal is rejected and the sentence H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015J 5 S.C.R.
A of death awarded to the accused-appellants is confirmed. The
judgment and order passed by the High Court is accordingly
affirmed.
42. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
B
Ordered accordingly.
Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.