PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTALversusSTATE OF UTIAR PRADESH & ANR.

                         [2015] 3 S.C.R. 876


A                 PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL

                                  v.
              STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH & ANR.

B             (Criminal Appeal No.2194 of 2011 etc.)

                         MARCH 11, 2015.

          [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                   N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]
c
         Penal Code, 1860- ss. 3021149, 404, 148, 201, 212,
    411 - Murder - Sales officer of Indian Oil Corporation on
    inspection of petrol pump of accused no. 1 found
    irregularities in the dispensation of fuel - Sales and supplies
D   to the petrol pump suspended, which were later restored
    on payment of fine - Month later, sales officer being
    suspicious again inspected the petrol pump of the accused
    - However, the next day sales officer found dead - Car of
E   A-7 and A-4 intercepted by police constable while they were
    transporling the dead'body of sales officer to dispose it of
    - Confessional statement made by A-7 and A-4 to the
    constable about commission of crime and involvement of
    other accused - On basis thereof, arrest of the accused and
F   recoveries made at their instance - Conviction and
    sentence of all the accused under the various provisions
    of Penal Code - However, the High Courl modified death
    sentence of accused no. 1 to life imprisonment while
    upholding the order of conviction and sentence of A-2, A-
G   4, A-5, A-7, A-8 and acquitting A-3 and A-6 - Interference
    with - Held: Not called for - Motive behind the brutal murder
    of the deceased trustworlhy- Nexus between the accused


H                                876
       PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITIAL v. STATE OF 877
               UTIAR PRADESH

to do away with the deceased as well as their participation A
in the crime established beyond reasonable doubt - Place
of incident was proved - Evidence on record trustworthy
and consistent, pointing to the guilt of the accused - Minor
discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses would not
come in the way of the other strong circumstantial evidence, B
cumulatively taken together, forming a complete chain of
events - Thus, the evidence adduced by the prosecution
clearly proved the chain of events connecting the accused
to the guilt of the commission of the offence - Arms Act -
s. 25, 30.                                                  c
      Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 25, 27 - Confession made
 by accused before the police - Admissibility of - Held:
 Statements made by an accused before police official which
 amount to confession is barred uls. 25 - However, in view D
 of s. 27 whatever information given by the accused in
 consequence of which a fact is discovered only would be
 admissible in the evidence, whether such information
 amounts to confession or not - On facts, confession given
.by the accused is not the basis for the courts below to E
 convict the accused, but it is only a source of information
 to put the criminal law into motion - Thus, the accused
 cannot take shelter u/s. 25.

    Dismissing the appeals, the Court                       F

    HELD: 1.1 The statements made by an accused
before police official which amount to confession is
barred under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. This
prohibition is, however, lifted to some extent by Section G
27 of the Act whereby, whatever information given by
the accused in consequence of which a fact is
discovered only would be admissible in the evidence,
whether such information amounts to confession or
not. The basic idea embedded under Section 27 of the H
878      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2015] 3 S.C.R.


A Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by
  subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the
  principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made
  on the strength of any information obtained from a
  prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee .that the
B information supplied by the prisoner is true. The
  information might be confessional or non~inculpatory
  in nature, but if it results in discovery of a fact it
  becomes a reliable information. The "fact discovered"
  as envisaged under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
C embraces the place from which the object was
  produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but
  the information given must relate distinctly to that
  effect. [Paras 25, 26, 27] [898-F-G; 899-B-F]

D     1.2 In the instant case, accused Nos. 4 and 7
  disclosed the names of their co-accused at whose
  instance various incriminating materials including
  pistols, cartridges, bullets, blood stained articles were
  recovered. Simply denying their role without proper
E explanation as to the knowledge about those
  incriminating material would justify the presumption
  drawn by the courts below to the involvement of the
  accused in the crime. The confession given by the
F accused is not the basis for the courts below to convict
  the accused, but it is only a source of information to
  put the criminal law into motion. Hence, the accused
  cannot take shelter under Section 25 of the Evidence
  Act. [Para 28] [899-F-H; 900-A]
G     1.3 The motive behind the brutal murder of the
  deceased as brought forward by the prosecution is
  trustworthy in the light of material available on record.
  Considering the evidence on record, there is no dou_bt
H that the accused No.1 bore grudge and with the
      PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 879
              UTTAR PRADESH

assistance of other accused, murdered the deceased. A
On the fateful day, the deceased visited the petrol pump
of accused No.1, where he was brutally murdered, is
evident from the evidence of PW 4, Manager of a Petrol
Pump, P.W.5 and P.W.8. [Para 29) [900-B-C, F-G; 901-C-
~                                                      B
    1.4 The findings by the courts below that the
accused conspire"d to commit the offence of murder of
the deceased is accepted. The nexus between the
accused to do away with the deceased, has been C
established by the prosecution beyond all reasonable
doubt. On fac1s, the nexus between the accused as well
as their participation in the crime is well established
beyond reasonable doubt and there is nothing on
record to suggest that the accused were unnecessarily D
implicated by the police. [Para 30) [901-F-G; 902-F]

