Holding

The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not bona‑fide cultivating tenants and that the executing court could not set aside the decree or grant them protection under the 1955 Act; therefore, the execution of the decree in favour of the appellants must proceed.

Summary

The appellants obtained a decree for specific performance and possession of a suit property against the vendors, but the vendors failed to execute the sale deed. The appellants sought execution of the decree, while the respondents (nephews of the vendors) claimed to be cultivating tenants and objected to the delivery of possession under Section 47 of the CPC, invoking the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955. The lower courts upheld the respondents' objections, holding that the execution court could entertain their claim of possession, and the High Court affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court held that the respondents were not bona‑fide cultivating tenants, had not raised their tenancy claim during the original suit, and provided no documentary evidence; consequently, the execution court could not revisit the validity of the decree or grant them protection under the 1955 Act. The Court set aside both the High Court’s order and the execution court’s order, directing that possession be handed over to the appellants and issuing directions to curb delays in execution proceedings. The appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the courts below erred in upholding the objections raised by respondents 1 and 2, who claimed to be cultivating tenants, against the execution of the decree for specific performance and possession.
Whether respondents 1 and 2 are entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955, and whether the executing court could decide the validity of the decree on that ground.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 47
Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955s. 3, s. 6

Subjects

Section 47Order XXI Rule 97-103Execution petitionObjections to executionSpecific performanceCultivating tenantsDecretal propertyCollusionJurisdictionTamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection ActDelay in execution proceedings

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 540 : 2025 INSC 329

Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors.
v.
V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 3640-3642 of 2025)
06 March 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the courts below committed any error in upholding the
objections raised by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein against
execution of the decree on the claim of being in possession of
the suit property in their capacity as cultivating tenants; Whether
the respondent nos. 1 and 2 are entitled to the protection of the
Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 and could
the Executing Court have decided the question of validity of the
decree on this ground.

Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.47; Or. XXI, rr.97, 101 – Tamil
Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 – Objection
raised by Respondent nos.1 and 2 against execution of the
decree claiming to be in possession of the suit property in
their capacity as cultivating tenants, upheld by courts below –
Respondent nos.1 and 2, if entitled to the protection of the
1955 Act and whether the Executing Court could have decided
the question of validity of the decree on this ground:
Held: The decree in favour of the appellants granting specific
performance with possession was affirmed by the High Court
and the SLP against the order of the High Court also stood
dismissed – Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 chose not to contest the
original suit before the ASJ – They did not appear even before
the High Court and Supreme Court in the appeals filed by the
vendors (judgment debtors) – Further, the issues that ought to
have been raised by the parties during the adjudication of the
original suit cannot be determined by the executing court as
such adjudication may undermine the decree itself – Respondent
nos.1 and 2 could have filed a joint written statement stating that
* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 541

Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.

they are cultivating tenants at the stage of the original suit itself,
but rather they raised the said issue in the form of objections at
the stage of execution – Furthermore, respondent nos.1 and 2
failed to produce any documentary evidence as regards their
claim of being cultivating tenants, even at the stage of their s.47
application – Present is a case of collusion between the vendors
and the respondent nos.1 and 2 (nephews of the vendors), to
deprive the appellants from availing the fruits of the decree in
their favour – Even otherwise, the respondent nos.1 and 2 cannot
claim protection of the special legislation of 1955 for the period
during which they were not registered as tenants cultivating the
suit properties – The certificate that they are in possession of the
suit properties since 1974 does not establish any independent
right of possession in their favour – Further, the certificate itself
appears to have been obtained in collusion with the vendors who
at the time of giving “no objection” had ceased to be the owners of
the suit property – Respondent nos.1 and 2 are not the bona fide
cultivating tenants of the suit property – Thus, there is no question
of deciding the validity of the decree on the ground of being a
nullity due to lack of jurisdiction of the civil court to evict cultivating
tenants – The rejection by the High Court of the amendments to
the execution petition filed by the appellants was erroneous, set
aside – Impugned order and the order passed by the Executing
Court, set aside. [Paras 60, 63-65, 68-71]

Directions by Supreme Court – Inordinate delay by the
Executing Courts in deciding execution petitions:
Held: In view of the direction in Rahul S. Shah case requiring the
execution proceedings to be completed within six months from
the date of filing, High Courts across the country to call for the
necessary information from their respective district judiciary as
regards pendency of the execution petitions – High Courts to issue
an administrative order or circular directing their respective district
judiciary to ensure that the execution petitions pending in various
courts shall be decided and disposed of within a period of six
months without fail otherwise the concerned presiding officer would
be answerable to the High Court on its administrative side – The
data along with the figures of pendency and disposal thereafter
collected by all the High Courts to be forwarded to the Registry
of the Supreme Court with individual reports. [Paras 74, 75, 77]
542 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.47; Or.XXI rr.97, 101 – s.47
vis-à-vis Or.XXI r.97 – Questions to be determined by the Court
executing decree – Resistance or obstruction to possession
of immovable property:
Held: If an application u/Or.XXI, r.97 is made, then its determination
will be under r.101 – r.103 further provides that where any
application has been adjudicated upon u/rr.98 or 100, the order
made thereon shall have the same force and will be subject
to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it
were a decree – U/s.47 all questions relating to the execution,
discharge or satisfaction of the decree, have to be determined
by the executing court whereas u/r. 101 all questions including
question relating to right, title or interest in the property arising
between the parties to the proceedings have to be determined
by the executing court – s.47 is a general provision whereas
Or.XXI, rr.97 and 101 deal with a specific situation – Moreover,
s.47 deals with executions of all kinds of decrees whereas Or.XXI,
rr.97 and 101 deal only with execution of decree for possession –
Apart from that, earlier, i.e., prior to the amendment, every order
falling u/s. 47 was appealable (as the terms ‘decree’ included the
order u/s.47) whereas now only certain orders as provided for
u/Or. XXI have been made appealable – In the present case, the
application of the respondents No.1 and 2 u/s.47 was in substance
an application for determination of their possessory rights under
Or XXI, r.97. [Para 52 ]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – s.47 – Or.XXI, r.101 – Harmonious
construction – Questions to be determined by the Court
executing decree:
Held: A harmonious reading of s.47 with Or.XXI r.101 implies that
questions relating to right, title or interest in a decretal property
must be related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the
decree – Thus, only matters arising subsequent to the passing of
the decree can be determined by an executing court u/s.47 and
Or.XXI R.101. [Para 62]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XXI, r.97 – Resistance or
obstruction to possession of immovable property – Application
u/Or. XXI, r.97 – Nature:
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 543

Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.

Held: An application u/Or. XXI, r.97 may be made in respect of
obstruction raised by any person in obtaining possession of the
decretal property– Courts adjudicating such application have to
do so in accordance with r.101 and hold a full-fledged inquiry to
determine all questions including questions relating to right, title
or interest in the property arising between the parties. [Para 42]

Words and Phrases – Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Or. XXI,
rr.35, 97-101 – Decree for immovable property – Resistance
or obstruction to possession of immovable property – “any
person” – Interpretation of:
Held: In execution of decree for possession of immovable property,
the executing court delivers actual physical possession of the
decretal land to the decree holder – r.35 confers jurisdiction on
the executing Court to remove any person, who is bound by the
decree and who refuses to vacate the property – “any person who
is bound by the decree”, clearly mandates that removal can only
be of a person who is bound by the decree – Further, rr.97 to 101
deal with situation when execution is obstructed or resisted by
“any person” claiming right, title or interest in the property – The
words “any person” include even a stranger to a decree resisting
the decree of possession as not being bound by a decree or by
claiming independent right, title or interest to the property – Thus,
r.97 not only provides remedy to a decree holder in obtaining
possession of an immovable property but also to a stranger who
obstructs or resists delivery of possession of the property by claiming
derivative title from the judgment debtor or independent right, title
or interest in the decretal property – Whereas, r.99 gives right to
a third party claiming right, title or interest in the property to seek
restoration of the decretal property. [Paras 48, 49]

Case Law Cited
Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and Anr. [1998] 2 SCR
587 : (1998) 3 SCC 723; C.F. Angadi v. Y.S. Hirannayya [1972]
2 SCR 515 : (1972) 1 SCC 191; Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v.
Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [1971] 1 SCR 66 : (1970) 1 SCC 670;
Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi [2021] 4 SCR 279 :
(2021) 6 SCC 418 – relied on.
Shreenath & Anr. v. Rajesh & Ors. [1998] 2 SCR 709 : (1998) 4
SCC 543; State of Bihar & Ors. v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank
544 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Samiti [2018] 7 SCR 1147 : (2018) 9 SCC 472; Salem Advocate
Bar Association v. Union of India [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 929 : (2005)
6 SCC 344; Rajinder Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh [2014] 2 SCR 356 :
(2014) 15 SCC 529; Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram,
AIR 1960 SC 388; Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma
[2023] 1 SCR 355; Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash [1977] 3 SCR
60 : (1977) 2 SCC 662; Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad
Jaiswal [1997] 1 SCR 463 : (1997) 3 SCC 694; NSS Narayan
Sarma & Ors. v. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. & Ors. [2001] Supp.
5 SCR 327 : (2002) 1 SCC 662; Samir Singh and Anr. v. Abdul
Rab [2014] 10 SCR 1004 : (2015) 1 SCC 379; Bhanwar Lal v.
Satyanarain [1994] Supp. 4 SCR 208 : (1995) 1 SCC 6; Bhoj
Raj Garg v. Goyal Education and Welfare Society & Ors., Special
Leave Petition (C) Nos. 19654 of 2022 – referred to.

List of Acts
Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’
Protection Act, 1955.

List of Keywords
Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 97-103 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908; Execution petition, Objections against execution of the
decree; Discharge or satisfaction; Cultivating tenants; Decretal
property; Executing court; Right of possession; Collusion; Lack
of jurisdiction; Objection at the stage of execution; Execution
proceedings; Agreement of sale; Amendment application;
Possession of immovable property; Resistance or obstruction;
Frustrate and defeat decree; Validity of decree; Revenue authorities;
Dispossession; Transferee pendente lite; Right, title or interest in
property; Independent right of possession; Judgment debtor; Notice
of execution of the sale deed; Bona fide and genuine; Original
vendors; Third party; “any person”; Stranger to a decree.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3640-3642
of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.12.2019 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in CRPNPD No. 4311 of 2011 and
CRPNPD Nos. 2150 and 2151 of 2015
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 545

Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Senthil Jagadeesan, Sr. Adv., Punit Manoj Agarwwal, Ms. Mrinal
Kanwar, Vaibhav.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Rahul Jain, Vishnu Shankar Jain.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts: -
INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ........................................................... 6
B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS .......................... 22
C. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NOS. 1 & 2 .... 25
D. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED ........................................ 32
E. ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 33
(i) Relevant statutory provisions ....................................... 33
(ii) Nature of application under Order XXI Rule 97 .......... 37
(iii) Section 47 of the CPC vis-à-vis Order XXI Rule 97 of 51
the CPC ............................................................................
F. CONCLUSION .................................................................. 77

1. Leave granted.
2. “The seeker of justice many a time has to take long circuitous
routes, both on account of hierarchy of courts and the procedural
law. Such persons are and can be dragged till the last ladder of the
said hierarchy for receiving justice but even here he only breathes
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
546 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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fear of receiving the fruits of that justice for which he has been
aspiring to receive. To reach this stage is in itself an achievement
and satisfaction as he, by then has passed through a long arduous
journey of the procedural law with many hurdles replica of mountain
terrain with ridges and furrows. When he is ready to take the bite of
that fruit, he has to pass through the same terrain of the procedural
law in the execution proceedings, the morose is writ large on his face.
What looked inevitable to him to receive it at his hands distance is
deluded back into the horizon. The creation of the hierarchy of courts
was for a reasonable objective for conferring greater satisfaction to
the parties that errors, if any, by any of the lower courts under the
scrutiny of a higher court be rectified and long procedural laws also
with good intention to exclude and filter out all unwanted who may be
the cause of obstruction to such seeker in his journey to justice. But
this obviously is one of the causes of delay in justice. Of course, under
this pattern the party wrongfully gaining within permissible limits also
stretches the litigation as much as possible. Thus, this has been the
cause of anxiety and concern of various authorities, legislators and
courts. How to eliminate such a long consuming justice? We must
confess that we have still to go a long way before true satisfaction
in this regard is received. Even after one reaches the stage of final
decree, he has to undergo a long distance by passing through the
ordained procedure in the execution proceedings before he receives
the bowl of justice.
The courts within their limitation have been interpreting the procedural
laws so as to conclude all possible disputes pertaining to the
decretal property, which is within its fold in an execution proceeding,
i.e., including what may be raised later by way of another bout of
litigations through a fresh suit. Similarly, legislatures equally are also
endeavouring by amendments to achieve the same objective. The
present case is one in this regard. Keeping this in view, we now
proceed to examine the present case.
In interpreting any procedural law, where more than one interpretation
is possible, the one which curtails the procedure without eluding
justice is to be adopted. The procedural law is always subservient to
and is in aid of justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates
the recipient of justice is not to be followed.” [Shreenath & Anr. v.
Rajesh & Ors reported in (1998) 4 SCC 543]
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 547

Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.

