PUNEET SABHARWALversusCBI

                 [2024] 3 S.C.R. 679 : 2024 INSC 221

                            Puneet Sabharwal
                                   v.
                                  CBI
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1682 of 2024)
                               19 March 2024
             [Vikram Nath and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       The charges were framed against the appellants. While the
       charge against the appellant-P was u/s. 109 IPC r/w. s.13(1)
       (e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the
       charge against appellant-R was u/s. 13(1)(e) r/w. s.13(2) of the
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In substance, the charge
       was that appellant-R owned assets disproportionate to known
       sources of income and the appellant-P son of R has abetted him
       in the commission of the said offence. The High Court, by the
       impugned order, dismissed the petitions for quashing criminal
       proceedings. The question that arises for consideration is whether
       the courts below were justified in refusing to quash and set aside
       the order on charge dated 21.02.2006 and the charges as framed
       on 28.02.2006.

                                  Headnotes
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s. 13(1)(e) r/w. s. 13(2)
       – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 109 – Income Tax Act, 1961 – The
       appellant-R was exonerated by the Income Tax Appellate
       Tribunal by order dated 31.08.2007 – It was contended that in
       view of the orders made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
       in the reopening proceedings, which were based on the
       search conducted by the CBI, there is absolutely no ground
       to proceed with the criminal trial – It was further argued, with
       respect to the appellant-P, that he was a minor for a large
       portion of the check period and therefore could not be made
       an accused – Propriety:
       Held: In the instant case, the probative value of the Orders of
       the Income Tax Authorities, including the Order of the Income Tax
       Appellate Tribunal and the subsequent Assessment Orders, are
       not conclusive proof which can be relied upon for discharge of the

* Author
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       accused persons – These orders, their findings, and their probative
       value, are a matter for a full-fledged trial – In view of the same,
       the High Court has rightly not discharged the appellants based on
       the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities – The appellants herein
       are being prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of
       Corruption Act while they seek to rely on an exoneration under
       the Income Tax Act – The scope of adjudication in both of these
       proceedings are vastly different – The authority which conducted
       the income tax proceedings and the authority conducting the
       prosecution is completely different (CBI) – The CBI was not and
       could not have been a party to the income tax proceeding – The
       charges were framed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, while
       the appellants seek to rely upon findings recorded by authorities
       under the Income Tax Act – The scope of adjudication in both
       the proceedings are markedly different and therefore the findings
       in the latter cannot be a ground for discharge of the Accused
       Persons in the former – The proceedings under the Income Tax
       Act and its evidentiary value remains a matter of trial and they
       cannot be considered as conclusive proof for discharge of an
       accused person – As far as the contention about the minority of
       the appellant-P is concerned, it need not detain the Court since
       for the last seven years of the check period admittedly he was
       not minor –Thus, the appellants have not made out a case for
       interference with the order on charge dated 21.02.2006 and the
       order of framing charge dated 28.02.2006. [Paras 32, 37, 40,
       23, 44]

                               Case Law Cited
            State of Karnataka v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha & Ors. [2017]
            5 SCR 525 : (2017) 6 SCC 263 – relied on.
            Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal &
            Anr. [2011] 4 SCR 889 : (2011) 3 SCC 581; Ashoo
            Surendranath Tewari v. CBI & Anr. (2020) 9 SCC 636;
            J. Sekar v. Directorate of Enforcement [2022] 3 SCR
            698 : (2022) 7 SCC 370 – held inapplicable.
            P. Nallamal v. State (1996) 6 SCC 559; Vishwanath
            Chaturvedi (3) v. Union of India & Ors. [2007] 3 SCR
            448 : (2007) 4 SCC 380; Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat &
            Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. [2012] 10 SCR 1034 :
            (2013) 11 SCC 476; State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                           681

                         Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


            & Ors. [2014] 1 SCR 135 : (2014) 11 SCC 709; CBI
            & Anr. v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi & Anr.
            [2021] 13 SCR 364 : (2021) 18 SCC 135; Onkar Nath
            Mishra & Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. [2007]
            13 SCR 716 : (2008) 2 SCC 561; State of Karnataka
            v. L. Muniswamy & Ors. [1977] 3 SCR 113 : (1977)
            2 SCC 699 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860; Income
     Tax Act, 1961.

                             List of Keywords
     Disproportionate Assets; Known source of income; Income tax
     return; Income tax proceeding; Evidentiary value; Conclusive proof;
     Quashing; Criminal Proceedings; Framing of charge; Discharge;
     Exoneration in civil adjudication; Criminal Prosecution; Criminal
     trial.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1682
     of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 01.12.2020 of the High Court
     of Delhi at New Delhi in WPCRL No.200 of 2010
     With
     Criminal Appeal No.1683 of 2024
                         Appearances for Parties
     Mukul Rohatgi, Siddharth Agarwal, Ardhendu Mauli Prasad, Sr.
     Advs., Ninad Laud, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Ms. Shrika Gautam,
     Karan Mathur, Ms. Rashika Narain, Sangramsingh R. Bhonsle,
     Zubin Dash, Ms. Samridhi S Jain, Nrupal A Dingankar, Ms.
     Pushkara A Bhonsle, Naman Sherstra, Mahesh Jadhav, Advs. for
     the Appellant.
     K.M. Natraj, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi,
     Rajan Kumar Chaurasia, Padmesh Mishra, Navanjay Mahapatra,
     Shantanu Sharma, B.K. Satija, Manoj K. Mishra, Abhinav S.
     Raghuvanshi, Advs. for the Respondent.
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                   Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment
       K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1.     Leave granted.
2.     The present appeals call in question the correctness of the judgment
       of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated 01.12.2020 in Writ
       Petition (Criminal) No. 200 of 2010 and Writ Petition (Criminal) No.
       339 of 2010. These proceedings in the High Court, in turn, challenged
       the Order on charge dated 21.02.2006, as well as the charges
       framed on 28.02.2006, by the Special Judge, Delhi. While the charge
       against the appellant Puneet Sabharwal was under Section 109 IPC
       read with Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
       Act, 1988, the charge against appellant R.C. Sabharwal was under
       Section 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
       1988. In substance, the charge was that appellant R.C. Sabharwal
       owned assets disproportionate to known sources of income and the
       appellant Puneet Sabharwal, son of R.C. Sabharwal, has abetted
       him in the commission of the said offence. The High Court, by the
       impugned order, dismissed the petitions. Aggrieved, the appellants
       are before us.
       Brief Facts:
3.     On 23.08.1995, based on source information, the Anti-Corruption
       Bureau, New Delhi, District New Delhi registered a First Information
       Report in Crime No.RC-74(A)/95-DLI.
4.     On 28.08.1995, a charge-sheet was filed against both the appellants.
       In substance, the allegations, as set out in the charge-sheet, were
       as follows:
       (i)    That the appellant R.C. Sabharwal was Additional Chief Architect
              in New Delhi Municipal Corporation;
       (ii)   That while being posted in various capacities from the year
              1968 onwards, he had amassed huge assets which are
              disproportionate to his known sources of income;
       (iii) That the assets were acquired by R.C. Sabharwal either in
             his name or in the name of his family members. Details of the
             assets were set out.
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                      683

