PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHERversusTHE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER

                 [2023] 15 S.C.R. 923 : 2023 INSC 933



                            CASE DETAILS

                 PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER
                                     v.
          THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER
                   (Criminal Appeal No. 3274 of 2023)
                          OCTOBER 19, 2023
       [S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
                             HEADNOTES
      Issue for consideration: Whether the courts below were justified
in convicting and sentencing the accused for the offences punishable
u/ss. 498A, 304B read with s. 34 IPC and ss. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act; whether the conviction of the accused u/s. 304 B IPC would be
sustainable; and whether accused can be convicted for the offence punishable
u/s. 306 IPC though not charged for said offence.
      Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 498A, 304B rw s. 34, 306 – Cruelty against
married women – Abetment of suicide - Accused-husband and in-laws
subjected the deceased-wife to such cruelty and harassment for dowry
demand as to drive her to commit suicide by self-immolation – Recording
of the dying declaration of the wife and thereafter she succumbed to her
burn injuries – Conviction of the accused for the offences punishable u/
ss. 498A, 304B/34 and s. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced
accordingly – Justification:
      Held: Perusal of the dying declaration clearly suggests the same to be
genuine, true and the maker has stated the true story – Dying declaration
does not suggest that there was any proximate nexus to the act of committing
suicide on account of preceding dowry demand or the demand of dowry
on any particular date having triggered the deceased to commit the suicide
or forced her to self immolate – Proximate link not being available, the
conviction of the accused u/s 304B was improper and cannot be sustained
and is set aside – In the light of dying declaration having been accepted to
have been made by the deceased and the contents of the same disclosing
that she was mentally traumatized, unable to withstand the torture meted
                                    923
924           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 15 S.C.R.



out, which resulted in her committing suicide would suffice to convict the
accused for the offence punishable u/s. 498A – It is this taunting or mental
torture which she could not withstand and forced her to commit suicide
by selfimmolation – Thus, the accused persons are liable to be convicted
for the offence punishable u/s. 306 though charge was not framed – As
regards, aged accused-in laws, in view of the period of sentence already
undergone, and not having any past history of criminal record, a lenient view
is taken while imposing the sentence – Judgment and order of conviction
passed by the courts below is modified - Appellants are acquitted for the
offences punishable u/s. 304B and ss. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act
and convicted for the offence punishable u/ss. 306 and 498A read with s.
34 and sentenced to imprisonment for the period already undergone with
fine – Dowry Prohibition Act – ss. 3 and 4. [Paras 13, 17, 19, 21, 29, 30]
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 215 – Effect of errors –
Conviction of an accused for an offence with which he may not have
been specifically charged with – Permissibility – Accused having been
tried for the offences punishable u/ss. 498A, 304B IPC and ss. 3 and 4
of DP Act, if can be convicted for the offence punishable u/s. 306 IPC
though not charged for said offence:
      Held: Omission to frame charge does not disable the court from
convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have been proved on
the evidence on record – On facts, from the statement of charge framed u/s.
304B and in the alternative s. 306, it is clear that all the facts and ingredients
for framing the charge for offence u/s. 306 existed – Mere omission on the
part of the trial judge to mention s. 306 IPC with 498A would not preclude
this Court from convicting the accused for the said offence when found
proved – In the charge framed u/s. 304B, it is clearly mentioned that dying
declaration of the deceased indicates that deceased was mentally traumatized
and she was unable to tolerate the torture and harassment meted out by
the accused person on account of which she committed suicide by self
immolation and as such non-framing of the specific charge would not be fatal
as no injustice is being caused to the accused – Thus, the accused persons
liable to be convicted for the offence punishable u/s. 306 though charge
was not framed – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 304B, 306 – Dowry Prohibition
Act – ss. 3 and 4. [Paras 27, 29]
     PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                                  925
            KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER


       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Salim Gulab Pathan v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 6 SCC 606; Atbir
v. Government (2010) 9 SCC 1; Kamlavva and Anr v. State of Karnataka
(2009) 13 SCC 614; Bansilal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359; Sher
Singh Alias Partapa v. State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCR 29; Dinesh Seth
v. State of NCT of Delhi (2008) 14 SCC 94; Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P.
(2004) 5 SCC 334; K. Prema S. Rao & Anr v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and
Others (2003) 1 SCC 217 – referred to.
       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3274 of 2023.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 20.07.2022 of the High Court of
Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in CRLA No.2847 of 2012.
      Appearances:
     Ganesh Kumar R., Manjunath Meled, Sandeep Sharma, Mrs.
Vijayalaxmi Udapudi, Advs. for the Appellants.
     Prateek K. Chadha, AAG, V. N. Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta,
Sreekar A., Ms. Muskan Singla, Ms. Pragya Ganjoo, Shubhranshu Padhi,
Advs. for the Respondents.

       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                 JUDGMENT
      ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
      1. Leave granted.
      2. The judgment dated 20.07.2022 passed by High Court of Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench dismissing the Criminal Appeal No.2847 of 2012 by affirming
the judgment and order of sentence convicting the appellants passed by the
Sessions Judge, Bagalkot in S.C. No.35 of 2011 dated 14.09.2012 for the offences
punishable under Section 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 3
and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act (for short the ‘DPAct’) has been called in question.
926          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 15 S.C.R.