3. We are tempted to preface our judgment with the above quoted
observations of this Court made almost three decades back, as
the situation remains the same even today. It is said that the woes
for the litigants in this country start once they are able to obtain a
decree in their favour and are unable to execute and reap its fruits
for years together.
4. These appeals arise from a common judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 18.12.2019 in Civil
Revision Petition (NPD) No. 4311 of 2011 (“first revision petition”)
and Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 2151 of 2015 (“second revision
petition”) filed by the appellants herein under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the “CPC”) by which the High Court
rejected the revision petitions and thereby affirmed the orders passed
by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem (“ASJ”) one allowing the
application filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein, respectively,
under Section 47 of the CPC and rejecting the application filed by
the appellants herein seeking amendment in the execution petition.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX
5. One Ayyavoo Udayar, the father of the appellants herein entered
into an agreement of sale dated 30.06.1980 with Ramanujan and
Jagadeesan, the respondent nos. 3 and 4 herein (the “vendors”)
respectively, whereby the respondents agreed to sell the property
under dispute (the “suit property”) for Rs. 67,000/-. An earnest
money of Rs. 10,000/- was paid by Ayyavoo Udayar while entering
the agreement of sale. It was agreed between the parties that the
balance of Rs. 57,000/- would be paid on or before 15.11.1980 upon
receipt of which, the vendors would execute the sale deed.
6. On 15.11.1980, Ayyavoo Udayar issued a telegram to the vendors
requesting that they should receive the balance consideration and
execute the sale deed. The vendors sent a reply stating that they
would execute the sale deed on 20.11.1980, however, no sale deed
was executed even on the said date. Since the vendors did not
come forward to execute the sale deed despite notice and talks of
settlement, Ayyavoo Udayar was compelled to file the O.S. No. 514
of 1983 before the Subordinate Judge, Salem praying for specific
performance of agreement of sale i.e. the execution and registration
of the sale deed in respect of the suit properties and delivery of
548 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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actual physical possession of the same. The relief prayed for in the
plaint by the original plaintiff Ayyavoo Udayar is reproduced below:
“Therefore the plaintiff prays that this Honourable Court
may be pleased to pass a decree for specific performance.
(a) Directing the defendants 1 and 2 to execute and
register the sale deed in respect of the entire suit
properties for the sum of Rs. 67,000/- and deliver
actual possession of the entire suit properties to the
plaintiff, and if the defendants 1 and 2 fail to execute
the sale deed;
(b) The Court may be pleased to execute and register
the sale deed in respect of the entire suit properties
for Rs. 67,000/- in favour of the plaintiff and order
delivery of possession of the suit properties to the
plaintiff;
(c) Directing the defendants 1 and 2 to pay the costs
of the suit;
(d) Directing the defendants 1 and 2 to deduct the value
of the trees cut by them after the date of the suit
agreement;
(e) Granting such other relief or reliefs as the court may
deem fit and necessary under the circumstances of
the case and thus render justice.”
7. Ayyavoo Udayar impleaded the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively
herein in the O.S. No. 514 of 1983 along with the vendors. The
respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein are the sons of the vendors’ sister
and were inducted into the suit properties to give an appearance
that they were in possession of the said properties. Ayyavoo Udayar
impleaded the respondent nos. 1 and 2 in order to avoid any possible
obstruction by them and to enable the appellants herein to take
delivery of possession of the suit properties without multiplicity of
proceedings. However, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein thought
fit not to contest suit and allowed the suit to proceed ex parte against
them. The relevant portion of the plaint is reproduced below:
“10.⁠ ⁠Now that the time for filing the suit is likely to expire
the plaintiff has been for the past one month requesting
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 549

Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.

the mediators and the defendants 1 an 2 to see that
the sale deed is executed and property delivered to the
plaintiff after completing the registration formalities. But
the defendants 1 and 2 would not heed to the words of
the plaintiff nor to that of the mediators like Muthusami
Udayar son of Arunachala Udayar of Masinaickampatti
and Chinnasami Udayar of Ayothiapattinam. On the other
hand the 1st defendant seems to have inducted the
defendants 2 and 3 into the suit properties to make it
appear that they (defendants 3 and 4) are in possession
of the suit properties. The defendants 3 and 4 are the
1st defendant’s sister’s sons. They are obliged to the
defendants 1 and 2. All the defendants are now, for the
past one week giving out in the village by they would not
on any account allow the plaintiff to have the sale deed
executed in his favour or to enter into the suit property by
any means. Hence the plaintiff is constrained to file this
suit for specific performance. The defendants 3 and 4
are added in order to avoid any possible obstruction
by them and to enable the plaintiff to take delivery of
possession without multiplicity of proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied)

8. The Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem on 02.04.1986 decreed
the original suit as prayed for and directed the vendors to execute
the sale deed within one month of the passing of the decree, failing
which the court would execute the sale deed. Aggrieved by the said
judgment and decree, the vendors preferred an appeal before the
High Court. A single judge partly allowed the appeal and modified
the decree to some extent. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not
appear in the appeal proceedings as well.
9. The second appeal preferred by the vendors before a division bench
of the High Court was also dismissed on 19.03.2004 subject to the
condition that the appellants herein would deposit a further sum of
Rs. 67,000/- as consideration within a period of one month from the
date of the order. Though the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein were
parties to the second appeal yet they did not participate during the
course of the hearing. Pursuant to the High Court’s direction, the
appellants deposited a sum of Rs. 67,000/- on 19.04.2004.
550 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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10. Thereafter, the vendors filed a special leave petition before this
Court challenging the judgment of the High Court dated 19.03.2004,
which came to be dismissed on 20.01.2006. The vendors thereafter
preferred a review petition against the said order which also came
to be dismissed by this Court on 18.04.2006.
11. In the meantime, the appellants filed R.E.P. No. 237 of 2004 for
execution of the sale deed in respect of the suit properties and
for delivery of possession thereof. All the respondents herein were
impleaded in the said execution petition and the vendors were
named as the persons against whom the execution of the decree
was sought. The said petition was dismissed on 03.12.2004 by the
ASJ on the ground that a special leave petition filed by the vendors
before this Court remained pending.
12. The appellants, aggrieved by the dismissal of the execution petition,
filed Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 2032 of 2005 before the High
Court and simultaneously filed another R.E.P. No. 244 of 2005 for
getting the sale deed executed in respect of the suit properties and
for delivery of possession thereof. The High Court vide its order dated
21.02.2006 allowed the CRP (NPD) No. 2032 of 2005 observing
that the ASJ had provided no reason for dismissing the execution
petition of the appellants except that the special leave petition filed
by the respondents herein remained pending. Since the special leave
petition before this Court came to be disposed on 20.01.2006, the
order of the ASJ dated 03.12.2004 was set aside.
13. Consequent to the order of the High Court dated 20.01.2006, the
proceedings in respect of the R.E.P. No. 237 of 2004 were restored
and the appellants withdrew the R.E.P. No. 244 of 2005.
14. Thereafter, the vendors filed Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 1865
of 2007 before the High Court challenging the order of the ASJ
accepting the deposit of Rs. 67,000/- made by the appellants on
19.04.2004 on the ground that such deposit was not made within a
period of thirty days as per the order dated 19.03.2004 of the High
Court. This revision petition came to be dismissed by the High Court
on 10.07.2007 and it was observed that the appellants herein were
late by one day in depositing the amount of Rs. 67,000/- because
18.04.2004 was the last day to deposit the amount and it was a
holiday. Since the appellants had deposited the amount on the next
working day, the deposit was considered as well within time.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 551

Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.

15. On 17.08.2007, the Executing Court executed a registered sale
deed in favour of the appellants on behalf of all the respondents
to the original suit including the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein
who were in possession of the property but did not hold any title in
respect thereof.
16. Aggrieved by the inclusion of the names of respondent Nos. 1 and 2
in the sale deed, the vendors filed the Civil Revision Petition (NPD)
No. 3916 of 2007 before the High Court for deletion of the names
of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein. The appellants also filed a
memo in this regard and agreed to the deletion of the names of the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from the sale deed. The High Court, by way
of its order dated 08.01.2008 allowed the deletion of the names of the
two respondents and directed the Executing Court to carry out the
requisite rectifications to the sale deed in this regard. Accordingly, a
rectification deed dated 25.01.2008 came to be executed removing
the names of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein as the vendors
from the sale deed.
17. On 12.02.2008, the Executing Court passed an order for delivery of
possession of the suit property to the appellants herein. Pursuant to
the said order, the appellants along with the Village Administrative
Officer, Surveyor and Court Amin reached at the site of the property
to give effect to the order for delivery of possession. However, the
handing over of the possession of the property was obstructed by
the respondent No. 1 herein who threatened to self immolate himself
if anybody dared to enter the property. As the delivery of possession
could not be effected, a delivery warrant and obstruction report were
filed before the ASJ on 20.02.2008.
18. Subsequently, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein filed an application
dated 12.03.2008 under Section 47 of the CPC (“R.E.A. 163 of
2011”) before the ASJ on the following grounds:
(1) no notice regarding execution of the sale deed and delivery
of possession was served upon them due to which they were
unable to avail a fair chance of putting forth their objections;
(2) since their names were deleted from the sale deed so executed,
the same was not binding upon them and the executing court
had illegally added their names in the list of parties in the order
for delivery of possession;
(3) the appellants herein had acted fraudulently.
552 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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An interim relief was also prayed for by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
herein to stay the operation of the execution order, which directed
delivery of possession of the suit property to the appellants.
19. After filing the execution application, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
herein filed a petition before the Tehsildar, Vazhapadi for inclusion
of their names in the cultivation account for the suit property
retrospectively from 1974 submitting that they were in possession of
the same since 1967. The series of orders delivered in this regard
are detailed below:
a) The Tehsildar, Vazhapadi vide order dated 18.10.2008 held
that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein were in possession
of the suit property and ordered that their names be entered
in the cultivation account of the same. The Tehsildar, however,
gave no finding regarding inclusion of the respondents’ names
retrospectively from 1974.
b) The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein, aggrieved by the order
dated 18.10.2008, filed W.P. No. 5032/09 before the Telsildar,
Vazhapadi to get their names registered in the cultivation account
in respect of the suit property from 1974 onwards. While the
hearing of the writ petition was going on, the vendors, whose
names were registered as pattadharars for the suit property,
gave a statement that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had been in
possession of the said land for a long time and that the vendors
did not have any objection to the inclusion of their names in
the cultivation account of the suit property. Upon examination
of relevant documents and the Village Administrative Officer,
the Tehsildar recorded that as the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
had been in enjoyment of the suit property for a long time, the
inclusion of their names in the cultivation account for the year
2008 was correct. However, their names cannot be entered in
the cultivation account as persons being in possession of the
suit property from 1974 onwards.
c) Aggrieved by the non-inclusion of their names in the cultivation
account for the suit property retrospectively from 1974, the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein appealed to the Revenue
Divisional Officer. It was held by the Revenue Divisional Officer
vide order dated 29.10.2009 that there is no provision in law
to enter the names of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 553