                        Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


     (iv) The check period was taken from the date when the appellant
          R.C. Sabharwal joined as an Assistant Architect in NDMC i.e.
          20.08.1968 to the date of the search i.e. 23.08.1995.
     (v)   That the total income of the appellant R.C. Sabharwal from
           salary was Rs. 10,00,042/-. Detailed breakup of salary for the
           years was given. The income from the salary of his spouse
           was Rs. 8,72,249.42
     (vi) Apart from the above salaried income, income accruing
          to the accused R.C. Sabharwal from several enterprises,
          companies and trusts was also set out. Rental income was
          also mentioned as well as income from insurance policies
          and income arising out of interest. After computing all the
          income, it was mentioned that the total income was of Rs.
          1,23,18,091/-
     (vii) Expenditure was provided to the extent of Rs. 18,23,108/-.
           Movable assets to the tune of Rs. 4,25,450/- was mentioned.
           It was also alleged that there were bank balances in the name
           of appellant R.C. Sabharwal and in the name of his family
           members to the tune of Rs. 82,63,417/-.
     (viii) As far as the immovable assets are concerned, a set of twenty-
            four properties were set out which were in all valued at Rs.
            2,27,94,907/-.
     (ix) That the appellant R.C. Sabharwal could not satisfactorily
          account for the assets disproportionate to his known sources
          of income.
     (x)   That the appellant R.C. Sabharwal was a party to the criminal
           conspiracy with his son, being appellant Puneet Sabharwal,
           who had received Rs. 79 lakhs through encashment of Special
           Bearer Bonds and he facilitated commission of the offence as
           a conspirator.
     (xi) That in furtherance of the said criminal conspiracy, assets were
          acquired by R.C. Sabharwal in the name of M/s Morni Devi Brij
          Lal Trust, M/s Morni Merchants and other firms in which the
          sole beneficiary was appellant Puneet Sabharwal, his son. It
          was further alleged that appellant R.C. Sabharwal dealt with
          all the financial matters of the said trusts/firms.
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       (xii) It was concluded that a criminal case was made out against
             appellant R.C. Sabharwal and Puneet Sabharwal for offence
             punishable under 120-B IPC r/w 5(2) r/w 5(1)(e) of PC Act, 1947
             corresponding to 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of PC Act, 1988.
       (xiii) Further, it was concluded that against R.C. Sabharwal a case
              under Section 5(2) r/w 5(1)(e) of PC Act, 1947 corresponding to
              13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of PC Act, 1988 was made out for possession
              of assets worth Rs. 2,05,63,341/- disproportionate to his known
              sources of income.
       Order on Charge:
5.     On 21.02.2006, the Special Judge pronounced an order on charge
       after elaborately discussing the principles governing discharge. The
       learned Judge rendered the following findings in the order on charge:
       (i)    The expression “known sources of income” can only have
              reference to the sources known to the prosecution;
       (ii)   The prosecution cannot be expected to know the firms of the
              accused persons;
       (iii) The income from firms of the accused persons would be within
             the special knowledge of the accused, under Section 106 of
             the Evidence Act and it was for the accused to ‘satisfactorily
             account’ for the charge of owing disproportionate assets, which
             can only be discharged at trial;
       (iv) Insofar as the appellant Puneet Sabharwal is concerned, reliance
            was placed on the statement of Chartered Accountant Anil
            Mehta to the effect that the properties were purchased benami
            by appellant R.C. Sabharwal in the name of his son and sister;
       (v)    The learned judge relied upon P. Nallamal v. State, (1996) 6
              SCC 559, wherein this Court held that a non-public servant
              can be tried in the same trial along with the public servant for
              abetment of offence under Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of the
              PC Act.
       (vi) There was sufficient material to show the existence of grave
            suspicion arising out of the material placed before the Court
            regarding involvement of both the appellants for commission of
            offences under Section 109 IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) r/w
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                          685