                      FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      3. The third daughter of the complainant (Shri Chandappa Gooli)
named Akkamahadevi was married to second respondent/accused No.1
herein on 16.05.2010. A complaint came to be lodged by Sri Chandappa
Gooli, father of the deceased on 20.12.2010 alleging thereunder that a dowry
of Rs. 31,000 and 1.5 tolas of gold was given at the time of marriage and
additional dowry of Rs. 50,000 and gold was demanded after two months
of marriage. It was alleged that accused No.1 and his parents (appellants)
gave physical and mental torture to his daughter and unable to bear the same
she committed suicide by self-immolating namely by pouring kerosene and
lighting fire. A dying declaration came to be recorded on 20.12.2010 and she
died on 24.12.2010 due to burn injuries. Initially FIR came to be registered
in Crime No.143 of 2010 for the offences punishable under Section 323,
498A read with Section 34 of IPC and 504 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4
of the DP Act and on her death on 24.12.2010, Section 304B of IPC was
added. On completion of investigation charge-sheet came to be filed and
the jurisdictional sessions judge took cognizance of the offence alleged
against the accused persons namely husband-accused No.1 (R-2 herein),
appellant No’s 1 and 2 herein (accused No.2 and 3) and Smt. Ningamma
accused No.4. On behalf of the prosecution, 32 witnesses were examined as
PW-1 to PW-32 and they got marked 50 documents as Ex.P-1 to P-50 and
three material objects as MO 1 to MO 3. On closure of prosecution side, the
accused were examined and their statements also came to be recorded under
section 313 of Cr.P.C. Accused No.4 (mother of accused No.3) had expired
on 28.02.2012 and as such the proceedings against her stood abated. After
hearing the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned advocates appearing
for accused No. 1 to 3, they came to be convicted for the offences alleged
against them. The learned Trial Judge had convicted the accused by relying
upon the dying declaration (Ex.P.45) and sentenced them to undergo 7 years
of simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 304B, five years of
simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, one year of simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 498A
r/w Section 34 of IPC and one year of simple imprisonment for the offence
under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act with fine of Rs. 1000 for each of
the offences under Section 498A, 304B and Section 4 of DP Act for each
of the accused and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for
    PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                              927
    KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

a period of 3 months, and fine of Rs. 31,000 each for the offence under
Section 3 of DP Act with default sentence of three months. All sentences
were ordered to run concurrently.
      4. Being aggrieved by said judgment, appeal came to be preferred on
various grounds and primarily on the ground that deceased had suffered
burn injuries to the extent of 70-80% and she was not in a position to speak.
It was also contended that Doctor PW-32 who had certified that deceased
was able to speak had not even recorded the blood pressure and pulse rate
of the deceased in the case-sheet and the treated doctor PW-31 has also
admitted that general condition of the deceased was poor at the time of
admission to the hospital itself. It was also urged that evidence which was
available before the trial court was not appreciated in proper perspective
and mere dying declaration cannot be the sole basis of conviction unless
it was corroborated. It was also contended that none of the prosecution
witnesses supported the story of prosecution and they had turned hostile
and as such learned Session Judge ought not to have convicted the accused
persons.
      5. The High Court by the impugned judgement having formulated
points for its consideration vide paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment,
has answered the points formulated, in favour of the prosecution and against
the accused by holding that dying declaration was recorded properly and
same is proved by taking into consideration the contents of the same and
the evidence of Tehsildar who recorded the same as well as the evidence
of Doctor PW-31 who treated the deceased and had issued Ex.P-46 (case
sheet of deceased Mahadevi). Hence, this appeal.
      6. We have heard the arguments of the learned advocates appearing
for the parties. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants contends that
dying declaration is neither true nor voluntary statement of deceased as she
was not physically or mentally fit to make any declaration and undisputedly
the parents of the deceased had not supported the case of the prosecution. He
would also contend that doctor who had examined the deceased and treated
her has clearly deposed that deceased was suffering from breathlessness
when brought to the hospital and he had also certified that she had suffered
70 to 80% burn injuries and thereby making her physically and mentally
incapacitated to give any declaration or make any statement.
928          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      7. Per contra Shri V.N. Raghupathy, learned Standing Counsel
appearing for the State by supporting the judgment of both the courts would
submit that there is no cogent material to displace the findings recorded
by the courts below. He would also contend that dying declaration cannot
be brushed aside merely because deceased had suffered 70% to 80% burn
injuries and this cannot be a ground to set aside the conviction. He would
submit that Doctor PW-31 had deposed in clear terms that deceased was
mentally fit to make statement and as such no doubt can be raised as regards
the mental capacity of the deceased to make statement wherein she had
assigned the reasons for her self-immolation. Hence, he prays for rejection
of the appeal.
           DISCUSSION, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
      8. The facts narrated hereinabove would suffice for examining as to
whether the orders of the courts below requires to be sustained or modified
or set aside. Elaborate narration of factual aspects would only burden this
judgment and as such we desist from doing so, except to the extent required.
     9. The solemnisation of marriage between second respondent and
Mrs. Akkamahadevi on 16.05.2010 is not in dispute. She having died on
24.12.2010 due to burn injuries sustained on 20.12.2010 is also not in
dispute.
      9.1 The gist of the prosecution case is that there was consistent demand
for dowry and deceased was tortured for additional dowry and unable to
sustain the physical and mental torture meted out to her, she had committed
suicide by self-immolation viz, by pouring kerosene and lighting herself.
      9.2 The complainant, PW-24 who is the father of the deceased has not
supported the case of the prosecution and he has deposed that accused had
looked after the deceased well. Long and short of the deposition of PW-24
(father of deceased) is that he did not support the case of the prosecution.
PW-1 witness to the inquest panchanama too has turned hostile. The
neighbours of the house where the deceased was residing namely PW-3
and PW-4 have turned hostile. PW-5 and PW-21 whom the prosecution
claimed of having known the fact of ill-treatment given by the accused to
the deceased have turned hostile. The persons who are said to have advised
the accused not to ill-treat the deceased have also turned hostile. The persons
    PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                                929
    KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