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cultivation accounts retrospectively from 1974 as such accounts
had already been closed and hence, no alteration could be
made therein. The respondents were granted leave to file an
application before the Tehsildar for issuance of a certificate
that they were in possession of the suit property since 1974.
20. The R.E.A. No. 163 of 2011 was initially rejected by the ASJ.
Consequently, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein filed Civil Revision
Petition (NPD) No. 2354 of 2008 before the High Court. The High
Court vide order dated 25.04.2011 set aside the ASJ’s order, which
rejected the execution application and observed that the same was
not passed on merits. The High Court directed the lower court to
dispose of the Execution Application filed under Section 47 of the
CPC read with Section 151 thereof and pass appropriate orders
within the time specified in the order.
21. Pursuant to the directions of the High Court, the ASJ vide order
dated 12.08.2011 allowed R.E.A. No. 163/2011 of the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 herein and held as follows:
a) The High Court, while executing the sale deed, ordered for
deletion of the names of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein as
they were not the vendors who had title to sell the suit property.
b) The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by way of oral and documentary
evidence have established that they were in possession of
the suit property. On the other hand, the appellants herein did
not examine any independent witnesses to establish that the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were not in possession of the suit
property.
c) Further, in both the execution petitions namely R.E.P. No. 237
of 2004 and R.E.P. No. 244 of 2005, the appellants did not
seek any relief for delivery of possession from the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2.
d) The appellants can take over possession only after taking
appropriate legal steps/proceedings.
22. Aggrieved by the order of the ASJ, the appellants filed Civil Revision
Petition (NPD) No. 4311 of 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the “first
revision petition”) before the High Court. The grounds taken in the
said petition are summarized below:
554 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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a) The order of the ASJ dated 12.08.2011 rejecting the appellants’
prayer on the ground that no notice of execution of the sale
deed by the court was served to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2,
was erroneous since notice to show cause against execution is
necessary only in certain circumstances as laid down in Order
XXI Rule 22 of the CPC. It was submitted that no notice was
mandatory in the case on hand as the execution petition was
filed by the decree-holder within two years of the confirmation
of the decree by the High Court.
b) The Executing Court failed to consider that the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 were impleaded as defendants in O.S. No. 514
of 1983 and were aware of the decree passed against them
therein on 02.04.1986. Further, the respondent Nos. 1 and
2, by their own admission, were fully aware of the decree for
delivery of possession passed against them and as such the
allegations that they were not aware of the events subsequent
thereto cannot be a ground to obstruct the execution of decree
by way of a petition under Section 47 of the CPC.
c) Subsequent to the execution of agreement to sell between the
appellants and vendors, the respondent no. 1 herein had filed an
O.S. No. 1384 of 1980 for permanent injunction against Ayyavoo
Udayar, the vendors, respondent no. 2 herein as well as his
father, Venkatasamy Naidu. The said suit was subsequently
dismissed. However, such actions of the respondent No. 1 would
indicate that the contesting respondents herein were aware
about the agreement to sell before the institution of the suit
for specific performance in which they were parties. Therefore,
the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had no good reason to contend
that they were not aware of the proceedings especially when
they continued to remain parties to the dispute in the original
suit till it attained finality by way of a judgment of this Court.
d) The Executing Court also did not take into consideration the
fact that the execution application of the respondent Nos. 1
and 2 could not have been allowed because a sale deed had
already been executed by the ASJ in favour of the appellants
and against the vendors. The prayer for delivery of possession
was a consequential relief. The rejection of the said prayer by
the Executing Court based on hyper technical objections raised
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 555

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by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, could have been cured by
amending the prayer in R.E.P. No. 237 of 2004.
23. A week after the first revision petition i.e. on 08.11.2011, the appellants
filed the R.E.A. No. 14 of 2012 under Order VI Rule 17 read with
Section 151 of the CPC for amendments in the R.E.P. No. 237 of
2004. The appellants sought to record that the respondents’ SLP
and Review Petition pursuant to the proceedings in the original
suit for specific performance, came to be dismissed by this Court.
Further, the appellants sought amendment of the prayer made in
the execution petition asking for execution of the sale deed on
behalf of the vendors and delivery of possession against all the
respondents. The vendors in their counter-statement alleged that
the said execution application was preferred by the appellants with
a mala fide intention and seeking amendment to the array of parties
against whom execution was prayed for, after a lapse of seven and
a half years was legally untenable.
24. The appellants, on 10.04.2013, sought for one another amendment
by way of R.E.A. No. 145 of 2013 seeking to disclose about the
other execution petitions filed after R.E.P. No. 237 of 2004. The
vendors filed a counter-statement to the same alleging that said
amendment application was filed with an ulterior motive of delaying
the execution proceedings. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein
also filed a counter submitting that they were not parties to the
R.E.P. No. 237 of 2004 as they were not issued notice regarding
the same. They came into knowledge of the execution proceedings
only after the court Amin visited the property to deliver possession
of the property to the appellants.
25. The ASJ vide two separate orders dated 24.04.2015 allowed the
execution petition on the ground that the appellants had not made any
prayer in the execution petition against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
and since the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had proved their possession
of the suit property, the appellants could take possession only after
taking necessary legal steps. It was held that since the appellants
had not preferred any appeal or revision against the order dated
12.08.2011, the same had become final and binding on the parties.
As a result, the orders allowing R.E.P. 237 of 2004 would have no
effect and therefore, the question of amendment of the same did
not arise. The appellants challenged the order dated 24.04.2015 by
556 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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way of Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 2151 of 2015 (hereinafter
referred to as the “second revision petition”).

Impugned Order of the High Court
26. The High Court vide its common order (the “impugned order”) held
as follows:
a) The ASJ’s order allowing the respondents’ execution application
under Section 47 was correct on the aspect of serving of
notice. The appellants although were aware of the fact that
the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were in possession of the suit
property yet they did not ask the court to serve notice to the said
respondents. Since no notice was provided to the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2, the court could not have passed a direction for
delivery of possession.
b) The appellants did not take any steps to amend the execution
petition R.E.P. No. 237 of 2004 till the disposal of the
respondents’ execution application R.E.A. No. 163 of 2011
under Section 47 of the CPC. Once the said application was
allowed, there remained no execution proceedings pending so
far as the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were concerned. Therefore,
the amendment applications filed in R.E.A. No. 14 of 2012 and
R.E.A. No. 145 of 2015 were held to be non-maintainable.
c) The appellants did not prefer any appeal against the order of
the ASJ dated 12.08.2011 allowing the application under Section
47 of the CPC, till 2015 and no reasons were assigned by the
appellants for such delay.
d) Thus, the High Court held that there was no material irregularity
in the orders of the ASJ dated 12.08.2011 and 24.04.2015
respectively and upheld the same.

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS
27. Mr. Senthil Jagadeesan, the learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants submitted that the High Court could be said
to have committed a serious error in passing the impugned order
for the following reasons:
a. The appellants had not filed any appeal or revision against the
order of the ASJ allowing the application under Section 47 of
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 557

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the CPC, till 2015. However, the appellants had challenged the
said order by preferring the first revision petition as early as
31.10.2011 and the same was decided by the High Court by
way of the impugned order.
b. The appellants had filed the execution petition on 19.07.2004
that is, after four months of confirmation of the decree in the
original suit by the High Court. The learned counsel invited
our attention to the provision in Order 21 Rule 22 of the CPC,
which stipulates that a notice to show cause against execution
is required to be served compulsorily only if the application for
such execution is made, inter alia, more than two years after
the date of the decree. He submitted that in view of the said
provision, no separate notice was required to be issued to the
judgment debtors in the case on hand as the execution petition
was filed well within the time period of two years.
c. The contention of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that they
were not aware about the execution petition was erroneously
accepted by the High Court. The High Court failed to notice
that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had appeared through their
counsel in CRP No. 2032 of 2005 by way of which the R.E.P.
No. 237 of 2004 was restored. Therefore, the respondents were
fully aware about the resumption of proceedings before the
Executing Court but still chose not to participate therein. Though
served with the summons in the original suit proceedings, yet
they chose not to appear, contest or challenge the decree
therein as well.
d. The appellants’ application for amending the execution petition
was squarely within the framework of the decree and ought to
have been allowed by the High Court in light of the judgments
of this Court in State of Bihar & Ors. v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi
Vikas Bank Samiti reported in (2018) 9 SCC 472 and Salem
Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India reported in (2005)
6 SCC 344. It has been held in these decisions that rules of
procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to
defeat it. The courts ought to adopt such construction of rules
or procedure that prevents miscarriage of justice.
28. Mr. Jagadeesan further submitted that a clear case of collusion
between the vendors and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is made
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out. The attempt is to frustrate the decree and thereby deprive the
appellants of its fruits. The same is evident from the following facts:
a) The names of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were deleted
from the sale deed executed by the Executing Court at the
behest of the vendors, who facilitated the filing of objections
by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by getting their names removed
from the sale deed.
b) The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 applied for registration of their
names in the cultivation account of the suit property only in
2008 that is, four years after the confirmation of the decree by
the High Court. Though they had prayed for inclusion of their
names in the revenue records from 1974 onwards, yet the
revenue authorities allowed for such inclusion only from 2008
onwards. Further, their names were included in the revenue
records solely because of the “no objection” from the vendors
and not because of any independent right that they possessed.

C. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NOS. 1 & 2
29. Mr. Rahul Jain, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 addressed himself on the following points:
i. The decree travelled beyond the judgment,
ii. No effective proceedings were instituted by the appellants
against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein,
iii. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have a lawful title and have been
in lawful and uninterrupted possession of the suit properties
since 1967,
iv. The appellants had not instituted any suit for recovery of
possession, and
v. The civil courts inherently lacked jurisdiction to decide the
question of possession as the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were
cultivating tenants.
30. The learned counsel submitted that the original suit was for specific
performance of the agreement of sale of the suit property and
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were not parties to the said agreement.
They were impleaded in the original suit stating that they were in
possession of the suit property. Even though the appellants were
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 559

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aware of the said fact, yet they did not pray for dispossession of
the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and no pleadings were made against
them.
31. Further, the trial court’s order dated 02.04.1986, having considered
the issue of possession, decreed the suit “as prayed for”. The decree
of the trial court dated 02.04.1986 is reproduced below:
“This suit coming on 21.3.1986 for final hearing before
me in the presence of Thiru. A. Duraisami, Counsel for
the plaintiff and of G. Perumal counsel for the defendants
and having stood over till this day for consideration this
court doth order and decree as follows:-
1. that the defendants 1 and 2 do execute the sale deed
for Rs. 67000/- in favour of the plaintiff in respect of
the entire suit properties described hereunder within
one month from this date and register the same;
2. that the plaintiff to deposit the balance of Rs. 57000/-
into court to perform the sale agreement;
3. that the defendants 1 and 2 are at liberty to withdraw
the said sum from the court: after executing the sale
deed and register it in favour of the plaintiff.
4. that the defendants do deliver possession of the suit
properties to the plaintiff; (…)”
32. The learned counsel submitted that while Clause 4 of the decree
directed that “the defendants do deliver possession of the suit
properties to the plaintiff”, such general language should be read
within the context of the wordings in the other directions issued
by the decree, the reasoning of the trial court in its judgment, and
the specific prayer sought in the original plaint, as the suit was for
specific performance.
33. Mr. Jain relied on the decision of this Court in Rajinder Kumar v.
Kuldeep Singh reported in (2014) 15 SCC 529 to submit that the
question of alternative reliefs does not arise in case of a suit for
specific performance, when it is decreed as prayed for. The relevant
portion of the judgment relied upon is reproduced below:
“21. If the suit for specific performance is not decreed as
prayed for, then alone the question of any reference to
560 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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the alternative relief would arise. Therefore, there is no
question of any ambiguity. As held by this Court in Topanmal
Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram and consistently
followed thereafter, even if there is any ambiguity, it is for
the executing court to construe the decree if necessary
after referring to the judgment. If sufficient guidance is
not available even from the judgment, the court is even
free to refer to the pleadings so as to construe the true
import of the decree. No doubt, the court cannot go behind
the decree or beyond the decree. But while executing a
decree for specific performance, the court, in case of any
ambiguity, has necessarily to construe the decree so as
to give effect to the intention of the parties.”
34. As regards the question whether the appellants had instituted an
effective proceeding against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the learned
counsel submitted that:
a. The respondents were not a necessary party to the original
suit for specific performance as they were neither parties
to the agreement of sale nor lis pendens purchasers of the
suit properties. The appellants sought no relief of possession
against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the original suit despite
impleading them as parties because they were in actual physical
possession of the suit properties.
b. In R.E.P. 237 of 2004, the appellants sought relief only against
the vendors and not against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
despite impleading them in the execution petition. Further, no
notice was served to the said respondents and as a result, the
respondents were not afforded an opportunity to be heard by
the Executing Court.
c. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were also not parties to the sale
deed registered by the Executing Court and their names were
deleted therefrom without any objection by the appellants.
35. The learned counsel, with a view to establish that the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 were in lawful and uninterrupted possession of the suit
properties since 1967, submitted as follows:
a. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 stated that their father was in
possession of the suit property since 1967 and was cultivating
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the land. After his demise in 1983, the respondents have been
in continuous possession of the suit property.
b. Further, the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated
29.10.2009 held that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been in
enjoyment of suit property for over 40 years and the certificate
of possession issued in this regard recognizes the same.
36. On the question whether the appellants were supposed to bring a
separate suit for recovery of possession, Mr. Jain submitted that:
a. The appellants, despite being aware that the respondent Nos.
1 and 2 were in possession of the suit property, brought no
suit for recovery of possession against them. The onus was
on the appellants to establish that they had a better title to the
suit property as against the continuous possession claimed by
the respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
b. The learned counsel relied on this Court’s decision in Smriti
Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma reported in 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 9 to contend that the appellants could not have
claimed possession by way of mere execution proceedings
without first establishing a better title to the properties in
question. The relevant portion of the judgment relied upon is
reproduced below:
“(…) The defendants cannot be dispossessed unless
the plaintiff has established a better title and rights
over the Schedule ‘A’ property. A person in possession
of land in the assumed character as the owner, and
exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership,
has a legal right against the entire world except the
rightful owner. A decree of possession cannot be
passed in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that
defendant nos. 1 to 12 have not been able to fully
establish their right, title and interest in the Schedule
‘A’ property. The defendants, being in possession,
would be entitled to protect and save their possession,
unless the person who seeks to dispossess them
has a better legal right in the form of ownership or
entitlement to possession.”
c. Further, the appellants, being the decree holders, failed to file
an application to seek recovery of possession under Order XXI
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Rule 97, after having been obstructed by the respondents. Such
process could not have been circumvented by the appellants
by seeking an amendment to their execution petition, especially
after the respondents’ Section 47 application had already been
allowed by the Executing Court.
37. Mr. Jain further submitted that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are
cultivating tenants in continuous possession of the suit property and
accordingly are protected under Sections 3 and 6 of the Tamil Nadu
Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 respectively which imposes
a bar on the jurisdiction of the civil courts in matters of eviction of
cultivating tenants.
38. The learned counsel relied on this Court’s decision in Sunder
Dass v. Ram Prakash reported in (1977) 2 SCC 662 to submit that a
challenge to the validity of a decree can be set up even at the stage
of execution proceedings, in cases where the civil court inherently
lacks jurisdiction. The relevant portion of the judgment relied upon
is reproduced below:
“3. Now, the law is well settled that an executing court
cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its
legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this
general rule and that is that where the decree sought to
be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction
in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an
execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent
jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the
court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void
and can be declared to be void by any court in which it is
presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever
it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at
the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings.
The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection
that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the
decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur
the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because
the decree being null and void, there would really be no
decree at all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR
1954 SC 340 : (1955) 1 SCR 117] and Seth Hiralal Patni
v. Sri Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199 : (1962) 2 SCR 747].
It is, therefore, obvious that in the present case, it was
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competent to the executing court to examine whether
the decree for eviction was a nullity on the ground that
the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the
suit in which the decree for eviction was passed. If the
decree for eviction was a nullity, the executing court could
declare it to be such and decline to execute it against the
respondent.”
39. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that the Executing Court
and High Court were correct in allowing the application under Section
47 to afford the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to prove their long and
continuous possession of the suit property as cultivating tenants.

D. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED
40. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the following questions
fall for our consideration:
(i) Whether the courts below committed any error in upholding the
objections raised by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein against
execution of the decree on the claim of being in possession of
the suit property in their capacity as cultivating tenants?
(ii) Whether the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are entitled to the
protection of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act,
1955 and could the Executing Court have decided the question
of validity of the decree on this ground?

E. ANALYSIS

(i) Relevant statutory provisions

41. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, we
must refer to few relevant provisions of the CPC, which read thus :-
Section 47 reads as follows:
“47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing
decree.
(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in
which the decree was passed, or their representatives,
and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of
564 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing
the decree and not by a separate suit.
(3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or
is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for
the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court.
Explanation 1.-- For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff
whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against
whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit.
Explanation II.-- (a) For the purposes of this section, a
purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree
shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the
decree is passed; and
(b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of
such property to such purchaser or his representative
shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution,
discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning
of this section.”

Order XXI, Rule 35 reads as follows:
“35. Decree for immovable property.-
(1) Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable
property, possession thereof shall be delivered to the
party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as
he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if
necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree
who refuses to vacate the property.
(2) Where a decree is for the joint possession of immovable
property, such possession shall be delivered by affixing
a copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place on
the property and proclaiming the beat of drum, or other
customary mode, at some convenient place, the substance
of the decree.
(3) Where possession of any building on enclosure is to
be delivered and the person in possession, being bound
by the decree, does not afford free access, the Court,
through its officers, may, after giving reasonable warning
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and facility to any woman not appearing in public according
to the customs of the country to withdraw, remove or open
any lock or bolt or break open any door or do any other
act necessary for putting the decree-holder in possession.”

Order XXI, Rule 97 reads as follows:
“97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of
immovable property:-
(1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of
immovable property or the purchaser of any such property
sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by
any person in obtaining possession of the property, he
may make an application to the Court complaining of such
resistance or obstruction.
2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the
Court shall proceed to adjudicate the upon the application
in accordance with the provisions herein contained.”

Order XXI, Rule 98 reads as follows:
“98. Orders after adjudication.
(1) Upon the determination of the questions referred
to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such
determination and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2),-
(a) make an order allowing the application and directing
that the applicant be put into the possession of the property
or dismissing the application; or
(b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the
case, it may deem fit.
(2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied
that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without
any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other
person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any
transferee, where such transfer was made during the
pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct
that the applicant be put into possession of the property,
and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in
566 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance
of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor, or any person
acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in
the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days.”

Order XXI, Rule 99 reads as follows:
“99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser :-
(1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor
is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of
a decree for the possession of such property or, where
such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by
the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the
Court complaining of such dispossession.
(2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall
proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance
with the provisions herein contained.”

Order XXI, Rule 100 reads as follows:
“100. Order to be passed upon application complaining
of dispossession.
Upon the determination of the questions referred to
in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such
determination,-
(a) make an order allowing the application and directing
that the applicant be put into the possession of the property
or dismissing the application; or
(b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the
case, it may deem fit.”

Order XXI, Rule 101 reads as follows:
“101. Question to be determined:-
All questions (including questions relating to right, title or
interest in the property) arising between the parties to a
proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or
their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of
the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing
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with the application and not by a separate suit and for
this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in any other law for the time
being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide
such questions.”

Order XXI, Rule 103 reads as follows:
“103. Orders to be treated as decrees.
Where any application has been adjudicated upon under
rule 98 or rule 100 the other made thereon shall have the
same force and be subject to the same conditions as to
an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree.”

(ii) Nature of application under Order XXI Rule 97

42. It is a settled position of law that an application under Order XXI Rule
97 may be made in respect of obstruction raised by any person in
obtaining possession of the decretal property. The courts adjudicating
such application have to do so in accordance with Rule 101 and hold
a full-fledged inquiry to determine all questions including questions
relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the
parties.
43. This Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal
reported in (1997) 3 SCC 697, has held that :-
“4. (…) A conjoint reading of Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 99
and 101 projects the following picture:
(1) If a decree-holder is resisted or obstructed in execution
of the decree for possession with the result that the decree
for possession could not be executed in the normal manner
by obtaining warrant for possession under Order XXI Rule
35, then the decree-holder has to move an application
under Order XXI Rule 97 for removal of such obstruction
and after hearing the decree-holder and the obstructionist
the Court can pass appropriate orders after adjudicating
upon the controversy between the parties as enjoined by
Order XXI Rule 97 sub-rule (2) read with Order XXI Rule
98. It is obvious that after such adjudication if it is found
that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without
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just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person
at his instigation or on his behalf then such obstruction
or resistance would be removed as per Order XXI Rule
98 sub-rule (2) and the decree-holder would be permitted
to be put in possession. Even in such an eventuality the
order passed would be treated as a decree under Order
XXI Rule 101 and no separate suit would lie against such
order meaning thereby the only remedy would be to prefer
an appeal before the appropriate appellate court against
such deemed decree.
(2) If for any reason a stranger to the decree is already
dispossessed of the suit property relating to which he
claims any right, title or interest before his getting any
opportunity to resist or offer obstruction on spot on account
of his absence from the place or for any other valid reason
then his remedy would lie in filing an application under
Order XXI Rule 99, CPC claiming that his dispossession
was illegal and that possession deserves to be restored
to him. If such an application is allowed after adjudication
then as enjoined by Order XXI Rule 98 sub-rule (1) CPC
the Executing Court can direct the stranger applicant under
Order XXI Rule 99 to be put in possession of the property
of if his application is found to be substanceless it has to
be dismissed. Such an order passed by the Executing
Court disposing of the application one way or the other
under Order XXI Rule 98 sub-rule (1) would be deemed
to be a decree as laid down by Order XXI Rule 103 and
would be appealable before appropriate appellate forum.
But no separate suit would lie against such orders as
clearly enjoined by Order XXI Rule 101.
5. In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order
XXI lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes
pertaining to execution of decree for possession obtained
by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the
said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is
offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which
comes to be noted by the Executing Court as well as by
the decree-holder the remedy available to the decree-
holder against such an obstructionist in only under Order
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 569

