Holding

The Tribunal’s award is confined to the class of workers who were in service on the cut‑off date and were parties to the dispute; it does not automatically bind the employer to extend the same benefit to later employees, and a writ petition filed after an unreasonable delay cannot be entertained.

Summary

The New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) had 17 senior Shift‑In‑Charge employees who voluntarily became Meter Readers and were given a higher pay scale as an ad‑hoc, personal measure. An industrial dispute was later raised by other Meter Readers, and the Industrial Tribunal awarded pay parity to those Meter Readers who were in service at the time the ad‑hoc benefit was granted, fixing a cut‑off date of 12‑Feb‑1982. Subsequent Meter Readers, appointed after that date, filed writ petitions in 1999 seeking the same pay scale, and the Delhi High Court allowed them, directing NDMC to grant parity. NDMC appealed, contending that the Tribunal’s award was limited to the class of workers existing on the cut‑off date and that the writ petitions were filed after an unreasonable delay. The Supreme Court held that Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act does not extend the award to employees who were not parties to the dispute and were appointed after the cut‑off date, and that a writ petition filed after a 17‑year delay cannot be entertained. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside.

Issues considered

Whether the award of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act extends to employees appointed after the cut‑off date who were not parties to the industrial dispute.
Whether a writ petition filed after a prolonged delay (17 years) can be entertained under Article 226.
Whether the discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised in favour of such delayed petitioners.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 18(3)(b)

Subjects

Industrial disputePay paritySection 18 Industrial Disputes ActCut‑off dateWrit petitionDelayDiscretionary jurisdictionEqual payAd‑hoc pay protection

Judgment

NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL A
- I
}'.

PAN SINGH AND ORS.

MARCH 8, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.]

Labour Laws:

industrial Disputes Act, 1947; S.18: c
Shifis-lncharge working in higher scale of pay opted to serve as Meter
Readers in lower scale of pay-Pay protection provided by employer-New
Delhi Municipal Council-Employees serving as Meter Readers at relevant
time raising an industrial dispute claiming pay parity-Industrial Tribunal
allowing pay parity to them fixing a cut-off date-Filing of a writ petition D
by subsequent appointee-Meter Readers claiming parity in pay scales with
the earlier Awardees-Allowed by High Court-On appeal, Held: Employer
-· ~ allowed higher pay scale to shift Incharge in order to protect their pay-
/ndustrial Tribunal allowed pay parity to Meter-Readers who have been
serving as such at the relevant time by fixing a cut-off date-Subsequent
appointee-Meter Readers were neither parties to the Industrial dispute nor E
they raise any grievance in regard to their condition of service-They filed
writ petition only after 17 years after their appointment-Discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who have not approached
the Court within a reasonable time-It was not a fit case where the High
Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of writ F
petitioners-Meter Readers-Hence, impugned order cannot be sustained and
set aside.

There were posts of Meter Readers as also Shifts Incharge in the pay
scale of Rs. 220-400 and Rs. 185-300 respectively in the New Delhi Municipal
Council (NDMC)/appellant. The posts of Meter Readers were meant to be G
filled up by direct recruitment. 17 senior most Shifts In charge, however,

- for certain reasons opted to become Meter Readers which was allowed by the
appellant-employer. As they were working in a higher scale of pay, their pay
was protected. Some other Meter Readers who were working as such at the
711 H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 3 S.C.R.

A relevant time raised an industrial dispu.te purported to be on the premise that
j .
they had been discriminated against. The Industrial Tribunal by reason of an
Award allowed pay parity to them. Subsequent appointees-Meter Readers/
respondents filed a Writ Petition before the High Court claiming parity in
the matter of grant of scale of pay with the Awardees-Meter Readers whose
pay scale was revised earlier in terms of an Award of the Industrial Court.
B The Writ Petitions have been allowed by the High Court observing that
although they are not covered by the Award, but the appellant being model
employer must grant the same scale of pay to them as granted earlier to other
serving Meter Readers.

C Appellant-ND MC contended that once the cut off date was fixed by the
Tribunal, the respondents, having joined the services of the appellant
thereafter, could not have been directed to be treated alike in the matter of
grant of the same scale of pay; and that the Writ Petitions having been filed
in July, 1999, the High Court committed a serious illegality in directing back
wages in their favour.
-
D
Respondent submitted that the Award of the Industrial Tribunal was
binding upon the appellant in terms of Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act and in that view of the matter, as respondents perform same or )"' ~
similar nature of duties as are being performed by the other workmen, they
were entitled to be treated alike; and that the respondent did not raise a
E separate industrial dispute as they had all along been under the impression
that they would be covered by the Award which may be made in the said
Reference.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

F HELD: 1.1. Seventeen persons who were granted higher scale of pay
had been working as Shifts In charge. As Shifts In charge, they were entitled \ .

to a higher scale of pay. They were given a higher scale so as to protect
their pay which were personal to them and that too on an ad-hoc measure. It
was not by way of a revision of scale of pay as understood in the ordinary
G sense of the term. [Para to] [717-C)

1.2. The Industrial Tribunal in its A ward proceeded on the basis that
the concerned workmen were entitled to the benefit of higher scale as they
were similarly situated to those 17 senior most Meter Readers. The direction
in terms of the Award was confined only to those who were in employment at
H the time when the said benefit was given to the said 17 Meter Readers. They,
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL r. PAN SINGH 713
· thus, formed a class by themselves. A cut-off date having been fixed by the A
-~ Tribunal, those who were thus not similarly situated, were to be treated to
have formed a different class. They could not be treated alike with the others.
The High Court has not considered this aspect of the matter.
jParas 11, 12 and 131 (717-E, Fl

1.3. Although, Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides B
that all workmen who were employed in an establishment, subsequently become
employed therein would also be bound by the Award of the Industrial Tribunal.
But, they must be entitled to the similar benefits. Respondents were not
parties to the said dispute. They did not raise any grievance in regard to
their conditions of service. Had they been parties to the Reference, the matter C
might have been otherwise. (Para 1411717-H; 718-A-B)

Punjab National Bank And Ors v. Manjeet Singh And Anr., (2006) 8
sec 647, relied on.
1.4. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. D
Respondents filed a Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their
grievances for a long time. They did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at
the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties
even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that those employees who were employed or who were recruited
after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a E
long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions could not have been entertained even
if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction
may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the Court after a long
time. Delay and !aches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable
jurisdiction. (Para 1611718-D-EI
F
.. Govt. of WB. v. Tarun K. Roy And Ors .. [200411 SCC 347; Chairman,
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.. (2006) 12 SCALE 347 and
Karna/aka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing Director
and Anr. v. K. Thangappan and Anr., [2006) 4 SCC 322, relied on.

· 1.5. Although, there is no period oflimitation provided for filing a Writ
G
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, Writ
Petition should be filed within a reasonable time. [Para 17) (718-GI

Lipton India Ltd. and Ors. v. Union Of India And Ors., (1994) 6 SCC
524 and MR, Gupta v. Union of India And Ors.. (1995( 5 SCC 628, referred H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A to.
f. -
l.6. It was not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised
its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the respondents.

Shiv Dass v. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 2 SCALE 325 : (2007) I
B Supreme 455, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1214 of2007.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21 J.2005 of the High Court of Delhi
at New Delhi in W.P. No. 4661/1999.
.-
c Rakesh K. Khanna, Dr. Rashmi Khanna, Surya Kant, Shailja Sinha,
Jahanvi Worah and Neeraj Sharma for the Appellant.

Asha Jain Madan, Mukesh Jain and Ambar Jain for the Respondents.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. I. Leave granted.

2. Appellant is a local authority constituted under the New Delhi .,,._ •
Municipal Act, 1994. It has been performing its municipal functions in the
E New Delhi area; one of them being distribution of electricity to the consumers
upon buying the same from the Electricity Supply Companies. For the said
purpose, it has a electricity department. In the said department, there were
posts of Meter Readers as also Shifts Incharge. The pay scale of Shifts In-
charge was Rs. 220-400 and that of the Meter Readers Rs. 185-300. The post
of Meter Readers was meant to be filled up by direct recruitment. 17 senior
F most Shift In charge, however, for certain reasons opted to become Meter
Readers. As they were working in a higher scale of pay, their pay was
protected. Such protection of pay was given to them by an Order dated
I0.2.1982, stating :
. -

"I. The matter regarding revision of pay scale from Rs. 185-300 to
G Rs. 220-440 of those Meter Readers who were promoted as Meter
Readers from the Cadre of Shift-In-charge II Grade was discussed in
the meeting held on 15 .12.81 at 11.00 AM under the Chairmanship of
the Administrator. It was decided by the Administrator that the matter
be examined whether higher pay scale of Rs. 220-400 could be given
-
H to the 17 such senior-most Meter Readers, purely as ori ad hoc
NE\\ DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL"· PAN SINGH [S.B. SINHA . .I.] 715
measure which would be personal to them. A
2. Accordingly, the case was discussed in the meeting of Heads of
Departments namely CE(E)/CE(C)/F A,CA, Secretary, MOH, DD(H) and
LWO headed by the Administrator on 06.02.1982 and was decided that
the pay scale of Rs. 220-10-300-EB-400 be allowed w.e.f. 6.2.82 to all
those 17 Meter Readers who had previously worked as Shift In charge B
Grade I!, but this revision of scale will be personal to them without
making any precedent..."

3. Some other Meter Readers who were in services of the appellant at
the relevant time raised an industrial dispute purported to be on the premise
that they had been discriminated against. Reference was made to the Presiding C
Officer, Industrial Tribunal No. 3, Delhi for detem1ination of inter-alia the
following industrial dispute:-

"!. Whether the pay scale of Meter Readers should be revised from
Rs. 520-815 to Rs. 590-10001- as has been done in case of 17 Meter
Readers namely I) Shri Turen Singh, 2) Ram Chander Singh, 3) Shri D
Rameshwar Lal Bali, 4. Shri Prem Chand Sharma, 5. Raj Kumar Kalia
. -~
(6) Sh. Prabhu Dayal, (7) Sh. Anand Kishore Aggarwal, (8) Shri
Jagannath Pars had, (9) Sh. D.P. Malhotra, (I 0) Sh. Bhu Dev Sharma,
(I I) Sh. Sukh Dev Singh, (12) Shri Ajaib Singh, (13) Shri H.C. Chauhan,
(14) Shri K.S. Rawat, (15) Shri Devi Sanai, (16) Shri MansaRam, (17) E
Shri Subhash Chand Sharma and if so what directions are necessary
in this respect?"

4. Respondents were not parties therein. They did not file any application
for their impleadment. By reason of an Award dated 7.1.1998, the Industrial
Court directed :- F
"In the light of the above observations of the meter readers, who were
in service at the time when the benefit was given to 17 meter readers,
whose names are morefully detailed in Annexure B of claim statement
are entitled to get the benefit of the said order in the similar manner
in which the same has been given to those 17 meter readers purely G
as an adhoc measure to be personal to them and discrimination made
y
by the management amongst the same class of meter readers is an act
of arbitrariness and amounts to misuse of the principles of law. The
management is directed to pay the arrears of the said amount on the
same analogy to which 17 meter readers have been given benefit to H
716 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A the same as per order dated 12.02.82 within a period of6 months from ~.-
the date the award become enforceable under law failing which the
meter readers of the said period will be entitled to get an interest @
18% per annum to the same ..."

5. The respondents were appointed after 12.2.1982 i.e during the period
B 1.4.1982 and 3.6.1984. They filed a Writ Petition claiming parity in the matter
of grant of scale of pay by filing a Writ Petition with the Awardees before
the High Court of Delhi. By reason of the impugned Judgment, the said Writ
Petitions have been allowed stating that although they are not covered by
the Award, the appellant being model employer must treat the employees
similarly situated and, thus as the respondents had passed the test in June,
c 1981, they could not be denied the pay scale which has been granted to them.

6. Respondent filed the Writ Petition in July, 1999 claiming inter-alia the
following reliefs:-

"(a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the Respondent
D to grant to the petitioners the benefit of the revised pay scale,
as had been granted to other meter readers vide office order
dated 10.02.1982 (Annexure-B). Office order dated 23.12.1998 y..· •
(Annexure-D) and office order dated 17.5.1999 (Annexure - D-1)
alongwith all the consequential reliefs.
E (b) Grant to the petitioners the appropriate amount of damages
including cost of the present petition as also such other or
fu1ther reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, proper and
expedient in the facts and circumstances of the present case."

7. Mr. Rakesh K. Khanna, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
F of the appellant would urge that once the cut off date was fixed by the
~
Tribunal as on 6.2.1982, the respondents, having joined the services of the
appellant thereafter, could not have been directed to be treated alike in the
matter of grant of the same sc.ale of pay. In any event, the Writ Petitions
having been filed in July, 1999, the High Court committed a serious illegality
G in directing back wages in their favour.

8. Ms. Asha Jain Madan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the "< ~

respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the Award of the Industrial
Tribunal was binding upon the appellant in terms of Section 18(3 )(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act and in that view of the matter, as respondents perform
H same or similar nature of duties as are performed by the other workmen, they
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. PAN SINGI I [S.13. SINHA. J.] 717
were entitled to be treated alike. The learned counsel would contend that the A
-~ respondent did not raise a separate industrial dispute as they had all along
been under the impression that they would be covered by the Award which
may be made in the said Reference.

9. Respondents were appointed on different dates, admittedly after
6.2.1982. Entitlement of an employee to be placed on a particular scale of pay B
would depend upon the terms and conditions laid down in the contract of
service.

I0. Seventeen persons who were granted higher scale of pay as noticed
hereinbefore had been working as Shifts in charge. As Shifts In charge, they
were entitled to a higher scale of pay. They were given a higher scale so as
c
to protect their pay which were personal to them and that too on an ad-hoc
measure. It was not by way of a revision of scale of pay as understood in
the ordinary sense of the term.

11. Those Meter Readers who were purported to be similarly situated D
meaning thereby those who were in service as on 12.2.1982 i.e. the date when
the purported pay scales of 17 senior most Meter Readers on ad-hoc basis
~ -.(
were revised, raised an industrial dispute. The Industrial Tribunal in its Award
proceeded on the basis that the concerned workmen were entitled to the
benefit of higher scale as they were similarly situated to those 17 senior most
Meter Readers. E

12. The direction in terms of the Award was confined only to those who
were in employment at the time when the said benefit was given to the said
17 Meter Readers.

13. They, thus, formed a class by themselves. A cut-off date having F
i. been fixed by the Tribunal, those who were thus not similarly situated, were
~
to be treated to have formed a different class. They could not be treated alike
with the others. The High Court, unfortunately, has not considered this
aspect of the matter.

\ 14. Submission of learned counsel for the respondent that Section G
I8(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act would govern the Award, in our
i
/
" opinion is not correct. Section 18(3 )(b) although, provides that all workmen
who were employed in an establishment, subsequently become employed
therein would also be bound by the Award of the Industrial Tribunal. But,
they must be entitled to the similar benefits. Respondents were not parties H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S.C.R.

A to the said dispute. They did not raise any grievance in regard to their
conditions of service.

15. Had they been parties to the Reference, the matter might have been
otherwise, as was held in Punjab National Bank And Ors v. Manjeet Singh
And Anr., (2006] 8 SCC 647, whereupon Ms. Asha Jain Madan, learned
B counsel for respondent strongly relied upon. Section 18(3)(b) does not postulate
that although the concerned workmen would form different classes, an Award
made in favour of another class of workmen would automatically be extended
to the other. In l'uniab National Bank (supra), the workman contended that
they were not bound by the Award, which contention was rejected having
C regard to the fact that they were similarly situated and in fact were parties in
the industrial disputes and were represented through their Union.

16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of.
Respondents herein filed a Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate
their grievances for a !ong time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity
D with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not imp lead
themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the
Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted
the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
.could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite
E that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who
approach the Court after a long time. Delay and !aches are relevant factors
for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy And
Ors., ('2004] I SCC 347, Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh
and Anr., (2006) 12 SCALE 347 and Karna/aka Power Corpn. Ltd. through
F its Chairman & Managing Director and Anr. v. K. Thangappan and Anr.,
[2006J 4 sec 322.

17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a Writ
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, Writ Petition
should be filed within a reasonable time.
G
18. See Lipton India ltd. And Ors. v. Union of India And Ors., (1994]
6 SCC 524 and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India And Ors., [ 1995] 5 SCC 628.

19. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 2 SCALE 325 : (2007)
I Supreme 455, this Court held:-
H
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL" PAN SINGH [S.B. SINHA. J.J 719

"9. It has been pointed om by this Court in a number of cases A
. -~ that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care
of delay. This was first stated in K. V. Raja Lakshmiah v. State of
Mysore, AIR (1967) SC 993. There is a limit to the time which can be
considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government
had turned down one representation the making of another
representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of B
Orissa v. Sri Pyarimohan Samantaray, AIR ( 1976) SC 2617 making of
repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation
of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay
alone. See State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 1639 also.

10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues C
from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook
delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each
case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years
normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which
could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The . D
High Court did not examine whether on merit appellant had a case. If
on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference,
it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone."

20. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the
High Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of E
the respondents herein.

21. For the reasons aforementioned, impugned Judgment cannot be
sustained which is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. In the facts
and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
F
S.K.S. Appeal allowed.