Supreme Court of India
PERNOD RICARD INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ANOTHERversusKARANVEER SINGH CHHABRA
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 981
- Decided
- 14 August 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
No deceptive similarity exists between the appellants' registered marks and the respondent's LONDON PRIDE, so no interim injunction is warranted.
Summary
Pernod Ricard India Private Ltd. and a related entity own the registered trademarks BLENDERS PRIDE, IMPERIAL BLUE and SEAGRAM'S for premium whiskies. They sought an interim injunction to stop Karanveer Singh Chhabra from using the mark LONDON PRIDE, alleging infringement and passing off. The Commercial Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court rejected the injunction, finding no deceptive similarity between the marks, emphasizing the anti‑dissection rule, the overall impression test, and the generic nature of the word PRIDE. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, holding that the overall visual, phonetic and conceptual differences preclude a likelihood of confusion and that the appellants cannot claim exclusive rights over the common term PRIDE. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the suit was directed to proceed on its merits.
Issues considered
- The applicability of the anti‑dissection rule and overall similarity test to determine deceptive similarity between BLENDERS PRIDE, IMPERIAL BLUE, SEAGRAM'S and LONDON PRIDE.
- Whether the appellants can claim exclusive rights over the common word 'PRIDE' in the context of trademark infringement and passing off.
- Whether a prima facie case of infringement exists sufficient to justify an interim injunction under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
- The relevance of the dominant feature test and the average consumer with imperfect recollection in assessing likelihood of confusion.
Legislation cited
- Trade Marks Act, 1999s. 11(1), s. 135, s. 15, s. 17, s. 20(2), s. 26(2), s. 27, s. 28, s. 29, s. 2(h), s. 2(m), s. 2(q), s. 2(v), s. 2(w), s. 2(zb), s. 9(1)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Appellants, engaged in the manufacture and distribution of wines, liquors, and spirits, sell whisky under the brand names ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, both of which are registered trademarks. The appellants also hold a registered trademark as the house mark of Appellant No.1, and is used both in India and internationally across various product lines. Respondent was marketing whisky under the mark ‘LONDON PRIDE. The issue was whether the appellants were entitled to grant of interim injunction restraining the respondent
Subjects
Trademark InfringementPassing OffDeceptive SimilarityDistinctivenessTrade DressColour SchemePackagingAnti-Dissection RuleDominant Feature TestAverage Consumer TestImperfect RecollectionInterim InjunctionPrima Facie CaseBalance Of ConvenienceIrreparable HarmWell-Known TrademarkSection 28 RightsSection 29 InfringementSection 135 RemediesBrand IdentityCommercial IntegrityPublic InterestPost-Sale Confusion Doctrine
Judgment
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 805 : 2025 INSC 981
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another
v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
(Civil Appeal No. 10638 of 2025)
14 August 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Appellants, engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
wines, liquors, and spirits, sell whisky under the brand names
‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, both of which are
registered trademarks. The appellants also hold a registered
trademark for ‘SEAGRAM’S’, which serves as the house mark
of Appellant No.1, and is used both in India and internationally
across various product lines. Respondent was marketing whisky
under the mark ‘LONDON PRIDE. The issue was whether the
appellants were entitled to grant of interim injunction restraining
the respondent from using the impugned trademark, get-up, and
trade dress including the packaging of ‘LONDON PRIDE’ on the
ground that such use amounted to infringement and/or imitation
of the appellants’ registered trademarks, namely, ‘BLENDERS
PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’.
Headnotes†
Trademark – ‘Infringement’ and ‘Passing Off’ – Appellants
sought interim injunction restraining the respondent from
using the impugned trademark, get-up, and trade dress
including the packaging of ‘LONDON PRIDE’ on the ground
that such use amounted to infringement and/or imitation of
the appellants’ registered trademarks, namely, ‘BLENDERS
PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’ – Commercial
Court dismissed the interim injunction application – High
Court denied relief – Correctness:
Held: 1.1. It is a settled principle of trademark law that deceptive
similarity does not necessitate exact imitation – What is material is
the likelihood of confusion or association in the minds of consumers
arising from an overall resemblance between the competing marks –
The applicable standard is that of an average consumer with
* Author
806 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
imperfect recollection – While comparing rival marks, Courts must
assess the marks in their entirety, rather than dissecting composite
trademarks into isolated components – The dominant feature of a
mark may assist in crossing the preliminary threshold of analysis,
but the ultimate inquiry must focus on the overall impression created
by the mark, especially in the context of the relevant goods, trade
channels, and target consumers – The proper test is not to place the
two marks side by side to identify dissimilarities, but to determine
whether the impugned mark, when viewed independently, is likely
to create an impression of association or common origin in the
mind of the average consumer – Even if a particular component of
a mark lacks inherent distinctiveness, its imitation may still amount
to infringement if it constitutes an essential and distinctive feature
of the composite mark as a whole. [Paras 41, 42]
1.2. Applying the settled legal standards, including the anti-
dissection rule, the overall similarity test, and the perspective of
an average consumer, prima facie there is no deceptive similarity
between the competing marks that would give rise to confusion.
[Para 44]
2.1. The appellants’ attempt to isolate the word ‘PRIDE’ as the basis
of comparison is legally untenable – Trademark similarity must be
assessed by considering the mark as a whole, and not by extracting
a single component for comparison – When viewed in their entirety,
the appellants’ marks – ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’,
and ‘SEAGRAM’S’ are structurally, phonetically, and visually
distinct from the respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’ – The mere
presence of the common word ‘PRIDE’ which is a generic and
laudatory term, does not render the competing marks deceptively
similar in the absence of an overall resemblance – Thus, under
the anti-dissection rule, no case for infringement or passing off is
made out – Upon a holistic comparison, the overall commercial
impression of ‘LONDON PRIDE’ is substantially different from either
of the appellants’ marks – The trade dress, label design, colour
scheme, typography, and brand presentation are all distinctive and
unrelated – Moreover, the term ‘LONDON’ introduces a geographical
identifier that conveys a distinct brand identity, divergent from
‘BLENDERS’ or ‘IMPERIAL’ – The respondent’s mark, therefore,
does not imitate the dominant features of the appellants’ marks –
It is evident that the marks ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘LONDON
PRIDE’ are visually, phonetically, and conceptually distinct – The
appellants cannot assert monopoly over the common term ‘PRIDE’,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 807
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
and no actionable similarity arises merely from its use in the
respondent’s mark. [Paras 32.4, 33.4, 34.6]
2.2. In the present case, the marks – ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and
‘LONDON PRIDE’ – are clearly not identical – Though the products
are similar, the branding, packaging, and trade dress of each are
materially distinct – The Commercial Court and High Court have
rightly held that the term ‘PRIDE’ is publici juris, and commonly used
in the liquor industry – The dominant components –‘BLENDERS’,
‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘LONDON’ – are entirely different both
visually and phonetically, producing distinct overall impressions.
[Para 45]
2.3. The courts below also correctly observed that the products in
question are premium and ultra-premium whiskies, targeted at a
discerning consumer base –Such consumers are likely to exercise
greater care in their purchase decisions – The distinct trade dress
and packaging reduce any likelihood of confusion – The shared use
of the laudatory word ‘PRIDE’, in isolation, cannot form the basis for
injunctive relief –In the liquor industry, where advertising is highly
restricted, brand recognition rests predominantly on packaging and
consumer loyalty – Unless the imitation is deliberate and intended
to mislead, the chance of confusion is minimal – The allegation of
counterfeiting in the present case appears to be speculative and
unsupported by credible evidence. [Paras 46, 49]
3. The appellants’ attempt to combine elements from two distinct
marks – ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ – to challenge
the respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’, constitutes a hybrid and
untenable pleading – Each mark must be assessed independently,
and cherry-picking generic or unregistered features from multiple
marks to fabricate a composite case of infringement is not legally
sustainable – It is not in dispute that the word “PRIDE” is not
registered as a standalone mark – Nor can the appellants claim
exclusivity over common elements like bottle shape or color
schemes that are generic and widely used in the industry – While
the composite marks ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’
are protected, their individual elements – lacking distinctiveness –
are not independently enforceable. [Paras 50, 51]
4. The High Court correctly noted that ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ uses
a round bottle, whereas ‘LONDON PRIDE’ adopts a cylindrical
form – The labels, cartons, and design motifs are entirely different –
These variations eliminate the possibility of confusion – Comparison
808 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
between ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ and ‘LONDON PRIDE’ reveals even
greater divergence – The marks differ in word arrangement, label
structure, and packaging – No similarity exists, visual, phonetic,
or structural, that can support a claim for infringement or passing
off – Since resemblance is a sine qua non for both causes of
action, the appellants’ claim must fail – Although the appellants hold
registrations for the composite marks, no evidence was adduced
to demonstrate that any particular element, such as bottle shape,
color scheme, or the word “PRIDE”, had acquired distinctiveness
or secondary meaning –Trademark protection extends only to
distinctive identifiers – Descriptive or commonplace elements fall
outside the ambit of protection unless distinctiveness is proved.
[Paras 53-55]
5. Significantly, the appellants’ earlier challenge to United Spirits’
use of the term ‘PRIDE’ in the mark “Royal Challenger American
Pride” was unsuccessful – The Punjab and Haryana High Court held
that the appellants did not possess an independent registration for
the word ‘Pride’, but only for the composite mark ‘Blenders Pride’ –
Accordingly, they could not claim any exclusive or enforceable rights
over the standalone word ‘Pride’ – The Court further observed that
having failed to object to the registration of the impugned mark
before the Trade Marks Registry, the appellants were estopped from
asserting such rights subsequently – This decision was upheld by
this Court in SLP (C) No. 17674/2023 dismissed on 06.09.2023 –
Therefore, the appellants’ present attempt is contrary to law and
settled principles of equity. [Para 56]
6. There is no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of
the Commercial Court and the High Court – Appellants have failed
to establish a prima facie case of deceptive similarity that could
justify the grant of interim injunction. [Para 57]
Trade Marks Act, 1999 – Scheme of – Elucidated:
Held: In essence, the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provides a
comprehensive statutory framework for protecting registered
trademarks, while also preserving the rights of prior users through
passing off actions – The Act clearly distinguishes between absolute
and relative grounds for refusal of registration and provides
effective enforcement mechanisms – Crucially, the guiding test is
the likelihood of confusion in the mind of an average consumer not
actual confusion, which serves as the touchstone for both refusal
of registration and infringement proceedings. [Para 18.8]
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 809
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
Trademarks – ‘Infringement’ and ‘Passing off’ – Distinction
between:
Held: A key distinction between the two lies in the requirements
of proof – In an infringement action, the plaintiff is not required to
establish the distinctiveness or goodwill of the mark, registration, by
itself, affords the right to seek protection – If the impugned mark is
shown to be identical or deceptively similar to the registered mark, no
further evidence of confusion or deception is necessary – However,
in a passing off action, the plaintiff must prove: (i) the existence
of goodwill or reputation in the mark, (ii) a misrepresentation
made by the defendant, and (iii) a likelihood of damage to the
plaintiff’s goodwill – While an intent to deceive is not a necessary
element in either action, passing off requires proof of a likelihood
of confusion or deception – Actual deception or damage need not
be proved – the test is whether confusion is probable in the mind
of the average consumer due to the similarity in the marks or the
overall get-up of the goods – Another key distinction is that in a
passing off action, the defendant’s goods need not be identical to
those of the plaintiff they may be allied or even unrelated, provided
the misrepresentation is such that it affects or is likely to affect the
plaintiff’s business reputation – In contrast, infringement requires
that the unauthorised use relate to the same or similar goods or
services for which the trademark is registered – Additionally, in an
infringement suit, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish use
of the mark; even a registered proprietor who has not commenced
use can sue for infringement – However, in a passing off action, the
plaintiff must demonstrate prior and continuous use, and that the
mark has acquired distinctiveness in the minds of the public – While
both actions seek to prevent unfair competition and protect against
consumer confusion, an action for infringement offers broader
statutory protection based solely on registration and ownership – In
contrast, passing off is grounded in equitable principles and imposes
a higher evidentiary burden to safeguard commercial goodwill under
common law. [Paras 29.1-29.5]
Trademarks – ‘Infringement’ and ‘Passing off’ – Principles
governing grant of injunction – Discussed:
Held: As a general rule, a proprietor whose statutory or common
law rights are infringed is entitled to seek an injunction to restrain
further unlawful use – However, this remedy is not absolute – The
considerations governing the grant of injunctions in trademark
810 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
infringement actions broadly apply to passing off claims as well –
That said, a fundamental distinction remains: while a registered
proprietor may, upon proving infringement, seek to restrain all use
of the infringing mark, a passing off action does not by itself confer
an exclusive right – The grant of injunction, whether for infringement
or passing off, is ultimately governed by equitable principles and
is subject to the general framework applicable to proprietary
rights – Where actual infringement is established, that alone may
justify injunctive relief; a plaintiff is not expected to wait for further
acts of defiance – Grant of interim injunction in trademark matters
requires the court to consider multiple interrelated factors: prima
facie case, likelihood of confusion, relative merits of the parties’
claims, balance of convenience, risk of irreparable harm, and the
public interest – These considerations operate cumulatively, and
the absence of any one of these may be sufficient to decline interim
relief. [Paras 36.1-36.4]
Trademarks – Evaluation of competing trademarks – Courts
not expected to adopt a mechanical, side-by-side comparison
of the marks – Judicial scrutiny is guided by interpretative
doctrines. [Para 4]
Trademarks – Principle governing trademark infringement and
passing off – Similarity and Distinctiveness: Name, Colour
Scheme, and Trade Dress – Discussed. [Paras 31, 31.1-31.8]
Trademarks – Principle governing trademark infringement
and passing off – Rule of Anti-Dissection – Discussed.
[Paras 32, 32.1-32.3]
Trademarks – Principle governing trademark infringement
and passing off – Dominant Feature Test – Discussed.
[Paras 33, 33.1-33.3]
Trademarks – Principle governing trademark infringement and
passing off – No Exclusive Right Over Common or Descriptive
Terms – Discussed. [Paras 34, 34.1-34.5]
Trademarks – Principle governing trademark infringement
and passing off – Average Consumer Test and Doctrine of
Imperfect Recollection – Discussed. [Paras 35, 35.1-35.6]
Trademarks – Recent evolution of Trademark jurisprudence
in the United Kingdom – Post-sale confusion doctrine –
Discussed. [Paras 40-40.6]
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 811
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
Case Law Cited
Parle Products (P) Ltd., v. J.P. & Co., Mysore [1972] 3 SCR 289 :
(1972) 1 SCC 618; Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. [2001] 2 SCR 743 : AIR 2001 SC 1952; Wander Ltd. v. Antox
India (P) Ltd. (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 727 : 1990 SCC OnLine SC
490; Godfrey Philips India Ltd v. Girnar Food & Beverages Pvt.
Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 257 – relied on.
Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satyadeo Gupta [1963] 2 SCR 484 : AIR
1963 SC 449; Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna
Pharmaceutical Laboratories [1965] 1 SCR 737 : AIR 1965 SC
980; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products
[1960] 1 SCR 968 : AIR 1960 SC 142; National Bell Co. v. Metal
Goods Manufacturing Co. [1971] 1 SCR 70 : (1970) 3 SCC 665;
S.M.Dychem v. Cadbury India Ltd [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 86 : 2000
(5) SCC 573; T.V. Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises [2011] 4 SCR
1000 : (2011) 4 SCC 85; Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd v. Sudhir
Bhatia (2004) 3 SCC 90; Heinz Italia v. Dabur India Ltd (2007)
6 SCC 1; Khoday Distilleries Ltd v. Scotch Whisky Association
[2008] 9 SCR 975 : 2008 (10) SCC 723; Baker Hughes Ltd v.
Hiroo Khushalani (2004) 12 SCC 628; Coca-Cola Company of
Canada Ltd. v. Pepsi-Cola Company of Canada Ltd., 1942 SCC
OnLine PC 7 : AIR 1942 PC 40 (5J); Corn Products Refining Co., v.
Shangrila Food Products Ltd. [1960] 1 SCR 968 : AIR 1960 SC
142; Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad and Others
(2001) 5 SCC 568; Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal
Choksi and Others [2024] 11 SCR 1343 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3538; Tungabhadra Industries Ltd v. Registrar of Trade Marks,
AIR 1959 SC 989; Bajaj Auto Ltd v. TVS Motor Co. Ltd [2009] 14
SCR 548 : (2009) 9 SCC 797 – referred to.
Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. v. United Spirits Ltd., 2023 SCC
OnLine P&H 477 : (2023) 3 RCR (Civil) 162 – referred to.
Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 316 US 203 (1942); Singer Manufacturing Co v. loog, 1880
18 Ch.D. 395, p.412; Parker – Knoll Ltd v. Knoll International Ltd.,
1962 RPC 265; Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer v. Klijsen Handel BV
Case C-342/97 [2000] F.S.R. 77, ECJ; James Crossley Eno v.
William George Dunn, H.L. (E) 1890, June 19. Vol. XV, App.
Cas. page 252; Aristoc Ltd v. Rysta Ltd., 1945 AC 68 (House
of Lords); Pianotist Co. Ltd’s Application (1906) 23 RPC 774 at
p. 777; American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., (1975) AC 396;
Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL (Respondent) v Dream Pairs
Europe Inc and Another (Appellants) [2025] UKSC 25 – referred to.
812 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
List of Acts
Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Books and Periodicals Cited
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition – referred to.
List of Keywords
Trademark Infringement; Passing Off; Deceptive Similarity;
Distinctiveness; Trade Dress; Colour Scheme; Packaging; Anti-
Dissection Rule; Dominant Feature Test; Average Consumer Test;
Imperfect Recollection; Interim Injunction; Prima Facie Case;
Balance Of Convenience; Irreparable Harm; Injurious Association;
Initial Interest Confusion; Goodwill; Reputation; Secondary Meaning;
Well-Known Trademark; Statutory Framework; Trade Marks Act
1999; Section 28 Rights; Section 29 Infringement; Section 135
Remedies; Judicial Precedents; Comparative Advertising; Phonetic
Similarity; Visual Similarity; Structural Similarity; Consumer
Confusion; Market Misappropriation; Honest Practices; Unfair
Competition; Brand Identity; Commercial Integrity; Public Interest;
International Jurisprudence; Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine;
Injunctive Relief.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10638 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.11.2023 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in MA No. 232 of 2021
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Advs., Hemant Singh,
Ms. Mamta Jha, Mohit D. Ram, Sambhav Jain, Akhil Saxena,
Ms. Reha Mohan, Rajul Shrivastav, Ms. Monisha Handa, Anubhav
Sharma, Sidhant Oberoi, Ms. Akanksha Majumdar, Ms. Nayan
Gupta, Sabir Kachhi, Ms. Pritha Suri, Ms. Ira Mahajan, Ms. Tabeer
Riyaz.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Shyam Devan, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Sr. Advs., Vaibhav Mishra,
Ekansh Mishra, Ayush Jain, Roungan Chowdhury, Shubham Tiwari.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 813
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted. For the sake of convenience and in order to facilitate
a structured analysis, this judgment is arranged under the following
heads:
Sl. HEADINGS PAGE
No. NO.*
I INTRODUCTION 03
II FACTUAL MATRIX 05
III CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 08
IV ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION 17
V STATUTORY FRAMEWORK – OVERVIEW OF 18
RELEVANT PROVISIONS FROM THE TRADE MARK
ACT, 1999
VI JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS 27
VII ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES 48
(A) SIMILARITY AND DISTINCTIVENESS - NAME, 58
COLOUR SCHEME, AND TRADE DRESS
(B) ANTI-DISSECTION RULE 62
(C) DOMINANT FEATURE TEST 65
(D) NO EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OVER COMMON OR 68
DESCRIPTIVE TERMS
(E) AVERAGE CONSUMER TEST AND IMPERFECT 70
RECOLLECTION
(F) LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING GRANT OF 74
INTERIM INJUNCTION
VIII RECENT EVOLUTION OF TRADEMARK 82
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UK – THE POST-SALE
CONFUSION DOCTRINE
IX SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 91
X CONCLUSION 97
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
814 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Law of trademarks has been aptly described by Justice
Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court in the following words:
“The protection of trademarks is the law’s recognition of
the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we
live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods
by them. A trademark is a merchandising shortcut which
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he
has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a trademark
exploits this human propensity by making every human
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means
employed, the aim is the same – to convey through the
mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability
of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is
attained, the trademark owner has something of value. If
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the
symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress”.
– Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co.1
2. Trademarks are central to the identity, survival, and growth of any
business operating in a competitive commercial environment. They
enable enterprises to establish consumer trust and preserve the
goodwill built over time through substantial investments in quality,
service, and brand visibility. For consumers, trademarks serve as
indicators of the source and consistent quality of goods or services
across different providers, thereby enabling them to make informed
choices, which may, at a minimum, affect taste and preference, and
at a maximum, impact their health and well-being. It is, therefore,
imperative that intellectual property rights are robustly protected against
infringing entities that seek to unfairly capitalize on another’s goodwill,
to the detriment of both the rightful owner and the end consumer.
3. At the heart of trademark law lies the foundational principle that there
must be no likelihood of confusion in the mind of the average consumer.
In cases involving composite marks, it is not necessary that the
impugned mark replicate the original in its entirety; even partial imitation
1 316 US 203 (1942)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 815
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
may amount to infringement or passing off if it evokes an association
with the registered or prior-used mark in the consumer’s mind.
4. However, the application of this principle is nuanced. Courts are not
expected to adopt a mechanical, side-by-side comparison of the
marks. Rather, judicial scrutiny is guided by interpretative doctrines
such as the anti-dissection rule and the doctrine of the dominant mark,
inter alia, other well-established tests. Although these principles are
frequently applied in tandem, they do not always align perfectly, and
courts have differed in their application depending on the specific
facts and context of each case.
5. The present case offers an opportunity for this Court to clarify the
appropriate analytical framework for evaluating competing trademarks.
While the anti-dissection rule – which requires the mark to be
considered as a whole – has statutory foundation under the Trade
Marks Act, 1999, the doctrine of the dominant mark is a judicially
evolved principle, aimed at identifying the essential or memorable
component of a mark that is likely to influence consumer perception.
The purpose of this doctrine is to determine whether the impugned
mark creates a deceptive association in the minds of consumers,
thereby enabling the defendant to unjustly benefit from the plaintiff’s
established reputation. This analysis is guided by the perspective of
an average consumer with imperfect recollection, who is not expected
to retain or compare marks with exact precision.
II. FACTUAL MATRIX
6. This appeal arises from the judgment dated 03.11.2023 passed by
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore2 in Misc. Appeal No.
232 of 2021, whereby the High Court dismissed the appellants’
challenge to the order dated 26.11.2020 passed by the Commercial
Court (District Judge Level), Indore3 in Case No. COMMS 3 of 2020
and IA No.01 of 2020.
7. By the order dated 26.11.2020, the Commercial Court rejected the
application filed by the appellants under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and
2 of the Code of Civil Procedure4. For ease of reference, the reliefs
sought in the interlocutory application are reproduced below:
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
3 For short, “the Commercial Court”
4 For short, “CPC”
816 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“… to grant an order of interim injunction restraining the
Defendant, its proprietors, partners as the case may be,
assigns in business, sister concerns, associates, agents,
dealers, distributors, stockists, etc. from manufacturing,
selling, offering for sale, advertising in any manner including
on the internet, directly or indirectly dealing in whisky or
any alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages under the trade
mark LONDON PRIDE and/or label and/or packaging and/
or any other label/packaging and/or trade mark that may
be identical/deceptively similar to IMPERIAL BLUE label
or packaging and/or deceptively similar to the trade mark
BLENDERS PRIDE and/or SEAGRAM’S amounting to
infringement of Plaintiffs’ trademark registrations and/or
copyright and/or passing off and/or unfair competition.”
“... in view of the facts and circumstances of the present
case and in the interest of justice and the public interest,
an ex parte ad interim injunction in the aforementioned
terms may kindly be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs /
Applicants and against the Defendant.”
8. According to the appellants, they are engaged in the manufacture
and distribution of wines, liquors, and spirits. They sell whisky under
the brand names ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, both
of which are registered trademarks. The appellants also hold a
registered trademark for ‘SEAGRAM’S’, which serves as the house
mark of Appellant No.1, and is used both in India and internationally
across various product lines.
9. On 05.02.1945, the appellants’ predecessor viz., Seagram Company
Limited obtained registration of the trademark SEAGRAM’S vide
Registration No. 105507 in Class 33, in respect of “Whisky”. Later,
on 25.03.1994, registration of the trademark ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’
was obtained vide Registration No. 623365 in Class 33, covering
“Wines, Spirits and Liqueurs”. The trademark ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’
was coined and adopted by the appellants’ predecessor, and has
been in extensive worldwide use since 1973 for whisky products.
10. In 1995, ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ whisky was launched in India, and
achieved an annual turnover exceeding INR 1,700 Crores for
the financial year 2019-20. In 1997, the appellants’ predecessor
launched whisky under the trademark ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ in India. On
28.06.2016, they secured registration of the ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ device,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 817
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
vide Registration No. 3296387 in Class 33, for “Alcoholic beverages,
except beers”, followed by Registration No. 3327621 on 03.08.2016
for the same mark in the same class. The brand ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’
achieved an annual turnover exceeding INR 2,700 Crores for the
financial year 2018-19. Both brands today enjoy formidable goodwill
and reputation, domestically and internationally.
11. In May 2019, the appellants became aware that the respondent has
been marketing whisky under the mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’, using
packaging that was deceptively similar to that of the appellants.
The mark adopted by the respondent was not only phonetically and
visually similar to ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, but also copied the colour
combination, get-up and trade dress of ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ label.
Further, the respondent used ‘SEAGRAM’S’ embossed bottles of the
appellants’ mark ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, for the sale of its LONDON PRIDE
whisky, which also amounts to an infringement of the appellants’
registered SEAGRAM’S trademark.
12. Aggrieved by the respondent’s actions, the appellants instituted Civil
Suit No. 3 of 2020 before the Commercial Court, seeking a decree
of permanent injunction restraining the respondent from trademark
infringement, passing off, copyright violation, and also prayed for
reliefs, such as, rendition of accounts, damages, and delivery up of
infringing material. An application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and
2 CPC, was also filed seeking an interim injunction.
13. By order dated 26.11.2020, the Commercial Court dismissed the
interim injunction application. Challenging the same, the appellants
approached the High Court by filing Misc. Appeal No. 232 of 2021,
which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 03.11.2023, which
is impugned in the present appeal.
III. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
14. Assailing the judgment passed by the High Court, the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants made the following submissions:
14.1. The present case involves elements of both trademark
infringement and passing off. The respondent has dishonestly
adopted trademarks deceptively similar to the appellants’ well-
known and registered marks – ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL
BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’ – used for whisky, which enjoy
significant commercial reputation in India and internationally.
818 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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14.2. The appellants’ trademarks are duly registered and protected
under Sections 28 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ has been in continuous use since 1995,
with annual sales exceeding INR 1,700 Crores; ‘IMPERIAL
BLUE’ has been in use since 1997, with annual sales
exceeding INR 2,700 Crores. In contrast, the respondent has
only a pending application for the mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’ and
has failed to justify its adoption of a deceptively similar mark.
14.3. The imitation of two established brands – ‘BLENDERS
PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ – by the respondent is neither
coincidental nor innocent; it is a deliberate and dishonest
attempt to misappropriate the appellants’ goodwill and
reputation, thereby creating confusion or association with the
appellants’ goods. This conduct constitutes both trademark
infringement and passing off.
14.4. The Appellate Court failed to apply the test of deceptive similarity
laid down by this Court in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma
v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories5, where it was
held that once the essential features of a registered mark are
copied, differences in get-up, packaging, or additional writing
are immaterial. Similarly, in Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satyadeo
Gupta6 this Court held that marks must be compared as a
whole, without dissecting or excluding any part. The Appellate
Court erroneously dissected the mark ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’
and compared “BLENDERS” with “LONDON”, ignoring the
distinctive and dominant component “PRIDE” – thus violating
both the anti-dissection rule and the doctrine of overall similarity.
14.5. In an infringement analysis, the test is whether there is a
likelihood of confusion or association in the mind of the public.
This is a matter for judicial determination and not dependent
on testimonial evidence. The law protects against the likelihood
of confusion itself; there is no requirement to prove actual
deception or damage. Trademarks are remembered by their
overall commercial impression, and even minor variations may
be perceived by consumers as brand extensions or sub-brands.
5 AIR 1965 SC 980
6 AIR 1963 SC 449
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 819
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
14.6. In the present case, the composite mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’ is
deceptively similar to the registered word mark ‘BLENDERS
PRIDE’. Both are used for identical goods – Indian Made
Foreign Liquor (IMFL Whisky) – and are sold through the
same trade channels. The term ‘PRIDE’ which is neither
generic nor descriptive in the context of alcoholic beverages,
forms the essential and dominant part of the appellants’ mark.
The respondent’s use of this term, combined with another
descriptive term, results in an overall similarity that is likely
to mislead an average consumer with imperfect recollection.
14.7. The label and packaging of ‘LONDON PRIDE’ constitute a
colourable imitation of the registered trademarks associated
with ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, including the label, packaging, and
bottle design. Despite acknowledging the principle of overall
comparison, the Appellate Court erred by dissecting individual
elements rather than assessing the overall visual impression
created by the competing marks.
14.8. The Appellate Court placed undue emphasis on the dissimilarity
between the word marks ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ and ‘LONDON
PRIDE’ while overlooking the visual similarities in colour
scheme, layout, and overall packaging. It is well settled that
the use of a deceptively similar logo alone can amount to
infringement of a registered device mark.
14.9. The Appellate Court erred in applying Sections 15(1) and
17(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, despite the appellants
not claiming exclusive rights over the word ‘PRIDE’ per se,
but only over the composite mark ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ as
a whole, protected under Section 17(1). The finding that
‘PRIDE’ is publici juris, is flawed, as the respondent produced
no evidence of actual or widespread use in the trade. Mere
entries in the Trademark Register are legally insufficient,
as held in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila
Food Products7, and National Bell Co. v. Metal Goods
Manufacturing Co.8.
7 AIR 1960 SC 142
8 (1970) 3 SCC 665
820 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
14.10. The Courts below erroneously relied on the overruled decision
in S.M.Dychem v. Cadbury India Ltd9, which emphasized
dissimilarities in marks. The binding decision in Cadila
Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 10 requires
an assessment of overall similarity from the perspective of
an average consumer with imperfect recollection.
14.11. Reliance was placed on T.V. Venugopal v. Ushodaya
Enterprises11, Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd v. Sudhir
Bhatia12, and Heinz Italia v. Dabur India Ltd13, which held
that in cases of dishonest adoption, injunctive relief must
follow in order to uphold commercial integrity and protect
consumer interest.
14.12. The Appellate Court wrongly presumed that consumers of
IMFL whisky are discerning and literate, thereby ruling out
the likelihood of confusion. However, the test of imperfect
recollection applies regardless of a consumer’s education
or economic background. In Cadila Health Care ltd v.
Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd (supra), this Court affirmed
that similarity between marks must be assessed from
the perspective of an average consumer with imperfect
recollection.
14.13. The respondent’s reliance on Khoday Distilleries Ltd v.
Scotch Whisky Association14 is misplaced. That decision
involved a claim that the use of the term “SCOT” in the mark
‘PETER SCOT’ might mislead consumers into believing
the product was Scotch whisky. The Court held that such
consumers were discerning, but the context was specific to
origin misrepresentation. The present case involves not the
geographic origin of whisky, but deceptive similarity between
brands. Moreover, Khoday Distilleries was not a case of
trade mark infringement or passing off, but one concerning
9 2000 (5) SCC 573
10 AIR 2001 SC 1952 : AIR 2001 SC 1952
11 (2011) 4 SCC 85
12 (2004) 3 SCC 90
13 (2007) 6 SCC 1
14 2008 (10) SCC 723
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 821
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
cancellation of registration under Section 9 of the Trade
Marks Act, and is therefore inapplicable.
14.14. The continuous use of SEAGRAM’S embossed bottles by
the respondent constitutes an infringement of the appellants’
registered word mark. However, the Appellate Court failed
to return any finding on this crucial issue.
14.15. Reference was made to the concept of “Injurious association”,
wherein the similarity of brands leads consumers to
associate the defendant’s product with that of the plaintiff,
thereby misappropriating the plaintiff’s goodwill. Such
misappropriation causes irreparable harm – greater than mere
monetary loss – because it undermines the brand identity
and reputation built over decades. The structural similarity
between ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘LONDON PRIDE’, is
likely to create an assumption that the two originate from
the same source or that one is a variant of the other. Such
mis-association is actionable and warrants injunctive relief.
14.16. “Initial interest confusion” arises, where consumers are initially
drawn to a product due to its similar branding, even if they
realise prior to purchase that it is not the original. Courts have
held that such conduct still constitutes misappropriation of
goodwill. This principle is directly applicable to the present
case. In this regard, reliance was placed on Baker Hughes
Ltd v. Hiroo Khushalani15.
14.17. The appellants have established a prima facie case of
both infringement and passing off. Their marks have been
in continuous and extensive use for over three decades,
and enjoy substantial goodwill. In contrast, the respondent
entered the market only in 2018 and lacks any statutory or
proprietary rights.
14.18. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 03.11.2023 is
liable to be set aside, and that the appellants are entitled to
interim injunction to protect their statutory and proprietary
rights, and to restrain the respondent from continuing its
infringing and unlawful conduct.
15 (2004) 12 SCC 628
822 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
15. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submitted
that the respondent is the proprietor of the trademark ‘LONDON
PRIDE’ and all associated intellectual property. The respondent has
been manufacturing and marketing liquor under the said brand name
in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was submitted that the respondent
is the sole applicant for registration of the mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’,
and no other party has ever sought registration under the same or
similar name. Accordingly, the respondent claims exclusive rights
over the mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’, including its distinctive elements
and the goodwill attached thereto. It was further contended that the
respondent’s mark is entirely dissimilar in name, appearance, and
composition from any of the appellants’ earlier registered trademarks.
The brand ‘LONDON PRIDE’ is also registered with the Excise
Department of Madha Pradesh. According to the learned counsel,
there exists no visual, phonetic, or structural similarity between their
mark and those of the appellants. The appellants, therefore, lack a
prima facie case, and the elements of irreparable harm and balance
of convenience are also not in their favour. However, the factual
assertions concerning the appellants’ trademarks, their registration
status, and usage were not disputed.
15.1. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the label
used by the appellants for their products under the trademark
‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ and the label of the respondent’s product
sold under ‘LONDON PRIDE’ are entirely distinct, with no
elements of visual or conceptual overlap. It was submitted
that there is no deceptive similarity between the labels that
could lead to confusion in the minds of consumers.
15.2. It was additionally, submitted that the impugned order
represents a proper and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the
Commercial Court, which thoroughly evaluated the marks and
packaging of both parties before arriving at its conclusion. A
holistic comparison of the trademarks and packaging reveals
that the two products are clearly distinguishable. The goods
of both parties are sold in sealed boxes, not loose, and the
boxes themselves are visually distinct. The colour scheme,
typography, logos and other graphical elements are markedly
different. It was contended that both the essential features
and the overall visual impression of the competing marks
are dissimilar.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 823
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
15.3. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that to obtain a
temporary injunction, the appellants were required to establish
actual damage or the likelihood of irreparable harm, which
they failed to do. The mere existence of a prima facie case is
insufficient in law. It must also be shown that the appellants
would suffer irreparable injury that could not be compensated
in monetary terms, which is not the case herein.
15.4. Ultimately, it was submitted that the appellants had failed to
demonstrate the essential requirements for grant of interim
relief – namely, a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and
irreparable harm. The Courts below, having rightly assessed
the factual and legal issues, rejected the prayer for temporary
injunction. Thus, no grounds for interference by this Court in
appellate jurisdiction are made out by the appellants.
IV. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
16. We have heard the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for both parties and carefully perused the materials
available on record.
17. The question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is
whether the appellants are entitled to the grant of an interim injunction
restraining the respondent from using the impugned trademark, get-
up, and trade dress – including the packaging – of ‘LONDON PRIDE’
on the ground that such use amounts to infringement and/or imitation
of the appellants’ registered trademarks, namely, ‘BLENDERS
PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’.
V. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
18. The present dispute directly invokes the statutory protections available
under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, particularly in relation to trademark
infringement and deceptive similarity. The relevant provisions are
extracted and summarized below:
“2. Definitions and interpretation. – (1) In this Act, unless
the context otherwise requires, –
(h) “deceptively similar”.— A mark shall be deemed to be
deceptively similar to another mark if it so nearly resembles
that other mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion;
824 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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(m) “mark” includes a device, brand, heading, label, ticket,
name, signature, word, letter, numeral, shape of goods,
packaging or combination of colours or any combination
thereof;
(q) “package” includes any case, box, container, covering,
folder, receptacle, vessel, casket, bottle, wrapper, label,
band, ticket, reel, frame, capsule, cap, lid, stopper and cork;
(v) “registered proprietor”, in relation to a trade mark,
means the person for the time being entered in the register
as proprietor of the trade mark;
(w) “registered trade mark” means a trade mark which
is actually on the register and remaining in force;
(zb) “trade mark” means a mark capable of being
represented graphically and which is capable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one person from
those of others and may include shape of goods, their
packaging and combination of colours; and—
(i) in relation to Chapter XII (other than section 107), a
registered trade mark or a mark used in relation to goods
or services for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate
a connection in the course of trade between the goods or
services, as the case may be, and some person having
the right as proprietor to use the mark; and
(ii) in relation to other provisions of this Act, a mark used
or proposed to be used in relation to goods or services for
the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection
in the course of trade between the goods or services,
as the case may be, and some person having the right,
either as proprietor or by way of permitted user, to use the
mark whether with or without any indication of the identity
of that person, and includes a certification trade mark or
collective mark;
9. Absolute grounds for refusal of registration. —
(1) The trade marks—
(a) which are devoid of any distinctive character, that is to
say, not capable of distinguishing the goods or services
of one person from those of another person;
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 825
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
(b) which consist exclusively of marks or indications which
may serve in trade to designate the kind, quality, quantity,
intended purpose, values, geographical origin or the time
of production of the goods or rendering of the service or
other characteristics of the goods or service;
(c) which consist exclusively of marks or indications which
have become customary in the current language or in the
bona fide and established practices of the trade,
shall not be registered:
Provided that a trade mark shall not be refused registration
if before the date of application for registration it has
acquired a distinctive character as a result of the use
made of it or is a well-known trade mark.
11. Relative grounds for refusal of registration.—
(1) Save as provided in section 12, a trade mark shall not
be registered if, because of—
(a) its identity with an earlier trade mark and similarity of
goods or services covered by the trade mark; or
(b) its similarity to an earlier trade mark and the identity
or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade
mark,
there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the
public, which includes the likelihood of association with
the earlier trade mark.
(2) A trade mark which—
(a) is identical with or similar to an earlier trade mark; and
(b) is to be registered for goods or services which are
not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is
registered in the name of a different proprietor,
shall not be registered if or to the extent the earlier trade
mark is a well-known trade mark in India and the use of the
later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage
of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute
of the earlier trade mark.
826 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(3) A trade mark shall not be registered if, or to the extent
that, its use in India is liable to be prevented—
(a) by virtue of any law in particular the law of passing off
protecting an unregistered trade mark used in the course
of trade; or
(b) by virtue of law of copyright.
(4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the registration
of a trade mark where the proprietor of the earlier trade
mark or other earlier right consents to the registration, and
in such case the Registrar may register the mark under
special circumstances under section 12.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, earlier
trade mark means— [(a) a registered trade mark or an
application under section 18 bearing an earlier date of filing
or an international registration referred to in section 36E or
convention application referred to in section 154 which has
a date of application earlier than that of the trade mark in
question, taking account, where appropriate, of the priorities
claimed in respect of the trade marks;] (b) a trade mark
which, on the date of the application for registration of
the trade mark in question, or where appropriate, of the
priority claimed in respect of the application, was entitled
to protection as a well-known trade mark.
(5) A trade mark shall not be refused registration on the
grounds specified in sub-sections (2) and (3), unless
objection on any one or more of those grounds is raised
in opposition proceedings by the proprietor of the earlier
trade mark.
(6) The Registrar shall, while determining whether a trade
mark is a well-known trade mark, take into account any
fact which he considers relevant for determining a trade
mark as a well-known trade mark including—
(i) the knowledge or recognition of that trade mark in the
relevant section of the public including knowledge in India
obtained as a result of promotion of the trade mark;
(ii) the duration, extent and geographical area of any
use of that trade mark; (iii) the duration, extent and
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 827
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
geographical area of any promotion of the trade mark,
including advertising or publicity and presentation, at fairs
or exhibition of the goods or services to which the trade
mark applies;
(iv) the duration and geographical area of any registration
of or any application for registration of that trade mark
under this Act to the extent that they reflect the use or
recognition of the trade mark;
(v) the record of successful enforcement of the rights in
that trade mark, in particular the extent to which the trade
mark has been recognised as a well-known trade mark
by any court or Registrar under that record.
(7) The Registrar shall, while determining as to whether a
trade mark is known or recognised in a relevant section
of the public for the purposes of sub-section (6), take into
account—
(i) the number of actual or potential consumers of the
goods or services;
(ii) the number of persons involved in the channels of
distribution of the goods or services;
(iii) the business circles dealing with the goods or services,
to which that trade mark applies.
(8) Where a trade mark has been determined to be well
known in at least one relevant section of the public in India
by any court or Registrar, the Registrar shall consider that
trade mark as a well-known trade mark for registration
under this Act.
(9) The Registrar shall not require as a condition, for
determining whether a trade mark is a well-known trade
mark, any of the following, namely:—
(i) that the trade mark has been used in India;
(ii) that the trade mark has been registered;
(iii) that the application for registration of the trade mark
has been filed in India;
828 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(iv) that the trade mark—
(a) is well-known in; or
(b) has been registered in; or
(c) in respect of which an application for registration has
been filed in,
any jurisdiction other than India, or
(v) that the trade mark is well-known to the public at large
in India.
(10) While considering an application for registration of
a trade mark and opposition filed in respect thereof, the
Registrar shall—
(i) protect a well-known trade mark against the identical
or similar trade marks;
(ii) take into consideration the bad faith involved either of
the applicant or the opponent affecting the right relating
to the trade mark.
(11) Where a trade mark has been registered in good
faith disclosing the material informations to the Registrar
or where right to a trade mark has been acquired through
use in good faith before the commencement of this Act,
then, nothing in this Act shall prejudice the validity of the
registration of that trade mark or right to use that trade
mark on the ground that such trade mark is identical with
or similar to a well-known trade mark.
15. Registration of parts of trade marks and of trade
marks as a series.—
(1) Where the proprietor of a trade mark claims to be
entitled to the exclusive use of any part thereof separately,
he may apply to register the whole and the part as separate
trade marks.
(2) Each such separate trade mark shall satisfy all the
conditions applying to and have all the incidents of, an
independent trade mark.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 829
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
(3) Where a person claiming to be the proprietor of
several trade marks in respect of the same or similar
goods or services or description of goods or description
of services, which, while resembling each other in the
material particulars thereof, yet differ in respect of—
(a) statement of the goods or services in relation to which
they are respectively used or proposed to be used; or
(b) statement of number, price, quality or names of places;
or
(c) other matter of a non-distinctive character which does
not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark; or
(d) colour,
seeks to register those trade marks, they may be registered
as a series in one registration.
17. Effect of registration of parts of a mark.— (1) When
a trade mark consists of several matters, its registration
shall confer on the proprietor exclusive right to the use of
the trade mark taken as a whole.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
when a trade mark—
(a) contains any part—
(i) which is not the subject of a separate application by
the proprietor for registration as a trade mark; or
(ii) which is not separately registered by the proprietor as
a trade mark; or
(b) contains any matter which is common to the trade or
is otherwise of a non-distinctive character,
the registration thereof shall not confer any exclusive right
in the matter forming only a part of the whole of the trade
mark so registered.
27. No action for infringement of an unregistered trade
mark.— (1) No person shall be entitled to institute any
proceeding to prevent, or to recover damages for, the
infringement of an unregistered trade mark.
830 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of
action against any person for passing off goods or services
as the goods of another person or as services provided
by another person, or the remedies in respect thereof.”
28. Rights conferred by registration. — (1) Subject to
the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade
mark shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor of
the trade mark the exclusive right to the use of the trade
mark in relation to the goods or services in respect of
which the trade mark is registered and to obtain relief in
respect of infringement of the trade mark in the manner
provided by this Act.
(2) The exclusive right to the use of a trade mark given
under sub-section (1) shall be subject to any conditions
and limitations to which the registration is subject.
(3) Where two or more persons are registered proprietors
of trade marks, which are identical with or nearly resemble
each other, the exclusive right to the use of any of those
trade marks shall not (except so far as their respective
rights are subject to any conditions or limitations entered
on the register) be deemed to have been acquired by
any one of those persons as against any other of those
persons merely by registration of the trade marks but
each of those persons has otherwise the same rights as
against other persons (not being registered users using
by way of permitted use) as he would have if he were the
sole registered proprietor.
29. Infringement of registered trade marks.—(1) A
registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not
being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of
permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which
is identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in
relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade
mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use
of the mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark.
(2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who,
not being a registered proprietor or a person using by
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 831
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Karanveer Singh Chhabra
way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark
which because of—
(a) its identity with the registered trade mark and the
similarity of the goods or services covered by such
registered trade mark; or
(b) its similarity to the registered trade mark and the
identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by
such registered trade mark; or
(c) its identity with the registered trade mark and the identity
of the goods or services covered by such registered trade
mark,
is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or
which is likely to have an association with the registered
trade mark.
(3) In any case falling under clause (c) of sub-section (2),
the court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion
on the part of the public.
(4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not
being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of
permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which—
(a) is identical with or similar to the registered trade mark;
and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not
similar to those for which the trade mark is registered; and
(c) the registered trade mark has a reputation in India
and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair
advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character
or repute of the registered trade mark.
(5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person if he
uses such registered trade mark, as his trade name or part
of his trade name, or name of his business concern or part
of the name, of his business concern dealing in goods or
services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person uses a
registered mark, if, in particular, he—
832 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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(a) affixes it to goods or the packaging thereof;
(b) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts them on the
market, or stocks them for those purposes under the
registered trade mark, or offers or supplies services under
the registered trade mark;
(c) imports or exports goods under the mark; or
(d) uses the registered trade mark on business papers
or in advertising.
(7) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who
applies such registered trade mark to a material intended
to be used for labeling or packaging goods, as a business
paper, or for advertising goods or services, provided such
person, when he applied the mark, knew or had reason
to believe that the application of the mark was not duly
authorized by the proprietor or a licensee.
(8) A registered trade mark is infringed by any advertising
of that trade mark if such advertising—
(a) takes unfair advantage of and is contrary to honest
practices in industrial or commercial matters; or
(b) is detrimental to its distinctive character; or
(c) is against the reputation of the trade mark.
(9) Where the distinctive elements of a registered trade
mark consist of or include words, the trade mark may be
infringed by the spoken use of those words as well as by
their visual representation and reference in this section to
the use of a mark shall be construed accordingly.
135. Relief in suits for infringement or for passing
off.—(1) The relief which a court may grant in any suit
for infringement or for passing off referred to in section
134 includes injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as
the court thinks fit) and at the option of the plaintiff, either
damages or an account of profits, together with or without
any order for the delivery-up of the infringing labels and
marks for destruction or erasure.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 833
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
(2) The order of injunction under sub-section (1) may
include an ex parte injunction or any interlocutory order
for any of the following matters, namely:—
(a) for discovery of documents; (b) preserving of infringing
goods, documents or other evidence which are related to
the subject-matter of the suit;
(c) restraining the defendant from disposing of or dealing
with his assets in a manner which may adversely affect
plaintiff’s ability to recover damages, costs or other pecuniary
remedies which may be finally awarded to the plaintiff.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), the court shall not grant relief by way of damages
(other than nominal damages) or on account of profits in
any case—
(a) where in a suit for infringement of a trade mark, the
infringement complained of is in relation to a certification
trade mark or collective mark; or (b) where in a suit for
infringement the defendant satisfies the court—
(i) that at the time he commenced to use the trade mark
complained of in the suit, he was unaware and had no
reasonable ground for believing that the trade mark of
the plaintiff was on the register or that the plaintiff was a
registered user using by way of permitted use; and
(ii) that when he became aware of the existence and nature
of the plaintiff’s right in the trade mark, he forthwith ceased
to use the trade mark in relation to goods or services in
respect of which it was registered; or
(c) where in a suit for passing off, the defendant satisfies
the court—
(i) that at the time he commenced to use the trade mark
complained of in the suit, he was unaware and had no
reasonable ground for believing that the trade mark for
the plaintiff was in use; and
(ii) that when he became aware of the existence and
nature of the plaintiff’s trade mark he forthwith ceased to
use the trade mark complained of.”
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18.1. A plain reading of the above provisions indicates that
Section 2(h) defines “deceptively similar” as a mark that
so nearly resembles another mark as to be likely to cause
confusion or deception. This definition forms the cornerstone
of the test applied in registration refusals and infringement
disputes. Section 2(m), (q), (v), (w), (zb) respectively define
mark, package, registered proprietor, registered trademark,
and trademark, laying the foundational terms used throughout
the Act.
18.2. Section 9(1) bars registration of trademarks that are deceptive,
non-distinctive, or commonly used in trade. However, the
proviso carves out an exception where such marks have
acquired distinctiveness through prolonged and exclusive
use – commonly referred to as having acquired a “secondary
meaning”.
18.3. Section 11 prohibits registration of marks identical or similar to
earlier marks for identical or similar goods or services, where
a likelihood of confusion exists. It further extends protection
to well-known trademarks, even across dissimilar goods or
services, thereby recognizing the doctrine of dilution.
18.4. Section 15 permits registration of series marks, provided that
the differences between them do not materially affect their
identity. Section 17 clarifies that exclusive rights are granted
over the mark as a whole (sub-section (1)), while sub-section
(2) ensures that generic or non-distinctive elements within a
composite mark are not monopolized individually.
18.5. Section 27(2) recognizes the common law remedy of passing
off, thereby ensuring that rights in an unregistered trademark
can still be protected based on prior use.
18.6. Section 28 confers on the registered proprietor exclusive rights
to use the trademark and to obtain relief in case of infringement.
Section 29 outlines specific instances of infringement:
Sub-section (1) covers identical or deceptively similar marks
used for identical goods or services,
Sub-section (2) expands the scope to include similar goods /
services likely to cause confusion,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 835
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
Sub-section (4) protects well-known marks even in cases of
dissimilar goods / services provided there is unfair advantage
or damage to the mark’s reputation,
Significantly, Section 29(3) raises a presumption of confusion
when identical marks are used for identical goods/ services,
easing the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff.
18.7. Finally, Section 135 empowers courts to grant relief in suits
for infringement or passing off. This includes temporary or
permanent injunctions, damages, account of profits, and
orders for seizure of infringing goods. Importantly, courts are
authorized to grant ex parte and interlocutory relief to prevent
continued misuse or dilution of trademarks during the pendency
of litigation.
18.8. In essence, the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provides a comprehensive
statutory framework for protecting registered trademarks, while
also preserving the rights of prior users through passing off
actions. The Act clearly distinguishes between absolute and
relative grounds for refusal of registration and provides effective
enforcement mechanisms. Crucially, the guiding test is the
likelihood of confusion in the mind of an average consumer
– not actual confusion – which serves as the touchstone for
both refusal of registration and infringement proceedings. In the
present case, the issues of similarity, reputation, and consumer
confusion must be analyzed within this statutory scheme.
VI. JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
19. Before proceeding further to analyse the facts of the case, we deem it
necessary to refer and consider the judicial precedents on trademark
infringement and passing off, to assess whether, in the present case,
the appellants are entitled to the relief of interim injunction.
19.1. In the Privy Council decision of Coca-Cola Company of
Canada Ltd. v. Pepsi-Cola Company of Canada Ltd.16
the issue pertained to alleged infringement under the Unfair
Competition Act, 1932. Both parties were using their respective
marks – Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola – for similar non-alcoholic
16 1942 SCC OnLine PC 7 : AIR 1942 PC 40 (5J)
836 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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beverages in the same market. The Privy Council upheld the
lower court’s finding that no infringement had occurred. It
observed that although both marks contained the common term
“cola”, the word was descriptive in nature and not capable of
exclusive appropriation. The essential and distinctive features
of the competing marks were identified as “Coca” and “Pepsi”,
which were held sufficient to distinguish the respective goods.
The ruling underscored that trademark protection does not
extend to ordinary, descriptive, or laudatory terms unless
they have acquired a secondary meaning or distinctiveness.
Consequently, the mere presence of the shared term “Cola” was
held inadequate to establish deceptive similarity or likelihood
of confusion. The relevant paragraphs of the decision are
extracted below for ready reference:
“4. The contemporaneous use of both marks in the
same area in association with wares of the same kind
is not in dispute. The actual question for decision in
the present case may, therefore, in the light of the
above definition be stated thus — Does the mark used
by the defendant so resemble the plaintiff’s registered
mark or so clearly suggest the idea conveyed by
it, that its use is likely to cause dealers in or users
of non-alcoholic beverages to infer that the plaintiff
assumed responsibility for the character or quality
or place of origin of Pepsi-Cola? The President of
the Exchequer Court answered the question in the
affirmative; the Supreme Court answered it in the
negative. Their Lordships are in agreement with the
Supreme Court.
5. The case appears to them to be one which is free
from complications, and which raises neither new
matter of principle nor novel question of trademark
law. The only peculiar feature of the case is the
dearth of evidence, attributable doubtless to the
procedure adopted by the plaintiff at the trial. The
only matters proved before the plaintiff’s case was
closed were (1) the plaintiff’s registered mark and
(2) the user by the defendant of the mark alleged to
be an infringement. No evidence of (to put it shortly)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 837
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confusion either actual or probable was adduced. It
was contended that a statement by a witness called
by the defendant (one Charles Guth) was proof of
actual confusion. Guth was general manager of
a United States company which owns the capital
stock of the defendant. He was also President of a
New York company called Loft Incorporated which
owned a large number of candy stores in New York
at which Coca-Cola was sold. Subsequently the sale
of Coca-Cola was discontinued, and Pepsi-Cola was
sold at the stores. A passing off action was brought
by the Delaware Coca-Cola Company against Loft
Incorporated. The judge of the Court of Chancery,
Delaware, dismissed the action holding that Loft
Incorporated was not responsible for the acts of its
agents of which evidence had been given. In the
course of his cross-examination in the Exchequer
Court Guth was asked “Then you have no quarrel with
the Chancellor’s decision as to the facts expressed
in his opinion?” and he answered “None at all.” It
was argued that this answer proved the fact found
in the judgment of the Chancellor viz. (as quoted by
the President of the Exchequer Court from a report
of the case) that “the uncontradicted evidence shows
that substitutions were made by employees of the
defendants of a product other than Coca-Cola for
that beverage when calls for the same were made.”
6. The learned President relied on this judgment “as
very formidable support to the plaintiff’s contention
that … there is likelihood of confusion”; but in their
Lordships’ opinion he was not entitled to refer to or
rely upon a judgment given in proceedings to which
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a party, as
proving the facts stated therein. Those facts are in no
way proved thereby, nor are they in any way proved
by the answer of Guth which has been quoted above.
Guth could not of his own knowledge either quarrel
or agree with the Chancellor’s decision as to what
it was that had happened in the numerous stores,
838 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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and was described by the word “substitutions”. There
was accordingly no evidence before the Exchequer
Court of confusion actual or probable. In these
circumstances, the question for determination must be
answered by the Court, unaided by outside evidence,
after a comparison of the defendant’s mark as used
with the plaintiff’s registered mark, not placing them
side by side, but by asking itself whether, having due
regard to relevant surrounding circumstances, the
defendant’s mark as used is similar (as defined by
the Act) to the plaintiff’s registered mark as it would
be remembered by persons possessed of an average
memory with its usual imperfections.
7. In the present case two circumstances exist which
are of importance in this connexion. The first is the
information which is afforded by dictionaries in relation
to the word “Cola”. While questions may sometimes
arise as to the extent to which a Court may inform itself
by reference to dictionaries there can, their Lordships
think, be no doubt that dictionaries may properly be
referred to in order to ascertain not only the meaning
of a word, but also the use to which the thing (if it
be a thing) denoted by the word is commonly put. A
reference to dictionaries shows that Cola or Kola is a
tree whose seed or nut is “largely used for chewing
as a condiment and digestive” (Murray), a nut of
which “the extract is used as a tonic drink” (Webster),
and which is “imported into the United States for
use in medical preparations and summer drinks”
(Encyclopaedia Americana). Cola would therefore
appear to be a word which might appropriately be
used in association with beverages and in particular
with that class of non-alcoholic beverages colloquially
known by the description of “soft drinks”. That in fact
the word “Cola” or “Kola” has been so used in Canada
is established by the second of the two circumstances
before referred to. The defendant put in evidence a
series of 22 trade marks registered in Canada from
time to time during a period of 29 years, viz., from
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 839
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
1902 to 1930, in connexion with beverages. They
include the mark of the plaintiff and the registered
mark of the defendant. The other 20 marks consist of
two or more words or a compound word, but always
containing the word “Cola” or “Kola”. The following
are a few samples of the bulk; — “Kola Tonic Wine”
“La-Kola” “Cola-Claret”, “Rose-Cola”, “Orange Kola”
“O’Keefe’s Cola”, “Royal Cola”. Their Lordships
agree with the Supreme Court in attributing weight
to those registrations as showing that the word Cola
(appropriate for the purpose as appears above) had
been adopted in Canada as an item in the naming
of different beverages. The proper comparison must
be made with that fact in mind.
8. Numerous cases were cited in the Courts of
Canada and before the Board in which the question
of infringement of various marks has been considered
and decided; but except when some general principle
is laid down, little assistance is derived from authorities
in which the question of infringement is discussed in
relation to other marks and other circumstances. The
plaintiff claimed that by virtue of S. 23(5)(b), Unfair
Competition Act, 1932 its registered mark was both
a word mark and a design mark; and their Lordships
treat it accordingly. If it be viewed simply as a word
mark consisting of g “Coca” and “Cola” joined by a
hyphen, and the fact be borne in mind that Cola is a
word in common use in Canada in naming beverages,
it is plain that the distinctive feature in this hyphenated
word, is the first word “Coca” and not “Cola”. “Coca”
rather than “Cola” is what would remain in the average
memory. It is difficult indeed impossible, to imagine
that the mark Pepsi-Cola as used by the defendant,
in which the distinctive feature is, for the same reason
the first word “Pepsi” and not “Cola”, would lead
anyone to confuse it with the registered mark of the
plaintiff. If it be viewed as a design mark the same
result follows. The only resemblance lies in the fact
that both contain the word “Cola”, and neither is written
840 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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in block letters, but in script with flourishes. But the
letters and flourishes in fact differ very considerably
notwithstanding the tendency of words written in script
with flourishes to bear a general resemblance to each
other. There is no need to specify the differences in
detail; it is sufficient to say that in their Lordships’
opinion, the mark used by the defendant, viewed as
a pattern or picture, would not lead a person with an
average recollection of the plaintiff’s registered mark
to confuse it with the pattern or picture represented
by that mark. In the result their Lordships are of
opinion that the trade mark used by the defendant
and the registered mark of the plaintiff are not trade
marks so nearly resembling each other or so clearly
suggesting the idea conveyed by each other that the
contemporaneous use of both in the same area in
association with wares of the same kind would be
likely to cause dealers in or users of such wares to
infer that the same person assumed responsibility for
their character or quality or for the conditions under
which or the class of persons by whom they were
produced or for their place of origin. The defendant
therefore has not adopted for use in Canada in
connexion with its wares a trade mark which in any
way offends against the provisions of S. 3, Unfair
Competition Act, 1932. Their Lordships will humbly
advise His Majesty that this appeal and the cross
appeal should be dismissed. The plaintiff will pay
the costs of the appeal and the defendant will pay
the costs of the cross appeal with the usual set-off.
Appeal dismissed.”
19.2. In Corn Products Refining Co., v. Shangrila Food Products
Ltd.17, the appellant, who was the registered proprietor of the
trademark Glucovita used in relation to glucose-based food
products, sought an injunction against the respondent who
had commenced marketing a similar product under the mark
17 AIR 1960 SC 142
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 841
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
Gluvita. The primary contention was one of deceptive similarity
and passing off. This court held that the two marks – Glucovita
and Gluvita – were phonetically and visually similar, and likely
to mislead or confuse an average consumer of imperfect
recollection. The court, accordingly, granted an injunction
restraining the respondent from using the impugned mark.
The following paragraph is apposite in this regard:
“15. Now it is a well recognised principle, that has to
be taken into account in considering the possibility
of confusion arising between any two trademarks,
that, where those two marks contain a common
element which is also contained in a number of other
marks in use in the same market such a common
occurrence in the market tends to cause purchasers
to pay more attention to the other features of the
respective marks and to distinguish between them by
those features. This principle clearly requires that the
marks comprising the common element shall be in
fairly extensive use and, as I have mentioned, in use
in the market in which the marks under consideration
are being or will be used.”
19.3. In Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta (supra), this
Court had extensively analysed the principles governing
distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion in trademarks. It
held that the marks ‘Amritdhara’ and ‘Lakshmandhara’ were
deceptively similar, owing to their structural and phonetic
resemblance. Reaffirming the anti-dissection rule, the court
observed that an average consumer does not dissect a
trademark into its components or analyze its etymology, but
perceives the mark as a whole. Further, the Court noted that
both marks were used for similar medicinal products targeted
at a wide consumer base, including illiterate and semi-literate
individuals. From the standpoint of an average purchaser
with imperfect recollection, the overall similarity in sound
and structure was likely to cause confusion or deception.
Mere etymological or lexical differences were considered
immaterial. While several precedents on deceptively similar
composite marks were cited, the Court emphasized that
each case must be determined on its own facts. The degree
842 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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of resemblance sufficient to create confusion cannot be
predetermined and must be assessed in light of the overall
context. The admissibility of earlier decisions cited was also
debated; however, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on
their admissibility, as those decisions were not determinative in
resolving the issue of deceptive similarity between Amritdhara
and Lakshmandhara. The following paragraph from the
judgment is apposite:
“6. It will be noticed that the words used in the sections
relevant for our purpose are “likely to deceive or cause
confusion.” The Act does not lay down any criteria
for determining what is likely to deceive or cause
confusion. Therefore, every case must depend on
its own particular facts, and the value of authorities
lies not so much in the actual decision as in the tests
applied for determining what is likely to deceive or
cause confusion. On an application to register, the
Registrar or an opponent may object that the trade
mark is not registerable by reason of cl. (a) of s.8,
or sub-s. (1) of s.10, as in this case. In such a case
the onus is on the applicant to satisfy the Registrar
that the trade mark applied for is not likely to deceive
or cause confusion. In cases in which the tribunal
considers that there is doubt as to whether deception
is likely, the application should be refused. A trade
mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion by the
resemblance to another already on the Register if it
is likely to do so in the course of its legitimate use
in a market where the two marks are assumed to be
in use by traders in that market….
For deceptive resemblance two important questions
are: (1) who are the persons whom the resemblance
must be likely to deceive or confuse, and (2) what
rules of comparison are to be. adopted in judging
whether such resemblance exists. As to confusion,
it is perhaps an appropriate description of the state
of mind of a customer who, on seeing a mark thinks,
that it differs from the mark on goods which’ he
has previously bought, but is doubtful whether that
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 843
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
impression is Dot due to imperfect recollection. (See
Kerly on Trade Marks, 8th edition, p. 400.) ”
7. … We must consider, the overall similarity of the two
composite words ‘Amritdhara’ and ‘Lakshmandhara’.
We do not think that the learned Judges of the High
Court were right in Paying that no Indian would
mistake one ‘for the other. An unwary purchaser of
average intelligence and imperfect recollection would
not, as the High Court supposed, split the name into
its component parts and consider the etymological
meaning thereof or even consider the meanings of the
composite words as ‘current of nectar’ or current of
Lakshman’. He would go more by the overall structural
and phonetic similarity and the nature of the medicine
he has previously purchased, or has been told about,
or about which has other vise learnt and which he
wants to purchase. Where the trade relates to goods
largely sold to illiterate or badly educated persons,
it is no answer to say that a person educated in
the Hindi language would go by the etymological or
ideological meaning and, see the difference between
‘current of nectar’ and current of Lakshman’. ‘Current
of Lakshman in a literal sense has no meaning to
give it meaning one must further make the inference
that the ‘current or stream’ is as pure and strong
as Lakshman of the Ramayana. An ordinary Indian
villager or townsmen will perhaps know Lakshman,
the story of the Ramayana being familiar to him but
we doubt if he would etymologine to the extent of
seeing the socalled ideological difference between
‘Amritdhara’ and ‘Lakshmandhara’. He would go more
by the similarity of the two names in the context of
the widely known medicinal preparation which he
wants for his ailments. We agree that the use of
the word ‘dhara’ which literally means ‘Current or
stream’ is not by itself decisive of the matter. What we
have to consider here is the overall similarity of the
composite words, having regard to the circumstance
that the goods bearing the two names are medicinal
844 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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preparations of the same description. We are aware
that the admission of a mar is not to be refused,
because unusually stupid people, “fools or idiots”,
may be deceived. A critical comparison of the two
names may disclose some points of difference, but
an unwary purchaser of average intelligence and
imperfect recollection would be deceived by the
overall similarity of the two names having regard to
the nature of the medicine he is looking for with a
somewhat vague recollection that he had purchased
a similar medicine on a previous occasion with. a
similar name…..
9. Nor do we think that the High Court was. right in
thinking that the appellant was claiming a. monopoly
in the common Hindi word ‘dhara’. We do not think
that is quite the position here. What the appellant
is claiming is its right under s.21 of the Act, the
exclusive right to the use of its trade mark, and to
oppose the registration of a trade mark which go
nearly resembles its trade mark that it is likely to
deceive or cause confusion….
12. On a consideration of all the circumstances, we
have come to the conclusion that the overall similarity
between the two names in respect of the same
description of goods was likely to cause deception
or confusion within the meaning of s. 10(1) of the Act
and Registrar was right in the view he expressed.
The High Court was in error taking a contrary view.”
19.4. In Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna
Pharmaceutical Laboratories (supra), the appellant who
was the registered proprietor of the trademark ‘Navaratna
Pharmacy’, instituted a suit for infringement and passing off
against the respondent, who was manufacturing ayurvedic
medicines under a similar name. The appellant alleged
that the respondent’s use of the name was likely to cause
confusion among consumers. This court held that the claim
of infringement was not made out, as the two marks were not
sufficiently similar to deceive or confuse the public within the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 845
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
meaning of the Trade Marks Act. However, the Court upheld
the passing off claim, observing that the overall similarity in
name and trade dress could mislead consumers and adversely
affect the goodwill of the appellant’s business. The following
paragraphs are relevant in this context:
“28. … The finding in favour of the appellant to which
the learned counsel drew our attention was based
upon dissimilarity of the packing in which the goods
of the two parties were vended, the difference in the
physical appearance of the two packets by reason
of the variation in the colour and other features and
their general get-up together with the circumstance
that the name and address of the manufactory of the
appellant was prominently displayed on his packets
and these features were all set out for negativing the
respondent’s claim that the appellant had passed off
his goods as those of the respondent. These matters
which are of the essence of the cause of action for
relief on the ground of passing off play but a limited
role in an action for infringement of a registered
trade mark by the registered proprietor who has a
statutory right to that mark and who has a statutory
remedy for the event of the use by another of that
mark or a colourable imitation thereof. While an action
for passing off is a Common Law remedy being in
substance an action for deceit, that is, a passing off
by a person of his own goods as those of another,
that is not the gist of an action for infringement. The
action for infringement is a statutory remedy conferred
on the registered proprietor of a registered trade mark
for the vindication of the exclusive right to the use
of the trade mark in relation to those goods (Vide
Section 21 of the Act). The use by the defendant of
the trade mark of the plaintiff is not essential in an
action for passing off, but is the sine qua non in the
case of an action for infringement. No doubt, where
the evidence in respect of passing off consists merely
of the colourable use of a registered trade mark, the
essential features of both the actions might coincide
846 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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in the sense that what would be a colourable imitation
of a trade mark in a passing off action would also be
such in an action for infringement of the same trade
mark. But there the correspondence between the two
ceases. In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must,
no doubt, make out that the use of the defendant’s
mark is likely to deceive, but where the similarity
between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s mark is
so close either visually, phonetically or otherwise
and the court reaches the conclusion that there is an
imitation, no further evidence is required to establish
that the plaintiff’s rights are violated. Expressed in
another way, if the essential features of the trade mark
of the plaintiff have been adopted by the defendant,
the fact that the get-up, packing and other writing or
marks on the goods or on the packets in which he
offers his goods for sale show marked differences,
or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that
of the registered proprietor of the mark would be
immaterial; whereas in the case of passing off, the
defendant may escape liability if he can show that
the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods
from those of the plaintiff.
29. When once the use by the defendant of the
mark which is claimed to infringe the plaintiff’s mark
is shown to be “in the course of trade”, the question
whether there has been an infringement is to be
decided by comparison of the two marks. Where the
two marks are identical no further questions arise;
for then the infringement is made out. When the two
marks are not identical, the plaintiff would have to
establish that the mark used by the defendant so
nearly resembles the plaintiff’s registered trade mark
as is likely to deceive or cause confusion and in
relation to goods in respect of which it is registered
(Vide Section 21). A point has sometimes been
raised as to whether the words “or cause confusion”
introduce any element which is not already covered
by the words “likely to deceive” and it has sometimes
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Karanveer Singh Chhabra
been answered by saying that it is merely an extension
of the earlier test and does not add very materially
to the concept indicated by the earlier words “likely
to deceive”. But this apart, as the question arises
in an action for infringement the onus would be on
the plaintiff to establish that the trade mark used by
the defendant in the course of trade in the goods in
respect of which his mark is registered, is deceptively
similar. This has necessarily to be ascertained by
a comparison of the two marks — the degree of
resemblance which is necessary to exist to cause
deception not being capable of definition by laying
down objective standards. The persons who would be
deceived are, of course, the purchasers of the goods
and it is the likelihood of their being deceived that is
the subject of consideration. The resemblance may
be phonetic, visual or in the basic idea represented
by the plaintiff’s mark. The purpose of the comparison
is for determining whether the essential features of
the plaintiff’s trade mark are to be found in that used
by the defendant. The identification of the essential
features of the mark is in essence a question of fact
and depends on the judgment of the Court based
on the evidence led before it as regards the usage
of the trade. It should, however, be borne in mind
that the object of the enquiry in ultimate analysis is
whether the mark used by the defendant as a whole
is deceptively similar to that of the registered mark
of the plaintiff.”
19.5. In Parle Products (P) Ltd., v. J.P. & Co., Mysore18, this
Court laid down the test for deceptive similarity in trademark
infringement. The dispute concerned the plaintiff’s registered
trademark and distinctive packaging for “Glucose Biscuits”,
and the defendant’s use of similar packaging and get-up for
their biscuits marketed under the name “Glucobiscuit”. The
Court observed that the two marks, taken with their overall
packaging and presentation, were deceptively similar –
18 (1972) 1 SCC 618
848 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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particularly given the class of consumers targeted, namely
children and the general public, who are not expected to
conduct a detailed comparison. It was held that an average
consumer, possessing imperfect recollection, could easily be
misled due to the visual, phonetic, and structural similarities in
the competing products. Accordingly, the Court ruled in favour
of the plaintiff, and restrained the defendant from continuing
use of the impugned mark. The relevant paragraph is extracted
below for better appreciation:
“9. It is therefore clear that in order to come to the
conclusion whether one mark is deceptively similar to
another, the broad and essential features of the two
are to be considered. They should not be placed side
by side to find out if there are any differences in the
design and if so, whether they are of such character
as to prevent one design from being mistaken for the
other. It would be enough if the impugned mark bears
such an overall similarity to the registered mark as
would be likely to mislead a person usually dealing
with one to accept the other if offered to him. In this
case we find that the packets are practically of the
same size, the color scheme of the two wrappers
is almost the same; the design on both though not
identical bears such a close resemblance that one
can easily be mistaken for the other. The essential
features of both are that there is a girl with one arm
raised and carrying something in the other with a
cow or cows near her and hens or chickens in the
foreground. In the background there is a farm house
with a fence. The word “Gluco Biscuits” in one and
“Glucose Biscuits” on the other occupy a prominent
place at the top with a good deal of similarity between
the two writings. Anyone in our opinion who has a
look at one of the packets today may easily mistake
the other if shown on another day as being the
same article which he had seen before. If one was
not careful enough to note the peculiar features of
the wrapper on the plaintiffs goods, he might easily
mistake the defendants’ wrapper for the plaintiffs
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 849
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
if shown to him some time after he had seen the
plaintiffs’. After all, an ordinary purchaser is not gifted
with the powers of observation of a Sherlock Holmes.
We have therefore no doubt that the defendants’
wrapper is deceptively similar to the plaintiffs’ which
was registered. We do not think it necessary to refer
to the decisions referred to at the Bar as in our view
each case will have to be, judged on its own features
and it would be of no use to note on how many points
there was similarity and in how many others there
was absence of it.”
19.6. In Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. (supra), it was held that even minor differences may be
insufficient if the overall impression conveyed by the marks is
likely to deceive or cause confusion. The applicable test is not
one of exact or absolute similarity, but whether the essential
and distinctive features of the plaintiff’s mark have been
appropriated by the defendant in a manner likely to mislead
or confuse the average consumer. The following paragraph
is apposite in this regard:
“16. Dealing once again with medicinal products, this
Court in F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey
Manner & Co. (P) Ltd. [(1969) 2 SCC 716] had to
consider whether the word “Protovit” belonging to
the appellant was similar to the word “Dropovit” of
the respondent. This Court, while deciding the test
to be applied, observed at pp. 720-21 as follows:
(SCC para 7)
“The test for comparison of the two word marks were
formulated by Lord Parker in Pianotist Co. Ltd.’s
application [(1906) 23 RPC 774] as follows:
‘You must take the two words. You must judge of
them, both by their look and by their sound. You must
consider the goods to which they are to be applied.
You must consider the nature and kind of customer
who would be likely to buy those goods. In fact, you
must consider all the surrounding circumstances; and
you must further consider what is likely to happen if
850 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
each of those trade marks is used in a normal way as
a trade mark for the goods of the respective owners of
the marks. If, considering all those circumstances, you
come to the conclusion that there will be a confusion,
that is to say, not necessarily that one man will be
injured and the other will gain illicit benefit, but that
there will be a confusion in the mind of the public
which will lead to confusion in the goods — then
you may refuse the registration, or rather you must
refuse the registration in that case.’
It is necessary to apply both the visual and phonetic
tests. In Aristoc Ltd. v. Rysta Ltd. [62 RPC 65] the
House of Lords was considering the resemblance
between the two words ‘Aristoc’ and ‘Rysta’. The
view taken was that considering the way the words
were pronounced in English, the one was likely to
be mistaken for the other. Viscount Maugham cited
the following passage of Lord Justice Lukmoore in
the Court of Appeal, which passage, he said, he
completely accepted as the correct exposition of
the law:
‘The answer to the question whether the sound of
one word resembles too nearly the sound of another
so as to bring the former within the limits of Section
12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1938, must nearly always
depend on first impression, for obviously a person who
is familiar with both words will neither be deceived
nor confused. It is the person who only knows the
one word and has perhaps an imperfect recollection
of it who is likely to be deceived or confused. Little
assistance, therefore, is to be obtained from a
meticulous comparison of the two words, letter by
letter and syllable by syllable, pronounced with the
clarity to be expected from a teacher of elocution. The
Court must be careful to make allowance for imperfect
recollection and the effect of careless pronunciation
and speech on the part not only of the person seeking
to buy under the trade description, but also of the
shop assistant ministering to that person’s wants.’
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 851
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
It is also important that the marks must be compared
as wholes. It is not right to take a portion of the word
and say that because that portion of the word differs
from the corresponding portion of the word in the
other case there is no sufficient similarity to cause
confusion. The true test is whether the totality of the
proposed trade mark is such that it is likely to cause
deception or confusion or mistake in the minds of
persons accustomed to the existing trade mark. Thus
in Lavroma case Lord Johnston said:
‘… we are not bound to scan the words as we would
in a question of comparatio literarum. It is not a matter
for microscopic inspection, but to be taken from the
general and even casual point of view of a customer
walking into a shop.’ ”
On the facts of that case this Court came to the
conclusion that taking into account all circumstances
the words “Protovit” and “Dropovit” were so dissimilar
that there was no reasonable probability of confusion
between the words either from visual or phonetic
point of view.”
19.6.1. Further, in the same decision, this Court laid down the
parameters to be applied in a passing off action involving
deceptive similarity of marks. The relevant paragraph is
usefully extracted below:
“35. Broadly stated, in an action for passing-off on
the basis of unregistered trade mark generally for
deciding the question of deceptive similarity the
following factors are to be considered:
(a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks
are word marks or label marks or composite marks
i.e. both words and label works.
(b) The degree of resemblance between the marks,
phonetically similar and hence similar in idea.
(c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they
are used as trade marks.
852 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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(d) The similarity in the nature, character and
performance of the goods of the rival traders.
(e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy
the goods bearing the marks they require, on their
education and intelligence and a degree of care
they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or
using the goods.
(f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing
orders for the goods.
(g) Any other surrounding circumstances which
may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity
between the competing marks.
36. Weightage to be given to each of the aforesaid
factors depending upon facts of each case and the
same weightage cannot be given to each factor
in every case.”
19.7. In Khoday Distilleries Limited (Now known as Khoday India
Limited) v. Scotch Whisky Association and others (supra),
this Court addressed the question of whether the use of the
expression “Peter Scot” by an Indian manufacturer for whisky
amounted to passing off or infringement of the respondents’
rights associated with the term “Scotch”. The respondents
contended that the mark “Peter scot” was deceptively similar to
“scotch” and was likely to mislead consumers into believing that
the product had some connection with genuine Scotch whisky
originating from Scotland. The appellant however contended
that. the mark “Peter Scot” was derived from the founder’s
son’s name and was adopted without any intent to deceive.
This Court rejected the plea of deceptive similarity, holding
that the term “Scot” in Peter Scot was not sufficient, in and of
itself, to mislead or deceive the public into believing that the
product originated in Scotland. It was emphasized that the test
of deceptive dissimilarly must be applied from the standpoint of
an average consumer with imperfect recollection. Mere phonetic
similarity the Court held, is not determinative unless it leads to
actual or likely confusion. Furthermore, in actions for passing
off, an intention to deceive must be established, and mere
similarity in names without such intent is insufficient. Although
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 853
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
“Scotch” constitutes a protected geographical indication, the
Court found that “Peter Scot” was a bona fide and honest
adoption, not intended to exploit the reputation of Scotch whisky.
Ultimately, it was held that no actionable confusion or deception
had been proved, and accordingly, the injunction sought by the
respondents was rightly declined. The decision reaffirms that the
test of deceptive similarity must be applied holistically, having
regard to the overall impression created by the mark, rather
than focusing merely on phonetic or structural resemblance in
isolation. The following paragraphs are pertinent in this regard:
“75. The tests which are, therefore, required to be
applied in each case would be different. Each word
must be taken separately. They should be judged by
their look and by their sound and must consider the
goods to which they are to be applied. Nature and the
kind of customers who would likely to buy goods must
also be considered. Surrounding circumstances play
an important factor. What would be likely to happen if
each of those trademarks is used in a normal way as
a trade mark of the goods of the respective owners
of the marks would also be a relevant factor.
76. Thus, when and how a person would likely be
confused is a very relevant consideration.
77. Where the class of buyers, as noticed hereinbefore,
is quite educated and rich, the test to be applied is
different from the one where the product would
be purchased by the villagers, illiterate and poor.
Ordinarily, again they, like tobacco, would purchase
alcoholic beverages by their brand name. When,
however, the product is to be purchased both by
villagers and town people, the test of a prudent man
would necessarily be applied. It may be true that the
tests which are to be applied in a country like India
may be different from the tests either in a country of
England, the United States of America or Australia.
78. We however, do not mean to suggest that in a
case of this nature, the Heightened Scrutiny Test
should be applied as urged on behalf of the appellant.
Bollinger, J. v. Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd., whereupon
854 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Mr Desai has strongly relied upon, makes such a
distinction. Bollinger, J. was a case on demurrer. It
was concerned with sale of Spanish champagne. In
that case, in para 4 of the application, the applicant
stated: (All ER p. 804 B-C)
“Then in Para 4 they deny that this name ‘Spanish
Champagne’ is a false description, and they continue:
‘The defendants deny that the said section imposes
any statutory duty on the defendants or any statutory
duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs.
Alternatively, if the said section does impose any
such statutory duty the same is not actionable at the
suit of any of the plaintiffs or at all.”
The court proceeded on certain assumptions which
are: (Bollinger case, All ER p. 804 F-G)
“(1) The plaintiffs carry on business in a geographical
area in France known as Champagne;
(2) the plaintiffs’ wine is produced in Champagne and
from grapes grown in Champagne;
(3) the plaintiffs’ wine has been known in the trade for
a long time as ‘Champagne’ with a high reputation;
(4) members of the public or in the trade ordering
or seeing wine advertised as ‘Champagne’ would
expect to get wine produced in Champagne from
grapes grown there; and
(5) the defendants are producing a wine not produced
in that geographical area and are selling it under the
name of ‘Spanish Champagne’.”
It was noticed: (Bollinger case, All ER p. 805 B-D)
“The well-established action for ‘passing off’ involves
the use of a name or get-up which is calculated to
cause confusion with the goods of a particular rival
trader, and I think it would be fair to say that the
law in this respect has been concerned with unfair
competition between traders rather than with the
deception of the public which may be caused by the
defendant’s conduct, for the right of action known
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Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
as a ‘passing-off action’ is not an action brought by
the member of the public who is deceived but by
the trader whose trade is likely to suffer from the
deception practised on the public but who is not
himself deceived at all.”
Before the learned Judge, the plaintiffs claimed that
their goodwill in the name or description “champagne”
is injured by the defendants’ conduct to which the
counsel for the defendants did not contest the
correctness of the statement. The learned Judge,
referring to Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles and laying
down the principles of injuries, noticed the argument
of the counsel that before a person can negative the
argument of the defence counsel, the person can
recover for loss or it must be shown that his case
falls within the class of actionable wrongs stating:
(Bollinger cases, All ER p. 810H-I)
“... But the law may be thought to have failed if it can
offer no remedy for the deliberate act of one person
which causes damage to the property of another.
There are such cases, of course, but they occur, as
a rule, when the claims of freedom of action outweigh
the interests of the other persons who suffer from
the use which a person makes of his own property.”
It was in the aforementioned fact situation, the learned
Judge proceeded to determine as to whether the
description “Spanish champagne” is calculated to
deceive, holding that the plaintiff has a right to bring
any action.
…
80. Referring to Kerly on Trade Marks, which we have
referred to hereinbefore, the learned Judge said:
[Bollinger (No. 2) case, All ER p. 566 E-F]
And it has been said that regard should not be had
to “unusually stupid people, fools or idiots”. Moreover,
if the goods are expensive and not of a kind usually
selected without deliberation and the customers
generally educated persons these are all matters to
856 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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be considered”. (That is also a quotation from the
same book.) Various other judicial statements are
collected in the judgment of the Assistant Registrar
in George Angus & Co. -s Application, Re, RPC at
pp. 31-32, to which I was referred.
In arriving at the said decision, the following was
specifically noticed (All ER p. 567 B -D)
“Mr Munday, whose wine business was in Swansea,
when asked-’How far do you think the class of
customers that you deal with know the origin of
Champagne?’ replied:
‘Limited. Some would know. The first category I
mentioned would know a fair amount about it. In
the second category some. But there would be a
considerable number in my area who would know
nothing about it except that it was a wine they wanted
for a special occasion or for something in their life
they wanted to celebrate with. They would then want
that. That is how much they would know about it- just
a general outline.’”
It was furthermore held: [Bollinger (No. 2) case, All
ER pp. 567 1-568 C]
There is thus, in my view, a considerable body of
evidence that persons whose life or education has not
taught them much about the nature and production
of wine, but who from time to time want to purchase
Champagne, as the wine with the great reputation,
are likely to be misled by the description “Spanish
Champagne”.
Something was said on the subject of the burden of
proof. Well, burden of proof is something which may
shift in the course of an action. It appears to me that
when the plaintiffs have shown that a description used
by the defendants contains an untruthful statement
that a wine which is not Champagne is Champagne,
they have gone some way to establishing their case,
and the Court might require to be satisfied that such
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 857
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
an untrue statement was so clearly qualified as to be
not likely to mislead. But, however, that may be, I am
satisfied on the evidence that a substantial portion of
the public are likely to be misled. And as Lord Justice
Lindley said in Slazenger & Sons v. Feltham & Co.
50, RPC at p. 537:
“One must exercise one’s common sense, and, if you
are driven to the conclusion that what is intended to
be done is to deceive if possible, I do not think it is
stretching the imagination very much to credit the
man with occasional success or possible success.
Why should we be astute to say that he cannot
succeed in doing that which he is straining every
nerve to do?”
81. The Bollinger test, 48 was not only applied in
Warnink (Erven) BV v. J. 51 Townend & Sons (Hull)
Ltd. but in all the cases which have been referred to
by Mr Desai to which the different High Courts of India
as also to which we have taken note of. However,
tests laid down in Australia and the United States in
respect of selfsame goods as noticed hereinbefore
are somewhat different.
82. But then we are concerned with the class of
buyer who is supposed to know the value of money,
the quality and content of Scotch whisky. They are
supposed to be aware of the difference of the process
of manufacture, the place of manufacture and its
origin. Respondent 3, the learned Single Judge as
also the Division Bench of the High Court, therefore,
failed to notice the distinction, which is real and
otherwise borne out from the precedents operating
in the field. (See Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and
Trade Names, 13th Edn., p. 600)
83. Had these tests been applied the matter might
have been different. In a given case probably we
would not have interfered but we intend to do so only
because wrong tests applied led to a wrong result.
858 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
84. So far as the applicability of the 1999 Act is
concerned, having regard to the provisions of Sections
20(2) and 26(2), we are of the opinion that the 1999
Act will have no application.”
19.8. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.19, this Court elaborated
the principles governing the grant or refusal of interim
injunctions in trademark infringement and passing off actions. It
was underscored that appellate courts ought to be circumspect
in interfering with the discretionary orders of lower courts in such
matters. Interference is warranted only where the discretion
has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or in
disregard of settled legal principles. The following paragraphs
from the judgment are reproduced below for present purposes:
“13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid,
the appellate bench fell into error on two important
propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to
the very scope and nature of the appeals before it
and the limitations on the powers of the appellate
court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal
preferred against a discretionary order. The second
pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to
the quality of Antox›s alleged user of the trademark
on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall
deal with these two separately.
14. The appeals before the Division Bench were
against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge.
In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere
with the exercise of discretion of the court of
first instance and substitute its own discretion
except where the discretion has been shown to
have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously
or perversely or where the court had ignored
the settled principles of law regulating grant or
refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal
against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal
on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the
19 (1990) Supp. SCC 727 : 1990 SCC OnLine SC 490
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 859
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
material and seek to reach a conclusion different from
the one reached by the court below if the one reached
by that court was reasonably possible on the material.
The appellate court would normally not be justified in
interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal
solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter
at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary
conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by
the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner
the fact that the appellate court would have taken a
different view may not justify interference with the
trial court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to
these principles Gajendragadkar,J. in Printers (Mysore)
Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 :
AIR 1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721)
“... These principles are well established, but as has
been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton
& Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law as to
the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made
by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is
well established, and any difficulty that arises is due
only to the application of well settled principles in an
individual case’.”
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to
this principle.
….
19.9. In Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad and
others20, this Court emphasized that while considering an
application for a temporary injunction, the court must avoid
conducting a mini-trial or delving into the merits of the case
in detail. The exercise at that stage is limited to determining
whether a prima facie case exists, along with considerations
of balance of convenience and potential irreparable injury. The
focus is not to adjudicate the ultimate rights of the parties.
The relevant paragraph reads as under:
20 (2001) 5 SCC 568
860 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“6. It may not be appropriate for any court to hold a
mini-trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction.
As noticed by the Division Bench that there are
two documents which indicated that there was a
prima facie case to be investigated. Unless the sale
certificate is set aside or declared to be a nullity, the
same has legal validity and force. It cannot be said
that no right could be derived from such a certificate.
Secondly, when the contesting respondents were
in possession as evidenced by the record of rights,
it cannot be said that such possession is by a
trespasser. The claim of the contesting respondents
is in their own right. The decisions referred to by the
learned counsel for the appellant are in the context
of there being no dispute as to ownership of the land
and the possession was admittedly with a stranger
and hence temporary injunction is not permissible.
Therefore, we are of the view that the Division Bench
has very correctly appreciated the matter and come to
the conclusion in favour of the respondents. In these
circumstances, we dismiss these appeals. We may
notice that the time-bound directions issued by the
Division Bench will have to be adhered to strictly by the
parties concerned and the suits should be disposed
of at an early date but not later than six months from
the date of the communication of this order.”
19.10. In a more recent decision in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi Vs.
Harish Ambalal Choksi and Others21, this Court reaffirmed
the narrow scope of appellate interference with orders
granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions. It was held that
unless the discretion exercised by the trial court is shown to
be perverse, arbitrary, or capricious, appellate courts ought
not to substitute their views. The following paragraphs are
relevant in this connection:
“33. In the case of Anand Prasad Agarwal v.
Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001) 5 SCC 568, it was held
21 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3538
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 861
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
by this Court that it would not be appropriate for
any court to hold a mini-trial at the stage of grant of
temporary injunction.
34. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence
aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there
is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs
adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima
facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his
property or the right is a condition precedent for
the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case
is not to be confused with prima facie title which
has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only
prima facie case is a substantial question raised,
bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision
on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie
case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The
Court further has to satisfy that noninterference by
the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the
party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy
available to the party except one to grant injunction
and he needs protection from the consequences of
apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable
injury, however, does not mean that there must be
no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but
means only that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately compensated
by way of damages. The third condition also is that
“the balance of convenience” must be in favour
of granting injunction. The Court while granting or
refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound
judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial
mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the
parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with
that which is likely to be caused to the other side if
the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing
possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury
and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the
subject matter should be maintained in status quo,
an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has
862 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting
or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending
the suit. (See: Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992)
1 SCC 719.)”
VI. ANALYSIS
20. At the outset, we note that the present proceedings arise from
an order passed by the High Court affirming the decision of the
Commercial Court, which had rejected the appellants’ application
for interim injunction. The main suit, being Civil Suit No. 3 of 2020
instituted by the appellants before the Commercial Court is still
pending adjudication.
21. During the pendency of the suit, the appellants filed an application
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking an interim injunction
to restrain the respondent from manufacturing, selling, offering
for sale, advertising, or otherwise dealing in whiskey under the
trademark ‘LONDON PRIDE’, or any packaging or label bearing a
trademark that is identical or deceptively similar to the appellants’
registered trademarks viz., ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’,
or ‘SEAGRAM’S’, alleging infringement and passing off.
22. Upon a comparison of the rival marks, the Commercial Court found
that the only common element was the word ‘PRIDE’, and that no
other similarity was discernible. The packaging, style, bottle shape,
and logos of the two brands were found to be entirely different. The
Court also examined whether a consumer of the appellants’ product
‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ would likely be deceived by the respondent’s
product ‘LONDON PRIDE’, and concluded that ‘PRIDE’ is a commonly
used word in ordinary parlance, over which no exclusivity could be
claimed. The bottles of the respective products were found to be
clearly distinguishable. Since the appellants had not claimed a shape
trademark, and the bottles generally adhered to standrad forms, no
similarity could be drawn in that regard. The appellants’ bottle bore the
embossing ‘SEAGRAM QUALITY’, and the labels of the competing
products carried distinct names and logos. No imitation capable
of misleading consumers was found in the respondent’s product.
Moreover, the bottle produced by the appellants during the hearing
did not bear any such embossed mark. Accoridngly, the Court held
that the appellants had failed to establish a prima facie case, and
that the balance of convenience did not favour them. Dismissing
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 863
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
the application for interim injunction, the Court held that the mere
use of the word ‘PRIDE’ by the respondent could not amount to
imitation of the appellants’ trademarks. Aggrieved by the said order,
the appellants preferred an appeal before the High Court.
23. The High Court, upon consideration of the material on record,
concurred with the findings of the Commercial Court and held that
the respondent’s use of the word ‘PRIDE’ was unlikely to mislead
or confuse a consumer of average intelligence. Products such as
those in question are generally identified and purchased by their
complete names, or more commonly, by their first words. In the
appellants’ trademark, the first word is ‘BLENDERS’, whereas in the
respondent’s mark, it is ‘LONDON’. There is absolutely no similarity
between the two. The Court further held that ‘PRIDE’ is a generic,
commonly used, and laudatory expression. It concluded that the
dominant part of the appellants’ mark is ‘BLENDERS’. A comparison
between ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ and ‘LONDON PRIDE’ was found to be
wholly irrelevant, as the marks are entirely dissimilar. Accordingly,
there could be no likelihood of confusion or deception in the mind of a
reasonable consumer. The Court also noted that the word ‘PRIDE’ is
publici juris, common to the trade, and cited the existence of 48 other
trademarks containing the word ‘PRIDE’ registered under Classes 32
and 33, many of which are also registered with the Excise Authorities
for sale of liquor. Therefore, the appellants could not claim exclusive
rights over the ‘PRIDE’ component of their marks.
24. The High Court further observed that the competing trademarks
related to ‘premium’ or ‘ultra-premium’ whiskey, and that consumers
of such products can reasonably be presumed to be literate and
possess sufficient intelligence to distinguish between ‘BLENDERS
PRIDE/IMPERIAL BLUE’ and ‘LONDON PRIDE’. Even consumers
of average intelligence with imperfect recollection would be able to
differentiate between the rival brands. The High Court affirmed the
Commercial Court’s finding that there was no deceptive similarity in
the respondent’s mark that could constitute imitation of the appellants’
trademarks. The High Court found no infirmity in the conclusions
drawn by the Commercial Court and dismissed the appeal. It directed
the Commercial Court to proceed with the trial of the suit on merits
and to dispose it of expeditiously – preferably within nine months of
receipt of the certified copy of the High Court’s order – without being
influenced by any observations made in the course of interlocutory
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proceedings. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants have preferred the
present appeal before this Court.
25. The principal contention advanced by the learned Senior Counsel
for the appellants is that the appellants’ registered trademarks ought
to have been compared with the respondent’s mark in their entirety,
rather than by isolating individual components to assess visual,
phonetic, or structural similarity. However, the Commercial Court
erroneously dissected the word ‘PRIDE’ from the appellants’ registered
trademark ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, and based its comprison primarily
on that isolated element. Such dissection is impermissible under
Section 28(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. According to the learned
Senior Counsel, these settled principles are equally applicable at the
interlocutory stage while adjudicating an application for interim relief.
25.1. It is further contended that the comparison should have been
conducted from the standpoint of an average consumer with
imperfect recollection. A holistic comparison of the products
reveals that essential features – such as the bottle shape,
label structure, and the distinctive colour combination of dark
blue, light blue, and gold – are deceptively similar and likely to
cause confusion. However, the Commercial Court erroneously
presumed that purchasers of premium and ultra-premium
whisky are discerning and unlikely to be misled.
25.2. It is also submitted that the respondent has dishonestly
adopted the essential and distinctive elements of the appellants’
registered trademarks. Such conduct amounts to an actionable
tort and warrants the grant of an interim injunction, even in
the absence of further proof of passing off.
26. On the other hand, the respondent contends that there is no similarity
between the competing marks that could mislead or confuse a
consumer. Both parties sell their products in boxed packaging, and
a comparison of the respective boxes reveals no resemblance likely
to mislead an ordinary purchaser. The colour scheme, typography,
headings, logos, and other features are entirely distinct and dissimilar.
Not only are the essential features different, but the overall visual
impression conveyed by the products is also substantially dissimilar.
Moreover, the respondent asserts that no exclusive proprietary right
can be claimed over the word ‘PRIDE’ which is a common, laudatory
term found in every dictionary and widely used in ordinary parlance.
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27. As we have seen above, the law is no longer res integra. At this
stage, a comparative visual analysis of the competing trademarks
is warranted to determine whether the respondent’s mark bears any
deceptive similarity to the appellants’ registered trademarks, so as to
mislead or confuse an average consumer, by juxtaposing the facts
with the settled legal position. The competing marks are:
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28. In support of their claim, the appellants in their affidavit, highlighted
the following overall similarities between their three registered
trademarks and the respondent’s mark:
(i) The shape of the bottles is identical.
(ii) The shape of the “dome structure” used in the label on the box
and bottle is identical.
(iii) The color combination used on the label and packaging includes
dark blue, light blue, golden and white.
(iv) The names of the brands (IMPERIAL BLUE v LONDON
PRIDE) in both cases, are written in white against a dark blue
background, within an identically shaped dome.
(v) The trademark name is written in white lettering below the
emblem, with “BLUE” centered below “IMPERIAL” and “PRIDE”
centered below “LONDON.”
(vi) The outer packaging features thick golden borders, and the
inside of the packaging is dark blue.
(vii) The top-middle section of the label contains an emblem—
Seagram’s Crest Device in gold for Imperial Blue and a lion’s
face device in gold for London Pride.
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28.1. In particular, with respect to the label and logo, the appellants
allege the following deceptive similarities:
(i) The color combination of dark blue, light blue, and gold
is used in both labels and packaging.
(ii) The textual content on both logos is rendered in white.
(iii) The outer packaging in both cases features thick golden
borders with a dark blue background.
29. Before delving further, it is important to note that a passing off
action is a common law remedy designed to protect the goodwill
and reputation of a trader against misrepresentation by another,
which causes or is likely to cause confusion among consumers.
As observed by James L.J, in Singer Manufacturing Co v. loog,22
“no man is entitled to represent his goods as being the goods of
another man”. A passing off action applies to both registered and
unregistered marks, and is rooted in the principle that one trader
should not unfairly benefit from the reputation built by another.
In contrast, an action for trademark infringement is a statutory
remedy under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 available only in relation
to registered trademarks. It is intended to safeguard the exclusive
proprietary rights that registration confers.
29.1. A key distinction between the two lies in the requirements of
proof. In an infringement action, the plaintiff is not required
to establish the distinctiveness or goodwill of the mark –
registration, by itself, affords the right to seek protection. If the
impugned mark is shown to be identical or deceptively similar
to the registered mark, no further evidence of confusion or
deception is necessary. However, in a passing off action, the
plaintiff must prove: (i) the existence of goodwill or reputation
in the mark, (ii)a misrepresentation made by the defendant,
and (iii)a likelihood of damage to the plaintiff’s goodwill.
29.2. While an intent to deceive is not a necessary element in either
action, passing off requires proof of a likelihood of confusion
or deception. It is well settled that actual deception or damage
need not be proved – the test is whether confusion is probable
22 1880 18 Ch.D. 395, p.412
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in the mind of the average consumer due to the similarity in
the marks or the overall get-up of the goods.
29.3. Another key distinction is that in a passing off action, the
defendant’s goods need not be identical to those of the
plaintiff – they may be allied or even unrelated, provided the
misrepresentation is such that it affects or is likely to affect the
plaintiff’s business reputation. In contrast, infringement requires
that the unauthorised use relate to the same or similar goods
or services for which the trademark is registered.
29.4. Additionally, in an infringement suit, it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to establish use of the mark; even a registered proprietor
who has not commenced use can sue for infringement.
However, in a passing off action, the plaintiff must demonstrate
prior and continuous use, and that the mark has acquired
distinctiveness in the minds of the public.
29.5. Thus, while both actions seek to prevent unfair competition and
protect against consumer confusion, an action for infringement
offers broader statutory protection based solely on registration
and ownership. In contrast, passing off is grounded in
equitable principles and imposes a higher evidentiary burden
to safeguard commercial goodwill under common law.
APPLICABILITY OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
30. We shall now proceed to apply the legal principles governing
trademark infringement and passing off to the facts of the present
case, in order to determine whether the respondent’s mark is
deceptively similar to the appellants’ registered trademarks.
(A) SIMILARITY AND DISTINCTIVENESS: NAME, COLOUR
SCHEME, AND TRADE DRESS
31. Trademark protection – whether based on name, colour combination,
trade dress, or structural features – centres on a mark’s ability to
distinguish the commercial origin of goods or services in the minds
of consumers. The likelihood of confusion remains the cornerstone
of both infringement and passing off actions.
31.1. A registered trademark is infringed when a person, in the
course of trade, uses a mark that is identical or deceptively
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similar to a registered trademark in relation to similar goods or
services. Section 2(1)(h) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 defines
‘deceptively similar’ to mean ‘a mark shall be deemed to be
deceptively similar to another mark if it so nearly resembles
that other mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion’.
31.2. Whether a trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion is
a question of fact. Courts have consistently held that the broad
and essential features of the rival marks must be considered.
The assessment focuses on visual appearance, phonetic
similarity, the nature of the goods, the class of purchasers,
and the manner of sale.
31.3. As held in Parker – Knoll Ltd v. Knoll International Ltd.23,
proof of an intention to deceive is not required; a likelihood
of confusion is sufficient to establish infringement or passing
off. The evaluation must be made from the standpoint of an
average consumer with imperfect recollection, emphasizing
the overall commercial impression rather than engaging in a
minute or mechanical comparison.
31.4. The strength of a trademark lies in its inherent distinctiveness
or the distinctiveness acquired through use. Invented or coined
marks – such as Kodak or Solio – are inherently distinctive
and command the highest degree of protection. These marks
immediately signify the commercial origin of the goods or
services. In contrast, descriptive marks – such as Air India,
Mother Dairy, HMT, Windows, Doordarshan, LIC, and SBI – are
not inherently distinctive and must acquire secondary meaning
in the minds of the public to qualify for protection. That is,
the public must come to associate the mark with a particular
source. Similarly, geographical terms like Simla or Liverpool, or
generic trade terms, are generally not registrable unless they
have acquired distinctiveness through long and exclusive use.
The more distinctive a mark – whether inherently or through
acquired reputation – the stronger its position in infringement
or passing off actions.
23 1962 RPC 265
870 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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31.5. In the case of composite marks – those contained multiple
elements, such as words and logos – the overall impression
created by the mark is relevant. However, proprietors cannot
claim exclusive rights over individual components, particularly,
non-distinctive or descriptive elements. Courts have often
required disclaimers of such generic parts at the time of
registration. For instance, in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd v.
Registrar of Trade Marks24, the registration of “Diamond T” in
a diamond-shaped logo was granted, but the word “Diamond”
was required to be disclaimed due to its non-distinctiveness.
31.6. Short marks, especially those consisting of two-letter or
minimal-character combinations, are treated cautiously. These
are often considered non-distinctive, because they tend to
resemble abbreviations, product codes, or alphanumeric
references – especially in industries such as textiles,
chemicals and machinery. Unless secondary meaning is
clearly demonstrated, such marks may be refused registration.
However, courts have recognized exceptions for arbitrary or
invented short marks that are not commonly used in the relevant
trade – particularly in sectors like food and beverages, where
even brief combinations can act as unique identifiers of origin.
31.7. Colour combinations are treated similarly to single colours
combined with other distinctive elements. A specific combination
of colours may be prima facie registrable depending on its
manner of presentation. For example, colours used within a
defined geometric shape may qualify for registration. Where
colours are applied to packaging or labels, the burden of
proving acquired distinctiveness is higher. In such cases, the
proprietor must show that the colour scheme functions as a
badge of origin. Ultimately, trademark law seeks to protect
indicators of source – both inherently and through acquired
distinctiveness – which were previously protectable only
through the more demanding process of a passing off action.
31.8. Trade dress, encompassing the overall visual appearance
of a product – including packaging, layout, colour schemes,
24 AIR 1959 SC 989
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 871
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and graphics – also enjoys protection. Indian courts have
recognized that a deceptively similar trade dress, even in
the absence of a word mark, may mislead consumers and
constitute passing off, particularly where visual cues trigger
brand association and market confusion.
31.9. Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, we are not
persuaded that the respondent’s mark is deceptively similar to
the appellants’ registered trademarks, when viewed in totality.
The appellants’ marks – ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL
BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’ – are inherently distinctive. By
contrast, the respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’ uses the
term ‘PRIDE’ in a distinct commercial context and overall
presentation. The term ‘PRIDE’ being a common and laudatory
expression, cannot be claimed exclusively in isolation. Although
both parties’ trade dress and colour schemes feature elements
of blue and gold, such similarities are insufficient to establish
deceptive similarity. The placement of elements, design of
labels, font styles, and emblems differ in material respects.
Viewed holistically, the competing marks do not create such
an overall resemblance as is likely to cause confusion or
deception in the mind of an average consumer exercising
imperfect recollection.
(B) RULE OF ANTI-DISSECTION
32. A foundational principle in trademark law is that marks must be
compared as a whole, and not by dissecting them into individual
components. This is known as the anti-dissection rule, which reflects
the real-world manner in which consumers perceive trademarks –
based on their overall impression, encompassing appearance, sound,
structure, and commercial impression. In Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt
Sharma v. Navratna Pharmaceuticals Laboratories (supra), this
Court underscored that the correct test for trademark infringement
is whether, when considered in its entirety, the defendant’s mark
is deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered mark. The Court
expressly cautioned against isolating individual parts of a composite
mark, as such an approach disregard how consumers actually
experience and recall trademarks.
32.1. While Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 restricts
exclusive rights to the trademark as a whole and does not
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confer protection over individual, non-distinctive components
per se, courts may still identify dominant or essential features
within a composite mark to assess the likelihood of confusion.
However, this does not permit treating such features in isolation;
rather, they must be evaluated in the context of the overall
commercial impression created by the mark.
32.2. This approach finds further support in the observations
of scholars such as McCarthy in Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, who note that consumers seldom engage
in detailed, analytical comparisons of competing marks.
Purchasing decisions are instead based on imperfect
recollection and the general impression created by a mark’s
sight, sound, and structure. The anti-dissection rule thus aligns
the legal test for infringement with the actual behaviour and
perception of consumers in the marketplace.
32.3. Consequently, in disputes involving composite marks, the mere
presence of a shared or generic word in both marks does not,
by itself, justify a finding of deceptive similarity. Courts must
undertake a holistic comparison examining visual, phonetic,
structural, and conceptual elements, to assess whether the
overall impression created by the rival marks is likely to
mislead an average consumer of ordinary intelligence and
imperfect memory. If the marks, viewed in totality, convey
distinct identities, the use of a common element – particularly
if it is descriptive or laudatory – will not by itself amount to
infringement.
32.4. In the present case, the appellants’ attempt to isolate the
word ‘PRIDE’ as the basis of comparison is legally untenable.
Trademark similarity must be assessed by considering the
mark as a whole, and not by extracting a single component
for comparison. When viewed in their entirety, the appellants’
marks – ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and
‘SEAGRAM’S’ – are structurally, phonetically, and visually
distinct from the respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’. The
mere presence of the common word ‘PRIDE’ which is a generic
and laudatory term, does not render the competing marks
deceptively similar in the absence of an overall resemblance.
Thus, under the anti-dissection rule, no case for infringement
or passing off is made out.
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(C) DOMINANT FEATURE TEST
33. In determining whether a mark is deceptively similar to another,
courts often consider the dominant feature of the mark – that is, the
element which is most distinctive, memorable, and likely to influence
consumer perception. While the anti-dissection rule requires marks
to be compared in their entirety, courts may still place emphasis on
certain prominent or distinguishing elements, especially where such
features significantly contribute to the overall commercial impression
of the mark.
33.1. The principles of the anti-dissection rule and the dominant feature
test, though seemingly in tension, are not mutually exclusive.
Identifying a dominant feature can serve as an analytical
aid in the holistic comparison of marks. In certain cases, an
infringing component may overshadow the remainder of the
mark to such an extent that confusion or deception becomes
virtually inevitable. In such instances, courts – while maintaining
a contextual and fact-specific inquiry – may justifiably assign
greater weight to the dominant element. However, emphasis on
a dominant feature alone cannot be determinative; the ultimate
test remains whether the mark, viewed as a whole, creates a
deceptive similarity likely to mislead an average consumer of
ordinary intelligence and imperfect recollection.
33.2. An analogy that aptly illustrates the significance of a dominant
element in a composite mark is that of mixing milk and water.
If a small quantity of milk is added to a half-glass of water,
the mixture becomes cloudy – the change is perceptible, but
the dominant character remains watery. Conversely, if the
same amount of water is added to a half-glass of milk, the
result still appears to be milk – the dilution is imperceptible.
Though the components are the same, the perceptual impact
differs, depending on which element dominates. Similarly, in
trademark analysis, the presence of common elements across
marks does not automatically indicate a likelihood of confusion.
What matters is the relative prominence and distinctiveness of
the elements. Just as the milk in the second example visually
and qualitatively overwhelms the water, a dominant feature in
a mark can subsume other components and shape consumer
perception. Therefore, while assessing deceptive similarity,
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due weight must be given to the dominant element, without
disregarding the composite nature of the mark.
33.3. The dominant feature of a mark is typically identified based on
factors such as its visual and phonetic prominence, placement
within the mark (with initial components often carrying greater
perceptual weight), inherent distinctiveness, and the degree of
consumer association it has generated. The dominant element
functions as the “hook” that captures the consumer’s attention
and facilitates brand recall. For instance, in composite marks
such as ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ or ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, the terms
‘BLENDERS’ and ‘IMPERIAL’ may be regarded as dominant,
owing to their distinctive and less frequently used character.
In contrast, elements such as ‘PRIDE’ or ‘BLUE’ are relatively
generic, descriptive, or commonplace in the liquor industry, as
evidenced by other marks like ROCKFORD PRIDE, ROYAL
PRIDE, or OAK PRIDE. Such shared or non-distinctive terms
cannot be monopolized, unless it is established that they have
acquired secondary meaning through extensive and exclusive
use, and are uniquely associated with the plaintiff’s goods in
the minds of the public.
33.4. In the present case, the appellants contend that the respondent’s
use of the mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’ infringes their marks
‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’. However, upon
a holistic comparison, the overall commercial impression
of ‘LONDON PRIDE’ is substantially different from either of
the appellants’ marks. The trade dress, label design, colour
scheme, typography, and brand presentation are all distinctive
and unrelated. Moreover, the term ‘LONDON’ introduces a
geographical identifier that conveys a distinct brand identity,
divergent from ‘BLENDERS’ or ‘IMPERIAL’. The respondent’s
mark, therefore, does not imitate the dominant features of
the appellants’ marks. As such, there exists no real likelihood
of confusion or false association in the mind of an average
consumer exercising ordinary caution and imperfect recollection.
(D) NO EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OVER COMMON OR DESCRIPTIVE
TERMS
34. It is a well-established principle of trademark law that generic,
descriptive, or laudatory terms – particularly those commonly used in
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a given trade – cannot be monopolized by any one proprietor. Even
where such terms form part of a registered trademark, protection
does not extend to those elements per se unless it is affirmatively
shown that they have acquired secondary meaning – i.e., that the
term has come to be exclusively and distinctively associated with
the plaintiff’s goods in the perception of the consuming public.
34.1. In Godfrey Philips India Ltd v. Girnar Food & Beverages
Pvt. Ltd.25, this Court unequivocally held that descriptive
words denoting the character or quality of goods are not
capable of exclusive appropriation, except where they have
acquired distinctiveness through prolonged, continuous, and
exclusive use.
34.2. The word ‘PRIDE’ is a laudatory and commonly used English
term, typically employed to suggest notions of excellence,
heritage, or national identity. Within the alcoholic beverages
industry, it is extensively used as part of various trademarks.
Judicial notice may be taken of multiple registrations under
Class 33 – such as McDowell’s Pride, Highland Pride, Royal
Pride, and Pride of India – all incorporating the term ‘PRIDE’.
This widespread usage illustrates that the word is publici
juris, not inherently distinctive, and therefore incapable of
exclusive appropriation in the absence of compelling evidence
of secondary meaning.
34.3. The appellants’ mark ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ is a composite
trademark, comprising the suggestive term ‘BLENDERS’ –
alluding to the craft of blending spirits – and the laudatory word
‘PRIDE’. By contrast, the respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’,
couples a geographical term with the same non-distinctive
word ‘PRIDE’. The mere presence of a shared generic or
descriptive element is insufficient, by itself, to support a claim
of deceptive similarity.
34.4. In Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
(supra), this Court reaffirmed that deceptive similarity must
be assessed holistically, taking into account factors such as
the nature of the marks, the class of purchasers, mode of
25 (2004) 5 SCC 257
876 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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purchase, and the overall circumstances surrounding the
trade.
34.5. In the present case, the appellants have failed to produce
cogent evidence – such as consumer surveys, brand
recognition studies, or consistent third-party references – to
demonstrate that the term ‘PRIDE’ has acquired secondary
meaning exclusively pointing to their product. Mere duration
of use, turnover, or marketing expenditure is insufficient to
displace the term’s inherent descriptive or laudatory character.
As judicial precedent makes clear, even extensive use of a
descriptive term does not justify exclusivity unless such use has
displaced the word’s primary meaning, so that it now serves
as a source identifier in the minds of the consuming public.
34.6. Applying the settled legal principles, it is evident that the
marks ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘LONDON PRIDE’ are
visually, phonetically, and conceptually distinct. The appellants
cannot assert monopoly over the common term ‘PRIDE’,
and no actionable similarity arises merely from its use in
the respondent’s mark. In the absence of demonstrable
confusion or misrepresentation, the respondent’s use does
not amount to infringement under Section 29 nor does it
constitute passing off.
(E) AV E R A G E C O N S U M E R T E S T A N D I M P E R F E C T
RECOLLECTION
35. The average consumer test is a central standard in trademark and
unfair competition law. It assesses whether there exists a likelihood of
confusion between two marks, or whether a mark lacks distinctiveness
or is merely descriptive. The test is grounded in the perception of
the average consumer – a person who is reasonably well-informed,
observant, and circumspect, but not an expert or overly analytical.
As held by the European Court of Justice in Lloyd Schuhfabrik
Meyer v. Klijsen Handel BV26, the average consumer forms an
overall impression of a mark rather than dissecting it into individual
components.
26 Case C-342/97; [2000] F.S.R. 77, ECJ
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35.1. A key feature of this test is the recognition that consumers
rarely recall trademarks with perfect accuracy. For example, this
Court in Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satyadeo Gupta (supra)
emphasized that the comparison must be made from the
perspective of a person of average intelligence and imperfect
recollection. Thus, minor phonetic or visual similarities may
cause confusion if the marks share prominent or memorable
features. The test also considers that the degree of consumer
attentiveness may vary depending on the nature of the goods:
greater care may be exercised when purchasing luxury items
than in the case of everyday consumer goods.
35.2. The test is equally relevant to both inherent and acquired
distinctiveness. A mark has inherent distinctiveness if, by
its very form and appearance, it identifies trade origin to the
average consumer at the time of registration. A mark may
acquire distinctiveness if, through consistent and prolonged
use, it becomes associated by a significant portion of the
relevant public with a particular commercial source – even if
the consumer cannot name the source precisely. What matters
is not that the consumer knows the producer, but that the mark
serves as an indicator of origin.
35.3. However, the test has limitations. In cases involving product
shapes or designs, where the features serve a technical
function or add substantial value, policy considerations may
override consumer perception. While the average consumer
may identify the essential characteristics of a product’s shape
or configuration, their opinion is not determinative in assessing
registrability, especially where legal prohibitions against
functional or aesthetic monopolies come into play.
35.4. The doctrine of imperfect recollection, closely linked to the
average consumer test, emphasizes the importance of first
impression. Courts have cautioned against overly technical or
granular comparisons of trademarks [See: James Crossley
Eno v. William George Dunn27 and Aristoc Ltd v. Rysta
Ltd,28]. Instead, they have favoured realistic assessments that
27 H.L. (E) 1890, June 19. Vol. XV, App. Cas. page 252
28 1945 AC 68 (House of Lords)
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account for hazy memory, indistinct pronunciation, and fleeting
visual impressions. Notably, invented or fanciful words are
generally more difficult to recall than common or descriptive
ones, and distinctive features are more likely to be retained
in the consumer’s memory.
35.5. The foundational test for assessing deceptive similarity
remains the Pianotist Test, as laid down in Pianotist Co.
Ltd’s Application29 by Justice Parker. Indian courts continue
to apply this holistic standard, which requires consideration
of the visual and phonetic similarity of the marks, the nature
of the goods, the class of consumers, and all surrounding
circumstances. Justice Parker framed the test as follows:
“You must take the two words. You must judge of
them, both by their look and by their sound. You must
consider the goods to which they are applied, the
nature and kind of customer who would be likely to
buy the goods, and all the surrounding circumstances.
You must further consider what is likely to happen if
each of these trademarks is used in a normal way
for the respective goods. If, considering all these
circumstances, you come to the conclusion that there
will be confusion – not necessarily that one trader
will be passed off as another – but that there will be
confusion in the mind of the public leading to confusion
in the goods, then registration must be refused.”
35.6. This multifactorial framework complements the modern average
consumer test, ensuring that the analysis of deceptive similarity
remains practical and context-sensitive. It focuses on the overall
commercial impression left by the marks, rather than conducting
a mechanical or analytical breakdown. Indian courts have
consistently adopted this approach in determining the likelihood
of confusion in both infringement and passing off actions.
35.7. Applying these principles, it becomes evident that the rival
marks are not deceptively similar. The appellants’ trademarks –
‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’ –
29 (1906) 23 RPC 774 at p. 777
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convey distinct commercial impressions, when compared with
the respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’. The overall visual
appearance, phonetic structure, and trade dress – though
sharing some generic elements such as use of blue and
gold – are sufficiently different. These structural and conceptual
dissimilarities between the marks outweigh any incidental
similarities, negating the likelihood of confusion in the mind of
a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection.
(F) LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING GRANT OF INJUNCTION
36. The Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not prescribe any rigid or exhaustive
criteria for determining whether a mark is likely to deceive or cause
confusion. Each case must necessarily be decided on its own facts
and circumstances, with judicial precedents serving to illuminate the
applicable tests and guiding principles rather than to dictate outcomes.
36.1. As a general rule, a proprietor whose statutory or common law
rights are infringed is entitled to seek an injunction to restrain
further unlawful use. However, this remedy is not absolute. The
considerations governing the grant of injunctions in trademark
infringement actions broadly apply to passing off claims as
well. That said, a fundamental distinction remains: while a
registered proprietor may, upon proving infringement, seek
to restrain all use of the infringing mark, a passing off action
does not by itself confer an exclusive right. In appropriate
cases, the court may mould relief in passing off so as to permit
continued use by the defendant, provided it does not result in
misrepresentation or deception.
36.2. The grant of injunction – whether for infringement or passing
off – is ultimately governed by equitable principles and is
subject to the general framework applicable to proprietary rights.
Where actual infringement is established, that alone may justify
injunctive relief; a plaintiff is not expected to wait for further
acts of defiance. As judicially observed, “the life of a trademark
depends upon the promptitude with which it is vindicated.”
36.3. The principles laid down in American Cyanamid Co. v.
Ethicon Ltd30 continue to guide the Courts while determining
30 (1975) AC 396
880 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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interim injunction applications in trademark cases. The following
criteria are generally applied:
(i) Serious question to be tried / triable issue: The plaintiff
must show a genuine and substantial question fit for trial.
It is not necessary to establish a likelihood of success
at this stage, but the claim must be more than frivolous,
vexatious or speculative.
(ii) Likelihood of confusion / deception: Although a detailed
analysis of merits is not warranted at the interlocutory stage,
courts may assess the prima facie strength of the case
and the probability of consumer confusion or deception.
Where the likelihood of confusion is weak or speculative,
interim relief may be declined at the threshold.
(iii) Balance of convenience: The court must weigh the
inconvenience or harm that may result to either party
from the grant or refusal of injunction. If the refusal would
likely result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff’s goodwill
or mislead consumers, the balance of convenience may
favor granting the injunction.
(iv) Irreparable harm: Where the use of the impugned mark by
the defendant may lead to dilution of the plaintiff’s brand
identity, loss of consumer goodwill, or deception of the
public – harms which are inherently difficult to quantify – the
remedy of damages may be inadequate. In such cases,
irreparable harm is presumed.
(v) Public interest: In matters involving public health, safety,
or widely consumed goods, courts may consider whether
the public interest warrants injunctive relief to prevent
confusion or deception in the marketplace.
36.4. In conclusion, the grant of an interim injunction in trademark
matters requires the court to consider multiple interrelated
factors: prima facie case, likelihood of confusion, relative
merits of the parties’ claims, balance of convenience, risk of
irreparable harm, and the public interest. These considerations
operate cumulatively, and the absence of any one of these
may be sufficient to decline interim relief.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 881
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
37. Earlier, the appellants were unsuccessful in asserting a similar claim
regarding the use of the word ‘Pride’. In Pernod Ricard India (P)
Ltd. v. United Spirits Ltd.31 the appeal arose from the dismissal
of an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, wherein
the appellant, Pernod Richard India Private Ltd, had sought an
interim injunction restraining United Spirits Ltd from using the mark
“Royal Challenge American Pride”. By order dated 17.01.2022, the
commercial court rejected the appellant’s plea. The Punjab and
Haryana High Court vide its judgment dated 21.03.2023 upheld the
commercial court’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The court
held that the appellant had no independent registration over the
word ‘pride’, but only over the composite mark ‘Blenders Pride’.
Consequently, no exclusive or enforceable rights could be claimed in
respect of the standalone word ‘Pride’. Further, the Court observed
that since the appellant had failed to raise any objection at the
stage of registration of the rival mark before the Registrar of Trade
Marks, it was estopped from doing so at a later stage. The following
paragraphs from the High Court’s decision are pertinent in this regard:
“24. Learned counsel for the respondent has summarised
his arguments on the following issues:
24.3. Estoppel
The admissions made by the appellant-plaintiff before
the Registry, especially when the appellant is claiming a
right at the time of registration is important and will debar
the appellant-plaintiff from any relief and if not disclosed
in the plaint, amounts to material concealment. The reply
of the plaintiff at the time of registration of its mark, in
response to the objection raised by the Registrar, in which
the plaintiff gave up any right over the word “Pride” and
rather claimed right over “BLENDER’S” is an important
factor. The relevant portion of plaintiff’s reply in respect
of their own admission and claim is reproduced below:
“We submit that the subject mark is a unique combination
of word BLENDER’S and PRIDE which in combination or
in isolation have no reference whatsoever with the goods
for which registration is sought by the applicants.”
31 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 477 : (2023) 3 RCR (Civil) 162
882 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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“…We further submit that it is a well-settled principle that
the marks have to be compared in entirety and should
not be dissected into separate components for the sake
of comparison.”
Further plaintiff in respect to different marks containing
PRIDE inter alia gave the following reply:
“Mcdowell’s Pride
When compared as a whole, the cited mark Mcdowell’s
pride is phonetically, visually as well structurally dissimilar
and distinguishable from the subject mark.”
34. Accordingly, considering the matter from the factual as
well as legal aspect and by applying the ratio of judgments
and taking into consideration the provisions of law and
applicable to the facts of the present appeal, the bone of
contention revolves around primarily the two trade marks
i.e. “Blenders Pride” on one hand owned by the appellant
and “Royal Challenge American Pride”, a trade mark duly
registered by the respondents on the other hand are
on loggerheads. In the light of the express provisions
whereby the trade mark or a part of trade mark has been
infringed, it is a requirement of law as per Sections 15
and 17 of the Act that the part of the trade mark has to be
registered separately and admittedly in the present case,
the appellant is holder of the registered trade mark titled
“Blenders Pride” collectively, and, therefore, the entire thrust
of the argument and the case built up by the appellant that
there is infringement by the respondents is only on the basis
of a common word “Pride”. At the outset, in the absence
of any registration of the word “Pride” independently
and separately, disentitles the appellant to any stay qua
the same. Further the act and conduct of the appellant
also demonstrates that they themselves have foregone
their right and have never objected to the use of the
word “Pride” separately. Reliance has been placed on
multiple litigations especially the one before the Delhi High
Court passed in Reddys Laboratories Ltd. v. Controller,
Trade Marks [Reddys Laboratories Ltd. v. Controller, Trade
Marks, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 813] , which the appellant
consented and did not raise any objection.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 883
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
39. it is too far stretch at the behest of the appellant that
by use of word “Pride”, there could be any misconception
or dilution in the mind of the common man on the
street, who is the ultimate consumer, which would lead
to any confusion. The said parameter having not been
met, the appellant ahs failed to demonstrate as to how
he is facing any irreparable loss or injury which could
not be compensated in terms of money and as to how
the balance of convenience lies in its favour. Both the
companies are well reputed and well established in their
field and are rather competitors. The similarities of the
single word cannot be taken as an infringement and/or
passing off and, hence, we do not find any merit in the
present appeal and in fact, any interim relief granted to
the appellant will adversely affect the open market and
might lead to monopolistic trade activity by the appellant.
40. Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed.”
37.1. The appellant thereafter challenged the decision of the High
Court by filing Special Leave Petition (C) No. 17674/2023 before
this Court. The SLP was dismissed by order dated 06.09.2023,
wherein, the Court declined to interfere, observing as follows:
“After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length,
the impugned orders being concurrent which is for
the purposes of determination of interim arrangement
pending suit cannot in any manner influence the final
determination of the suit, we would not like to interfere
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
However, we find that the suit is at an initial stage
for almost 3 years and in a suit of this nature even
issues have not been framed. On our query, learned
counsel for the petitioner submits that there are only
two witnesses to be examined and so is the position
with the respondent.
The aforesaid being the position, we are of the view
that from the stage of framing of issues to such a
trial and arguments, it should not take more than six
months to complete the trial proceedings. We order
accordingly.
884 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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The concerned District Judge, Mohali to proceed with
the suit accordingly.
At the insistence of counsel for the petitioner, we
clarify that it is well settled proposition of law that
decisions on interlocutory applications are only made
to protect rival interests pending suit. Somehow the
interim applications itself are treated as final decision
but it is not so. In all such cases, interim arrangements
should be made and the trial should proceed rather
than to spend time only on interlocutory applications.
That protects the petitioner against the apprehension
that the impugned judgment may be cited in other
Court qua petitioner’s cases of a similar nature.
Needless to say that the trial Court will not be
influenced at the stage of final decision based on
evidence recorded with the observations at the
interlocutory stage whether of the trial Court or the
High Court.
The special leave petition is dismissed.”
38. In Bajaj Auto Ltd v. TVS Motor Co. Ltd32, this Court expressed grave
concern over the inordinate delays in the adjudication of intellectual
property disputes in India. It observed that litigation in matters involving
copyright, trademarks, and patents is often prolonged, with the real
contest revolving around interim injunctions, while final adjudication
remains elusive for years. Terming this as an unsatisfactory state of
affairs, the Court emphasized the need for time-bound disposal of
such cases. It accordingly, directed that final judgment in IP matters
should ordinarily be delivered within four months of filing the suit, with
hearings conducted on a day to-day basis. The following paragraphs
are pertinent in this context:
“3. It is evident that the suit is still pending before the
learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. We are
unhappy that the matter has been pending in the High
Court at the interlocutory stage for such a long time as
the suit was filed in December 2007 and yet even written
statement has not been filed.
32 (2009) 9 SCC 797
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 885
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
4. Recently, we have held in Shree Vardhman Rice &
General Mills v. Amar Singh Chawalwala [(2009) 10 SCC
257] as follows:
“… Without going into the merits of the controversy, we
are of the opinion that the matters relating to trade marks,
copyrights and patents should be finally decided very
expeditiously by the trial court instead of merely granting
or refusing to grant injunction. Experience shows that in the
matters of trade marks, copyrights and patents, litigation
is mainly fought between the parties about the temporary
injunction and that goes on for years and years and the
result is that the suit is hardly decided finally. This is not
proper.
Proviso (a) to Order 17 Rule 1(2) CPC states that when the
hearing of the suit has commenced, it shall be continued
from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have
been examined, unless the court finds that, for exceptional
reasons to be recorded by it the adjournment of the hearing
beyond the following day is necessary. The court should
also observe clauses (b) to (e) of the said proviso.
In our opinion, in matters relating to trade marks, copyright
and patents the proviso to Order 17 Rule 1(2) CPC should
be strictly complied with by all the courts, and the hearing
of the suit in such matters should proceed on day-to-day
basis and the final judgment should be given normally
within four months from the date of the filing of the suit.”
As has been observed by us in the aforesaid case,
experience has shown that in our country, suits relating
to the matters of patents, trade marks and copyrights are
pending for years and years and litigation is mainly fought
between the parties about the temporary injunction. This
is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs, and hence we had
passed the abovequoted order in the abovementioned case
to serve the ends of justice. We direct that the directions
in the aforesaid order be carried out by all courts and
tribunals in this country punctually and faithfully.
5. In the present case, although arguments were advanced
at some length by the learned counsel for both the parties,
886 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
we are of the opinion that instead of deciding the case at
the interlocutory stage, the suit itself should be disposed
of finally at a very early date. Hence, without going into
the merits of the controversy, we direct the respondent-
defendant to file written statement in the suit, if not already
filed, on or before the last date for closing of the Madras
High Court for Dussehra holidays. We would request the
learned Single Judge who is trying the suit to commence
the hearing of the suit on the reopening of the Madras
High Court after Dussehra holidays and then carry it on
a day-to-day basis. No adjournment whatsoever ordinarily
will be granted and the suit shall be finally disposed of on
or before 30-11-2009.”
39. We have carefully examined the judicial precedents both in support
of and against the grant of interim injunctions in actions for trademark
infringement and passing off. These authorities also delineate the
limited scope of appellate interference with the discretionary findings
of the trial Court on such applications. We are in respectful agreement
with the principles enunciated in the aforementioned decisions.
Applying these settled principles to the facts of the present case,
we are of the considered view that the rival marks, when assessed
in their entirety, do not exhibit such visual, phonetic, or structural
similarity as would give rise to a real and tangible likelihood of
confusion in the mind of an average consumer possessing imperfect
recollection. The overall trade dress, distinctive components, and
market presentation of the respondent’s product serve to sufficiently
distinguish it from that of the appellants. Accordingly, the allegation
of deceptive similarity is not borne out on a prima facie assessment,
and no case is made out warranting the grant of interim relief.
VIII. RECENT EVOLUTION OF TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE
IN THE UK – THE POST-SALE CONFUSION DOCTRINE
40. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
in Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL (Respondent) v Dream
Pairs Europe Inc and another (Appellants)33 marks a significant
development in trademark jurisprudence, particularly concerning the
33 [2025] UKSC 25
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 887
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
principle of post-sale confusion. The judgment not only reaffirms the
established principles governing similarity of marks and likelihood
of confusion, but also reinforces the appellate standard of review
regarding findings of fact by a trial Court.
Scope of appellate review
40.1. While rejecting the appellants’ contentions, the Supreme Court
restored the findings of the High Court (trial Court), emphatically
reaffirming the well settled legal principle that an appellate
court cannot substitute its own findings merely because it may
have arrived at a different conclusion. Unless there exists an
error apparent on the face of the record or the trial court has
committed a fundamental jurisdictional error going to the root
of the matter, appellate interference is unwarranted.
Post-sale confusion: A Developing Doctrine
40.2. The notion of post-sale confusion – though well recognized
in jurisdictions like the United States and now the UK – is still
relatively novel within Indian trademark law. It refers to the
confusion that occurs not at the point of purchase, but rather
after the product has been bought and is seen in use by
others. This form of confusion can arise, for example, when
a consumer knowingly purchases counterfeit goods – such as
imitation Rolex watches or knockoff Adidas or Nike apparel – or
when automobiles are inspired from more premium offerings.
In such cases, while the purchaser may not be deceived, the
public at large may be misled into associating the infringing
goods with the original brand, thereby diluting the brand’s
reputation and goodwill.
40.3. The underlying harm in post-sale confusion lies in the deceptive
appearance of legitimacy, which can impair the distinctiveness
and perceived exclusivity of the genuine product. This is
especially relevant in sectors like fashion, luxury goods,
automobiles, and food items, where brand visibility and public
perception are essential aspects of consumer engagement
and brand equity.
40.4. However, in the present case, the goods in question are not
intended for public display and are for private consumption.
888 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Therefore, the doctrine of post-sale confusion, while significant,
is not directly applicable to the facts of this particular matter. The
issue remains ripe for more comprehensive analysis in a future
case where such considerations may come up for consideration.
40.5. Even though the doctrine of post-sale confusion is inapplicable
to the facts of the present case, certain paragraphs from the
judgment of the UK Supreme Court remain relevant, particularly,
insofar as they clarify the broader principles governing similarity
of marks, likelihood of confusion, and the limits of appellate
interference with trial court findings.
40.6. For better appreciation, the relevant portions of the judgment
are extracted below:
“(b)The functions of a trade mark and the right of an
owner of a registered trade mark:
16. In L’Oréal SA v Bellure NV (C-487/07) [2010] Bus
LR 303, para 58, the CJEU gave a non-exhaustive
list of the various functions of a registered trade mark,
referring to “not only the essential function…but also
its other functions, in particular that of guaranteeing
the quality of the goods or services in question and
those of communication, investment or advertising”.
17. In SkyKick UK Ltd v Sky Ltd [2024] UKSC 36;
[2025] Bus LR 251, para 54, Lord Kitchin (with whom
the other Justices agreed) outlined the essential
function of a registered trade mark as being:
“… in particular, to guarantee the identity
of the origin of the goods or services
in relation to which it is used. In more
colloquial terms, it is a badge of origin
and its purpose is to permit the consumer,
without any possibility of confusion, to
distinguish the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of another”
(f) The average consumer
29. The average consumer includes “any class of
consumer to whom the guarantee of origin is directed
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 889
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
and who would be likely to rely on it, for example in
making a decision to buy or use the goods”: London
Taxi Corpn Ltd v Frazer-Nash Research Ltd [2017]
EWCA Civ 1729; [2018] FSR 7 per Floyd LJ, at
para 34.
30. The characteristics of the average consumer have
been considered in several
cases. In Lidl Great Britain Ltd v Tesco Stores Ltd
[2024] EWCA Civ 262; [2025] 1 All ER 311 Arnold
LJ observed, at para 15, that discussion of the
characteristics and role of the average consumer
occupies the whole of Chapter 3 in Kerly’s Law of
Trade Marks and Trade Names, 17th ed (2023).
Arnold LJ then proceeded to highlight several points
for the purposes of that case, at paras 16-20. It is
appropriate also for the purposes of this appeal to
set out those points:
“16. First, the average consumer is
both a legal construct and a normative
benchmark. They are a legal construct
in that consumers who are ill-informed or
careless and consumers with specialised
knowledge or who are excessively careful
are excluded from consideration. They are
a normative benchmark in that they provide
a standard which enables the courts to
strike a balance between the various
competing interests involved, including
the interests of trade mark owners, their
competitors and consumers.
17. Secondly, the average consumer is
neither a single hypothetical person nor
some form of mathematical average, nor
does assessment from the perspective of
the average consumer involve a statistical
test. They represent consumers who have
a spectrum of attributes such as age,
gender, ethnicity and social group. For this
890 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
reason the European case law frequently
refers to ‘the relevant public’ and ‘average
consumers’ rather than, or interchangeably
with, ‘the average consumer’: see, for
example, Intel Corpn Inc v CPM United
Kingdom Ltd (Case C-252/07) [2008]
ECR I-8823; [2009] Bus LR 1079, para
34. It follows that assessment from the
perspective of the average consumer
does not involve the imposition of a
single meaning rule akin to that applied
in defamation law (but not malicious
falsehood). Thus, when considering the
issue of likelihood of confusion, a conclusion
of infringement is not precluded by a finding
that many consumers of whom the average
consumer is representative would not be
confused. To the contrary, if, having regard
to the perceptions and expectations of the
average consumer, the court considers that
a significant proportion of the relevant public
is likely to be confused, then a finding of
infringement may properly be made.
1 8 . T h i r d l y, a s s e s s m e n t f r o m t h e
perspective of the average consumer is
designed to facilitate adjudication of trade
mark disputes by providing an objective
criterion, by promoting consistency of
assessment and by enabling courts and
tribunals to determine such issues so far as
possible without the need for evidence. ….
…
20. Fifthly, the average consumer rarely has
the opportunity to make direct comparisons
between trade marks (or between trade
marks and signs) and must instead rely
upon the imperfect picture of the trade
mark they have kept in their mind.”
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 891
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
(g) Similarity of the sign to the trade mark
31. It is sufficient for the purposes of this appeal to
state that the test for the similarity of the sign to the
trade mark was set out by the CJEU in Sabel BV v
Puma AG (Case C251/95) [1998] 1 CMLR 445 which,
at para 23, it stated:
“That global appreciation of the visual,
aural or conceptual similarity of the marks
in question, must be based on the overall
impression given by the marks, bearing
in mind, in particular, their distinctive and
dominant components.”
In short, in order to assess the degree of similarity
between the marks concerned, the court must
determine the degree of visual, aural (or phonetic)
and conceptual similarity between them.
32. If the threshold of similarity is passed, then an
assessment of the degree of similarity becomes
relevant to the subsequent question as to whether
“there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of
the public”: Sabel BV v Puma AG, at para 23.
33. In Ferrero SpA v Office for Harmonisation in
the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (C-
552/09 P) [2011] ETMR 30 the CJEU stated, at para
66, that:
“It is only if there is some similarity, even
faint, between the marks at issue that the
General Court must carry out a global
assessment in order to ascertain whether,
notwithstanding the low degree of similarity
between them, there is, on account of the
presence of other relevant factors such as
the reputation or recognition enjoyed by
the earlier mark, a likelihood of confusion
or a link made between those marks by
the relevant public.”
The CJEU also referred to this requirement for a
global assessment even if the degree of similarity
892 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
was only faint, at para 60 of its judgment in European
Union Intellectual Property Office v Equivalenza
Manufactory SL (Case C-328/18 P) EU:C:2020:156
(“Equivalenza”). At para 60 the CJEU stated:
“… It is only if there is some similarity,
even faint, between those signs that the
General Court must carry out a global
assessment in order to ascertain whether,
notwithstanding the low degree of similarity
between them, there is, on account of
the presence of other relevant factors
such as the reputation or recognition
enjoyed by the earlier mark, a likelihood
of confusion in the mind of the relevant
public (see, to that effect, judgment of 24
March 2011, Ferrero v OHIM (C552/09 P)
EU:C:2011:177; [2011] ETMR 30, paras 65
and 66 and the case-law cited).”
In relation to the faint degree of similarity see also
JW Spear & Sons Ltd v Zynga Inc [2015] EWCA Civ
290; [2016] 1 All ER 226, paras 58-60. Furthermore,
in that case Floyd LJ also addressed the issue of
taking forward the court’s assessment of the degree
of similarity to the global assessment of the likelihood
of confusion. He stated at para 60(iv) that:
“In conducting the global appreciation test
the court must take forward its assessment
of the degree of similarity perceived by
the average consumer between the mark
and sign.”
(h) Likelihood of confusion on the part of the public
34. If the sign is at least similar to the trade mark, then
the court is required to assess whether “there exists
a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public”.
35. The public does not (always) mean everyone
but instead means the relevant public. So, in
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 893
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
Consumer Products Ltd (C299/99) [2003] Ch 159,
para 63, the CJEU, citing Gut Springenheide GmbH v
Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt─Amt für
Lebensmittelüberwachung (Case C210/96) [1998]
ECR I-4657, para 31, identified the relevant public
as the “average consumer of the category of goods
or services in question”. In Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer
& Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV (C-342/97) [1999]
ECR I-3819; [1999] All ER (EC) 587, the CJEU again
identified the relevant public in the same way. The
CJEU stated, at para 25:
“The wording of article 5(1)(b) of the
Directive – ‘there exists a likelihood of
confusion on the part of the public...’ —
shows that the perception of marks in
the mind of the average consumer of
the category of goods or services in
question plays a decisive role in the global
appreciation of the likelihood of confusion.”
36. The average consumer is only a consumer of
the particular type of goods or services concerned.
There is no requirement that the average consumer
is an actual purchaser who buys or who has bought
the specific goods or services in respect of which a
potentially infringing sign is used. Where the goods
are consumer goods in almost universal use in the
United Kingdom, the relevant public consists of a
very wide group of the members of the public. As this
case concerns footwear, it was common ground that
the public concerned with footwear is the UK adult
population generally: see the judgment of Miles J at
para 122.
37. In Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro Goldwyn Mayer
Inc (Case C-39/97) [1999] ETMR 1; [1998] All ER (EC)
934, para 29, the CJEU explained what amounts to a
likelihood of confusion in the following terms:
“… the risk that the public might believe
that the goods or services in question
894 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
come from the same undertaking or, as
the case may be, from economically-linked
undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of
confusion…“
38. In order to try to ensure consistency of decision
making, a standard summary of the principles
established by these authorities, expressed in terms
referable to the registration context, has been adopted
in this jurisdiction. The current version was set out
by Arnold LJ in Match Group LLC v Muzmatch Ltd
[2023] EWCA Civ 454; [2023] Bus LR 1097, para
27, as being:
“(a) the likelihood of confusion must be
appreciated globally, taking account of all
relevant factors;
(b) the matter must be judged through
the eyes of the average consumer of the
goods or services in question, who is
deemed to be reasonably well informed and
reasonably circumspect and observant, but
who rarely has the chance to make direct
comparisons between marks and must
instead rely upon the imperfect picture of
them he has kept in his mind, and whose
attention varies according to the category
of goods or services in question;
(c) the average consumer normally
perceives a mark as a whole and does
not proceed to analyse its various details;
(d) the visual, aural and conceptual
similarities of the marks must normally
be assessed by reference to the overall
impressions created by the marks bearing
in mind their distinctive and dominant
components, but it is only when all other
components of a complex mark are
negligible that it is permissible to make
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 895
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Karanveer Singh Chhabra
the comparison solely on the basis of the
dominant elements;
(e) nevertheless, the overall impression
conveyed to the public by a composite
trade mark may, in certain circumstances,
be dominated by one or more of its
components
(f) and beyond the usual case, where
the overall impression created by a mark
depends heavily on the dominant features
of the mark, it is quite possible that in a
particular case an element corresponding
to an earlier trade mark may retain an
independent distinctive role in a composite
mark, without necessarily constituting a
dominant element of that mark;
(g) a lesser degree of similarity between
the goods or services may be offset by a
greater degree of similarity between the
marks, and vice versa;
(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion
where the earlier mark has a highly
distinctive character, either per se or
because of the use that has been made
of it;
(i) mere association, in the strict sense
that the later mark brings the earlier mark
to mind, is not sufficient;
(j) the reputation of a mark does not give
grounds for presuming a likelihood of
confusion simply because of a likelihood
of association in the strict sense; and
(k) if the association between the marks
creates a risk that the public might believe
that the respective goods or services
come from the same or economically-
896 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
linked undertakings, there is a likelihood
of confusion.
39. Having set out the standard summary of the
principles in terms referable to the registration context,
Arnold LJ went on to state, at para 28, that:
“The same principles are applicable when
considering infringement, although it is
necessary for this purpose to consider the
actual use of the sign complained of in the
context in which the sign has been used.”
(i) The context in which the sign has been used.
82. The same pragmatic approach to the level of
attentiveness in relation to post-sale confusion was
applied on appeal in the judgment of the CJEU (First
Chamber). The relevant paragraphs in the judgment
are paragraphs 40–43. At para 40 the CJEU stated:
“40. Where it is established in fact that
the objective characteristics of a given
product mean that the average consumer
purchases it only after a particularly
careful examination, it is important in law
to take into account that such a fact may
reduce the likelihood of confusion between
marks relating to such goods at the crucial
moment when the choice between those
goods and marks is made.”
94. It is perhaps obvious, and certainly an inevitable
conclusion drawn from experience, that reasonable
minds, and in particular reasonable judicially trained
minds, each faithfully applying the relevant law and
principles, will come to different conclusions about
the answer to these multifactorial questions. While of
course the decision of an appellate court trumps that
of the court below, the law has imposed structured
constraints designed to prevent a free for all in a higher
court whenever a party (with the necessary resources)
wishes to challenge the first instance decision of the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 897
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
trial judge. The reasons for these constraints are set
out in a string of well-known authorities including,
in the intellectual property context, Fage UK Ltd v
Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5; [2014] FSR 29,
per Lewison LJ at para 114. The reasons there set
out relevantly include the following:
(i) The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is
the first and last night of the show.
…
95. In Lifestyle Equities CV v Amazon UK Services
Ltd [2024] UKSC 8; [2024] Bus LR 532 this court
reviewed those constraints in a trade mark context.
After citing from the Fage case this court in a joint
judgment said, at paras 49-50:
“49. That does not, however, mean the
appeal court is powerless to intervene
where the judge has fallen into error in
arriving at an evaluative decision such as
whether an activity was or was not targeted
at a particular territory. It may be possible to
establish that the judge was plainly wrong
or that there has been a significant error of
principle; but the circumstances in which
an effective challenge may be mounted
to an evaluative decision are not limited
to such cases. Many of the important
authorities in this area were reviewed by
the Court of Appeal in In re Sprintroom Ltd
[2019] 2 BCLC 617, paras 72–76. There,
in a judgment to which all members of the
court (McCombe, Leggatt and Rose LJJ)
contributed, the court concluded, at para
76, in terms with which we agree, that on
a challenge to an evaluative decision of
a first instance judge, the appeal court
does not carry out the balancing exercise
afresh but must ask whether the decision
of the judge was wrong by reason of an
898 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
identifiable flaw in the judge’s treatment
of the question to be decided, such as a
gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a
failure to take into account some material
factor, which undermines the cogency of
the conclusion.
50. On the other hand, it is equally clear
that, for the decision to be ‘wrong’ under
CPR r 52.21(3), it is not enough to show,
without more, that the appellate court might
have arrived at a different evaluation.”
IX. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
41. It is a settled principle of trademark law that deceptive similarity does
not necessitate exact imitation. What is material is the likelihood of
confusion or association in the minds of consumers arising from an
overall resemblance between the competing marks. The applicable
standard is that of an average consumer with imperfect recollection.
42. While comparing rival marks, Courts must assess the marks in
their entirety, rather than dissecting composite trademarks into
isolated components. The dominant feature of a mark may assist
in crossing the preliminary threshold of analysis, but the ultimate
inquiry must focus on the overall impression created by the mark –
especially in the context of the relevant goods, trade channels, and
target consumers. The proper test is not to place the two marks
side by side to identify dissimilarities, but to determine whether
the impugned mark, when viewed independently, is likely to create
an impression of association or common origin in the mind of the
average consumer. Even if a particular component of a mark lacks
inherent distinctiveness, its imitation may still amount to infringement
if it constitutes an essential and distinctive feature of the composite
mark as a whole.
43. Section 17(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 grants exclusive rights
only in respect of the mark as registered. Section 17(2) excludes
protection for common or non-distinctive elements unless such
elements have acquired secondary meaning. Sections 27(2) and
29 preserve the right to institute passing off actions and define
the contours of infringement, respectively. Notably, Section 29(3)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 899
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
presumes confusion only where identical marks are used for identical
goods – a condition not met in the present case as the marks.
44. Applying the settled legal standards – including the anti-dissection
rule, the overall similarity test, and the perspective of an average
consumer – we prima facie find no deceptive similarity between the
competing marks that would give rise to confusion.
45. In the present case, the marks – ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘LONDON
PRIDE’ – are clearly not identical. Though the products are similar, the
branding, packaging, and trade dress of each are materially distinct.
The Commercial Court and High Court have rightly held that the term
‘PRIDE’ is publici juris, and commonly used in the liquor industry.
The dominant components – ‘BLENDERS’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and
‘LONDON’ – are entirely different both visually and phonetically,
producing distinct overall impressions.
46. The courts below also correctly observed that the products in question
are premium and ultra-premium whiskies, targeted at a discerning
consumer base. Such consumers are likely to exercise greater care
in their purchase decisions. The distinct trade dress and packaging
reduce any likelihood of confusion. The shared use of the laudatory
word ‘PRIDE’, in isolation, cannot form the basis for injunctive relief.
47. Though the appellants heavily rely on the anti-dissection principle,
they themselves seek to dissect their composite marks and claim
exclusive rights over isolated elements such as ‘PRIDE’ and the use
of the colour blue. Their claim, in essence, appears to be based on
brand association with the Seagram’s or Pernod Richard portfolio,
rather than any legally cognizable infringement.
48. The allegation regarding the embossing of “Seagram Quality” on the
respondent’s bottle was rightly rejected by the Commercial Court.
The bottle produced as evidence by the appellants lacked such
embossing, and this finding remains unchallenged. The appellants
themselves admitted that they failed to furnish any invoice or produce
a witness to support their claim, thereby rendering the allegation
unreliable and lacking in bona fides.
49. In the liquor industry, where advertising is highly restricted, brand
recognition rests predominantly on packaging and consumer loyalty.
Unless the imitation is deliberate and intended to mislead, the chance
of confusion is minimal. The allegation of counterfeiting in the present
case appears to be speculative and unsupported by credible evidence.
900 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
50. The appellants’ attempt to combine elements from two distinct
marks – ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ – to challenge
the respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’, constitutes a hybrid and
untenable pleading. Each mark must be assessed independently,
and cherry-picking generic or unregistered features from multiple
marks to fabricate a composite case of infringement is not legally
sustainable.
51. It is not in dispute that the word “PRIDE” is not registered as a
standalone mark. Nor can the appellants claim exclusivity over
common elements like bottle shape or color schemes that are
generic and widely used in the industry. While the composite marks
‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ are protected, their
individual elements – lacking distinctiveness – are not independently
enforceable.
52. The piece-meal approach adopted by the appellants – seeking to
combine unrelated features from their own marks – has undermined
their claim. Apart from the shared use of a common term, there is
no meaningful similarity between the marks. Key elements such as
packaging, typography, bottle design, and label layout are materially
distinct. In a market segment, where consumers are more discerning,
the likelihood of confusion is negligible.
53. The appellants’ contention that the Commercial Court dissected the
marks mechanically is belied by the High Court’s holistic analysis.
The High Court correctly noted that ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ uses a
round bottle, whereas ‘LONDON PRIDE’ adopts a cylindrical form.
The labels, cartons, and design motifs are entirely different. These
variations eliminate the possibility of confusion.
54. The comparison between ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ and ‘LONDON PRIDE’
reveals even greater divergence. The marks differ in word arrangement,
label structure, and packaging. No similarity exists – visual, phonetic,
or structural – that can support a claim for infringement or passing
off. Since resemblance is a sine qua non for both causes of action,
the appellants’ claim must fail.
55. Although the appellants hold registrations for the composite marks, no
evidence was adduced to demonstrate that any particular element –
such as bottle shape, color scheme, or the word “PRIDE” – had
acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning. Trademark protection
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 901
Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
extends only to distinctive identifiers. Descriptive or commonplace
elements fall outside the ambit of protection unless distinctiveness
is proved.
56. Significantly, the appellants’ earlier challenge to United Spirits’ use
of the term ‘PRIDE’ in the mark “Royal Challenger American Pride”
was unsuccessful. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the
appellants did not possess an independent registration for the word
‘Pride’, but only for the composite mark ‘Blenders Pride’. Accordingly,
they could not claim any exclusive or enforceable rights over the
standalone word ‘Pride’. The Court further observed that having
failed to object to the registration of the impugned mark before the
Trade Marks Registry, the appellants were estopped from asserting
such rights subsequently. This decision was upheld by this Court in
SLP (C) No. 17674/2023 dismissed on 06.09.2023. Therefore, the
appellants’ present attempt is contrary to law and settled principles
of equity.
57. In view of the foregoing analysis, we find no ground to interfere
with the concurrent findings of the Commercial Court and the High
Court. The appellants have failed to establish a prima facie case of
deceptive similarity that could justify the grant of interim injunction.
X. CONCLUSION
58. In fine, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The Commercial Court is
directed to proceed with the trial and dispose of the suit on merits,
in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made by
this court or by the courts below, within a period of four months from
the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. It is clarified that the
present judgment is confined to the adjudication of the application
for interim injunction, based solely on the materials available at this
interlocutory stage. There shall be no order as to costs.
59. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
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