                         Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


           13(2) of the PC Act as far as the appellant Puneet Sabharwal
           was concerned and under Section 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of
           the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as far as R.C. Sabharwal
           was concerned.
     Charges:
6.   Thereafter, by order dated 28.2.2006, charges were also framed. For
     the sake of convenience, the charges against both the appellants
     are set out hereinbelow:
                               “CHARGE NO. 1
           That you being a public servant employed as Additional
           Chief Architect, NDMC, New Delhi, during the period
           20.8.1968 to 23.08.1995 were found in possession of
           assets to the tune of Rs. 3,10,58,324/- as against your
           income and that of your family members Income, to the tune
           of Rs. 1,23,18,091/- and expenditure of Rs. 18,23,108/-
           and you were found in possession of total assets to the
           tune of Rs. 2,05,63,341/- which were disproportionate to
           your known sources of income and which you could not
           satisfactorily account for and thereby you committed an
           offence U/s. 13(1)(e) punishable U/s. 13(2) of the PC Act,
           1988 and within my cognizance.
           And I hereby direct you to be tried by this court for the
           said offence.
                                CHARGE NO. 2
           That while your father Shri R.C. Sabharwal being a public
           servant employed as Additional Chief Architect, NDMC,
           New Delhi during the period 20.08.1968 to 23.08.1995 you
           intentionally aided him in commission of the offence U/s
           13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the PC Act as he was found in
           possession of assets to the tune of Rs. 3,10,58,324/- as
           against his income and that of his family members income,
           to the tune of Rs. 1,23,18,091/- and expenditure of Rs.
           18,23,108/- and he was found in possession of total assets
           of the tune of Rs. 2,05,63,341/, which were disproportionate
           to his known sources of income and which he could not
           satisfactorily account for and thereby you committed an
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            offence, of abetment U/s 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) and
            Sec. 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and within my cognizance.
            And hereby direct you to be tried by this court for the
            said offence.”
                                                  [emphasis supplied]
       Orders on the income tax front:
7.     After the order of the Trial Court, both with regard to the order on
       charge and the framing of charges, and before the High Court
       disposed of the Petitions before it, leading up to the impugned order,
       certain developments took place on the income tax front.
8.     The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal pronounced its judgment on
       31.08.2007 in appeals and cross appeals filed by the assessees
       [which included the Appellants herein] and the department, with
       regard to the reopening of the assessments for the years 1989-1990
       to 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 to 2001-2002.
9.     Earlier, the Assessing Officer had reopened the assessment for
       Assessment Year 1996-1997 and made certain additions and deletions
       in the hands of the Appellants herein and other assessees. Thereafter,
       the CIT (Appeals) had upheld the validity of the reopening while
       approving or disapproving some of the additions and deletions made
       by the Assessing Officer. However, the Tribunal had, on 07.03.2005,
       held that the reopening of the assessment for the Assessment Year
       1996-1997 was not justified since the conditions precedent for
       reopening the assessment were not fulfilled. Consequently, the issues
       regarding the merits of additions or deletions were not adjudicated
       by the Tribunal in the said Order.
10. However, the Tribunal in its order dated 31.08.2007, while hearing
    appeals and cross-appeals concerning the reopening of assessment
    for the years 1989-1990 to 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 to 2001-2002,
    found that materials did exist for reopening the assessment for the
    said assessment years. Thereafter, it examined the merits of the
    additions made on substantive basis and additions denied, in the
    years under consideration in the hands of appellant R.C. Sabharwal.
    It noted that the Tribunal was required to examine the additions
    and deletions carried out by the Assessing Officer and the CIT
    (Appeals) in the assessment year 1996-1997 because, in the view
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                       687

                         Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


     of the Tribunal, the issue of additions in all the other years under
     consideration flowed from the base assessment year of 1996-1997.
11. While considering the various additions and deletions, the Tribunal
    inter alia considered the addition carried out by the Assessing Officer
    [which was thereafter deleted by the CIT (Appeals)] in the hands of
    the appellant R.C. Sabharwal herein with respect to income of M/s
    Morni Devi Brij Lal Trust. The Assessing Officer had justified these
    additions on the grounds that:
     (i)    The source of investment made by the founders of the said
            trust being Smt. Morni Devi and Sh. Brij Lal was not explained.
     (ii)   The special bearer bonds which were encashed in the account
            of the said Trust were not out of investments from the Trust
            since the said bonds were purchased prior to the formation of
            the Trust itself. Some other person had invested the amount
            and encashed it in the hands of the trust.
     (iii) The founder of the trust was not shown to have the income
           necessary to purchase the said bonds.
12. The CIT (Appeals) had deleted these additions. In examining this
    issue and approving the said deletion, the Tribunal rendered the
    following findings:
     (i)    The Appellant R.C. Sabharwal had no obligation to explain the
            source of investment of the founders of the trust being Smt.
            Morni Devi and Sh. Brij Lal.
     (ii)   The Trust itself had been filing its return of income since it
            came into existence and had been assessed separately. No
            evidence was produced to show that the assessee was the
            benami owner of the trust.
     (iii) As regards the credits representing deposits of Special Bearer
           Bonds, relying upon Section 3 of the Special Bearer Bonds
           (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1981 it was held that no person
           who has subscribed to or has otherwise acquired Special Bearer
           Bonds shall be required to disclose, for any purpose whatsoever,
           the nature and source of acquisition of such bonds and that
           complete immunity has been granted to the bond holders. The
           presumption of the Assessing Officer that the bearer bonds were
           acquired by the trust was held to be not correct;
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       (iv) Reference is made by the Tribunal to the findings of the CIT
            (Appeals) that the special bearer bonds were tendered for
            encashment by the trust and that Assessing Officer exceeded
            his jurisdiction in making an enquiry and calling upon the trust
            to explain the nature and source of acquisition of such bonds.
       (v)   Reference is made by the Tribunal to the findings of the CIT
             (Appeals) that the trust would be a person within the meaning
             of the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act,
             1981.
       (vi) The Tribunal then quotes the findings of the CIT (Appeals)
            whereunder it was held that once the assessment has been
            made and the department has accepted the existence of the
            trust it could not be reversed without bringing on record any
            adverse material. The onus was on the department to show that
            the trust was benami and there was no evidence in that regard.
       (vii) The Tribunal then quotes the findings of the CIT (Appeals)
             whereunder it was concluded that the Assessing Officer had
             not been able to prove that the Trust was benami and that the
             income of the trust belonged to R.C. Sabharwal. Holding so,
             the additions to the tune of Rs. 8,14,230/- was deleted. No
             further comments were given by the Tribunal in regard to this
             addition/deletion.
13. Thereafter, on the issue of appellant Puneet Sabharwal having
    received funds from the Morni Devi Brij Lal Trust which was held to
    belong to appellant R.C. Sabharwal, it was found that since Morni
    Devi Brij Lal Trust was a separate entity and since the appellant
    Puneet Sabharwal was running its business, its income could not be
    added in the hands of the appellant R.C. Sabharwal. The Tribunal
    also considered the additions/deletions with regard to various other
    firms and assessees which we do not seek to set out herein for the
    purposes of brevity.
14. Ultimately, only on the aspect of deposits in the joint bank accounts
    of minors, so far as it fell within the limitation period, the Tribunal
    restored the matter back to the Assessing Officer for deciding the
    issue afresh and the appeal of the revenue was allowed to that limited
    extent. Holding so, the appeals were disposed of. Consequently,
    on 30.12.2009, the Assessing Officer passed an assessment order
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                         Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