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XXI Rule 97 sub-rule (1) and he cannot bypass such
obstruction and insist on re- issuance of warrant for
possession under Order XXI Rule 35 with the help of
police force, as that course would amount to bypassing
and circumventing the procedure laid down under Order
XXI Rule 97 in connection with removal of obstruction
of purported strangers to the decree. Once such an
obstruction is on the record of the Executing Court it is
difficult to appreciate how the Executing Court can tell
such obstructionist that he must first lose possession
and then only his remedy is to move an application
under Order XXI Rule 99, CPC and pray for restoration
of possession. The High Court by the impugned order
and judgment has taken the view that the only remedy
available to a stranger to the decree who claims any
independent right, title or interest in the decretal property
is to go by Order XXI Rule 99. This view of the High
Court on the aforesaid statutory scheme is clearly
unsustainable. It is easy to visualise that a stranger to the
decree who claims an independent right, title and interest
in the decretal property can offer his resistance before
getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his
grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent
right, title and interest in the decretal property even after
losing possession as per Order XXI Rule 99. Order XXI
Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual
execution of the decree for possession wherein the
grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon
before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder.
While Order XXI Rule 99 on the other hand deals with
the subsequent stage in the execution proceedings where
a stranger claiming any right, title and interest in the
decretal property might have got actually dispossessed
and claims restoration of possession on adjudication of
his independent right, title and interest dehors the interest
of the judgment-debtor. Both these types of enquiries in
connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger
to the decree are clearly contemplated by the aforesaid
scheme of Order XXI and it is not as if that such a stranger
to the decree can come in the picture only at the final
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stage after losing the possession and not before it if he
is vigilant enough to raise his objection and obstruction
before the warrant for possession gets actually executed
against him With respect the High Court has totally ignored
the scheme of Order XXI Rule 97 in this connection by
taking the view that only remedy of such stranger to
the decree lies under Order XXI Rule 99 and he has no
locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the
actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in
the execution proceedings. The view taken by the High
Court in this connection also results in patent breach of
principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who
alleges to have any independent right, title and interest
in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party
to the decree even though making a grievance right in
time before the warrant for execution is actually executed,
would be told off the gates and his grievance would not
be considered or heard or merits and he would be thrown
off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the
decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable
injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go
overboard without being considered on merits and such
obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such
an order of the Executing Court, therefore, would fail also
on the ground of non- compliance with basic principles
of natural justice. On the contrary the statutory scheme
envisaged by Order XXI Rule 97, CPC as discussed
earlier clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides
a statutory remedy both to the decree- holder as well as
to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the
matter and to get proper adjudication before the Executing
Court and it is that adjudication which subject to the
hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the
parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be
barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings
and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid
down by Order XXI Rules 97 and 103 would remain a
complete code and the sole remedy for the concerned
parties to have their grievances once and for all finally
resolved in execution proceedings themselves.
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6.(…) A reading of Order 21, Rule 97 CPC clearly
envisages that “any person” even including the
judgment-debtor irrespective whether he claims
derivative title from the judgment-debtor or set up
his own right, title or interest dehors the judgment-
debtor and he resists execution of a decree, then the
court in addition to the power under Rule 35(3) has
been empowered to conduct an enquiry whether the
obstruction by that person in obtaining possession
of immovable property was legal or not. The decree-
holder gets a right under Rule 97 to make an application
against third parties to have his obstruction removed
and an enquiry thereon could be done. Each occasion
of obstruction or resistance furnishes a cause of action
to the decree-holder to make an application for removal
of the obstruction or resistance by such person (…)”
(Emphasis supplied)

44. In Shreenath (supra), the application under Order XXI Rule 97 was
filed by the tenants who were not parties to the suit. The question
was whether the tenants could maintain an application under Order
XXI Rule 97. This Court while interpreting the words ‘any person’
held that any person includes even persons not bound by the decree.
Paragraphs 10 and 11 read thus :-
“10. Under sub-clause 1 order 21, Rule 35, the Executing
Court delivers actual physical possession of the disputed
property to the decree-holder and, if necessary, by
removing any person bound by the decree who refuses
to vacate the said property. The significant words are
by removing any person bound by he decree. Order
21, Rule 36 conceives of immovable property when in
occupancy of a tenant or other person not bound by the
decree, the Court delivers possession by fixing a copy
of the warrant in some conspicuous place of the said
property and proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum
or other customary mode at some convenient place, the
substance of the decree in regard to the property. In other
words, the decree-holder gets the symbolic possession.
Order 21, rule 99 conceives of resistance or obstruction
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to the possession of immovable property when made in
execution of a decree by “ any person”. this may be either
by the person bound by the decree, claiming title through
judgment debtor or claiming independent right of his own
including tenant not party to the suit or even a stranger.
A decree holder, in such case, may make an application
to the Executing Court complaining such resistance, for
delivery of possession of the property. Sub-clause (2)
after 1976 substitution empowers the executing Courts
when such claim is made to proceed to adjudicate upon
the applicants claim in accordance with provisions
contained hereinafter. This refers to Order 21, Rule 101
(As amended by 1976 Act) under which all questions
relating to right, title or interest in the property arising
between the parties under Order 21, Rule 97 or Rule 99
shall be determined by the Court and not by a separate
suit, By the amendment, one has not to go for a fresh
suit but all matter pertaining to that property even if
obstructed by a stranger is adjudicated and finality
given even in the executing proceedings. We find the
expression “any person” under sub-clause (1) is used
deliberately for widening the scope of power so that
the Executing court could adjudicate the claim made
in any such application under order 21, Rule 97. Thus
by the use of the words ‘any person’ it includes all
persons resisting the delivery of possession, claiming
right in the property even those not bound by the
decree, includes tenants or other persons claiming
right on their own including a stranger.
11. So, under Order 21, Rule 101 all disputes between
the decree-holder and any such person is to be
adjudicated by the Executing Court. A party is not
thrown out to relegate itself to the long drawn out
arduous procedure of a fresh suit. This is to salvage
the possible hardship both to the decree-holder and
other person claiming title on their own right to get it
adjudicated in the very execution proceedings. We find
that order 21, Rule 35 deals with cases of delivery of
possession of an immovable property to the decree-
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 573

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holder by delivery of actual physical possession
and by removing any person in possession who is
bound by a decree, while under Order 21, Rule 36
only symbolic possession is given where tenant is
in actual possession. Order 21, rule 97 as aforesaid,
conceives of cases where delivery of possession to
decree-holder or purchaser is resisted by any person.
‘Any person’ , as aforesaid, is wide enough to include
even a person not bound by a decree or claiming right
in the property on his own including that of a tenant
including stranger.”
(Emphasis supplied)

45. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust and Anr. reported in
1998 (3) SCC 723, a three Judge Bench of this Court has observed
that a third party to the decree including the transferee pendente lite
can offer resistance or obstruction and his right has to be adjudicated
under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. The relevant portion of the said
judgment is reproduced below:
“9. At the outset, we may observe that it is difficult to agree
with the High Court that resistance or obstructions made
by a third party to the decree of execution cannot be gone
into under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code. Rules 97 to 106
in Order 21 of the Code are subsumed under the caption
“Resistance to delivery of possession to decree-holder or
purchaser”. Those rules are intended to deal with every
sort of resistance or obstructions offered by any person.
Rule 97 specifically provides that when the holder of a
decree for possession of immovable property is resisted or
obstructed by-“any person” in obtaining possession of the
property such decree-holder has to make an application
complaining of the resistance or obstruction. Sub-rule (2)
makes it incumbent on the court to proceed to adjudicate
upon such complaint in accordance with the procedure
laid down.
10. It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available
to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable
property by the decree-holder. Rule 101 stipulates
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that all questions “arising between the parties to a
proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule
99” shall be determined by the executing court, if
such questions are “relevant to the adjudication of
the application”. A third party to the decree who offers
resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule
101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence
of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the
execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was
made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment
debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk
to the limited question whether he is such transferee
and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point
the execution court has to hold that he has no right
to resist in view of the clear language contained in
Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising
further contentions is based on the salutary principle
adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of property
Act.
--xxx--
14. It is clear that executing court can decide whether
the resistor or obstructor is a person bound by the
decree and he refused to vacate the property. That
question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory
process contemplated in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the
Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not
necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of
evidence. Court can make the adjudication on admitted
facts or even on the averments made by the resistor.
Of course the Court can direct the parties to adduce
evidence for such determination. If the Court deems
it necessary.”
(Emphasis supplied)

46. This Court, in NSS Narayan Sarma & Ors. v. Goldstone Exports
(P) Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 662, has held as under:-
“15. Provision is made in the Civil Procedure Code for
delivery of possession of immovable property in execution
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 575

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of a decree and matters relating thereto. In Order 21 Rule
35 provisions are made empowering the executing court to
deliver possession of the property to the decree holder if
necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree
who refuses to vacate the property. In Rule 36 provision
is made for delivery of formal or symbolical possession
of the property in occupancy of a tenant or other person
entitled to occupy the same and not bound by the decree
to relinquish such occupancy. Rules 97 to 101 of Order
21 contain the provisions enabling the executing court
to deal with a situation when a decree holder entitled to
possession of the property encounters obstruction from any
person. From the provisions in these rules which have been
quoted earlier the scheme is clear that the legislature has
vested wide powers in the executing court to deal with all
issues relating to such matters. It is a general impression
prevailing amongst the litigant public that difficulties of a
litigant are by no means over on his getting a decree for
immovable property in his favour. Indeed, his difficulties
in real and practical sense, arise after getting the decree.
Presumably, to tackle such a situation and to allay the
apprehension in the minds of litigant public that it takes
years and years for the decree holder to enjoy fruits of
the decree, the legislature made drastic amendments in
provisions in the aforementioned Rules, particularly, the
provision in Rule 101 in which it is categorically declared
that all questions including questions relating to right, title
or interest in the property arising between the parties to a
proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or
their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of
the application shall be determined by the Court dealing
with the application and not by a separate suit and for
this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained in any other law for the time being
in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such
questions. On a fair reading of the rule it is manifest that
the legislature has enacted the provision with a view to
remove, as far as possible, technical objections to an
application filed by the aggrieved party whether he is
the decree holder or any other person in possession
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of the immovable property under execution and has
vested the power in the executing court to deal with all
questions arising in the matter irrespective of whether
the Court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a
dispute of the nature. This clear statutory mandate and
the object and purpose of the provisions should not
be lost sight of by the Courts seized of an execution
proceeding. The Court cannot shirk its responsibility
by skirting the relevant issues arising in the case.
--xxx--
19. From the principles laid down in the decisions noted
above, the position is manifest that when any person
claiming title to the property in his possession obstructs the
attempt by the decree-holder to dispossess him from the
said property the executing Court is competent to consider
all questions raised by the persons offering obstruction
against execution of the decree and pass appropriate
order which under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 103 is
to be treated as a decree.”
(Emphasis supplied)

47. In Samir Singh and Anr. vs. Abdul Rab, reported in (2015) 1 SCC
379, this Court, after considering its previous judgment in Brahmadeo
Chaudhary (supra) has held thus:-
“26. The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out that the court
has the authority to adjudicate all the questions pertaining
to right, title or interest in the property arising between
the parties. It also includes the claim of a stranger
who apprehends dispossession or has already been
dispossessed from the immovable property. The self-
contained Code, as has been emphasised by this Court,
enjoins the executing court to adjudicate the lis and the
purpose is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It is also
so because prior to 1976 amendment the grievance
was required to be agitated by filing a suit but after the
amendment the entire enquiry has to be conducted by
the executing court. Order XXI, Rule 101 provides for
the determination of necessary issues. Rule 103 clearly
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 577

