PHR INVENT EDUCATIONAL SOCIETYversusUCO BANK AND OTHERS

                 [2024] 4 S.C.R. 541 : 2024 INSC 297

                   PHR Invent Educational Society
                                v.
                       UCO Bank and Others
                       (Civil Appeal No. 4845 of 2024)
                                 10 April 2024
      [B.R. Gavai,* Rajesh Bindal and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       Matter pertains to the High Courts entertaining petitions arising
       out of the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability
       of an effective alternative remedy.

                                   Headnotes
       Constitution of India – Art. 226 – Cases related to recovery of
       dues of banks and auction sale – Exercise of power u/Art 226
       by filing writ petition, in spite of availability of an alternative
       remedy – Maintainability of the writ petition:
       Held: Ordinarily the High Court would not entertain a petition u/Art.
       226 if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person –
       This rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery
       of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of
       banks and other financial institutions – While dealing with such
       petitions, the High Court must keep in mind that the statutes enacted
       for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch
       as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery
       of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies
       for redressal of the grievance – Though the powers of the High
       Court u/Art. 226 are of widest amplitude, still the Courts cannot
       be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint – On facts, the
       High Courts entertained petitions arising out of the DRT and the
       SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective alternative
       remedy – High Court interfered with the writ petition only on the
       ground that the matter was pending for sometime before it and if
       the petition not entertained, the Borrower would be left remediless
       – However the High Court failed to take into consideration the
       conduct of the Borrower – Though the High Court was specifically
       informed that, on account of confirmation of sale and registration
       thereof, the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High
       Court failed to consider that aspect – High Court ought to have
* Author
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       taken into consideration that the confirmed auction sale could have
       been interfered with only when there was a fraud or collusion, which
       was not a case – Effect of the order of the High Court would be
       again reopening the issues which attained finality – Also instant
       case would not come under any of the exceptions – Thus, the
       High Court grossly erred in entertaining the petition – Impugned
       order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside – Costs
       of Rs.1,00,000/- imposed upon the Borrower – Securitization and
       Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
       Interest Act, 2002. [Paras 15, 24, 26, 32, 34]
       Constitution of India – Art. 226 – Power of High Courts to issue
       certain writs – Exceptions, when a petition u/Art. 226 could
       be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy:
       Held: It is when the statutory authority has not acted in accordance
       with the provisions of the enactment in question; it has acted in
       defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; it has
       resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and when
       an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of
       natural justice [Para 29]

                                Case Law Cited
            United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Others
            [2010] 9 SCR 1 : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : 2010 INSC 428;
            Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited and
            Others [2023] 13 SCR 53 : (2024) 2 SCC 1 : 2023 INSC
            838; South Indian Bank Limited and Others v. Naveen
            Mathew Philip and Another [2023] 4 SCR 18 : (2023)
            SCC OnLine SC 435 : 2023 INSC 379; State of U.P.
            v. Mohammad Nooh [1958] 1 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC
            86 : 1957 INSC 81; Agarwal Tracom Private Limited v
            Punjab National Bank and Others [2017] 11 SCR 164 :
            (2018) 1 SCC 626 : 2017 INSC 1146; Authorized Officer,
            State Bank of Travancore and Another v Mathew K.C
            [2018] 1 SCR 233 : (2018) 3 SCC 85 : 2018 INSC
            71; Phoenix ARC Private Limited v Vishwa Bharati
            Vidya Mandir and Others [2022] 1 SCR 950 : (2022)
            5 SCC 345 : 2022 INSC 44; Varimadugu OBI Reddy
            v B Sreenivasulu and Others [2022] 16 SCR 1108 :
            (2023) 2 SCC 168:2022 INSC 1205; Valji Khimji and
            Company v. Official Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product
            (Gujarat) Limited and Others [2008] 12 SCR 1 : (2008)
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                              543

       PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others


           9 SCC 299 : 2008 INSC 925; Dwarika Prasad v. State
           of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2018] 3 SCR 29 : (2018)
           5 SCC 491 : 2018 INSC 210; Commissioner of Income
           Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC
           603 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Constitution of India; Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial
     Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

                              List of Keywords
     Alternative remedy; Effective remedy; Recovery of taxes, cess, fees,
     other types of public money; Dues of banks and other financial
     institutions; Quasi-judicial bodies; Rule of exhaustion of alternative
     remedy; Rules of self-imposed restraint; Deprecation; Alternative
     statutory remedy; Debts Recovery Tribunal; Securitization
     application; Sale of his mortgaged properties; Rule of self-restraint;
     Redressal of grievance; Costs; Principles of judicial procedure;
     Principles of natural justice.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATEJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.4845 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 04.02.2022 of the High Court
     for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WP No. 5275 of 2021
                         Appearances for Parties
     R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Khalid M.S, A. Karthik, Manu Krishnan, Ms.
     Gunjan Rathore, Kavinesh R M, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Partha Sil, Sanjiv Kr. Saxena, Chirag Joshi,
     Ms. Sayani Bhattacharya, Abhiraj Chaudhary, Venkateswara Rao
     Anumolu, Sunny Kumar, Puneet Aggarwal, Advs. for the Respondents.
                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                 Judgment
     B.R. Gavai, J.
1.   Leave granted.
2.   This appeal challenges the order dated 4th February 2022, passed
     by the Division Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana
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       at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 5275 of 2021, whereby the High
       Court disposed of the writ petition filed by Dr. M.V. Ramana Rao,
       respondent No. 3 herein (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Borrower’).
       The High Court set aside the order dated 2nd February 2021, passed
       by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II at Hyderabad (hereinafter referred
       to as ‘DRT’) and allowed Miscellaneous Application (M.A.) No.
       97 of 2020 in Securitization Application (S.A.) No. 1476 of 2017
       filed by the Borrower for the restoration of the said S.A. No. 1476
       of 2017 filed by him under Section 17 of the Securitization and
       Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
       Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’ for short). The Borrower had
       filed S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 against the Notice dated 2nd September
       2017 issued by the UCO Bank (hereinafter referred to as the
       ‘Respondent-Bank’) for the sale of his mortgaged properties which
       was to be conducted by the Authorized Officer (Respondent No.2)
       of the Respondent-Bank in light of the default in repayment of loan
       by the Borrower. The DRT, in its aforementioned order dated 2nd
       February 2021, had dismissed the M.A. No. 97 of 2020 for the
       restoration of S.A. No. 1476 of 2017, which had been previously
       dismissed as withdrawn vide DRT vide order dated 21st September
       2020. The Division Bench of the High Court, in the impugned
       order, while setting aside the order of DRT dated 2nd February
       2021, further directed DRT to proceed with S.A. No. 1476 of 2017
       in accordance with law.
3.     The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under:
       3.1 The Borrower had availed a loan from the Respondent-Bank and
           in order to secure the said loan, the Borrower had mortgaged
           four properties (hereinafter referred to as ‘scheduled properties’)
           situated at Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh as collateral security.
           However, the Borrower defaulted in the repayment of the loan
           amount, which led the Respondent-Bank to initiate proceedings
           against the borrower under the SARFAESI Act.
       3.2 Thereafter, the Respondent-Bank issued an Auction Sale
           Notice on 2nd September 2017 for auctioning off the scheduled
           properties and published information about the same in the Times
           of India and one other vernacular newspaper. According to the
           said Auction Sale Notice, the auction was to be conducted on
           14th December 2017.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                      545

       PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others


     3.3 Aggrieved by the Auction Sale Notice, the Borrower preferred
         a securitization application being S.A. No.1476 of 2017 before
         DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, thereby inter alia
         praying for setting aside of the same.
     3.4 In the meanwhile, the auction was conducted on 14th December
         2017 by the Respondent-Bank through Respondent No.2. The
         PHR Invent Educational Society, (hereinafter referred to as
         the ‘auction purchaser’), i.e., the appellant herein participated
         in the said auction and emerged as the highest bidder for a
         bid of Rs.5,72,22,200/-. The appellant deposited 25% of the
         bid amount i.e. Rs. 1,38,05,550/- including the Earnest Money
         Deposit of the said amount. The fact remains that the Borrower
         did not deposit the amount.
     3.5 On the same day i.e., 14th December 2017, DRT passed an
         interim order in S.A. No. 1476 of 2017, thereby refusing to
         interfere with the sale of the scheduled properties which was to
         be conducted on that very day. The Borrower had also filed an
         interlocutory application being I.A. No. 3446 of 2017, thereby
         praying for stay of further proceedings qua the auction of the
         scheduled properties, wherein DRT directed the Respondent-
         Bank not to confirm the sale of the scheduled properties subject
         to the Borrower depositing 30% of the outstanding dues as
         claimed for in the Auction Sale Notice in two equal installments.
         The first installment of 15% amount was to be deposited within a
         week from the date of the said order, and the second installment
         of 15% amount was to be deposited within two weeks thereafter.
         The DRT further directed that, in the event that the Borrower
         failed to make the aforesaid deposits, the interim stay would
         stand vacated and the Respondent-Bank would be at liberty
         to confirm the sale in favor of the highest bidder, although the
         sale itself was made subject to the final outcome in S.A. No.
         1476 of 2017.
     3.6 Subsequently, the appellant deposited Rs.4,29,16,650/- towards
         the payment of the balance auction price on 28th December 2017.
     3.7 In the meanwhile, the Borrower proposed One Time Settlement
         (‘OTS’ for short) for all the outstanding loan accounts. However,
         the Respondent-Bank refused to accept the same and requested
         the Borrower to settle all the outstanding loan accounts with
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            interest payable at the contractual rate, as applicable thereon
            vide letter dated 12th May 2020.
       3.8 Following which, DRT passed an order dated 21st September
           2020, whereby S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 was dismissed as
           withdrawn at the behest of the Borrower who submitted that
           the matter had been settled out of court. On the other hand,
           the Respondent-Bank filed a Memo of Non-Settlement before
           DRT thereby informing that no such out-of-court settlement
           had been reached.
       3.9 Upon S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 being dismissed as withdrawn,
           the Respondent-Bank confirmed the sale of the scheduled
           properties in favor of the appellant herein. A Sale Certificate
           was issued by the Respondent-Bank on 2nd November 2020
           and the possession of the scheduled properties was accordingly
           delivered to the appellant. Subsequently, on 11th November
           2020, the Sale Certificate came to be registered in favor of
           the appellant herein.
       3.10 In the meantime, the Borrower preferred M.A. No. 97 of 2020 in
            S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 before DRT, praying for the restoration of
            S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 to the file and setting aside the aforesaid
            order of DRT dated 21st September 2020. However, on 2nd
            February 2021, DRT passed an order thereby dismissing the
            said M.A. filed by the Borrower.
       3.11 Aggrieved thereby, the Borrower filed writ petition before the
            High Court. The High Court, by the impugned order, disposed
            of the said writ petition, thereby setting aside the order of
            DRT, and further directing it to proceed with S.A. No. 1476
            of 2017 in accordance with law. The M.A. No. 97 of 2020 in
            S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 was thus allowed restoring S.A. No.
            1476 of 2017.
4.     Being aggrieved thus, the auction purchaser has preferred the
       present appeal.
5.     We have heard Shri R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel appearing
       on behalf of the appellant-auction purchaser, Shri Partha Sil,
       learned counsel appearing on behalf of the UCO Bank and Shri
       Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
       the respondent No.3-Borrower.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                           547

         PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others


6.    Shri Basant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-
      auction purchaser submitted that the High Court has grossly erred in
      entertaining the writ petition filed by the Borrower when an efficacious
      alternative remedy of statutory appeal was available to the Borrower
      under the SARFAESI Act. He relies on the judgments of this Court
      in the cases of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and
      Others1, Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited and
      Others2 and South Indian Bank Limited and Others v. Naveen
      Mathew Philip and Another3.
7.    Shri Basant further submitted that the conduct of the Borrower also
      disentitled him to an equitable relief. It is submitted that the Borrower
      had filed the writ petition after the entire payment was made by the
      appellant-auction purchaser and a Sale Certificate was also issued
      in its favour. The learned Senior Counsel therefore submitted that
      the writ petition filed by the Borrower deserves to be dismissed and
      the present appeal deserves to be allowed.
8.    Shri Partha Sil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the UCO
      Bank, also advanced similar arguments and prayed for dismissal of
      the writ petition filed by the Borrower.
9.    Shri Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the
      Borrower, on the contrary, submitted that non-exercising of the
      jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India on
      the ground of availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of self-
      restraint. It is submitted that, in deserving cases, the High Court is
      not precluded from entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the
      Constitution in order to do justice to the parties. The learned Senior
      Counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of State of
      U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh4.
10. The facts in the present case are not disputed. It is not in dispute
    that in the auction held on 14th December 2017, the appellant-
    auction purchaser was the highest bidder having offered a bid for an
    amount of Rs.5,72,22,200/- and that the appellant-auction purchaser
    deposited 25% of the bid amount i.e. Rs.1,38,05,550/- immediately.