     accepting the explanation of the assessee on the aspect remitted
     and the income of the assessee Puneet Sabharwal was fixed at
     Rs. 67,550/-.
     Proceedings in the High Court:
15. These orders which came subsequent to the orders of the Trial
    Court were placed before the High Court. It was contended that in
    view of the orders made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the
    reopening proceedings, which reopening was based on the search
    conducted by the CBI, there is absolutely no ground to proceed with
    the criminal trial. It was further argued, with respect to the appellant
    Puneet Sabharwal, that he was a minor for a large portion of the
    check period and therefore could not be made an accused.
16. Repelling the contentions, the High Court held as follows:
     (i)    Simply because for a large part of the period of investigation,
            the appellant Puneet Sabharwal was a minor, would not by itself
            be a reason to disregard the fact that at least for the seven
            years of the investigation period he was a major;
     (ii)   Under Section 3(2) of Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and
            Exemptions) Act, 1981, the immunities under the Act are
            inapplicable to offences committed under the Prevention of
            Corruption Act or similar offences;
     (iii) Prosecution has sought to rely upon statements of several
           witnesses;
     (iv) In State of Karnataka v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha & Ors. (2017)
          6 SCC 263, this Court had held that income tax assessment
          orders are apropos tax liability on income and they do not
          necessarily attest to the lawfulness of the sources of income;
     (v)    That what was relevant was whether there was a strong
            suspicion that the accused has committed the offence and that
            in the view of the High Court there was indeed a case for trial.
            Holding so, the Writ Petitions were dismissed.
     Contentions:
17. Before us Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Siddharth Agarwal, learned
    senior counsel for the appellants reiterated the contentions raised
    before the High Court.
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18. Insofar as the appellant Puneet Sabharwal was concerned, it was
    contended as follows:
       (i)    That the High Court erred in holding that merely because for
              a large part of the period of investigation, the appellant was a
              minor, it would not be by itself a reason to disregard the fact
              that for at least seven years of the investigation period he was
              a major;
       (ii)   That the courts below erred in, without more, endorsing the
              allegations against the appellant(s) solely on account of being
              named as a beneficiary in the trust deed of M/s Morni Devi Brij
              Lal Trust. Further, the Court erred in endorsing the allegation
              that the trust was holding benami properties of which appellant
              R.C. Sabharwal was a beneficial owner;
       (iii) That since out of the twenty years of the check period except
             7 years of the said period the appellant Puneet Sabharwal
             was a minor, it belied logic as to how the said appellant could
             have conspired with his father. This indicated gross abuse of
             process of law.
       (iv) That the charge as framed indicates that criminal proceedings
            have been saddled against appellant Puneet Sabharwal merely
            by virtue of being his father’s son and none of the ingredients
            under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code were attracted;
       (v)    That the High Court erred in not taking into account the
              exoneration of the appellant’s father by the Income Tax
              Appellate Tribunal; that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, by
              its order of 31.08.2007, rendered a categorical finding that the
              father did not hold the properties of the said trust as benami
              and even the limited issue on which the Income Tax Appellate
              Tribunal remanded the matter, by the order of 30.12.2009, the
              assessment officer found the deposits to be income of the son.
19. Insofar as the appellant R.C. Sabharwal is concerned, the argument
    was substantially on the basis of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
    order of 31.08.2007. The contentions were as follows:
       (i)    The order of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal categorically held
              that income arising from properties of various entities were
              wrongly added to the income of the appellant;
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                          Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