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stipulates that when an application is adjudicated upon
under Rule 98 or Rule 100 the said order shall have the
same force as if it were a decree.
Thus, it is a deemed decree. If a Court declines to
adjudicate on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction,
the said order cannot earn the status of a decree. If an
executing court only expresses its inability to adjudicate
by stating that it lacks jurisdiction, then the status of the
order has to be different. (...)”
(Emphasis supplied)
48. A conjoint reading of the relevant provisions and the principles laid
down by this Court makes it clear that in execution of decree for
possession of immovable property, the executing court delivers actual
physical possession of the decretal land to the decree holder. Rule
35 confers jurisdiction on the executing Court to remove any person,
who is bound by the decree and who refuses to vacate the property.
The words “any person who is bound by the decree”, clearly mandate
that removal can only be of a person who is bound by the decree.
Rules 97 to 101 deal with situation when execution is obstructed or
resisted by “any person” claiming right, title or interest in the property.
The words “any person” include even a stranger to a decree resisting
the decree of possession as not being bound by a decree or by
claiming independent right, title or interest to the property.
49. Thus, Rule 97 not only provides remedy to a decree holder in
obtaining possession of an immovable property but also to a stranger
who obstructs or resists delivery of possession of the property by
claiming derivative title from the judgment debtor or independent
right, title or interest in the decretal property. Whereas, Rule 99 gives
right to a third party claiming right, title or interest in the property to
seek restoration of the decretal property. Suffice it to say that the
remedy under Rule 99 is available when a person claiming right to
the decretal property is already dispossessed.
50. Rule 101 enjoins upon the executing Court dealing with application
under Rule 97 or 99 to determine all questions including questions
relating to right, title or interest in the property, arising between
the parties and relevant to the adjudication of the application. As
held by this Court in Silverline Forum (supra) the question that
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the executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101 must
possess to adjuncts viz. (i) that such question should have legally
arisen between the parties and (ii) such question must be relevant
for consideration and determination between the parties. Upon
adjudication of such questions, the executing court is under an
obligation to pass appropriate order as contemplated under Rule 98
or 100, as the case may be. When eventually such order is passed,
it would be treated as decree and no separate Suit would lie against
such order. It therefore follows that the only remedy is to prefer an
appeal before the appropriate court against such deemed decree.

(iii) Section 47 of the CPC vis-à-vis Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC

51. Under Section 47 of the CPC, questions arising between the parties
to the suit relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the
decree are covered whereas under Order XXI, Rule 97 read with
rule 101 of the CPC, questions including those relating to right,
title or interest in the property arising between the parties to the
proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order
XXI are to be determined by the executing court. The language of
Rule 97 provides that where the holder of a decree for possession
of immovable property is resisted or obstructed by any person in
obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application
to the court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. The
language used is “obstructed by any person”. It may be by the
judgment-debtor or by a third person. Sub-rule (2) of the said Rule
97 further provides that where an application is made under sub-
rule (1), the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application
in accordance with the provisions thereunder contained. Sub-rule
(2) of Rule 98 of Order XXI, further provides that where upon such
determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction
was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by
some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, he shall direct
that the applicant be put into, possession of the property. Rule 101
of Order XXI provides as under:
“101. Question to be determined:-
All questions (including questions relating to right, title or
interest in the property) arising between the parties to a
proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 579

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their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of
the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing
with the application and not by a separate suit and for
this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in any other law for the time
being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide
such questions.”
52. Thus the cumulative effect of all these rights read together is that if an
application under Order XXI, Rule 97 is made, then its determination
will be under Rule 101 and then Rule 103 further provides that
where any application has been adjudicated upon under Rules 98
or 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and will
be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if
it were a decree. Under Section 47 of the CPC all questions relating
to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, have to
be determined by the executing court whereas under Rule 101 all
questions including question relating to right, title or interest in the
property arising between the parties to the proceedings have to be
determined by the executing court. Section 47 is a general provision
whereas Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 deal with a specific situation.
Moreover, Section 47 deals with executions of all kinds of decrees
whereas Order XXI, Rules 97 and 101 deal only with execution
of decree for possession. Apart from that, earlier, i.e., prior to the
amendment, every order falling under Section 47 was appealable
(as the terms ‘decree” included the order under Section 47 of the
CPC) whereas now only certain orders as provided for under Order
XXI have been made appealable.
53. In such circumstances referred to above the application of the
respondents No. 1 and 2 under Section 47 of the CPC bearing R.E.A.
No. 163 of 2011 was in substance an application for determination
of their possessory rights under Order XXI Rule 97.
54. This Court in Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain, reported in (1995) 1
SCC 6, has held that even an application filed under Section 47
would be treated as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 and an
adjudication is required to be conducted under Rule 98. Dispossession
of the applicant from the property is not a condition for declining to
entertain the application. The relevant portion of the judgment is
reproduced below:
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“5. The procedure has been provided in Rules 98 to
103. We are not, at present, concerned with the question
relating to the procedure to be followed and question
to be determined under Order 21, Rules 98 to 102. A
reading of Order 21, Rule 97 CPC clearly envisages
that “any person” even including the judgment-debtor
irrespective whether he claims derivative title from
the judgment-debtor or set up his own right, title or
interest dehors the judgment-debtor and he resists
execution of a decree, then the court in addition to
the power under Rule 35(3) has been empowered to
conduct an enquiry whether the obstruction by that
person in obtaining possession of immovable property
was legal or not. The decree-holder gets a right under
Rule 97 to make an application against third parties to
have his obstruction removed and an enquiry thereon
could be done. Each occasion of obstruction or resistance
furnishes a cause of action to the decree-holder to make
an application for removal of the obstruction or resistance
by such person.
6. When the appellant had made the application on 25-
5-1979 against Satyanarain, in law it must be only the
application made under Order 21, Rule 97(1) of CPC. The
executing court, obviously, was in error in directing to
make a fresh application. It is the duty of the executing
court to consider the averments in the petition and
consider the scope of the applicability of the relevant
rule. On technical ground the executing court dismissed
the second application on limitation and also the third
application, on the ground of res judicata which the High
Court has in the revisions now upheld. The procedure is
the handmaid of substantive justice but in this case it has
ruled the roost.
7. In the above view we have taken, the High Court has
committed grievous error of jurisdiction and also patent
illegality in treating the application filed by the appellant
as barred by limitation and the third one on res judicata.
Once the application, dated 25-5-1979 was made, the
Court should have treated it to be one filed under
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 581

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Order 21, Rule 97(1) CPC. The question of res judicata
for filing the second and third applications does not arise.
Under these circumstances the appellate court, though for
different reasons was justified in directing an enquiry to
be conducted for removal of the obstruction or resistance
caused by Satyanarain under Order 21 Rules 35(3) and
97(2) and Order 21, Rules 101 and 102 of CPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)

55. Before we proceed further, we must look into some part of the
reasonings of the Executing Court as well as the High Court.
56. The Executing Court in its order dated 12.08.2011 observed as under:
“1. The petition is filed by the petitioners against the
respondents under Section 47 CPC stating that they are
in possession of the suit properties; that their objections
should be enquired into and that the execution petition
should be dismissed.

2. Gist of the Petition:
The petitioners are defendants, in O.S.No.514/83. It was
decided against the petitioners. The petitioners are not
aware of anything that has happened after the judgement
dated 2.4.86. On 20.2.08 the Court Amin, Respondents,
the Village Administrative Officers and few others came
to the suit property, tried to vacate the petitioners and
take possession. In E.P.No.237/04, the petitioners were
not served with any notice. When they approached their
Advocate and stated the details, he told that the E.P. was
filed against Ramanujam and Jagadeesan.
Thereafter, the petitioners have filed this petition of objection.
The respondents have filed R.E.P.No.237/04 praying for
execution of the Sale Deed for the suit property. The
petitioners are added for namesake and no notice is served
upon the petitioners. Having impleaded these petitioners in
the execution petition, not sending notice to them is legally
unsustainable. The respondents have filed E.P.No.244/05
adding the petitioners as parties. But notice is not sent to
the petitioners. The E.P. was closed as not pressed.
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On the basis of C.R.P.No.2032/05, E.P.No.237 /04 is taken
on file. Vihen the Revision is pending before the High
Court, the respondents have filed an execution petition.
The respondents have not approached the court with clean
hands. Even after E.P.No.237 /04 is taken on file, no notice
was sent to the petitioners. A sale deed dated 17.8.2007
was executed on behalf of the petitioners also. Thereafter,
another deed was written on 25.1.08 by removing the
names of the petitioners. The sale deed will not bind the
petitioners. To show that the suit properties are in the
possession and enjoyment of the petitioners from 1967 till
date, the Adangal register is filed. The petitioners will be
put to irreparable loss if delivery is ordered. The petition
is to be allowed.
3. The gist of the Counter Statement filed by the 7th
respondent adopted by the respondents 1 to 6 and 8 is
as follows:
The petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable.
The petitioners are parties to O.S.No.514/83 and also the
subsequent proceedings thereafter. The petitioners are
the 1st defendant Ramanujam’s sister’s sons. The 1st
petitioners filed a suit in O.S.No.1384/1980 against Ayyavu
Udayar, Ramanujam and others for permanent injunction.
In the said suit, Ramanujam objected the claim of the
petitioners and the suit was dismissed on 29.7.1982. As
the petitioners were continuously troubling the father of
the respondents, they were added as defendants 3 and
4 in the suit O.S.No.514/83. The defendants 1 and 2 filed
an appeal A.S.No.469/86 before the High Court adding
the petitioners also as parties. After the death of Ayyavu
Udayar, these respondents were added as respondents 4
to 11 therein. On 29.9.2000, the column 6 of the decree
in O.S.No.514/83 was removed and the appeal was
dismissed. During the pendency of the appeal, the 1st
respondent and his son entered into an agreement with
Arivazhagan to sell the property.
Against the dismissal of the appeal, the defendants 1 and
2 filed LP.A. No.62/2001 against the petitioners and the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 583

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respondents. As per the Order in LPA, the respondents
deposited a further sum of Rs.67,000/- before the Court
on 19.4.04. During the pendency of E.P.No.237/04, the
defendants 1 & 2 filed SLP No.18184/2004 before the
Supreme Court against the petitioners and the legal heirs
of Ayyavu Udayar. when a Memo was filed before this
Court about the pendency of the SLP, this Court dismissed
the E.P. After the High Court Order, the execution petition
237 / 04 was taken on file, on endorsement E.P.No.244/05
was dismissed as not pressed. The LPA was dismissed
on 20.1.2006. The defendants 1 & 2 filed a review
petition No.359/06 and the same was dismissed on
18.4.06. The petitioners are aware of all the proceedings
upto the Supreme Court arid they were also parties in
the proceedings. The 1st petitioner Rajamani entered
into an agreement with one P.R. Jayakumar, Advocate.
O.S.No.197/87 is now pending as 327/10. The petitioners
do not have rights over the suit properties. They do not
have any rights w object delivery of possession. The
petitioners are not in possession of title suit properties.
The petition is to be dismissed.
4. Whether the petition is bound to be allowed?
5. On the side of the petitioners, PW-1 was examined
and Exhibits P-1 to P-11 were marked. On the side of
the respondents, R- 1 was examined and Exhibits R-1 to
R-16 were marked.