1    [2010] 9 SCR 1 : (2010) 8 SCC 110 : 2010 INSC 428
2    [2023] 13 SCR 53 : (2024) 2 SCC 1 : 2023 INSC 838
3    [2023] 4 SCR 18 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 435 : 2023 INSC 379
4    [1958] 1 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 : 1957 INSC 81
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       It is also not in dispute that on 14th December 2017, the learned
       DRT, though refused to interfere with the sale but directed the
       Respondent-Bank not to confirm the sale of the scheduled properties
       subject to the Borrower depositing 30% of the outstanding dues in
       two equal installments within one week and two weeks thereafter
       respectively. The learned DRT had also directed that, in case of
       failure of compliance, the interim stay would stand automatically
       vacated and the Respondent-Bank would be entitled to confirm the
       sale. It is also not in dispute that the Borrower did not comply with
       the said order of the learned DRT. It is thus clear that, on non-deposit
       of the amount as directed by the learned DRT vide order dated
       14th December 2017, the interim direction passed on the said date
       stood automatically vacated. After the aforesaid period was over,
       the appellant-auction purchaser deposited the balance amount of
       Rs.4,29,16,650/-.
11. It appears that, during the pendency of the proceedings before
    the learned DRT, the Borrower submitted an OTS proposal to the
    Respondent-Bank on 29th March 2019, thereby offering to settle the
    accounts for an amount of Rs.3,75,00,000/-. It further appears that the
    Borrower also deposited 10% upfront amount i.e. Rs.37,50,000/. On
    12th May 2020, the Respondent-Bank, in reply to the OTS application,
    asked the Borrower to settle all the four loan accounts with interest
    at the contractual rate.
12. On 20th August 2020, the Borrower filed an application being I.A. No.
    1691 of 2020 in the proceedings pending before DRT requesting for
    advancing the date of hearing stating that there was urgency in the
    matter and also that the appellant-auction purchaser had withdrawn
    from the auction. Thereafter, vide order dated 21st September 2020,
    the said S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 came to be withdrawn on a statement
    made by the counsel for the Borrower that the matter had been settled
    out of court. It is also relevant to mention that on 5th October 2020,
    the Respondent-Bank had filed a memo before DRT informing that
    there was no settlement.
13. After the disposal of the S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 as withdrawn, the
    Respondent-Bank confirmed the sale in favour of the appellant-auction
    purchaser on 2nd November 2020. Thereafter, on 4th November 2020,
    the Borrower filed a miscellaneous application being M.A. No. 97 of
    2010 for restoration of the said S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 on the ground
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                              549

       PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others


     that the said S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 had been withdrawn because
     the Chief Manager and AGM of the Respondent-Bank had orally told
     the Borrower that unless the S.A. No. 1476 of 2017 was withdrawn,
     they could not process the OTS proposal. It is further relevant to
     note that on 11th November 2020, the Sale Certificate was registered.
     Vide order dated 2nd February 2021, DRT dismissed the said M.A.
     No. 97 of 2010. Thereafter, the writ petition being No. 5275 of 2021
     came to be filed by the Borrower on 25th February 2021 before the
     High Court. Vide the impugned order, the High Court set aside the
     order passed by DRT and directed it to proceed with S.A. No. 1476
     of 2017.
14. The law with regard to entertaining a petition under Article 226
    of the Constitution in case of availability of alternative remedy is
    well settled. In the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra), this Court
    observed thus:
           “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled
           law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition
           under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy
           is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule
           applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery
           of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the
           dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view,
           while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the
           action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High
           Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by
           Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such
           dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not
           only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of
           the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial
           bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved
           person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must
           insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the
           Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available
           under the relevant statute.
           44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are
           conscious that the powers conferred upon the High
           Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to
           any person or authority, including in appropriate cases,
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          any Government, directions, orders or writs including the
          five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the
          rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are
          very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise
          of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be
          oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved
          by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep
          in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the
          Constitution.
          45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative
          remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion,
          but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court
          should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the
          Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that
          the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by
          filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular
          legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal
          of his grievance.”
15. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that the High
    Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
    Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved
    person. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in
    matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public
    money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. The
    Court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions involving
    challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc.,
    the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by
    Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code
    unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive
    procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of
    quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved
    person. It has been held that, though the powers of the High Court
    under Article 226 of the Constitution are of widest amplitude, still
    the Courts cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint
    evolved by this Court. The Court further held that though the rule
    of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not
    one of compulsion, still it is difficult to fathom any reason why the
    High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the
    Constitution.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                            551

          PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others


16. The view taken by this Court has been followed in the case of
    Agarwal Tracom Private Limited v. Punjab National Bank and
    Others5.
17. In the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and
    Another v. Mathew K.C.6, this Court was considering an appeal
    against an interim order passed by the High Court in a writ petition
    under Article 226 of the Constitution staying further proceedings at
    the stage of Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. After considering
    various judgments rendered by this Court, the Court observed thus:
              “16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained
              and the interim order granted for the mere asking
              without assigning special reasons, and that too without
              even granting opportunity to the appellant to contest the
              maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice
              the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The
              opinion of the Division Bench that the counter-affidavit
              having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be
              sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient
              justification to have declined interference.”
18. The same position was again reiterated by this Court in the case of
    Phoenix ARC Private Limited v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir
    and Others7.
19.     Again, in the case of Varimadugu OBI Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu
       and Others8, after referring to earlier judgments, this Court observed
       thus:
              “34. The order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 was an
              appealable order under Section 18 of the SARFAESI
              Act, 2002 and in the ordinary course of business, the
              borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the
              statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under
              Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. In the absence
              of efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was


5     [2017] 11 SCR 164 : (2018) 1 SCC 626 : 2017 INSC 1146
6     [2018] 1 SCR 233 : (2018) 3 SCC 85 : 2018 INSC 71
7     [2022] 1 SCR 950 : (2022) 5 SCC 345 : 2022 INSC 44
8     [2022] 16 SCR 1108 : (2023) 2 SCC 168 : 2022 INSC 1205
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          no reasonable justification tendered by the respondent
          borrowers in approaching the High Court and filing writ
          application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019
          under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
          without exhausting the statutory right of appeal available
          at its command.”
20. It could thus be seen that this Court has strongly deprecated the
    practice of entertaining writ petitions in such matters.
21. Recently, in the case of Celir LLP (supra), after surveying various
    judgments of this Court, the Court observed thus:
          “101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed
          serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements
          in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of
          statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI
          Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
          Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in
          Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati
          Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] , it
          appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise
          its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory
          remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.”
22. It can thus be seen that it is more than a settled legal position of law
    that in such matters, the High Court should not entertain a petition
    under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative
    statutory remedy is available.
23. The only reasoning that could be seen from the impugned order
    given by the learned Division Bench of the High Court is as under:
          “11. It is true that under Section 18 of the SARFAESI
          Act, petitioner has the alternative remedy against the
          impugned order by filing appeal before the appellate
          Tribunal. However, having regard to the fact that the writ
          petition is pending before this Court for quite some time
          and also considering the fact that if the impugned order is
          allowed to stand, petitioner would be left without a remedy
          to ventilate his grievance, we deem it fit and proper not
          to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of not availing the
          alternative remedy.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                            553

       PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others


           12. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides that any
           person including a borrower who is aggrieved by the action
           of secured creditor under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI
           Act may file an application thereunder. Supreme Court
           has held time and again that the Tribunal exercises wide
           jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, even
           to the extent of setting aside an auction sale. In the instant
           case, we are consciously not referring to the merit of the
           case. All that we are concerned is whether for whatever
           reason a person who is aggrieved in law should be left
           remediless. In the instant case, petitioner had invoked his
           remedy by filing securitization application under sub-section
           (1) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The application
           was pending for three years before the Tribunal. From
           the docket order dated 21.09.2020, we find that a junior
           counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had reported
           that the matter was settled out of Court and therefore, leave
           was sought for withdrawing the securitization application
           which was accordingly granted.
           13. When the settlement did not materialize, petitioner
           went back to the Tribunal for revival of the securitization
           application which was however dismissed on the ground
           that version of the petition did not deserve acceptance.
           14. On thorough consideration of the matter we are of the
           view that dismissal of the miscellaneous application of the
           petitioner by the Tribunal dies not appear to be justified.
           15. Though subsequent developments may have a bearing
           on the grant of ultimate relief to a litigant but the same by
           itself cannot denude the adjudicating authority of its power
           to adjudicate the grievance raised by the aggrieved person
           which it otherwise possess.”
24. It can thus clearly be seen that though it was specifically contended
    on behalf of the appellant herein that the writ petition was not
    maintainable on account of availability of alternative remedy, the High
    Court has interfered with the writ petition only on the ground that the
    matter was pending for sometime before it and if the petition was not
    entertained, the Borrower would be left remediless. We however find
    that the High Court has failed to take into consideration the conduct
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       of the Borrower. It is further to be noted that, though the High Court
       had been specifically informed that, on account of subsequent
       developments, that is confirmation of sale and registration thereof,
       the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High Court has
       failed to take into consideration those aspects of the matter.
25. This Court, in the case of Valji Khimji and Company v. Official
    Liquidator of Hindustan Nitro Product (Gujarat) Limited and
    Others9, has observed thus:
             “30. In the first case mentioned above i.e. where the
             auction is not subject to confirmation by any authority, the
             auction is complete on the fall of the hammer, and certain
             rights accrue in favour of the auction-purchaser. However,
             where the auction is subject to subsequent confirmation
             by some authority (under a statute or terms of the auction)
             the auction is not complete and no rights accrue until the
             sale is confirmed by the said authority. Once, however, the
             sale is confirmed by that authority, certain rights accrue in
             favour of the auction-purchaser, and these rights cannot be
             extinguished except in exceptional cases such as fraud.
             31. In the present case, the auction having been confirmed
             on 30-7-2003 by the Court it cannot be set aside unless
             some fraud or collusion has been proved. We are satisfied
             that no fraud or collusion has been established by anyone
             in this case.”
26. In our view, the High Court ought to have taken into consideration
    that the confirmed auction sale could have been interfered with only
    when there was a fraud or collusion. The present case was not a
    case of fraud or collusion. The effect of the order of the High Court
    would be again reopening the issues which have achieved finality.
27. It is further to be noted that this Court, in the case of Dwarika Prasad
    v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others10, has clearly held that the
    right of redemption stands extinguished on the execution of the
    registered sale deed. In the present case, the sale was confirmed
    on 2nd November 2020 and registered on 11th November 2020.


9    [2008] 12 SCR 1 : (2008) 9 SCC 299 : 2008 INSC 925
10   [2018] 3 SCR 29 : (2018) 5 SCC 491 : 2018 INSC 210
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                               555

            PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others


28. Insofar as the contention of the Borrower and its reliance on the
    judgment of this Court in the case of Mohammad Nooh (supra) is
    concerned, no doubt that non-exercise of jurisdiction under Article
    226 of the Constitution on the ground of availability of an alternative
    remedy is a rule of self-restraint. There cannot be any doubt with that
    proposition. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following
    observations of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income
    Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal11:
              “15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised
              some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where
              the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with
              the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance
              of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has
              resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or
              when an order has been passed in total violation of the
              principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in
              Thansingh Nathmal case [AIR 1964 SC 1419] , Titaghur
              Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
              Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other
              similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a
              petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective
              alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person
              or the statute under which the action complained of has
              been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of
              grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory
              forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ
              petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory
              dispensation.”
29. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain
    exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
    could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy.
    Some of them are thus:
      (i)     where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with
              the provisions of the enactment in question;
      (ii)    it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial
              procedure;


11   (2014) 1 SCC 603
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       (iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and
       (iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles
            of natural justice.
30. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a
    petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative
    remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under
    which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a
    mechanism for redressal of grievance.
31. Undisputedly, the present case would not come under any of the
    exceptions as carved out by this Court in the case of Chhabil Dass
    Agarwal (supra).
32. We are therefore of the considered view that the High Court has
    grossly erred in entertaining and allowing the petition under Article
    226 of the Constitution.
33. While dismissing the writ petition, we will have to remind the High
    Courts of the following words of this Court in the case of Satyawati
    Tondon (supra) since we have come across various matters wherein
    the High Courts have been entertaining petitions arising out of the
    DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective
    alternative remedy:
              “55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite
              repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts
              continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies
              under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise
              jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which
              have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and
              other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope
              and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their
              discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and
              circumspection.”
34. In the result, we pass the following order:
       (i)    The appeal is allowed;
       (ii)   The impugned order dated 4th February 2022 passed by the
              High Court in Writ Petition No. 5275 of 2021 is quashed and
              set aside; and
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                        557

       PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others


     (iii) Writ Petition No. 5275 of 2021 is dismissed with costs quantified
           at Rs.1,00,000/- imposed upon the Borrower.
35. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.


     Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain                   Result of the case:
                                                            Appeal allowed.