     (ii)   The appellant was not the owner of those entities and
            consequently the properties and money held by those entities
            could not be held to be under the ownership of the appellant
            R.C. Sabharwal;
     (iii) The reassessment for thirteen years was carried out on the
           complaint of CBI itself;
     (iv) The courts below misapplied the judgment of this Court in Selvi
          J. Jayalalitha (supra) and failed to notice the distinguishing
          feature namely that, in the present case, it was not a case
          of reliance on income tax return but the returns which were
          subjected to an inquisition.
     (v)    The High Court exercising power under Article 226, 227 of the
            Constitution of India and Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has power
            to look into material placed by the accused in arriving at its
            conclusion for discharge.
20. For both the appellants, reliance was placed on Radheshyam
    Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal & Anr., (2011) 3 SCC 581, Ashoo
    Surendranath Tewari v. CBI & Anr. (2020) 9 SCC 636 and J. Sekar
    v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2022) 7 SCC 370 to contend that
    where there is exoneration on merits in a civil adjudication, criminal
    prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be
    allowed to continue since the underlying principle is that the standard
    of proof in criminal cases is higher.
21. The submissions of the appellants were strongly refuted by Mr.
    K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General. Learned ASG
    contended as follows:
     (i)    That at the stage of framing of charges what is relevant is
            material as is available on the date of framing of the charge;
     (ii)   That a court of law is not required to appreciate evidence at the
            stage of framing of charges to conclude whether the materials
            produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused;
     (iii) That it was settled law that probative value of material on record
           cannot be gone into at the stage of framing of charges since
           the court was not conducting a mini trial;
     (iv) Relying on Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & Ors. v. State of U.P. &
          Anr., (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was contended that all that has
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             to be seen is whether there is a ground for presuming that the
             offence has been committed and not whether there was ground
             for convicting the accused;
       (v)   That even a strong suspicion founded on material which leads
             the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of
             the factual ingredients constituting the offence would justify the
             framing of the charge.
       (vi) Reliance placed on the order of the Income Tax Appellate
            Tribunal dated 21.08.2007 is subsequent to the framing of
            charges and even otherwise cannot be the basis for the
            discharge of the accused;
       (vii) That the criminal prosecution does not depend upon the
             order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and,
             most importantly, the prosecution was not and could not
             have been a party before the Income Tax Authorities and
             the ITAT;
       (viii) That the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal order can be at best, if
              permissible in law, used as a piece of evidence and the Income
              Tax Appellate Tribunal order will not have the effect of nullifying
              the order framing charges by a criminal court. Reliance has
              been placed on Selvi J. Jayalalitha (supra), Vishwanath
              Chaturvedi (3) v. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 380
              and State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC
              709 to contend that the findings of the Income Tax Authorities
              are not binding on a criminal court to readily accept the legality
              or lawfulness of the source of income.
       (ix) The power to quash a proceeding and nip the same in the bud
            has to be exercised with great caution and circumspection.
       So contending, the learned ASG prayed that no case has been
       made out to set aside the order on charge and the charges and the
       appeals deserve to be dismissed.
       Question:
22. Under the above circumstances, the question that arises for
    consideration is: Whether the courts below were justified in refusing
    to quash and set aside the order on charge dated 21.02.2006 and
    the charges as framed on 28.02.2006?
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                     693

                       Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


     Analysis:
23. Having heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the
    records, we are of the opinion that the appellants have not made out
    a case for interference with the order on charge dated 21.02.2006
    and the order of framing charge dated 28.02.2006. We say so for
    the following reasons.
24. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant R.C. Sabharwal,
    the father of appellant Puneet Sabharwal, owned assets to the
    tune of Rs. 2,05,63,341/- and that this was disproportionate to his
    known sources of income which was computed at Rs. 1,23,18,091/-.
    The allegation against the son Puneet Sabharwal was that he had
    received Rs. 79 lakhs through encashment of Special Bearer Bonds
    and he facilitated commission of offence inasmuch as assets were
    acquired by appellant R.C. Sabharwal in the name of M/s Morni
    Devi Brij Lal Trust, M/s Morni Merchants and other firms in which the
    sole beneficiary was appellant Puneet Sabharwal. The order framing
    charge invokes Section 109 IPC to be read with Section 13(1)(e)
    read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act against Puneet Sabharwal.
25. The main plank of the arguments of the appellants is that the Income
    Tax Appellate Tribunal order dated 31.08.2007, has, while allowing
    the appeals of the assessees and dismissing the cross appeals
    of the department (except to a small extent which too got settled
    with the assessment order of 30.12.2009), held that no case was
    made out to justify that the income and assets of the entities such
    as the Morni Lal Brij Trust were to be added to the income of R.C.
    Sabharwal. In view of the same, it is argued that there is no case
    for prosecuting them for owning disproportionate assets.
26. It is argued that per se the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal order
    should result in quashment of proceedings and the discharge of the
    accused. Additionally, it is argued that on the ground that analogous
    tax proceedings have ended in favour of the appellants, a criminal
    prosecution on identical facts cannot continue. For this, reliance is
    placed on the judgments mentioned hereinabove.
27. We have already discussed the substance of the Income Tax
    Appellate Tribunal order of 31.08.2007. In law, the submissions of
    the appellants ought to fail on both the counts as there is no basis
    to nip the criminal prosecution in this case in its bud.
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28. As far as the first argument about the criminal proceedings losing
    its efficacy in view of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal order of
    31.08.2007 is concerned, we accept the submission of the respondent
    CBI that the prior rulings of the court ending with the judgment in
    Selvi J. Jayalalitha (supra) have clearly concluded the issue against
    the appellants.
29. This Court, in Selvi J. Jayalalitha (supra), was concerned with
    an appeal against an order of acquittal passed in a case of
    disproportionate assets under Section 13 of the Prevention of
    Corruption Act. The accused persons therein had sought to place
    reliance on income tax returns and income tax assessment orders.
    In that context the Court had concluded that income tax returns and
    orders are not by themselves conclusive proof that they are lawful
    sources of income under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption
    Act and that independent evidence to corroborate the same would
    be required. The Court held:
          “188. In Anantharam Veerasinghaiah & Co. v. CIT, 1980
          Supp SCC 13 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 274] , the return filed by the
          petitioner assessee, who was an Abkari contractor, was not
          accepted by the ITO as amongst others, excess expenditure
          over the disclosed available cash was noticeable and further
          several deposits had been made in the names of others. The
          assessee’s explanation that the excess expenditure was met
          from the amounts deposited with him by other shopkeepers
          but were not entered in his book, was not accepted and
          penalty proceedings were taken out against him holding
          that the items of cash deficit and cash deposit represented
          concealed income resulting from suppressed yield and
          low selling rates mentioned in the books. The Appellate
          Tribunal, however, allowed the appeal of the assessee and
          set aside the penalty order. The High Court reversed [CIT v.
          Anantharam Veerasingaiah & Co., 1971 SCC OnLine AP 262
          : (1975) 99 ITR 544] the decision of the Appellate Tribunal
          and the matter reached the Supreme Court.
          189. It was held that as per Section 271(1)(c) of the Income
          Tax Act, 1961, penalty can be imposed in case where
          any person has concealed the particulars of his income
          or has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                         695