who were present during the marriage talks of the deceased and accused No.1
namely PW-7 to PW-9 have also not supported the case of the prosecution.
Other witnesses namely PW-10, 11, 12, 19, 18, 30 as well as the mother
of the deceased PW-22 have not supported the case of the prosecution. Dr.
Suresh Basarkod (PW.26) who tendered the case sheet attested by casualty
medical officer of Kumareshwar Hospital, Bagalkot, where deceased was
admitted, has deposed that Dr. Pramod Mirji (PW-31) and Dr. Vishwanath
are competent to speak about medical treatment extended to Mahadevi
(deceased). However, Dr. Vishwanath was not examined.
      9.3 Dr. Pramod Mirji has been examined as PW-31 and he has stated
that deceased was conscious and she was complaining of pain. He has further
deposed to the following effect:
     “The patient was conscious and she was complaining of pain. There
     were burn injuries over entire body excepted face. The injured has burn
     injuries of 70% -80%. The patient was in a position to speak. She was
     under my treatment till she died on 24.12.2010 at about 5.15 a.m. Now
     I see Ex.P-46 and it is Xerox copy of case sheet of the said injured.
     In case sheet Ex.P-46 I have mentioned that the patient was under
     agony due to pain and pulse not filed and B.P. was not recordable and
     therefore I have opined that general condition of patient was poor.”
      Perusal of his cross-examination would indicate that he had treated
the deceased for four days and the pulse rate and blood pressure was not
recorded on the day of admission and it is kept blank in the case sheet Ex.P-
46. He also admits that entries in the case sheet would reflect that the general
condition of the deceased was poor. He further admits that blood pressure
of the deceased was not recordable and pulse was feeble. He further admits
that deceased was suffering from breathlessness as per the entries found in
Ex.P-46 (case sheet). He has also admitted that even though patient was
conscious at times the patient had not been in a position to talk.
      9.4 Dr. Mahalingappa Kori (PW32) who was CMO at Kumareshwar
Hospital, Bagalkot during the relevant period when the dying declaration
(Ex.P-45) was recorded has deposed that he was working as casualty
medical officer at the hospital on 20.12.2010 from 2:00 PM to 8:00 PM.
He has further deposed that Tahasildar (PW25) had expressed his intention
to record the dying declaration of injured Mahadevi and he had requested
930          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


him to be present at the time of recording of the statement. He states that he
examined Mahadevi at that time and she was conscious and in a condition to
speak. He also states that the statement of Mahadevi was recorded between
4:20 PM to 5:15 PM. He has identified his endorsement and signature at
Ex-P45(b) on the dying declaration.
      10. Taluka executive Magistrate Basappa Laxmappa Gothe PW-25 is
said to have recorded the dying declaration of the deceased as per Ex.P-
45, based on which the accused has been convicted by the trial court and
affirmed by the High Court. PW25 who was the Tahasildar at Bagalkot
during the relevant period has deposed that he was working as Tahasildar
in Bagalkot from 08/07/2009 to 27/04/2011. He has deposed that Dr.
Mahalingappa Kori (PW32) was present when he recorded the statement of
Mahadevi from 4:20 PM to 5:15 PM. He further deposes that Dr. MC Kori
had talked to the deceased and found that she was in a fit condition to give
statement. He further deposes that he was also convinced that Mahadevi
was fit to give statement. He has identified the statement recorded by
him as Ex-P45 and also the LTM of the deceased found in Ex-P45. He
has deposed that doctor was present throughout the time of recording of
statement and the signature & endorsement of the doctor marked as Ex-
P45(b) has been identified. PW25 had also conducted inquest panchnama
(Ex.P-1) & recorded the statement of Renavva Chandappa Guli (PW22)
and he has identified his signature found on the statement of PW22 (Ex.
P40) as Ex.P-40(a). He has denied the suggestion that deceased Mahadevi
had not given any statement.
      11. The learned Sessions judge has referred to the judgment of
this Court in the case of Salim Gulab Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra
(2012) 6 SCC 606 whereunder it has been held that dying declaration can
be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence of the court.
Yet another judgment of this Court in the case of Atbir vs. Government
(2010) 9 SCC 1 which is to the same effect has also been relied upon by
the Sessions Judge to convict the accused, whereunder it has been held
that dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction.
      “(a) If it satisfies the conscience of the court that deceased was in a
      fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was
      not a case of prompting or imagination;
    PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                              931
    KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

