Holding

Section 60(6) IBC excludes the entire moratorium period in computing the limitation period for any suit or application by or against a corporate debtor, making the arbitration application filed by Minosha timely.

Summary

NDMC entered into a purchase order with Minosha India Ltd, terminated it for alleged non‑performance and the latter invoked the arbitration clause on 7 June 2016. Before the arbitration could commence, the corporate debtor was admitted to corporate insolvency resolution on 14 May 2018, a moratorium was imposed under Section 14 of the IBC and a resolution plan was approved on 28 November 2019. Minosha filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on 25 November 2020 seeking appointment of an arbitrator; the Delhi High Court allowed it on 14 December 2020. NDMC appealed, contending that the application was barred by the three‑year limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act and that Section 60(6) IBC did not extend the limitation for a corporate debtor. The Supreme Court held that Section 60(6) expressly excludes the entire moratorium period when computing limitation for any suit or application by or against a corporate debtor, thereby extending the limitation period and rendering the arbitration application timely. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 60(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to exclude the moratorium period for computing the limitation period of an arbitration application filed by a corporate debtor.
Whether the three‑year limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 without extension by the moratorium.
Whether a corporate debtor can initiate arbitration proceedings during the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC.

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 11(6), s. 12(5)
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016s. 10, s. 14, s. 17, s. 25(2)(b), s. 31, s. 60(6), s. 7, s. 9
Limitation Act, 1963s. 3

Subjects

InsolvencyMoratoriumLimitation periodArbitrationSection 60(6) IBCCorporate debtorStatutory interpretationArbitration and Conciliation Act

Judgment

1072 [2022]
SUPREME COURT 16 S.C.R. 1072
REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
v.
MINOSHA INDIA LIMITED
(Civil Appeal No. 3470 of 2022)
B APRIL 27, 2022
[K.M. JOSEPH AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Arbitration and
conciliation Act, 1996 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Limitation Period –
Insolvency – Appointment of Arbitrator – Freezing of limitation
C
during the moratorium period – Appellant (NDMC) placed a
purchase order with the Respondent (MIL) – Due to the failure on
part of the Respondent to perform its obligation as per the existing
agreement, NDMC terminated the agreement – On June 7, 2016,
the Respondent (MIL) issued the notice for commencement of the
D arbitral proceeding as per the provisions provided under the A&C
Act, 1996 – Before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings,
insolvency proceedings started against the Respondent(MIL) on May
14, 2018 by the orders of NCLT – On November 28, 2019, the
Resolution Plan to resolve the insolvency of the Respondent was
sanctioned by the Tribunal – On the same date i.e. November 28,
E
2019, the Respondent(MIL) filed an application for appointment of
the arbitrator before the High Court of Delhi as per s. 11(6) of the
1996 Act – The application for appointment of the arbitrator was
allowed by the High Court on December 14, 2020 – Appellant did
not raised any objection to the issue of limitation before the High
F Court – Before the Supreme Court, the appellant (NDMC) contended
that the notice of commencement of the arbitration proceedings was
dated June 7, 2016 and the application for appointment of an
arbitrator has to be filed within the period of 3 years from the date
on which the notice of commencement of the arbitral proceedings
commenced – The application for appointment of arbitrator was
G
made by the respondent on November 28, 2019 which is beyond the
time period of three years – Also, the Respondent is not protected
by the moratorium imposed under Section 60(6) read with Section
14 of the IBC, 2016 (period of limitation) – Held: an application

H
1072
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1073
LIMITED

under Section 7, 9 or 10, does bring in a period which is intended A
to bring a corporate debtor back to life if possible, ‘a period of
calm’, in the words of the respondent – But this is a period during
which the management of the corporate debtor is displaced,
ironically, a period of turbulent churning – While it may be true
that proceedings by the corporate debtor through the resolution
B
professional is contemplated, it is not impossible to contemplate that
the resolution professional for whatever reason it may be, does not
discharge his duties and conduct proceedings in all matters as he
should – This as can be the rationale for the Law Giver excluding
the period of limitation in regard to suits or applications at the
instance of the corporate debtor under Section 60(6) – In the instant C
case, an order of Moratorium under Section 14, the entire period
of the Moratorium is liable to be excluded in computing the period
of limitation even in a suit or an application by a corporate debtor.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The principles of interpretation of statutes have D
been invoked in the varying contexts and are to be applied on
the basis of the facts of the case, the nature of the law and a host
of principles. Undoubtedly, the golden rule of interpretation is
the interpretation which thrives on the ordinary meaning of the
words as they are used. This principle of literal interpretation of E
statutes has over a period of time indeed yielded to an
interpretation which is purposive or which seeks to accommodate
the object of the law giver. Suffice it to say that if the words of a
statute are not ambiguous, the scope of interpretation dwindles.
It is not for the Court to rewrite a statute. There may be occasions
where the Court may even go to the extent of leaving out a word F
or not giving effect to certain part in order to give full meaning to
the law by way of gleaning and giving effect to the intention of the
legislature. [Para 19][1087-F-H; 1088-A-B]
2. No doubt, another principle, which has rightfully vied for
the Court’s approval in this regard, is that, an interpretation which G
furthers the object and purpose of the law, must weigh with the
Court, the most. [Para 21][1088-G]

H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A 3. Under Section 17, the management of the affairs of the
corporate debtor is taken over by the interim resolution
professional. The powers of the Board of Directors or the partners
of the corporate debtor shall stand suspended and it would be
exercised by the interim resolution professional. When the
authority changes hands from the interim resolution professional
B
to the resolution professional, the previous management
continues to be excluded. The committee of creditors comes into
being. Under the supervision, ‘as it were’, of the committee of
creditors, all the matters are proceeded with. The resolution plans
are received by the resolution professional and the resolution
C plan which is finally approved by the committee of creditors and
still further at the hands of the adjudicating authority, would result
in the curtains being wrung down on the moratorium under
Section 31(3). During this entire period, what is noteworthy is
that while in law and in form, the corporate debtor continues to
exist and represented by the interim resolution professional to
D
begin with and the resolution professional thereafter, the erstwhile
management of the corporate debtor is displaced. When the
resolution plan is approved, a new management takes over. All
this is contemplated when the CIRP is successful. Undoubtedly,
if it is unsuccessful, the corporate debtor slips into liquidation.
E Therefore, on the one hand, an application under Section 7, 9 or
10, does bring in a period which is intended to bring a corporate
debtor back to life if possible, ‘a period of calm’, in the words of
the respondent. But this is a period during which the management
of the corporate debtor is displaced, ironically, a period of
turbulent churning. While it may be true that proceedings by the
F
corporate debtor through the resolution professional is
contemplated, it is not impossible to contemplate that the
resolution professional for whatever reason it may be, does not
discharge his duties and conduct proceedings in all matters as
he should. We are noting this as this can be the rationale for the
G Law Giver excluding the period of limitation in regard to suits or
applications at the instance of the corporate debtor under Section
60(6). [Para 24][1091-A-F]

H
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1075
LIMITED

4. As far as understanding the meaning of Section 60(6) is A
concerned, there cannot be a slightest doubt that the period of
Moratorium is excluded even in the case of a suit or application
brought by a corporate debtor, viz., in regard to the period of the
moratorium. It is true that on the one hand what is tabooed in
Section 14 when a Moratorium is put into place is inter alia the
B
institution of suits or continuance of pending suits or proceedings
against the corporate debtor including proceeding in execution
of inter alia, the decree or order of an arbitration panel. [Para
25][1091-G-H; 1092-A]
5. We have already undertaken the task of understanding
the purport of the Code and the context in which section 60(6) C
has been put in place. This Court cannot possibly sit in judgment
over the wisdom of the Law Giver. The period of limitation is
provided under the Limitation Act. The law giver has
contemplated that when a moratorium has been put in place, the
said period must be excluded. We cannot overlook also the D
employment of words ‘any suit or application’. This is apart, no
doubt, from the words ‘by a corporate debtor’. Interpreting the
statute in the manner which the appellant seeks would result in
our denying the benefit of extending the period of limitation to
the corporate debtor, a result, which we think, would not be
warranted by the clear words used in the statute. [Para 27] E
[1093-B-D]
6. This Court is of the view that section 60(6) of the IBC
does contemplate exclusion of the entire period during which
the moratorium was in force in respect of corporate debtor in
regard to a proceeding as contemplated therein at the hands of F
the corporate debtor. [Para 28][1093-E]
Noharlal Verma v. District Co-Operative Central Bank
Limited, Jagdalpur (2008) 14 SCC 445: [2008] 14 SCR
774; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance
and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424: G
[1987] 2 SCR 1; Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal
Tribunal (1976) 3 All England Law Reports 611;
Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and Ors.
(2002) 3 SCC 722: [2002] 2 SCR 369; New India
H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and Ors.
(2008) 3 SCC 279: [2007] 13 SCR 598: Tirath Singh
v. Bachittar Singh and Others AIR 1955 SC 830: [1955]
SCR 457 – referred to.
Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory
B Interpretation, Fourteenth Edition, Page No. 145-
referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2008] 14 SCR 774 referred to Para 4

C [1987] 2 SCR 1 referred to Para 6
[2002] 2 SCR 369 referred to Para 20
[2007] 13 SCR 598 referred to Para 21
[1955] SCR 457 referred to Para 2
D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3470
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2020 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Arbitration Petition No.668 of 2020.
Gourab Banerji, Sr. Adv., Harsha Peecharra, Yoginder Handoo,
E Rakesh Talukdar, Ashwin Kataria, Garvit Solanki, Advs. for the Appellant.
Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv., Mahesh Agarwal, Ms. Sayree Basu
Mullik, Rishabh Parikh, Rohan Talwar, Deepak Joshi, Raghav Agrawal,
Ms. Aarzoo Aneja, E. C. Agrawala, Advs. for the Respondent.

F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. M. JOSEPH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The foremost question which falls for determination by this
Court is the impact of Section 60(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
G Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IBC’ for brevity) and whether the
aforesaid provision gives rise to a new lease of life to a proceeding at
the instance of the corporate debtor on the basis of a moratorium which
is put in place by virtue of the order passed under section 14 of the IBC
and whether corporate debtor can take advantage of the same to bring
H
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1077
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

the application in this case filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration A
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1996 Act’).
3. Pursuant to an agreement dated 20.02.2015, the appellant placed
a purchase order of Rs.16,20,00,000/- with the respondent. The appellant,
however, issued a termination notice to the respondent on account of its
alleged inaction and conduct which is described as non-responsive. This B
led to the respondent approaching the High Court of Delhi which finally
culminated in a direction by the High Court to afford an opportunity of
hearing to the respondent and to consider its representation. The
appellant, however, rejected the representation by communication dated
17.05.2016. Invoking the provision in the contract providing for arbitration,
the respondent addressed communication dated 07.06.2016. The C
appellant sent its reply on 20.7.2016 where it, inter alia, did not consent
for either of the names suggested by the respondent and instead proposed
to proceed for arbitration through the Delhi International Arbitration
Centre (DIAC). On 14.5.2018 the National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT) Mumbai admitted an application under Section 10 of the IBC D
and declared the moratorium. On 28.11.2019, a resolution plan was
approved by the NCLT. On 25.11.2020, the respondent filed an
application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act. By the impugned order
dated 14.12.2020, the High Court of Delhi has allowed the application
filed under Section 11(6) and appointed a former Chief Justice of a High
Court to be the arbitrator. It is apposite at this point itself to notice E
certain parts of the impugned order in this regard:
“6. Learned counsel are also ad idem that, in view of Section
12(5) of the 1996 Act read with the Seventh Schedule
thereto, the arbitral mechanism, contemplated by the afore-
extracted Clauses from the Purchase Order and the F
Agreement, cannot be allowed to operate, as the
Chairperson of the NDMC would be disabled from
appointing the arbitrator. This position stands crystallized
in a number decisions, including the judgments of the
Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. G
United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755 and Perkins
Eastman Architects DPC v. IISCC (India) Limited AIR
2020 SC 59, and of this Court in Proddatur Cable TV
DIGI Services v. SITI Cable Network Limited MANU/
DE/0178/2020.
H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A 7. The petitioner wrote to the respondent on 7th June, 2016,
suggesting the names of two retired Judges of this Court as
the sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the dispute.
8. The respondent, however, vide its response, dated 20th
July, 2016, suggested that the matter could be referred to
B the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC), for being
arbitrated.
9. Today, before me, learned counsel request the Court to
appoint an independent arbitrator, who would conduct the
arbitration under the aegis of the DIAC, and in accordance
C with the procedure established in that regard.
10. Learned counsel are also agreeable to pay the fees of
the learned sole arbitrator in accordance with the Fourth
Schedule to the 1996 Act.”
It is in view thereto that the appointment of the arbitrator was
D made.
4. We have heard Shri Gourab Banerjee, learned senior counsel
for the appellant, and Shri N. K. Kaul, learned senior counsel on behalf
of the respondent.
Shri Gourab Banerjee, learned senior counsel, would contend that
E
being a plea relating to limitation and since the aspect of limitation pertains
to jurisdiction the mere fact that the counsel for the appellant in the High
Court has consented to the order appointing the arbitrator will not stand
in the way of the appellant pointing out that the application under section
11(6) was clearly beyond time. In this regard, Section 3 of the Limitation
F Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1963 Act’) is harnessed. It is
pointed out that irrespective of whether the parties set up the case of
limitation, it is the bounden duty of the Court to dismiss the suit or an
application or proceeding which is barred by limitation. In this regard,
learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment of this Court reported
in Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Limited,
G
Jagdalpur (2008) 14 SCC 445:
“32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit,
appeal or application is barred by limitation, a court or an
adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority
H
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1079
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it A
on merits.
33. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963
reads as under:
“3. Bar of limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions
contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit B
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after
the prescribed period shall be dismissed although
limitation has not been set up as a defence.”
(emphasis supplied)
C
Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room
for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or
application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be
dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or
defence has been set up. In other words, even in absence
of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the D
court or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or
application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application
is barred by limitation.”
5. He apparently anticipates the contention based on Section 60(6)
of the IBC. Learned senior counsel for the appellant would point out E
that no reliance should be permitted to be placed on Section 60(6) of the
IBC by the respondent. He would point out that Section 60(6), no doubt,
appears to, in so many words, countenance the exclusion of the period
during which there is a moratorium in effect in the launching of the
proceeding even by the corporate debtor. He would point out that a F
perusal of the scheme of the IBC would reveal that upon an application
being admitted under Sections 7, 9 or 10, the moratorium springs into
existence. However, the contents of Section 14 and the result it produces
would show that in no way does it forbid or act as an embargo against
the corporate debtor launching a proceeding. There is, in other words,
no warrant for exclusion of the period for a suit or proceeding by the G
corporate debtor. In this regard, he seeks further reinforcement by virtue
of the fact that IBC contemplates that the resolution professional is clothed
with the power to conduct proceedings including the proceedings under
the 1996 Act. In this regard, support is sought to be drawn from provisions
of Section 25 of the IBC. Section 25(2)(b) inter alia reads as follows:
H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A “25
……………………………………………………………..............
……………………………………………………………..............
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the resolution professional
B shall undertake the following actions, namely:—
……………………………………………………………..............
……………………………………………………………..............
(b) represent and act on behalf of the corporate debtor with third
parties, exercise rights for the benefit of the corporate debtor in
C
judicial, quasi-judicial or arbitration proceedings;
……………………………………………………………..............
……………………………………………………………..............
He would, therefore, contend that when not only there is no express
D embargo against the corporate debtor from pursuing any proceeding but
the law, in fact, contemplates the resolution professional launching the
proceedings and representing and acting on behalf of the corporate debtor
in judicial, quasi-judicial or arbitration proceedings during a moratorium,
the present application under section 11(6) which is admittedly barred
E but for exclusion of the time under Section 60(6) is to be treated as time
barred. In this regard, he would commend to the Court that the Court
may employ the principles of interpretation which have commended itself
of late, in particular, viz., an interpretation, which advances the object
and the purpose of the law. A mere adherence to the literal meaning of
the law should be avoided particularly in the context of the provision of
F the IBC having regard to the deleterious results, which it would produce
on third parties like the appellant. In other words, when there was no
barrier on the corporate debtor during the period of limitation to lay an
application under Section 11(6) in the facts of this case, and the period
would at any rate expire on 20.07.2019 on the basis of reply dated
G 20.07.2016 of the appellant to the respondent, Section 60(6) will not
assist the respondent.
6. He would submit that this Court may bear in mind the admonition
of this Court on an earlier occasion contained in the judgment of this

H
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1081
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

Court reported in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & A
Investment Co. Ltd. and others1:
“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the
context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may
well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives
the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. B
That interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With
this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole
and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by
phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the C
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-
maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear
different than when the statute is looked at without the
glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we D
must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each
section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant
and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire
Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can
be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed
so that every word has a place and everything is in its E
place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the
setting of the entire Act and by reference to what
preceded the enactment and the reasonsfor it that the
Court construed the expression “Prize Chit”
in Srinivasa [(1980) 4 SCC 507 : (1981) 1 SCR 801 : 51 F
Com Cas 464] and we find no reason to depart from the
Court’s construction.”
7. In this regard, he would point out that the Court may contemplate
that there may be suits which a corporate debtor also during the period
of the moratorium may not be in a position to bring. He gives an example G
of interpleader suit. It may be in such cases alone that the Courts must
give meaning to the exclusion of the period of limitation in favour of a
corporate debtor in Section 60(6). He would further contend that the
acceptance of the case of the respondent under Section 60(6) would
render the phrase in section 60(6), viz., ‘for which an order of
1
(1987) 1 SCC 424
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A moratorium has been made under this part’ otiose. The said phrase,
in other words, is employed in order to confine the benefit of the exclusion
to only suits which would be covered by or come under a cloud as a
result of the moratorium. The present application under section 11(6) is
clearly not one such proceeding. In other words, it is his case that the
words ‘for which an order of moratorium has been made under this
B
part’ which is to be treated as a descriptive part, describes the case of
such proceedings to which the third part will apply, the third part being
the period during which the moratorium is in place, shall be excluded.
The Court may place an interpretation which gives meaning to each
word/phrase in the provision. If a blanket benefit was contemplated by
C the Legislature applicable to all suits and applications by or against the
corporate debtor, the provision would be differently worded. He would
illustrate this with reference to examples by adding and rewriting the
provisions. Section 60(6) is intended to confer the consequential benefit
upon the corporate debtor and, hence, the scope of Section 60(6) should
not be wider than the scope of the moratorium itself. An interpretation
D
which balances the competing public interest of third parties subserved
by limitation and the corporate debtors financial benefit may be placed.
In this regard, he contended that the very object of the law of limitation
or rather the policy which underlies it, is that the long dormant claims
must not be allowed to be brought in a Court or other authority. Another
E principle which is pressed into service is that the defendant or the
respondent, as the case may be, would have lost materials or evidence
to bolster its case if a stale claim is sprung on him causing grave prejudice
to him. Reasonable diligence must inform actions brought. In this case,
this aspect has special relevance according to the learned senior counsel
for the appellant for the reason that the matter relates to the year 2015.
F
The respondent not having brought the application for appointment of an
arbitrator within the period of limitation which is ordinarily available, the
appellant is disabled from establishing its case before the arbitrator as
many of the documents are not available and witnesses may not be
available as appellant’s employees have retired. All of this would produce
G substantially adverse results on the appellant. None of this was in the
contemplation of the law giver and the acceptance of the respondent’s
case would involve giving a free run to those who sleep on their rights
and bring a delayed claim much beyond the period of limitation.

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NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1083
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

8. In this regard, it is also pointed out that there is a resolution plan A
which is approved and its impact may be perceived. The case of the
respondent, it is pointed out, even according to the respondent, is that the
respondent discovered late on going through the files that the application
had to be filed. All of this is incomprehensible when the corporate debtor
continued during the period of the moratorium, i.e., the corporate body
B
continued and it was under the management of the Resolution Professional
who was duly clothed with the authority to proceed for the appointment
of an arbitrator under Section 11(6), even during the moratorium. By
reason of the fact that the management is taken over, the corporate
body does not vanish. So all throughout, there is a corporate body and
there is nothing in law which stood in the way of it lodging an application C
under Section 11(6). The moratorium certainly has nothing to do with
the delayed launching, as it did not bar the launching of proceedings
under Section 11(6). It is therefore, contended that the Court may not
accept the case based on Section 60(6) of the IBC.
9. Per contra, Shri N. K. Kaul, learned senior counsel for the D
respondent would stoutly oppose the appeal. In the very first place he
would submit that the conduct of the appellant which is a public authority
should not commend itself to the Court. He would point out that in the
letter dated 20.07.2016, actually the stand of the respondent was that it
agreed for arbitration but it wanted the arbitration to be carried out through
DIAC. Thereafter, he would draw our attention to the finding in the E
impugned Order, which reads:
“25. That the Respondent vide its letter dated 20.07.2016
replied to the aforesaid Notice dated 07.06.2016, wherein
the Respondent did not provide consent for either of the
names suggested by the Petitioner and instead proposed F
to proceed with arbitration through Delhi Arbitration
Centre. Thus, there has been no mutual agreement
between the parties in respect of the appointment of an
independent Sole arbitrator.”
10. Not unnaturally, he also took us to paragraphs 6 to 10 which G
we have already adverted to. The matter does not end there. He would
submit that following the order of the High Court, proceedings were
commenced before the Arbitrator. 19.02.2021, 25.03.2021, 06.07.2021
and a date in May, 2021 are pointed to as dates on which proceedings
H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A were held before the Arbitrator. He would complain that the conduct of
the appellant does not reflect honesty as is expected of the State. It is
further pointed out that the fact that arbitration proceedings had
commenced was not brought to this Court’s notice when this Court issued
notice in the matter and passed an interim order.
B 11. He would further highlight that in effect, the impugned order
is a consent order. Therefore, irrespective of the Court’s decision on
the question of law which has been raised relating to the ambit of Section
60(6), the appeal cannot be permitted to succeed. As far as the true
scope of Section 60(6) is concerned, he would submit that section 14
brings in a period which he describes as a ‘calm period’. In other words,
C he would contend that when an order of moratorium is passed in a
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the IBC, it is
intended to bring about a period during which a resurrection or revival of
the corporate body is attempted. A hiatus is put in place in respect of
other proceedings as contemplated under Section 14. He would contend
D that be it a literal interpretation that this Court may place or a contextual
interpretation, the result is inevitable that the period of moratorium will
stand excluded even as far as a suit or an application by a corporate
debtor is concerned. As far as the literal interpretation goes, the law
giver has not left anything for imagination and there would be no merit in
the case of the appellant. As far as the object of the Code is concerned,
E Parliament contemplated that every attempt should be made to bring
back an ailing corporate debtor to life. The argument based on Section
25(2)(b) of the IBC is sought to be met by pointing out that while it does
give power to the Resolution Professional to represent the company in
proceedings including proceedings under the 1996 Act and there can be
F no doubt that the Resolution Professional could have taken steps under
Section 11(6), that should not be the end of the inquiry. The question
must be answered with reference to the express words used in Section
60(6) and also bearing in mind what actually happens on the ground
once a moratorium is put in place and the corporate debtor undergoes a
CIRP.
G
12. The learned senior counsel for the respondent also enlists in
his support, the report of the Joint Committee of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2015, which reads as follows:
“29. Adjudicating Authority for Corporate persons – Clause
H 60 and 79 (14(e)
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1085
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

FICCI in the memorandum submitted to the A
Committee was of the view that the exclusion of moratorium
period from calculation of limitation period applies only in
the context of suit or application in the name or on behalf of
the corporate debtor. It is not clear as such exclusion also
applies in respect of suits against the company by the
B
creditors which are also subject to stay under the moratorium
provisions. It was, therefore, suggested that the words “or
against the corporate debtor” may be added after the words
“corporate debtor” under Clause 60(6) of the Bill.
The Committee while agreeing to the suggestion
of FICCI, decide that clause 60(6) may be modified as C
under: -
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation
Act, 1963 or in any other law for the time being in
force, in computing the period of limitation specified
for any suit or application by or against a corporate D
debtor for which an order of moratorium has been
made under this Part, the period during which such
moratorium is in place shall be excluded’.
Further clause 6091) provides that Adjudicating Authority
for corporate persons including personal guarantors shall E
be National Company Law Tribunal. Since clause 79(14)(e)
is contrary to clause 60(1), as a consequential amendment,
clause 79(14)(e) may be omitted.”
13. Learned senior counsel for the respondent does not dispute
that the moratorium in any way stands in the way of a proceeding being F
launched by the corporate debtor. In the facts of this case, the application
being one under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act, such an application could
have been maintained during the period of the moratorium. It could
have been maintained as we have already noted by the Resolution
Professional but this does not whittle down the benefit of the exclusion G
under Section 60(6).
14. It is, therefore, according to him, clear that the provision, even
originally, did provide for the exclusion of time for proceedings by the
corporate debtors while exclusion of time against the debtor, was a later
H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A addition. The law always was that the exclusion under Section 60(6)
was contemplated in favour of the corporate debtors.
15. The learned senior counsel for the appellant did attempt to
emphasise the impact of the following sentence:
“……..It is not clear as such exclusion also applies in respect
B of suits against the company by the creditors which are
also subject to stay under the moratorium provisions.”
The appellant would also contend that the fact of the arbitration
being on going was disclosed to this Court.

C ANALYSIS
16. Section 14 of the IBC reads as follows:
“14. (1) Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3),
on the insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating
Authority shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting
D all of the following, namely:—
(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or
proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution
of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal,
arbitration panel or other authority;
E (b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by
the corporate debt or any of its assets or any legal right or
beneficial interest therein;
(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security
interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its
F property including any action under the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002;
(d) the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor
where such property is occupied by or in the possession of
G the corporate debtor.
(2) The supply of essential goods or services to the corporate
debtor as may be specified shall not be terminated or
suspended or interrupted during moratorium period.

H
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1087
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to such A
transactions as may be notified by the Central Government
in consultation with any financial sector regulator.
(4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date
of such order till the completion of the corporate insolvency
resolution process: B
Provided that where at any time during the corporate
insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating
Authority approves the resolution plan under sub-section
(1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of
corporate debtor under section 33, the moratorium shall C
cease to have effect from the date of such approval or
liquidation order, as the case may be.
17. Section 60(6) of the IBC must next be noticed:
“60……………………………….....................................
D
.......................................................................................
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act,
1963 or in any other law for the time being in force, in
computing the period of limitation specified for any suit or
application by or against a corporate debtor for which an
E
order of moratorium has been made under this Part, the
period during which such moratorium is in place shall be
excluded.”
18. We must, in the first place, notice that the Courts would not
indulge in interpretation of a report of a body and when there is better
F
material in the form of the Act itself available for interpretation.
19. The principles of interpretation of statutes have been invoked
in the varying contexts and are to be applied on the basis of the facts of
the case, the nature of the law and a host of principles. Undoubtedly,
the golden rule of interpretation is the interpretation which thrives on the
ordinary meaning of the words as they are used. This principle of literal G
interpretation of statutes has over a period of time indeed yielded to an
interpretation which is purposive or which seeks to accommodate the
object of the law giver. Suffice it to say that if the words of a statute are
not ambiguous, the scope of interpretation dwindles. It is not for the
H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A Court to rewrite a statute. There may be occasions where the Court
may even go to the extent of leaving out a word or not giving effect to
certain part in order to give full meaning to the law by way of gleaning
and giving effect to the intention of the legislature. The principle that
literal meaning must be accepted is undoubtedly subject to the principle
that it will make way when such interpretation will lead to an absurdity
B
or grave injustice which a law giver could not have contemplated.
20. It is necessary to refer to the Principles of Interpretation of
Statute in context of the submissions, which have been made. In (1976)
3 All England Law Reports 611, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, in the case of
Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal has given an exposition of
C the golden rule of interpretation, which is the same as understanding the
words of a Statute in their natural and ordinary sense, with reference to
the grammatical meaning and the same has been adverted and approved
by this Court in Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and others 2:
“9. …
D
‘Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning
what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes,
so important to people who hope to live under the rule of law,
will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible
to apply “the golden rule” of construction, that is to read the
E statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the
ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context,
without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be
credited with good sense; so that when such an approach
produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of
F statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently
to avoid such disadvantage, though no further’.”
21. No doubt, another principle, which has rightfully vied for the
Court’s approval in this regard, is that, an interpretation which furthers
the object and purpose of the law, must weigh with the Court, the most.
G In this regard, we may notice the following view expressed by Justice S.
B. Sinha in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and
another3:

2
(2002) 3 SCC 722
3
(2008) 3 SCC 279
H
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1089
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

“51. … With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a A
proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal
interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity
which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to
interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must
place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. So
B
done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted
to which would require the construction of the Act in such a
manner so as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled,
which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory
scheme to fulfil its constitutional obligations as held by the
Court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. [(1990) 4 SCC C
406]
52. Barak in his exhaustive work on “Purposive Construction”
explains various meanings attributed to the term “purpose”.
It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive
Construction in Barak’s words: D
“Hart and Sachs also appear to treat ‘purpose’ as a subjective
concept. I say ‘appear’ because, although Hart and Sachs
claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in
the legislator’s shoes, they introduce two elements of
objectivity : First, the interpreter should assume that the E
legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to
achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second,
the interpreter should accept the non-rebuttable presumption
that members of the legislative body sought to fulfil their
constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows
the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the F
author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had
he or she acted reasonably.”
(Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, (2007) at
p. 87.)”
G
22. In Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation
14th Edition, page 145 while dealing with the application of Heydon’s
Rule, we find the following statements:
“It has also been said that the application of the rule in
Heydon’s case should not be taken to extremes; that if there
H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A were many problems before the enactment of the statute it
does not follow that in an effort to solve some of them the
Parliament intended to solve all; and that loyalty to the rule
does not require the adoption of a construction which leads
manifestly to absurd results. These propositions stated by
LORD ROSKILL in Anderton v. Ryan [(1985) 2 ALL ER
B
355] are unexceptional but their misapplication may lead to a
narrow construction defeating the object of the statute as
actually happened in that case which was overruled within a
year in R. V. Shivpuri [(1986) 2 ALL ER 334]. Further, if the
statutory language in its primary or ordinary meaning in the
C context has a wider effect, it cannot be artificially confined
to remedy the single identified mischief which is conceived
to have occasioned the statutory provision for once a mischief
has been drawn to the attention of the parliamentary draftsman
he would have considered whether any concomitant mischiefs
should be dealt with as a necessary corollary.”
D
23. This Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh and Others 4
approved of the following statement in Maxwells Interpretation of Statues
10th Edition Page 229.
“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning
E and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction
of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some
inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably
not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies
the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the
sentence.”
F
24. Under the IBC, by virtue of the order admitting the application,
be it under Sections 7, 9 or 10, and imposing moratorium, proceedings as
are contemplated in Section 14 would be tabooed. This undoubtedly
does not include an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act by
the corporate debtor or for that matter, any other proceeding by the
G corporate debtor against another party. At least there is no express
exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court or authorities to entertain any
such proceeding at the hands of the corporate debtor. However, we
must not be oblivious to the other provisions as well. Under Section 17,

4
H AIR 1955 SC 830
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1091
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor is taken over by A
the interim resolution professional. The powers of the Board of Directors
or the partners of the corporate debtor shall stand suspended and it
would be exercised by the interim resolution professional. When the
authority changes hands from the interim resolution professional to the
resolution professional, the previous management continues to be
B
excluded. The committee of creditors comes into being. Under the
supervision, ‘as it were’, of the committee of creditors, all the matters
are proceeded with. The resolution plans are received by the resolution
professional and the resolution plan which is finally approved by the
committee of creditors and still further at the hands of the adjudicating
authority, would result in the curtains being wrung down on the moratorium C
under Section 31(3). During this entire period, what is noteworthy is that
while in law and in form, the corporate debtor continues to exist and
represented by the interim resolution professional to begin with and the
resolution professional thereafter, the erstwhile management of the
corporate debtor is displaced. When the resolution plan is approved, a
D
new management takes over. All this is contemplated when the CIRP is
successful. Undoubtedly, if it is unsuccessful, the corporate debtor slips
into liquidation. Therefore, on the one hand, an application under Section
7, 9 or 10, does bring in a period which is intended to bring a corporate
debtor back to life if possible, ‘a period of calm’, in the words of the
respondent. But this is a period during which the management of the E
corporate debtor is displaced, ironically, a period of turbulent churning.
While it may be true that proceedings by the corporate debtor through
the resolution professional is contemplated, it is not impossible to
contemplate that the resolution professional for whatever reason it may
be, does not discharge his duties and conduct proceedings in all matters
F
as he should. We are noting this as this can be the rationale for the Law
Giver excluding the period of limitation in regard to suits or applications
at the instance of the corporate debtor under Section 60(6).
25. As far as understanding the meaning of Section 60(6) is
concerned, there cannot be a slightest doubt that the period of Moratorium
is excluded even in the case of a suit or application brought by a corporate G
debtor, viz., in regard to the period of the moratorium. It is true that on
the one hand what is tabooed in Section 14 when a Moratorium is put
into place is inter alia the institution of suits or continuance of pending
suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including proceeding in
H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.

A execution of inter alia, the decree or order of an arbitration panel. So,
also the provision prohibits any action to foreclose, recover or enforce
any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its
property including any action under the Securitization and Reconstruction
of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002. Still
further, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor in the
B
occupation of the corporate debtor is forbidden. These provisions do not
in any manner appear to stand in the way of the corporate debtor
instituting or proceeding with a suit or a proceeding against others. Section
60(6) on the other hand excludes the period during which the Moratorium
under Section 14 is in place in computing the period of limitation. An
C ambiguity is introduced, namely the need to exclude the period of limitation
for a suit or an application, at the instance of the corporate debtor when
a Moratorium ushered in by an order under Section 14 does not pose
any bar against a suit or an application at the instance of the corporate
debtor. The words for which an order of Moratorium has been made
under this part is intended to be the point of reference or the premise for
D
the exclusion of the time for the purpose of computing the period of
limitation. Besides being the point of reference and being the sine qua
non for applying Section 60(6), it also specifies the period of time which
will be excluded in computing of the period of limitation. In other words,
present an order of Moratorium under Section 14, the entire period of
E the Moratorium is liable to be excluded in computing the period of
limitation even in a suit or an application by a corporate debtor.
26. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
based on the approval of the resolution plan and the effect of Section 31
apparently of the IBC does not appeal to us. What Section 31 of the Act,
F IBC undoubtedly proclaims is that on approval of the resolution plan by
the adjudicating authority the plan becomes binding on a corporate debtor,
its employees, members, creditors, the Central Government any State
Government or any local authority as provided therein, guarantors and
others stakeholders involved in the resolution plan. We are unable to
perceive how the appellant can derive support from the said provision.
G In fact, taking the scheme of the IBC Section 60(6) would become an
integral part of the scheme which will enure to the benefit of the resolution
applicant which is enabled to take suitable measures to ventilate its
legitimate grievances by excluding the period during which a Moratorium
was enforced for the purpose of computing the period of limitation.
H
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. MINOSHA INDIA 1093
LIMITED [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

27. In other words, notwithstanding the period of limitation under A
the Limitation Act, the Law Giver has thought it fit to provide that in
respect of a corporate debtor if there has been an order of moratorium
made in Part II, the period during which such moratorium was in place
shall be excluded. ‘For which an order of moratorium’ cannot bear the
interpretation which is sought to be placed by the appellant. The
B
interpretation placed by the appellant is clearly against the plain meaning
of the words which have been used. We have already undertaken the
task of understanding the purport of the Code and the context in which
section 60(6) has been put in place. This Court cannot possibly sit in
judgment over the wisdom of the Law Giver. The period of limitation is
provided under the Limitation Act. The law giver has contemplated that C
when a moratorium has been put in place, the said period must be
excluded. We cannot overlook also the employment of words ‘any suit
or application’. This is apart, no doubt, from the words ‘by a corporate
debtor’. Interpreting the statute in the manner which the appellant seeks
would result in our denying the benefit of extending the period of limitation
D
to the corporate debtor, a result, which we think, would not be warranted
by the clear words used in the statute.
28. Therefore, we are of the view that section 60(6) of the IBC
does contemplate exclusion of the entire period during which the
moratorium was in force in respect of corporate debtor in regard to a
proceeding as contemplated therein at the hands of the corporate debtor. E

29. In light of the view we have taken, we consider it unnecessary
to go into the question relating to whether in view of the consent given
by the appellant to the appointment of the arbitrator, the appellant should
be debarred from raising the plea of limitation. The appeal will stand
dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. F

Ankit Gyan and Amarendra Kumar Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Ajay, LCRA)

G

H