Supreme Court of India
P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDYversusTHE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 725
- Decided
- 16 May 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
A statement of an accused recorded under Section 161 CrPC, including a confessional statement, cannot be taken into consideration against a co‑accused at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail; such statements may be considered only at trial under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, subject to its conditions.
Summary
The petitioners, former public servants, were charged in a large‑scale corruption case involving alleged manipulation of liquor allocations and kickbacks. They applied for anticipatory bail, but the Andhra Pradesh High Court denied relief, relying on confessional statements recorded from co‑accused under Section 161 of the CrPC. The Supreme Court examined whether such statements can be considered at the bail stage and whether the High Court erred in its discretion. It held that statements of an accused under Section 161, especially confessional ones, are inadmissible for use against a co‑accused at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail and may be considered only at trial under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, subject to strict conditions. While the Court disagreed with the High Court’s reliance on those statements, it found that the discretion to deny anticipatory bail was exercised judiciously given the seriousness of the allegations and the need for effective investigation. Consequently, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed and the denial of anticipatory bail was upheld.
Issues considered
- Can a statement of an accused recorded under Section 161 CrPC, including a confessional statement, be taken into consideration against a co‑accused at the stage of anticipatory bail or regular bail?
- Does Section 30 of the Evidence Act permit the use of such statements at the bail stage?
- Whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in denying anticipatory bail to the petitioners.
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023s. 316(5), s. 318(4), s. 3(5), s. 3(8), s. 61(2)
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 162, s. 223, s. 315
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 17, s. 21, s. 24, s. 25, s. 26, s. 28, s. 29, s. 30
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 34, s. 37, s. 409, s. 420
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(b), s. 13(2), s. 7, s. 7A, s. 8
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the statement of an accused u/s.161, Cr.P.C implicating co-accused can be looked into qua such co-accused at the stage of anticipatory bail or regular bail; whether the High Court exercised its discretion in a judicious manner while declining to the petitioners. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.161 – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.30, 17, 21, 24-29, 145 – High Court denied anticipatory bail to the Petitioners relying on the confessional statements made by co-accused persons during interrogation
Subjects
Section 161 CrPCconfessional statementanticipatory bailSection 30 Evidence Actco‑accusedpolitical biascorruptioncustodial interrogationjoint trialadmissionexculpatory statementinvestigative discretionpublic interest
Judgment
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1221 : 2025 INSC 725
P Krishna Mohan Reddy
v.
The State of Andhra Pradesh
(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7532 of 2025)
16 May 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the statement of an accused u/s.161, Cr.P.C implicating
co-accused can be looked into qua such co-accused at the
stage of anticipatory bail or regular bail; whether the High Court
exercised its discretion in a judicious manner while declining to
grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.161 – Evidence Act,
1872 – ss.30, 17, 21, 24-29, 145 – High Court denied anticipatory
bail to the Petitioners relying on the confessional statements
made by co-accused persons during interrogation holding
that such disclosure statement of co-accused can be taken
into consideration for providing lead in investigation and even
during trial it is admissible u/s.30:
Held: Such a confession cannot be looked into at the stage of
anticipatory bail or even regular bail – High Court had its own
understanding of s.30, Evidence Act that what is admissible u/s.30
can also be looked into at the stage of considering the plea of
anticipatory bail or even regular bail – Said view not agreed with –
Police statements of the co-accused u/s.161, CrPC cannot be looked
into at the stage of grant of anticipatory or regular bail to another
co-accused – A statement of an accused u/s.161, Cr.P.C stands on
a different footing from a police statement of any ordinary witness –
A statement of an accused u/s.161, Cr.P.C., would ordinarily be
inculpatory or exculpatory – An inculpatory statement again may be
in the form of an admission or a confession – Where such police
statement of an accused is confessional statement, the rigour of
ss.25 and 26 respectively will apply – A confessional statement of
an accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by ss.24 or 25
respectively and is in tune with the provisions of ss.26, 28 and 29,
Evidence Act – A police statement of an accused which is in the form
1222 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever
can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or
during trial – Since such confessional statements are rendered
inadmissible by virtue of s.25 of the Evidence Act, the provision
of s.30 would be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on
such confessional statement of an accused to implicate another
co-accused – A confessional statement of one accused implicating
another co-accused may be taken into consideration by the court
against such co-accused in terms of s.30, Evidence Act, only at the
stage of trial provided the conditions therein are fulfilled – However,
such confessional statements can only be pressed into consideration
by the court as a rule of prudence, provided the ingredients or
conditions of s.30 r/w ss.24 to 29, Evidence Act, are fulfilled –
Further, where the police statement of an accused is in the form
of an admission, such inculpatory statement even if it implicates
another co-accused cannot be taken into consideration against such
co-accused in terms of ss.17 r/w 21, Evidence Act, as doing so
would militate against the general principle, that an admission may
be given as evidence against the maker alone – Furthermore, where
the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory statement
i.e., it is neither a confession nor an admission, the statement being
one u/s.161, would immediately attract the bar u/s.162, CrPC and
the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided
in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or re-examination of
such accused person alone – Even if such exculpatory statement
of one accused, implicates another co-accused, the same cannot
be taken into consideration against such co-accused, as there
can be no credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an
accused implicating another co-accused – Penal Code, 1860 –
ss.409, 420, 120B r/w.34, 37 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
[Paras 39, 46, 53]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.30 – Ingredients or conditions required
under, for a confession to operate against a co-accused –
Stated. [Para 37]
Anticipatory bail – Denial of – Corruption case – Political
bias alleged:
Held: High Court looked into the matter in details and exercised
its discretion in a judicious manner while declining to grant
anticipatory bail to the petitioners – In corruption cases concerning
influential persons, effective interrogation of the suspect is of
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1223
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
tremendous advantage – High Court rightly appreciated the
apprehension of the investigating agency that the petitioners
would influence the witnesses, considering particularly the high
position they all held at one point of time – Anticipatory bail to
accused in cases of the present nature would greatly harm the
investigation and impede the prospects of unearthing of the
ramifications involved in the conspiracy – Public interest also
would suffer as a consequence – Though, to some extent, the
petitioners made out a prima facie case of political bias or mala
fides but that by itself is not sufficient to grant anticipatory bail
overlooking the other prima facie materials on record – Political
vendetta or bias if any is one of the relevant considerations while
considering the plea of anticipatory bail however, that by itself is
not sufficient for the grant of anticipatory bail – Courts should not
just look into the aspect of political vendetta and ignore the other
materials on record constituting a prima facie case as alleged
by the State – It is only when the court is convinced more than
prima facie that the allegations are frivolous and baseless, that it
may bring into the element of political vendetta into consideration
for the purpose of considering the plea of anticipatory bail.
[Paras 16, 18-20, 27]
Case Law Cited
Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani & Anr. [1978] 3 SCR 608 : AIR 1978
SC 1025; Mahabir Mandal & Ors. v. State of Bihar [1972] 3 SCR
639 : AIR 1972 1331 – relied on.
Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar C.K. & Anr. [2022] 14 SCR
1012 : (2022) 17 SCC 391; K. Hashim v. State of T.N. [2004]
Supp. 6 SCR 1 : (2005) 1 SCC 237; State (NCT of Delhi) v.
Navjot Sandhu [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2005) 11 SCC 600;
Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P [1952] 1 SCR 526: (1952) 1
SCC 275; Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. [2002] Supp. 2 SCR
31 : (2002) 7 SCC 334; Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu
[2003] Supp. 2 SCR 335 : (2003) 10 SCC 586; Suresh Budharmal
Kalani v. State of Maharashtra [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 608 : (1998)
7 SCC 337; Dipak Bhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat
& Anr. [2019] 6 SCR 701 : (2019) 16 SCC 547; Sahib Singh
v. State of Haryana [1997] Supp. 3 SCR 95 : (1997) 7 SCC
231; Indresh Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 2411; Salim Khan v. Sanjai Singh (2002) 9 SCC
670 – referred to.
1224 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Badri Prasad Prajapati v. State of M.P. (2005) Cr.L.J. 1856;
Chintamani Das v. State, AIR 1970 Ori 100; Sohar Singh v. State
of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat 448; Queen Empress v. Jagat Chandra Mali,
ILR (1894) 22 Cal 50; Naresh v. R, AIR 1938 Cal 479; Periyaswami
Moopan, In re., 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 – referred to.
Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (1939) PC 47; Bhuboni Sahu v.
R, 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence Act, 1872; Penal
Code, 1860; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023.
List of Keywords
Statement of accused under Section 161 of CrPC implicating
another co-accused; Stage of anticipatory bail or regular bail;
Disclosure statements made by co-accused; Section 30 of
Evidence Act, 1872; Conditions for confession to operate against
a co-accused; Police statements of the accused person; Police
statements of ordinary witness; Sections 17 to 29 of Evidence Act,
1872; Anticipatory bail denied; Confession against a co-accused;
Custodial interrogation; Inculpatory statement; Exculpatory
statement; Rule of prudence; Political vendetta; Political bias;
Corruption cases; Influential persons; Admission; Confession;
Investigating agency to carry out a fair, impartial and transparent
investigation; Criminal conspiracy; Excise Policy; Cooperating
with the investigating agency; Confessional statements; Police
remand; Confession made before police official; Third-degree
methods.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No. 7532 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.05.2025 of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh at Amravati in CRLP No. 4838 of 2025
With
Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7533 of 2025 and Special
Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7534 of 2025
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1225
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Siddhartha Dave, Dr. Vikas Singh, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi,
S Niranjan Reddy, S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Advs., Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki,
Ms. Akhila Palem Rami Reddy, Ms. Palak Arora, Sidharth Seem,
Sahil Raveen, Ms. Deepika Kalia, Ms. Vasudha Singh, Sudeep
Chandra, Meeran Maqbool, Vivek Rajan D.B.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Mukul Rohatgi, Sidharth Luthra, Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Advs.,
Guntur Pramod Kumar, Ms. Prerna Singh, Vishwajeet Singh, Udit
Dedhiya, Manoviraj Singh, Samarth Krishan Luthra, Dhruv Yadav,
Bp Naidu, Dhanamjaya Dutt Shrimali.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS (CRL.) NO. 7532 &7533 OF 2025
1. Since the issues involved in the two petitions i.e. SLP (Crl.) No.
7532 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 7533 of 2025 wherein anticipatory
bail is being prayed for are same and the challenge is also to the
self-same common impugned order passed by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati denying anticipatory to the petitioners,
those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed
of by this common order.
2. The petitioners have been denied anticipatory bail by the High Court
in connection with Crime No.21 of 2024 registered at CID Police
Station, \angalagiri, Guntur District for the offence punishable under
Sections 409, 420, 120-B read with Sections 34 & 37 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 respectively (now Sections 316(5), 318(4), 61(2),
3(5) & 3(8) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) & Sections 7, 7A,
8 and 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
3. We need not delve much into the case of the prosecution as put
up, more particularly, when the High Court has reproduced the
same exhaustively in its impugned order dated 7-5-2025 passed in
Criminal Petition No.4837/2025 and Criminal Petition No.4838/2025
respectively.
1226 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
4. However, with a view to give a fair idea as to the case of the
prosecution as on date, we may just reproduce a portion of the First
Information Report which reads thus: -
“12. The Committee after examining of records found the
following:
1. Suppression of the established popular brands and unfair
discrimination in allocation of OFS over a period of time
leading to almost disappearance of some brands from the
market. 2. Favorable and preferential allocation of orders to
certain new brands in violations of the existing norms giving
them undue market share and competitive advantage. 3.
The procurement system was shifted to manual process
giving scope for manipulation in OFS against the previous
system of automated OFS compromising the integrity
or the process; 4. The MD, APSBCL reported that
Committee has examined OFS (order for supply) data
from 2018 onwards, detailed in annexures, but they could
not ascertain the motive behind such discrimination and
manipulations observed from the records and data related
to the procurement process and other issues mentioned
in the petition, They recommended that an external
specialized investigation agency may be advised to take
up such action. 5. The MD, APSBCL on the basis of above
committee reported that the matter may be examined and
referred to a Specialized Agency for further necessary
action. 6. The report has been examined and considering
the seriousness of the matter as per the contents of the
enquiry report of the Internal Committee mentioning
suppression of brands, unfair discrimination preferential
allocation OFS violation etc, the CID, Mangalagiri, AP is
requested to take necessary action for investigation into
the matter as recommended by the Internal Committee and
the MD, APSBCL. MUKESH KUMAR MEENA PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT TO The Criminal
Investigation Department (CID), Mangalagiri, AP Sc/Sf. //
FORWARDED :: BY ORDER// SECTION OFFICER. The
complainant requested for necessary legal action in this
regard. Copy of the complaint is enclosed herewith.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1227
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
13. Action Taken: On 23.09.2024 at 22:00 hrs received
an English typed report of Sri Mukesh Kumar Meena,
Principal Secretary to Government, Andhra Pradesh vide
Memo No.Rev-01/CPE/20/2024-VIG-IV, dated, 20.09:2024
from O/o the Addl.DGP, CID, A.P., along with memo in
C.No.7020/EOW C-14/CID-AP/2024, dated: 23.09.2024
with instructions to register a case. As per the instructions
I registered the same as case in Cr.No.21/2024 U/S 420,
409, 120(B) IPC is registered at CID PS, A.P, Mangalagiri
on 23.09.2024 át 22:00 hrs. The original FIR along with
the complainant’s report and enclosures submit to The
Hon’ble Court of III Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Vijayawada and copy of FIR along with complainant’s
report and enclosures sent to the 1.0. Sri T.Daiva Prasad,
DSP, CID, RO, Kurnool for investigation and copies to all
concerned.”
5. We heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, the learned Senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner namely P. Krishna Mohan Reddy and Mr.
Vikas Singh, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
namely K. Dhananjaya Reddy.
6. On the other hand, we heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Siddharth Luthra
and Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, the learned Senior counsel appearing
for the State of Andhra Pradesh.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently
submit that their clients at the relevant point of time were holding
public office. They were public servants. They have retired from
service. However, due to political vendetta and bias, they have been
arrayed in the alleged crime on the allegations that they are a part
and parcel of a well-hatched criminal conspiracy.
8. It was further submitted that there is no prima facie case worth the
name against the petitioners. In other words, there is no prima facie
case worth the name at this point of time to deny anticipatory bail.
9. During the course of hearing, it was brought to our notice that both
these petitioners have been cooperating with the investigating agency.
Their statements have been recorded. They have been interrogated
and they shall continue to cooperate with the investigating agency
till the charge-sheet is filed.
1228 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
10. It was also pointed out, that the investigating agency has been
adopting dubious methods and tactics for the purpose of extracting
confessional statements from different witnesses by adopting third
degree methods. It was pointed out that a Writ Petition had to be filed
in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati seeking necessary
relief in this regard and the High Court has passed an order permitting
a lawyer to remain present at the time of interrogation.
11. It was further pointed out that at one point of time, the entire issue
was looked into by the Competition Commission and the Competition
Commission did not find anything what is being alleged today by
the State.
12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that
it is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail, more particularly, when
the entire case put up by the State is actuated by political bias or
mala fides.
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State
vehemently submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law
could be said to have been committed by the High Court in denying
the anticipatory bail to the petitioners.
14. They would submit that there is more than a prima facie case
against the petitioners. The investigation is at a very crucial stage.
According to the State, there has been misappropriation of public
exchequer to the tune to more than Rs.3,000 Crore. It was also
submitted that the investigating agency may also deem fit to pray
for custodial interrogation if need arises and if some good valid
grounds are made out.
15. In short, the submission on behalf of the State is that at this point
of time, this Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of
grant of anticipatory bail as it may have its own implications in the
investigation which is in progress and is at a crucial stage.
16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view
that we should not exercise our discretion for the purpose of grant
of anticipatory bail. The High Court has looked into the matter
in details and thereafter, declined to grant anticipatory bail as prayed
for.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1229
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
17. The High Court while reaching the conclusion that more than a
prima facie case has been made out against the petitioners for the
purpose of denying anticipatory bail to them, has observed thus: -
“22. According to the prosecution, the scheme in question
favoured select liquor brands such as Adan and Leela,
while sidelining well-established brands like Pernod
Ricard and McDowell. As a result, several distilleries
either shut down operations or diverted their products
to other states Despite receiving consumer complaints
regarding the quality of alcohol, no remedial measures were
undertaken. The distilleries allegedly employed methods
such as transferring funds to gold traders, procuring GST
invoices, and remitting cash to the accused after deducting
commissions. The investigation has revealed suspicious
transactions amounting to approximately Rs 300-400
crores. In support of these allegations, the prosecution has
produced records suspicious transactions involving Leela
Agro and S.P.Y. Agro; bullion transactions entered into by
Tilak Nagar Industries Limited: bullion invoices and ledger
entries of Arham Bullion and Tiiak Nagar Industries Limited
and details of entities that were found to be non-existent.
25. The allegations against the petitioners are that they
were responsible for the discontinuation of popular liquor
brands and the promotion of favoured brands, collecting
approximately Rs.3200 Crores in kickbacks for the
liquor syndicate. The prosecution further claims that,
on average, the accused received Rs.50-60 crores per
month in kickbacks, with A.1 allegedly handing over these
amounts to the petitioners in Crl.P.No.5009 of 2025 and
Crl.P.No.4838 of 2025.
29. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Respondent-State argues that the proceedings before
the Competition Commission of India (CCI) pertain to
the period from 2019 to 2021, whereas the allegations
against the accused persons cover the period from 2019
to 2024. Therefore, the findings recorded by the CCI
cannot be afforded significant weight in this context. The
1230 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
prosecution has relied upon sale transactions presented
in a tabular form, and the details contained therein, prima
facie, support the prosecution’s case.
Brand Quantity in Quantity in
2018-19 2023-24
McDowell’s Brandy 22,73,086 5
Imperial Blue Whisky 20,21,955 7
Kingfisher Beer 1,02,47,566 11,82,388
Budweiser Beer 22,52,195 0
Brand Market share in Market share in
2018-19 2023-24
McDowell’s Brandy 23.41% 2.15%
Kingfisher Beer 29.5% 3.21%
Budweiser Beer 11.43% 1.25%
S.No. Name of the Brand Quantity Intended
1 Ocean Blue Whiskey 2,76,706
2 Daru House Whiskey 68,83,420
3 Supreme Blend Whiskey 77,35,400
4 Brilliant Blend Whiskey 37,30,800
5 9 Sea Horse Whiskey 46,07,733
6 Andhra Gold Whiskey 20,61,711
7 Good Friend Whiskey 27,72,050
8 HD Whiskey 22,02,555
32 This Court views that the investigating officer deserves a
free hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion
in a case containing severe allegations. With regard to the
Prosecution’s case, the Investigation remains incomplete.
Granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioners could potentially
hinder the ongoing investigation. The allegations are
severe, and the investigating agency has not yet been able
to interrogate the Accused/Petitioners. The established
legal principle is that anticipatory bail is not granted as
a matter of routine; it should only be provided when the
Court is convinced that exceptional circumstances warrant
such an extraordinary remedy.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1231
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
36. The statements provided by several witnesses have
underscored the petitioners’ prima facie involvement in
the criminal conspiracy associated with e Excise Policy.
It cannot lose sight of serious allegations leveled by the
prosecution and the evidences collected during the course
of investigation and presented before this Court, which
prima facie reveal the petitioners ‘role in the offence in
question. The material placed on record, its face, suggests
the petitioners involvement in the offence in question. Given
these circumstances, custodial interrogation is deemed
essential to confront the petitioners with the gathered
evidence and to unravel a broader conspiracy implicating
the accused in the implementation of the Excise Policy.”
18. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the High Court failed
to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner while declining to
grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners as prayed for.
19. Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation oriented than
questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order
under Section 438. In corruption cases concerning influential persons,
effective interrogation of the suspect is of tremendous advantage in
disinterring many useful information and also materials which are
likely to be concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if
the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated
by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very
often interrogation in such condition would reduce to a mere ritual.
The High Court remained alive and very rightly to the apprehension
of the investigating agency that the petitioners would influence the
witnesses, considering particularly the high position they all held at
one point of time.
20. Anticipatory bail to accused in cases of the present nature would
greatly harm the investigation and would impede the prospects of
unearthing of the ramifications involved in the conspiracy. Public
interest also would suffer as a consequence.
21. It was sought to be argued that the petitioners have already joined
the investigation and are fully cooperating with the investigating
agency and therefore, there is no need for custodial interrogation.
22. The petitioners might have been cooperating with the investigation
and they might have been interrogated also by the investigating
1232 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
agency so far but, at the same time, we should not overlook the fact
that by grant of anticipatory bail, we may come in the way of the
investigating agency if at all it wants custodial interrogation.
23. As held by this Court in Sumitha Pradeep vs. Arun Kumar C.K.
& Anr. reported in (2022)17 SCC 391 that it would be preposterous
as a proposition of law to say that if custodial interrogation is not
required that by itself is sufficient to grant anticipatory bail. Even in
cases where custodial interrogation may not be required the court
is obliged to consider the entire case put up by the State, more
particularly, the nature of the offence, the punishment provided in
law for such offence etc.
24. It is needless to say that for the purpose of custodial interrogation,
the investigating agency has to make out a prima facie case at the
time when remand is prayed for. Whether any case for police remand
is made out or not, it is for the Court concerned to look into.
25. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are of the view that we
should not come in the way of the investigating agency at this point
of time and the investigation should be permitted to proceed further.
26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important.
27. To some extent, the petitioners could be said to have made out a
prima facie case of political bias or mala fides but that by itself is
not sufficient to grant anticipatory bail overlooking the other prima
facie materials on record. Political vendetta or bias if any is one of
the relevant considerations while considering the plea of anticipatory
bail. The courts should keep one thing in mind, more particularly,
while considering the plea of anticipatory bail that when two groups
of rival political parties are at war which may ultimately lead to
litigations, more particularly, criminal prosecutions there is bound to
be some element of political bias or vendetta involved in the same.
However, political vendetta by itself is not sufficient for the grant of
anticipatory bail. The courts should not just look into the aspect of
political vendetta and ignore the other materials on record constituting
a prima facie case as alleged by the State. It is only when the court
is convinced more than prima facie that the allegations are frivolous
and baseless, that the court may bring into the element of political
vendetta into consideration for the purpose of considering the plea
of anticipatory bail. The frivolity in the entire case that the court may
look into should be attributed to political bias or vendetta.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1233
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
Section 30 of the Evidence Act
28. It appears from the impugned order that the High Court looked into
few disclosure statements made by co-accused and according to
the High Court, as such disclosure statements are admissible during
trial under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short,
the “Evidence Act”) those can also be looked into at the stage of
considering the plea of anticipatory bail or even regular bail.
29. The High Court in its impugned order has observed as under:
“20. The prosecution has also relied upon the confessional
statements of co-accused persons to establish the
petitioners’ involvement in the commission of the offence.
However, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the petitioners have strongly opposed the reliance on
such confessional statements, contending that they are
inadmissible in evidence. In contrast, the learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondent/State submits that the
statements made by co-accused persons are subject to
evaluation during trial, and it would be incorrect to contend
that confessional statements made by an accused during
interrogation cannot be considered for the purpose of
connecting other accused persons. This Court is of the
view that such disclosure statements made by co-accused
can indeed be taken into consideration as investigative
leads and. further, may be admissible during trial under
Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act.
21. It is erroneous to say that confessional statement made
by the accused during interrogation cannot be considered
or looked into to connect the other co-accused. Such
disclosure statement of co-accused can certainly be taken
into consideration for providing lead in investigation and
even during trial it is admissible under Section 30 of the
Indian Evidence Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Since the High Court has touched Section 30 of the Evidence Act,
we would like to say something in this regard. The said provision
reads thus: -
1234 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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“When more persons than one are being tried jointly
for the same offence, and a confession made by one of
such persons affecting himself and some other of such
persons is proved, the court may take into consideration
such confession as against such other person as well as
against the person who makes such confession.”
31. As per Section 5 of Evidence Act, only those facts or facts in issue
which are considered relevant under Chapter II of the Act would
be admissible as evidence. Section(s) 24 to 30 of the Evidence
Act, deals with the relevancy and admissibility of ‘confessions’ as
evidence. Section 24 of the Evidence Act provides when a confession
would be relevant by laying down a negative rule of relevancy and
prescribing the general parameters when a confession would be
considered irrelevant; namely when such confession is caused by
either threat, inducement or promise.
32. Section(s) 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively are an exception
to the aforesaid general rule of relevancy of confessions. Section
28 provides that where although any threat, inducement or promise
was made to cause a confession, yet if such confession was made
after the cessation, removal or eradication of such improper influence
or impression, then such confession would be relevant. Section 29
on the other hand, expands the test of relevancy by prescribing a
positive rule of when a confession would continue to be relevant
and provides that a confession made under one particular type
of promise i.e., a promise of secrecy or made as a result of any
deception, intoxication or by one’s own volition in response to any
question, would not render such confession irrelevant.
33. Section 25 of the Evidence Act, goes one step further, by providing
that even if such confession is not hit by Section 24 i.e., it is not the
result of any threat, inducement or promise and thus, considered
relevant, still such confession would be inadmissible if it was made
to a police officer. Section 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act, however,
carves out an exception to this. Section 26 provides that, a confession
made by the accused to persons other than police officers would be
inadmissible, if it was made whilst he was in police custody, unless
such confession was made in the presence of a magistrate. Whereas,
Section 27 only permits limited use of such statement only to the
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1235
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
extent that a fact is discovered pursuant to disclosure statement
which would connect the accused with the crime with authorship of
concealment.
34. Section 30 of the Evidence Act, provides that a confession made by
a person admitting his own guilt and at the same time implicating
another person, such confession “may be taken into consideration”
by the court against the maker as-well as against the person it is
being made, if both of them are being “tried jointly”.
35. The Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R reported in 1949 SCC
OnLine PC 12 explained the significance of the expression “may take
into consideration” used in Section 30. It observed that a “confession”
does not come within the definition of “Evidence” under Section 3
of the Evidence Act, as it is neither required to be given on oath,
nor in the presence of the co-accused, and the same cannot be
tested by cross-examination. Thus, although a confession against a
co-accused, is not an evidence, yet as per Section 30, a court may
take it into consideration and act upon it. However, the courts must
be mindful that such confessions do not amount to proof, it is only
one of the elements in the consideration of all other facts proved in
a particular case, and therefore, there must be other evidence before
such confession is taken into consideration. [See also: K. Hashim v.
State of T.N., (2005) 1 SCC 237; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot
Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600]
36. This Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P reported in (1952) 1
SCC 275 further explained as to when such confession may be taken
into consideration against another co-accused. Placing reliance on
the decision of Periyaswami Moopan, In re. reported in 1930 SCC
OnLine Mad 86 it was held that, “where there is evidence against
the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then
the kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into
the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence” and
“the proper way is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused
excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see
whether, if it is believed a conviction could safely be based on it. If
it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course
it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise
where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it
stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a
1236 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession
and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify
himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would
not be prepared to accept”. Thus, such a confession can only be
pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend
assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused.
37. The ingredients or conditions required under Section 30 of the
Evidence Act, before any confession is made to operate against a
co-accused are as under: -
(i) there must be joint trial for the same offence;
(ii) it must be a confession;
(iii) the confession must inculpate or implicate the maker and to
the same extent the other accused
(iv) the confession of guilt must be duly proved.
The aforesaid four conditions have to be strictly established. Such
confession cannot be taken into consideration under Section 30
where the confession itself was not relevant or inadmissible or where
a co-accused was not being tried jointly with the accused person
who made the confession or where he did not make a statement
incriminating himself along with the co-accused. [See Mohd. Khalid v.
State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334; Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot
Sandhu, (2003) 10 SCC 586]
38. In Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra reported
in (1998) 7 SCC 337, this Court held that under Section 30 of the
Evidence Act a confession of an accused is relevant and admissible
against a co-accused if both are jointly facing trial for the same
offence. However, such confessional statements of an accused cannot
be used against a co-accused in terms of Section 30 of Evidence
Act, for the purpose of framing charges in the absence of any other
evidence to do so. Similarly, where one of the accused has been
discharged, confessional statement of such accused persons cannot
be used against a co-accused, as the pre-condition under Section
30 of the Evidence Act, namely of there being a joint trial for the
same offence is not fulfilled.
39. The High Court has its own understanding of Section 30 of the
Evidence Act. It says that what is admissible under Section 30 can
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1237
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
also be looked into at the stage of considering the plea of anticipatory
bail or even regular bail. However, we are not impressed with the
view expressed by the High Court. We are of the considered opinion
that such a confession if any cannot be looked into at the stage of
anticipatory bail or even regular bail for the following reasons: -
(i) Before a confession is taken into consideration against a co-
accused, the said confession has to be duly proved against
the maker. It has to be clearly established that such confession
is not vitiated either by Section 24 of the Evidence Act nor
rendered inadmissible by Section 25 thereof, which can
only be ascertained in the course of trial. It must be clearly
established by leading cogent evidence in the course of the
trial before the case for the prosecution comes to an end.
[See: Dipak Bhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat
& Anr., (2019) 16 SCC 547]. When confession is made before
police official, the same cannot be proved in evidence at all.
Statement contemplated under section 30 should be relevant
and admissible, and that is the foremost requirement of section
and sine qua non.
(ii) Section 30 of Evidence Act postulates that such a confession
can be taken into consideration only where the accused persons
are jointly tried. The said provision does not merely require that
the persons must be accused of the same offence, but rather
requires that they must be being tried jointly for the said offence.
[See: Queen Empress v. Jagat Chandra Mali, ILR (1894) 22
Cal 50; Naresh v. R, AIR 1938 Cal 479]. Joint trial here refers
to the one provided under Section 223 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short, the “Cr.P.C.”). Thus, where the
accused persons are either not being tried jointly, or are yet to
be charged for the same offence and thereafter tried together,
Section 30 of the Evidence Act would be inapplicable. [See:
Badri Prasad Prajapati v. State of M.P., (2005) Cr.L.J. 1856].
Thus, Section 30 of the Evidence Act, would not spring into
action when the charges are yet to be framed and the accused
persons are yet to be committed to trial, and any confession
admissible thereunder cannot be taken into consideration by
the courts.
(iii) Assuming for a moment that such a confession can be looked
into at the stage of anticipatory bail or even regular bail, as
1238 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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per Kashmira Singh (supra), such a confession can only be
pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to
lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused.
Thus, there must exist other evidence on record, before the
court looks into such confession.
40. Where a confessional statement is otherwise excluded or inadmissible
by virtue of Section(s) 25 or 26 of the Evidence Act, respectively,
there can be no question of such confessional statements being made
admissible against another co-accused by stretching it with the help
of Section 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 places a complete
ban on the making of such confession by that person whether he
is in custody or not. Section 26 lays down that a confession made
by a person while he is in the custody of a police officer shall not
be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence
of a Magistrate. [See: Sahib Singh v. State of Haryana, (1997) 7
SCC 231] Confessional statement contemplated under Section 30
of the Evidence Act, must be both relevant and admissible in terms
of the Evidence Act.
41. At this stage, we may clarify, with a view to obviate any possibility
of confusion, whether a confession statement of an accused person
implicating another co-accused be taken into consideration against
such co-accused in terms of Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.
42. It is no more res integra that a person who is accused of an offence
or named in the first information report, can be examined by the
police and his statement may be recorded under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C., in this regard reliance may be placed on the decision
of this Court in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani & Anr. reported
in AIR 1978 SC 1025. However, the question as to whether
such statement of the accused is admissible in law and in what
manner can the same be looked into was explained by this Court
in Mahabir Mandal & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1972
1331, wherein it was held that as per Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. no
statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of
an investigation shall be signed by the person making it or used
for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence
under investigation at the time when such statement was made.
The only instance where such statements may be considered or
looked into has been provided in the Proviso to sub-section (1)
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1239
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
of Section 162, which permits the use of such statement or any
part thereof, to contradict such witness in the manner provided
by Section 145 of Evidence Act or in the re-examination of such
witness for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to
in his cross-examination.
43. A statement given by an accused to the police under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C. may be either in the form of a confession or an admission.
The Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor reported
in (1939) PC 47 explained that a confession is a statement admitting
the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute
the offence, whereas an admission is only in respect of a gravely
incriminating fact. Even a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself
a confession. Where such statement is a confessional statement,
the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 will apply in full force, and the
said confession would be completely inadmissible as held in Sahib
Singh (supra) and a catena of other decisions of this Court. Where,
however, such statement amounts to an admission, the statement
being one under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar
under Section 162 of the Cr.PC., and the same may be used only for
the very limited purpose provided in the Proviso as held in Mahabir
Mandal (supra).
44. We are conscious of a handful of decisions of this Court wherein
it has been held that statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.
ought to be looked into by the courts in deciding the question of
grant of bail. Indresh Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.,
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2411 observed that “statements
under Section 161 of Cr. P.C. may not be admissible in evidence,
but are relevant in considering the prima facie case against an
accused in an application for grant of bail in case of grave offence”.
Similarly, in Salim Khan v. Sanjai Singh reported in (2002) 9 SCC
670, it was held that the court is “duty-bound to consider all the
statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC, examine the gravity
of the offence and also examine the question of possibility of the
accused tampering with the evidence and possibility of getting the
attendance of the accused during trial and then would be entitled
to grant bail to an accused”.
45. However, the aforesaid observations cannot be singled out and
construed devoid of its context. While it is permissible for the courts
1240 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to examine the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.
for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has
been made out against the accused and the nature or gravity of the
allegations, the same applies only insofar as such police statements
are of witnesses and not accused persons.
46. Both Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held
that in deciding the question of grant of bail, it is the statements
of witness under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. that has to be looked
into. Nowhere has this Court held that even the police statements
of the accused person under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. must also
be looked into at the stage of grant of anticipatory or regular bail.
47. This is because a statement of an accused under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C stands on a different footing from a police statement
of any ordinary witness. Statements of an accused person under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by virtue of ordinarily being in the form
of either an admission or a confession cannot be looked into
qua another co-accused, as to say otherwise would be to ignore
the substantive provisions of Section(s) 17, 21, 25 and 26 of the
Evidence Act and the well settled cannons of law of evidence.
However, the aforesaid does not apply, where the statement of an
accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C is exculpatory in nature,
which we shall discuss later.
48. As per Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, the general
principle is that an admission may be given as evidence against
the maker only and cannot be used against any other person. The
only two exceptions to the aforesaid rule are in the context of civil
disputes, i.e., where a party having a joint interest with others makes
an admission relating to a subject-matter, it can be used against
others or where such admission is sought to be used against any
heir or persons claiming interest through or under the makers of
such admission.
49. As explained in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), a confession
is one specie of an admission, this flows from the logic that every
confession is an admission but not every admission is a confession,
while admissions in itself is a specie or type of a statement. As a
natural corollary to the aforesaid, any statement of the accused
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. which is in the form of an admission
that admits any incriminating fact or implicates another person by
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1241
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
such statement, would be governed by the provisions of Section 17
of Evidence Act, more particularly the prohibition of usage of such
admissions against third-persons. An admission by one accused
cannot be used against another co-accused. [See: Chintamani
Das v. State, AIR 1970 Ori 100; Sohar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR
1960 Pat 448]. The aforesaid may be looked at from one another
angle, since the Evidence Act, more particularly, Section(s) 17 and
30 clearly stipulate in well-defined terms, when an admission or a
confession, respectively, may be used against another person, the
logical sequitur of the aforesaid is that, except for the manner laid
down under the said provisions, no admission or confession may
be used against another person. Since, Section 17 of the Evidence
Act does not postulate the use of an admission by one accused
against another, any statement of the accused under Section 161
of the Cr.P.C., implicating such co-accused cannot be looked into
by the courts.
50. Even where the police statement of an accused person under Section
161 of the Cr.P.C is neither an admission nor a confession, i.e., it is
exculpatory in nature and not inculpatory, such statements can be
looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of culling out
the stance of the accused person qua the allegations. An exculpatory
police statement of an accused person under Section 161 of the
Cr.P.C which at the same time implicates another co-accused,
cannot be relied upon, merely because such statement is not hit
by the safeguards and rigours that apply in respect of inculpatory
statements in the form of an admissions or confessions under the
Evidence Act. The fundamental cannon of criminal jurisprudence
is that a statement of one accused person cannot be used against
another co-accused person. The limited exception to this aforesaid
general principle are inculpatory confessions, where the accused
person in his confessional statement not only admits his own guilt
but also implicates another co-accused. The rationale behind this
limited exception as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), is that an
admission by an accused person of his own guilt affords some sort
of credibility or sanction in support of the truth of his confession
against others as-well as himself. An exculpatory statement is an
affront to the aforesaid principle. Thus, an exculpatory statement of
an accused person under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. can only be
looked into for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance
1242 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the
accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms
of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C. However, such exculpatory statement
insofar as it implicates another co-accused person can in no manner
be relied upon by the courts as against such co-accused as such
statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if
such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of
Section 315 of the Cr.P.C., and because such exculpatory statement
has no credibility.
51. Such statements at best could be said to be helpful to the investigating
authorities for the purpose of ascertaining that the investigation
is proceeding in the right direction or not, as ordinarily, once the
investigation is over, these statements are neither supplied to the
accused along with chargesheet nor placed on record.
52. Thus, Section 30 itself makes it clear that the whole legal exercise
by virtue of which this provision of law can be made applicable,
depends upon the proving of confession before a court which makes
it into an admissible one in order to implicate the other accused
provided the confession given by such person is established with full
strength on the basis of other materials pertaining to the attendant
circumstances. It would necessarily mean that mere confession
alone will not be adequate or sufficient to implicate other persons. It
is incumbent that there are other materials also which would render
support or substantiate the case of the confession. However, it is
subject to the standard of proving as contemplated by law. If this is
the position, the court should look into the statements alleged to have
been given by the co-accused and that too before a police officer
during the course of investigation with great care and circumspection.
The said statements are directly hit by Section 161 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Particularly, the statement given by any one of
the accused persons and recorded by the police officer during the
course of investigation cannot be relied upon by the prosecution,
except subject to the limitations provided by Section 145 of the Indian
Evidence Act. The statement given by an accused involving himself
in the crime and also implicating third person cannot be proved
legally in the court. It will be in direct conflict with Sections 25 and
26 respectively of the Evidence Act. If such evidence or confession
cannot be proved, then the occasion for utilizing such statement
against another person would not arise.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1243
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
53. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges: -
(i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the first
information report, can be examined by the police and his
statement may be recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.,
as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra).
(ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C,
would ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature
or may be exculpatory in nature.
(iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an
admission or a confession. If such statement admits either a
gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which
constitute the offence, respectively, as held in Pakala Narayana
Swami (supra), then it amounts to confession.
(iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional
statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will
apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused
will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25
respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s)
26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively. In other words,
a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a
confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever
can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or
during trial. Since such confessional statements are rendered
inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the
provision of Section 30 would be of no avail, and no reliance
can be placed on such confessional statement of an accused
to implicate another co-accused.
(v) A confessional statement of one accused implicating another
co-accused may be taken into consideration by the court against
such co-accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only
at the stage of trial, where (1) the confession itself was relevant
and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved
against the maker; (3) such confessional statement incriminates
the maker along with the co-accused and; (4) both the accused
persons in question are in a joint trial for the same offence.
(vi) Furthermore, because such confessional statements are not
“evidence” in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in
1244 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Bhuboni Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira
Singh (supra) can only be pressed into consideration by the
court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other
evidence against such co-accused, provided that aforesaid
ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24
to 29 of the Evidence Act, are fulfilled.
(vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in the form of
an admission, such inculpatory statement even if it implicates
another co-accused cannot be taken into consideration against
such co-accused in terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the
Evidence Act, as doing so would militate against the general
principle, that an admission may be given as evidence against
the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid general
principle carved out under the Evidence Act, do not permit the
usage of such admission against a co-accused in any scenario
whatsoever.
(viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory
statement i.e., it is neither a confession nor an admission, the
statement being one under Section 161, would immediately
attract the bar under Section 162 of the Cr.PC., and the same
may be used only for the very limited purpose provided in
the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or re-examination
of such accused person alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal
(supra). Even if such exculpatory statement of one accused,
implicates another co-accused, the same cannot be taken into
consideration against such co-accused, as there can be no
credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an accused
implicating another co-accused, more particularly because it is
neither required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the
co-accused, the same cannot be tested by cross-examination
and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates against
the foundational principle that permits taking into consideration
a statement of one accused person against another co-accused
as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), i.e., ‘when a person
admits guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating
fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence,
and in doing so exposes himself and in the process other
co-accused persons to the pain and penalties provided for the
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1245
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
guilt, there exists a sincerity and semblance of sanction for the
truthfulness of such statement’.
(ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Indresh
Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that
statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. ought to be looked
into by the courts at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for
the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been
made out against the accused and the nature and gravity of the
allegations, yet the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such
statements under Section 161 were made by witnesses and
not accused persons. A statement of an accused under Section
161 of the Cr.P.C. stands on a completely different footing from
a police statement of a witness. As already discussed in the
foregoing paragraphs, if the police statement of an accused is
inculpatory in nature, its more in the form of a confession or
admission rather than a statement, and the relevant provisions
of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act, will apply with all its
vigour. Where such statement of the accused is exculpatory in
nature, the same can be looked into by the courts only for the
limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused
person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused, if
the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of
Section 315 of the Cr.P.C.. However, such exculpatory statement
insofar as it implicates another accused person cannot be
looked into by the courts, as such statements by their nature
cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person
declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of
the Cr.P.C., and because such exculpatory statement has no
credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra).
(x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C for the purpose of anticipatory or
regular bail, the court must first ascertain whether such person
is actually a witness or an accused person, or likely to be an
accused person in respect of the offence(s) alleged. This is
because, there may be situations where a person while giving
his statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C may not be an
accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts
must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still
1246 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
ongoing, a person who was originally a witness may happen
to be later arrayed as an accused person. If the court was to
blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely
because he is not named in the first information report, without
first seeing whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an
accused or not, it would lead to an absurd situation where the
statement of such a person may be relied upon up until such
person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution the courts,
where it emerges from the material on record, that such a person
is likely to be arrayed as an accused, the courts should refrain
from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is
not prejudiced in any manner.
Allegations of third-degree methods
54. Besides the above, we would also like to make ourselves very clear
that the investigating agency shall not adopt any third-degree methods
or shall not coerce or exert any undue pressure or bring any undue
influence on any of the witnesses or any of the co-accused to make
statements that may suit the State. Tomorrow, if any complaint is
made before the court in this context with some cogent material, be
it the trial Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, the same
shall be viewed very seriously. It is expected of the investigating
agency to carry out a fair, impartial and transparent investigation,
more particularly, in accordance with law.
55. Before we close this matter, we make it further clear that if the
petitioners are ultimately arrested, remanded and thereafter sent
to judicial custody and if any regular bail application is filed, the
same shall be considered on its own merits in accordance with law.
It is needless to say that the principles of grant of anticipatory bail
substantially differ from the principles of grant of regular bail. It is for
the Court concerned to apply the correct principles of law so far as the
grant of regular bail is concerned and decide the same accordingly.
56. With the aforesaid, these Special Leave Petitions are disposed of.
57. If the petitioners have any further apprehension that they may be
ill-treated, they can approach the High Court and obtain the very
same relief that the High Court has granted in favour of the other
witnesses.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1247
P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 7534 OF 2025
1. This petitioner has already been arrested in connection
with Crime No.21 of 2024 registered at CID Police Station,
Mangalagiri, Guntur District, State of Andhra Pradesh.
2. We are informed that the petitioner was arrested and remanded
to judicial custody. While reminding him to judicial custody, the
investigating officer did not pray for any police remand. After
being remanded to judicial custody, according to the State, the
investigating officer has now moved an application seeking
police remand of the petitioner.
3. We do not say anything in this regard because it will be for
the Court concerned to consider whether once an accused is
remanded to judicial custody whether thereafter the Investigating
Officer can pray for police remand or not.
4. Be that as it may, if any application for regular bail is filed by the
petitioner, the same shall be looked into by the Court concerned
on its own merits by applying the well-settled principles of grant
of regular bail in accordance with law.
5. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition is disposed of.
6. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Special Leave Petitions disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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