     (b) It is true and voluntary and no further corroboration is required;
     (c) It is not suspicious.”
     It has also been observed therein that rule requiring corroboration is
merely a rule of prudence. If the dying declaration discloses that deceased
was unconscious or could never have made any statement, the conviction
cannot be sustained. Even non-mentioning of minute details cannot be a
ground to reject the said declaration and brief statement would suffice. If
the evidence on record would suggest that the deceased was not in a fit
condition to make statement or declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail.
      12. In the instant case, we notice from the facts that the deceased had
self-immolated. A plain reading of the dying declaration Ex.P-45 recorded
by PW-25 would indicate that reason for self-immolation by the deceased
was on account of her inability to tolerate the torture meted out by the
accused persons and she was not able to withstand the same and as such
she self-immolated in the agricultural land. The physical disability suffered
by her on account of the burn injuries sustained would not disentitle her to
make statement, if said statement had been made consciously knowing the
consequences thereof and such statement or declaration cannot be brushed
aside only on the ground of burn injuries (in the instant case 70% to 80%)
having been sustained by her. As such, the contention raised by the learned
advocates appearing for the appellants cannot be accepted or in other
words the dying declaration cannot be brushed aside. The acceptance of
the dying declaration by the court below is just a proper and under similar
circumstances, this Court, in the case of Kamlavva And Anr Vs. State of
Karnataka (2009) 13 SCC 614 has held that even in circumstances where
the burn injuries was to the extent of 70% to 80% the dying declaration can
be accepted and it has been further held to the following effect.
     “20. The next and the most vital issue which was raised is regarding
     the admissibility of the dying declaration stated to have been made by
     the deceased before her death. Before dealing with the factual aspect
     of the dying declaration, it would be necessary to know the exact
     legal position which has been laid down and reiterated by this Court
     time and again.
932           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      21. The question as to admissibility of a dying declaration came
      up before this Court in several cases. In Laxman v. State of
      Maharashtra, wherein also a question regarding the admissibility
      of the dying declaration was raised, the Constitution Bench held
      that the Court must decide that the declarant was in a fit state of
      mind to make the declaration, but where the eyewitnesses’ evidence
      including the evidence of a Magistrate who had recorded the dying
      declaration to that effect was available, mere absence of doctor’s
      certification as to the fitness of the declarant’s state of mind, would
      not ipso facto render the dying declaration unacceptable. It was
      further held that the evidentiary value of such dying declaration
      would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular
      case.
      22. In para 3 of the said judgment in Laxman case, this Court discussed
      the juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration in the
      following manner: (SCC p. 713)
      “3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration
      is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the
      point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every
      motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most
      powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the
      same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be
      given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many
      circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a
      man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law
      to accept the veracity of his statement.”
      23. The Constitution Bench in Laxman case also referred to an earlier
      decision of this Court in Koll Chunilal Savjl v. State of Gujarat wherein
      it was held that the ultimate test with regard to the admissibility of a
      dying declaration is whether the dying declaration can be held to be
      a truthful one and voluntarily given. In the said decision it was also
      held that before recording the declaration, the officer concerned must
      find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement.
      The aforesaid ratio of Koli Chunilal Savji case was affirmed by the
      Constitution Bench in Laxman case¹.
PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                               933
KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

 24. In Vikas v. State of Maharashtra this Court elaborately discussed
 the previous relevant decisions governing the legality of dying
 declaration and observed in para 45 as follows: (SCC pp. 529-30)
 45. The Court, referring to earlier case law, summed up principles
 governing dying declaration as under: (Paniben case, SCC pp. 480-
 81, para 18)
 (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration
 cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
 (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and
 voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration.
 (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and
 must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting
 or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify
 the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.
 (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon
 without corroborative evidence.
 (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any
 dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected.
 (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the
 basis of conviction.
 (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details
 as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
 (vii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be
 discarded.
 On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.
 (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased
 was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up
 to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the
 deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration,
 the medical opinion cannot prevail.
 (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given
 in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.
934           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      25. After referring to the decision of this Court in Khushal Rao v. State
      of Bombay, this Court in Vikas reiterated the legal position that where
      a dying declaration is recorded by a competent Magistrate, it would
      stand on a much higher footing inasmuch as a competent Magistrate
      has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration
      of the victim and in absence of circumstances showing anything to the
      contrary, he should not be disbelieved by the court.”
      13. In the light of above discussion, we are of the considered view
that the dying declaration Ex.P-45 in the instant case which came to be
accepted by the courts below cannot be found fault with, particularly, in the
backdrop of the evidence tendered by the person who recorded the same
as per Ex.P-45 and he having stood to his ground in the cross-examination
and having spoken about her mental capability to make such statement and
that too consciously. Dr. M.C. Kori PW-32 in whose presence the dying
declaration Ex.P-45 came to be recorded by PW-25 has categorically
stated that deceased Mahadevi was conscious and she was in a condition
to speak. There is no prescribed format for recording the dying declaration.
The perusal of the dying declaration in the instant case clearly suggests
the same to be genuine and the maker has stated the true story. On going
through the same, it appears to our mind as it appeared to the trial court and
the High Court to be genuine, true and not tainted with doubt or shrouded
with mystery. The contents of the dying declaration Ex.P-45 suggests the
possible explanation of the occurrence of the incident and it also appears
to be the truthful version of the maker.
      14. The incidental question that would also arise for our consideration
is: whether the conviction of the accused under Section 304B would be
sustainable? The ingredients to be satisfied for convicting an accused for
the offence punishable under Section 304B are:
      “(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury
      or otherwise than under a normal circumstance.
      (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her
      marriage.
      (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
      husband or any relative of her husband.
    PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                                935
    KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

     (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with
     demand of dowry.
     (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the
     woman soon before her death.”
      15. This Court in the case of Bansilal vs. State of Haryana (2011) 11
SCC 359 has held that, to attract the provision of Section 304B of the IPC,
one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established
is that “soon before her death”, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment
“in connection with the demand of dowry”. It has been further held:
     “20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have
     been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a
     presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. It may also
     be pertinent to mention herein that the expression “soon before her
     death” has not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each
     case, the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to
     the death of the victim and decide if there is any proximate connection
     between the demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and the
     death. (Vide T. Aruntperunjothi v. State ; Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan;
     State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram ; Anand Kumar v. State of M.P. and
     Undavalli Narayana Rao v. State of A.P.”
       16. In Sher Singh Alias Partapa vs State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCR 29
it has been held:
     “16. As is already noted above, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
     and Section 304-B IPC were introduced into their respective statutes
     simultaneously and, therefore, it must ordinarily be assumed that
     Parliament intentionally used the word “deemed” in Section 304-B to
     distinguish this provision from the others. In actuality, however, it is
     well-nigh impossible to give a sensible and legally acceptable meaning
     to these provisions, unless the word “shown” is used as synonymous
     to “prove” and the word “presume” as freely interchangeable with the
     word “deemed”. In the realm of civil and fiscal law, it is not difficult
     to import the ordinary meaning of the word “deem” to denote a set of
     circumstances which call to be construed contrary to what they actually
     are. In criminal legislation, however, it is unpalatable to adopt this
936           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      approach by rote. We have the high authority of the Constitution Bench
      of this Court both in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas
      Cashewnut Factory [AIR 1953 SC 333] and State of T.N. v. Arooran
      Sugars Ltd. [(1997) 1 SCC 326], requiring the Court to ascertain the
      purpose behind the statutory fiction brought about by the use of the
      word “deemed” so as to give full effect to the legislation and carry it to
      its logical conclusion. We may add that it is generally posited that there
      are rebuttable as well as irrebuttable presumptions, the latter oftentimes
      assuming an artificiality as actuality by means of a deeming provision.
      It is abhorrent to criminal jurisprudence to adjudicate a person guilty
      of an offence even though he had neither intention to commit it nor
      active participation in its commission. It is after deep cogitation that
      we consider it imperative to construe the word “shown” in Section
      304-B IPC as to, in fact, connote “prove”. In other words, it is for
      the prosecution to prove that a “dowry death” has occurred, namely,
      (i) that the death of a woman has been caused in abnormal circumstances
      by her having been burned or having been bodily injured,
      (ii) within seven years of her marriage,
      (iii) and that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
      or any relative of her husband,
      (iv) in connection with any demand for dowry, and
      (v) that the cruelty or harassment meted out to her continued to have
      a causal connection or a live link with the demand of dowry.
      We are aware that the word “soon” finds place in Section 304-B; but we
      would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years,
      but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be
      stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause
      for the death under Section 304-B or the suicide under Section 306
      IPC. Once the presence of these concomitants is established or shown
      or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility,
      the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of
      guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof
      upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt,
      beyond reasonable doubt. It seems to us that what Parliament intended
    PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                               937
    KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

     by using the word “deemed” was that only preponderance of evidence
     would be insufficient to discharge the husband or his family members
     of their guilt. This interpretation provides the accused a chance of
     proving their innocence. This is also the postulation of Section 101
     of the Evidence Act. The purpose of Section 113-B of the Evidence
     Act and Section 304-B IPC, in our opinion, is to counter what is
     commonly encountered—the lack or the absence of evidence in the
     case of suicide or death of a woman within seven years of marriage. If
     the word “shown” has to be given its ordinary meaning then it would
     only require the prosecution to merely present its evidence in court, not
     necessarily through oral deposition, and thereupon make the accused
     lead detailed evidence to be followed by that of the prosecution.
     This procedure is unknown to common law systems, and beyond the
     contemplation of CrPC.”
      17. In the instant case as noticed hereinabove, the parents of the
deceased and other witnesses who had recorded their statement before the
I.O. with regard to alleged demand of dowry have retraced their steps or
in other words have turned hostile and have not supported the prosecution
and have denied of having made any such statement before police. Be
that as it may. This Court having arrived at a conclusion that the dying
declaration made by the deceased as per Ex.P-45 being genuine and when
said declaration is perused it would not suggest that there was any proximate
nexus to the act of committing suicide on account of preceding demand for
dowry or in other words the demand of dowry on any particular date having
triggered the deceased to commit the suicide or forced her to self-immolate.
This proximate link not being available in the facts obtained in the present
case, we are of the considered view that conviction of the accused under
Section 304B cannot be sustained.
      18. In the aforesaid analysis of law, when we turn our attention to the
facts on hand it would emerge from the records that appellants-accused
persons have been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections
498A, 304B of IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Section
498A of IPC prescribes imprisonment which may extend to 3 years and
the Explanation thereunder has two parts. The first part would relate to
subjecting a married woman to cruelty for any willful conduct which is of
938           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


such a nature as is likely to drive her to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb, or health (whether mental or physical). Second
Part i.e. Clause (b) of Section 498A would indicate that cruelty would
encompass harassment of a married woman where such harassment is with
a view to pressurize her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security on account of failure by her
or any person related to her to meet such demand.
      19. In Dinesh Seth v State of NCT of Delhi (2008) 14 SCC 94,
this Court has examined the width and scope of two Sections i.e., 304B &
498A and was held to be different. Section 304B deals with cases of death
as a result of cruelty or harassment within 7 years of marriage. Whereas
Section 498A has a wider spectrum and it covers all cases in which the wife
is subjected to cruelty by her husband or relative of the husband which may
result in death by way of suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life,
limb or health (whether mental or physical) or even harassment caused
with a view to coerce the woman or any person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand of property or valuable security. We have already discussed
hereinabove as to there being no nexus for the deceased to self-immolate
herself on account of such demand having preceded immediately before
her death. As such we have opined that convicting the accused/appellants
under Section 304B was improper or the prosecution had failed to establish
that the death had occurred and soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by the appellants.
      20. It has been held in Dinesh Seth’s (Supra) Case
      “24. Section 498-A was added to IPC by amending Act 46 of 1983
      in the backdrop of growing menace of dowry related cases in which
      the women were subjected to cruelty and harassment and were forced
      to commit suicide. This section lays down that if the husband or his
      relative subjects a woman to cruelty, then he/she is liable to be punished
      with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall
      also be liable to fine. Explanation appended to this section defines the
      term “cruelty” to mean any wilful conduct which is of such a nature
      as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
      injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
      of the woman; or harassment of the woman where such harassment is
   PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                                939
   KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

     with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any
     unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account
     of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
     25. After three years, Section 304-B was inserted by amending Act 43
     of 1986 to deal with cases involving dowry deaths occurring within
     seven years of marriage. Sub-section (1) of Section 304-B IPC lays
     down that where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or
     bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances
     within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before
     her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
     or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand
     for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband
     or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. By virtue of
     Explanation appearing below sub-section (1), the word “dowry” used
     therein carries the same meaning as is contained in Section 2 of the
     Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
     26. The ingredient of cruelty is common to Sections 304-B and 498-A
     IPC, but the width and scope of the two sections is different, inasmuch
     as Section 304-B deals with cases of death as a result of cruelty or
     harassment within seven years of marriage, Section 498-A has a wider
     spectrum and it covers all cases in which the wife is subjected to cruelty
     by her husband or relative of the husband which may result in death by
     way of suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
     (whether mental or physical) or even harassment caused with a view
     to coerce the woman or any person related to her to meet unlawful
     demand for property or valuable security.”
      21. Section 498A having a wider scope, it will have to be examined as
to whether the accused is to be convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 498A or in other words, the order of conviction passed by Sessions
Court and affirmed by High Court deserves to be affirmed, notwithstanding
the conviction under Section 304B having been set aside. Irrespective of
the fact that accused have been acquitted for the offence punishable under
Section 304B, Section 498A would cover the cases in which the wife is
subjected to cruelty by husband or relatives of the husband which may
result in death by way of suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life,
940           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


limb or health (whether mental or physical). In the light of dying declaration
(Ex.P-45) having been accepted to have been made by the deceased and the
contents of the same disclosing that she was unable to withstand the torture
meted out, which resulted in her committing suicide would suffice to convict
the accused for the offence punishable under Section 498A.
      22. This takes us to the next question as to whether the accused can
be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC though not
charged for said offence. Similar situation arose before this Court in Dalbir
Singh vs State of U.P. (2004) 5 SCC 334 where a charge for the offence
under Section 306 had not been framed against the accused though accused
had faced trial in respect of the charges under Section 302, 498A and 304B
IPC as has happened in the instant case where the accused have been tried
for the offences punishable under Section 498A, 304B IPC and Section 3
and 4 of DP Act and this Court had answered in the affirmative in Dalbir
Singh’s case by arriving at the following conclusion:
      “17. There is a catena of decisions of this Court on the same lines and
      it is not necessary to burden this judgment by making reference to each
      one of them. Therefore, in view of Section 464 CrPC, it is possible for
      the appellate or revisional court to convict an accused for an offence
      for which no charge was framed unless the court is of the opinion that
      a failure of justice would in fact occasion. In order to judge whether a
      failure of justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine
      whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence
      for which he is being convicted and whether the main facts sought to
      be established against him were explained to him clearly and whether
      he got a fair chance to defend himself. We are, therefore, of the opinion
      that Sangaraboina Sreenu [(1997) 5 SCC 348 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 690]
      was not correctly decided as it purports to lay down as a principle of
      law that where the accused is charged under Section 302 IPC, he cannot
      be convicted for the offence under Section 306 IPC.
      18. The facts and circumstances of the present case may now be
      examined in the light of the principle discussed above. The trial court
      and also the High Court have recorded a clear finding and with which
      we are in complete agreement, that the accused had started making a
      demand of dowry soon after marriage. Even after his father-in-law had
PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                               941
KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

 given him a colour TV, a scooter and money for purchasing the flat,
 he did not feel satisfied and continued to harass his wife. He used to
 frequently taunt her that some of the items given by way of gift at the
 time of marriage were of poor quality and were not of his standard.
 He had also assaulted his wife and even his seven-year-old daughter
 on several occasions. It was in such circumstances that Vimla took
 the extreme step of not only setting herself on fire, but also her two
 daughters, one of whom was only one-year old. The letter written by
 Vimla just before taking such an extreme step speaks volumes about
 the treatment meted out to her by the accused. Therefore, the basic
 ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC have been established
 by the prosecution. These features of the prosecution case were sought
 to be established by the prosecution in order to substantiate the charge
 under Section 498-A IPC and also for showing that the accused had
 a motive to commit the crime of murder for which he was actually
 charged. The cross-examination of the witnesses shows that every
 effort was made to demolish the aforesaid aspect of the prosecution
 case, namely, that neither was any demand of dowry made nor were
 any gifts or presents or money received by the accused at a subsequent
 stage and that Vimla had not been subjected to any kind of harassment
 or ill-treatment. The next question to be seen is whether the accused
 was confronted with the aforesaid features of the prosecution case in his
 statement under Section 313 CrPC. His statement runs into six pages
 where every aspect of the prosecution case referred to above was put to
 him. He also gave a long written statement in accordance with Section
 233(2) CrPC wherein he admitted that Vimla committed suicide. He
 also admitted that the scooter and colour TV were subsequently given
 to him by his in-laws but came out with a plea that he had paid money
 and purchased the same from his in-laws. There is no aspect of the
 prosecution which may not have been put to him. We are, therefore,
 of the opinion that in view of the material on record, the conviction
 under Section 306 IPC can safely be recorded and the same would
 not result in failure of justice in any manner. The record shows that
 the accused was taken into custody on 29-3-1991 and was released
 from jail after the decision of the High Court on 20-3-1997 and thus
 he has undergone nearly six years of imprisonment. In our opinion, the
942           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      period already undergone (as undertrial and after conviction) would
      meet the ends of justice.”
      22. In Dinesh Seth’s case (supra) it has been held that in certain
situations, an accused can be convicted for an offence with which he may
not have been specifically charged and an error, omission or irregularity in
framing of charge is, by itself not sufficient for upsetting the conviction.
The only exception to this general rule as can be noticed from Section 464
of Cr.P.C. is, unless the accused is able to demonstrate a failure of justice
has in fact been occasioned thereby. It has been held thereunder as:
      “21. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that in certain situations
      an accused can be convicted for an offence with which he may not have
      been specifically charged and that an error, omission or irregularity
      in the framing of charge is, by itself not sufficient for upsetting the
      conviction. The appellate, confirming or revisional court can interfere
      in such matters only if it is shown that error, omission or irregularity in
      the framing of charge has caused prejudice to the accused and failure
      of justice has been occasioned.”
     23. After noticing the meaning to be attached to the plain language
of Section 221 and Section 464 of Cr.P.C. this Court in Dinesh Seth-supra
has opined:
      “11. A reading of the plain language of Sections 221(1) and (2) shows
      that if a single act or a series of acts constitute several offences and the
      prosecution is not certain about the particular offence then the accused
      can be charged with the allegation of having committed all, some or
      any of the offences. In such a case the accused can be convicted of
      the offence with which he may not have been specifically charged but
      evidence produced by the prosecution proves that such an offence has,
      in fact, been committed.
      12. Section 222(1) lays down that when a person is charged with an
      offence consisting of several particulars and combination of only some
      of the particulars constituting a minor offence is proved then he can
      be convicted of the minor offence with which he may not have been
      charged. Section 222(2) lays down that when a person is charged with
      an offence but the facts proved constitute a minor offence then he can
    PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                                  943
    KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

      be convicted of the minor offence despite the fact that he may not have
      been charged with that offence. Sub-section (3) of Section 222 lays down
      that a person charged with an offence, can be convicted of an attempt to
      commit such offence even though a separate charge may not have been
      framed on that account.
      13. Section 464(1) lays down that any error, omission or irregularity in the
      framing of charge including any misjoinder of charges, will not invalidate
      a finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction unless
      the higher court comes to a conclusion that failure of justice has been
      occasioned. Sub-section (2) of Section 464 specifies the modes which
      can be adopted by the court of appeal, confirmation or revision, if such
      court is of the opinion that a failure of justice has been occasioned on
      account of non-framing of charge or any error, omission or irregularity
      in the framing of charge.”
      24. In the light of aforesaid analysis, the question that would arise
is: whether the accused in the instant case can be convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 306 IPC? Section 306 reads as under:
      “306. Abetment of suicide. —If any person commits suicide, whoever
      abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment
      of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
      also be liable to fine.”
      The basic ingredients of an offence under Section 306 is suicidal death
and its abetment thereof. To attract the ingredients of abetment, the intention
of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide would
be necessary.
      25. It would be necessary at this juncture itself to note the statement made
by the deceased in her dying declaration Ex.P-45 which is to the following effect:
      “I have been given in marriage xxx for the dowry all of them were
      harassing me by saying my father had given less dowry and customary gifts
      to the groom. As I couldn’t tolerate the torture, I have set fire to myself
      by pouring on me at the shade situated in our land on 20.12.2010 in
      early morning at about 6:30 to 7:00. My husband xxx Bagalkot city.”
                                                    (Emphasis supplied by us)
944           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      26. The court below had formulated point No.1 for its adjudication
which is to the effect: whether the deceased Akkamahadevi died suicidal
death? and, answered the same in the affirmative by opining that deceased
died due to burn injuries which she had suffered on account of self-
immolation. The act of cruelty has been spelt out by none else than the
victim herself in her dying declaration Ex.P-45. She has in clear words stated
all the accused were harassing her by stating that her father had given less
dowry and customary gifts to her husband and being unable to tolerate this
mental torture, she had set fire to herself on the fateful day. The accused
being the husband, father-in-law & mother-in-law are said to have harassed
the deceased, subjected her to cruelty and the deceased has in clear terms
stated in her dying declaration that she could not tolerate the same. Thus,
the torture which has taken place within the four walls is supported by the
statement of the victim and stands proved by virtue of dying declaration
having been accepted by us. It is this act of torture which led the deceased to
commit suicide and these acts have forced the deceased to commit suicide.
      27. Omission to frame charge does not disable the court from
convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have been proved
on the evidence on record. The code has ample provisions to meet a situation
like the one before us. From the statement of charge framed under Section
304B and in the alternative Section 306, it is clear that all the facts and
ingredients for framing the charge for offence under Section 306 existed.
The mere omission on the part of the trial judge to mention Section 306
IPC with 498A would not preclude this Court from convicting the accused
for the said offence when found proved. In the charge framed under Section
304B of IPC, it has been clearly mentioned that the accused has subjected the
deceased to such cruelty and harassment as to drive her to commit suicide
by self-immolation and as such non-framing of the specific charge would
not be fatal in the instant case as no injustice is being caused to the accused.
      28. This court in K. Prema S. Rao & anr v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao
and others (2003) 1 SCC 217 has held that mere omission or defect in
framing of charge would not be fatal if from the statement of charge under
Section 304B and in the alternative Section 498A, it is clear that all facts
and ingredients for framing of charge under Section 306 existed in the case,
same would suffice. It was further held that:
PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                               945
KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

 “22. Mere omission or defect in framing charge does not disable the
 criminal court from convicting the accused for the offence which is
 found to have been proved on the evidence on record. The Code of
 Criminal Procedure has ample provisions to meet a situation like the
 one before us. From the statement of charge framed under Section
 304-B and in the alternative Section 498-A IPC (as quoted above) it
 is clear that all facts and ingredients for framing charge for offence
 under Section 306 IPC existed in the case. The mere omission on the
 part of the trial Judge to mention Section 306 IPC with Section 498-A
 IPC does not preclude the court from convicting the accused for the
 said offence when found proved. In the alternate charge framed under
 Section 498-A IPC, it has been clearly mentioned that the accused
 subjected the deceased to such cruelty and harassment as to drive her to
 commit suicide. The provisions of Section 221 CrPC take care of such
 a situation and safeguard the powers of the criminal court to convict
 an accused for an offence with which he is not charged although on
 facts found in evidence, he could have been charged for such offence.
 Section 221 CrPC needs reproduction:
 “221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed.—(1) If a
 single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which
 of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the
 accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such
 offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he
 may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one
 of the said offences.
 (2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence, and it
 appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he
 might have been charged under the provisions of sub-section (1), he
 may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed,
 although he was not charged with it.”
 23. The provision of sub-section (2) of Section 221 read
 with sub-section (1) of the said section can be taken aid of in
 convicting and sentencing Accused 1 of offence of abetment of
 suicide under Section 306 IPC along with or instead of Section
 498-A IPC.
946           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


      24. Section 215 allows the criminal court to ignore any error in stating
      either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge,
      if the accused was not, in fact, misled by such error or omission in
      framing the charge and it has not occasioned a failure of justice. See
      Section 215 CrPC which reads:
      “215. Effect of errors.—No error in stating either the offence or the
      particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state
      the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the
      case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error
      or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice.”
      25. As provided in Section 215 CrPC omission to frame charge
      under Section 306 IPC has not resulted in any failure of justice. We
      find no necessity to remit the matter to the trial court for framing
      charge under Section 306 IPC and direct a retrial for that charge. The
      accused cannot legitimately complain of any want of opportunity to
      defend the charge under Section 306 IPC and a consequent failure of
      justice. The same facts found in evidence, which justify conviction
      of the appellant under Section 498-A for cruel treatment of his wife,
      make out a case against him under Section 306 IPC of having abetted
      commission of suicide by the wife. The appellant was charged for an
      offence of higher degree causing “dowry death” under Section 304-B
      which is punishable with minimum sentence of seven years› rigorous
      imprisonment and maximum for life. Presumption under Section 113-
      A of the Evidence Act could also be raised against him on same facts
      constituting offence of cruelty under Section 498-A IPC. No further
      opportunity of defence is required to be granted to the appellant when
      he had ample opportunity to meet the charge under Section 498-A IPC.”
      29. In the aforesaid background and the evidence on record as already
noticed by us hereinabove, it can be safely noted that High Court ought to
have examined as to whether accused could have been convicted for an
offence for which no charge was framed and not undertaking of such an
exercise would result in failure of justice? Thus, it will have to be seen from
the facts unfolded in the present case as to whether the accused was aware
of the basic ingredients of the offence for which they are being tried and
whether the main facts sought to be established against them were explained
    PARANAGOUDA AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF                                  947
    KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

to them clearly and whether they got a fair chance to defend themselves. If the
answer is in the affirmative, then necessarily this Court will have to proceed
further and examine as to whether accused can be convicted for the offence
not charged and if the answer is in the negative it would result in acquittal
of the accused for said offence. In the instant case the dying declaration of
the deceased would clearly indicate that deceased was mentally traumatized
and she was unable to tolerate the torture and harassment meted out by
the accused person on account of which she committed suicide. It is this
taunting or mental torture which she could not withstand and forced her to
commit suicide by self-immolation. In that view of the matter, we are of the
considered opinion that accused persons are liable to be convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 306 IPC though charge was not framed.
The accused (appellant Nos.1 and 2) are now aged about 66 and 61 years
respectively. They have already spent one year, one month and 27 days
in prison. They do not have any past history of criminal record. Hence, a
lenient view has to be taken while imposing the sentence.
      30. For the reasons afore-stated the appeal is allowed in part. The
judgment and order of conviction passed by the Sessions Court in SC No.35
of 2011 dated 14.09.2012 as affirmed in Criminal Appeal No.2847 of 2012 by
judgment dated 20.07.2022 is hereby modified. The appellants are acquitted
for the offences punishable under Section 304B IPC and Section 3 and 4
of Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 306 and Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to
imprisonment for the period already undergone with fine of Rs.5000/- each
and in default to pay the fine to undergo one month simple imprisonment
for each of the offence.


Headnotes prepared by:                                      Appeal partly allowed.
Nidhi Jain