                        Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


           such income. The related proceeding was quasi-criminal
           in nature and the burden lay on the Revenue to establish
           that the disputed amount represented income and that
           the assessee had consciously concealed the particulars
           of his income or had deliberately furnished inaccurate
           particulars. The burden of proof in penalty proceedings
           varied from that involved in assessment proceedings and
           a finding in assessment proceedings that a particular
           receipt was income cannot automatically be adopted as
           a finding to that effect in the penalty proceedings. In the
           penalty proceedings, the taxing authority was bound to
           consider the matter afresh on the materials before it, to
           ascertain that whether a particular amount is a revenue
           receipt. It was observed that no doubt the fact that the
           assessment year contains a finding that the disputed
           amount represents income constitutes good evidence in
           the penalty proceedings, but the finding in the assessment
           proceedings cannot be regarded as conclusive for the
           purpose of penalty proceedings. Before a penalty can
           be imposed, the entirety of the circumstances must be
           taken into account and must lead to the conclusion that
           the disputed amount represented income and that the
           assessee had consciously concealed the particulars
           of his income or had deliberately furnished inaccurate
           particulars.
           190. The decision is to convey that though the IT returns
           and the orders passed in the IT proceedings in the instant
           case recorded the income of the accused concerned as
           disclosed in their returns, in view of the charge levelled
           against them, such returns and the orders in the IT
           proceedings would not by themselves establish that such
           income had been from lawful source as contemplated in
           the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, 1988
           and that independent evidence would be required to
           account for the same.
           191. Though considerable exchanges had been made
           in course of the arguments, centring around Section 43
           of the Evidence Act, 1872, we are of the comprehension
           that those need not be expatiated in details. Suffice it to
696                                                    [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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       state that even assuming that the income tax returns, the
       proceedings in connection therewith and the decisions
       rendered therein are relevant and admissible in evidence
       as well, nothing as such, turns thereon definitively as
       those do not furnish any guarantee or authentication of
       the lawfulness of the source(s) of income, the pith of the
       charge levelled against the respondents. It is the plea of
       the defence that the income tax returns and orders, while
       proved by the accused persons had not been objected
       to by the prosecution and further it (prosecution) as well
       had called in evidence the income tax returns/orders and
       thus, it cannot object to the admissibility of the records
       produced by the defence. To reiterate, even if such returns
       and orders are admissible, the probative value would
       depend on the nature of the information furnished, the
       findings recorded in the orders and having a bearing on the
       charge levelled. In any view of the matter, however, such
       returns and orders would not ipso facto either conclusively
       prove or disprove the charge and can at best be pieces of
       evidence which have to be evaluated along with the other
       materials on record. Noticeably, none of the respondents
       has been examined on oath in the case in hand. Further,
       the income tax returns relied upon by the defence as well
       as the orders passed in the proceedings pertaining thereto
       have been filed/passed after the charge-sheet had been
       submitted. Significantly, there is a charge of conspiracy
       and abetment against the accused persons. In the overall
       perspective therefore neither the income tax returns nor
       the orders passed in the proceedings relatable thereto,
       either definitively attest the lawfulness of the sources of
       income of the accused persons or are of any avail to
       them to satisfactorily account the disproportionateness of
       their pecuniary resources and properties as mandated by
       Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.
       199. The import of this decision is that in the tax regime,
       the legality or illegality of the transactions generating
       profit or loss is inconsequential qua the issue whether
       the income is from a lawful source or not. The scrutiny
       in an assessment proceeding is directed only to quantify
       the taxable income and the orders passed therein do not
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                          697

                         Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


           certify or authenticate that the source(s) thereof to be
           lawful and are thus of no significance vis-à-vis a charge
           under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.
           200. In Vishwanath Chaturvedi (3) v. Union of India, (2007)
           4 SCC 380 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 302], a writ petition was
           filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking
           an appropriate writ for directing the Union of India to take
           appropriate action to prosecute R-2 to R-5 under the 1988
           Act for having amassed assets disproportionate to the
           known sources of income by misusing their power and
           authority. The respondents were the then sitting Chief
           Minister of U.P. and his relatives. Having noticed that
           the basic issue was with regard to alleged investments
           and sources of such investments, Respondents 2 to 5
           were ordered by this Court to file copies of income tax
           and wealth tax returns of the relevant assessment years
           which was done. It was pointed out on behalf of the
           petitioner that the net assets of the family though were
           Rs 9,22,72,000, as per the calculation made by the official
           valuer, the then value of the net assets came to be Rs
           24 crores. It was pleaded on behalf of the respondents
           that income tax returns had already been filed and the
           matters were pending before the authorities concerned
           and all the payments were made by cheques, and thus
           the allegation levelled against them were baseless. It was
           observed that the minuteness of the details furnished by
           the parties and the income tax returns and assessment
           orders, sale deeds, etc. were necessary to be carefully
           looked into and analysed only by an independent agency
           with the assistance of chartered accountants and other
           accredited engineers and valuers of the property.It was
           observed that the Income Tax Department was concerned
           only with the source of income and whether the tax was
           paid or not and, therefore, only an independent agency or
           CBI could, on court direction, determine the question of
           disproportionate assets. CBI was thus directed to conduct
           a preliminary enquiry into the assets of all the respondents
           and to take further action in the matter after scrutinising
           as to whether a case was made out or not.
698                                                          [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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          201. This decision is to emphasise that submission of
          income tax returns and the assessments orders passed
          thereon, would not constitute a foolproof defence against
          a charge of acquisition of assets disproportionate to the
          known lawful sources of income as contemplated under
          the PC Act and that further scrutiny/analysis thereof is
          imperative to determine as to whether the offence as
          contemplated by the PC Act is made out or not.”
                                                [Emphasis Supplied]
30. The appellants herein have contended that the decision in J.
    Jayalalitha (supra) would not be applicable to the present case
    since, according to them, that decision involved only an assessment
    order, while the present case involves the findings by an Appellate
    Tribunal after an inquisition into the issues involved. The Appellants
    herein seek to rely on Paragraph 309 of the decision in J. Jayalalitha
    (supra) in support of the same. Paragraph 309 is set-out hereunder:
          “309. In contradistinction, the High Court quantified the
          amount of gifts to be Rs 1.5 crores principally referring to
          the income tax returns and the orders of the authorities
          passed thereon. It did notice that there had been a delay
          in the submission of the income tax returns but accepted
          the plea of the defence acting on the orders of the Income
          Tax Authorities. It seems to have been convinced as well
          by the contention that there was a practice of offering
          gifts to political leaders on their birthdays in the State. Not
          only is the ultimate conclusion of the High Court, dehors
          any independent assessment of the evidence to overturn
          the categorical finding of the trial court to the contrary, no
          convincing or persuasive reason is also forthcoming. This
          assumes significance also in view of the state of law that
          the findings of the Income Tax Authorities/forums are not
          binding on a criminal court to readily accept the legality
          or lawfulness of the source of income as mentioned in the
          income tax returns by an assessee without any semblance
          of inquisition into the inherent merit of the materials on
          record relatable thereto. Not only this aspect was totally
          missed by the High Court, no attempt seems to have
          been made by it to appraise the evidence adduced by
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                           699

                         Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


            the parties in this regard, to come to a self-contained and
            consummate determination.”
31. These submissions do not appeal to us for the following reasons:
     (i)    First of all, the inquisition mentioned in Paragraph 309 of the
            said decision, is the inquisition to be made by the criminal
            court. That is clear from a complete reading of the above-said
            paragraph. In that case, the High Court, while acquitting the
            accused, had merely gone by the income tax records which
            were produced by the accused persons. However, the Trial
            Court had independently examined the issue and had not
            mechanically gone by the income tax records. It was while
            commenting on this that this Court said an inquisition ought to
            have been made on the material.
     (ii)   Secondly, this Court in J. Jayalalitha (supra), before arriving
            at a conclusion regarding the probative value of the income tax
            returns, has examined in detail the previous decisions of this
            Court where there were not only assessment orders but also
            decisions of the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. It is
            only after considering this aspect that the Court laid down that
            the Income Tax Returns and Orders passed in IT Proceedings
            are not conclusive proof.
     (iii) Thirdly, this Court has categorically held that while income tax
           returns/orders may be admissible as evidence, the probative
           value of the same would depend on the nature of the information
           furnished and findings recorded in the order, and would not ipso
           facto either conclusively prove or disprove a charge.
     (iv) Fourthly, it is important to note that the decision in J. Jayalalitha
          (supra) was in a matter involving a full-fledged trial and the
          Court was hearing an appeal against an Order of acquittal
          passed by the High Court. The Court also noted that income
          tax returns or orders could at best be evidences which have to
          be evaluated along with the other materials on record.
     (v)    This Court, in cases involving either discharge [State of
            Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan & Ors. (2014) 11 SCC 709
            Paragraph 32.3] or quash [CBI & Anr. v. Thommandru Hannah
            Vijayalakshmi & Anr. (2021) 18 SCC 135 Paragraph 63-64] has
            noted that Income Tax Returns are not conclusive proof which
700                                                        [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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          can be relied upon either to quash the criminal proceeding or
          to discharge the accused persons.
32. Therefore, in the present case, the probative value of the Orders of
    the Income Tax Authorities, including the Order of the Income Tax
    Appellate Tribunal and the subsequent Assessment Orders, are not
    conclusive proof which can be relied upon for discharge of the accused
    persons. These orders, their findings, and their probative value, are
    a matter for a full-fledged trial. In view of the same, the High Court,
    in the present case, has rightly not discharged the appellants based
    on the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities.
33. Insofar as the submission that where there is exoneration in a civil
    adjudication, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and
    circumstances cannot be allowed to continue is concerned, the
    same is also without merit as far as the present case is concerned.
34. The appellants herein have placed reliance on the decisions of this
    Court in Radheyshyam Kejriwal (supra), Ashoo Surendranath
    Tewari (supra) and J. Sekar (supra) to argue that once there is an
    exoneration on merits in a civil adjudication, a criminal prosecution
    on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to
    continue. In our opinion, none of the above-referred decisions are
    applicable to the facts of the present case.
35. In Radheshyam Kejriwal (supra), this Court was concerned with
    a fact situation where the Petitioner therein was being prosecuted
    under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 for payments
    made by him in Indian currency in exchange for foreign currency
    without any general or specific exemption from the Reserve Bank
    of India. The Enforcement Directorate had commenced both an
    adjudication proceeding and a prosecution under the provisions of
    the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. It so transpired that
    the Adjudicating Officer found that no documentary evidence was
    available to prove the foundational factum of the Petitioner therein
    entering into the alleged transactions which fell foul of the Act and
    thereafter directed that the proceedings be dropped. The question
    which fell for the consideration before this Court was whether the
    result of this adjudication proceeding would lead to exoneration of
    the Petitioner in the criminal prosecution.
36. In this background, this Court noticed that the adjudication proceedings
    under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 involved an
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                         701

                        Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


     adjudication on whether a person had committed a contravention
     of any provisions of the Act. It is in this context, that the Court went
     on to hold that where the allegation in an adjudication proceeding
     and proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration
     in the former is on merits i.e. that there is no contravention of the
     provisions of the Act, then the trial of person concerned would be
     an abuse of process of the Court.
37. The decision in Radheyshyam (supra) was in a fact situation where
    the adjudicatory and criminal proceedings were being commenced
    by the same authority in exercise of powers under the same Act.
    Further, as this Court had noted, the civil adjudication proceedings
    related to an adjudication as to whether there was contravention of
    provisions of the Act and the Rules thereunder, which had an impact
    on the prosecution under the Act. However, in the present case,
    the appellants herein are being prosecuted under the provisions
    of the Prevention of Corruption Act while they seek to rely on an
    exoneration under the Income Tax Act. The scope of adjudication in
    both of these proceedings are vastly different. The authority which
    conducted the income tax proceedings and the authority conducting
    the prosecution is completely different (CBI). The CBI was not and
    could not have been a party to the income tax proceeding. Given
    the said factual background, the decision in Radheyshyam (supra)
    is not applicable to the present case.
38. In Ashoo Surendranath (supra), the Petitioner therein was working
    as a DGM at the Small Industries Development Bank of India while
    there was diversion of funds from the Bank. The allegation against
    the Petitioner therein was that he had shared the RTGS details for
    the account to which the amount was diverted, to another official who
    was the purported kingpin of the crime. The competent authority of
    the Bank had refused to provide a sanction for prosecution of the
    Petitioner therein, which was supported by the report of the Central
    Vigilance Commission. The question therefore posed before the
    Court was whether the report of the Central Vigilance Commission
    should lead to discharge of the Petitioner therein.
39. In the above-mentioned factual background, this Court set-out the
    findings of the Central Vigilance Commission which had recorded
    that the e-mail sent by the Petitioner therein had clearly been
    sent to the principal accused for the purpose of verification since
    the latter was the officer for verification and that this showed that
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       there was no role that the Petitioner played in perpetrating the
       offence. Thereafter, relying upon the decision in Radheyshyam
       (supra), the Court concluded that since the allegation has been
       found to be “not sustainable at all”, the criminal prosecution could
       not be continued.
40. The decision in Ashoo Surendranath (supra) is not applicable to
    the present case because the decision in Ashoo Surendranath
    (supra) concerned a singular prosecution under the provisions of
    the Indian Penal Code where the sanctioning authority had, while
    denying sanction, recorded on merits that there was no evidence to
    support the prosecution case. In that context, the Court was of the
    opinion that a criminal proceeding could not be continued. However,
    in the present case, the charges were framed under the Prevention
    of Corruption Act, while the appellants seek to rely upon findings
    recorded by authorities under the Income Tax Act. The scope of
    adjudication in both the proceedings are markedly different and
    therefore the findings in the latter cannot be a ground for discharge
    of the Accused Persons in the former. The proceedings under the
    Income Tax Act and its evidentiary value remains a matter of trial
    and they cannot be considered as conclusive proof for discharge of
    an accused person.
41. The appellants herein have further sought to place reliance on J.
    Sekar (supra) to argue that the letter of the Income-Tax Department
    was relied upon to quash prosecution under the Prevention of
    Money Laundering Act, 2002. In our opinion, this decision is again
    inapplicable to the present case. In J. Sekar (supra), the criminal
    proceedings had arisen based upon the information furnished by
    the Income Tax Department regarding recovery of unauthorized
    cash and other items during their search. It so transpired that the
    Income Tax Department accepted the explanation of the accused
    regarding the recovered cash which led to closure of the Income
    Tax proceedings. Thereafter, even the criminal proceedings led to
    filing of a closure report on the ground that no sufficient evidence
    was found for continuation of prosecution. The proceedings under
    the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, being based on the
    Income Tax Department’s information after their search and the
    registration of FIR, were found to be unsustainable in view of no
    violation being found either by the Department or in the criminal
    proceeding.
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                     703

                       Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI


42. The decision in J. Sekar (supra) is therefore distinguishable on
    facts. In the abovementioned case, there was an exoneration
    by not only the Income Tax Department, to the effect that no
    case was made, there was also an exoneration in the criminal
    proceedings which involved the Scheduled Offence. In the present
    case, the proceedings under the Income Tax Act which are
    sought to be relied upon relate to the assessment of income of
    the assessee and not to the source of income and the allegation
    of disproportionate assets under the Prevention of Corruption
    Act. The said Orders cannot be the basis to abort the criminal
    proceeding in the present case.
43. We are not to conduct a dress rehearsal of the trial at this stage.
    The tests applicable for a discharge are well settled by a catena of
    judgments passed by this Court. Even a strong suspicion founded
    on material on record which is ground for presuming the existence
    of factual ingredients of an offence would justify the framing of
    charge against an accused person [Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors. v.
    State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2008) 2 SCC 561 Paragraph 11]. The
    Court is only required to consider judicially whether the material
    warrants the framing of charge without blindly accepting the decision
    of the prosecution [State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Ors.
    (1977) 2 SCC 699 Paragraph 10]. Applying these principles to the
    present case, we accept the submission of the learned ASG that
    the appellants have not made out the case to say that the charge
    is groundless.
44. The other argument about the minority of the appellant Puneet
    Sabharwal also need not detain the Court since for the last seven
    years of the check period admittedly he was not a minor. All the
    defences are available for the appellants to be placed before the
    Trial Court.
45. In view of what we have held hereinabove, we are not called upon
    to answer the argument raised by the learned ASG that the Income
    Tax Appellate Tribunal order being a document which has emerged
    subsequent to the framing of the charge, it cannot be taken into
    consideration at all.
46. For all the above reasons, we find no merit in these appeals and
    the appeals are dismissed. The interim orders stand vacated. All
    pending applications stand closed. The trial has been pending for
704                                                        [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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       nearly 25 years. We direct that the trial be expeditiously concluded
       and, in any case, on or before 31.12.2024. Needless to mention
       that the observations made herein are only in the context of the
       discharge proceedings.


       Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan                 Result of the case:
                                                          Appeals dismissed.