6. ORDER:
Both the sides argued their case on the basis of the
petition and the reply filed by them. The case records were
considered. Stating that the petitioners are in possession
of the suit properties of O.S.No.514/83, on the side of the
petitioners, the 2nd petitioner Ethirajulu was examined as
PW-1 and 11 documents were marked. The order passed
by the Tahsildar and RDO and six cultivation accounts
are there.
On the side of the respondents, the Jill respondent was
examined as RW-1and16 documents were marked.
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On the side of the petitioners, it was argued that the
petitioners are in possession and enjoyment of the suit
properties and that Ramanujam & Jagadeesan are not
in possession of the same. The petitioners have filed the
cultivation account and the orders passed by the orders
passed by the RDO and stated that they are in possession
of the properties. The documents filed by the petitioners
confirm the same. The petitioners have also stated that
they are in possession of the properties from 1967.
On the side of the respondents, the arguments by the
petitioners were vehemently opposed and it was stated
that the petitioners do not have any right to object and
oppose the delivery of possession. The Ld. Counsel
for the petitioners argued that Ihe respondents have
filed two execution petitions viz., E.P.No.237 /04 and
E.P.No.244/05. On perusal of the court records, it is seen
that the respondents filed E.P.No.237 /04 in 2004, got
the sale deed and for delivery of possession of property
made prayer only against Ramanujam and Jagadeesan.
and that the petitioners are simply added as parties
therein. When Ramanujam and Jagadeesan filed a
Memo before this Court that SLP is pending, E.P.No.237
/04 was dismissed by this court. Challenging that order,
the respondents filed Revision Petition for restoration of
E.P.No.237 /04. In the meantime, the respondents filed
the second execution petition E.P.No.244/05 against
Ramanujam and Jagadeesan. A prayer which is made
in E.P.No.237 /04 is also made in the second execution
petition. In both the petitions, even though the names of
Rajamani and Ethirajulu are stated, the prayer is made
only against Ramanujam and Jagadeesan alone. The
Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents has also
accepted the same. A perusal of the records also show
that it is true that no relief is claimed against the petitioners
in column 9 of the E.P. and that prayer is made in column
9 only against Ramanujam and Jagadeesan as accepted
by the Senior Advocate.
The Learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that no
notice was sent to the petitioners herein in the E.P. and that
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 585

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notice was sent only to Ramanujam and Jagadeesan. A
perusal of the court records also shows that notice is sent
from the court in the execution petition only to Ramanujam
and Jagadeesan. Even though the petitioners are shown
as respondents 3 & 4 in the execution petition, no notice
was sent to them, as no prayer was made against them.
The Senior Advocate for foe respondents has not denied
the same. In E.P. No.237/04, the court has executed the
sale deed on behalf of Ramanujam, Jagadeesan, Ethirajulu
and Rajamani. Challenging the said order, Ramanujam and
Jagadeesan filed a revision before the Hon’ble High Court.
The Hon’ble High Court has also directed that the names
of Rajamani and Ethirajulu may be removed and this court
has also executed a rectification deed removing the names
of the petitioners. The RW-1 has also accepted this fact
in the cross examination. The 1st respondent has also
accepted in the cross examination that Ramanujam and
Jagadeesan filed C.R.P. before the High Court stating that
it is not proper to execute the sale deed on behalf of all the
4 persons; that it is ordered by the High Court to remove
the names of Rajamani and Ethirajulu and execute the sale
deed and that as the names of Rajamani and Ethirajulu are
removed, the sale deed is not binding so far as Rajamani
and Ethirajulu are concerned. It is accepted on the side of
the respondents that the order and the sale deed will not
bind the petitioners. During the course of the course of
the argument by both sides, it was stated that O.S.No.52/
11 is pending before this court; that O.S.No.608/08 was
filed before the District Munsif Court and that on transfer,
the same is pending as O.S.No.52/ 11. It is accepted by
the respondents that a suit for partition in respect of 3.60
acres, which is one item of the suit property. So it is clear
that the respondents have filed claiming half share in the
undivided 3 acres and 60 cents.
When PW-1 was cross-examined on the side of the
respondents, questions were asked about O.S.No.326/
10, 327/10 and 328/10. No details were asked for about
O.S.No.52/ 11. The petitioners by oral and documentary
evidences have proved that they are in possession of the
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suit properties. The Senior Advocate on the side of the
respondents has also admitted that when delivery was
to be taken, the petitioners were m possession and that
prevented the effecting of delivery, the petitioners stated
that they will set fire to themselves by pouring kerosene.
On the side of the respondents, no favourable answers
were obtained by addressing detailed questions to PW-1.
On perusal of foe records, it is seen that the petitioners
were added in all foe proceedings only nominally and no
specific prayer is made in the execution petition against
the petitioners. While cross-examining PW 1 on the side
of the respondents, suggestion was made that he is giving
false evidence only to prevent the effecting of delivery and
to drag on the proceedings and the PW-1 has denied the
same. In RW 1’s evidence, it is seen that the High Court
has removed the names of Rajamani and Ethirajulu and
as Rajamani and Ethirajulu are nominally added, it will not
affect their rights. The judgement in O.S.No.514/83 win
not bind the petitioners. In E.P. also, no Bhatta was paid
for sending notice to the petitioners. In E.P.No.237/04 and
E.P.No.214/05, relief is claimed in column 9 only against
Ramanujam and Jagadeesan.
On the side of the respondents, it is proved that the
possession of the suit property is wit.li Ramanujam
and Jagadeesan. It is not stated in their reply that the
possession of the suit property is with Ramanujam and
Jagadeesan. No independent witness was examined to
show that Rajamani and Ethirajulu are not in possession
and that Ramanujam and Jagadeesan are in possession of
the suit property. In both the execution petitions, no prayer
is made against the petitioners for delivery of possession.
The petitioners have proved that they are in possession.
The respondents have not produced the records relating
to the proceedings in prior litigations. It is not proved that
the possession of the property is with Ramanujam and
Jagadeesan. As the respondents have not asked for any
prayer in the execution petition against the petitioners
herein to prove that the petitioners are in possession,
as no acceptable reason is stated for not making any
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prayer against foe petitioners, which affects the case of
the respondents, when the petitioners have proved their
possessory rights over the suit properties and also as the
respondents can take possession only after taking legal
steps/ proceedings and also as the objections raised by
the petitioners are acceptable, this court holds that in the
interest of justice, the petition is to be allowed.”
57. Thus, according to the Executing Court, although the respondent
nos. 1 and 2 herein were impleaded as parties in the execution
petition filed by the appellants herein yet no notice was sent to them
as there was no prayer made against them. Secondly, according to
the Executing Court the respondent nos. 1 and 2 have been able to
establish that they are in possession of the suit properties. In such
circumstances, the objections raised by the respondent Nos. 1 and
2 herein under Section 47 of the CPC were upheld.
58. The High Court while affirming the order passed by the Executing
Court proceeded altogether on a different footing. The High Court
held as under:
“25. Even after knowing the possession of the respondents
3 and 4 / defendants, in the earlier occasion, after so many
years, the decree holders, purposely did not ask the Court
to send notice to respondents 3 and 4 / defendants. In fact
the decree has also been passed against the respondents
3 and 4 / defendants, in which the respondents 3 and 4
/defendants, are directed to hand over possession to the
decree holders. Only taking into consideration of the same,
the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem,
had allowed the REA No. 163 of 2011 vi de order dated
12.08.2011, by holding that since, no notice is served to
respondents 3 and 4/ defendants, the Court cannot pass
any order directing the respondents 3 and 4/ defendants, to
deliver possession and thereby their right of possession, is
no way effected. Therefore, this Court is of the considered
view that the said proposition taken by the court below do
not have any material irregularity.
26. However, it is the duty of the Court below to dismiss
the REP No.237 of 2004, after allowing the application filed
in REA No. 163 of 2011 (47 CPC). But the learned First
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Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem, without following the
consequential procedure, allowed the revision petitioners/
decree holders to file applications for amending the
execution petition. Since the right of the respondents 3
and 4/ defendants are determined in REA No. 163 of 2011,
the question of subsequent amendment in the same EP
(REP No.237 of 2004) in Column No. 10 virtually does
not arise on the date. So far as respondents 3 and 4 are
concerned, no execution petition was pending. Under
the said circumstances, amendment petitions are not
maintainable. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that
the amendment applications filed in REA Nos. 14 of 2012
and 145 of 2013, are not maintainable in liminie.
27.The decree holders should have taken steps to amend
the execution petition atleast after seeing the defence set
up by the respondents 3 and 4/defendants in the REA No.
163 of 2011. But they have not taken any steps to amend
the execution petition till the disposal of application filed
under Section 47 CPC. More than that, the decree holder /
revision petitioners, after knowing the result of REA No. 163
of 2011 in the year 2011, till 2015 they have not preferred
any appeal against the order passed in the petition filed
under Section 47 CPC. The reason for not filing the appeal
or revision, immediately, is not explained on the side of the
revision petitioners/decree holders. Though the procedure
is meant to advance cause of justice, it is for the litigants
to watch the proceedings, then and there, without any
delay, with care and vigil.
28. Therefore, in the light, of the above discussions, this
Court is of the opinion that the impugned order passed in
the petition filed under Section 47 CPC is not having any
material irregularity and thereby, the order dated 12.08.2011
made in REA No.163 of 2011 in REP No.237 of 2004 in
OS No.514 of 1983, is sustained and CRP No.4311 of
2011, is dismissed.
29. Further, as already observed, after allowing the
application filed under Section 47 CPC, the Execution
Petition has to be closed. But for the reasons best known,
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the execution petition filed by the revision petitioners/
decree holders was kept alive and thereafter, the
revision petitioners/ decree holders took the applications
for amendment. In fact, the same is not maintainable.
Therefore, the orders dated 24.04.2015 made in REA
Nos.14 of 2012 and 145 of 2013 in REP No.237 of 2004 in
OS No.514 of 1983, are also sustained and CRP Nos.2150
& 2151 of 2015, are dismissed. No costs. Consequently,
the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.”
59. It appears that the Courts below proceeded absolutely on a wrong
footing. What the courts below should have considered is the simple
fact whether the obstruction at the end of the respondent nos. 1
and 2 of the execution of the decree of specific performance and
possession of the suit property could be said to be bona fide and
genuine. In other words, the consideration at the end of both the
courts should have been whether the respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein
being nephews of the original venders are acting in collusion with
each other only with a view to frustrate and defeat the decree.
60. We are of the view that the Courts below failed to consider the
following:
a. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively are nephews of the
vendors and claim to have come into possession of the suit
property in the year 1983 when the suit was first instituted by
the appellants before the ASJ. They were impleaded in the
original suit as the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 respectively.
b. The decree in favour of the appellants granting specific
performance with possession was affirmed by the High Court
on 19.03.2004 and the SLP against the order of the High Court
stood dismissed on 20.01.2006. The respondent Nos. 1 and
2 respectively chose not to contest the original suit before the
ASJ. They did not appear even before the High Court and this
Court in the appeals filed by the vendors (judgment debtors).
c. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were also impleaded in the
execution petition bearing R.E.P. No. 237 of 2004 and the
order of the High Court dated 21.02.2006 indicates that they
had appeared through their advocate and were aware about
the said execution petition.
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d. The Executing Court executed the sale deed on 17.08.2007
and ordered for delivery of possession of the suit property to
the appellants. When such order was sought to be effected by
the appellants along with the Village Administrative Officer, the
respondent no. 1 obstructed the delivery of possession.
e. Thereafter, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively filed an
execution application R.E.A. No. 163 of 2011 on 12.03.2008
alleging fraud on the part of the appellants saying that they were
not aware about the execution proceedings. At this stage, the
respondent no. 2 brought onto the record for the first time that
he along with the respondent no. 1 were cultivating the land
constituting the suit property.
f. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, after seven months
i.e. on 18.10.2008 filed a petition before the revenue authorities
for inclusion of their names in the cultivation account of the suit
property and prayed that the same be done retrospectively from
the year 1974. Though, the revenue authorities only allowed
for inclusion of their names from 2008 onwards yet they were
granted certificate that they were in possession of the suit
property from 1974 onwards. Such certificate was provided to
them on the basis of the “no objection” given by the vendors
(judgment debtors) as they were considered to be title holders of
the said property. From the facts on record, it can be discerned
that the revenue authorities were not made aware of the sale
deed executed in favour of the appellants herein and that the
title of the suit property stood transferred to them.
61. It further appears that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively,
claiming to be cultivating tenants, had contended before the courts
below that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters
pertaining to possession of the suit property and eviction therefrom.
The respondents submitted that the decree passed in the original
suit was a nullity and therefore, the validity of the decree could be
challenged even during the execution proceedings.
62. A harmonious reading of Section 47 with Order XXI Rule 101
implies that questions relating to right, title or interest in a decretal
property must be related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction
of the decree. The import of such a reading of the provisions is that
only matters arising subsequent to the passing of the decree can
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be determined by an executing court under Section 47 and Order
XXI Rule 101. Such reasoning is reinforced by the decisions of this
Court in C.F. Angadi v. Y.S. Hirannayya reported in (1972) 1 SCC
191 and Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman
reported in (1970) 1 SCC 670, wherein it has been held that while
determining a question under Section 47, an executing court cannot
go behind the decree and question the correctness of the same.
63. What flows from the position of law, as afore stated, is that the issues
that ought to have been raised by the parties during the adjudication
of the original suit cannot be determined by the executing court as
such adjudication may undermine the decree itself. This Court in
Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi reported in (2021) 6
SCC 418 has held that the benefit of Section 47 cannot be availed to
conduct a retrial causing failure of realisation of fruits of the decree.
The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:
“24. In respect of execution of a decree, Section 47 CPC
contemplates adjudication of limited nature of issues
relating to execution i.e. discharge or satisfaction of the
decree and is aligned with the consequential provisions
of Order 21 CPC. Section 47 is intended to prevent
multiplicity of suits. It simply lays down the procedure
and the form whereby the court reaches a decision. For
the applicability of the section, two essential requisites
have to be kept in mind. Firstly, the question must be
the one arising between the parties and secondly, the
dispute relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction
of the decree. Thus, the objective of Section 47 is to
prevent unwanted litigation and dispose of all objections
as expeditiously as possible.
25. These provisions contemplate that for execution
of decrees, executing court must not go beyond the
decree. However, there is steady rise of proceedings
akin to a retrial at the time of execution causing failure
of realisation of fruits of decree and relief which the
party seeks from the courts despite there being a
decree in their favour. Experience has shown that
various objections are filed before the executing court
and the decree-holder is deprived of the fruits of the
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litigation and the judgment-debtor, in abuse of process
of law, is allowed to benefit from the subject-matter
which he is otherwise not entitled to.
26. The general practice prevailing in the subordinate
courts is that invariably in all execution applications, the
courts first issue show-cause notice asking the judgment-
debtor as to why the decree should not be executed as is
given under Order 21 Rule 22 for certain class of cases.
However, this is often misconstrued as the beginning of
a new trial. For example, the judgment-debtor sometimes
misuses the provisions of Order 21 Rule 2 and Order 21
Rule 11 to set up an oral plea, which invariably leaves no
option with the court but to record oral evidence which
may be frivolous. This drags the execution proceedings
indefinitely.
27. This is antithesis to the scheme of the Civil
Procedure Code, which stipulates that in civil suit, all
questions and issues that may arise, must be decided
in one and the same trial. Order 1 and Order 2 which
relate to parties to suits and frame of suits with the object
of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, provides for joinder
of parties and joinder of cause of action so that common
questions of law and facts could be decided at one go.”
(Emphasis supplied)

64. In the present case, the appellants have pleaded in their plaint that
the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively were impleaded therein as
defendants as they were in possession of the suit property. However,
the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 chose not to contest the suit despite
being aware of the prayer of the appellant for delivery of possession
of the suit properties. They could have filed a joint written statement
stating that they are cultivating tenants at the stage of the original
suit itself, but rather raised the said issue in the form of objections
at the stage of execution.
65. Furthermore, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 failed to produce any
documentary evidence as regards their claim of being cultivating
tenants, even at the stage of their Section 47 application. Instead,
they filed for registration of their names in the cultivation account of
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the suit property only in 2008 and prayed for retrospective inclusion
of their names from 1974. While the Revenue authorities declined
the retrospective inclusion of the respondents’ names as cultivating
tenants from 1974, it allowed for their inclusion in the cultivation
account of the suit property starting from 2008 onwards. The revenue
authorities also ordered for grant of certificate to the respondent Nos. 1
and 2 certifying that they were in possession of the suit property from
1974 on the strength of the “no objection” provided by the vendors.
66. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are asserting their independent right
to remain in possession of the suit land and consequent protection
under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955,
owing to their status of being cultivating tenants granted in 2008 by
the Revenue authorities.
67. It is worthwhile to revisit the facts that the High Court and this Court
had affirmed the decree of specific performance with possession
in favour of the appellants in the year 2004 and 2006 respectively.
Subsequently, the sale deed was executed by the Executing Court
on 17.08.2007 thereby transferring title of the suit property to the
appellants. Despite such confirmation of the decree and transfer of title
in favour of the appellants, it is incomprehensible why a notice was
sent to the vendors by the revenue authorities in 2008. Further, the
vendors gave “no objection” to the grant of certificate of possession
to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from 1974 despite not having any
authority to do so in light of the sale deed dated 17.08.2007.
68. In our considered view, the aforesaid by no stretch of imagination can
be construed to be a legal right of possession existing independently
from the title of the vendors which has now stood transferred to the
appellants. It is nothing but a case of apparent collusion between the
vendors and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to deprive the appellants
from availing the fruits of the decree in their favour.
69. Even otherwise, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 cannot claim protection
of the special legislation of 1955 for the period during which they
were not registered as tenants cultivating the suit properties. In our
view, the certificate that they are in possession of the suit properties
since 1974 does not come to their aid. We say so, because the said
certificate does not establish any independent right of possession in
favour of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Further, the certificate itself
appears to have been obtained in collusion with the vendors who
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at the time of giving “no objection” had ceased to be the owners of
the suit property.
70. In such circumstances referred to above, we find it extremely difficult
to accept that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are bona fide cultivating
tenants of the suit property and thus, the determination of the question
of them being in possession of the same must necessarily go against
them and in favour of the appellants. Therefore, there is no question
of deciding the validity of the decree on the ground of being a nullity
due to lack of jurisdiction of the civil court to evict cultivating tenants.
71. In such circumstances referred to above, we have reached the
conclusion that the High Court committed an egregious error in
passing the impugned order. We must now ensure that the appellants
are able to reap the fruits of the decree. We are also of the view that
the rejection by the High Court of the amendments to the execution
petition filed by the appellants, was erroneous and deserves to be
set aside.
72. Before we close this matter, we firmly believe that we should say
something as regards the long and inordinate delay at the end of the
Executing Courts across the country in deciding execution petitions.
73. It is worthwhile to revisit the observations in Rahul S. Shah (supra)
wherein this Court has provided guidelines and directions for conduct
of execution proceedings. The relevant portion of the said judgment
is reproduced below:
“42. All courts dealing with suits and execution proceedings
shall mandatorily follow the below mentioned directions:
42.1. In suits relating to delivery of possession, the court
must examine the parties to the suit under Order 10 in
relation to third-party interest and further exercise the power
under Order 11 Rule 14 asking parties to disclose and
produce documents, upon oath, which are in possession
of the parties including declaration pertaining to third-party
interest in such properties.
42.2. In appropriate cases, where the possession is not in
dispute and not a question of fact for adjudication before
the court, the court may appoint Commissioner to assess
the accurate description and status of the property.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 595

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42.3. After examination of parties under Order 10 or
production of documents under Order 11 or receipt of
Commission report, the court must add all necessary
or proper parties to the suit, so as to avoid multiplicity
of proceedings and also make such joinder of cause of
action in the same suit.
42.4. Under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC, a Court Receiver can be
appointed to monitor the status of the property in question
as custodia legis for proper adjudication of the matter.
42.5. The court must, before passing the decree,
pertaining to delivery of possession of a property
ensure that the decree is unambiguous so as to not
only contain clear description of the property but also
having regard to the status of the property.
42.6. In a money suit, the court must invariably resort to
Order 21 Rule 11, ensuring immediate execution of decree
for payment of money on oral application.
42.7. In a suit for payment of money, before settlement
of issues, the defendant may be required to disclose his
assets on oath, to the extent that he is being made liable
in a suit. The court may further, at any stage, in appropriate
cases during the pendency of suit, using powers under
Section 151 CPC, demand security to ensure satisfaction
of any decree.
42.8. The court exercising jurisdiction under Section
47 or under Order 21 CPC, must not issue notice
on an application of third party claiming rights in
a mechanical manner. Further, the court should
refrain from entertaining any such application(s)
that has already been considered by the court while
adjudicating the suit or which raises any such
issue which otherwise could have been raised and
determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence
was exercised by the applicant.
42.9. The court should allow taking of evidence during
the execution proceedings only in exceptional and rare
cases where the question of fact could not be decided by
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resorting to any other expeditious method like appointment
of Commissioner or calling for electronic materials including
photographs or video with affidavits.
42.10. The court must in appropriate cases where it
finds the objection or resistance or claim to be frivolous
or mala fide, resort to sub-rule (2) of Rule 98 of Order
21 as well as grant compensatory costs in accordance
with Section 35-A.
42.11. Under Section 60 CPC the term “… in name of the
judgment-debtor or by another person in trust for him or
on his behalf” should be read liberally to incorporate any
other person from whom he may have the ability to derive
share, profit or property.
42.12. The executing court must dispose of the
execution proceedings within six months from the date
of filing, which may be extended only by recording
reasons in writing for such delay.
42.13. The executing court may on satisfaction of the fact
that it is not possible to execute the decree without police
assistance, direct the police station concerned to provide
police assistance to such officials who are working towards
execution of the decree. Further, in case an offence against
the public servant while discharging his duties is brought
to the knowledge of the court, the same must be dealt
with stringently in accordance with law.
42.14. The Judicial Academies must prepare manuals and
ensure continuous training through appropriate mediums to
the court personnel/staff executing the warrants, carrying
out attachment and sale and any other official duties for
executing orders issued by the executing courts.”
(Emphasis supplied)

74. The mandatory direction contained in Para 42.12 of Rahul S. Shah
(supra) requiring the execution proceedings to be completed within
six months from the date of filing, has been reiterated by this Court
in its order in Bhoj Raj Garg v. Goyal Education and Welfare
Society & Ors., Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 19654 of 2022.
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75. In view of the aforesaid, we direct all the High Courts across the
country to call for the necessary information from their respective
district judiciary as regards pendency of the execution petitions.
Once the data is collected by each of the High Courts, the High
Courts shall thereafter proceed to issue an administrative order or
circular, directing their respective district judiciary to ensure that the
execution petitions pending in various courts shall be decided and
disposed of within a period of six months without fail otherwise the
concerned presiding officer would be answerable to the High Court
on its administrative side. Once the entire data along with the figures
of pendency and disposal thereafter, is collected by all the High
Courts, the same shall be forwarded to the Registry of this Court
with individual reports.
76. Registry is directed to forward one copy each of this judgment to all
the High Courts at the earliest.
77. The Registry shall notify this matter once again after seven months
only for the purpose of reporting compliance of the directions issued
by us referred to above.

F. CONCLUSION
78. In the result, the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The
impugned judgment passed by the High Court is hereby set aside.
The order passed by the Executing Court is also hereby set aside.
79. The Executing Court shall now proceed to ensure that vacant and
peaceful possession of the suit property is handed over to the
appellants in their capacity as decree holders and if necessary, with
the aid of police. This exercise shall be completed within a period
of two months from today without fail.
80. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey