Holding

The Supreme Court held that the appellant companies are not entitled to the 25% rebate because the 1991 notification was rescinded before their power supply commenced and the later notifications were declared void, and the High Court’s decision is binding under res judicata.

Summary

The appellant companies, industrial units in Goa, claimed a 25% rebate on electricity tariffs under a 1991 notification that was later rescinded in 1995 and amended in 1996. They argued that their entitlement crystallised when they applied for power and that the State could not withdraw the benefit due to promissory estoppel. The High Court dismissed their writ petitions, holding that the 1991 notification was no longer operative for supplies made after its rescission and that the later notifications were void. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court, applying the doctrine of res judicata and public interest to reject the rebate claim and uphold the demand notices issued under the 2002 Act. Consequently, all civil appeals were dismissed and no further review was permitted.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant companies are covered by the 30‑09‑1991 notification for availing a 25% rebate on electricity tariff.
Whether the rescission of the 1991 notification and subsequent voiding of the 1996 notifications extinguish the rebate entitlement.
Whether the principle of promissory estoppel or public equity can prevent the State from withdrawing the rebate.
Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars re‑litigation of the rebate claim in the present appeals.

Legislation cited

Electricity Act, 1910s. 23, s. 51-A
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 21
Goa (Prohibition of Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002s. 3

Subjects

rebate on electricity tariffpublic interestres judicatapromissory estoppelnotification rescissionindustrial unitsGoa electricity policyfinancial crunchpublic equityreview petition

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 138 : 2025 INSC 217

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd.
v.
State of Goa and Ors.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2027-2028 of 2012)
14 February 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the appellant-companies are covered by the notification
issued by the State dated 30.09.1991 for the purpose of availing
25% rebate on the tariff chargeable for availing power supply.

Headnotes†
Electricity Act, 1910 – ss.23, 51-A – Goa (Prohibition of Further
Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002 – s.3 –
Electricity tariff – Relief of rebate of 25% on electricity tariff
in terms of notification dated 30.09.1991 to the appelant
companies – By notification dated 30.09.1991 the industrial
units which applied for availing power supply for bona fide
industrial activities entitled to rebate of 25% on the tariff
chargeable to electricity bills for five years from the date
electricity supply made available – Supply of electricity to
appellant-companies – 25% rebate given only from 01.01.1997 –
By Notification dated 31.03.1995, previous notification dated
30.09.1991 was rescinded – Notifications of 1996 amended
notification dated 30.09.1991 to include another consumer
category and to extend the benefit of rebate to all the industrial
units who apply or avail extra high-tension power supply –
Thereafter, by Circular dated 31.03.1998, the State suspended
the rebate entitlement, however, the said circular did not
mention whether the suspension of the rebate given under the
notification dated 30.09.1991 or the amending notifications of
15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996 and on 24.07.1998, the notification
dated 01.08.1996 was rescinded – Writ petitions – High Court
in GR Ispat’s case held that rescission of the notification dated
30.09.1991 would only mean that the benefit was given up from

* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 139

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

01.04.1995 and the new industrial units could not apply after
01.04.1995 to obtain the benefit of rebate; that the amendment
of the notification after its rescission indicates that the
notification dated 30.09.1991 was in existence and operation
for those industrial units who had already become entitled
to get the benefit of rebate under it, thus, the suspension of
the release of rebate was invalid and inoperative; notification
dated 24.07.1998 is legal, valid and operative and that the
petitioning companies were entitled to 25% rebate in power
tariff till 24.07.1998 – GR Ispat’s case upheld by this Court –
Thereafter, 2002 Act was passed which specified that those
who had already availed benefits of notifications dated 1996
would be liable to refund the amount – Respondents sought
recovery from the appellants under the 2002 Act – Challenge
to – Division Bench dismissed the petitions upholding the
demand notices – Review applications also dismissed –
Correctness:
Held: High Court rightly held that the appellant-companies are
not entitled to the rebate and the impugned demand notices does
not suffer from any vice including that of illegality – High Court in
GR Ispat’s case held that the challenge against the rescission on the
grounds of promissory estoppel against the State is unsustainable
as it must yield to the principle of public equity – Thus, the
Government has a justifiable ground of supervening public interest
to withdraw the grant of rebate in power tariff which was promised
in the notifications dated 30.09.1991 and 01.08.1996 – Judgment
of GR Ispat attained finality – Supply of electricity was effected to
all the appellant-companies, except one, on varying dates beyond
31.03.1995; however, the notification dated 30.09.1991 had life
till 31.03.1995 whereafter it stood rescinded – Declaration in
Manohar Parrikar’s case that the Notifications dated 15.05.1996 and
01.08.1996 were non-est and void ab initio – Appellant-companies
were seeking benefit of these subsequent notifications before the
High Court in GR Ispat’s case which was not accepted by the High
Court – Considering the ruling by the High Court that they are
covered under the notification dated 30.09.1991, they now seek
to protect their benefits under the guise of this notification which,
in any event, stood rescinded with effect from 01.04.1995 whereas
the supply was effected therafter – Division Bench rightly held that
140 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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the challenge is without any legal basis as the question is squarely
covered by the decision in GR Ispat’s case – Principle of res judicata
applies even to petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction
u/Art.226 – Writ petitions before the High Court hit by res judicata
in view of its previous decision in GR Ispat’s case which, when
challenged before this Court, was upheld – Appellant-companies
bound by the decision in GR Ispat’s case – Having failed up to this
Court, the appellant-companies could not have adopted a stand
different from the one taken in the first round of litigation – Public
interest change the things against the appellant-companies – High
Court accepted that the policy of rebate was unviable resulting from
financial crunch and was overriding public interest, and would apply
as res judicata against the appellant-companies – Also no appeal
lies against order of rejection of petition for review – Constitution
of India – Art.226. [Paras 19-21, 24, 25, 27-30]

Case Law Cited
GR Ispat Ltd. v. Chief Electrical Engineer, 1999 (1) Goa L.T. 218;
Manohar Parrikar v. State of Goa, 2001 SCC OnLine Bom 350;
MRF Limited v. Manohar Parrikar & Ors. [2010] 5 SCR 1081 :
(2010) 11 SCC 374; Goa Glass Fibre Limited v. State of Goa
& Anr. [2010] 5 SCR 970 : (2010) 6 SCC 499; Pawan Alloys &
Casting (P) Ltd. v. UP SEB [1997] Supp. 3 SCR 266 : (1997) 7
SCC 251; Inderchand Jain v. Motilal [2009] 11 SCR 252 : (2009)
14 SCC 663; Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi [1960] 3 SCR
590 : [1960] 3 SCR 590; Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land
Board [1998] Supp. 2 SCR 514 : (1999) 5 SCC 590; T.P. Moideen
Koya v. State of Kerala [2004] Supp. 4 SCR 904 : (2004) 8 SCC
106 – referred to.

List of Acts
Electricity Act, 1910; General Clauses Act, 1897; Goa (Prohibition
of Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002.

List of Keywords
Rebate on the tariff chargeable for availing power supply; Electricity
tariff; Suspension of rebate; Rescission; Industrial units; GR Ispat’s
case; Promissory estoppel against the State; Principle of public
equity; Manohar Parrikar’s case; Principle of res judicata; First
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 141

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

round of litigation; Public interest; Policy of rebate; Financial crunch;
Overriding public interest; Res judicata; Petition for review; Tariff
applicable to electricity bills; Rebate; High-tension or low-tension
power; Extra High-tension power; Rescission of notification by
State; Power tariff; Rules of business; Non-est; Void ab initio;
Judgment in personam; Principle of estoppel; Res judicata on writ
jurisdiction; Appeal on review petition.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2027-2028
of 2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.07.2011 and 21.10.2011
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition
No. 160 of 2011 and CRA No. 26 of 2011 in W.P. No. 160 of 2011
respectively

Appearances for Parties
Santosh Paul, Sr. Adv., A. Raghunath, Sriharsh Nahush Bundela,
Amaan Khan, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. A. Subhashini, Abhay Anil Anturkar, Dhruv Tank, Aniruddha
Awalgaonkar, Sarthak Mehrotra, Ms. Surbhi Kapoor, T. Mahipal,
Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta J.

