Holding

The respondents did not wilfully disobey the Court’s direction and therefore are not liable for civil contempt.

Summary

The petitioners, instructors under Haryana's Adult and Non‑formal Education Scheme, sought contempt proceedings against the State of Haryana and the Union of India for allegedly failing to pay arrears as directed by the Supreme Court on 2 June 1988, which required them to receive pay on par with squad teachers. The Court noted that the earlier judgment did not specify a monetary amount, and the resulting liability of about Rs 28 crore was unforeseen by both the Court and the parties. The State argued that without financial contribution from the Union, it could not meet the payment obligation, having already disbursed only Rs 20 crore. The Court examined whether the non‑payment constituted wilful disobedience under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, emphasizing that civil contempt requires intentional, willful defiance. Citing Dushyant Soma v. Sushma Soma and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Pramod Bhartiya, the Court held that compelling circumstances, such as the unexpected financial burden, preclude a finding of wilful contempt. Consequently, the Court found no wilful disobedience and dismissed all contempt petitions.

Issues considered

Whether the State of Haryana and the Union of India are in civil contempt for not paying the arrears to instructors as directed by the Supreme Court.
Whether the non‑payment was wilful and intentional or caused by compelling financial circumstances.
Whether the Court may punish the respondents in the absence of a specific monetary direction in the original judgment.

Legislation cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(b)

Subjects

Contempt of CourtCivil contemptWilful disobedienceEqual pay for equal workEducation schemeState financial liabilityJudicial discretion

Judgment

A NIAZ MOHAMMAD AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA.AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1994

B [M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, CJI. KULDIP SINGH
AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.]

Contempt of Court Acl 197.1 :

C Section 2(b )-Civil contempt--Wi/fu/ disobedience a prereq-
uisite-Compelling circumstances under which contemner unable to comply
with the order-Held: Does not amount to contempt ··

· These petitions were filed for initiating contempt proceedings
against /the respondents for non-payment of arrears or salary to the
D Petitlo,;ers-lnstructors in the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme
under the Education Department or Haryana, on par with squad teachers
On
as directed by the Court earlier. the contempt petitions directions were
issned to the Union oflndia and the State of Haryana to make joint efforts
and to use the resource for paying the amount due to the teachers within
E two months. The Union oflndia filed an application for modifying the said
order since the earlier direction was Issued to State of Haryana which bas
to comply with it and not the Union of India. This Court permitted the
Union of India to convert the said application into a Review petition.

On behalf or the State of Haryana, It was contended that the total
F financial liability would be in the order of Rs. 28 crores which it was not
aware. when the direction was Issued, and unless the Union of India
contributes and bears a part or the burden, It would not .be possible to
comply with the said direction.

Dismissing the petitions, this Court
G
HELD : 1. The Court while considering the issue as to whether the
alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied and
carried out the direction of the Court, has to take into consideration all
facts and circumstances or a particular ease. That is why the framers of .•
H the Act while defining 'civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful
720
N.MOHAMMADv. STATE 721

disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other A
process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of
the direction of a court, the court must not only be satisfied about the
disobedience of any judgment decree, direction or writ but should also be
satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the
circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the Court, the B
Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such
disobedience is the result of some compelling Circumstances under which
it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the Court
may not punish the alleged contemner. (726-G, H, 727-A, C, D]

Dushyant Soma/ v. Sushma Somal AIR (1981) SC 1026, relied on. C
2. In the present case, there is no specific direction in the judgment
of this Court dated 2.6.1988 in the connected Writ Petition, to pay any
particular amount to the Instructors. This Court has simply decided the
question as to whether they are entitled to the scale of Pay which has been
given to Squad Teachers. Having decided that question in favour of the D
Instructors, this Court directed that arrears be paid to be Instructors
from their respective dates of appointments, treating them at par with the
Squad Teachers. That the said direction will involve payment of about 28
crore of rupees was neither known to the Court not to the parties to that
proceeding. As such, this Court is now entitled to examine the question as E
to whether in the special facts and circumstances of the present case, the
respondents, should be punished for having committed contempt of this
Court. (727-D to F]

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Pramod Bhartiya, (1993] 1 SCC 539, relied
on. F

3. There is no wilful disobedience on the part of the respondents in
complying the direction given by this Court in the said judgment. It cannot
be disputed that when the aforesaid direction was given, this Court was not
conscious that the direction had created a liability for payment of about 28 G
crores of rupees, as arrears to the Iostructiors in the Adult and Non-formal
Education Scheme· under the Education Department in the State of
Haryana. Out of that amount about 20 crores of rupees have already been
disbursed for different periods to the Instructors. In this background, it is
not possible to hold that respondents have committed contempt of this
Court for which they ought to be punished by this Court. (728-E, F] H
7.22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A ORIGINAL JURISDICTION C.M.P. No. 314/89 in W.P. (C) No.
597/86 With I.A. No. 3-6 in C.MP. No. 314/89 in WP (C) 597/86 CMP No.
7984/89 WP (C) No. 78/88 CMP No. 7984/89 In WP (C) No. 395/88,
Contempt P. Nos. 14, 115/89, 344, 345, 346 & 347/93 in W.P. (C) No. 494/88
CMP No. 7983/88, in WP (C) No. 77/83, WP(C) No. 401/89, CMP. Nos.
3293, 3292/89, 3291, 3289/89, 5490, 3060/89 in WP (C) No. 455/86, WP (C)
B No. 635/86, 636/86, 777/86 75/90, 1518/87, 1686/87, IA. No. 1/90 in Con-
tempt. P.No. 14/89 in WP (C) No. 494/88, W.P. (C) No. 784/89, Contempt
P.No. 81/91 in WP (C) Nos. 1428/87, C.P. No. 82/91 in WP. 1489/87 & R.P.
(C) No. 618/93.

c IN

Writ Petition (C) No. 597 of 1986.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Rekha Pandey, B.K.
D
Prasad and K. Swamy for the appearing parties.

Rajinder Sachhar, Ms. Indu Malhotra and Ms. Shirin Khajuria for
the Respondpnts. '

E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.P. SINGH, J. These petitions have been filed for initiating
proceeding for contempt, against the respondents, for having disobeyed
and ignored the order passed by this Court on 2.6.1988 in Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 597 of 1986.
F
The petitioners were working as instructors under the Adult and
Non-formal Education Scheme, under the Education Department of
Haryana. The object of the said Scheme was to impart literacy (functional
and awareness) to the adult illiterates in age group of 15-35 years and to
provide literacy to the children in the age group of 5-15 years, who were
G drop-outs from the primary and middle school level or who had never
joined any regular school. At the relevant time there was another Scheme
known as State Social Education Scheme in the State of Haryana, for
imparting education to the illiterates, in the villages known as State Adult
Education Programme. The teachers employed under the Scheme were
H .known as squad teachers.
N.MOHA.\.1MAD v. STATE [N.P. SINGH, J.] 723

In the year 1981 the services of the head squad teachers and squad A
teachers were regularised and the pay scales of regular Head Masters and
teachers of primary schools maintained by the State Government were
given to them. The petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition claimed that
they were also performing the same na~ure of duties as performed by squad
teachers as such they were also entitled to pay scales of the squad teachers B
under the Education Department along with other benefits from the date
they were initially appointed.

On behalf of the State, this. claim was contested. According to the
State, the writ petitioners who were instructors, did not perform similar
duties as performed by squad teachers. But it was said by this Court : C
'
"There is no doubt that instructors and squad teachers are
employees of the same employer doing work of similar nature in .
the same Department, therefore the appointment on a temporary
basis or on regular basis does not affect that doctrine of equal D
pay for equal work. Article 39(d) contained in Part IV of the
Constitution ordains the State to direct its policy towards securing
equal pay for equal work for both men and women. Though Article
39 is included in the Chapter on Directive Principles of State
Policy, but it is fundamental in nature. The purpose of the Article
is to fix certain social and e.conomic goals for avoiding any dis- E
crimination amongst the people doing similar work in matters
relating to pay. The Doctrine of equal pay for equal work has been
implemented by 1this C~urt in Randhir Singh v. Union of India,
Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. and Surinder Singh v. Engineer-
in-Chief, CPWD. In view the these authorities it is too late in the F
day to disregard the Doctrine of equal pay fo1 equal work on the
ground of the employment being temporary and tlie other being
permanent in nature. A temporary or casual employee performing
the same duties and functions is entitled to the same pay as paid
to a permanent employee.
G
The· respondents' contention that the mode of recruitment of
petitioners is different from the mode of recruitment of squad
teacher inasmuch as the petitioners are appointed locally while
squad teachers were selected by the Subordinate Service Selection
Board after competing with candidates from any part of the H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A country. Emphasis was laid during argument that if a regular
selection was held many of the petitioners may not have been
·appointed· they got the employment because outsiders did not
compete. In our opinion, this submission has no merit. Admittedly,
the petitioners were appointed on the recommendation of a Selec-
tion Committee appointed by the Adult Education Department. It
""
B is true that the petitioners belong to the locality where they have
been posted, but they were appointed only after selection, true that
they· have not been appointed after selection made by the Subor- · ..._
dinate Service Selection Board but that is hardly relevant for the
purposes of application of doctrine of "equal pay for equal work".
c The difference in mode of selection will not affect the application
of the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" if both the classes of
persons perform similar functions and duties under the same
employer."

Ultimately it was held that instructors were entitled to the same pay scale
D as sanctioned to the squad teachers and a direction was given to fix the
scale of pay of the instructors with effect from the date of their initial
appointment by ignoring the break, in service on account of six months
fresh appointments.

E From the judgment aforesaid, it appears that the aforesaid direction
had been given to the State of Haryana. In the Writ Petition aforesaid,
Union of India had not been impleaded as a party. At some later stage
Union of India was added as a proforma respondent. From the judgment
it does not app_ear that Union of Iadia was involved in any manner in the
implementation of the scheme.
F
In the present peMion for initiating the proceeding for contempt of
this Court, against the respondents, it has been alleged that by not having
paid the arrears of salary to the instructors, in terms of the aforesaid order
passed by this Court, respondents are liable to be punished. On 7.8.1991
G this Court passed the following order :
--:-
"State Counsel is granted ~hree months' time for making the
payments. List the matters after three months."

H Yet another order w,as passed on 11.11.1991 saying:
N.MOHAMMAD v. STAIB [N.P. SINGH, J.] 725

"The judgment of this Court requiring the respondent to pay A
salary to the teachers is binding on the State of Haryana as well
as on the Union of India. We, accordingly, direct the Union of
India and the State of Haryana both to make joint efforts and to
use the resources for paying the amount due to the teachers within
2 months.
B
List the application after two months."

Thereafter a petition was filed on behalf of the Union of India for modify-
ing the aforesaid order dated 11.11.1991 saying that in view of the specific
direction given in the judgment of this Court, which is sought to be C
enforced by the petitioners, there was no occasion to issue any direction
to the Union of India by the aforesaid order dated 11.11.1991 because the
direction which is sought to be enforced in the proceeding for contempt,
has to be complied with by the State of Haryana. On 4.11.1992 this Court
head the counsel, appearing for Union of India, State of Haryana and the D
petitioners and granted permission to the Union of India to convert the
application for modification of order dated 11.11.1991, into a Review
Petition.

It appears to be an admitted position that by virtue of the judgment
aforesaid directing that the instructors under the Adult and Non-formal E
Education Scheme of the Education Department of the State of Haryana,
be treated at part with squad teachers under the Social Education Scheme
of the Education Department of the same State for purpose of payment of
salary and other emoluments with effect· from the date of their initial
appointments, the total liability created is about 28 crores of rupees. On F
behalf of the State of Haryana, it was stated that this Court itself was not
conscious, when the aforesaid writ petition was allowed, about the nature
of financial burden. Mr. Sachar, who appeared for the State of Haryana,
categorically stated that unless Union of India contributes and bears a part
of the burden aforesaid which has been caused on the State of Haryana, it
is not possible to comply with the direction given in the aforesaid judgment. G
In that connection he informed the Court that with great difficulties, in
order to comply with the direction of this Court, Rs. 20 crores have been
arranged and paid to the different instructors under the Adult and Non-
formal Education Scheme, which was a temporary scheme. He expressed
the predicament of the State of Haryana in releasing any further fund, H
72.6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A beyond what. has already been paid, and sought a direction to the Union
of India to contribute the balance of the amount.

During hearing of the application, reference was made to later
judgments of this Court, where Benches consisting of three Judges have
reviewed all the earlier judgments of this Court in respect of the doctrine
B of "equal pay for equal work". Special reference was made to the judgment
in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Pramod Bhartiya, [1993] 1 SCC
539, where it has been pointed out that the doctrine of equal pay for equal
work was neither a mechanical rule nor does it mean geometrical equality.
The concept of reasonable classification and all other rules evolved with
C respect to Articles 14 and 16(1) come into play wherever complaint of
infraction of the said rule fails for consideration. It was further said that
it was not enough to say that the qualifications were same or the schools
were of the same status or the service conditions were similar, what was
more crucial was whether they discharge similar duties, functions and
D responsibilities. The burden to prove that in all respects, the two groups
are identical, was on the petitioners, who claimed equal pay. According to
us, now it is not open for this Court to examine the correctness of the view
expressed and the direction given in favour of the petitioners, the dis-
obedience of which is the subject matter of the present controversy.

E Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') defines "Civil Contempt" to mean "wilful dis-
obedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process
of a court... ... ". Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or
carry out an order of the court made in favour of the party, it is a civil
F contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction
has been made can move the Court for initiating proceeding for contempt
against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from
the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an
execution proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure. The party in whose
favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order.
G The Court while considering the issue as t~ whether the alleged contemner
should be punished for not having complied and carried out the direction
of the Court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of
a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil
contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment,
H decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contem- ·
N.MOHAMMAD v. STAIB [N.P. SINGH, J.] 727

ner is punished for non compliance of the direction of a court the Court A
must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of.any judgment, decree,
direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was
wilful and intentional. The Civil Court while executing a decree against
the judgment debtor is not concerned and bothered .whether the dis-
obedience to any judgment, or decree, was wilful. Once a decree has been . B .
passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may· be
conseque{\ces thereof. But wile examining the grievance of the person who
has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate the proceeding for
contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held
guilty and punished, the Court has to record a finding that such dis-
obedience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a C
particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the Court is satisfied
that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the
result of some compelling circumstances which it was not possible for the
contemner to comply with the order, the Court may not punish the alleged
contemner.
D
In the present case, there is no specific direction in the aforesaid
judgment of this Court dated 2.6.1988 in the connected Writ Petition, to
pay any particular amount to the instructors, This Court has simply decided
the question as to whether they are entitled to the scale of pay which has
been given to squad teachers. Having decided that question in favour of E
the instructors, this directed that arrears be paid to the instructors w.e.f.
their respective dates of appointments, treating them at par with the squad
teachers. This direction will involve payment of about 28 crores of rupees
was neither known to the Court not to the parties to that proceeding. As.
such, this Court is now entitled to examine the question as to whether in F
the special facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondents
should be punished for having committeed contempt of this Court. In the
case of Dushyant Soma/ v. Sushma Soma/, AIR (1981) SC 1026 = [1981]
2 SCC 277 this Court said :

"Nor is a person to be punished for Contempt of Court for G
disobeying an order of Court except when the disobedience is
established beyond reasonable doubt, the standard of proof being
similar, even if not the same, as in a criminal proceeding. Where
the person alleged to be in contempt is able to place before the
Court sufficient material to conclude that it is impossible to obey H
72J!, SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the order, the Court will not be justified in punishing the all~ged
contemner."

In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn, Volume 9, para 53 page 34, it has
been said:

B "Although contempt may be committed in the absence of wilful
disobedience on the part of the contemner, committal or se-
questration will not be order unless the contempt involves a degree
of fault or misconduct."

It has been further stated :
c '
. "In circumstances involving misconduct, civil contempt bears a
two-fold character, implying as between the parties to the proceeq-
ings merely a right to exercise and a liability to submit to a form
of civil execution, but as between the party in default and the state,
D a penal or disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by the court in
the public interest."

Taking all facts and circumstances into consideration, we are satis-
fied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no
E willful disobedience on the part of the respondents in complying with the
direction given by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. It cannot be
disputed that when the aforesaid direction was given, this Court was not
conscious that the direction had created a liability for payment of about 2f!,
crores of rupees, as arrears to the instructors in the Adult and Non-formal
Education Scheme under the Education Department in the State of
F Haryana. Out of that amount about 20 crores of rupees have already been
disbursed for different periods to the instructors. In this background, it is
not possible to hold that respondents have committed contempt of this
Court, for which they ought to be punished by this Court. Accordingly, all
the petitions including W.P.(C) Nos. 401 and 784 of 1989 are dismissed.

G.N. Petitions dismissed.