NAZIM & ORS.versusTHE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

                 [2025] 10 S.C.R. 263 : 2025 INSC 1184

                             Nazim & Ors.
                                   v.
                        The State of Uttarakhand
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 715 of 2018)
                                06 October 2025
           [M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing, beyond
       a reasonable doubt, a complete chain of circumstances leading
       only to the conclusion of guilt of the Appellants, or whether the
       circumstances leave room for reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.

                                   Headnotes†
       Circumstantial Evidence – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201,
       120-B – Conviction of the appellants u/ss.302, 201, 120-B, IPC
       rested largely on the testimony of three prosecution witnesses,
       PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 – Interference with:
       Held: 1.1 Prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken
       chain of circumstances – Evidence on record does not complete
       the chain of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused
       persons – There are substantial gaps in the case of the prosecution.
       [Paras 56, 29]
       1.2 The first and most glaring circumstance is the omission of the
       names of the two of the three Appellants in the FIR – PW-1, the
       complainant and the father of the deceased, expressly named
       six persons with whom he admittedly had long-standing enmity,
       yet he did not attribute any role to the present Appellants, ‘N’ and
       ‘A’ – Both PW-1 and PW-2 were admittedly familiar with them –
       Despite this, their names were not mentioned in the FIR, nor was
       any contemporaneous explanation offered for their absence – This
       significant omission strikes at the root of the prosecution narrative,
       undermines its credibility, and constitutes a material fact that must
       weigh heavily in favour of the accused. [Para 29]
       1.3 Further, there are improbabilities in PW-2’s testimony, coupled
       with his unexplained silence at crucial stages – The prosecution
       then relied on testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4 to establish

* Author
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       last-seen circumstance – However, there are serious infirmities
       in their accounts making their evidence less reliable – The
       prosecution’s reliance on PW-3 and PW-4 falters on two counts:
       firstly, the absence of TIP renders their identification unreliable and
       secondly, even if their testimony is accepted, ‘last-seen’ theory
       alone is insufficient to sustain the conviction in the circumstances
       of the present case. [Paras 33, 34, 48]
       1.4 The prosecution’s reliance on the last seen theory is misplaced –
       The interval between the alleged sightings and the discovery of
       the corpse is too wide to exclude the possibility of intervention by
       others – The last seen theory applies only when the time gap is so
       narrow that the hypothesis of another’s involvement is eliminated –
       That condition is absent here – Last-seen theory alone is weak
       evidence and requires corroboration, which is absent in this case.
       [Paras 45, 46]
       1.5 Furthermore, though the medical evidence proves the fact of
       homicidal death but does not implicate the Appellants – The forensic
       report is neutral, the recovery is procedurally suspect – When the
       only scientific evidence available neither supports the prosecution’s
       narrative nor connects the accused to the crime, it is impermissible to
       uphold a conviction solely on doubtful eyewitness testimony. [Para 53]
       1.6 The case of the prosecution with respect to motive is also
       tenuous – The motive alleged by the prosecution is only that the
       Appellants sought revenge for an insult to their sister – However,
       no concrete evidence of animus was led – There is no evidence
       that the Appellants bore any grudge against a ten-year-old child –
       Circumstances on record are not consistent with the hypothesis of
       the guilt of the accused and fail to exclude every other reasonable
       hypothesis, including their innocence – Suspicion, however strong,
       cannot take the place of proof – Appellants entitled to the benefit of
       the doubt – Impugned Judgment set aside – Appellants acquitted.
       [Paras 54, 56]
       Circumstantial Evidence – Conviction based on circumstantial
       evidence – When can be sustained – Conditions enumerated
       in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, stated. [Para 28]

       Circumstantial Evidence – Omission in naming accused
       persons in FIR – Effect:
       Held: In a case based solely on circumstantial evidence, every
       circumstance must withstand rigorous scrutiny – The failure to name
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                Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


     two of the three Appellants in the FIR, despite the complainant’s
     familiarity with them, casts a serious shadow on the subsequent
     attempt to implicate them – It raises a legitimate inference that
     their names were introduced at a later stage, thereby suggesting
     the possibility of false implication. [Para 30]

     Last seen theory – Evidentiary value:
     Held: The ‘last seen’ theory is itself a weak link unless the
     prosecution establishes a narrow time gap between when the
     accused and the deceased were seen together and the recovery of
     the body, such that the possibility of intervention by a third person
     is excluded – It would be unsafe to base conviction solely on this
     circumstance unless it is corroborated by some other strong and
     clinching material. [Para 44]

     Evidence – Dock identification without a prior TIP:
     Held: Has little evidentiary value where the witness had no prior
     familiarity with the accused and courts must exercise extreme
     caution in accepting such identification. [Para 41, 42]

     Circumstantial Evidence – Scientific evidence:
     Held: Where scientific evidence is neutral or exculpatory, courts
     must give it due weight – To convict on doubtful testimony while
     ignoring scientific tests is to substitute suspicion for proof – Despite
     the inconclusive forensic report, the High Court dismissed the
     absence of DNA evidence as inconsequential and affirmed the
     conviction solely on ocular testimony – Such an approach is
     untenable in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence.
     [Para 51]

                               Case Law Cited
     Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1
     SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116; Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of
     Madhya Pradesh [1975] 3 SCR 519 : (1975) 3 SCC 815; P.
     Sasikumar v. State [2024] 7 SCR 87 : (2024) 8 SCC 600; State
     of U.P. v. Satish [2005] 1 SCR 1132 : (2005) 3 SCC 114; Chattar
     Singh & Anr. v. State of Haryana [2008] 12 SCR 765 : (2008)
     14 SCC 667; Krishan Kumar & Anr. v. State of Haryana [2023]
     11 SCR 861 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1180; Hatti Singh v. State
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       of Haryana [2007] 5 SCR 221 : (2007) 12 SCC 471; Padman
       Bibhar v. State of Odisha, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1190; Kali Ram
       v. State of Himachal Pradesh [1974] 1 SCR 722 : (1973) 2 SCC
       808 – relied on.

                                   List of Acts
       Penal Code, 1860; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
       Children) Rules, 2007; Evidence Act, 1872.

                                List of Keywords
       Circumstantial Evidence; Conviction based solely on circumstantial
       evidence; Conviction solely on ocular testimony; Last seen theory;
       Chain of circumstances; Chain of circumstances not complete;
       Beyond reasonable doubt; Omission of the names in FIR; Complete
       and unbroken chain of circumstances not established; False
       implication; Dock identification without prior TIP; No TIP conducted;
       Suspicion cannot take place of proof; Benefit of the doubt; Acquittal.

                               Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       715 of 2018
       From the Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2017 of the High Court
       of Uttarakhand at Nainital in CRLA No. 122 of 2014

                           Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellants:
       K.K.Tyagi, Iftekhar Ahmad, Rajeev Kumar Bansal, Ms. Garima
       Tyagi, Sarvam Ritam Khare.
       Advs. for the Respondent:
       Akshat Kumar, Ms. Anubha Dhulia.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

       Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1.     The present case has its genesis in the tragic and unnatural
       death of a young boy, Muntiyaz Ali, aged merely ten years. On the
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     morning of 5th June 2007, he went to the family’s mango orchard
     near Kishanpur to stand guard, but he did not return home. By
     late evening, his prolonged absence caused alarm and his father,
     Nanhe Khan (PW-1), organised a search with family members and
     co‑villagers. Their efforts proved fruitless. At first light on 6th June
     2007, PW‑1 resumed the search and discovered Muntiyaz’s lifeless
     body beneath a mulberry tree near a pit on the family’s land. A rope
     was found tightened around his neck, his hands tied behind his back
     with a rope, and an axe drenched in blood lying close by.
2.   PW-1 immediately lodged a written complaint at Police Station
     Jaspur. In his complaint, he expressed suspicion against six co-
     villagers with whom he had a long-standing enmity, namely Wahid,
     Muslim, Arman, Jahangir, Zahid and Babu. Notably, two of the three
     present Appellants, namely Nazim and Aftab, were not named in the
     initial First Information Report (hereinafter referred as “FIR”). The
     police registered FIR No. 966 of 2007 under Section 302 of Indian
     Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred as “IPC”) on 06.06.2007
     at about 10 in the morning. Subsequently, during the investigation,
     Nazim and Aftab were also implicated, and a charge‑sheet was
     filed against all the accused persons under Sections 302, 201,
     377 and 120-B IPC.
3.   The case was committed for trial before the Court of the Ld. Additional
     Sessions Judge, Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar (hereinafter
     referred as “Trial Court”) where it was registered as Sessions Trial
     Nos. 40 of 2008 and 40A of 2008. After a full-fledged trial, the Ld.
     Trial Court vide its judgment dated 05.04.2014, acquitted five of the
     accused, namely Wahid, Muslim, Jahangir, Zahid and Babu of all
     charges. The present Appellants namely, Nazim, Aftab and Arman
     Ali, were convicted under Sections 302, 201 and 120-B IPC and
     acquitted under Section 377 of IPC. The Ld. Trial Court sentenced
     each of them to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 of
     IPC, along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each and in default thereof, to
     further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. For the offence
     under Section 201 of IPC, they were sentenced to undergo rigorous
     imprisonment for a period of seven years and a fine of Rs.3,000/-
     each and in default thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
     a period of 6 months. Additionally, they were also convicted for the
     commission of an offence under Section 120(B) of IPC read with
     Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine of
     Rs.5,000/- each and in default thereof, to further undergo rigorous
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       imprisonment for one year. The Ld. Trial Court directed that all the
       sentences were to run concurrently.
4.     The conviction rested largely on the testimony of three prosecution
       witnesses. PW-2, the scribe of the FIR, who claimed that on the night
       of 04.06.2007, he had overheard the accused persons conspiring
       to avenge an affront to their family’s honour. PW-3, Om Prakash,
       was presented as a ‘last seen’ witness who claimed to have seen
       the deceased in the company of the Appellants Nazim and Aftab
       shortly before the incident. PW-4, Mohammed Rafi, was relied upon
       for corroborating these circumstances. The Ld. Trial Court placed
       reliance on these testimonies and concluded that the Appellants,
       in furtherance of a conspiracy, had committed the murder of the
       young boy.
5.     Aggrieved by the order, the Appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No.
       122 of 2014, while the Complainant filed Criminal Appeal No. 129 of
       2014, before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital (hereinafter
       referred as “High Court”). By its judgment dated 15.11.2017, the
       High Court dismissed the appeals (hereinafter referred as “Impugned
       Judgement”). The High Court observed that the Trial Court had
       correctly analysed the evidence on record and found no infirmity in
       its findings. It affirmed that the testimonies of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4
       were credible and that the chain of circumstances was sufficient to
       bring home the guilt of the Appellants. The present appeal assails
       the said Impugned Judgment dated 15.11.2017.

       IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
6.     While upholding the conviction of the Appellants, the High Court
       appreciated the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
       acknowledged that the case is based on circumstantial evidence.
       After examining the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the
       High Court accepted the testimonies of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 as
       credible and summarised what it considered to be a complete chain
       of circumstantial evidence. It observed:
            “18. What emerges from the statements of witnesses, as
            discussed hereinabove, is that PW-1 Nanhe Khan’s son
            Muntiyaz Ali was missing on 05.06.2007. He had gone to
            look after the mango orchard. He did not come back till
            late night. The dead body was recovered on 06.06.2007.
            It was the case of strangulation. The axe was also seen
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                Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


          by PW-1 Nanhe Khan near the dead body. It was soaked
          with blood. PW2 Tauhid Ali is the important witness. He
          has heard Appellants being told by Wahid, Jahid, Hussain,
          Jahangir, Muslim and Babu to take revenge from the
          family of Nanhe Khan, since his nephew has teased their
          sister. He has heard their conversation on 04.06.2007.
          Nanhe Khan’s son went missing on 05.06.2007. He has
          also signed the recovery memo of rope as well as of axe.
          The Appellants - Nazim and Aftab were seen by PW3
          Om Prakash Singh on 05.06.2007. PW4 Mohd. Rafi has
          seen Nazim, Arman and Aftab together in the evening of
          05.06.2007. It is the case of the circumstantial evidence.
          In order to prove the case based on circumstantial
          evidence, it is necessary to complete the chain. All the
          circumstances must exclusively point towards the guilt
          of the accused. In the present case, the prosecution
          has completed the chain, as far as the Appellants are
          concerned. They were seen on the date of occurrence
          by PW3 Om Prakash Singh and PW4 Mohd. Rafi. The
          conversation was heard by PW2 Tauhid Ali, whereby the
          co‑accused exhorted the Appellants to take revenge from
          the family of Shamshad, who was the relative of Nanhe
          Khan. The cause of death, as per the statement of PW8
          Dr. T.K. Pant was strangulation and injury no. 1 could
          be caused with an axe. The rope was recovered at the
          instance of Arman Ali.”
7.   The High Court thereafter adverted to certain medical and investigative
     aspects, noting that:
          “19. It has come in the statement of PW8 Dr. T.K. Pant
          that some blunt object was inserted in the anus of the
          deceased.
          20. Learned counsel for the Appellantsaccused has argued
          that the axe was not sent for FSL examination. It is a case
          of defective investigation. However, there is overwhelming
          evidence that the cause of death of deceased was due to
          strangulation and injury from axe.”
8.   On a careful perusal of the Impugned Judgment, it could be seen
     that the High Court has heavily relied upon the testimonies of the
     prosecution witnesses – PW-1 and PW-2. Therefore, with regards to
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       the submission that upon overhearing the conspiracy, PW2 should
       have informed PW-1, the High Court reasoned as under:
            “21. Learned Senior Advocate for the Appellants in CRLA
            No. 122 of 2014 has argued that if PW2 Tauhid Ali has
            heard the conversation, he should have told it to Nanhe
            Khan. The fact of the matter is that he has overheard
            the conversation. The coaccused were exhorting the
            Appellants to take revenge from the family of Shamshad.
            Shamshad happens to be the relative of Nanhe Khan. It
            has come in the statement of PW2 Tauhid Ali that he did
            not take the issue very seriously, since there was enmity
            between the family of the accused and Nanhe Khan. He
            was under the impression that it was of loose talk. The
            statement of PW2 Tauhid Ali does inspire confidence. He
            has no animosity with the accused.”
9.     The Court next dealt with the defence contention that the feast at
       which the conspiracy was allegedly hatched had occurred on 3rd
       June 2007 rather than 4th June 2007. It observed:
            “23. DW1 Shafiq Ahmad has deposed that the feast was
            on 03.06.2007. He has admitted that all the accused
            were called in the feast by him. The statement of DW2
            Shamim Ahmad does not inspire confidence, since he has
            not produced the original receipt and register. The fact
            of the matter is that the feast was thrown by DW1 Shafiq
            Ahmad on 04.06.2007. The accused namely Arman,
            Nazim and Aftab were recognised by PW3 Om Prakash
            and PW4 Mohd. Rafi. PW3 Om Prakash and PW4 Mohd.
            Rafi are also natural witnesses. Their statements inspire
            confidence.”
10. Finally, the High Court endorsed the findings of the Trial Court and
    dismissed the appeal in the following terms:
            “24. Learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the
            evidence, whereby the Appellants have been convicted
            and sentenced, as noticed hereinabove. There is no
            evidence against the other coaccused, who have rightly
            been acquitted by learned Trial Court. The prosecution
            has failed to prove that the unnatural offence has been
            committed by the Appellants and co-accused.”
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                Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


     THE CHALLENGE
11. Taking exception to the Impugned Judgement, Ld. Counsel on behalf
    of the Appellants submitted that the High Court did not examine the
    grounds taken by the Appellants and has assailed the concurrent
    findings of the courts below on multiple grounds. It is submitted that
    the prosecution’s case is founded solely on circumstantial evidence
    and has failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances
    pointing only towards the guilt of the Appellants. In his submission,
    several vital links necessary to establish their guilt are missing.
12. First and foremost, it is contentiously submitted that the Appellants,
    namely Nazim and Aftab, were not named in the FIR. PW1, who
    lodged the report, suspected six other villagers with whom he had
    long-standing enmity, but did not mention the names of the present
    Appellants. Counsel contended that this omission in the earliest
    version of events raises serious doubt about subsequent attempts
    to implicate the present Appellants.
13. Ld. Counsel for the Appellants assailed the credibility of PW2, Tauhid
    Ali, the scribe of the FIR, who later claimed to have overheard a
    conspiracy meeting on the night of 04.06.2007. Counsel submitted
    that his testimony cannot be relied upon for several reasons. First,
    although PW-2 scribed the FIR at the dictation of PW-1, he did not
    mention any conspiracy in that document, nor did he inform PW-1
    about such an incident when they met. Instead, PW2 surfaced
    with this allegation for the first time before the Court during trial.
    Secondly, when questioned, PW-2 explained that he had treated the
    conversation as “loose talk” and therefore refrained from disclosing
    it earlier. Counsel submitted that such an explanation is implausible.
    PW-2 himself admitted that he did not treat the matter seriously
    because of the pre-existing enmity between the families. Thirdly,
    conspiracies are not ordinarily conducted loudly in social gatherings
    so as to be overheard by passers-by. The claim that the accused
    would openly plot murder during a feast, within earshot of others
    seems improbable. Fourthly, the defence highlighted that DW-1 Shafiq
    Ahmad, in whose house the alleged meeting occurred, categorically
    denied that any feast took place on 04.06.2007, stating instead that
    his son’s marriage was solemnised on 03.06.2007.
14. The next limb of submission relates to the ‘last seen’ theory. PW3,
    Om Prakash, claimed to have seen the deceased with the Appellants,
    namely Nazim and Aftab, on 05.06.2007. Learned counsel submitted
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       that PW3 admitted in cross-examination that he did not know
       the Appellants earlier. Despite this, no test identification parade
       (hereinafter referred as “TIP”) was conducted. Counsel submitted
       that when a witness is a stranger to the accused, a TIP becomes
       essential to test the capacity of the witness to identify the accused.
       Identification for the first time in court, without the safeguard of a prior
       TIP, carries little probative value and cannot be treated as reliable
       evidence of identity. Counsel further pointed out that PW-3’s wife,
       Mithilesh, and his son, Pintu, were allegedly present with him at
       the time of the sighting. Yet, the prosecution chose not to examine
       them, though they were the most natural witnesses to corroborate
       PW-3’s account. Their non-examination, according to counsel, strikes
       at the root of the prosecution’s case and creates a serious lacuna
       in the evidence.
15. Similarly, PW-4, Mohd. Rafi, claimed to have seen the Appellants
    together on the evening of 05.06.2007. However, his statement
    finds no mention in the FIR and, upon scrutiny, suffers from internal
    contradictions. Counsel submitted that this omission in the earliest
    version, coupled with inconsistencies in his deposition, undermines
    his credibility.
16. On these grounds, the Counsel contended that the High Court’s
    assertion that PW3 and PW4 were “natural witnesses” and their
    statements “inspire confidence” ignores these deficiencies.
17. Ld. Counsel for the Appellants also challenged the evidentiary value
    of the rope and axe. He pointed out that the recovery was at the
    instance of the co-accused Arman Ali. It was only during the pendency
    of the appeal before the High Court, and at its direction, that the rope,
    axe, and clothes were forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory
    for examination. The FSL categorically reported that no complete
    DNA profile could be generated from the exhibits and, therefore, no
    match with the Appellants could be established. Counsel stressed
    that this was the only scientific evidence available in the case and, far
    from supporting the prosecution, it failed to implicate the Appellants
    in any manner. He submitted that both the Trial Court and the High
    Court ignored this crucial finding, even though it directly undercut
    the prosecution’s case. By treating the inconclusive DNA report as
    insignificant, the courts below overlooked the settled principle that
    when scientific evidence tilts in favour of the accused, it cannot be
    brushed aside. Counsel further underscored that the axe was not
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     initially sent for forensic examination at all. This lapse, according to
     him, revealed a serious flaw in the investigation. He submitted that
     the failure to subject a key alleged weapon of offence to scientific
     analysis at the appropriate stage amounted to defective investigation
     and deprived the prosecution’s case of the corroborative support it
     ought to have provided.
18. Counsel also referred to the testimony of PW8, Dr. T.K. Pant, who
    conducted the postmortem. The doctor opined that the cause of death
    was strangulation and that the injury could have been caused by an
    axe. However, he also noted that a blunt object had been inserted
    in the anus. The Appellants were acquitted of the unnatural offence,
    and counsel argued that the medical evidence does not, by itself, link
    the Appellants to the murder. He contended that the alleged motive,
    i.e. revenge for an insult to the sister of one of the coaccused is
    vague and unproven. In a case involving circumstantial evidence,
    the absence of motive weighs in favour of the accused.
19. It was further submitted that both the Appellants, Nazim and Aftab
    were juveniles on the date of the incident, as evidenced by their school
    records and the report of a medical board. The Juvenile Justice Board
    rejected this claim based on an electoral roll. Appellants submit that
    this contravenes Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
    of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred as “JJ Act”).
20. Even apart from juvenility, Counsel submitted that the High Court
    failed to re-appreciate the evidence independently, as it merely
    echoed the Trial Court’s reasoning and dismissed the appeal without
    addressing the serious deficiencies pointed out by the defence. He
    emphasized that the chain of circumstances is incomplete and that
    the Appellants are entitled to acquittal.
21. Opposing the appeal, Ld. Counsel for the State supported the
    concurrent findings of the courts below. He submitted that the
    testimonies of PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4 are cogent, trustworthy, and
    mutually corroborative, and that together they establish a complete
    chain of circumstances pointing only to the Appellants’ guilt. Counsel
    emphasised that the case rests on circumstantial evidence and
    submits that prosecution has successfully proved unbroken chain
    of circumstances pointing only towards the guilt of the Appellants.
    He pointed out that PW-2 overheard the co-accused exhorting the
    Appellants to take revenge, PW-3 saw the deceased in the company
    of Nazim and Aftab on the evening of 05.06.2007, and PW-4 also
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       identified the Appellants later that evening. According to the State,
       these witnesses were natural witnesses, situated at the relevant time
       and place, and their testimonies inspire confidence.
22. Counsel for the State further highlighted that the rope and axe
    were recovered from the spot itself, and the post-mortem report
    established that the cause of death was strangulation and that one
    of the injuries could have been inflicted by an axe. He argued that
    these facts provide corroborative support to the ocular testimony.
23. Addressing the inconclusive DNA findings, Counsel submitted that
    failure to obtain a complete profile does not absolve the Appellants.
    He explained that forensic results often turn inconclusive due to the
    degradation of biological samples over time. Therefore, such reports
    cannot automatically exonerate an accused when other evidence
    firmly establishes guilt.
24. On the issue of non-mention of the Appellants’ names in the FIR,
    Counsel submitted that PW-1 initially suspected other villagers due to
    prior enmity. But subsequent investigation revealed the involvement
    of Nazim and Aftab. In his submission, the omission is not fatal when
    credible witnesses later identified the Appellants and linked them to
    the occurrence.
25. Lastly, Counsel contended that the plea of juvenility was rightly
    rejected by the Juvenile Justice Board and the High Court. He
    further submitted that the absence of motive is not decisive when
    the prosecution has otherwise succeeded in proving a consistent
    chain of circumstances sufficient to sustain a conviction.

       DISCUSSION
26. Having heard learned counsel for both parties and perused the record,
    the principal issue for consideration is whether the prosecution has
    succeeded in establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, a complete
    chain of circumstances leading only to the conclusion of guilt of the
    Appellants, or whether the circumstances leave room for reasonable
    doubt warranting acquittal.
27. The present case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. Therefore,
    before entering the discussion about the case of the Appellant and
    the submissions of the respective counsel, it will be worthwhile to
    briefly state the principles relating to any conviction to be imposed
    based on circumstantial evidence, which this Court has repeatedly
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                   Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


     laid down in various decisions. It will be essential to extricate these
     principles in order to appreciate the approach made by the Trial Court,
     as well as the High Court while convicting the Appellant based on
     such circumstantial evidence.
28. It is trite that in such cases, the prosecution must establish a complete
    chain of circumstances consistent only with the guilt of the accused
    and inconsistent with any other hypothesis. This Court in its decision
    in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,1 held that
    before a conviction can be sustained on circumstantial evidence,
    five conditions must be fulfilled: (i) the circumstances from which
    the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully established; (ii) the
    facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
    of guilt; (iii) they should be of a conclusive nature; (iv) they should
    exclude every possible hypothesis except that of guilt; and (v) there
    must be a chain of evidence so complete that it leaves no reasonable
    ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence. These “five golden
    principles” constitute the panchsheel of circumstantial evidence. This
    Court has repeatedly reiterated that if the circumstances proved are
    consistent either with innocence or guilt, the accused is entitled to
    the benefit of doubt, and that where two views are possible, the one
    favourable to the accused must be adopted.
29. Tested against these principles, in the present case, the evidence
    on record can in no fathomable circumstance complete the chain
    of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused persons. The
    prosecution case reveals substantial gaps. The first and most glaring
    circumstance is the omission of the names of Nazim and Aftab in the
    FIR. PW1, the complainant and the father of the deceased, expressly
    named six persons with whom he admittedly had long-standing enmity,
    yet he did not attribute any role to the present Appellants, Nazim
    and Aftab. This Court in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of Madhya
    Pradesh2, has emphasised that when important facts are omitted in
    the FIR, such omissions are relevant under Section 11 of the Indian
    Evidence Act, 1872, in judging the veracity of the prosecution case.
    The Court observed:
            “9. No doubt, an FIR is a previous statement which can,
            strictly speaking, be only used to corroborate or contradict


1   (1984) 4 SCC 116
2   (1975) 3 SCC 815
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          the maker of it [….] but omissions of such important facts,
          affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under
          Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of
          the prosecution case.”
30. In the present case, both PW-1 and PW-2 were admittedly familiar
    with Nazim and Aftab. Despite this, their names were not mentioned
    in the FIR, nor was any contemporaneous explanation offered for their
    absence. The High Court acknowledged the omission but brushed
    it aside as inconsequential. This approach is untenable. In a case
    based solely on circumstantial evidence, every circumstance must
    withstand rigorous scrutiny. The failure to name two of the three
    Appellants in the FIR, despite the complainant’s familiarity with them,
    casts a serious shadow on the subsequent attempt to implicate them.
    It raises a legitimate inference that their names were introduced at
    a later stage, thereby suggesting the possibility of false implication.
    If PW-1 and PW-2 genuinely believed that Nazim and Aftab were
    responsible, there is no plausible reason for their omission in the
    FIR. This significant omission strikes at the root of the prosecution
    narrative, undermines its credibility, and constitutes a material fact
    that must weigh heavily in favour of the accused.
31. Now, coming to the first link in the chain of circumstances relied upon
    by the subordinate courts to convict the Appellants is the deposition
    of PW2, Tauhid Ali. He deposed that on the night of 04.06.2007, while
    returning from his fields around 10:00 p.m., he passed in front of the
    house of Shafiq Ahmad, where a marriage reception was underway.
    According to him, he noticed several co-villagers, including Wahid,
    Jahid Hussain, Muslim, Babu, Arman Ali, Nazim and Aftab, sitting on
    charpai near the entrance. He claimed that Wahid, Jahid, Jahangir,
    Muslim and Babu exhorted Arman, Nazim and Aftab to avenge the
    alleged insult caused when Shamshad, nephew of the complainant,
    teased their sister. They allegedly told the Appellants that they should
    not tolerate such humiliation and that they would only be respected
    if they “finished” a male member of Shamshad’s family. PW-2 further
    stated that the Appellants responded by declaring that within one or
    two days they would act accordingly. PW-2 admitted that he treated
    these remarks as mere “loose talk”, gave them no weightage, and
    walked on without reporting the matter to anyone. Even when the
    boy went missing the next day, he maintained silence, and when
    the body was found on 06.06.2007, he still did not disclose this
    alleged conspiracy. Significantly, on that very morning, he scribed
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                       277

                Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


     the FIR at the dictation of PW-1, yet he omitted this crucial fact. His
     explanation that he did not take the conversation seriously because
     of pre-existing enmity between Wahid Ali and Nanhe Khan’s families,
     and therefore assumed it was “loose talk” is unconvincing. If indeed
     he had overheard an open and categorical threat to commit murder,
     it is inexplicable that he suppressed it from the complainant, from
     the police, and even from the FIR that he himself scribed.
32. Furthermore, PW-2’s testimony that he overheard such a grave
    conspiracy being discussed in a marriage feast, with several
    villagers and guests present, appears inherently improbable and
    lacks plausibility. Conspiracies to commit homicide are rarely, if ever,
    hatched so loudly and publicly as to be overheard by passers-by.
    The defence witnesses, DW-1 Shafiq Ahmad and DW-2 Shamim
    Ahmad, also testified that the marriage feast had taken place on
    03.06.2007 for DW-1’s son and not on 04.06.2007, thereby casting
    additional doubt on PW-2’s timeline. Added to this is the fact that
    PW-2 not only remained with PW-1 during the search for the missing
    boy but also attested the seizure memos for the rope and axe on
    06.06.2007, yet still kept silent about the alleged conspiracy. This
    belated revelation, for the first time during the trial, bears all the
    hallmarks of an afterthought.
33. The High Court brushed aside these serious contradictions and
    omissions on the ground that PW-2 bore no animosity against the
    Appellants and that his testimony “inspires confidence”. Be that as
    it may, such an approach fails to recognise that in a case founded
    solely on circumstantial evidence, every link in the chain must be
    firmly established and wholly credible. The improbabilities in PW-2’s
    testimony, coupled with his unexplained silence at crucial stages,
    render this circumstance unreliable and incapable of forming part
    of the chain of proof.
34. The prosecution next relied on the testimonies of PW-3, Om Prakash
    and PW-4, Mohd. Rafi to establish the last-seen circumstance. The
    Trial Court and the High Court both accepted these witnesses as
    “natural witnesses” and treated their accounts as reliable. Upon
    closer scrutiny, however, serious infirmities emerge that make their
    evidence less reliable.
35. PW-3 deposed that on 05.06.2007, he, along with his wife Mithilesh
    and son Pintu, was harvesting sugarcane in the fields of Sardar
    Harjeet Singh. Around 9:00 a.m., a boy approached them and enquired
278                                                       [2025] 10 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       whether they could sell him milk. PW-3 testified that upon asking,
       the boy disclosed that he was a resident of Rajpur. PW-3 directed
       him to Sardar Harjeet Singh for milk. According to PW-3, later in the
       forenoon, when they were returning from the fields around 11:00
       a.m., he saw Nazim conversing with the deceased, under a mango
       tree on PW-1’s land. He added that when he returned around 5:00
       p.m. to the sugarcane fields, he noticed a charpai lying unattended
       under the same tree, but did not see any persons there.
36. In cross-examination, however, PW-3 made admissions that
    significantly weaken his testimony. He candidly admitted that he did
    not know either Nazim or Aftab previously. His identification of them
    in court was, therefore, the first occasion on which he claimed to
    recognise them. He also admitted that the mango trees were situated
    150–200 metres away from where he was working. The sugarcane
    crop he was harvesting was about three feet high, and while cutting,
    he and his family members were bending forward, facing the western
    side, whereas Nanhe Khan’s orchard lay to the east. By his own
    admission, therefore, his line of sight was obstructed, and he could
    not see what lay ahead while engaged in harvesting.
37. Equally significant is the fact that although PW-3 claimed his wife
    and son were with him at the time of the alleged sighting, the
    prosecution did not examine them. Both would have been natural
    witnesses capable of corroborating or contradicting his account. Their
    non-examination is a glaring omission. PW-3 also admitted that he
    could not say what transpired between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., nor
    could he explain the presence of the charpai he saw in the evening.
38. PW-4, Mohd. Rafi, a labourer by occupation, deposed that on the
    evening of 05.06.2007, he was returning from work with his friend,
    Noor Mohammed, after loading soil onto a trolley. They stopped at
    Kishanpur dhaba to have tea. PW-4 stated that as they were about
    to leave, he saw the Appellants Nazim and Aftab, along with co-
    accused Arman, walking together from the northern side of the chak
    road. According to him, on seeing PW-4 and his companion, the
    three appeared shocked and quickly changed direction, walking away
    towards the other side. PW-4 further deposed that after witnessing
    this, he returned to his village and informed PW-1, Nanhe Khan, that
    he had seen these three persons.
39. In cross-examination, however, PW-4 admitted that although he
    claimed to have conveyed this information to PW-1, he could not
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                          279

                   Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


     recall when exactly he had told him. He further acknowledged that
     he did not have any conversation with the accused at the Dhaba, nor
     did he know from where they had come or where they had gone after
     he saw them. His statement provides no detail linking their presence
     on the road to the crime. Importantly, this alleged sighting did not find
     mention in the FIR, which PW-2 had scribed the very next morning
     at the dictation of PW-1. The omission of such a material fact in the
     earliest version of the incident severely weakens its reliability.
40. PW-4 also conceded that he joined the search party on the night of
    05.06.2007 after the child went missing, but he did not disclose to
    anyone in that large gathering that he had seen the accused earlier
    in the evening. This silence, despite an obvious occasion to speak,
    casts further doubt on his version. It was only during trial that PW-4
    articulated these facts in detail, thereby lending his account the
    character of an afterthought.
41. Both PW-3 and PW-4 thus identified the Appellants for the first
    time in court. No TIP was conducted, even though PW-3 admitted
    he had never known the accused earlier. It is well settled that dock
    identification without a prior TIP has little evidentiary value where the
    witness had no prior familiarity with the accused. In P. Sasikumar v.
    State3, this Court acquitted the accused on precisely this ground,
    holding:
            “17. The admitted position in this case is that the test
            identification parade was not conducted. All the prosecution
            witnesses who identified the accused in the Court […]
            were not known to the present Appellant. They had not
            seen the present Appellant prior to the said incident. He
            was a stranger to both of them….
            18. […] Under these circumstances, TIP had become
            necessary particularly when both the accused, who are
            alleged to have committed this murder were arrested
            within two days.
            19. […] No explanation whatsoever has been given by
            the prosecution as to why TIP was not conducted in this
            case before a Magistrate as it ought to have been done.”



3   (2024) 8 SCC 600
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42. The Court further explained that TIP is only part of the investigative
    process and that the substantive evidence is dock identification;
    however, where the accused is a stranger to the witness and no
    TIP is held, courts must exercise extreme caution in accepting such
    identification. The following paragraph of P. Sasikumar (supra) is
    indicative of the same:
           “21. It is well settled that TIP is only a part of police
           investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not
           a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of
           evidence, is only dock identification that is identification
           made by witness in court during trial.
           23. […] In cases where an accused is a stranger to a
           witness and there has been no TIP, the trial court should
           be very cautious while accepting dock identification by
           such a witness.
           24. […] We are of the opinion that not conducting a TIP
           in this case was a fatal flaw in the police investigation
           and in the absence of TIP the dock identification of the
           present appellant will always remain doubtful. Doubt always
           belongs to the accused.”
43. In the present case, it is clear that the identification of the appellants
    by PW-3 and PW-4 cannot be accepted with confidence. PW-3 himself
    admitted he had never known Nazim or Aftab previously, yet no TIP was
    conducted. His alleged sighting was from a considerable distance while
    engaged in harvesting work, with his line of sight obstructed, and the
    natural witnesses present with him were not examined. PW-4, though
    a co-villager, failed to mention his alleged sighting either in the FIR
    or during the search for the missing child, and could not even recall
    the timing of him informing PW-1 about it. Both witnesses identified
    the Appellants for the first time in court, which, in the absence of a
    TIP, renders their dock identification less credible. Their testimonies,
    therefore, cannot constitute reliable evidence of identification.
44. Even apart from the deficiencies in identification, the ‘last‑seen’
    theory is itself a weak link unless the prosecution establishes a
    narrow time gap between when the accused and the deceased were
    seen together and the recovery of the body, such that the possibility
    of intervention by a third person is excluded. At this juncture, it is
    relevant to refer to the following decisions:
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                             281

                   Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


     a.     This Court has consistently cautioned against treating the
            last-seen circumstance as conclusive proof of guilt. In State
            of U.P. v. Satish4, it was observed:
                   “22. The last-seen theory comes into play where
                   the time gap between the point of time when the
                   accused and the deceased were last seen alive and
                   when the deceased is found dead is so small that
                   the possibility of any person other than the accused
                   being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It
                   would be difficult in some cases to positively establish
                   that the deceased was last seen with the accused
                   when there is a long gap and possibility of other
                   persons coming in between exists. In the absence
                   of any other positive evidence to conclude that the
                   accused and the deceased were last seen together,
                   it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of
                   guilt in those cases….”
     b.     The same principle was reiterated in Hatti Singh v. State of
            Haryana5, where this Court held:
                   “28. There cannot be any doubt that conviction can
                   be based on circumstantial evidence, but therefor
                   the prosecution must establish that the chain of
                   circumstances only consistently points to the guilt of
                   the accused and is inconsistent with his innocence.
                   Circumstances, as is well known, from which an
                   inference of guilt is sought to be drawn are required
                   to be cogently and firmly established. They have to
                   be taken into consideration cumulatively. They must
                   be able to conclude that within all human probability
                   the accused committed the crime.”
     c.     In the subsequent decision in Chattar Singh & Anr. v. State of
            Haryana6, this Court warned against drawing hasty inferences
            from such evidence. It observed that the last-seen theory is a
            weak kind of evidence. It would be unsafe to base conviction


4   (2005) 3 SCC 114
5   (2007) 12 SCC 471
6   (2008) 14 SCC 667
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                              Supreme Court Reports


            solely on this circumstance unless it is corroborated by some
            other strong and clinching material.
       d.   Most recently, in Krishan Kumar & Anr. v. State of Haryana7, this
            Court reiterated the dangers of indirect or presumptive application
            of the last-seen theory stating that the theory cannot be applied in
            the absence of clear and positive testimony placing the deceased
            in the company of the accused at a proximate time before the
            occurrence. The doctrine cannot be stretched to presume such
            presence indirectly, nor can conjectures substitute proof. Any
            indirect application of the last-seen theory is impermissible.
45. In the present case, the prosecution’s reliance on the last-seen theory
    is misplaced. PW-3 stated that he saw the deceased conversing with
    Nazim around 11:00 a.m. on 05.06.2007, whereas PW-4 claimed to
    have seen Nazim, Aftab, and Arman walking together in the evening.
    The body, however, was recovered only the next morning. The interval
    between the alleged sightings and the discovery of the corpse is
    too wide to exclude the possibility of intervention by others. As held
    in Satish (supra), the last seen theory applies only when the time
    gap is so narrow that the hypothesis of another’s involvement is
    eliminated. That condition is absent here.
46. Equally, the circumstances narrated by PW-3 and PW-4 do not furnish
    corroboration of each other. PW-3 spoke only of a morning sighting
    from a distance whereas PW-4 described an evening encounter near
    a dhaba with no link to the deceased. Neither account establishes
    continuity of presence or proximity to the time of death. As cautioned
    in Hatti Singh and Chattar Singh (supra), last-seen theory alone
    is weak evidence and requires corroboration, which is absent in
    this case.
47. In this respect, as emphasised in Krishan Kumar (supra), courts
    cannot presume the presence of the deceased with the accused
    indirectly or through conjecture. Here, to accept the last-seen
    circumstance would require precisely such inference, stretching two
    vague and temporally separated sightings into a conclusion of guilt.
    The law does not permit such an approach. The last-seen evidence
    in this case, therefore, fails to meet the threshold laid down by this
    Court. It neither rules out alternative hypotheses nor completes the


7   2023 SCC OnLine SC 1180
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                          283

                  Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


     chain of circumstances, and instead leaves wide gaps inconsistent
     with conviction.
48. Thus, the prosecution’s reliance on PW3 and PW4 falters on two
    counts: firstly, the absence of TIP renders their identification unreliable
    and secondly, even if their testimony is accepted, ‘lastseen’ theory
    alone is insufficient to sustain the conviction in the circumstances
    of the present case. The High Court’s reliance on PW3 and PW4
    overlooks this cautionary principle.
49. Beside the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the High Court
    placed weight on the medical opinion of PW-8, Dr. T.K. Pant, who
    conducted the post-mortem. He deposed that the cause of death
    was shock and haemorrhage due to an ante-mortem stab injury and
    suffocation by strangulation. He noted a deep stab wound in the
    throat consistent with a sharp-edged weapon, bluish ligature marks
    on the wrists, and multiple abrasions. He also observed injuries
    consistent with a blunt object inserted into the anus and opined that
    the stab wound could be caused by an axe but equally by a sword
    or knife and the wrist marks were consistent with a rope. While
    his testimony confirms homicide, it does not link the injuries to any
    particular weapon or to the appellants.
50. However, the manner in which the rope and axe were dealt with by
    the investigating agency, and later by the courts below, is deeply
    unsatisfactory. During the course of the hearing of the criminal appeal,
    the High Court itself observed that these material exhibits had not
    been properly examined. It directed that the axe, rope, and certain
    items of clothing be sent for DNA and fingerprint testing, and further
    directed that the blood samples of the Appellants be collected and
    matched with the exhibits. Upon examining the same, the Forensic
    Science Laboratory reported that no complete autosomal DNA
    profiles could be generated from the exhibits. Consequently, no
    opinion could be given on a match with the blood samples of the
    Appellants. In effect, the only scientific evidence available was neutral
    as it neither connected the Appellants to the crime nor corroborated
    the oral testimony. This is akin to the situation in Padman Bibhar v.
    State of Odisha8, where the Supreme Court noted that the chemical
    examination report was inconclusive because the blood group could



8   2025 SCC OnLine SC 1190
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                         Supreme Court Reports


       not be matched and, therefore, the last seen evidence alone could
       not sustain a conviction.
51. Despite the inconclusive forensic report, the High Court dismissed
    the absence of DNA evidence as inconsequential and affirmed the
    conviction solely on ocular testimony. Such an approach is untenable
    in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Where scientific
    evidence is neutral or exculpatory, courts must give it due weight.
    To convict on doubtful testimony while ignoring scientific tests is to
    substitute suspicion for proof. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
    cautioned that suspicion, however strong, cannot replace evidence.
52. There are further doubts about the recovery of the rope. The
    prosecution claimed it was recovered from the scene in broad daylight,
    yet no independent public witnesses were examined to corroborate
    this. The investigating officer admitted that villagers were present
    during the seizure of soil samples, but none were called to testify.
    Such lapses diminish the credibility of the recovery and, by extension,
    the evidentiary value of the rope.
53. In a nutshell, the medical evidence proves the fact of homicidal death
    but does not implicate the Appellants. The forensic report is neutral,
    the recovery is procedurally suspect, and the High Court failed to
    grapple with these deficiencies. When the only scientific evidence
    available neither supports the prosecution’s narrative nor connects
    the accused to the crime, it is impermissible to uphold a conviction
    solely on doubtful eyewitness testimony.
54. The case of the prosecution with respect to motive is also tenuous.
    The motive alleged by the prosecution is only that the Appellants
    sought revenge for an insult to their sister. However, no concrete
    evidence of animus was led. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal
    Pradesh9, this Court observed that where the evidence admits two
    possibilities, i.e. one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence then
    the accused must receive the benefit of doubt. Absence of motive
    in a circumstantial case assumes significance and tilts the balance
    in favour of the accused. Here, the supposed motive is speculative
    and there is no evidence that the Appellants bore any grudge against
    a ten-year-old child.



9   (1973) 2 SCC 808
[2025] 10 S.C.R.                                                         285

                   Nazim & Ors. v. The State of Uttarakhand


55. Another aspect that deserves careful consideration is juvenility. The
    Appellants placed reliance on school records and a medical board
    report indicating that Nazim and Aftab were minors at the time of the
    incident. The Juvenile Justice Board dismissed this claim based on
    an electoral roll. Rule 12 of the JJ Act gives primacy to matriculation
    or equivalent school certificate, or in its absence a birth certificate or
    medical opinion. We certainly do not find it necessary to decide this
    issue in view of our conclusion on merits, however, the summary
    rejection of the juvenility plea reinforces the overall perception that
    the High Court did not fully re-appreciate the evidence.

     CONCLUSION
56. In light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that
    the prosecution has failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain
    of circumstances. The circumstances on record are not consistent
    with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and fail to exclude
    every other reasonable hypothesis, including their innocence. As is
    well-settled, suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.
    Accordingly, the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of the doubt.
57. Hence, the conviction and sentence of the Appellants Nazim, Aftab
    and Arman Ali under Sections 302, 201 and 120-B IPC, as affirmed
    by the High Court in its judgment dated 15.11.2017, cannot be
    sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
58. In view thereof, the Impugned Judgment dated 15.11.2017 passed
    by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital and the judgment dated
    05.04.2014 passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Kashipur,
    are set aside to the extent that the Appellants are acquitted of charges
    under Sections 302, 201 and 120-B IPC. Since the appellants are
    on bail, their bail bonds and sureties shall stand discharged.
59. The captioned appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
    Application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. No costs.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey