NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYversusRAVINDRA KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS

                         [2022] 1 S.C.R. 1113                             1113


  NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY                              A
                                  v.
       RAVINDRA KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS
                    (Civil Appeal No. 382 of 2012)
                        FEBRUARY 15, 2022                                 B
  [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
       Suit – Suit for declaration – The wife of respondent was
allotted a plot in Sector 15A, Noida on 10.3.1981 – She sworn on
affidavit dated 4.3.1983 that neither she nor her spouse owned
                                                                          C
any other plot in Noida – On 6.10.1981 respondent was allotted
residential plot in Sector 30, Noida – The allotment was inter alia
subject to term and condition that a person himself owning, or in
case of his spouse or dependent children owning a plot within
Municipal Corporation of Delhi or New Delhi or Noida complex,
will not be eligible for allotment of a plot in Noida – Respondent        D
filed affidavit alongwith his letter dated 1.12.1988 stating that he,
his spouse and dependent children did not own in full or part any
residential plot/house/flat in Noida, Delhi and New Delhi – The
wife of respondent transferred the Sec 15A plot vide transfer deed
executed on 25.10.1990 – Respondent was served notice on
                                                                          E
12.6.1996 that the Sector 30 plot had been obtained by him by
submitting a false affidavit as Sector 15A plot was already allotted
to his wife – After reply to notice, the allotment was cancelled on
18.10.1996 – Respondent filed suit for declaration restraining the
appellant from re-allocating the Sec 30 plot & from dispossessing
the respondent – Trial court decreed the suit – First Appellate Court     F
and the High Court affirmed the findings of trial court – Held: The
second plot (Sector 30 plot) allotted to the respondent had been
allotted against the express terms of allotment – There is neither
equity nor any law in favor of the respondent – A person who
misleads the Authority in obtaining allotment of a plot is not entitled
                                                                          G
to any relief – Judgment & decree of the Courts below set aside –
Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Act, 1976 – s.14.
      Affidavit – Filing of false affidavit – Effect – Held: Affidavits
are not mere sheet of paper but a solemn statement made before a
person authorized to administer oath or to accept affirmation –
                                                                          H
                                 1113
1114            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     The filing of a false affidavit disentitles the plaintiff for any equitable
       relief – On facts, cancellation of allotment of plot obtained after
       filing false affidavit was a legitimate ground of cancellation of lease.
             Fraud – Effect – Held: It vitiates all actions.
              Allowing the appeal, the Court
 B
             HELD:1. The plaintiff had invoked the jurisdiction of the
       Civil Court even though he had filed a false affidavit that his spouse
       or dependent children have not been allotted any plot.
       [Para 14][1121-B]

 C            2. It is an admitted fact that the wife of the plaintiff was
       allotted Sector 15A plot on 10.3.1981. The wife sworn an affidavit
       on 4.3.1983 that neither she nor her spouse owned any other
       plot in Noida. It was on 6.10.1981 that the plaintiff was informed
       about allotment of residential plot measuring 450 sq. yards in
       Sector 30. The allotment was said to be subject to terms and
 D     conditions as enclosed.Such terms show that a person himself
       owning, or in case of his spouse or dependent children owning a
       plot within the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or New Delhi or
       Noida complex, will not be eligible for allotment of a plot in Noida.
       The affidavit of the wife of the plaintiff was false as the plot
 E     measuring 450 sq. yards stood allotted to the plaintiff on 6.10.1981.
       Therefore, on the date the wife of the plaintiff had sworn the
       affidavit, the Sector 30 plot was already allotted to the plaintiff.
       The argument that plot might have been allotted but the
       possession was not with the wife of the plaintiff is incorrect. The
       affidavit was to the effect that she has not been allotted any plot
 F     either in her name or in the name of her husband. The affidavit
       was not that the plot has been allotted but possession has not
       been delivered. On the other hand, the plaintiff had sworn an
       affidavit, sent to the appellant with his letter dated 1.12.1988 that
       he, his spouse and dependent children do not own in full or in
 G     part on leasehold or freehold basis any residential plot. Even
       this affidavit is in respect of allotment of a plot not in respect of
       delivery of possession. It may be stated that when in 1988, the
       plaintiff had sworn the affidavit, the lease deed dated 31.1.1983
       already stood executed in respect of Sector 15A plot. Since the

 H
 NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. RAVINDRA                   1115
              KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS

lease was executed, the wife of the plaintiff applied for permission      A
to transfer which was granted and transfer deed was executed on
25.10.1990. The permission was granted by the appellant without
having knowledge of the fact that the husband of the allottee has
already been allotted a separate plot. Once an affidavit has been
filed which is on the face of it false to the knowledge of the
                                                                          B
executants, no benefit can be claimed on the ground that delivery
of possession was given. [Paras 15 & 16][1121-C-H; 1122-A-B]
       3. Affidavits filed are not mere sheet of paper but a solemn
statement made before a person authorized to administer oath
or to accept affirmation. The plaintiff had breached such solemn
statement made on oath. The terms and conditions of allotment             C
conveyed to the plaintiff on 1.12.1988 have a specific clause that
if allotment is obtained by any misrepresentation or misstatement
or fraud, the lease may be cancelled and the possession of the
plot and the building thereon may be taken by the Authority.
Therefore, cancellation of allotment of plot obtained after filing        D
false affidavit is a legitimate ground of cancellation of lease. Fraud
vitiates all actions. [Paras 18 & 19][1122-F-H; 1123-A]
       4. The argument that the lease was required to be
determined by the Chief Executive Officer is not tenable. The
determination of lease by the Chief Executive Officer would arise         E
if in case there was any violation of the terms of lease. If the
condition precedent for grant of lease itself was fraudulent, the
cancellation of lease was not required to be preceeded by
permission of the Chief Executive Officer. Still further, the Chief
Executive Officer has granted permission on 13.9.1998, though
the cancellation order was passed on 18.10.1996. Thus, it is a            F
case of irregularity at best which stands removed with the
permission of the Chief Executive Officer. The argument that if
the statute prescribes a power to do a certain thing in a certain
way, such thing must be done in that way and other modes of
performance are necessarily forbidden is not applicable in the            G
present case. Firstly, for the reason that admittedly, false affidavits
were filed by the plaintiff as well as by his wife. The filing of a
false affidavit disentitles the plaintiff for any equitable relief.


                                                                          H
1116             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     Secondly, any irregularity in the process of cancellation stands
       cured with Chief Executive Officer granting permission on
       13.9.1998. [Para 20][1123-E-H; 1124-A]
             5. The fact is that the second plot allotted to the plaintiff
       had been allotted against the express terms of allotment.
 B     Therefore, there is neither equity nor any law in favor of
       the plaintiff. A person who misleads the Authority in obtaining
       allotment of a plot is not entitled to any relief. [Para 23]
       [1124-C-D]
               ITC Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 7
 C             SCC 493 : [2011] 7 SCR 66; Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd.
               v. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 130 : [2003]
               6 Suppl. SCR 1235 and Managing Director, Haryana
               State Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. v.
               Hari Om Enterprises & Anr. (2009) 16 SCC 208 : [2008]
               9 SCR 821 – distinguished.
 D
               M. Veerabhadra Rao v. Tek Chand 1984 (Supp) SCC
               571: 1985 SCR 1003 – referred to.
               S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath
               (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 1: [1993] 3 Suppl.
 E             SCR 422 – relied on.
                              Case Law Reference
       [2011] 7 SCR 66                distinguished           Para 12
       [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1235       distinguished           Para 13
 F     [2008] 9 SCR 821               distinguished           Para 13
       [1985] SCR 1003                referred to             Para 17
       [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 422        relied on               Para19
               CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 382 of
 G     2012.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 25.02.2010 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh in Second Appeal No.363 of
       2000.

 H
    NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. RAVINDRA                    1117
                 KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS

     Ravindra Kumar, Sr. Adv., Binay Kumar Das, Ms. Priyanka Das,             A
Ms. Neha Das, Advs. for the Appellant.
     P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv., Manish K. Bishnoi, Ms. Pallavii Singh,
Ms. Harshika Verma, Advs. for the Respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                              B
          HEMANT GUPTA, J.
      1. The present appeal has been filed by the original defendant
against the judgment and decree passed by the High Court on 25.02.2010
upholding the findings of the first Appellate Court dated 19.12.1999
whereby the decree of the Trial Court was affirmed.                           C
       2. The plaintiff-respondent was allotted a residential plot No. D-
49, Sector- 30, Noida1 as a member of the Defence Services Cooperative
Housing Society on 06.10.1981. The possession of the plot was handed
over to him on 24.08.1991.
       3. However, prior to the allotment of the said plot, plot No. 84,      D
Sector- 15A, Noida2 was allotted to Smt. Amila Singhvi, wife of the
plaintiff on 10.03.1981. As per the pleaded case of the plaintiff, there
was an uncertainty on account of litigation between the Society of which
he was a member with the appellant authority. Therefore, the plot at
Sector 15A was applied for, which was allotted to the plaintiff’s wife on
                                                                              E
10.3.1981. It was pleaded that since the plaintiff was interested in Sector
30 plot as member of the Society, therefore, the wife of the plaintiff
transferred the Sector 15A plot in favor of one Mrs. Kanta Modi after
obtaining permission from the appellant. Later, a transfer deed was
executed on 25.10.1990.
                                                                              F
       4. The plaintiff was served with a notice on 12.06.1996 that the
Sector 30 plot had been obtained by him by submitting a false affidavit
as Sector 15A plot was already allotted to his wife. The grievance of the
plaintiff was that since the Sector 15A plot has been sold after obtaining
permission from the appellant, therefore, the Sector 30 plot was the only
plot in possession of the plaintiff. With the said claim, the suit for        G
declaration was filed restraining the defendant from re-allocating the
Sector 30 plot and from dispossessing the plaintiff from the same. After
considering the reply, the plot was cancelled on 18.10.1996.
1
    Hereinafter referred to as ‘Sector 30 Plot’
2
    Hereinafter referred to as ‘Sector 15A Plot’                              H
1118              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A            5. In the written statement filed by the appellant, it was asserted
       that there was no litigation in respect of the Sector 15A plot and that the
       plaintiff was aware of the allotment of the Sector 15A plot when Sector
       30 plot was allotted. However, the plaintiff intentionally concealed such
       factum of allotment and filed a false affidavit for the Sector 30 plot. It
       was also pleaded that the plaintiff was aware of the terms and conditions
 B
       of allotment that the plaintiff and his wife cannot retain both the plots
       separately. The Sector 15A plot was sold only to conceal the fact of
       obtaining double allotment. It was further contended that Sector 15A
       plot was allotted on 10.03.1981 and the wife of the plaintiff sworn an
       affidavit on 04.03.1983 that the allotee, her spouse and dependent children
 C     have not been allotted residential plot/house/flat in Noida, Delhi or New
       Delhi. The plaintiff was allotted Sector 30 plot on 06.10.1981. The plaintiff
       had also filed an affidavit along with his letter dated 1.12.1988 that he,
       his spouse and dependent children did not own in full or part any residential
       plot/house/flat in Noida, Delhi and New Delhi. The affidavit filed by the
       plaintiff reads thus:
 D
                                         “AFFIDAVIT
             I, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi S/o Late Shri K.M. Singhvi R/o of E-
             227, East of Kailash, New Delhi-110065, aged about 39 years do
             hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as under:-
 E           1.     That I have attained the age of majority on 26.01.1968.
             2.     That I am a bonafide and registered member of the Defence
                    Services Cooperative Housing Society (Regd.) in my own
                    name and right on May 1, 1976.
             3.     That I have deposited Rs.125/- as membership fee of the
 F                  above cooperative housing society on 18.07.1975.
             4.     That I, my spouse and dependent children do not own in full
                    or in part on lease hold or free hold basis any residential
                    plot or house in NOIDA and have not been allotted any
                    plot, or house on hire purchase basis in NOIDA complex.”
 G            6. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit inter alia on the ground
       that the lease executed in favour of the plaintiff cannot be determined
       merely by passing the subject order in terms of Section 111 (g) of the
       Transfer of Property Act, 1887 as no notice for determination of lease
       under the said section has been issued. Therefore, all rights in the lease
 H     would survive. The first Appellate Court and the High Court affirmed
 NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. RAVINDRA                         1119
      KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

the findings recorded by the Trial Court. The High Court further held           A
that plaintiff and his wife had no ulterior motive to perpetrate fraud on
the appellants. It was noted that there was no willful or dishonest intention
on the part of the plaintiff and his wife.
      7. Learned counsel for the appellant herein argued that the entire
basis of the decree passed by the Courts was erroneous and wholly               B
untenable in law. Lease was not cancelled for the reason that there was
any violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. The allotment was
cancelled as false affidavits were filed by the allotees of both the plots
which knocks down the very allotment since it was obtained by concealing
material facts. The appellant had a policy that a family would not get
more than one plot so as to provide housing to large number of citizens.        C

       8. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the letter of
allotment of plot to the plaintiff dated 6.10.1981 along with the terms and
conditions for the sale of developed leasehold rights of residential plots
to the members of the Cooperative Housing Building Societies in New
Okhla Industrial Development Area (NOIDA). It was contended that                D
such terms and conditions were applicable to all the Cooperative Housing
Building Societies. The relevant conditions read thus:
      “1. ELIGIBILITY:
      Any person who is competent to contract. A person himself owning          E
      or in the case of his/her spouse or dependent children owning a
      plot or house within municipal corporations of Delhi or New Delhi
      or Noida Complex will not be eligible for allotment of a plot in
      NOIDA.
      2. NOTE MORE THAN ONE PLOT:                                               F
      An eligible person will be allotted not more than one residential
      plot in the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority. Area
      separately eligible for allotment of plot and for this purpose they
      shall be treated as a single eligible person.
      xxx                               xxx                            xxx      G
      15. LEASE DEED AND OTHER CONDTIONS OF LEASE
      xxx                               xxx                            xxx
      (I) If the allotment of lease of the plot is obtained by any
      misrepresentation misstatement or fraud or if there is any breach         H
1120               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A              of the conditions of the lease, the allotment or as the case may be,
                the lease may be cancelled and the possession of the plot and the
                building thereon may be taken over by the Authority and the lessee
                will not be entitled to any compensation.”
              9. Thus, it was averred that the allotment was cancelled for the
 B     reason that the wife of the plaintiff was allotted a plot earlier in point of
       time but still, the plaintiff filed an affidavit not disclosing the allotment of
       such plot to his spouse. Thus, it was a violation of the terms and conditions
       of the allotment.
              10. On the other hand, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel
 C     for the plaintiff argued that the terms and conditions of the sale of
       developed leasehold rights have not been produced on record. The plaintiff
       became the member of the Cooperative Housing Society in the year
       1976 but the disputes were pending for a long time. Therefore, the plot
       at Sector 15A was sought, which was allotted to his wife. Subsequently,
       after the settlement of the dispute, such plot was allotted to the Society
 D     and as a member of the Society, he has been allotted a residential plot.
              11. It has been admitted by the plaintiff-respondent that on account
       of dispute regarding the allotment, no construction has been raised over
       the said plot.

 E            12. It was further submitted that in terms of Section 14 of the
       Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Act, 1976, the Chief Executive
       Officer can resume the site or building in case of non-payment of
       consideration or any installment or breach of any condition of such
       transfer or breach of any rule or regulation made. The judgment of this
       Court reported as ITC Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.3 has
 F     been relied upon to submit that in case a lessee commits default in paying
       either the premium or lease amount or commits breach of any term of
       the lease, the Chief Executive Officer alone can resume the plot. The
       Authority to resume implies and includes the Authority to unilaterally
       cancel the lease as well.
 G            13. It was also argued that the finding of fact recorded by the trial
       court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court was not interfered with
       by the High Court in the second appeal as no substantial question of law
       arose for consideration. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied

       3
 H         (2011) 7 SCC 493
    NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. RAVINDRA                       1121
         KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

upon judgments of this Court reported as Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v.            A
U.T., Chandigarh & Ors.4 and Managing Director, Haryana State
Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. v. Hari Om Enterprises
& Anr.5 to contend that determination of lease has to be the last resort.
       14. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and find that
the plaintiff had invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court even though        B
he had filed a false affidavit that his spouse or dependent children have
not been allotted any plot.
       15. It is an admitted fact that the wife of the plaintiff was allotted
Sector 15A plot on 10.3.1981. The wife sworn an affidavit on 4.3.1983
that neither she nor her spouse owned any other plot in Noida. It was on         C
6.10.1981 that the plaintiff was informed about allotment of residential
plot measuring 450 sq. yards in Sector 30. The allotment was said to be
subject to terms and conditions as enclosed. The relevant extract from
such terms and conditions have been reproduced above. Such terms
clearly show that a person himself owning, or in case of his spouse or
dependent children owning a plot within the Municipal Corporation of             D
Delhi or New Delhi or Noida complex, will not be eligible for allotment
of a plot in Noida. The affidavit of the wife of the plaintiff was false as
the plot measuring 450 sq. yards stood allotted to the plaintiff on 6.10.1981.
Therefore, on the date the wife of the plaintiff had sworn the affidavit,
the Sector 30 plot was already allotted to the plaintiff. The argument           E
that plot might have been allotted but the possession was not with the
wife of the plaintiff is incorrect. The affidavit was to the effect that she
has not been allotted any plot either in her name or in the name of her
husband. The affidavit was not that the plot has been allotted but
possession has not been delivered.
                                                                                 F
       16. On the other hand, the plaintiff had sworn an affidavit, sent
to the appellant with his letter dated 1.12.1988 that he, his spouse and
dependent children do not own in full or in part on leasehold or freehold
basis any residential plot. Even this affidavit is in respect of allotment
of a plot not in respect of delivery of possession. It may be stated that
when in 1988, the plaintiff had sworn the affidavit, the lease deed              G
dated 31.1.1983 already stood executed in respect of Sector 15A plot.
Since the lease was executed, the wife of the plaintiff applied for

4
    (2004) 2 SCC 130
5
    (2009) 16 SCC 208                                                            H
1122               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     permission to transfer which was granted and transfer deed was
       executed on 25.10.1990. The permission was granted by the appellant
       without having knowledge of the fact that the husband of the allottee
       has already been allotted a separate plot. Once an affidavit has been
       filed which is on the face of it false to the knowledge of the executants,
       no benefit can be claimed on the ground that delivery of possession
 B
       was given.
              17. In M. Veerabhadra Rao Vs. Tek Chand6, this Court was
       considering an affidavit attested by an Advocate in terms of Section
       3(2) of the Oaths Act, 1969. The conduct of appellant to attest an affidavit
       without oath and the attestation on the representation of the respondent
 C
       that it bears his signatures, came up for consideration. In these
       circumstances, this Court held as under:
                “17. The expression ‘affidavit’ has been commonly understood to
                mean a sworn statement in writing made especially under oath or
                on affirmation before an authorised Magistrate or officer. Affidavit
 D
                has been defined in sub-clause (3) of Section 3 of the General
                Clauses Act, 1897 to include ‘affirmation and declaration in the
                case of person by law allowed to affirm or declare instead of
                swearing.’ The essential ingredients of an affidavit are that the
                statements or declarations are made by the deponent relevant to
 E              the subject matter and in order to add sanctity to it, he swears or
                affirms the truth of the statements made in the presence of a
                person who in law is authorised either to administer oath or to
                accept the affirmation……”
              18. Therefore, affidavits filed were not mere sheet of paper but a
 F     solemn statement made before a person authorized to administer oath or
       to accept affirmation. The plaintiff had breached such solemn statement
       made on oath.
               19. The terms and conditions of allotment conveyed to the plaintiff
       on 1.12.1988 have a specific clause that if allotment is obtained by any
 G     misrepresentation or misstatement or fraud, the lease may be cancelled
       and the possession of the plot and the building thereon may be taken by
       the Authority. Therefore, cancellation of allotment of plot obtained after
       filing false affidavit is a legitimate ground of cancellation of lease. Fraud

       6
 H         1984 (Supp) SCC 571
    NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. RAVINDRA                        1123
         KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

vitiates all actions as laid down by this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya             A
Naidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. & Ors.7 wherein
it was held as under:
         “5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short
         question before the High Court was whether in the facts and
         circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary           B
         decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however,
         went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse.
         We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty
         cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove
         it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot   C
         be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an
         engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of
         law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who
         comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are
         constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court
         is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan-             D
         dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life
         find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains
         indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s
         case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He
         can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.”             E
       20. The argument that the lease was required to be determined
by the Chief Executive Officer is not tenable. The determination of lease
by the Chief Executive Officer would arise if in case there was any
violation of the terms of lease. If the condition precedent for grant of
lease itself was fraudulent, the cancellation of lease was not required to        F
be preceeded by permission of the Chief Executive Officer. Still further,
the Chief Executive Officer has granted permission on 13.9.1998, though
the cancellation order was passed on 18.10.1996. Thus, it is a case of
irregularity at best which stands removed with the permission of the
Chief Executive Officer. The argument that if the statute prescribes a
power to do a certain thing in a certain way, such thing must be done in          G
that way and other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden is
not applicable in the present case. Firstly, for the reason that admittedly,
false affidavits were filed by the plaintiff as well as by his wife. The

7
    (1994) 1 SCC 1                                                                H
1124              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     filing of a false affidavit disentitles the plaintiff for any equitable relief.
       Secondly, any irregularity in the process of cancellation stands cured
       with Chief Executive Officer granting permission on 13.9.1998.
              21. The judgment in ITC Limited as relied upon by the respondent
       is on altogether different facts. In that case, the allotment made in favour
 B     of ITC Limited was subject matter of challenge in Public Interest Litigation
       in writ petitions filed before the Allahabad High Court. The issue was in
       respect of cancellation of lease on account of violation of the terms, not
       based upon fraud in obtaining the lease.
             22. The judgments of this Court in Teri Oat Estates and Hari
 C     Om Enterprises are also on different facts wherein the Doctrine of
       Proportionality was applied.
              23. The fact is that the second plot allotted to the plaintiff had
       been allotted against the express terms of allotment. Therefore, there is
       neither equity nor any law in favor of the plaintiff. A person who misleads
 D     the Authority in obtaining allotment of a plot is not entitled to any relief.
              24. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree
       of the courts below are set aside and the suit is thus dismissed.

       Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                             Appeal allowed.
 E     (Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)




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