    1.5 The recovery of bullets from the tank of the
Automobiles Company and from behind their petrol
pump along with blood stained cloth cumulatively E
establish the place of incident to be the Automobiles
Company. Merely because all the bulle1s fired from the
gun did not hit the target and were not recovered from
the scene of offence, is no ground to conclude that the
incident did not take place. [Para 31) [903-B-D]        F
    1.6 As regards the allegation of contradictions in
the statements of prosecution witnesses, no major
contradictions are found which require attention and
consideration. In the instant case, the evidence on G
record is trustworthy and consistent, and there is only
one view, which points to the guilt of the accused.
Minor discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses
as pointed out by the accused should not come in the
way of the other strong circumstantial evidence, H
880        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A     cumulatively taken together, forms a complete chain of
      events, pointing towards the guilt of the accused in the
      commission of the crime. [Para 32] [903-D-E, G-H; 904-
      A-B]
      1.7 In cases where the direct evidence is scarce, the
8
  burden of proving the case of prosecution is bestowed·
  upon motive and circumstantial evidence. It is the chain
  of events that acquires prime importance in such cases.
  In the instant case, the evidence adduced by the
c prosecution clearly proves the chain of events
  connecting the accused to the guilt of the commission
  of the offence. The entire evidence brought on record
  by the prosecution, is not only convincing, but is also
  trustworthy. Even if the confession of accused Nos. 4
D and 7 made before PW 1 and PW 2, which is barred by
  Section 25 of the Evidence Act, is not taken into account,
  the other evidence on record adduced by the
  prosecution, is sufficient to hold the accused guilty of
  the offence. [Para 33] [904-B-C, F-H]
E
      1.8 Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial
  evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only
  when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are
  found to be incompatible with the innocence of the
F accused or the guilt of any other person. In the instant
  case, on scrutiny of evidence on record, the prosecution
  had established beyond reasonable doubt the complete
  chain of events which points at the guilt of the accused.
  Thus, in the light thereof, the prosecution succeeded in
G proving its case against _the accused beyond all
  reasonable doubt. [Paras 34,35] [905-A-C]
       State of Maharashtra Vs. Damu 2000 (3) SCR 880:
  (2000) 6 SCC 269; Rammi Vs. State of M.P 1999 (3) Suppl.
  SCR 1:(1999) 8 SCC 649; Bodhraj Vs. State of J & K 2002
H (2) Suppl. SCR 67:(2002) 8 SCC 45 - relied on.
       PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 881
               UTTAR PRADESH

    Aghnoo Nagesia Vs. State of Bihar(1966) 1 SCR 134; A
State of Punjab Vs. Barkat Ram (1962) 3 SCR 338; Mani
Vs. State of Ta milnadu 2008 (1) SCR 228:(2009) 17 SCC
273; Dafbir Kaur v. State of Punjab 1977 (1) SCR
280:(1976) 4 SCC 158; Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi
v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 2 SCC 465 - referred to. B

                 Case Law Reference

 (1966) 1 SCR 134         referred to.   Para 8

 (1962) 3 SCR 338         referred to.   Para 8           c
 2008 (1) SCR 228         referred to.   Para 15
 1977 (1) SCR 280         referred to.    Paras 22, 24

 (1980) 2 sec 465         referred to. - Paras 22, 24     D
 2000 (3) SCR 880          relied on.     Para 26

 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 1    relied on      Para 32

 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 67 relied on        Para 33          E
   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 2194 of 2011 etc.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.2009 of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench)     F
Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 1250 of 2007.

                         With

    Crl. A. Nos. 2195-2196, 2198, 2199 & 2200 of 2011     G

    S. K. Agarwal, P. C. Aggarwal, Jitendra Sarin, Pradeep
Aggarwal, Ram Niwas, Sarad Kumar Singhania, Ruchi ·
Kohli, Lal Pratap Singh, Nirmal Goenka, Nidhi Jaswal,
Anirudh Sharma, Mahesh Srivastava, Vaibhav M. H .
882        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A     Srivastava, P. N. Puri, Shivam Sharma, Gautam Awasthi for
      the Appellant.

      Gaurav Bhatia, AAG, Kunal Verma, Kamini Jaiswal,
  Shilpi Dey, Pragati Neekhra, Utkarsh Jaiswal for the
B Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      N.V. RAMANA, J. 1. These appeals are directed
  against a common impugned judgment dated 11th February,
C 2009 of the High court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, by
  which the appeals of the appellants herein who are accused
  of murdering one Manjunath, were dismissed.

       2. Material facts of the case as per prosecution are that
D the father of appellant Monu Mittal (Accused No. 1) was the
  owner of a petrol pump namely M/s Mittal Automobiles
  situated at Gola, District Lakhimpur Kheri, Uttar Pradesh.
  The deceased Manjunath was working as a Sales Officer
  with the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) at Gola. On
E 13.9.2005, the deceased inspected the petrol pump of
  Accused No. 1 and on finding some irregularities, the sales
  and supplies of the petrol pump were suspended by the IOC
  at his instance. However, the same were restored on 19th
F October, 2005 after the payment of fine of Rs.75,000/- by
  the owner of the petrol pump. Again on 191" November,
  2005, the deceased, being suspicious of malpractices still
  being carried on by Accused No. 1, inspected the said petrol
  pump.
G     3. On 20.11.2005, when the Head Constable (Ram
  Bhawan Singh) of P.S. Mahaoli, District Sitapur. along with
  Constable Asha Ram (PW2) and Driver Braj Kishore was
  on patrol duty on the National Highway, at about 8.00 am,
H one Maruti Car bearing No. UP 51 E 5176 was coming from
        PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 883
          UTIAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.]

 the direction of Maigalganj and upon seeing the police jeep,   A
 the Maruti Car suddenly turned back and tried to drive away
 from that place. On suspicion, the Maruti Car was chased
 and intercepted at about 8.30 am near Green Gold Dhaba.
 One Vivek Sharma (Appellant - Accused No. 7) was driving
 the car accompanied by another appellant Rakesh Kumar          B
 Anand (Appellant-Accused No.4) who was sitting on the
 back seat besides a blood stained dead body of S.
 Manjunath (deceased). On interrogation, both accused Nos.
 4 & 7 confessed that the deceased was shot dead by
 Pawan Kumar alias Monu Mittal (Accused No.1), Devesh           C
 Agnihotri (Accused No. 2), Sanjay Awasthi (Accused No.3),
 Lala Giri (Accused No.5), Harish Mishra (Accused No.6) at
 M/S Mittal Automobiles and they were carrying the dead
 body of the deceased in his car, to dispose of the same at
                                                                0
 an unknown place. Both the accused Nos. 4 & 7 were taken
 into custody and a recovery memo (Ext. Ka·1) was prepared
 and a case against all the accused under Sections
 147, 148, 149,302 and Section 201 read with Section 34,
 IPC, was registered on 20.11.2005.                             E

       4. Mr. P.N. Saxena, Sub-Inspector took up the
   investigation and in the presence of Ohan Raj Sahani (PW
   3, landlord of the deceased) conducted inquest. He
  collected blood stained seat covers and door mats (Ext. Ka- F
  9) from the Maruti Car besides several other belongings of
  the deceased, prepared site plan (Ext. Ka-8) and sent the
. dead body for post mortem. Thereafter, he transferred the
  investigation to P.S. Gola, and Parmesh Shukla,
   SHO(PW21) who took up further investigation, arrested G
  Shivkesh Giri @ Lala Giri (Accused No. 5) on 22.11.2005.
  He also recovered a wet blood stained cloth from behind
  the Petrol Pump which was allegedly used in cleaning the
  murder spot at the instance of Accused no 5. Three
  cartridges of 32 bore (Ext. Ka-16) were also recovered from H
884        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A behind the Petrol Pump on his pointing. Based on the
  confession of Lala Giri (Accused No. 5), he arrested the
  other accused Pawan Kumar, Sanjay Awasthi, Rajesh
  Verma and Harish Mishra at 6.50 p.m. near railway crossing
  in a car bearing number UP 31 F4629. A revolver was
B recovered from accused Rajesh Verma, owner of the car
  and a Pistol was recovered from accused Pawan Kumar
  (Ext Ka-17). On 23.11.2005 at 8:30 am, the 10 recovered
  the car of accused Pawan Kumar, his blood stained pant
  from Punerbhoo forest, Kheri. The 10 also recovered three
C empty cartridges from the ·diesel tank of the Petrol Pump
  on 24.11.2005 at 9:30 am on pointing of Accused No. 1
  Monu Mittal. Accused No.2 - Devesh Agnihotri was also
  arrested on the same day at 6:00 pm by TN Tripathi, Sub-
D Inspector (PW 19) from Bheera and at his instance, four
  empty cartridges (Ext. Ka-20) fired from the revolver of
  accused No. 8 - Rajesh Verma werif recovered from the
  house of one Jitendra Mishra uncle of Sanjay Awasthi (A-
      ~-                                        .

E      5. After investigation, the 10 submitted charge sheet,
  and the case was committed for trial. The trial court framed
  charges against all the accused u/s 147, 148, 302 r/w 149,
  201 and 120 B, IPC. Additional charges u/s 404 and 411
F of IPC, Section 30 of the Arms Act were framed against
  accused No. 1 - Pawan Kumar, charges u/s 212 IPC and
  Sections 25/30 of the Arms Act were framed against
  accused No.8 - Rajesh Verma. Also charges under Section
  411, IPC were framed against accused No.7 -Vivek Sharma
G and Accused No. 4 - Rakesh Kumar Anand.

      6. The Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused
  No.1 - Pawan Kumar @ Monu Mittal to death for offences
  u/s 302 r/w 149, IPC and to pay a fine of Rs 10,000/-, in
H default to undergo simple imprisonment (SI) for one year.
       PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 885
         UTTAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.]

He was also sentenced to 2 years RI and to pay a fine of         A
Rs. 5000/-, in default 3 months SI for the offence u/s 404,
IPC and 6 months imprisonment u/s 30 of the Arms Act, 2
years RI and to pay a fine of Rs 5000/- u/s 404, IPC and in
default to undergo 3 months S.I. The other accused,
namely accused No.2 - Devesh Agnihotri, accused No.3 -           B
Sanjay Awasthi, accused No. 4 - Rakesh Kumar Anand,
accused No. 5 - Shivkesh Giri @ Lalla Giri, accused No. 6
- Harish Mishra, accused No. 7 - Vivek Sharma and
accused No. 8 - Rajesh Verma were also convicted u/s 302
r/w Section 149, IPC and sentenced to suffer life                C
imprisonment. They were further sentenced to suffer one
year RI u/s 148, 5 years RI u/s 201, IPC, 5 years RI u/s
120 B IPC. Accused No.8 - Rajesh Verma was also
convicted u/s 212, IPC and sentenced to 3 years RI and to
                                                                 0
pay a fine of Rs 5,000/-, in default to undergo 6 months SI
u/s 25 of the Arms Act and sentenced to 1 year RI and to
pay a fine of Rs 1,000/-, in default to suffer SI for 3 months
and 6 months RI u/s 30 of the Arms Act. Accused Rakesh
Anand, Vivek Sharma and Pawan Kumar were also                    E
sentenced to 2 years RI u/s 411 IPC. All the sentences
were, however, directed to run concurrently.

     7. Aggrieved thereby, the accused-appellants
preferred appeals before the High Court. The High Court F
by the impugned judgment dated 11.12.2009 partly allowed
the appeal of Pawan Kumar (Accused No. 1) and modified
his death sentence to life imprisonment u/s 302 r/w 149 but
upheld the convictions for the other offences they are
charged with. The appeals of the accused Devesh Agnihotri G
(A-2), Rakesh Anand (A-4), Shivkesh Giri @ Lalla Giri (A-
5), Vivek Sharma (A-7) and Rajesh Verma (A-8) were,
however, dismissed by the High Court. The appeals of other
co-accused Harish Mishra (A-6) and Sanjay Awasthi (A-3)
were allowed giving them benefit of doubt and acquitted H
886        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015) 3 S.C.R.


A     them of all charges. Against the said judgment passed by
      the High Court, Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 & 8 filed the
      present appeals before this Court.

          8. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants
B argued that the Courts below have committed a grave error
    in convicting and sentencing the appellants on the very
   evidence by which it acquitted the co-accused Harish Mishra
   and Sanjay Awasthi of all the charges. The High Court relied
   solely on the confessional statements of the accused/
C appellants made to the police which is inadmissible in
   evidence under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
   Taking support from a decision of this Court in Aghnoo
   Nagesia Vs. State of Bihar, (1966) 1 SCR 134,. learned
   counsel submitted that "a confession made to a police
D officer under any circumstances is not admissible in
   evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made
   when the accused was free and not in police custody, as
   also a confession made before any investigation has
   begun". Unfortunately, the High Court has not considered
E Section 25 of the Evidence Act in its true spirit and erred in
   holding that the confessional statement of accused given
   to the police officer is admissible, because the same was
 • not made to the Investigating Officer but to some other
F police officer. Taking support from a decision of this Court
   in State of Punjab Vs. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338,
   learned counsel submitted that the confession made to any
   member of the police, of whatever rank and at whatever
  ·time, is inadmissible in evidence as per Section 25 of the
G Evidence Act.

      9. The learned counsel further submitted that the
  impugned judgement is based only on conjectures and
  surmises and not on any cogent and reliable evidence.
H There were no eyewitness to the occurrence and the case
       PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 887
         UTIAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.)

of prosecution is based solely on the circumstantial A
evidence. The prosecution has completely failed to prove
the chain of events linking the accused appellants to the
commission of offence. There is no direct witness or
incriminating evidence against the appellants to establish
the motive of the accused to kill the deceased. The courts B
below have ignored the fact that neither the Ballistic Report
(Ext. 61) nor the Serological Reports (Exts. Ka-60, 62, 62A)
support the case of prosecution. in the ballistic report, no
special characteristics were found and no conclusive
opinion was given that the shots were fired from the gun of C
the accused. The Ballistic Expert (Ext. Ka-61) clearly
mentioned in the report that "the individual characteristics
are absent" for giving a definite opinion. In the absence of
a firm expert opinion, it cannot be conclusively held that the
                                                               0
bullets recovered from near and around the scene of
offence were fired from the gun of accused No .1 Pawan
Kumar.

      10. It is the contention of the learned counsel that
 according to the Serological Report (Ext. Ka-60), no blood E
_was found on the cloth recovered from behind the petrol
 pump which was allegedly used to clean the site of crime
 as also the pant of the accused No. 1 (Exts. Ka-62 & 62A)
 Pawan Kumar allegedly recovered from his car. Another F
crucial loophole that is evident from the prosecution story
 is that the body of the deceased was stained with blood,
 but no blood stains were reported to be found on the clothes
of accused No. 7 - Vivek Sharma and accused No. 4 -
Rakesh Kumar Anand who were allegedly carrying the dead G
body of the deceased in his car to dispose of the same.
Also another dubious circumstance sought to be proved by
the prosecution is that when the car in which accused No.7
- Vivek Sharma and accused No.4 - Rakesh Kumar Anand,
were carrying the dead body of the deceased was H
888      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2015] 3 S.C.R.


A intercepted, P.W.3 - Dhanraj Sahni, landlord of the
  deceased appeared from the crowd and recognized the
  dead body. Learned counsel submitted that the landlord
  was living far away from the site where the accused were
  apprehended, and no reason is given by the prosecution
B for his presence at the spot where the car carrying the dead
  body of the deceased was intercepted. This casts a doubt
  on the prosecution story about the presence of the landlord
  at that point of time.

C       11. The learned counsel strenuously contends that
  another aspect that probablises the factum of manipulation
  of the case by the prosecution to implicate the appellants
  into the crime is that according to the prosecution case, in
  all, eleven bullets were fired at the deceased, but according
D to the post-mortem report (Ext. Ka-14), the deceased had
  suffered six firearm injuries, out of which there were two exit
  wounds on his body and four bullets were recovered from
  his body. There was no explanation coming forward from
  the prosecution as regards not finding the other bullets. It
E is not possible to imagine that other seven bullets did not
  hit anywhere at the place of incident. This fact clearly
  establishes that the prosecution manipulated the
  investigation. The prosecution thus totally failed to prove
F the place of occurrence and the recoveries alleged to have
  been made from the scene of offence were planted for the
  purpose of the case.
       12. Learned counsel further submitted that the Courts
  below have utterly failed to take into account the important
G material contradictions before convicting the appellants. PW
  21 - · Parmesh Kumar Shukla, SHO was said to have taken
  control of the case on the evening of 201h November, 2005
  and he came to know about the place of incident only on
H 21•1 November, 2005 seems improbable. The same stood
        PAWAN KUMAR@ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 889
          UTTAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.]

fortified by the fact that as per Rojanama (GD No. 38 dated      A
21-11-2005) he had visited the alleged place of occurrence
i.e. petrol pump on 21.11.2005. Whereas in his deposition
before the Trial Court he denied to have gone there on 21-
11-2005 and he further stated that he went to the place of
occurrence for the first time only on 22-11-2005 in the          B
afternoon. It is, therefore, clear that the investigations are
tainted, vital and material portion has been deliberately
concealed. The deposition of PW 21 visiting the place of
occurrence on 22-11-2005 ought to have been rejected by
the Courts below. Once a mate~ial portion of the evidence        C
of 1.0. is found to be false, no reliance could be placed on
his statement. Such material contradictions would not only
cast a doubt on his evidence, but discredits the entire case
of prosecution. Another discrepancy in the prosecution story     D
pointed out by the learned counsel is that as per
prosecution, accused No.5- Lalla Giri was arrested by PW
21 on 22-11-2005 from Railway Station, whereas on 21-
11-2005 at about 3.15 p.m. mother of Lalla Giri (A-5) had
sent a telegram (Ext. Kha-2) to the DIG, Lucknow                 E
complaining therein that her son has been wrongfully
confined by the PS Gola since 20-11-2005. This
uncontroverted fact belies his arrest and thus the recoveries
allegedly made at his instance cannot be relied upon.
     13. Learned counsel further contended that the Courts F
below have wrongly attributed the motive for the crime
inasmuch as M/S Mittc:I Automobiles was sealed by the
deceased owing to alleged malpractices. It is admitted fact
that apart from Mittal Automobiles one more petrol pump G
L.D Service Station was inspected by the deceased on the
same day and samples taken were found to be adulterated,
but no investigation was carried out in this regard. In fact,
no adulteration was detected from the samples collected
from M/S Mittal Automobiles. As a matter of fact, Weights H
890      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2015] 3 S.C.R.


A and Measurement Department conducted test of HSD (1150
  ltrs.) from June, 2005 to 13.9.2005. Though the entries were
  made in the Daily Stock Register of MIS Mittal Automobiles,
  no corresponding entry was made in the main stock register
  which resulted in stock variation which led to the sealing of
B the petrol pump. When M/S Mittal Automobiles clarified the
  same by reply dated 18-10-2005, the petrol pump was
  restored. The fine of Rs.75,000/- was paid in respect of
  technical defaults in order to ensure that the supply is
  restored. Hence, the motive part advanced by the
C prosecution is not proved and the Courts below have erred
  in not appreciating this fact.
       14. Learned counsel appearing for Accused No. 2 -
  Devesh Agnihotri submitted that the appellant was wrongly
D implicated in the crime. The appellant has no previous
  association with the prime acc~sed Monu Mittal. The
  appellant-accused No. 2 was not even present at the
  scene of crime at the relevant time as he was attending
  marriage of his brother in law in District Etah which is far
E away from the place of occurrence. Moreover, there is no
  incriminating evidence against accused No. 2.
       15. On behalf of Accused No. 5-Lalla Giri it is
  specifically argued that he has been wrongly convicted by
F the Trial Court merely because he was an ex-employee of
  Pawan Kumar @ Monu Mittal (Accused No.1 ). Mere
  recovery of empty cartridges at the instance of this
  appellant-accused is of no consequence when there is no
  evidence linking his participation in the crime. Moreover, the
G recovery of empty cartridges at the place of occurrence itself
  is highly doubtful as they can easily be destroyed. In support
  of the argument that in the absence of any link evidence,
  the appellant cannot be convicted under Sectiqn 302, IPC
  learned counsel relied on Mani Vs. State of Tamilnadu
H (2009) 17 SCC 273. Learned counsel further.argued that
        PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 891
          UTTAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.]

at the most the case against the appellant cannot be A
beyond Section 201, IPC for which the maximum sentence
is 10 years. The appellant has already undergone about 9
Y, years imprisonment.

     16. Learned counsel appearing for Accused No.4-             B
Rakesh Anand and Accused No. 7- Vivek Sharma submitted
that the prosecution has failed to complete the chain of
events qua Accused Nos. 4 and 7 to bring home their
culpability. Both the courts below have gravely erred in
holding that the dead body of the deceased was recovered         C
from the possession of these appellants on 20.11.20005 at
8.00 am. As per prosecution, at the time of their arrest,
the dead body of the deceased was bleeding, but admittedly
no blood was found on their clothes. No weapon, driving
licence, money etc. were found from their possession. No         D
relation between these two accused and other accused has
been proved. Moreover, there was no examination of any
independent witness to support the story of prosecution that
the dead body of the deceased was recovered from the
possession of these two accused. Allegedly, there was a          E
mob of about 100 to 150 people at that point of time, but
no independent witness has been examined to prove the
prosecution story, and in the absence of any independent
witness being examined, the confession statement and             F
consequent recovery, cannot be believed. Learned counsel
therefore submitted that it is in the interest of justice, the
appeals be allowed, as otherwise, the appellants would
suffer irreparable injustice, loss and injury.

    17. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Accused G
No. 8 -Rajesh Verma argued that the appellant was merely
an employee of an Urban Co- operative Bank and had no
previous enmity or motive to kill the deceased as he had
no interests in the business of Petrol Pump. His name H
892      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015) 3 S.C.R.


A neither figured in the confessional statement of the accused
  nor in the F.l.R. According to the prosecution, the licensed
  revolver of Accused No. 8 was recovered on 22~11-2005,
  but it was not even sealed at the spot despite the 1.0. having
  specific knowledge about its use. There was no specific
B evidence to establish the date, time and place of it being
  sealed. Only the oral assertion of 1.0. that the weapon was
  sealed a couple of days later by him, shows the possibility
  of revolver or bullet being changed, thereby wrongly
  implicating the accused in the crime. There was also no
C evidence of conspiracy against this appellant nor was any
  evidence to establish the intention, knowledge or prior
  meeting of the appellant with the other accused to commit
  the crime. The 1.0. in the cross examination admitted that
  the appellant neither used his revolver nor was present at
0
  the time of occurrence. There is also no absolute evidence
  of appellant giving his revolver to the prime accused. The
  appellant was ar. active worker of a political party and his
  political rivals being inimical towards him he was falsely
E implicated, but the Courts below have failed to take into
  consideration this aspect.

        18. Learned counsel appearing for all the accused-
  appellants strongly contended that the Courts below have
F committed grave error in convicting and sentencing the
  accused. The impugned judgment is not based on the true
  principles of law. It is not only gravely erroneous, but also
  against the material available on record. The alleged
  circumstances do not form a complete chain of events
G linking the accused to the commission of the crime, and the
  incriminating circumstances having not been proved by the
  prosecutjon, in accordance with law, the impugned judgment
  is, liable to be set aside.

        19. Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, learned Additional Advocate
H
       PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 893
         UTTAR PRADESH [NV. RAMANA, J.]

General appearing for the State, on the other hand,              A
supported the impugned judgment and submitted that this
is an unfortunate case where an Officer of the Indian Oil
Corporation was brutally murdered by the accused for
honestly carrying out his duties. This incident has shocked
the entire nation and has shaken the confidence of               B
thousands of aspiring officers. He submitted that Accused
No. 1 Pawan Kumar @ Monu Mittal had developed grudge
against the deceased because he inspected the petrol
pump run by him on 13.9.2005 and pointed out certain
irregularities, and on his intimation to IOC (Ext. Ka-34), the   C
sales and supplies of the pump were suspended. The
supplies were, however, restored only after payment of fine
on 191h October, 2005. The deceased again visited the petrol
pump of the accused on 19th November, 2005 for inspe.ction       D
and thereafter he was not seen alive.
     20. The learned AAG, on behalf of the prosecution,
submitted that the incriminating articles including empty
cartridges (Ext. 13) fired from the licensed pistol of Accused
No. 1, blood stained earth (Ext. Ka 60) recovered from the E
petrol pump of Accused No. 1 and on his pointing out, the
mobile instrument of the deceased was recovered from the
forest (Ext. Ka 21 ). The Ballistic Expert in his report clearly
mentioned that the bullets found in the body of the
deceased were fired from the licensed pistol of Accused No. F
1. The irregularities committed by the petrol pump were writ
large inasmuch as certain important documents and other
materials which were necessarily required to be kept in the
show room were not found, when the police along with IOC G
official and official of Weights and Measurements
Department inspected. Moreover, some articles used for
tampering of the seals of the machines and tank were
found.
    21. Learned AAG contended that the involvement of H
894         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A      accused Rakesh Anand (Accused No.4) and Vivek Sharma
       (Accused No.7) has been proved beyond all reasonable
       doubt as they were caught by patrolling police officials PW1-
       Head Constable Ram Bhawan, PW2 - Constable Asha Ram
      while they were carrying the dead body of the deceased in
B      his car. This fact is corroborated by the independent
      witness Dhanraj Sahni-PW3, the landlord of the deceased.
      Accused No. 2 - Devesh Agnihotri's involvement is evident
      from the confession of the co-accused, namely accused
       No. 7 - Vivek Sharma an.d accused No.4 - Rakesh Kumar
c     Anand and also by accused No.8 - Rajesh Verma, who
      confessed that his revolver was used by accused No. 2 -
      Devesh Agnihotri for the commission of crime. After his
      arrest, he confessed to the commission of the crime and
      also led to the recovery of four empty cartridges shot from
0
      the revolver of accused No. 8 - Rajesh Verma. Also
      accused No.2 - Devesh Agnihotri along with accused No.4
      - Rakesh Kumar Anand were earlier charge sheeted for an
      offence u/s 307 IPC in 1998 which is sufficient to establish
E     their nexus. Accused No.5 - Lalla Giri's involvement came
      to light from the confession made by accused No.7 - Vivek
      Sharma (A-7) and accused No.4 - Rakesh Kumar Anand,
      at whose instance accused No.5 - Lalla Giri was arrested
      on 22.11.2005, from the Railway Station while he was trying
F     to abscond. Accused No.5 - Lalla Giri, led to the recovery
      of three cartridges from behind the petrol pump and three
      more from the tank of the petrol pump. This clearly explains
      that accused No.5 - Lalla Giri, has played an active role in
      the conspiracy. in and commission of the crime. Accused
G     No.8 - Rajesh Verma was arrested along with Accused No.
      1 - Pawan Kumar and other accused when he was taking
      them in his car on 22.11.2005 and a revolver with two live
      and four missing cartridges were recovered from his
      possession. Those four cartridges were recovered at the
H     instance of accused No.2 - Devesh Agnihotri. Thus, in the
       PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITIAL v. STATE OF 895
         UTTAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.]

light of confessional statements of the accused and the        A
recoveries made at their instance, their involvement in the
crime is established by the prosecution beyond all
reasonable doubt. Therefore, no interference is warranted
with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Trial
Court as well as the High Court, upon appreciation of entire   B
evidence on record.

     22. Learned AAG, placing reliance on Dalbir Kaur v.
State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158 and Shivnaravan
Laxminarayan Joshi v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 2 C
sec 465 finally submitted that when the cumulative effect
of the evidence against the accused persons is sufficiently
convincing for the trial court as well as the High Court to
have come to the conclusion that the offence with which
the accused were charged were established against them D
beyond all reasonable doubt, unless there is substantial
question of law involved, this Court should refrain from
interfering with the concurrent findings of fact given by the
Courts below.
                                                              E
     23. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at
length and carefully perused the material on record.

     24. The contention of the learned Additional Advocate
General for the State that in view of the concurrent findings F
on facts recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the
High Court, this Court should not interfere with such
findings, unless there is substantial question of law involved.
Before dealing with the above contention, it is appropriate
to refer to the judgments in Da/bir Kaur v. State of Punjab G
(1976) 4 SCC 158 and Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi
v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 2 SCC 465, wherein this
Court laid down the guidelines.

    In Dalbir Kaur (supra) it was held as under:               H
896    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A     "8. Thus the principles governing interference by this
      Court in a criminal appeal by special leave may be
      summarised as follows:

      (1) that this Court would not interfere with the
B     concurrent finding of fact based on pure appreciation
      of evidence even if it were to take a different view on
      the evidence;

      (2) that the Court will not normally enter into a
c     reappraisement or review of the evidence, unless the
      assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error of
      law or procedure or is based on error of record,
      misreading of evidence or is inconsistent with the
      evidence, for instance, where the ocular evidence is
o     totally inconsistent with the medical evidence and so
      on;

      (3) .that the Court would not enter into credibility of the
      evidence with a view to substitute its own opinion for
E     that of the High Court;

      (4) that the Court would interfere where the High Court
      has arrived at a finding of fact in disregard of a judicial
      process, principles of natural justice or a fair hearing
      or has acted in violation of a mandatory provision of
F
      law or procedure resulting in serious prejudice or
      injustice to the accused;

      (5) this Court might also interfere where on the proved
      facts wrong inferences of law have been drawn or
G     where the conclusions of the High Court are manifestly
      perverse and based on no evidence.

      It is very difficult to lay down a rule of universal
      application, but the principles mentioned above and
H     those adumbrated in the authorities of this Court cited
      PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITIAL v. STATE OF 897
        UTIAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.]

    supra provide sufficient guidelines for this Court to A
    decide criminal appeals by special leave. Thus in a
  · criminal appeal by special leave, this Court at the
    hearing examines the evidence and the judgment of the
    High Court with the limited purpose of determining
    whether or not the High Court has followed the B
    principles enunciated above. Where the Court finds
    that the High Court has committed no violation of the
    various principles laid down by this Court and has made
    a correct approach and has not ignored or overlooked
    striking features in the evidence whi<::h demolish the C
    prosecution case, the findings of fact arrived at by the
    High Court on an appreciation of the evidence in the
    circumstances of the case would not be disturbed.

   9. Much time, energy and expense could be saved if D
   the principles enunciated above are strictly adhered to
   by counsel for the parties and they confine their
   arguments within the four corners of those principles
   and they cooperate in this sound and subtle judicial
   method without transgressing the limits imposed by the E
   decisions of this Court on its power to interfere with the
   concurrent findings of fact."

    In Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi (supra), it was
held as under:                                              F

   "... On a perusal of the record and judgment of the High
   Court we are clearly of the opinion that these appeals
   are concluded by findings of facts. It is well settled that
   this Court in special leave will not interfere with G
   concurrent findings of facts unless the findings are
   vitiated by a grave error of law or by an error which
   leads to serious and substantial miscarriage of justice.
   After a perusal of the judgment of the courts below we
   find ourselves in complete agreement with the view H
898      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A       taken by the High Court and are unable to find any
        special circumstances which require our interference
        with the order passed by the High Court."

         Therefore, what has to be appreciated in these
B appeals is whether any findings are vitiated by grave error
  of law or by an error which leads to serious and substantial
  miscarriage of justice, warranting interference of this Court.

       25. Coming to the facts of this case, there are no direct
c eye-witnesses to the incident. The entire case of the
  prosecution is based on the circumstantial evidence. The
  FIR came to be registered, based on the confessional
  statement of accused No. 7 - Vivek Sharma and accused
  No.4 - Rakesh Kumar Anand, made to the Head Constable
o - Ram Bhawan Singh - PW1. They confessed before P.W.1
  about the commission of the crime and involvement of the
  other accused, when he along with another police constable
  intercepted the car, while they were transporting the dead
  body of the deceased to dispose it of. Based on the
E confession statement made by them about the commission
  of the crime and involvement of other accused, the accused
  were arrested and recoveries were made at their instance.
  The contention that is put forth on behalf of the appellants
  is that the confession made to the police is not admissible
F in evidence, as per Section 25 of the Evidence Act. It is
  settled principle of law that statements made by an accused
  before police official which amount to confession is barred
  under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. This prohibition
  is, however, lifted to some extent by Section 27 which reads
G thus:

        27. How much of information received from
        accused may be proved.-Provided that, when any
        fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of
H       information received from a person accused of any
        PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 899
          UTTAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.]

    offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of A
    such information, whether it amounts to a confession
    or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
    discovered, may be proved.

     26. In the light of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, B
whatever information given by the accused in consequence
of which a fact is discovered only would be admissible in
the evidence, whether such information amounts to
confession or not. The basic idea embedded under Section
27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by C
subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle
that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the
strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such
a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by
the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional D
or non-inculpatory in nature, but if it results in discovery of
a fact it becomes a reliable information [See: State of
Maharashtra Vs. Darou, (2000) 6 SCfC 269.

     27. The ''fact discovered" as envisaged under Section     E
27 of the Evidence Act embraces the place from which the
object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to
it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that
effect.
                                                               F
     28. In the present case, Accused Nos. 4 & 7 disclosed
the names of their co-accused at whose instance various
incriminating materials including pistols, cartridges, bullets,
blood stained articles were recovered. Simply denying their
role without proper explanation as to the knowledge about G
those incriminating material would justify the presumption
drawn by the Courts below to the involvement of the
accused in the crime. The confession given by the accused
is not the basis for the courts below to convict the accused,
but it is only a source of information to put the criminal law H
900         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A     into motion. Hence, the accused cannot take shelter under
      Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

           29. The next contention of the appellants is that the
      prosecution could not prove the motive of the accused for
 B    the commission of the offence. We feel that the motive
      behind the brutal murder of the deceased as brought
      forward by the prosecution is trustworthy in the light of
      material available on record. Considering the evidence on
      record, there is no doubt in our mind that the deceased-
C     Manjunath had inspected M/S Mittal Automobiles on
      13.9.2005 and on finding irregularities, he had reported the
      same to the IOC and at his instance, the sales and supplies
      to the Pump of accused No.1 were suspended [Ex Ka-34].
      The IOC thereafter issued a show cause notice to the father
D     of Accused No.1. fn reply, his father had admitted that the
      pump was being mahaged by his son Pawan Kumar Mittal
      (Exts. 29 & 30). The record shows that accused No.1 was
      made to pay a fine of Rs 50000/- vide DD No.083226, dated
      17.10.2005 and another Rs 25000/- vide DD no. 083227,
E     dated 17.10.2005 [Exts. Ka 29-30]. Though, the sales and
      supplies were resumed on 19-10-2005, the deceased had
      again inspected the pump on 19.11.2005, a day before he
      was found dead. Suspecting that the deceased would again
F     give report to IOC alleging irregularities in the supplies, in
      which event, he would either be called upon to pay fine or
      may render his licence suspended, accused No.1 bore
      grudge and with the assistance of other accused; murdered
      the deceased. The fact that on the fateful day, the
G     deceased visited the petrol bunk of accused No.1, where
      he was brutally murdered, is evident from the evidence of
      PW 4 - Ashok Kumar Agarwal, Manager of MIS Agrawal
      Brothers Petrol Pump, who in his evidence deposed that
      the Accused No. 1 was inquiring about the location and
H     movement of the deceased prior to the alleged incident on
         PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 901
           UTIAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.)

  19'h November, 2005. P.W.5 - Anurag Agarwal of M/s.                 A
. Agarwal Brothers and P.W.8 - Ramesh Chandra Pandey,
  Manager of M/s. Alankar Hotel, also deposed that the
  deceased was in Gola on the day of incident. P.W.5 also
  deposed that the deceased left for Mis. Mittal Automobiles
  from his pump at 9.30 pm. P.W.17 - R.K. Justi, the                  B
  immediate senior officer of the deceased deposed that the
  deceased had gone to Mis. Mittal Automobiles for inspection
  on 19.11.2005. He further depo~ed that in his presence,
  three cartridges were recovered from the tank of M/s. Mittal
  Automobiles. This evidence clearly sh.ows that on the               C
  fateful day, the deceased went to M/s. Mittal Automobiles,
  and thereafter, he was found dead. Considering the fact
  that at the instance of the deceased, IOC imposed fine on
  accused No.1 for the irregularities found in the dispensation
                                                                      0
  of fuel, which lead to his paying up fine, there is every
  possibility of accused No.1 bearing grudge against the
  deceased, when the deceased visited his bunk on
  1.9.11.2005, suspecting that the deceased would again
  inspect the bunk and report the irregularities, in which event      E
  he may end up either paying fine or it will result in his licence
  being cancelled, accused No. 1 with .the assistance of other
  accused, had conspired to do away with the deceased, and
  accordingly killed him.
                                                             F
     30. We are in full agreement with the Courts below that
the accused conspired to commit the offence of murder of
the deceased. The nexus between the accused to do away
with the deceased, has been established by the prosecution
beyond all reasonable doubt. Accused No.1- Pawan Kumar G
@ Monu Mittal, being the owner/in-charge of pump where
the incident took place, is an interested party in the crime
to do away with the deceased, because at his instance, the
supplies were suspended and only upon paying fine, the
supplies were restored. Accused No.4 - Rakesh Anand and H
902      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A Accused No.7 - Vivek Sharma, were caught by P.W.1 -
  Head Constable and another police constable, while they
  were trying to dispose of the dead body of the deceased in
  his own car. They confessed about the involvement of
  accused No.5 - Lalla Giri. Lalla Giri (A-5) is an ex-
B employee of Pawan Kumar (A-1), and at his instance, three
  bullets were recovered from the petrol pump, which proves
  his presence at the spot and the time of occurrence.
  Accused no.2 - Devesh Agnihotri's involvement is
  ascertained by the fact that he had led to the recovery of
C four cartridges from the house of maternal uncle of Sanjay
  Awasthi. Devesh Agnihotri (A-2) was earlier tried for a case
  under Section 307 IPC along with Accused no.4 - Rakesh
  Anand, which proves his previous association with the
  conspirators, though cannot be a basis for the conviction.
0
  At the instance of Accused No. 2 - Devesh Agnihotri,
  Accused No.8 - Rajesh Verma was arrested with Accused
  No. 1 - Monu Mittal, while he was taking him in his own
  car, which proves his association with the main accused.
E At the time of his arrest, a revolver with two live cartridges
  was recovered. A rifle (Ext. Ka-18) belonging to Accused
  No.1 - Pawan Kumar @ Monu Mittal, was also recovered
  from the house of Accused No.8 - Rajesh Verma. Thus the
  nexus between the accused as well as their participation
F in the crime is well established beyond reasonable doubt
  and we find nothing on record to suggest that the accused
  were unnecessarily implicated by the police.

      31: There is also no doubt in our mind as regards the
G place of incident. An effort has been made by the learned
  counsel appearing for the accused to raise doubts over the
  same on the ground that the number of bullets used in the
  crime is not proportionate to the number of bullets hitting
  the deceased. It came on record in the evidence 6f PW-5
H - Anurag Agrawal of Mis Aggarwal Brothers Petrol Pump
        PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 903
          UTTAR PRADESH [N.V. RAMANA, J.)

 that the deceased had informed him at 9.30 p.m. on A
  19.11.2005 that from there he was going to M/S Mittal
 Automobiles, to take his measuring instruments which he
 had forgotten there. The recovery of bullets from the tank
 of MIS Mittal Automobiles and from behind their petrol pump
 along with blood stained cloth cumulatively establish the B
 place of incident to be M/S Mittal Automobiles. In every
 case of gun firing, it is not required that each and every
 bullet should hit the target. Thete may be attempts by the
 deceased or the victim to save himself from the raining
 bullets, and in which case, the bullets may not hit the target. C
 Merely because all the bullets fired from the gun did not hit
 the target and were not recovered from the scene of
 offence, is no ground to conclude that the incident did not
 take place.
                                                                 D
      32. As regards the allegation of contradictions in the
 statements of prosecution witnesses, we do not find any
 major contradictions which require our attention and
 consideration. When a witness is examined at length it is
 quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true E
 witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant
 details. But Courts should bear in mind that it is only when
 discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
 incompatible with the credibility of his version that the Court F
 is justified in jettisoning his evidence [See: Rammi Vs.
State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649). There is no doubt that
when two views are possible, the one which favours the
 accused should be taken and the accused should be
 acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt. But in the instant G
case, the evidence on record is trustworthy and consistent,
and there is only one view, which points to the guilt of the
accused. Though the learned counsel for the appellants
sought to point out minor discrepancies in the evidence of
the witnesses, but in the light of the above judgment of the H
904         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015) 3 S.C.R.


A     court, we are of the considered opinion that such minor
      discrepancies should not come in the way of the other
      strong circumstantial evidence, cumulatively taken together,
      forms.a complete chain of events, pointing towards the guilt
      of the accused in the commission of the crime.
B
           33. In cases where the direct evidence is scarce, the
      burden of proving the case of prosecution is bestowed upon
      motive and circumstantial evidence. It is the chain of events
      that acquires prime importance in such cases. B e f o r e
C     analysing factual aspects it may be stated that for a crime
      to be proved it is not necessary that the crime must be seen
      to have been committed and must, in all circumstances be
      proved by direct ocular evidence by examining before the
      court those persons who.had seen its commission. The ·
D     offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The
      principal fact or factum probandum may be proved indirectly
      by means of certain inferences drawn from factum probans,
      that is, the evidentiary facts. To put it differently,
      circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue
E     but consists of evidence of various other facts which are
      so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken
      together they form a chain of circumstances from which the
      existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or
F     presumed [See: Bodhraj Vs. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC
      45). In the case on hand, the evidence adduced by the
      prosecution as discussed above, clearly proves the chain
      of events connecting the accused to the guilt of the
      commission of the offence. The entire evidence brought
G     on record by the prosecution, is not only convincing, but is
      also trustworthy. Even if the confession of accused Nos. 4
      and 7 made before PW 1 and PW 2, which is barred by
      Section 25 of the Evidence Act, is not taken into account,
      the other evidence on record adduced by the prosecution,
H     is sufficient to hold the accused guilty of the offence.
          PAWAN KUMAR @ MONU MITTAL v. STATE OF 905
            UTTAR PRADESH [N.V RAMANA, J.]

       34. This Court has been consistently taking the view A
  that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence,
  the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the in-
  criminating facts and circumstances are found to be incom-
. patible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any
  other person. In the present case, on scrutiny of evidence B
  on record, we are convinced that the prosecution had es-
  tablished beyond reasonable doubt the complete chain of
  events which points at the guilt of the accused.

      35. Thus, in the light of above circumstances coupled       C
 with the complete chain of events, this Court has no man-
 ner of doubt to hold that the prosecution has succeeded in
 proving its case against the accused beyond all reasonable
 doubt.
                                                                  D
    36. Taking the entire case in its totality, we do not find
 any merit in these appeals requiring our interference.
 Resultantly, the appeals fail and are dismissed.
 Nidhi Jain                                  Appeals dismissed.