P. SHANTHI PUGAZHENTHIversusSTATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE SPE/CBI/ACB/CHENNAI
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 674
- Decided
- 12 May 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SUDHANSHU DHULIA
Holding
The appellant was correctly convicted for abetment of the offence under section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with section 109 IPC.
Summary
The appellant, an Assistant Superintendent at Chennai Port Trust, was convicted for abetting her husband, a public servant, in acquiring assets disproportionate to his known income during the check period 2002-2009. The assets were held in the appellant's name, and she was alleged to have concealed the wealth, thereby facilitating the offence under section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a non‑public servant could be held liable for abetment of that offence and whether the conviction under section 109 IPC read with sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Act was valid. Relying on the precedent set in P. Nallammal v. State and the provisions of Section 107 IPC, the Court held that the appellant’s conduct fell within the illustrations of abetment and that the offence was punishable irrespective of her marital status at the time of trial. The Court also noted that the 2018 amendment to the Act made all offences abettable, confirming the earlier position. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.
Issues considered
- Whether a non‑public servant can be convicted for abetment of an offence under section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
- Whether the appellant’s conviction under section 109 IPC read with sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act is legally sustainable
- Whether the appellant’s subsequent remarriage affects her liability for the alleged abetment
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 108, s. 109
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 12, s. 13(1)(e), s. 13(2)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of offence u/s.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Headnotes† Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.13(2), 13(1)(e) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.109 – of abetting her then husband (main accused) in acquiring disproportionate assets – Sustainability: Held: Admittedly, the appellant’s husband acquired assets (disproportionate to his income), during the check period, in appellant’s name – Appellant’s case falls
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 372 : 2025 INSC 674
P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi
v.
State Represented by the Inspector of
Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai
(Criminal Appeal No. 2581 of 2025)
13 May 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of offence
u/s.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Headnotes†
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.13(2), 13(1)(e) – Penal
Code, 1860 – s.109 – Appellant was held guilty of abetting her
then husband (main accused) in acquiring disproportionate
assets – Sustainability:
Held: Admittedly, the appellant’s husband acquired assets
(disproportionate to his income), during the check period, in
appellant’s name – Appellant’s case falls either in the 2nd or 3rd
illustration in the P. Nallammal case – After the disproportionate
wealth was amassed, the appellant was actively involved in
concealing such wealth by keeping assets in her name – Thus,
the appellant is guilty of offence of abetment falling u/s.109, IPC
r/w s.13(2) and 13(1)(e), 1988 Act – Appellant’s argument that she
is no longer the wife of co-accused as he remarried, has no force
because at the time of commission of offence, she was his wife –
Appellant allowed the co-accused to accumulate assets in her name
and thus, assisted him in accumulation of assets disproportionate
to the known sources of income – Appellant was rightly convicted
u/s.109 IPC r/w s.13(2) and13(1)(e), 1988 Act – Findings of both
the courts below not interfered with. [Paras 14-16]
Case Law Cited
P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State, represented by Inspector of Police
[1999] Supp. 1 SCR 135 : (1999) 6 SCC 559 – relied on.
* Author
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 373
P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai
List of Acts
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Public servant; Disproportionate
assets; Abetting husband in acquiring disproportionate assets;
Disproportionate wealth; Abetment of offence; Abetment of offence
under section 13(1)(e), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by
non-public servant; Concealing disproportionate wealth; Chennai
Port Trust; Assistant Superintendent; Divisional Manager; United
India Insurance Co. Ltd.; Raids; Movable and immovable properties
disproportionate to income; Property disproportionately purchased
by husband in wife’s name.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2581 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.01.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 429 of 2013
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Saurabh Jain, Prayag Jain, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, Arvind Kumar Sharma.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant before this Court, who was working as an Assistant
Superintendent in the Chennai Port Trust assails the judgment
and order dated 10.01.2018 passed by the High Court of Madras
(hereinafter ‘High Court’) which has sustained her conviction and
sentence under section 109 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter
374 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
‘IPC’) read with Section 13(2) and Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1988 (hereinafter ‘1988 Act’). The co-accused (husband
of the appellant, at the time) was also convicted and sentenced by
the same order under section 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
3. In June 2009, an FIR was registered against the appellant’s husband
alleging that he had illegally demanded and received Rs. 3000 for
handing over a cheque relating to a motor accident claim. While
investigating the FIR, certain raids were conducted at the appellant’s
husband’s house and on 31.12.2009 another FIR under section
13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act was registered against the
appellant’s husband, while he was serving as a public servant on
the post of Divisional Manager in United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
When the search was conducted on the residential premise of the
appellant’s husband, various incriminating documents relating to
movable and immovable property in the name of the appellant and
her husband were found. Primarily, it was alleged that during the
check period between 1.09.2002 and 16.06.2009, the appellant’s
husband had acquired movable and immovable properties which
were disproportionate to his income. The properties were in the
appellant’s name, as well as of her husband.
4. On 18.12.2010, a chargesheet was filed and the appellant was
charged under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the
1988 Act, while her husband was charged under section 13(2) read
with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, with details of the various movable
and immovable assets acquired by them during the check period. It
was alleged that disproportionate assets amounting to Rs. 60,99,216
have been acquired by the accused.
5. After perusing the evidence on record, the Trial Court vide order dated
27.05.2013 found the appellant and her husband guilty and held that
the appellant’s husband has acquired disproportionate assets to the
extent of Rs. 37,98,752 during the check period beyond his known
sources of income. The appellant was held guilty of abetting her
husband in acquiring such disproportionate assets. The appellant’s
husband was convicted under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the
1988 Act and sentenced to 2 years of R.I. Whereas the appellant
was sentenced under section 109 IPC read with 13(2) and 13(1)(e)
of the 1988 Act and sentenced to 1 year of R.I.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 375
P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai
6. Both the appellant and her husband preferred their criminal appeal
against the above order of conviction and sentence. On 10.01.2018,
the High Court dismissed the appeal and found no ground to interfere
with the findings of the Trial Court. While dismissing the appeal, the
High Court observed that although there are minor discrepancies
in the calculation of known sources of income of the accused, the
disproportionality of assets is hugely excessive. Specifically the High
Court observed that there is no material to show that the assets
acquired during the check period, were acquired from their known
source or sources of income, and even if the explanations provided by
the accused is accepted it does not still remove the disproportionality.
Now the appellant is before this Court.
7. The case of the appellant is that the courts below have grossly erred
in convicting her for abetting her husband (the main accused) in
acquiring disproportionate assets during the check period, and that
any property disproportionately purchased by her husband in her
name during the check period, cannot be held to be disproportionate
in the hands of the appellant. Further, the appellant would argue that
the co-accused is no longer her husband and he has subsequently
re-married. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that the
appellant was hand in glove with her husband in commission of the
crime and she abetted the commission of offence under section
13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
8. We have heard both the sides and perused the material on record.
9. The only question that comes up for our consideration is whether
the appellant was rightly convicted for abetment of offence under
section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
10. Section 107 of IPC defines and illustrates as to what is abetment.
Section 107 of IPC reads as follows:
“107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing
of a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if
an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
376 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation,
or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound
to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to
cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate
the doing of that thing.
Illustration
A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court
of Justice to apprehend Z, B, knowing that fact and also
that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and
thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B
abets by instigation the apprehension of C.
Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time
of the commission of an act, does anything in order to
facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates
the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”
Section 108 of IPC defines ‘Abettor’ as follows:
“108. Abettor—A person abets an offence, who abets
either the commission of an offence, or the commission
of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a
person capable by law of committing an offence with the
same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.
Explanation 1.—The abetment of the illegal omission of an
act may amount to an offence although the abettor may
not himself be bound to do that act.
Explanation 2.—To constitute the offence of abetment it is
not necessary that the act abetted should be committed,
or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should
be caused.
Illustrations
(a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A is
guilty of abetting B to commit murder.
(b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of the
instigation stabs D. D recovers from the wound. A is guilty
of instigating B to commit murder.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 377
P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai
Explanation 3.—It is not necessary that the person abetted
should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that
he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as
that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge.
Illustrations
(a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a lunatic to
commit an act which would be an offence, if committed
by a person capable by law of committing an offence,
and having the same intention as A. Here A, whether the
act be committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence.
(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a
child under seven years of age, to do an act which causes
Z’s death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the
act in the absence of A and thereby causes Z’s death.
Here, though B was not capable by law of committing an
offence, A is liable to be punished in the same manner as
if B had been capable by law of committing an offence,
and had committed murder, and he is therefore subject
to the punishment of death.
(c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B, in
consequence of the unsoundness of his mind, being
incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is
doing what is wrong or contrary to law, sets fire to the
house in consequence of A’s instigation. B has committed
no offence, but A is guilty of abetting the offence of setting
fire to a dwelling-house, and is liable to the punishment
provided for that offence.
(d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed, instigates
B to take property belonging to Z out of Z’s possession. A
induces B to believe that the property belongs to A. B takes
the property out of Z’s possession, in good faith, believing
it to be A’s property. B, acting under this misconception,
does not take dishonestly, and therefore does not commit
theft. But A is guilty of abetting theft, and is liable to the
same punishment as if B had committed theft.
Explanation 4.—The abetment of an offence being an
offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an
offence.
378 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Illustration
A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B accordingly
instigates C to murder Z, and C commits that offence in
consequence of B’s instigation. B is liable to be punished
for his offence with the punishment for murder; and, as A
instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable to the
same punishment.
Explanation 5.—It is not necessary to the commission of the
offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should
concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is
sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of
which the offence is committed.
Illustration
A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed that A
shall administer the poison. B then explains the plan to C
mentioning that a third person is to administer the poison,
but without mentioning A’s name. C agrees to procure the
poison, and procures and delivers it to B for the purpose
of its being used in the manner explained. A administers
the poison; Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and
C have not conspired together, yet C has been engaged
in the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been
murdered. C has therefore committed the offence defined
in this section and is liable to the punishment for murder.”
11. The law was laid down by this Court with respect to offences under
section 109 IPC read with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, in P. Nallammal
& Anr. v. State, represented by Inspector of Police (1999) 6
SCC 559, where this court was considering whether the appellants
therein are liable to be convicted of abetting crime under 13(1)(e)
of the 1988 Act.
12. In P. Nallamal (Supra), it was contended before this Court that an
offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act cannot be abetted by
a non-public servant. Further, that there is no provision in the 1988
Act which provides punishment for abetment of offence under section
13(1)(e) whereas it provides punishment for abetment of some other
offences under the 1988 Act. However, after discussing the history
of Section 13 of the 1988 Act which was a substitute for some of
the provisions of Chapter-IX of IPC which deals with offences by
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 379
P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai
or relating to public servants, this Court held that an offence under
section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act can be abetted by any other person.
After reading Section 107 of IPC and accepting suggestions of
Counsel, this Court gave illustrations that how even a person who
is not a public servant can abet the offence under section 13(1)(e)
of the 1988 Act. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:
“24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain illustrations which,
according to us, would amplify the cases of abetments
fitting with each of the three clauses in Section 107 of
the Penal Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.
The first illustration cited is this:
If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of
how other public servants have become more wealthy by
receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do
the same in order to become rich and the public servant
acts accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be
any doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation.
Next illustration is this:
Four persons including the public servant decide to raise
a bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons
prompt the public servant to keep such money in their
names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons
are guilty of abetment through conspiracy.
The last illustration is this:
If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he
has acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he
cannot keep them as he has no known source of income
to account, he requests A to keep the said wealth in A’s
name, and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it
is a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling under
the “Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.
25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how the offence
under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act can be abetted by
non-public servants. The only mode of prosecuting such
offender is through the trial envisaged in the PC Act.”
(Emphasis Provided)
380 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
13. In other words, any person who persuades a public servant to take
bribes, decides to raise money through bribes along with a public
servant and prompts such public servant to keep the wealth with
him/her or keeps the amassed wealth of a public servant in his/her
own name is guilty of committing the offence of abetment of offence
under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. We must also note that the
2018 Amendment to the 1988 Act has substituted Section 12 of
1988 Act and made all offences under the 1988 Act abettable. This
Section 12 of 1988 Act reads as follows:
“12. Punishment for abetment of offences.—Whoever
abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not
that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than three years, but which may extend
to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”
In any case, there is no doubt that offence under section 13(1)(e)
was abettable even prior to the 2018 Amendment.
14. In the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the appellant’s
husband has acquired assets (disproportionate to his income), during
the check period, in appellant’s name. Both the courts below have
given concurrent findings on this aspect, and it is not required for
us to deal with that aspect in detail.
15. If we apply the principles laid down in the P. Nallammal case
(supra), the present appellant’s case would definitely fall either in
the 2nd or 3rd illustration. It is not clear from the record whether the
appellant and her husband entered into a prior conspiracy to amass
a huge bulk of wealth through bribery, but there is no doubt that
after such disproportionate wealth was amassed, the appellant has
been actively involved in concealing such wealth by keeping assets
in her name. By doing so, the appellant is undoubtedly guilty of
offence of abetment falling under section109 IPC read with 13(2) and
13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
Moreover, we would like to note that even the appellant was a
public servant at the time of commission of the offence, as she was
holding the post of Assistant Superintendent in the Chennai Port
Trust, though she has been prosecuted here in her capacity as
the wife of the main accused. We would also like to note that the
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 381
P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v.
State Represented by the Inspector of Police SPE/CBI/ACB/Chennai
appellant’s argument that she is no longer the wife of co-accused
as the co-accused has remarried, has no force because at the time
of commission of offence, she was the wife of the co-accused. Even
if we assume that she was not the wife at the time of commission
of crime, then also it is immaterial since it is proven that she had
allowed the co-accused to accumulate assets in her name and thus,
assisted the co-accused in accumulation of assets disproportionate
to the known sources of income. It is a well settled law that even
a non-public servant can be convicted under section 109 IPC read
with 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. We, therefore, find no reason to hold
that the appellant could not have been convicted under section 109
IPC read with 13(2) and13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
16. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
the opinion that the finding of both the courts below does not require
any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
17. The appellant, who is on bail, is directed to surrender within four
weeks from today.
18. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. Pending application(s),
if any, stand(s) disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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