OIL & NATURAL GAS CORP. LTD.versusGUJARAT ENERGY TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LTD. & ORS.

                              [2017] 2 S.C.R. 922



A                   OIL & NATURAL GAS CORP. LTD.
                                       v.
    GUJARAT ENERGY TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LTD. &
                        ORS.

B                      (Civil Appeal No. 1315 of 2010)
                               MARCH 01, 2017
     . [DIPAK MISRA, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND MOHAN M.
                   SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.]
           Electricity Act, 2003 - s.125 - Delay in filing appeal,
c   co11do11ation of - Held: Supreme Court has jurisdiction to condone
    the delay but a limit has been fixed by the legislature, that is, 60
    days - When there is a statutory command by the legislation as
    regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be
    condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, it is based
D   on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy
    - It is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to
    Art.142 of the Constitution -111 the instant case, review application
    against the impugned order of tribunal was presented before the
    tribunal after expiry of 60 days that is to say the limitation prescribed
    for filing appeal before Supreme Court - In such a situation, it
E
    cannot be said that there has been any kind of due diligence on the
    part of the appellant - It is not an application u!s. 5 of the Limitation
    Act which is to be entertained by the Court- ljthe delay is statutorily
    not condonable, the delay cannot be condoned - Limitation Act,
    1963 - s.5 - Constitution of India - Art.142.
F
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
          HELD: 1. As per Section 125 of Electricity Act, 2003,
    Supreme Court, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented
    by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the period of 60.
    days from the date of communication of the decision or order of
G   the appellate tribunal to him, may allo~ the same to be filed within
    a further period not exceeding 60 days. In the instant case, the
    judgment was reserved on 18.9.2007 and pronounced in open
    cou11 on 28.9.2007. Therefore, the date of communication would
    be 28.9.2007. The certified copy was applied through email on
H
                                    922
    OIL & NATURAL GAS CORP. LTD. v. GUJARAT ENERGY                      923
         TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LTD. & ORS.

9.10.2007 and delivered on the same date. The appeal preferred           A
under Seciion 125 of the Act should have been filed within 60
days, i.e., 27.11.2007, to come within the period of limitation and
further to be entitled to get the benefit of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, he should have filed the appeal within a further
period of 60 days, i.e., 26.9.2008. Thus calculated, there is total
                                                                         B
delay of 71 days and 11 days beyond the expiry of 60 days the
limit that is stipulated under Section 125 of the Act. [Paras 5, 11
and 16] [926-E-F; 928-F-H; 929-AI
       Singh Enlerprises v. C.C.E., Jamshedpur & Ors.[2007)
       13 SCR 952 : (2008) 3 SCC 70; Commissioner of
       Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private                 c
       Limited & Anr. (2009) 5 SCC 79; Chhallisgarh State
       Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory
       Commission & Ors. [2010) 4 SCR 680 : (2010) 5 SCC
       23; M.P. Steel Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of
       Central Excise (2015) 7 SCC 58 - relied on.                       D
        2. The policy behind the Act emphasizing on the constitution
  of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide
  the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of
  the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The
  Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of    E
  the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to
  the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be
  followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a
  different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present
  nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone               ''·
  the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the         F
  ambit and sweep of the pro.\isions and policy of legislation. It is
· equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is
  uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to
  Article 142 of the Constitution. [Para 16) [932-E-G)
       Union Carbide Corporation etc. v. Union of India etc.            ·G
       elc. [1991) Supp. 1 SCR 251 - followed.
       Suprei11e Courl Bar Association v. Union of India and·
       Am: [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409; Prem Chand
       Garg & another vs. Excise Commr. AIR 1963 !;~ 996 :
       (1963) Suppl. SCR 885 - relied on.                                H
924            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A            3. In the instant case, the application for review was filed
      after expiry of 30 days. The Review Application was presented
      befo~e the tribunal on 10.01.2008. The main order was passed
      on 28.9.2007. Thus, the application for review was filed after
      expiry of 60 days, that is to say, the limitation that is prescribed
      for filing of an appeal before this Conrt. In such a situation, it
B
      cannot be said that there has been any kind of due diligence on
      the part of the appellant. It is not an application under Section 5
      of the Limitation Act which is to be entertained by the Court. If
      the delay is statutorily not condonable, the delay cannot be
      condoned. There is no impediment to consider the preliminary
c     objection at a later stage. That will be in consonance with the
      statutory provision. [Paras 18, 19] [933-D, F, H; 934-A]
            A.R Antulay v. RS. Nayak & Another [1988] 1 Suppl.
            SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602 - relied on.
            Mis. Suryachakra Power Corporation Ltd. v. Electricity
D           Department, Rep. By its Superintending Engineer, Port
            Blair & Ors. [2016] 8 SCR 108 : 2016 (10) SCALE 46
            - held inapplicable.                               ,.
                            · Case Law Reference

E     [2016] 8 SCR 108               held inapplicable      Para3

      [2010] 4 SCR 680               relied on              Para6
      [2007] 13 SCR 952              relied on              Para 7

      (2009) 5 sec 79                relied on              Para7
F
      (2015) 7 sec 58                relied on              Para 11
      [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1          relied on              Para 13
      [1991] Supp. (1) SCR 251       followed               Para 14
G     [1998] 2 SCR 795               relied on              Para 15
      [1963) Suppl. SCR 885          relied on              Para 16
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1315
      of2010.
H
     OIL & NATURAL GAS CORP. LTD. v. GUJARAT ENERGY                           925
         TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LTD. & ORS.

      From the Judgment and Order.dated 28.09.2007 of the Appellate            A
Tribunal for Electricity in Appeal No. 276 of2006.
        Amit Pawan, Adv. for the Appellant.
      Ms. Ranjitha Ramachandran, Ms. Swapna Seshadri, M. ·o.
Ramachandran, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms. Pooja Saigal,
Advs. for the Respondents.                                                     B

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       DIPAK MISRA, J. I. The present appeal preferred under
Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for brevity, 'the Act') assails
the correctness of the judgment rendered by the Appellate Tribunal for         c
Electricity (for shrnt, 'the tribunal') in Appeal No. 276 of2006 whereunder
the order dated 10.10.2006 passed in Application No.812 of2004 filed
by the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC), the appellant
herein, before the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (for short,
'the Commission') seeking a refund ofRs.1,22,27,225/-. The tribunal, as
is perceivable, stated the facts in detail, noted the arguments advanced       D
before it, analysed the order passed by the Commission and came to
hold that the ONGC was not entitled to refund and the claim was wholly
unsustainable.
      2. The present appeal was presented before the Registry of this
Court on 7.2.2008. An office note recorded that the appeal was barred          E
by 71 days. The appeal was listed before the Bench on 29.1.2010 on
which date this Court condoned the delay and admitted the appeal. When
the matter was taken up for hearing today, Ms. Ranjeeta Ramachandran,
learned counsel appearing for the I" respondent raised a preliminary
objection that th.is Court could not have condoned the delay of7 l days in
                                                                               F
view of the language employed in Section 125 of the Act and further the
condonation of delay by this Court was done without notice to the
respondent and hence, deserves to be recalled and as a sequitor, the
appeal has to be dismissed without any adverting to the same on merits.
For the aforesaid purpose, she has placed reliance on the authority in Ml
s. Suryachakra Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Electricity Department,              G
Rep. By its Superintending Engineer, Port Bl<tir & Orl·.'
     3. Mr. Saurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
would contend that it had applied for the certified copy of the order

1
    2016 (10) SCALE 46                                                         H
926             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 2 S.C.R.



A     which was made available on 9.10.2007 and, therefore, the said period
      has to be excluded. Additionally, it is urged by him that after the main
      order was pronounced by the tribunal, as there were manifest errors,
      Review Petition No. 4 of 2008 was filed and the said petition was
      dismissed on 7.3 .2008 and in such a situation, the delay, if any, has been
      correctly condoned and does not require to be dwelt upon and the
B
      preliminary objection is without any merit. In essence, the submission is
      that the application preferred for review of the principal order and the
      time consumed therein should be excluded by taking recourse to Section
      14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Limitation Act').
             4. Section 125 of the Act reads as follows:-
c
             "125. Appeal .to Supreme Court. - (I) Any person aggrieved
             by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal. may, file an
             appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of
             communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal,
             to him, on any one or more of the grounds specified in section
D            100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5of1908):
                  Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that
             the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the
             appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further
             period not exceeding sixty days."
E
             5. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear as
      crystal that this Court, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented
      by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the period of 60 days
      from the date of communication of the decision or order of the appellate
      tribunal to him, may allow the same to be filed within a further period not
F     exceeding 60 days. It is quite clear that this Court has the jurisdiction to
      condone the delay but a limit has been fixed by the legislature, that is, 60
      days.
            6. In Chlrnttisgttrh Stttle Electricity Board vs. Centrttl
      Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors.', the issue that arose before
G     this Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked
      forallowing the aggrieved person to file an appeal under Section 125 of
      the Act after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the
      decision of the tribunal. It adverted to the anatomy of Section 125 and

      '(20 lOJ 5 sec 23
H
   OIL & NATURAL GAS CORP. I ID. '· GUJARAT ENERGY                             927
  TRANSMISSION CORPORATI< !.\ LTD. [DIPAk MISRA, J.]

the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity(Proccdure, Form, Fee and Record         A
of Proceedings) Rules, 2007 and opined thus:-
      ""25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any
      decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court
      within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or
      order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court         B
      to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it
      is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal
      within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of
      limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111 (2) and
      125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the
      Limitation Act for filing suits etc. The use of the expression 'within    c
      a further period of not exceeding 60 days' in Proviso to Section
      125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120
      days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can
      entertain an appeal filed againstthe decision ororderofthe Tribunal
      after more than 120 days."                                                D
      7. The two-Judge Bench placed reliance on Singli Enterprises
vs. C.C.E., Jamshedpur & Ors.' and Commissioner of Customs
and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited & Ar.' and came
to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this
Court for maintaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the      E
tribunal beyond the period of 120 days in view of the prescription under
Section 125 of the Act and the proviso appended thereto. In that context,
the Court held:-
      " Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which
      may attract applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read         F
      with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation,
      namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against
      the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125
      will become nugatory."
      8. After so stating, as we find, the Court adverted to the concept        G
of communication and eventually opined:-
      "37. The issue deserves to be considered from another angle. As
      mentioned above, Rule 94(2) requires that when the order is
'\2008) 3 sec 10
'\2009) s sec 79                                                                H
928             Sl JPREME COURT REPORTS                          [20 I 7] 2 S.C.R..



A           reserved, the date of pronouncement shall be notified in the cause
            list and that shall be a valid notice of pronouncement of the order.
            The counsel appearing for the parties are supposed to take
            cognizance of the cause list in which the case is shown for
            pronouncement. If title of the case and name of the counsel is
            printed in the cause list, the same will be deemed as a notice
B
            regarding pronouncement of order. Once the order is pronoi;nced
            after being shown in the cause list with the title of the case and
            name of the counsel. the same will be deemed to have been
            communicated to the parties and they can obtain copy through e-
            mail or by filing an application for certified copy."
c            9. The eventual conclusion that was arrived at by the Court was
      that there is no escape from the conclusion that the appeal, in the said
      case, had been filed for more than 120 days from the da1e of
      communication of the tribunal's order and, therefore, as such the same
      could not be entertained.
D            10. In Mis. Sury11clu111krn Power Corporation Ltd. (supra) the
      case at hand, the Court referred to the earlier decisions and also
      deliberated upon application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act relying
      on the pronouncement in 11-lP. Steel Corpor11tion Lit/. vs. Commissioner
      of Central Excise', and ruled that principles under Section 14 of the
      Act can be applied even when Section 5 of the Act is not applicable. In
E
      the said case, the Court has emphasised that Section 14 would be
      applicable when there is pursuing of a remedy with due diligence and
      good faith. We shall advert to the said facet at the later part of our
      deliberation.
             11. In the instant case, as is noticeable, the judgment was reserved
F
      on 18.9.2007 and pronounced in open court on 28.9.2007. Therefore,
      the date of communication would be 28.9.2007 as per the principle laid
      down in Clilwttisg11r/1 St11te Electricity Botmf (supra). We entirely
      concur with the said view. In the case at hand, the certified copy was
      applied through email on 9.10.2007 and delivered on the same date. Be
G     that as it may, the date of communication is 28.9.2007 and, therefore,
      the appeal preferred under Section 125 of the Act should have been
      filed within 60 days, i.e., 27.11.2007, to come within the period oflimiiation
      and further to be entitled to get the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation
      Act, he should have filed the appeal within a further period of60 days,

H     '(2015) 7 sec ss
   OIL & NATURAL GAS CORP. LTD. v. GUJARAT ENERGY                               929
  TRA,NSMISSION COR!'()R.A.TlON LTD. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

i.e., 26.9.2008. Thus calm lated. tl1cre is total delay of71 days and 11        A
days beyond the expiry ofhll da) s the limit that is stipulated.under Section
125 of the Act.
      12. At this juncture, a submission has been advanced by Mr.
Agrawal that.in such a situation, this Court must exercise its jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution oflndia so that complete justice           B
can be done. Article 142 of the Constitution reads as follows:-
       "142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court
       and unless as to discovery, etc.- ( 1) The Supreme Court in
       the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree ar make
       such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause        c
       or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or orders
       so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in
       such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by
       Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such
       manner as the President may by order prescribe.
                                                                                 D
       (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by
       Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the
       territory oflndia, have all and every power to make any order for
       the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery
       or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment
       of any contempt of itself."·                                              E

       13. ln A.R.Antufoy v. R.S. N(ly(lk & wwtfler", while explicating
and elaborating the principles under A11icle 142, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.
(as His Lordship then was) opined thus:-
       "The fact that the rule was discretionary did not alter the position.
                                                                                 F
       Though Article 142(1) empowers the Supreme Cou11 to pass any
       order to do complete justice between the parties, the court cannot
       make an order inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed
       by Part III of the Constitution. No question of inconsistency
       between Article 142(1) and Article 32 arose. Gajendragadkar, J .,
       speaking for the majority of the judges of this Court said that           G
       Article 142( l) did not confer any poweron this Court to contravene
       the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution. Nor did Article
       145 confer power upon this Court to make rules, empowering it to
       contravene the provisions of the fundamental right. At page 899
'<1988) 2 sec 602                                                                H
930             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A           of the Reports, Gajendragadkar, J., reiterated that the powers of
            this Court are no doubt very wide and they are intended and "will
            always be exercised in the interests ofjustice". But that is not to
            say that an order can be made by this Court which is inconsistent
            with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part Ill of the
            Constitution. It was emphasised that an order which this Court
B
            could make in order to do complete justice between the parties,
            must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights
            guaranteed by the Constitution, hut it cannot even be
            inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant
            statutory laws (emphasis supplied). The court therefore, held that
c           it was not possible to hold that Article 142(1) conferred upon this
            Court powers which could contravene the provisions of Article
            32."
            14. The said decision has been clarified by a Constitution Bench
      in Union Carbide Corportdion etc. vs. Union ofIndia etc. etc.' wherein
D     M.N. Vekatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the
      majority, ruled that:-
            " It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the
            arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under
            Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of
E           serious public importance. The proposition that a provision in any
            ordinary law irrespective ofthe importance of the public policy on
            which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the apex Court
            under Article 142( I) is unsound and erroneous. In both Garg as
            well as Antulay cases the point was one of violaticn of
            constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The observations
F           as to the effect of inconsistency with statutory provisions were
            really nnnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate
            analysis turned on the breach of constitutional rights. We agree
            with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article 142
            insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not
G           exhausted by Section 320 or321 or482 CrPC or all of them put
            together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different
            level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or
            provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as
            prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article
      '1991 Supp.( I) SCR 251
H
 OIL & NATURAL GAS CORP. LTD. v. GUJARAT ENERGY                             931
 TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LTD. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody      A
     and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking into account the
     nature and status of the authority or the court on which conferment
     of powers - limited in some appropriate way- is contemplated.
     The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any
     fundamental considerations of public policy. Sri Sorabjee, learned
                                                                             B
     Attorney General, referring to Garg case, said that 1imitation on
     the powers under Article 142 arising from "inconsistency with
     express statutory provisions of substantive law" must really mean
     and be understood as some express prohibition contained in any
     substantive statutory law. He suggested that if the expression
     'prohibition' is read in place of 'provision' that would perhaps        c
     convey the appropriate idea. Butwe think that such prohibition
     should also be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental
     and general issues ofoublic policy and not merely incidental to a
     particular statutmy scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly
      incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such
                                                                             D
      express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that
      statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps,
     the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers
      under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of"complete justice"
      ofa cause or matter, the apex Court will take note of the express
      prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some      E
      fundamental principles ofoublic policy and regulate the exercise
      of its power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not
      relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but only to
      what ism is not 'complete justice' ofa cause or matter and in the
      ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No
                                                                             F
      question oflack ofjurisdiction or ofnullity can arise".
                                                    [Emphasis supplied]"
      15. ln this regard, another Constitution Bench in Supreme Court
Bar Association vs. Union of Im/iii and Anr.' opined:-
      "56. As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has
                                                                             G
      been placed by us from the Union Carbide case, A.R. Antu/av
      case and Delhi Judicial Service Assn. case go to show that
      they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the
      observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Garg case. It

'(1998) 4 sec 409
                                                                             H
932            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A           is one thing to say that "prohibitions or limitations in a statute"
            cannot come in the way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article
            142 to do complete justice between the parties in the pending
            "cause or matter" arising out of that statute, but quite a different
            thing to say that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 142,
            this Court can altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a
B
            statute. d~aling with the subject and pass orders concerning an
            issue which can be settled only thrDLigh a mechanism prescribed
            in another statute. This Court did not say so in Union Carbide
            case (rnpra} either expressly or by implication and on the contrary
            it has been held that the Apex Court ll'ill take note ofthe express
c           provisions t1f any substantive statutory law and regulate the
            exercise of its power and discretion accordingly ....
                                                           [emphasis added]"
          16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the
   Constitution Bench in Supreme Court B11r Associ11tio11 (supra) has ruled
D that there is no conflict ofopinion inA11tul11y's case or in U11io11 Carbide
   Corporatio11 's case with the principle set down in Prem Clta11d Garg
   & a11other vs. Excise Commr.'. Be it noted, when there is a statutory
   command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate
   that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty
   days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental,
E general issues of public policy as has been held in U11io11 Carbide
   Corporation's case. As the pronouncement in Clilwtti!1g11r/1 State
   Electricity Board (supra) lays down quite clearly that the policy behind
   the Act emphasizing on the constitution ofa special adjudicatory forum,
   is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be
F aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate
   Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of
   Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with
   regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to
   be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a
  -different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present n<Jture,
G  when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further
   delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of
   the provisions and policy oflegislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of
   the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be
   condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution.
H     'AlR 1963 SC 996
  OIL & NATURAL GAS CORP. LTD. v. GUJARAT ENERGY                                933
  TRANSMISSION CORPORATlON LTD. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

       17. We had stated earlier that we will be adverting to the passage       A
in Mis. Suryac/wkra Power Corporation Lt1l (supra). There, the
Court had referred to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It fundamentally
relied on M.P. Steel Corporation Ltd. (supra) wherein the Court after
referring to certain authorities, analysed thus:-
      " ....when a certain period is excluded by applying the principles         B
      contained in Section 14, there is no delay to be attributed to the
      appellant and the limitation period provided by the statute concerned
      continues to be the stated period and not more than the stated
      period. We conclude, therefore, that the principle of Section 14
      which is a principle based 011 advancing the cause ofjustice would
      certainly apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings           c
      which are bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which
      ultimately end without a decision on the merits of the case."
      The controversy in the case at hand has to be viewed regard
being had to the ratio laid down in the aforesaid authority.
                                                                                 D
       18. In the instant case, as is noticeable, the application for review
was filed after expiry of30 days. Learned counsel for the respondent
would contend that for filing ofreview, no time limit is prescribed. Per
contra, Ms. Ranjeeta Ramachandran has drawn our attention to Section
l 20F which confers the jurisdiction on the tribunal and sub-section (2) of
Section 120 clearly prescribes that the tribunal for the purpose of              E
discharging its functions under this Act can exercise the powers vested
in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and that in the
sub-section the review jurisdiction is included. The Review Application
was presented before the tribunal on 10.01.2008. The main order as has
been stated earlier was passed on 28.9.2007. Thus, the application for           F
review was filed after expiry of 60 days, that is to say, the limitation that
is prescribed for filing of an appeal before this Court. In such a situation
it cannot be said that there has been any kind of due diligence on the part
of the appellant. Therefore, the observations made in paragraph 9 of
Mis. Suryaclwlirn Power Corporatio11 Ltd. (supra) does not assist the
respondent.                                                                      G

        19. Another aspect needs to be adverted to. Mr. Agrawal submits
that when the delay in review was condoned by this Court, the appellant
should not be permitted to raise a preliminary objection. Suffice it to say,
it is not an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which is to
                                                                                 H
934               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        (20 f7] 2 S.C.R.


A      be entertained by the Court. We are singularly concerned with entertaining
       of an application for condonation. If the delay is statutorily not
       condonable, the delay cannot be condoned. There is no impediment to
       consider the preliminary objection at a later stage. That will be in
       consonance with the statutory provision. Needless to say, the order
       passed by this Court condoning the delay has to be ignored and we do
B
       so.
                20. Thus analysed, we find immense force in the preliminary
        objection raised by the learned counsel for the l" respondent and
      . accepting the same, we are inclined to dismiss the appeal and accordingly
        it is so ordered. There shall be no order as to costs.
c
       Devika Gujral                                              Appeal dismissed.