Supreme Court of India
NAVAS @ MULANAVASversusSTATE OF KERALA
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 215
- Decided
- 18 March 2024
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
Holding
The High Court was justified in applying the Swamy Shraddananda principle, but the appropriate sentence for the murder conviction is 25 years imprisonment without remission, not 30 years.
Summary
The appellant was convicted of murdering four members of a family, house‑trespass and attempted suicide, and was originally sentenced to death for the murder under s.302 IPC. The High Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment with a direction that the appellant could not be released for 30 years, invoking the Swamy Shraddananda principle. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in applying that principle and whether a 30‑year period without remission was appropriate. After reviewing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court held that while the High Court was correct in using the Swamy Shraddananda line of cases, the quantum of 30 years was excessive. Consequently, the Court modified the sentence to 25 years imprisonment without remission, inclusive of time already served, and upheld the convictions. The appeal was therefore partly allowed.
Issues considered
- The appropriateness of the High Court's application of the Swamy Shraddananda principle in commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment.
- Whether a fixed term of 30 years without remission is a proportionate sentence for the offence under s.302 IPC in the facts of the case.
- The correct quantum of years of imprisonment without remission that should be imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda framework.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 293, s. 428, s. 432, s. 433
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 106
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 309, s. 449
Subjects
Sentence/SentencingModificationAggravating and mitigating circumstancesRemissionRemission powersCommutation of penalty from death to life imprisonmentPrinciple of proportionalityRarest of the rare categoryIllicit intimacyHandwriting expert
Judgment
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 913 : 2024 INSC 215
Navas @ Mulanavas
v.
State of Kerala
(Criminal Appeal No. 1215 of 2011)
18 March 2024
[B. R. Gavai, K.V. Viswanathan* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Appellant-accused was held guilty for the offences punishable u/
ss.302, 449, 309, IPC and sentenced accordingly. For the offence
punishable u/s.302, IPC, he was sentenced to death. High Court
confirmed the conviction, however the sentence of death was
modified and reduced to imprisonment for life with a direction
that he shall not be released from prison for a period of 30 years
including the period already undergone with set off u/s.428, Cr.P.C.
alone. What should be the appropriate sentence and whether the
High Court was justified in adopting the Swamy Shraddananda v.
State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93 line of cases and whether
the fixing of the quantum at 30 years without remission was the
appropriate sentence, in the facts and circumstances of the case?
Headnotes
Sentence/Sentencing – Murder – Appropriate period of
sentence to be imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda v.
State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93 principle wherein it was
held that to avoid a death sentence, the courts can device a
graver form of imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years –
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances – Relevant factors
for arriving at the number of years which the convict will
have to undergo before which remission could be sought –
Trial Court sentenced the accused to death for the offence
punishable u/s.302, IPC – High Court confirmed the conviction,
however modified the death sentence to imprisonment for 30
years without remission following the Swamy Shraddananda
line of cases – Correctness:
Held: Circumstances of the present case were by themselves
consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused and the
accused alone was the perpetrator of the murders – On the
aggravating side, act committed by the accused was pre-planned/
* Author
914 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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premeditated; he brutally murdered 4 unarmed and defenseless
persons, one of whom was a child and the other an aged lady –
By the act of the accused, three generations of single family lost
their lives for no fault of theirs; nature of injuries inflicted on ‘L’
and two others highlights the brutality and cold-bloodedness of
the act – On the mitigating side, the accused was quite young
(28 years old) when he committed the act; the act committed was
not for any gain or profit; he did not try to flee and in fact tried
to commit suicide as he was overcome with emotions after the
dastardly act; he had been in jail for 18 years and 4 months and
the case was based on circumstantial evidence – Further, conduct
report of the appellant indicated that no disciplinary actions were
initiated against him in the prison and his conduct and behavior
had been satisfactory so far – Judgment of the High Cout is upheld
insofar as the conviction of the appellant u/ss.302, 449, 309 IPC
is concerned – Sentence imposed for the offence u/ss.449, 309,
IPC also not interfered with – High Court was justified on the
facts of the case in following Swamy Shraddananda principle
while imposing sentence for the offence u/s.302 IPC – However,
the sentence u/s.302 imposed by the High Court is modified from
a period of 30 years imprisonment without remission to that of a
period of 25 years imprisonment without remission, including the
period already undergone. [Paras 13, 58-60]
Sentence/Sentencing – Murder – Remission – Commutation of
death penalty to life imprisonment, however convict cannot be
released on the expiry of 14 years (the normal benchmark for
life imprisonment) – Aggravating and mitigating circumstances
– Appropriate period of sentence to be imposed under the
Swamy Shraddananda principle – Relevant factors for arriving
at the number of years which the convict will have to undergo
before which remission could be sought:
Held: Once the court decides that the death penalty is not to be
imposed and also that the convict cannot be released on the expiry
of 14 years, the guidelines set out in Swamy Shraddananda, V.
Sriharan and the line of cases which applied these judgments will
have to be considered and principles, if any, set out therein have
to be applied – There can be no straitjacket formulae – Pegging
the point up to which remission powers cannot be invoked is an
exercise that has to be carefully undertaken and the discretion
should be exercised on reasonable grounds – The principle in
Swamy Shraddananda as affirmed in V. Sriharan was evolved as
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 915
Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala
the normally accepted norm of 14 years was found to be grossly
disproportionate on the lower side – At the same time, since it is
a matter concerning the liberty of the individual, courts should also
guard against any disproportion in the imposition, on the higher
side too – A delicate balance has to be struck – 27 previously
decided cases applying the Swamy Shraddananda principle,
surveyed – A journey through the cases shows that the fundamental
underpinning is the principle of proportionality – The aggravating
and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers while
deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment,
have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory
imprisonment without remission, too – Some of the relevant factors
that the courts bear in mind for arriving at the number of years
which the convict will have to undergo before which the remission
powers could be invoked are number of deceased who were
victims of that crime, their age and gender; the nature of injuries
including sexual assault if any; the motive for which the offence
was committed; whether the offence was committed when the
convict was on bail in another case; the premeditated nature of
the offence; the relationship between the offender and the victim;
the abuse of trust if any; the criminal antecedents; and whether
the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society – Some
of the positive factors are age of the convict; the probability of
reformation of convict; the convict not being a professional killer;
the socioeconomic condition of the accused; the composition
of the family of the accused and conduct expressing remorse –
Additionally, the Court would be justified in considering the conduct
of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone – Aforesaid
factors not exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend
on the facts and circumstances therein. [Paras 26, 27, 57]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – According to the prosecution,
appellant had illicit intimacy with ‘L’ however, after she tried
to distance herself, the appellant was seriously aggrieved
– Allegedly, on the fateful night he gained access into her
house by making a hole in the eastern side wall of the house
and murdered ‘L’ along with three others in the house –
Appellant was the only other person inside the house, no
cogent explanation came from him as to what transpired at
the scene of occurrence:
Held: Evidence of the prosecution witnesses and even the
version of the accused establishes his presence at the scene of
916 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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occurrence – Appellant was the only other person inside the house,
with the other three being dead and one ‘KA’, who was injured
and unconscious and who later died in that state itself – There
was no cogent and plausible explanation forthcoming from the
accused as to what transpired at the scene of occurrence – This
coupled with the fact that his relationship with the deceased ‘L’
was strained clearly point to his guilt – s.106 states that when any
fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden
of proving that fact is upon him – s.106 is not intended to relieve
the prosecution of its duty – However, in exceptional cases where
it could be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for
the prosecution to establish the facts which are especially within
the knowledge of the accused, the burden will be on the accused
since he could prove as to what transpired in such scenario,
without difficulty or inconvenience – In this case, when an offence
like multiple murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the
initial burden has to be discharged by the prosecution – Once
the prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon
it, the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other
person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent
and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be
committed but he miserably failed on that score. [Para 12 (xiv)]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.293 – Prosecution case
was that there were writings on the wall and on certain objects
in the southern room of the ground floor where the accused
was found – Specimen of these writings was taken and referred
to the handwriting expert – Handwriting Expert produced P-42
report – Appellant contended that the handwriting expert had
not been examined:
Held: The submission flies in the face of s.293 – Exhibit P-42
Report was prepared by Dr. KPJ, Joint Director (Research),
Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram – The report
was duly marked and exhibited and proved as Exhibit P-42 – The
Joint Director who occupies a position above the Deputy Director
and Assistant Director, is encompassed in the phrase “Director”
used in s.293(4)(e) – Hence, the report Ex. P-42 is admissible
even without the examination of Dr. KPJ. [Para 12 (vii)]
Criminal Law – Cases falling short of the rarest of the rare
category – Sentencing – Principle laid down in Swamy
Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93, discussed.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 917
Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala
Evidence – Case based on circumstantial evidence – Principles
to be kept in mind while convicting an accused – Discussed.
Case Law Cited
Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and Others
[2015] 14 SCR 613 : (2016) 7 SCC 1 – followed.
Ammini & Others v. State of Kerala [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR
181 : (1998) 2 SCC 301; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4
SCC 116; Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka
[2008] 11 SCR 93 : (2008) 13 SCC 767 – relied on.
Padum Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2020] 1 SCR
57 : (2020) 3 SCC 35; Bhupinder Singh v. State of
Punjab [1988] 3 SCR 409 : (1988) 3 SCC 513; State
of H.P. v. Mast Ram [2004] Suppl. 4 SCR 269 : (2004)
8 SCC 660; Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of
Ajmer [1956] 1 SCR 199; Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of
Punjab [1983] 3 SCR 413 : (1983) 3 SCC 470; Haru
Ghosh v. State of West Bengal [2009] 13 SCR 847 :
(2009) 15 SCC 551; Mulla & Another v. State of U.P.
[2010] 2 SCR 633 : (2010) 3 SCC 508; Ramraj v. State
of Chhattisgarh [2009] 16 SCR 367 : (2010) 1 SCC
573; Ramnaresh and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh
[2012] 3 SCR 630 : (2012) 4 SCC 257; Neel Kumar
v. State of Haryana [2012] SCR 5 696 : (2012) 5 SCC
766; Sandeep v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2012] 5 SCR
952 : (2012) 6 SCC 107; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v.
State of Maharashtra [2013] 6 SCR 949 : (2013) 5
SCC 546; Sahib Hussain v. State of Rajasthan [2013]
2 SCR 1019 : (2013) 9 SCC 778; Gurvail Singh & Anr.
v. State of Punjab [2013] 1 SCR 783 : (2013) 2 SCC
713; Alber Oraon v. State of Jharkhand [2014] 9 SCR
330 : (2014) 12 SCC 306; Rajkumar v. State of Madhya
Pradesh [2014] 3 SCR 212 : (2014) 5 SCC 353; Selvam
v. State (2014) 12 SCC 274; Birju v. State of Madhya
Pradesh [2014] 1 SCR 1047 : (2014) 3 SCC 421; Tattu
Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2016] 3 SCR 561 :
(2016) 9 SCC 675; Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu
& Kashmir (2019) 12 SCC 791; Parsuram v. State of
918 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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Madhya Pradesh (2019) 8 SCC 382; Nand Kishore v.
State of Madhya Pradesh [2019] 1 SCR 260 : (2019) 16
SCC 278; Swapan Kumar Jha v. State of Jharkhand and
Another (2019) 13 SCC 579; Raju Jagdish Paswan v.
State of Maharashtra (2019) 16 SCC 380; X v. State of
Maharashtra [2019] 6 SCR 1 : (2019) 7 SCC 1; Irappa
Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka [2021] 11
SCR 51 : (2022) 2 SCC 801; Shiva Kumar v. State of
Karnataka [2023] 4 SCR 669 : (2023) 9 SCC 817; Manoj
and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR
452 : (2023) 2 SCC 353; Madan v. State of U.P. 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1473; Sundar v. State by Inspector
of Police [2023] 5 SCR 1016 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC
310; Ravinder Singh v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi
[2023] 4 SCR 480 : (2024) 2 SCC 323 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
List of Keywords
Sentence/Sentencing; Modification; Aggravating and mitigating
circumstances; Remission; Remission powers; Commutation of
penalty from death to life imprisonment; Principle of proportionality;
Rarest of the rare category; Illicit intimacy; Handwriting expert.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1215
of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.02.2010 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLA No.1620 of 2007
Appearances for Parties
Renjith B. Marar, Ms. Lakshmi N. Kaimal, Rajkumar Pavothil, Arun
Poomulli, Vishnu Pazhanganat, Keshavraj Nair, Davesh Kumar
Sharma, Ms. Ashu Jain, Jaleen Johnson, Harsh Vardhan Shah
Shyam, Advs. for the Appellant.
Jayanth Muthraj, Sr. Adv., Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K Joy,
Alim Anvar, Abraham Mathew, Advs. for the Respondent.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 919
Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. The present Appeal arises out of the judgment of a Division Bench
of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in D.S.R. No. 4 of 2007
and Criminal Appeal No. 1620 of 2007 dated 09.02.2010. The Death
Sentence Reference and the Criminal Appeal arose out of the
judgment of the Court of the III Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc),
Fast Track Court No. 1, Thrissur in Sessions Case No. 491 of 2006.
2. The trial Court found the appellant (the sole accused) guilty for the
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 449 IPC for having
committed the murder of Latha (aged 39 years), Ramachandran (aged
45 years), Chitra (aged 11 years) and Karthiayani Amma (aged 80
years) after committing house-trespass. After committing the above
said act, the accused attempted to commit suicide for which he was
also found guilty under Section 309 IPC. The trial Court sentenced the
accused to death for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
For the offence under Section 449 IPC, the accused was sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine
of Rs.1,000/- and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for
six months. The accused was also sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- for the
offence under Section 309 IPC, and in default of the payment of fine
to undergo simple imprisonment for one month.
3. When the matter went for confirmation before the High Court, the
High Court, while confirming the conviction, modified the sentence.
The sentence of death was modified and reduced to imprisonment
for life with a further direction that the accused shall not be released
from prison for a period of 30 (thirty) years including the period
already undergone with set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. alone.
Aggrieved, the appellant is before us in the present appeal by way
of special leave.
Brief Facts:
4. The prosecution story, in brief, is that in the household of the
deceased Ramachandran, there were four people residing. Apart
from Ramachandran, there was his wife Latha, their daughter Chitra
920 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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and Ramachandran’s mother Karthiayani Amma. The appellant,
according to the prosecution, had, at an earlier point in time, illicit
intimacy with Latha so much so that Latha even became pregnant,
later leading to termination of pregnancy. It is the prosecution case
that after Latha tried to distance herself, the appellant was seriously
aggrieved, and they advert to an occurrence of 03.02.2005 when
the appellant is supposed to have trespassed into the house where
Latha lived and even tried to harm her. They rely on Ext. P-9 to
Ext.P-11 complaints.
5. The macabre incident, out of which the present case arose, happened
on the night intervening 03.11.2005 and 04.11.2005. It is alleged
that the accused reached the house of the deceased late at night
on 03.11.2005. Having reached the house, he made a hole in the
eastern side wall of the house and gained access into the house.
It is the prosecution case that, having gained access and being
armed with 2 (two) knives and an iron rod, he caused the death of
Ramachandran and Chitra with the iron rod in the upper floor room
in the northern side of the house; that he caused serious injuries to
Karthiayani Amma in the northern room on the ground floor (resulting
in her death subsequently) and caused the death of Latha with
multiple stab injuries in the hall near the stairs on the ground floor.
6. The prosecution case is that PW-1 Thankamani, the domestic help,
who had seen the family hale and hearty the previous evening
i.e., 03.11.2005, had come to sweep the house on the morning of
04.11.2005 at around 07:00 a.m. While sweeping the courtyard, she
found that, unlike on normal days when the family would come out of
the house in the morning, no one came out that day. While sweeping,
she found that a hole had been dug on the eastern side wall of the
house and to her horror also found that blood was dripping from a
pipe adjoining the western side wall of the house. She raised an
alarm resulting in the neighbours converging on the property.
7. It is PW-2 (Shyama Sundaran), a neighbour, who called the police after
witnessing the commotion outside the house. PW-30 (KT Kumaran)
the ASI rushed to the spot with his police party and reached at 08:25
AM. He also found a hole in the wall on the eastern side of the house
and also that telephone cable was cut. He instructed PW-6 (Balan)
& PW-23 (Rajan) to break open the door on the western side of the
house first. PW-6 & PW-23 broke open the outer door but found
that the inner door was also locked and it could not be opened. It
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 921
Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala
was then decided to break open the door on the front side of the
house. PW-4 (Sandeep) removed the tile portion above the porch
and entered the porch. He then broke open the door using a pestle
and entered the poomukham (veranda). PW-4 then broke the glass
ventilator above the main door and inserted his hand to open the
door latch. As they entered, they found Latha’s dead body in the
passage near the stairs. The body of Ramachandran and Chitra
were found dead in the upper floor room on the northern side of
the house. Karthiyani Amma was found in the northern room on the
ground floor unconscious. PW-6 & PW-23 took Karthiyani Amma to
hospital. It was PW-32 (Ajaya Kumar), the Investigating Officer of
the case, who reached the spot at 09:15 AM and saw blood droplets
starting from the northern room on the ground floor to the room on
the south. When he opened the door, he found the accused lying
on the floor with a cut injury on his left wrist.
8. PW-30, ASI registered the suo motu FIR and PW-32, conducted the
investigation. The appellant was sent up for trial. In all, the prosecution
examined 32 witnesses (PWs 1-32) and proved Exhibits P1 to P45
series. Material Objects [M.Os.] 1-122 were also marked by the
prosecution. The accused did not examine any defence witnesses;
but proved Exhibits D1-D5. The accused also gave a statement while
being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. At the Section 313 stage,
he advanced a version to the effect that there was a pact between
him and Latha to commit suicide; that he had come to the house
of Latha on 03.11.2005 with the intention that both of them shall
commit suicide; that Latha had kept the door open as usual and he
gained entry into the house through such door; that after he entered
the house, he found Latha and others were all lying dead/injured;
that on account of grief, he had cut his left wrist in an attempt to
commit suicide and that he was found available in the house in an
unconscious state. The appellant was clearly implying that somebody
else had gained access into the house and caused the death of all
victims. It is then that he proceeded to commit suicide.
9. The case entirely rests on circumstantial evidence. Both the trial
Court and the High Court have closely marshalled the circumstantial
evidence in the case to arrive at the conclusion that the accused
alone is responsible for the death of the four deceased. Additionally,
it also relied on the fact that the accused having been found present
in the house had offered no plausible and cogent explanation about
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the sequence of events that had transpired inside, leading to the
sole and irresistible conclusion that the accused has perpetrated
the heinous crime.
Contentions:
10. We have heard Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel for the appellant,
who advanced elaborate arguments, covering the entire spectrum by
making available a chart setting out the summary of the deposition
of the prosecution witnesses, the relevant exhibits marked and the
argument of the defence in separate columns. He mainly contended
that the case made out by the prosecution falls short of the proof
needed in a case which is based entirely on circumstantial evidence.
Learned counsel contended that with the available evidence it would
be unsafe to sustain the conviction and pleaded for outright acquittal.
The specific contentions of the learned counsel challenging certain
individual circumstances have been dealt with hereinbelow while
tabulating the circumstances. Alternatively, learned counsel pleaded
that the sentence of 30 years without remission is excessive and
prayed that the sentence may be appropriately tailored to meet the
ends of justice.
11. Shri Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior counsel, for the State
vehemently rebutted the arguments of the counsel for the appellant
and contended that the trial Court and the High Court have correctly
arrived at the conclusion of guilt. Learned senior counsel contended
that the case actually warranted death penalty but the High Court
has modified it to a sentence of imprisonment for 30 years without
remission for the offence under Section 302. According to the learned
senior counsel, the sentence did not deserve any further modification.
Discussion:
12. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the respective parties and have perused the material on record,
including the relevant original trial Court records. The circumstances
that unerringly point to the guilt of the appellant as it emerges from
the deposition of the witnesses and the duly proved exhibits can be
summarized as under:
(i) There was the incident on 03.02.2005 when the accused
allegedly trespassed into the house and had thrown a koduval
(curved sword) at deceased Latha. This highlights the friction
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 923
Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala
between the accused and deceased Latha. Ext. P9 - P11
complaint of 03.02.2005 has been marked by the prosecution.
It also forms an important piece of evidence to establish motive.
ii) PW-3, Raman, an auto driver, deposed that on the night
of 03.11.2005, the accused engaged his services to go to
Orumanayur. The accused asked him to stop at a place called
Muthenmavu (which is the place where the house of the
deceased was situated) and he paid him Rs.70/-. We have seen
the original deposition and it clearly records that it was at 10.30
PM on the night of 03.11.2005 that the accused engaged the
services of PW-3 at Guruvayur auto stand to reach the area
where the house of the deceased was located. Mr. Renjith B.
Marar, learned counsel, has challenged the evidence of PW-3
on the ground that no test identification parade was held and
the identification was for the first time at the police station.
This submission need not detain the court as nothing much
turns on it. The presence of the accused even otherwise, at
the scene of occurrence has been spoken to by PW-1, PW-
2, PW-4, PW-6, PW-23, PW-30 and PW-32, as has been
discussed hereinbelow.
iii) PW-1 Thankamani has clearly spoken about the fact that, on
03.11.2005, when she left the house after her work at 7.30
p.m. all the deceased were hale and hearty. On the morning of
04.11.2005, it was she who detected the dripping of the blood
from the pipe adjoining the western wall, and a hole being made
in the eastern side wall of the house.
iv) The evidence of PW-1, 2, 4, 6, 23, 30 and 32 speaks about the
appellant lying in the southern room of the house and being
taken to the hospital from there. PWs 1,2,4,6,23 & 30 also speak
about the hole that has been made on the eastern wall of the
house. The seizure of M.O. 29,30,31,32,33 & 34 items i.e., 2
(two) knives, 2 (two) knife sheaths, iron rod and bag recovered
also contributes as a link in the chain.
v) On 4.11.2005, M.O. 29 & 30 (Knives found in the southern room
on the ground floor where the accused was found) were seized
and taken into custody under Ext. P-12 (Scene Mahazar). M.O.
33 (Iron rod) was also seized and taken from the northern room
in the upper floor, vide the same Ext. P-12.
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vi) Another important circumstance is the report of the Finger Print
Expert (Ext.P-22). The Finger Print Expert has opined that
the chance finger print on the water bottle found at the scene
of the crime (marked as C-9 by the Expert) was identified as
the left thumb impression of the appellant in the slip made
available with the Expert for verification (marked as “S” by
the expert). The Expert concluded in P-22 that since the
identical ridge characteristics are present in their nature and
relative possessions, the finger impressions “C9” and “S” are
identical i.e. that they are the impressions of the same finger
of the person. The Expert concluded that, in his opinion, that
the chance print marked as C-9 and developed by him from
the scene of crime on 04.11.2005 is made by the left thumb
of the appellant.
vii) The prosecution case is also that there were writings on the
wall and on certain objects in the southern room of the ground
floor where the accused was found. The writings indicate that
these were parting messages of the accused (as the High
Court labels them) since he had decided to commit suicide.
The writings were in the following words “Do not enter here”;
“Shyaman, you are a O, you should not desire the ruppam of a
woman, money will make people traitors, you are O, you should
not destroy the local area”; The mirror had the writing with pen
on it reading ‘Latha, I love you’ and same was underlined and
below that it was written ‘Salim, I love you’ and ‘Yahio I lo” and
below that ‘Shabna I lo”; The aforesaid wall had one wall clock
with the label ‘Samaya Quartz’ inside. On it, it was written with
marker pen ‘Latha, I love you’; On the wall, below the clock, it
was written “My name is Nawas, reason for my death is Latha,
so myself and Latha decided to die together.....Confirm by
Navaz P.M.”; “Yahayikka knows that now I shall not be there,
wherever, no harm should happen to Yahayikka. I may be an
idiot”; “For Salim to know, even if I am not there, you shall
always be in my eyes”. Near to that it was written “night =12
O’clock, I am at the house of Latha” in two lines. Below that
it was written “6 to 7= Finishing”; “I have no role in the looting
of 6 lakhs. I was present in the said vehicle. This is true” and
near to that it was written “for police to know where I was for
all these days, no child knows”.
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Specimen of these writings was taken and referred to the handwriting
expert. The Handwriting Expert produced P-42 report. PW-32, the
Investigating Officer spoke about the seizure of a mirror, a samaya
quartz clock and the November-December, 2005 page of Guruvayur
Cooperative Urban Bank Calendar. All these items had writings on
them at the scene of the crime. Twenty black and white photographs
of the handwritings were taken. These were termed ‘question’ writings
and marked by the Handwriting Expert in the report for his reference
as Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q5A, Q6, Q6A to Q6P. The Expert was also
furnished with the ‘standard’ writings by Appellant marked by the Expert
for his reference as S1 to S49. In Ext. P-42, the Handwriting Expert
concludes that, on comparison, the ‘question’ and ‘standard’ writings
are by the same person. He concluded that they agree in general
writing characteristics such as skill, speed, spacing, relative size
and proportionate spelling errors. The Expert opined that similarities
found between the question and standard writings are significant
and numerous and there did not exist any material differences. Only
with regard to the signature stamp in Q6(q), the expert concluded
that it was not possible to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding
the authorship for want of sufficient data on that score. With regard
to all others, it was concluded that the person who wrote the blue
enclosed writings stamped and marked as ‘standard’ writings also
wrote the red enclosed ‘question’ writings. The High Court has found
that this aspect of handwriting was not even seriously challenged by
the accused. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel, contended that
the handwriting expert had not been examined. In support thereof,
he relies on the judgment of this Court in Padum Kumar v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35. The submission flies in the
face of Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Exhibit P-42
Report is prepared by Dr. K.P. Jayakumar, Joint Director (Research),
Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram. The report is duly
marked and exhibited and proved as Exhibit P-42. The Joint Director
who occupies a position above the Deputy Director and Assistant
Director, is encompassed in the phrase “Director” used in Section
293(4)(e). This position is expressly settled by the judgment of this
Court in Ammini & Others v. State of Kerala, (1998) 2 SCC 301.
The relevant para of which is extracted hereinbelow:
“11. …..The trial court was also wrong in holding that
the report given by the Forensic Science Laboratory with
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respect to the contents of MO 44 was not admissible in
evidence as it was signed by its Joint Director and not by
the Director. On a true construction of Section 293(4) CrPC
it has to be held that Joint Director is comprehended by
the expression “Director”. The amendment made in clause
(e) of Section 293(4) now indicates that clearly. If the Joint
Director was not comprehended within the expression
Director then the legislature would have certainly named
him while amending the clause and providing that Section
293 applies to the Deputy Director or Assistant Director of
a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic
Science Laboratory. A Joint Director is a higher officer
than a Deputy Director or an Assistant Director and,
therefore, it would be unreasonable to hold that a
report signed by Joint Director is not admissible in
evidence though a report signed by the Deputy Director
or Assistant Director is now admissible. In our opinion
the High Court was right in holding that the report made
by the Joint Director was admissible in evidence and that
it deserved to be relied upon.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
Hence, the report Ex. P-42 is admissible even without the examination
of Dr. K. P. Jayakumar. (See also Bhupinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1988) 3 SCC 513 & State of H.P. v. Mast Ram, (2004)
8 SCC 660)
viii) The evidence of the doctors PWs-10 & 19, who conducted the
post-mortem of Latha & Chitra respectively, fixed the timing
of death between 6-18 hours prior to 6.25 PM on 04.11.2005.
Evidence of PW-25, Doctor who conducted post-mortem of
Ramachandran stated that the death occurred 12-18 hours prior
to 6:25PM. This synchronizes with the time that the accused
made entry into the house.
ix) The hair strands found on the body of Chitra were found to be
similar and identical to the hair of the accused. In Ext.P41(b),
which is the report of Dr. R. Sreekumar, Assistant Director
(Biology) in the forensic laboratory, it is opined that the hairs in
Item 45 (hairs from the belly of Chitra) are human scalp hairs
which are similar to the sample scalp hairs in Item 58 (a tuft
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 927
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of black hairs) which is the combed hair and cut hair of the
appellant. Challenging the circumstances, Mr. Renjith B. Marar,
learned counsel, contends that PW-27 Annamma John does
not speak about the hair being seized and that there was no
seizure memo spoken to in her 161 statement. This submission
has no merit since Exhibit P-26 is the seizure mahazar of the
objects collected by PW-27 on 04.11.2005, the day the sordid
incident was unravelled. In the Inquest Report also PW-14
mentions about the collection of hair from the body of the
deceased Chitra by PW-27.
x) It is also important to note that the 2 (two) strands of hair found
on one of the knives, was found to be Latha’s as per FSL
Report (Ex. P. 41(b)).
xi) The testimonies of the Doctors PWs, 10, 19, 25 and 26, clearly
bring out that the injuries sustained by the deceased could be
caused by means of M.O. 29, 30 and 33. This is an additional
circumstance.
xii) Ext.P41(c), which is the report of the Scientific Assistant
(Chemistry), FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, clearly establishes
that the black coloured ink in Item 66 (the marker pen with
trade brand label as Kolor Pik permanent XL marker) and 67
(1 black coloured plastic cap) is similar to the ink used in the
black coloured writings in Item 63 (wooden frame) item 64
(wall clock) with trade label samay and item 65 (calendar of
Guruvayur Cooperative Urban Bank). Item numbers referred to
here are the ones given for reference by the Scientific Assistant
in her report. The Marker pen (part of M.O. 95) was recovered
from the southern room where the Appellant was found, and
rightly an inference has been drawn that the writings on M.O.
43 (Wall Clock) M.O. 90 (Mirror) and M.O. 94 (2005 Calendar)
are the writings of the accused by using M.O 95 (marker pen)
xiii) At the site where the hole was drilled, soil/powder was available.
It is found in the forensic report that the soil/powder on M.O.
34 bag (found in the room where the accused was found) and
seized as per Ext.P-12 scene mahazar, was apparently similar
to the soil/powder seized near the hole. Equally so, in the
M.O. 71 shirt belonging to the accused, apparently similar soil/
powder was found. These are established by the FSL report
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(Exh. 41(a)). Further, the nail clippings of the accused taken
by PW-31 dated 14.11.2005 revealed apparently similar soil/
powder to the soil/powder found at the site of the hole as per
FSL report (Exh. 41(a)). This is a circumstance relied upon by
the prosecution to establish that the accused gained access
through the hole that he dug. The argument of the accused that
the nail clippings were taken on 14.11.2005 and no importance
could be attached has rightly been rejected by the High Court
saying that it is not even the case of the accused that the soil/
powder detected from the hole at the scene of occurrence was
planted on his nail. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel for the
appellant contended that Exhibit P-41(a) report was not put in
the Section 313 questioning in the context of the soil particles on
the wall tallying with the soil particles in the nail clippings and on
the shirt and the bag found in the room where the accused was
present. We have called for the original record and examined
the Section 313 statement and had the Malayalam version read
over to us. We have also seen the translated version of Section
313. Exhibit P-41(a) was put in question no. 52 but it was in the
context of item 68 cable and as to how it could be cut with the
knives (item 22 and 23). To that extent, Mr. Renjith B. Marar is
right that the report was not put in this context. The report was
put to the accused albeit in the context of the cable and knives.
However, viewed in the conspectus of the other circumstances
even if this circumstance is eschewed, it will not make any
difference to the ultimate conclusion. The further argument
that there was no seizure memo for the nail clippings is clearly
incorrect. PW-31 Dr. Hitesh Shankar has clearly deposed that
he had collected the nail clippings and hair samples and the
blood of the accused-appellant and after sealing and labeling
them handed it over to the police constable-4628. Exhibit P-45(i)
marked by PW-32 Ajay Kumar, Investigating Officer as part of
the property list, mentions about the collection of nail clippings,
hair sample and sodium fluoride tube. Hence, the contention that
the chain of custody is not established cannot be countenanced.
There is no reason to disbelieve PW-31 Dr. Hitesh Shankar and
the documents in support of the same.
xiv) The evidence of the prosecution witnesses and even the
version of the accused establishes his presence at the scene of
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 929
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occurrence. His explanation that deceased Latha would always
leave the door open for him to enter and that when he entered,
he found them already dead and lying on the floor wounded
has been found to be false. If the appellant’s own case is that
he entered the house that night, no cogent explanation has
been given as to who opened the door. However, we have
not gone by his version. His presence at the scene of crime
is established by the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-6,
PW-23, PW-30 and PW-32.
xv) The appellant was the only other person inside the house, with
the other three being dead and one Karthiayani Amma, who was
injured and unconscious and who later died in that state itself.
There is no cogent and plausible explanation forthcoming from
the accused as to what transpired at the scene of occurrence
on the night intervening 03.11.2005 and 04.11.2005. This
coupled with the fact that his relationship with the deceased
Latha was strained clearly point to his guilt. Section 106 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that when any fact is
especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of
proving that fact is upon him. We are conscious of the warning
administered by Justice Vivian Bose, rightly, in Shambhu Nath
Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer, 1956 SCR 199 to the effect
that Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its
duty. However, Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) itself recognizes
that in exceptional cases where it could be impossible or
at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to
establish the facts which are especially within the knowledge
of the accused, the burden will be on the accused since he
could prove as to what transpired in such scenario, without
difficulty or inconvenience. In this case, when an offence like
multiple murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the
initial burden has to be discharged by the prosecution. Once
the prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon
it, the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other
person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent
and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be
committed. The appellant has miserably failed on that score.
This can be considered as a very important circumstance,
constituting a vital link in the chain.
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13. Though the trial Court and the High Court have adverted to few
other circumstances, we are satisfied that the circumstances set out
hereinabove are by themselves consistent with the sole hypothesis
that the accused and the accused alone is the perpetrator of these
murders which were most foul.
14. It is also to be noted that the law on the appreciation of circumstantial
evidence is well settled and it will be an idle parade of familiar learning
to deal with all the cases. We do no more than set out the holding
in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984)
4 SCC 116, which dealt with the panchsheel or the five principles
essential to be kept in mind while convicting an accused in a case
based on circumstantial evidence:
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that
the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where
the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must
be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict
and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 931
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(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based
on circumstantial evidence.”
15. We are convinced that the circumstances presented in evidence
in this case more than meets the ingredients that are required to
be established. We find no reason to interfere with the concurrent
conviction recorded by the trial Court and the High Court against the
appellant for the offences under Section 302 (murder), 449 (house-
trespass) and 309 (attempt to commit suicide) and we maintain the
conviction.
Discussion on Sentence:
16. Coming to the sentencing, while the trial Court imposed the sentence
of death, the High Court has modified it to that of imprisonment for
30 years with no remission. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel,
made an impassioned plea as part of his alternative submission
that imprisonment for 30 years without remission is excessive and
disproportionate. Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior counsel, left
no stone unturned in contending that the appellant has got away
lightly and that he is fortunate to have escaped the gallows.
17. The question before us is what should be the appropriate sentence
and whether the High Court was justified in adopting the Swamy
Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 line of
cases and even it was justified whether the fixing of the quantum
at 30 years without remission was the appropriate sentence, in the
facts and circumstances of the case?
18. The trial court imposed the sentence of death as far as the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC was concerned. The trial court
recorded that the appellant had committed the murder of four
persons; that the appellant was blood-thirsty; that he had illicit love
affair with deceased Latha, the wife of deceased Ramachandran;
932 [2024] 3 S.C.R.
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that she even became pregnant because of him and then fell out
with the appellant; that there was an attempt to cause bodily injury
earlier to Latha by throwing a koduval (curved sword) on 03.02.2005;
that the nature of the injuries inflicted upon the deceased persons
indicate that the murders were committed in an extremely brutal and
dastardly manner; that they were premeditated and cold blooded
murders; that the entire family was eliminated including an innocent
child aged eleven years and a hapless 80 years old lady and that the
collective conscience of the community was shocked. The trial court
also noted that the accused attempted to commit suicide by cutting
the vein in his left forearm but however discarded that circumstance
and passed a sentence of death.
19. The High Court first recorded that there was no question of interfering
with the sentence under Sections 449 and 309 IPC and the question
was only whether the sentence of death ought to be confirmed or
not. Thereafter, the High Court delved into the balance sheet of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The High Court, while
recording the argument of the prosecution, noticed that there was prior
planning; that four lives were snuffed out and the entire family was
wiped out including a child and an aged woman; that the deceased
were unarmed and defenceless and no provocation or resistance was
offered by them; that the offence was committed after mischievously
planning the operation and after gaining access to the closed house
in the night by making a hole on the wall; that the incident reflected a
dare devil attitude; that the nature of weapons used by the accused,
namely, the knife and the iron bar is also taken as an aggravating
circumstance; that the nature and number of injuries inflicted on
deceased Latha (43 of which 38 were stab injuries) was also an
aggravating circumstance and that there were prior instances of
involvement by the accused in attempting to assault Latha.
20. Dealing with the mitigating circumstance, the High Court noticed the
contention of the defence, to the effect that there was no semblance
of any element of gain, profit or advantage for the accused; that
rightly or wrongly the accused was labouring under an impression
of deprivation in love; that the accused was in an extremely agitated
and excited state of mind; that there was indication to show that at
some point of time deceased Latha had herself suggested commission
of suicide together; that the accused had no motive whatsoever
against Ramachandran, Chitra and Karthiayani Amma; that he had
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 933
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great affection for Chitra and referred to Ramachandran in endearing
terms; that he had not used any weapon against Karthiayani Amma;
that he did not make any attempt to flee from justice and in fact
attempted to commit suicide; that he was a young man of twenty
eight years; that he was still young and not lost to civilization and
humanity and the final contention of the defence that he was not a
menace to the society.
21. Thereafter, the High Court dealt with the precedents laid down by
this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684,
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 to examine
whether the litmus test, namely, that the alternative option being
unquestionably foreclosed was fulfilled or not. Thereafter, the High
Court noticed the judgment of this Court in Swamy Shraddananda
(supra) and the holding thereon that to avoid a sentence of death,
it is possible for the courts to device a graver form of sentence of
imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years which would ensure that
the society is insulated from the criminal for such period as the court
may specify, including if the facts warranted, the entire rest of his life.
22. Thereafter applying Swamy Shraddananda (supra), the High Court
observed as follows:
“54. A question still remains whether the instant case is
one in which the graver alternatives of a life sentence are
also unquestionably foreclosed. We have rendered our
anxious consideration to all that all the relevant inputs.
We are unable to agree that all the options now available
can be said to be unquestionably foreclosed in the given
circumstances. In every case of death sentence, the court
must consider the purpose of the sentence. The theory
of reformation will have no place whatsoever in a case of
imposition of death sentence. In a case like the instant
one, the consideration of compensation/restoration cannot
also have any place, as all the members of the family
have been liquidated by the conduct of the accused. The
purpose of a death sentence - of eliminating the menace
to the society in the form of a hardened criminal and to
save society from the activities of such criminal may not
also have much role, given the alternative option of a life
sentence which will ensure that the accused does not
come into contact with the society thereafter.
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59. Let it not be assumed that this court does not perceive
the instant one to be a serious and dastardly crime. We,
to say the least, are convinced that the offence committed
calls for societal abhorrence and disapproval. But, the
totality of circumstances instill in us the satisfaction that this
is not a case where the range of further options available
to the court after Swamy Shraddananda (supra) are
unquestionably foreclosed. Placing fetter on the powers
of the Executive under Section 432 and 433 Cr.P.C. for a
prescribed period (and with due caution administered that
the powers under Article 72 and Article 161 should not be
lightly invoked to get over the prescription of such period
fixed by this Court) a sentence of imprisonment for life
which shall ensure that the offender does not get exposed
to society for a period of 30 years can be imposed. We are
not prescribing the ‘entire rest of the life’ as the period, as
fixed by their Lordships in Swamy Shraddananda (supra),
considering the totality of circumstances and because of
the optimistic faith in the infinite capacity of the human
soul to repent and reform.”
Holding so, the High Court modified the sentence of death to that
of imprisonment for life with the further direction that the accused
shall not be released from prison for a period of 30 (thirty) years
including the period already undergone with set off under Section
428 Cr.P.C. alone.
23. The State is not in appeal, having accepted the verdict of the High
Court. It is only the appellant who is in appeal. It is his submission
that the imposition of 30 (thirty) years sentence without remission
is excessive and the counsel urges that a suitable lesser sentence
be imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda principle. This is the
alternative submission advanced.
24. Swamy Shraddananda (supra), since affirmed subsequently in
Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and Others, (2016)
7 SCC 1, resolved a judge’s dilemma. Often it happens that a case
that falls short of the rarest of the rare category may also be one
where a mere sentence of 14 years (the normal benchmark for life
imprisonment) may be grossly disproportionate and inadequate.
The Court may find that while death penalty may not be warranted
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 935
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keeping in mind the overall circumstances, a proportionate penalty
would be to fix the period between 14 years and for the imprisonment
till rest of the life without remission. Addressing this issue felicitously
in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) Justice Aftab Alam speaking for
the court, held as follows:
“92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different
angle. The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence
may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly
disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant comes
to this Court carrying a death sentence awarded by the
trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court
may find, as in the present appeal, that the case just
falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may feel
somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence.
But at the same time, having regard to the nature of the
crime, the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life
imprisonment subject to remission normally works out
to a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate
and inadequate. What then should the Court do? If the
Court’s option is limited only to two punishments, one a
sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes,
of not more than 14 years and the other death, the Court
may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the
death penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous.
A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be
to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter
of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus
between 14 years’ imprisonment and death. It needs to
be emphasised that the Court would take recourse to the
expanded option primarily because in the facts of the case,
the sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment would amount to
no punishment at all.”
25. In V. Sriharan (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court affirmed
the principle laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (supra). It first
affirmed the principle that imprisonment for life meant imprisonment
for rest of the life, subject however, to the right to claim remission,
as provided in the Constitution and the statutes. It was further held
that the judgment in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) did not violate
any statutory prescription. The Court went on to observe that all that
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Swamy Shraddananda (supra) sought to declare was that within the
prescribed limit of the punishment of life imprisonment, having regard
to the nature of offence committed by imposing life imprisonment for
a specified period would be proportionate to the crime as well as
the interest of the victim. Thereafter, in the same judgment Ibrahim
Kalifulla, J., in a passage which repays study held as under:
“98. While that be so, it cannot also be lost sight of
that it will be next to impossible for even the lawmakers
to think of or prescribe in exactitude all kinds of such
criminal conduct to fit into any appropriate pigeonhole for
structured punishments to run in between the minimum
and maximum period of imprisonment. Therefore, the
lawmakers thought it fit to prescribe the minimum and the
maximum sentence to be imposed for such diabolic nature
of crimes and leave it for the adjudication authorities,
namely, the Institution of Judiciary which is fully and
appropriately equipped with the necessary knowledge
of law, experience, talent and infrastructure to study the
detailed parts of each such case based on the legally
acceptable material evidence, apply the legal principles
and the law on the subject, apart from the guidance it gets
from the jurists and judicial pronouncements revealed
earlier, to determine from the nature of such grave
offences found proved and depending upon the facts
noted, what kind of punishment within the prescribed limits
under the relevant provision would appropriately fit in. In
other words, while the maximum extent of punishment of
either death or life imprisonment is provided for under the
relevant provisions noted above, it will be for the courts
to decide if in its conclusion, the imposition of death
may not be warranted, what should be the number of
years of imprisonment that would be judiciously and
judicially more appropriate to keep the person under
incarceration, by taking into account, apart from the
crime itself, from the angle of the commission of such
crime or crimes, the interest of the society at large
or all other relevant factors which cannot be put in
any straitjacket formulae.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 937
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It will be clear from the paragraph above that the question of fixing the
number of years within the maximum, in the case of life imprisonment,
was to be left to the courts. It was mandated that the courts would
with its experience, knowledge of law, the talent and infrastructure
after studying the detailed parts of each case, with the guidance
from the jurists and judicial pronouncements revealed earlier would
decide judiciously about the period of incarceration which the case
warranted. It was also indicated that for this, apart from the crime
itself; the angle of the commission of such crime or crimes; the interest
of society at large and all other relevant facts which cannot be put
in any straitjacket formulae would be taken into account.
26. Once the court decides that the death penalty is not to be imposed
and also that the convict cannot be released on the expiry of 14
years, the guidelines set out in Swamy Shraddananda (supra), V.
Sriharan (supra) and the line of cases which have applied these
judgments will have to be considered and principles, if any, set out
therein have to be applied.
27. How much is too much and how much is too little? This is the difficult
area we have tried to address here. As rightly observed, there can
be no straitjacket formulae. Pegging the point up to which remission
powers cannot be invoked is an exercise that has to be carefully
undertaken and the discretion should be exercised on reasonable
grounds. The spectrum is very large. The principle in Swamy
Shraddananda (supra) as affirmed in V. Sriharan (supra) was
evolved as the normally accepted norm of 14 years was found to be
grossly disproportionate on the lower side. At the same time, since
it is a matter concerning the liberty of the individual, courts should
also guard against any disproportion in the imposition, on the higher
side too. A delicate balance has to be struck. While undue leniency,
which will affect the public confidence and the efficacy of the legal
system, should not be shown, at the same time, since a good part of
the convict’s life with freedom is being sliced away (except in cases
where the Court decides to impose imprisonment till rest of the full
life), in view of his incarceration, care should be taken that the period
fixed is also not harsh and excessive. While by the very nature of the
task mathematical exactitude is an impossibility, that will not deter
the Court from imposing a period of sentence which will constitute
“a just dessert” for the convict. Precedents can be good pointers as
advised in V. Sriharan (supra). A survey of the previously decided
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cases applying the Swamy Shraddananda (supra) principle would
be a safe and legitimate guide. It is in pursuance of that mandate that
we have made a survey of some of the cases to see how Swamy
Shraddananda (supra) had come to be applied in the course of
the last decade and a half.
28. In Swamy Shraddananda (supra) itself, on facts, after finding that it
was a murder of the wife in a systematic preplanned manner coupled
with the fact that it was a murder for gain, this Court directed that the
appellant therein be not released from prison for the rest of his life.
29. In Haru Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 15 SCC 551 which
involved the murder of two individuals and the attempt to murder
the third by the accused who was out on bail in another case, after
conviction, this Court while commuting the death penalty after taking
into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances imposed
a sentence of 35 (thirty five) years of actual jail sentence without
remission. It was noted that commission of the offence was not
premeditated since he did not come armed and that the accused
was the only bread earner for his family which included two minor
children.
30. In Mulla & Another v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 508 the
accused/appellant, along with other co-accused, was found guilty of
murdering five persons, including one woman. This Court confirmed
the conviction but modified the sentence. This Court stressed on the
fact that socio-economic factors also constitute a mitigating factor
and must be taken into consideration as in the case the appellants
belonged to extremely poor background which prompted them
to commit the act. The sentence was reduced from death to life
imprisonment for full life, subject to any remission by the Government
for good reasons.
31. In Ramraj v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2010) 1 SCC 573 which
involved the murder of his wife, this Court imposed a sentence of
20 (twenty) years including remissions.
32. In Ramnaresh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh., (2012) 4
SCC 257 the convicts were sentenced to death by the lower court,
with the High Court confirming the sentence, on finding them guilty
of raping and murdering an innocent woman while she was alone in
her house. This Court confirmed the conviction but found the case
did not fall under the ‘rarest of rare’ category for awarding death
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 939
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sentence. Ultimately, after setting out the well-established principles
and on consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
this Court, while commuting the sentence from death imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment of 21 (twenty one) years.
33. Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766 was a case
where the accused committed murder of his own four-year old
daughter. This Court, after considering the nature of offence, age,
relationship and gravity of injuries caused, awarded the accused 30
(thirty) years in jail without remissions.
34. In Sandeep v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 107 which
involved the murder of paramour and the unborn child (foetus), this
Court, while considering the facts and circumstances awarded a
period of 30 (thirty) years in jail without remission.
35. In Shankar Kisanrao Khade vs State of Maharashtra, (2013)
5 SCC 546, the accused was convicted for raping and murdering
a minor girl aged eleven years and was sentenced to death for
conviction under S. 302 of IPC, life imprisonment under S. 376,
seven years RI under S. 366-A and five years RI under S. 363 r/w
S. 34. This Court confirmed the conviction but modified the death
sentence to life imprisonment for natural life and all the sentences
to run consecutively.
36. Sahib Hussain v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 9 SCC 778, concerned
killing of five persons including three children. This Court, taking note
of the fact that the guilt was established by way of circumstantial
evidence and the fact that the High Court had already imposed a
sentence of 20 (twenty) years without remission, did not interfere
with the judgment of the High Court.
37. In Gurvail Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2013) 2 SCC 713
which involved the murder of four persons, this Court weighed
the mitigating factors i.e., age of the accused and the probability
of reformation and rehabilitation, and aggravating factors i.e., the
number of deceased, the nature of injuries and the totality of facts
and circumstances directed that the imprisonment would be for a
period of 30 (thirty) years without remission.
38. In Alber Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, (2014) 12 SCC 306 which
involved the murder by the accused of his live-in partner and the
two children of the partner, this Court, even though it found the
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murder to be brutal, grotesque, diabolical and revolting, applied the
proportionality principle and imposed a sentence of 30 (thirty) years
over and above the period already undergone. It was ordered that
there would be no remission for a period of 30 (thirty) years.
39. In Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 353, which
involved the rape and murder of helpless and defenceless minor girl,
this Court commuting the death penalty imposed a sentence of 35
(thirty five) years in jail without remission.
40. In Selvam v. State, (2014) 12 SCC 274, the accused was found
guilty of rape and murder of nine year old girl. This Court imposed
a sentence of imprisonment for a period of 30 (thirty) years without
any remission, considering the diabolic manner in which the offence
has been committed against the child.
41. In Birju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 3 SCC 421, the accused
was involved in the murder of a one-year-old child. This Court noted
that various criminal cases were pending against the accused but
stated that it cannot be used as an aggravating factor as the accused
wasn’t convicted in those cases. While commuting the death penalty,
this Court imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period
of 20 (twenty) years over and above the period undergone without
remission, since he would be a menace to the society if given any
lenient sentence.
42. In Tattu Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 9 SCC 675 this
Court was dealing with an appeal preferred by the accused who was
sentenced to death after he was found guilty of committing murder of
a minor girl and for kidnapping and attempt to rape after destruction
of evidence. This Court reduced the sentence from death to life
imprisonment for a minimum 25 (twenty five) years as it noted that
there exists a possibility of the accused committing similar offence
if freed after fourteen years. This Court also opined that the special
category sentence developed in Swamy Shradhanand (supra)
serves a laudable purpose which takes care of genuine concerns of
the society and helps the accused get rid of death penalty.
43. Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2019) 12 SCC 791
was a case where the accused was found guilty of murder of three
minor children of the sister-in-law of the accused. This Court, taking
note of the fact that the accused was not a previous convict or a
professional killer and the motive for which the offence was committed,
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namely, the grievance that the sister-in-law’s family was not doing
enough to solve the matrimonial problem of the accused, imposed
a sentence of life imprisonment till natural death of the accused
without remission.
44. In Parsuram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 8 SCC 382, the
accused had raped and murdered his own student. The Trial Court
sentenced the accused to death which was affirmed by the High
Court. This Court took into consideration the mitigating factors i.e.,
that the accused was twenty two years old when he committed the
act and the fact that there exists a possibility of reformation and
the aggravating factors i.e., that the accused abused the trust of
the family of the victim. After complete consideration and reference
to some precedents, this Court imposed a sentence of thirty years
without any remission.
45. In Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 16 SCC
278, the accused was sentenced to death by the Trial Court and
the High Court for committing rape and murder of minor girl aged
about eight years old. This Court noted the mitigating factors i.e.,
age of the accused at the time of committing the act [50 years] and
possibility of reformation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment
for a period of 25 (twenty five) years without remission.
46. Swapan Kumar Jha v. State of Jharkhand and Another, (2019)
13 SCC 579 was a case relating to abduction of deceased for
ransom and thereafter murder by the accused. This Court took into
consideration the mitigating factors i.e., young age of the accused,
possibility of reformation and the convict not being a menace to
society. On the other side of the weighing scale, was the fact that
the accused had betrayed the trust of the deceased who was his
first cousin and the fact that the act was premeditated. This Court
modified the death sentence to one of imprisonment for a period of
25 (twenty five) years with remissions.
47. Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 16 SCC
380 was a case where the accused was convicted for the rape
and murder of minor girl aged about nine years and sentenced to
death by the trial court which was affirmed by the High Court. This
Court noted the mitigating factors i.e., murder was not pre-planned,
young age of the accused, no evidence to show that the accused
is a continuing threat to society and the aggravating factors i.e., the
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nature of the crime and the interest of society, if petitioner is let out
after fourteen years, imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for
30 (thirty years) without remission.
48. In X v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 1 the accused was
sentenced to death by this Court on his conviction for committing rape
and murder of two minor girls who lived near his house. However,
in review, the question placed before the Court was whether post-
conviction mental illness be a mitigating factor. This Court answered
it in the affirmative but cautioned that in only extreme cases of mental
illness can this factor be taken into consideration. The Court reduced
the sentence from death to life imprisonment for the remainder of
his life as he still poses as a threat to society.
49. In Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2
SCC 801, this Court affirmed conviction of the accused, inter alia,
under S. 302 and 376 but modified the sentence from death to life
imprisonment for minimum 30 (thirty years). This Court stated that
mitigating factors such as young age of the accused, no criminal
antecedents, act not being pre-planned, socio-economic background
of the accused and the fact that conduct of the accused inside jail
was ‘satisfactory’ concluded that sufficient mitigating circumstances
exists to commute the death sentence.
50. In Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817, this
Court opined that the facts of the case shocked the conscience
of the Court. The accused was found guilty of rape and murder
of a twenty eight year old married woman who was returning from
her workplace. Despite noting that the case did not fall under the
‘rarest of rare’ category, the Court stated that while considering the
possibility of reformation of the accused, Courts held that showing
undue leniency in such a brutal case will adversely affect the public
confidence in the efficacy of the legal system. It concluded that a
fixed term of 30 (thirty years) should be imposed.
51. In Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC
353, the three accused were sentenced to death by the lower court
and confirmed by the High Court on their conviction under Section
302 for committing murder, during the course of robbery, of three
women. This Court, while modifying the sentence from death to
life imprisonment for a minimum 25 (twenty five) years, took into
consideration the non-exhaustive list of mitigating and aggravating
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factors discussed in Bachan Singh (supra) to establish a method
of principled sentencing. This Court also imposed an obligation on
the State to provide material disclosing psychiatric and psychological
evaluation of the accused which would help the courts understand
the progress of the accused towards reformation.
52. In Madan vs State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1473, this Court
was dealing with a case wherein the accused was sentenced to death,
along with other co-accused, for murdering six persons of his village.
This Court called for the jail conduct report and psychological report
of the accused which were satisfactory and depicted nothing out of
the ordinary. This Court also took into consideration the old age of
the accused and period undergone [18 yrs.] as mitigating factors.
This Court concluded that the case did not fall under the rarest of
rare category and commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment
for minimum 20 (twenty years) including sentence undergone.
53. In Sundar vs State by Inspector of Police - 2023 SCC OnLine SC
310, this Court, while sitting in review, commuted death sentence
awarded to accused therein to life imprisonment of minimum 20
(twenty years). The accused had committed rape and murder of a
7-year-old girl. Factors that influenced this Court to reach such a
decision were the fact that no court had looked at the mitigating factors.
It called for jail conduct and education report from the jail authorities
and found that the conduct was satisfactory and that accused had
earned a diploma in food catering while he was incarcerated. Apart
from the above, the Court noted the young age of the accused, no
prior antecedents to reach a conclusion warranting modification in
the sentence awarded.
54. In Ravinder Singh vs State Govt. of NCT of Delhi - (2024) 2 SCC
323, the accused was convicted under Sections 376, 377 & 506
of the IPC for raping his own 9-year-old daughter by the Sessions
court and conviction was confirmed by the High Court. The Sessions
Court, while imposing life imprisonment, also stated that the accused
would not be given any clemency by the State before 20 years.
This Court clarified that, as discussed in V. Sriharan (supra), the
power to impose a special category sentence i.e., a sentence more
than 14 years but short of death sentence can only be imposed by
the High Court or if in appeal, by this Court. Considering the nature
of the offence committed by the accused and the fact that if the
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accused is set free early, he can be a threat to his own daughter,
this Court imposed a minimum 20 (twenty years) life imprisonment
without remissions.
55. A survey of the 27 cases discussed above indicates that while in
five cases, the maximum of imprisonment till the rest of the life is
given; in nine cases, the period of imprisonment without remission
was 30 years; in six cases, the period was 20 years (In Ramraj
(supra), this Court had imposed a sentence of 20 years including
remission); in four cases, it was 25 years; in another set of two
cases, it was 35 years and in one case, it was 21 years.
56. What is clear is that courts, while applying Swamy Shraddananda
(supra), have predominantly in cases arising out of a wide array of
facts, keeping the relevant circumstances applicable to the respective
cases fixed the range between 20 years and 35 years and in few
cases have imposed imprisonment for the rest of the life. So much
for statistics. Let us examine how the judgments guide us in terms
of discerning any principle.
57. A journey through the cases set out hereinabove shows that the
fundamental underpinning is the principle of proportionality. The
aggravating and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers
while deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment,
have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory
imprisonment without remission, too. As a judicially trained mind
pores and ponders over the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and in cases where they decide to commute the death penalty they
would by then have a reasonable idea as to what would be the
appropriate period of sentence to be imposed under the Swamy
Shraddananda (supra) principle too. Matters are not cut and dried
and nicely weighed here to formulate a uniform principle. That is
where the experience of the judicially trained mind comes in as
pointed out in V. Sriharan (supra). Illustratively in the process of
arriving at the number of years as the most appropriate for the case
at hand, which the convict will have to undergo before which the
remission powers could be invoked, some of the relevant factors
that the courts bear in mind are:- (a) the number of deceased who
are victims of that crime and their age and gender; (b) the nature
of injuries including sexual assault if any; (c) the motive for which
the offence was committed; (d) whether the offence was committed
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 945
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when the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the premeditated
nature of the offence; (f) the relationship between the offender and the
victim; (g) the abuse of trust if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and
whether the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society.
Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the convict; (2)
the probability of reformation of convict; (3) the convict not being a
professional killer; (4) the socio-economic condition of the accused;
(5) the composition of the family of the accused and (6) conduct
expressing remorse.
These were some of the relevant factors that were kept in mind in
the cases noticed above while weighing the pros and cons of the
matter. The Court would be additionally justified in considering the
conduct of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone
to arrive at the number of years which the Court feels the convict
should, serve as part of the sentence of life imprisonment and before
which he cannot apply for remission. These are not meant to be
exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend on the facts
and circumstances therein.
58. How do these factors apply to the case at hand? The act committed
by the accused was pre-planned/premeditated; the accused brutally
murdered 4 (four) persons who were unarmed and were defenseless,
one of whom was a child and the other an aged lady. It is also to
be noted that by the act of the accused, three generations of single
family have lost their lives for no fault of theirs; Nature of injuries
inflicted on Latha, Ramachandran and Chitra highlights the brutality
and cold-bloodedness of the act.
59. On the mitigating side, the accused was quite young when he
committed the act i.e., 28 years old; The act committed by the accused
was not for any gain or profit; accused did not try to flee and in fact
tried to commit suicide as he was overcome with emotions after the
dastardly act he committed; accused has been in jail for a period
of 18 years and 4 months and the case is based on circumstantial
evidence. We called for a conduct report of the appellant from the
Jail Authorities. The report dated 05.03.2024 of the Superintendent,
Central Prison and Correctional Home, Viyyur, Thrissur has been
made available to us. The report indicates that ever since his
admission to jail, he had been entrusted with prison labour work such
as duty of barber, day watchman and night watchman. Presently,
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he has been assigned the job as convict supervisor for the last one
and a half years. The report clearly indicates that no disciplinary
actions were initiated against him in the prison and that the conduct
and behavior of the appellant in prison has been satisfactory so far.
Conclusion:
60. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the judgment of the High
Cout insofar as the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302,
449 and 309 IPC is concerned. We also do not interfere with the
sentence imposed on the accused for the offence under Section 449
and Section 309 of IPC. We hold that the High Court was justified
on the facts of the case in following Swamy Shraddananda (supra)
principle while imposing sentence for the offence under Section 302
IPC. However, in view of the discussion made above, we are inclined
to modify the sentence under Section 302 imposed by the High Court
from a period of 30 years imprisonment without remission to that of
a period of 25 years imprisonment without remission, including the
period already undergone. In our view, this would serve the ends
of justice.
For the reasons stated above, the Appeal is partly allowed in the
above terms.
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:
Appeal partly allowed.
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