The Appeal
1. In all but one of the civil appeals under consideration, the appellant-
companies call in question the common impugned judgment and
order dated 08.07.2011 of the High Court1 in a batch of writ petitions2
and a common order dated 21.10.2011 on a batch of civil review
applications. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court

1 High Court of Bombay, at Goa
2 W.P. Nos. 157-160/2011
142 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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declined to grant the relief of rebate of 25% on the electricity tariff
in terms of the notification dated 30.09.1991 to the appellants. The
subsequent order dismissed the review applications.
2. Civil Appeal No. 4556/2012 [M/s Karthik Alloys Ltd. v. The State
of Goa and Another] is a connected appeal, which challenges the
judgment and order dated 08.07.2011 of the High Court dismissing
the writ petition3 filed by M/s Karthik Alloys Ltd. on similar grounds.

Resume of facts
3. This is the third round of litigation before this Court regarding the
issue of grant of relief of rebate, but not between the same parties.
4. Civil Appeal No. 2027-28 of 2012 [Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. The State
of Goa and Another] is the lead appeal. Considering the commonality
of the issues of facts and law in all the connected appeals, we
proceed to note the facts of the lead appeal to the extent the same
are relevant for a decision on these appeals.
i. Vide Notification dated 27.06.1988, the first respondent-State
of Goa4 determined tariff applicable to electricity bills issued
from 01.07.1988.
ii. Vide Notification dated 30.09.1991 issued under Section 23
read with Section 51-A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910,5 the
SoG determined tariff whereby industrial units which applied for
availing High-Tension or Low-Tension power supply for bona
fide industrial activities were held entitled to a rebate of 25%
on the tariff chargeable under the notification dated 27.06.1988
for a period of five years from the date on which the electricity
supply was made available.
iii. The appellant-companies then applied for power from the SoG
and entered into respective power supply agreements. The
details are tabulated hereunder6:

3 WP No. 179/2011
4 SoG
5 1910 Act
6 Data taken from GR Ispat Ltd. v. Chief Electrical Engineer, 1999 (1) Goa L.T. 218
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 143

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

Appellant- Application Power Date of
Company for Power Supply Power
Agreement Connection
Puja Ferro 15.09.1992 05.08.1993 16.05.1995
Alloys Pvt. Ltd.
Karthik Alloys 26.11.1992 - 17.11.1993
Ltd.
Karthik - - 28.07.1995
Inductions Ltd.
Global Ispat 21.02.1994 10.02.1995 29.04.1995
Pvt. Ltd.
Sunrise 01.02.1994 08.02.1995 10.02.1995
Electromelt Ltd.

iv. Vide Notification dated 31.03.1995, issued under Section 23
read with Section 51-A of the 1910 Act as well as Section 21 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897, the previous notification dated
30.09.1991 was rescinded w.e.f. 01.04.1995. In terms thereof,
the scheme of rebate was stopped and any new industrial unit
applying for power after 31.03.1995 would not get the benefit
of the notification dated 30.09.1991.
v. On 15.05.1996, the notification dated 30.09.1991 was amended
to include another consumer category of “Extra High-Tension”.
vi. The notification dated 30.09.1991 was once again amended
on 01.08.1996 so as to extend the benefit of rebate to all the
industrial units who apply or avail extra high-tension power
supply. The rebate of 25% was given on the prevailing tariff
in force.
vii. Power began to be supplied to the appellant-companies as
mentioned in the table above. However, the 25% rebate was
given only from 01.01.1997. The accumulated arrears of rebate
were sought to be disbursed in 60 equated monthly instalments.
viii. Vide Circular dated 31.03.1998, the SoG suspended the rebate
entitlement. However, the said circular does not mention whether
the suspension of the rebate was of the rebate given under the
notification dated 30.09.1991 or the amending notifications of
15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996.
144 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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ix. On 24.07.1998, the amending notification dated 01.08.1996
was rescinded.
x. A batch of writ petitions challenging the circular dated 31.03.1998
and the notification dated 24.07.1998 came to be presented
before the High Court.
xi. The High Court vide judgment and order dated 21.01.1999 in W.P.
No. 239 of 1998 [GR Ispat Ltd. v. Chief Electrical Engineer7]
held that rescission of the notification dated 30.09.1991 by the
notification dated 31.03.1995 would only mean that the scheme
providing rebate was given up from 01.04.1995 and that the new
industrial units could not apply after 01.04.1995 to obtain the
benefit of rebate. The High Court also held that the amendment
of the notification after its rescission clearly indicates that the
notification dated 30.09.1991 was in existence and operation for
those industrial units who had already become entitled to get
the benefit of rebate under it. Therefore, the suspension of the
release of rebate was invalid and inoperative. The High Court
concluded that the notification dated 24.07.1998 is legal, valid
and operative and that the petitioning companies therein were
entitled to 25% rebate in power tariff till 24.07.1998.
xii. When the decision was challenged in this Court in CA No.
3206-3217/1999, interference was declined vide order dated
13.02.2001 as the High Court had taken a balanced view in
the matter.
xiii. A writ petition also came to be filed in the High Court challenging
the notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996 wherein
prayer was made to declare the same as null and void. The
High Court allowed the said writ petition [Manohar Parrikar v.
State of Goa 8] owing to brazen non-compliance with the Rules
of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution.
The impugned notifications were held to be non-est and void
ab initio and the consequential acts based on such notifications
were also to be considered null and void.

7 1999 (1) Goa L.T. 218
8 2001 SCC OnLine Bom 350
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 145

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

xiv. Meanwhile in 2002, the SoG enacted the Goa (Prohibition of
Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002.9
Section 3 of 2002 Act specified that any person or industrial
consumer in the SoG who has already availed of the benefits
of 25% rebate in pursuance of the Government notifications
dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996 would be liable to refund
the amount to the third respondent herein – the Chief Electrical
Engineer, Electricity Department, Government of Goa.
xv. A batch of civil appeals challenging the judgment and order in
Manohar Parrikar (supra) was dismissed by this Court in MRF
Limited v. Manohar Parrikar & Ors.10
xvi. Moreover, this Court in Goa Glass Fibre Limited v. State of
Goa & Anr.11 categorically held that the object of the 2002 Act
is not to undo or reverse the judgments of the Supreme Court
or the High Court but it merely seeks to recover and extinguish
all liabilities of the SoG that accrue or arise from the notifications
dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996.
xvii. Vide demand notice dated 21.02.2011, the respondents sought
recovery from Puja Ferro [the lead appellant-company], under
Section 3 of the 2002 Act, an amount of Rs. 1,36,30,072/-.
Aggrieved by the impugned demand notice, the appellant-
company preferred a writ petition12 before the High Court. Similar
demand notices were served on the other appellant-companies
leading them too to file their respective writ petitions before
the High Court.
xviii. By the common impugned judgment and order, referred to
at the beginning of this judgment, the Division Bench of the
High Court dismissed the batch of writ petitions filed by the
appellant-companies and thereby, upheld the demand notices.
Review applications filed against the impugned judgment and
order were also dismissed by the High Court holding that no
error apparent on the face of the record was shown to exist.

9 2002 Act
10 (2010) 11 SCC 374
11 (2010) 6 SCC 499
12 W.P. No.160/2011
146 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Impugned Judgments
5. Before the High Court, the appellant-companies assailed the demand
notices on the ground that the rebate was offered for the purpose
of increasing investment and industries in the SoG. Based on the
promise that incentives in the form of rebate would be given, the
appellant-companies set up industries in the SoG, obtaining loans
from banks and financial institutions as well as on plots of land on
lease from the Industrial Development Corporation. They urged that
the SoG was bound to provide the rebate as per the notifications
providing such rebate and the subsequent power supply agreement
entered into by and between the appellant-companies and the
authorities. Moreover, the High Court had previously decided that
the amendment of the rescinded notification would imply that the
rebate entitlement was still available to existing consumers and that
only new consumers were not eligible for the 25% rebate. This was
carried up to this Court which upheld the said order of the Division
Bench of the High Court. They further contended that the decision of
the High Court in Manohar Parrikar (supra) does not affect the claim
of the appellant-companies as it was a judgment in personam. It was
also urged that the SoG under the guise of recovery of rebate was
actually recovering the rebate benefit granted under the notification
dated 30.09.1991.
6. The respondents defended the impugned demand notices before
the High Court on the ground that the appellant-companies had
claimed that they availed the benefits of 25% rebate on the power
tariff pursuant to the notification dated 30.09.1991; however, their
case cannot be accepted because the notification dated 30.09.1991
was rescinded with effect from 01.04.1995 vide notification date
31.03.1995. It was further urged that the previous order of the
High Court in Manohar Parrikar (supra), which was subsequently
challenged before this Court, binds the appellant-companies as it
has clearly held that the rebate benefit will not be available to the
appellant-companies after the unexpired period of five years.
7. The High Court concluded that the appellant-companies are not
those who are claiming benefit of rebate under the notification dated
30.09.1991, as this notification was rescinded by the notification
dated 31.03.1995. The High Court, based on the reply affidavit filed
by the respondents, proceeded on the basis that the appellant-
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 147

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

companies have availed the power supply only after 31.03.1995.
The High Court held that the previous decisions have clarified that
the 2002 Act is valid and constitutional and that the demand notices
had been issued under Section 3 of the 2002 Act. Moreover, it
was held that the appellant-companies cannot rest their claims on
the basis of the notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996 as
these decisions were held not to be Government decisions, and the
notification dated 30.09.1991 was rescinded on 31.03.1995 with
effect from 01.04.1995.
8. The High Court observed that the appellant-companies have been
supplied power only from 10.05.1995, 29.04.1995, 28.07.1995 and
16.05.1995 and, therefore, none of the appellants before the High
Court could lay a valid claim to be covered by the notification dated
30.09.1991. Consequently, all the writ petitions came to be dismissed.
9. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the High Court, various
civil review applications were filed seeking a review thereof. The
Division Bench dismissed the same holding that there was no error
apparent on the face of the record that would necessitate any review
of the judgment and order under review.

Contentions
10. Mr. Santosh Paul, learned senior advocate for the appellant-
companies, orally as well as through the written notes of arguments
assailed the impugned judgment and order by contending that:
i. The appellant-companies are covered by the notification dated
30.09.1991 and not by the notification dated 01.08.1996.
ii. The High Court has not appreciated that the rights of the
appellant-companies crystallized upon making the application for
power while the notification dated 30.09.1991 was in force and
hence, irrespective of when the power was actually supplied,
the appellant-companies are entitled to the benefit of rebate.
iii. Referring to the decision in Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v.
UP SEB,13 it was urged that the new industries were attracted to
the region relying upon the promise of the SoG to grant rebate

13 (1997) 7 SCC 251
148 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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and that without the lure of rebate, the appellant-companies
would not have set up industries in the SoG.
iv. A notification cannot be rescinded with retrospective effect and
only with prospective effect and that the decision in GR Ispat
Ltd. (supra) clearly lays down that the appellant-companies
cannot be denied the rebate.
v. The impugned demand notices are illegal, arbitrary, and ultra
vires the provisions of the 2002 Act.
vi. The appellant-companies became aware of a certain letter of
the Electricity Department of the SoG which has a direct bearing
on the matter and discovery of such new material is sufficient
to exercise the power of review, as decided in Inderchand
Jain v. Motilal.14
vii. The appellant-companies have been treated rather unfairly
and to set things right, the impugned demand notices ought
to be quashed and the deposits made by them, in pursuance
of the order issuing notice dated 10.02.2012, may be directed
to be refunded.
11. Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents,
has assiduously contended that the impugned judgment and order
not suffering from any infirmity, the civil appeals deserve outright
dismissal. It was further contended that:
I. The impugned demand notices have been issued in consonance
with the 2002 Act. The challenge to the constitutionality of the
2002 Act has been upheld by this Court.
II. The High Court has rightly concluded that the said notification
dated 30.09.1991 does not cover the case of the appellant-
companies and hence, they are not entitled to any rebate.
III. The appellant-companies have received the benefits from the
notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996, however, the
case that has been made out before this Court is that they
received benefit from the notification dated 30.09.1991.

14 (2009) 14 SCC 663
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 149

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

The Question
12. The short question arising for decision in all the connected appeals
is, whether the appellant-companies are covered by the notification
dated 30.09.1991 for the purpose of availing 25% rebate on the tariff
chargeable for availing power supply.

Analysis and Reasons
13. At the outset, we record our sense of surprise having noticed that
the notification dated 30.09.1991, which was rescinded by notification
dated 31.03.1995, was amended twice vide notifications dated
15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996. However, the High Court in GR Ispat
(supra) clarified the position and such clarification having been
accepted by this Court, we refrain from expressing any further view.
14. Moving ahead to determine the question as to which of the notifications
would apply in the case of the appellant-companies before us, we
have perused the series of notifications published by the SoG along
with the impugned demand notices and the impugned judgment
and order.
15. The impugned demand notices were issued under the 2002 Act and
seeks to recover the rebate granted to the appellant-companies by
the SoG. This Court has previously held in Goa Glass Fibre (supra)
that the 2002 Act is legal and valid. This enactment provides for
recovery of rebate granted under the notifications dated 15.05.1996
and 01.08.1996. The appellant-companies have primarily urged before
this Court that since their claim is governed by the notification dated
30.09.1991, Section 3 of the 2002 Act does not apply to them and
that the SoG does not have the power to recover the rebate granted
to these companies.
16. While at first blush this argument seems to be attractive, upon a
closer examination of the facts, it must be rejected for the reasons
that follow.
17. In the case of GR Ispat (supra), the High Court decided that the
rescission of the notification dated 30.09.1991 was limited to new
industrial units and that it was very much in existence and operative
for those industrial units who had already become entitled to the
rebate benefit under the said notification. Therefore, the High Court
concluded that the grant of 25% rebate was operative till it was
150 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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suspended vide notification dated 31.03.1998. The High Court ruled
that only one of the petitioners before it, i.e., the Marmagao Steel
Company is entitled to the benefit of rebate under the notification
dated 30.09.1991 or the second notification dated 01.08.1996. The
High Court ruled that the companies could have applied before
01.10.1991 but the supply of electricity must be availed from a date
subsequent to 01.10.1991 for being entitled to the rebate. This ruling
is admittedly in favour of the appellant-companies. However, the
further discussion of the High Court from paragraph 35 onwards merits
consideration. The High Court specifically held that the challenge
against the rescission on the grounds of promissory estoppel against
the SoG is unsustainable as it must yield to the principle of public
equity. Therefore, it was held that the Government has a justifiable
ground of supervening public interest to withdraw the grant of rebate
in power tariff which was promised in the two notifications dated
30.09.1991 and 01.08.1996. The High Court further noted that many
of the companies did not complete their respective period of five
years to get the rebate on 27.07.1998; therefore, they will have to
forgo their claim of rebate for the unexpired period in view of the
overriding public interest arising due to financial crunch. The High
Court also clearly laid down the period of entitlement of rebate up to
27.07.1998 for the respective appellant-companies in paragraph 56
of the judgment. When challenged before this Court, it was dismissed
on the ground that the High Court has taken a balanced view of the
matter. Therefore, this judgment has attained finality.
18. Now turning to the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, the
appellant-companies on a similar challenge argued that the demand
notices seek to recover the benefit that has already been protected
by the Division Bench earlier in GR Ispat (supra). The High Court
spurned this argument by highlighting that the previous decision was
restricted to those claims which actually accrued and were admissible
in terms of the notification dated 30.09.1991. However, if the power
supply itself has not been availed of within the period during which
the notification dated 30.09.1991 was in force, the foundation for the
challenge itself is shaky and without any legal basis.
19. First, the notification dated 30.09.1991 made the rebate available for
five (5) years from the date on which electric supply was effected
to the appellant-companies. As seen in the table above, supply of
electricity was effected to all the appellant-companies, except M/s
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 151

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

Karthik Alloys, on varying dates beyond 31.03.1995; however, the
notification dated 30.09.1991 had life till 31.03.1995 whereafter it
stood rescinded, leaving no option but to decline acceptance of
their pleas.
20. Secondly, reliance placed on the notifications dated 15.05.1996
and 01.08.1996 is wholly misconceived as they must be deemed
not to have existed at all because of the declaration in Manohar
Parrikar (supra), that they were non-est and void ab initio. The
appellant-companies herein were seeking benefit of these subsequent
notifications before the High Court in GR Ispat (supra), which was not
accepted by the High Court. Considering the ruling by the High Court
that they are covered under the notification dated 30.09.1991, they
now seek to protect their benefits under the guise of this notification
which, in any event, stood rescinded with effect from 01.04.1995
whereas the supply was effected therafter. Despite the redundancy,
we stress that the appellant-companies, except M/s Karthik Alloys,
received power connection beyond 01.04.1995; thus these claims
cannot be sustained.
21. Thirdly, we do not have any doubt that the Division Bench is correct
in holding that the challenge is without any legal basis as the question
is squarely covered by the previous decision of the High Court in
GR Ispat (supra).
22. For the principle of res judicata to be applied in the subsequent
proceeding, it must be between the same parties and the cause of
action of the subsequent proceeding must be the same as in the
previous proceeding. The Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhyan
Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi15 has succinctly noted that the principle
of res judicata is essential in giving a finality to judicial decisions by
observing as under:
“The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving
a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a
res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it
applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When
a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of
law — has been decided between two parties in one suit

15 [1960] 3 SCR 590
152 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no
appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal
was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be
allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same
parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res
judicata is embodied in relation to suits in Section 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; but even where Section 11 does
not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied
by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation.
The result of this is that the original court as well as any
higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the
basis that the previous decision was correct.
The principle of res judicata applies also as between two
stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court,
whether the trial court or a higher court having at an
earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow
the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent
stage of the same proceedings. …”
23. A three-judge bench of this Court in the case of Hope Plantations
Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board,16 has elucidated the applicability of the
principles of res judicata and estoppel in the Indian context and
held that:
“26. It is settled law that the principles of estoppel and res
judicata are based on public policy and justice. Doctrine
of res judicata is often treated as a branch of the law
of estoppel though these two doctrines differ in some
essential particulars. Rule of res judicata prevents the
parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same
question over again even though the determination may
even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings
have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment
and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot litigate
again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate
any issue which was necessary for decision in the earlier
litigation. These two aspects are ‘cause of action estoppel’
and ‘issue estoppel’. These two terms are of common law

16 (1999) 5 SCC 590
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 153

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

origin. Again, once an issue has been finally determined,
parties cannot subsequently in the same suit advance
arguments or adduce further evidence directed to showing
that the issue was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is
to approach the higher forum if available. The determination
of the issue between the parties gives rise to, as noted
above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any subsequent
proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had been
determined. It also operates in subsequent suits between
the same parties in which the same issue arises. Section
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains provisions of
res judicata but these are not exhaustive of the general
doctrine of res judicata. Legal principles of estoppel and
res judicata are equally applicable in proceedings before
administrative authorities as they are based on public
policy and justice.
………
31. Law on res judicata and estoppel is well understood in
India and there are ample authoritative pronouncements
by various courts on these subjects. As noted above, the
plea of res judicata, though technical, is based on public
policy in order to put an end to litigation. It is, however,
different if an issue which had been decided in an earlier
litigation again arises for determination between the same
parties in a suit based on a fresh cause of action or where
there is continuous cause of action. The parties then may
not be bound by the determination made earlier if in the
meanwhile, law has changed or has been interpreted
differently by a higher forum. But that situation does not exist
here. Principles of constructive res judicata apply with full
force. It is the subsequent stage of the same proceedings.
If we refer to Order XLVII of the Code (Explanation to Rule
1) review is not permissible on the ground
‘that the decision on a question of law on which the
judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court
in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of
such judgment’.”
154 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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24. It is now well settled that the principle of res judicata applies even to
petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution. If any authority is required one may profitably
refer to the decision in T.P. Moideen Koya v. State of Kerala.17
25. In the instant case, we are convinced that the writ petitions before the
High Court were hit by res judicata in view of its previous decision
in GR Ispat (supra) which, when challenged before this Court, was
upheld with the further observation that a balanced view of the matter
had been taken and no interference was called for. The appellant-
companies were all parties and are bound by the decision in GR
Ispat (supra). Having failed up to this Court, the appellant-companies
could not have adopted a stand different from the one taken in the
first round of litigation. They sought to challenge the demand notices
by re-opening the litigation and arguing that they are entitled to the
benefit for five years, which they would have been entitled to had
they availed the supply of power within the time that the notification
dated 30.09.1991 was in force.
26. Though we have emphatically held against the appellant-companies
hereinabove, we wish to also deal with the final contention that since
the appellant-companies have invested in the SoG on the basis of
the rebate granted to them, the State is now estopped from resiling
and withdrawing this benefit, which has crystallised. Reliance has
been placed on the decision in Pawan Alloys (supra), where this
Court ruled:
“24. Consequently it cannot be held on the clear recitals
found in the aforesaid three notifications issued by the
Board that no representation whatsoever guaranteeing
10% rebate on electricity consumption bills could be culled
out from these notifications. We, therefore, agree with the
finding of the High Court on Issue No. 1 that by these
notifications the Board had clearly held out a promise
to these new industries and as these new industries
had admittedly got established in the region where the
Board was operating, acting on such promise, the same
in equity would bind the Board. Such a promise was not
contrary to any statutory provision but on the contrary was

17 (2004) 8 SCC 106
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 155

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

in compliance with the directions issued under Section
78-A of the Act. These new industries which got attracted
to this region relying upon the promise had altered their
position irretrievably. They had spent large amounts of
money for establishing the infrastructure, had entered
into agreements with the Board for supply of electricity
and, therefore, had necessarily altered their position
relying on these representations thinking that they would
be assured of at least three years’ period guaranteeing
rebate of 10% on the total bill of electricity to be consumed
by them as infancy benefit so that they could effectively
compete with the old industries operating in the field
and their products could effectively compete with their
products. On these well-established facts the Board can
certainly be pinned down to its promise on the doctrine
of promissory estoppel.”
However, the appellant-companies have failed to consider the
discussion in paragraph 31:
“31. In the light of this settled legal position we, therefore,
hold that even though the appellants have succeeded in
convincing us that the earlier three notifications dated
29-10-1982, 13-7-1984 and 28-1-1986 did contain a
clear promise and representation by the Board to the
prospective new industrialists that once they established
their industries in the region within the territorial limits of
the operation of the Board, they would be assured 10%
rebate on the total bills regarding consumption of electricity
by their industries for a period of three years from the initial
supply of electric power to their concerns, the appellants
will not be able to enforce the equity by way of promissory
estoppel against the Board if it is shown by the Board that
public interest required it to withdraw this incentive rebate
even prior to the expiry of three years as available to the
appellants concerned. It has also to be held that even if
such withdrawal of development rebate prior to three years
is not based on any overriding public interest, if it is shown
that by such premature withdrawal the appellant-promisees
would be restored to status quo ante and would be placed
in the same position in which they were prior to the grant
156 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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of such rebate by earlier notifications the appellants would
not be entitled to succeed……”
(emphasis supplied)

27. In our opinion, public interest is what turns the tide against the
appellant-companies. The SoG before the High Court in GR Ispat
(supra) had specifically taken the stand that the policy of rebate
was unviable resulting from financial crunch and was overriding
public interest. This, the High Court accepted, unlike in the case of
Pawan Alloys (supra). This too would apply as res judicata against
the appellant-companies.
28. Applying these principles to the instant case, we have no doubt in
our minds that the High Court was right in holding that the appellant-
companies before it are not entitled to the rebate and the impugned
demand notices do not suffer from any vice including that of illegality.
29. Regarding Civil Appeal No. 4556 of 2012 (M/s Karthik Alloys Ltd.
v. The State of Goa and Another), the matter has not been argued
before us as Mr. Paul, representing the concerned appellant-company
earlier, submitted not having received any instructions to proceed.
30. Turning to the challenge laid to the common order dismissing the
review applications, we hold bearing in mind Order XLVII Rule 7 of
the Code of Civil Procedure that no appeal lies against an order of
rejection of a petition for review. The Civil Appeals in this behalf are
misconceived.
31. Even otherwise, we have considered such appeals on merit. The
additional minor issue raised by the appellant-companies, as is
revealed from the common order on the review applications, is that
review was sought on two counts: first, that the rights of the applicants
had crystallised upon making the application for power and secondly,
a new document had been unearthed by the applicants which proves
that the High Court had committed a mistake/error apparent on the
face of the record. As the first question has already been answered
against the appellant-companies, it is clear that this is not a ground
for reviewing the judgment. On the second count also, the argument
of discovery does not at all impress us. The document being a letter
dated 06.04.1999 has been perused. It does not aid the review
applicants. We are, thus, in agreement with the High Court in its
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 157

Puja Ferro Alloys P Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors.

determination that the document does not in any way advance the
case of the appellant-companies.

Conclusion
32. Bearing in mind the aforesaid discussion, civil appeals nos.2027-
2028/2012, 2033-2034/2012, 2031-2032/2012, and 2035-2036/2012
are dismissed. Civil appeal no.4556/2012 is dismissed as not pressed.
33. No order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain