Holding

Property given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance becomes her absolute ownership under Section 14(1) once she is in possession, regardless of any restrictive covenants, and Section 14(2) does not apply.

Summary

Gurdial Singh transferred 94 kanals and 19 marlas of land to his wife Harmel Kaur in 1963 as maintenance, subject to restrictive covenants. After Singh's death, Harmel sold a portion of the land to the appellants. The second wife and three daughters of Singh sued, claiming a one‑seventh share, arguing that Harmel only held a life interest and that Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act applied. The trial court and High Court held that only a limited estate existed and dismissed the appellants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Section 14(1) any property given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance becomes her absolute property once she is in possession, irrespective of covenants, and that Section 14(2) does not apply. Consequently, the suit was dismissed and the appeal allowed.

Issues considered

Whether property given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance, subject to restrictive covenants, is governed by Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Whether the restrictive covenants in the compromise deed limit the wife's ownership to a life or restricted estate.
Interpretation of the term "possessed" in Section 14(1) with respect to post‑Act acquisitions.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 488
Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 14(1), s. 14(2)

Subjects

Hindu Succession ActSection 14female property rightsmaintenanceabsolute ownershiprestricted estatelife estatecompromise deedpossession

Judgment

A NAZAR SINGH AND ORS.
v.
JAGJIT KAUR AND ORS.

, NOVEMBER 13, 1995

B [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]

Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Section 14.

Female Hindu-Right to hold prope1ty-Absolute ownership-Husband
C and wife-Compromise deed /Jetween--Reshictive covenants-Grant of land
to wife in lieu of maintenance after commencement of the Act-Held wife
became absolute owner notwithstanding restrictive covenants-Section 14(1)
held applicable-Section 14(2) held not applicable-When properties are
acquired in lieu of maintenance.

D H got possession of 94 kanals and 19 marlas of land from her
husband G in lieu of maintenance under a compromise deed dated Decem·
ber 3, 1963 which contained several restrictive covenants. Subsequent to
the death of her husband she sold 70 kanals and 19 marlas of land to
defendants-appellants. G's second wife and her three daughters filed a suit
claiming Vflth share in the suit land sold to the appellants on the ground
E
that H was entitled to only 11!th share in the suit land. The Trial Court
decreed the suit by holding that (i) the compromise deed created only a
life estate in favour of H and not the absolute estate; (ii) sub-section (2)
of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was applicable to the case
and not sub-section (1). The judgment of the Trial Court was affirmed by
F the first as well as the second appellate court.

Allowing defendants-appellants' appeal and setting aside the im·
pugned judgment, this Court

HELD : 1. The suit lands given to H by her husband in lieu of her
G maintenance were held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited
owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompanying the
grant. The Courts below were in error in holding that because the com·
promise whereunder the said lands were given to H towards her main-
tenance, created a life estate and a restricted estate, sub-section (1) of
H Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not attracted and that it
162
NAZAR SINGH v. JAGJIT KAUR [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.) 163

is sub-section (2) that is attracted. (167-A-B; 168-C] A

(2) According to sub-section (1) where any property is given to a
female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the commencement of the
Act, such property becomes her absolute property on the commencement
of the Act provided the said property was "possessed" by her. Where,
however, the property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance B
after the commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute owner
thereof the moment she is placed in possession of the said property
(unless, of course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding the limita-
tions and restrictions contained in the instrument, grant or award
whereunder the property is given to her. This proposition follows from the C
words used in sub-section (1). Though the instrument, grant, award or
deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it
stands transformed into an absolute estate provided such property is given
to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is placed in her possession.
Therefore, the suit lands became the absolute property of H the moment D
she was placed in possession thereof. Consequently the respondent·
plaintitrs suit must fail. [167-C-F]

V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCC 99; Jagannathan
Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, (1987] 2 SCC 572 and Mangat Mal v. Punni
Devi, [1995] 6 sec 88, relied on. E

Gumpha v. Jaibai, (1994] 2 SCC 511, distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10339 of
1995.
F
From the Order dated the 9th February, 1995 of the H;gh Court of
Pb. and Haryana at Chandigarh in RS.A. No. 2598/94

Maninder Singh for the Appellant.
G
P.S. Mahendra, B.S. Oberoi and Rohit Luthra for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted. Heard counsel for the
parties. H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the second appeal filed by the
defendants-appellants. The suit for "possession of the land (suit lands) to
the extent of 7/gth share" has been decreed by the Trial Court and affirmed
in appeal and second appeal.
B Gurdial Singh was a resident of a village in Bhatinda district in
Punjab. He owned 94 kanals and 19 marlas of land in the village. He was
working as an employment officer in Madhya Pradesh. The relations
between him and his wife, Smt. Harmel Kaur, were strained. They were
living apart. Harmel Kaur filed a petition under Section 488 of the Criminal
c Procedure Code (old code) for grant of maintenance. In those proceedings,
a compromise was arrived at between Gurdial Singh and Harmel Kaur
whereunder the suit lands (94 kanals and 19 marlas in extent) were given
to Harmel Kaur in lieu of her maintenance. The compromise entered into
between them is evidenced by Exh. P-3. The lands were given to Harmel
D Kaur subject to the following conditions :

"l. That the possession of the land in dispute was given to Harmel
Kaur defendant No. 4.

2. That Harmel Kaur would be entitled to get the land cultivated
or to lease it out and to utilize its income for herself, wherever she
E likes.
T
3. That she would not sell or mortgage this land. She would
however be responsible for the payment of land revenue or any
other Govt. Tax from time to time.
F
4. If during the life time of Harrnel Kaur, Gurdial Singh gets back
the land from her he would pay her Rs. 50 per month as main-
tenance.

5. If Gurdial Singh died before Harrnel Kaur, then, in that case,
G Harmel Kaur would be entitled to get her share from the said land
as a legal hair in accordance with the law.

6. The maintenance allowance of Rs. 25 per month already being
paid to her, shall be stopped.

H 7. Harmel Kaur shall also be entitled to keep her residence at V.
NAZAR SINGH v. JAGJIT KAUR [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 165

Mehraj in the house belonging to Gurdial Singh. A
8. Harmel Kaur also thumb marked this agreement/compromise
and agreed that in case the land is taken away back by Gurdial
Singh, then she would get Rs. 50 per month as maintenance from
him."
B
Exh. P-3 is dated December 3, 1963.

Gurdial Singh died on July 30, 1981.

Harmel Kaur executed four sale deeds m November, 1987 and C
August, 1988 in favour of Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 (appellants herein)
whereunder she sold 70 kanals and 19 marlas of land out of the suit lands
for a consideration of Rs. 1, 62,200. On that basis, mutation was also
effected in the name of the appellants.

In January, 1991 the present suit was filed. The first plaintiff claimed D
to be the wife (second wife) of Gurdial Singh while Defendant Nos. 2 to 4
claimed to be their daughters. According to the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff
was married to Gurdial Singh on March 21, 1946. They claimed a 7/sth
share in the suit lands (including 70 kanals and 19 marlas sold to the
appellants) under and in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act. E
According to them, Harmel Kaur was entitled only to a Vsth share. The
defendants denied that the first plaintiff was married to Gurdial Singh or
Plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 are the daughters of Gurdial Singh. This issue is,
however, concluded by the finding of the first appellate court to the effect
that the first plaintiff was indeed married to Gurdial Singh and that
Plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 are their daughters. F
The courts below have decreed the suit holding that under the
compromise aforementioned, only a life interest was created in Harmel
Kaur and not an absolute interest. According to them (the High Court
dismissed the second appeal in limine), it is sub- section (2) of Section 14 G
of the Hindu Succession Act that applies herein and not sub-section (1).
The correctness of the said view is questioned by the defendants-appel-
lants. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as follows :

"14. Property of a femaleBindu to be her absolute prope1ty. - (1)
Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by
her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation. - In this sub-section, 'property' includes both mov-
able and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by
inheritance or devise or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance
B or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a
relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill
or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other
manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as
stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
.
'

c (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property
acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or
under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where
the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order
or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property."
D
According to sub-section (1), any property possessed by a female
Hindu shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
irrespective of the fact whether the said property was acquired ~y her
before the commencement of the Act or after the commencement of the
Act. Explanation to sub-section (1) elaborates the meaning and content of
E the expression "property" in sub-section (1). It includes property given in
lieu of maintenance.

Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of sub-sections (1)
and (2) has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions of this Court,
F the most important of which is the decision in V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha
Reddi, [1977] 3 SCC 99.* The principles enunciated in this decision have
been reiterated in a number of decisions later but have never been
departed from. According to this decision, sub-section (2) is confined to
cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a
G grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree,
order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the
property. It has also been held that where the property is acquired by a
Hindu female in lieu of right of maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a
Reference may also be had to the decision in Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam
Pillai, [1987] 2 SCC 572 which deals with post-Act acquisition of property by a female
H Hindu.
NAZARSINGHv. JAGJITKAUR [B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,J.] 167

pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope A
and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award
allotting the property to her prescribes a restricted estate in the property.
Applying this principle, it must be held that the suit lands, which were given
to Harmel Kaur by Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were held by
Harmel Kaur as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner not-
B
withstanding the several restrictive covenants accompanying the grant.
(Also see the recent decision of this Court in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi,
[1995) 6 sec 88 where a right to residence in a house property was held
to attract sub- section (1) of Section 14 notwithstanding the fact that the
grant expressly conferred only a limited estate upon her.) According to
sub-section (1), where any property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of C
her maintenance before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act,
such property becomes the absolute property of such female Hindu on the
commencement of the Act provided the said property was "possessed" by
her. Where, however, the property is given to a fem ale Hindu towards her
maintenance after the commencement of the Act, she becomes the absolute D
owner thereof the moment she is placed in possession of the said property
(unless, of course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding the limita-
tions and restrictions contained in the i1istnanent, grant or award whereunder
the property is given to her. This proposition follows from the words in
sub-section (1), which insofar as is relevant read : "Any property possessed
by a female Hindu..... after the commencement of this Act shall be held by E
her as full ~wner and not as a limited owner". In other words, though the
instrument, grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted
estate, as the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate
provided such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance
and is placed in her possession. So far as the expression "possessed" is F
concerned, it too has been the subject-matter of interpretation by several
decisions of this Court to which it is not necessary to refer for the purpose
of this case.

The learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs relied upon a
recent decision of this Court in Gumpha V. Jaibai, [1994] 2 sec 511 in G
support of his contention that in the facts of this case, it is sub-section (2)
of Section 14 and not sub-section (1) that is attracted. But that was a case
where certain property was given to a Hindu female under a Will. The
Bench held that since Will is referred to only in sub-section (2) and not in
sub-section (1), it is sub-section (2) that is attracted in the case of a H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A property bequeathed under a Will. Since, the suit lands were given to
Harmel Kaur under a compromise - and not under a Will - the principle
of the said decision has no application herein.

For the above reasons, we hold that the said lands became the
absolute property of Harmel Kaur the moment she was placed in posses-
B sion thereof. (It is not disputed that the said property was indeed placed
in her possession and that she was in possession and enjoyment thereof
from the date of the aforesaid compromise.) Once this is so, the suit must
fail. The Courts below were in error in holding that because the com-
promise whereunder the said lands were given to Harmel Kaur towards
C her maintenance, created a life estate and a restricted estate, sub-section
(1) of Section 14 is not attracted and that it is sub-section (2) that is
attracted here.

The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court
as affirmed by the first and second appellate courts are set aside and the ·
D suit is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed.