NAUSHEY ALI & ORS.versusSTATE OF U.P. & ANR.

                 [2025] 3 S.C.R. 289 : 2025 INSC 182

                            Naushey Ali & Ors.
                                       v.
                            State of U.P. & Anr.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 660 of 2025)
                              11 February 2025
             [K.V. Viswanathan* and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the present case is a fit case where proceedings could be
       quashed, particularly when Section 307, IPC inter alia was invoked
       and there was a settlement between the parties.

                                  Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code,
       1860 – s.307 – Complaint was filed against the appellants
       under various sections including s.307, IPC – However, parties
       later settled the dispute – High Court declined to quash the
       proceedings holding that a case involving allegation of offence
       u/s.307, IPC cannot be compounded – Interference with:
       Held: Impugned order set aside – High Court mixed up the
       concepts of compounding and powers of quashing – Further,
       mere mention of s.307 IPC in the FIR or the charge-sheet does
       not preclude the Court from quashing the proceedings if there is
       a settlement – Court can examine as to whether incorporation of
       s.307, IPC is there for the sake of it or whether there is evidence
       to back it going by the nature of injuries sustained; as to whether
       the injuries are inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body
       and the nature of weapon used – In the present case, admittedly,
       there is a settlement between the parties – Furthermore, on facts,
       considering the injury, the nature of the weapon used and the
       overt act attributed to the appellants, no offence u/s.307, IPC was
       made out either on a stand-alone basis or with the aid of s.149 –
       As a matter of fact, the police had actually closed the case in its
       final report however, it was the trial Court which refused to accept
       the same and summoned the appellants – Present is a fit case
       where pending proceedings should be quashed – Proceedings
       quashed. [Paras 12, 14, 19, 23, 24]
* Author
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       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing
       vis-à-vis compounding:
       Held: Compounding and quashing are conceptually different –
       However, merely because there is a settlement, for certain
       categories of offences proceedings will not be quashed because
       the crimes that have harmful effects on the public and consist of
       wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being
       of the society cannot be quashed, only because the accused and
       the victim have amicably settled the matter – In the instant case,
       the nature of the weapon and the nature of the injury (fracture
       of the head of distal phalanx of left ring finger), the offence
       alleged, on facts, does not fall in that category of cases where the
       court should deny relief in the event of a settlement – On facts,
       considering all the circumstances, the crime is not such which
       has a harmful effect on the public and has the effect of seriously
       threatening the well-being of the society – Proceeding with the
       trial, when parties have amicably resolved the dispute is futile
       and would be a grave abuse of process – Thus, settlement ought
       to be given effect to by quashing the proceedings – Proceedings
       quashed. [Para 20]

                                Case Law Cited
       Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another [2012] 8 SCR 753 :
       (2012) 10 SCC 303; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan
       and Others [2019] 2 SCR 864 : (2019) 5 SCC 688; Narinder Singh
       and Others v. State of Punjab and Another [2014] 4 SCR 1012 :
       (2014) 6 SCC 466; Ramgopal v. State of M.P. [2021] 6 SCR 249 :
       (2022) 14 SCC 531 – relied on.

                                  List of Acts
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.

                               List of Keywords
       Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 307
       of Penal Code, 1860; Quashment of Proceedings; Quashing;
       Settlement; Compromise; Compounding of offence; Common
       Object; General Allegation; Role not specific; Overt Act; Dispute
       settled; Harmful effect on the public; Threatening the well-being
       of the society; Abuse of process; Nature of the weapon; Nature
       of the injury.
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                        291

                Naushey Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.


                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
     No. 660 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 19.01.2023 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No. 1315 of 2023

                         Appearances for Parties
     Anupam Mishra, Jenis V Francis, Advs. for the Appellants.
     Ms. Garima Prashad, Sr. A.A.G., Sudeep Kumar, Ms. Manisha,
     Ms. Rupali, Harikumar V., Advs. for the Respondents.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present appeal calls in question the correctness of the order
     dated 19.01.2023 in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 1315
     of 2023 on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
     By the said order, the High Court, by holding that a case involving
     allegation of Commission of offence under Section 307 of the Indian
     Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) cannot be compounded, dismissed
     the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking quashment of
     proceedings. Five of the eight appellants before the High Court –
     Naushey Ali, Khushboo Ali, Khursheed, Raza Ali and Nanhe – are
     before this Court in Appeal. The other three have passed away.
3.   The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass.
     i)    The appellants and respondent No.2 Mahmood S/o late Abdul
           Lateef are residents of the same village - Barwara Khas, District
           Moradabad, U.P.
     ii)   With respect to an occurrence on 11.08.1991, it was the
           appellants’ party which first lodged Case Crime No. 248/91 on
           the said day itself against the respondent No.2, his father and
           others for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149,
           307, 325, 506, 323 and 504 of IPC.
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       iii)   On 27.08.1991, Case Crime No. 248-A/91 was registered by
              Abdul Lateef, on behalf of respondent No.2, in FIR No. 141
              of 1991. The sections, violations of which were alleged were,
              147, 148, 149, 307, 325, 506, 323 and 504 IPC. This FIR was
              registered against all eight persons, including the appellants.
       iv)    The gravamen of the allegation was that the appellants’ party
              wanted to pass the irrigation water through the field of the
              complainant by forcibly digging the land. When it was resisted
              by the complainant party, the appellants’ party abused them in
              filthy language and assaulted Mahmood S/o Abdul Lateef with
              lathi and iron bars. When Mahmood ran to save his life, Abdul
              Waris (since deceased) opened fire from his rifle.
       v)     According to the complainant, on hearing the sound, Munnan S/o
              Mangu and Vilayat S/o Inayat came and saved them. Thereafter,
              they reached the Police Station to lodge a report, when they
              found that the appellants’ party was already present at the Police
              Station. A complaint was lodged by Mahmood but the thumb
              impression on his behalf was put by his father Abdul Lateef.
       vi)    On 07.09.1991, after investigation, the police filed a final report
              No. 50/91 stating that the complaint was a false complaint. It
              was recorded that during the course of investigation, from the
              statements of witnesses, it was found that the case has been
              falsely registered by the complainant as a counter blast to FIR
              No. 248/91 lodged by the appellants’ party.
       vii)   However, on 05.09.1992, the police report was rejected by
              the VIth Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad, who
              summoned the appellants and the three others - Abdul Waris,
              Rasheed and Maseeta (all since deceased), for trial, for offences
              punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 324, 325 and
              323 of IPC and issued warrants.
       viii) Aggrieved, the appellants challenged the order dated 05.09.1992
             of the trial Court before the High Court in Criminal Revision No.
             1318 of 1992, wherein an interim order was passed staying the
             order of 05.09.1992.
       ix)    The criminal revision was ultimately dismissed on 03.04.2015
              after it remained pending for nearly twenty-three years. It is the
              case of the appellants’ party that the dismissal of the criminal
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                 Naushey Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.


            revision was not known to them till October, 2022, when they
            received summons from the trial Court.
     x)     It appears that, in the meantime, due to the intervention of the
            elderly persons in the village, on 19.12.2022, a compromise was
            entered into between the injured Mahmood and the appellants.
     xi)    Based on the compromise and affidavit of the injured Mahmood,
            the appellant and three others filed application under Section
            482 CrPC numbered as Criminal Misc. Application No. 1315 of
            2023 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad praying for
            quashment of the entire proceedings in view of the compromise
            entered into between the parties on 19.12.2022.
     xii)   It has also come on record that Case No. 248 of 1991 lodged
            on 11.08.1991 by the appellants’ party was settled during the
            lifetime of Abdul Waris. There is no dispute that the said case
            is not pending.
     xiii) However, vide the impugned order, on the ground that the
           matter related to an offence under Section 307 IPC in which
           there are injuries and a fracture of the head of distal phalanx of
           left ring finger received by R-2 Mahmood, the High Court held
           that the matter cannot be compounded. The relevant part of
           the judgment of the High Court is set out herein below:-
                 “Although it is a common ground between both the
                 learned counsels that parties have entered into
                 compromise and have settled their dispute outside
                 the Court. The said compromise has been filed by
                 separate affidavits and has also been filed by the
                 injured. Copy of which is Annexure-8 to the affidavit
                 but since the matter relates to offence under Section
                 307 IPC in which there are injuries and even fracture
                 of head of distal phalanx of left ring finger received
                 by Mehboob Ali and looking to the settled law with
                 regard to compounding of offence, the matter cannot
                 be compounded”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

     xiv) Aggrieved, five of the eight petitioners before the High Court
          are in appeal before us. Three others have passed away.
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4.     We have heard Mr. Anupam Mishra, learned counsel for the
       appellants, Ms. Garima Prashad, learned Senior Advocate and AAG
       for the respondent No.1-State of U.P. and Mr. Harikumar V., learned
       counsel for respondent No.2- Mahmood. We have also perused the
       records of the case as well as the written submissions filed by the
       appellants.
5.     The only question that arises for consideration is: Is the present
       case a fit case where proceeding could be quashed, particularly
       when Section 307 IPC has inter alia been invoked in the summons?
6.     At the outset, we want to set right the error that occurs in the short
       order of the High Court. The High Court has not appreciated the
       difference between compounding of an offence and quashment
       of proceedings. As explained in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab
       and Another (2012) 10 SCC 303, quashing of offence or criminal
       proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and
       victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. This Court,
       highlighting the difference, had the following to say:-
            “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
            ground of settlement between an offender and victim is
            not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are
            different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
            power of compounding of offences given to a court under
            Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of
            criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
            inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power
            of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions
            contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and
            squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of
            opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence
            or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by
            the material on record as to whether the ends of justice
            would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate
            consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
            58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
            having regard to the fact that the dispute between the
            offender and the victim has been settled although the
            offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion,
            continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in
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           futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute
           between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored;
           securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding
           factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect
           on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously
           endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and
           it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and
           the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the
           victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes
           have been made compoundable in law, with or without
           the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences
           like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental
           depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under
           special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
           offences committed by public servants while working in that
           capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim
           can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences
           which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour
           having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,
           partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising
           out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the
           family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim
           and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes
           between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such
           offences have not been made compoundable, the High
           Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash
           the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it
           is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is
           hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and
           by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall
           be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The
           above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
           depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category
           can be prescribed.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

7.   As would be additionally clear from a close reading of the above two
     paragraphs, even though compounding and quashing are conceptually
     different, this Court was careful in pointing out that merely because
     there is a settlement, for certain categories of offences proceedings
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       will not be quashed. This is on the premise that crimes that have
       harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously
       endangers and threatens the well-being of the society cannot be
       quashed, only because the accused and the victim have amicably
       settled the matter.
8.     Coming to the facts, notwithstanding the fact that the High Court has
       mixed up the concepts of compounding and powers of quashment,
       still the case needs to be considered from the point of view of
       Section 482.
9.     Will the mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the criminal proceedings
       force the court to adopt a hands-off approach, when parties come
       forward with a settlement? In that event, what should be the duty
       of the court and what are the tests to be applied to decide in which
       cases settlements would be accepted and in which cases it would
       not be?
10. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others
    (2019) 5 SCC 688, after discussing the ratio in Narinder Singh and
    Others vs. State of Punjab and Another (2014) 6 SCC 466 and
    other judgments, this Court held:-
            “15. Considering the law on the point and the other
            decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove,
            it is observed and held as under:
            15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of
            the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-
            compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can
            be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the
            civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial
            transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
            family disputes and when the parties have resolved the
            entire dispute amongst themselves;
            15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those
            prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences
            of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
            etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
            serious impact on society;
            15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the
            offences under the special statutes like the Prevention
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           of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
           servants while working in that capacity are not to be
           quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the
           victim and the offender;
           15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act,
           etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious
           offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against
           the society and not against the individual alone, and
           therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under
           Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have
           a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in
           exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on
           the ground that the parties have resolved their entire
           dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court
           would not rest its decision merely because there is a
           mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
           framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
           Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
           307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
           collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead
           to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
           purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
           nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
           on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons
           used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court
           would be permissible only after the evidence is collected
           after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge
           is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not
           permissible when the matter is still under investigation.
           Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7
           of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh should be
           read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
           circumstances stated hereinabove;
           15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of
           the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect
           of non-compoundable offences, which are private in
           nature and do not have a serious impact on society,
           on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise
           between the victim and the offender, the High Court is
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           required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the
           conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused
           was absconding and why he was absconding, how
           he had managed with the complainant to enter into a
           compromise, etc.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

11. Before we apply this judgment to the facts, it will be worthwhile to
    recall the observations of Sikri, J. in Narinder Singh (supra):-
           “26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though
           it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted
           to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time
           the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many
           times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties
           leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by
           either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it
           a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. …”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

12. Coming back to Laxmi Narayan (supra), this Court has held that
    mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge-sheet
    should not be the basis for adopting a hands-off approach. It has
    further held that it would be open for the court to examine as to
    whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of
    it or whether there is evidence to back it. It has been held that the
    courts may go by the nature of injuries sustained; as to whether
    the injuries are inflicted on the vital/ delicate parts of the body and
    the nature of weapon used. It has also been clarified that such
    an exercise would be permissible after investigation and filing of
    chargesheet/framing of charges or during the trial. [See 15.4 of
    Laxmi Narayan (supra)].
13. Coming to the facts of the case, admittedly, there is a settlement
    between the parties. The case filed by the appellants’ party which
    was prior in point of time and that too on the same day of occurrence,
    has been settled.
14. It should be recalled that, at the outset, after investigation, the police
    actually closed the case in its final report of 07.09.1991. It was the
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     trial Court, which by its order of 05.09.1992, refused to accept the
     same and summoned the appellants. The incident is of 11.08.1991,
     i.e. about 33½ years back. No doubt, there is a reference to the firing
     in the FIR but admittedly there was no injury. The allegation is that
     firing was done by Abdul Waris. He is since deceased. The facts,
     assuming to be true, also do not make out a case of common object
     for the appellants under Section 149 IPC insofar as the offence of
     Section 307 is concerned.
15. The role attributed to the seven members, including the five
    appellants is not specific. General allegation was that they abused
    in filthy language and assaulted Mahmood with lathi and iron bars.
    The specific individual role was only attributed to Adbul Waris, who
    is since deceased.
16. In any event, the police who investigated disbelieved the entire story.
    No recoveries have been made of any pellets. What engaged the
    attention of the High Court was only the fracture of the head of the
    distal phalanx of left finger of respondent No.2.
17. We have seen the injuries sustained by Mahmood (R-2) from the
    medical evidence collected. From the injury report, it is clear that
    while the first four injuries were contusions and abrasions, injury Nos.
    5, 6 and 7 pertained to incised lacerated wound and swelling on the
    middle finger of the left hand. We have also seen the x-ray report
    which shows that in the left hand there was a fracture of the head
    of distal phalanx of left ring finger. Assuming that this was the result
    of injury with lathis or iron bar, applying the test in Laxmi Narayan
    (supra), considering the injury and the nature of the weapon used,
    certainly no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out.
18. Section 307 of IPC reads as under:-
           “307. Attempt to murder.—
           Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge,
           and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused
           death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with
           imprisonment of either description for a term which may
           extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and
           if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender
           shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such
           punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
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           Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending
           under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for
           life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.”
19. Keeping in mind the surrounding circumstances, the nature of the
    weapon and the nature of the injury, on facts, we are inclined to
    conclude that the overt act attributed to the appellants does not bring
    the case within the four corners of the Section 307 of IPC, either on
    a stand-alone basis or as held above with the aid of Section 149
    of IPC.
20. We are also inclined to conclude that considering the overall
    circumstances, the nature of the weapon and the nature of the injury
    (fracture of the head of distal phalanx of left ring finger), the offence
    alleged, on facts, does not fall in that category of cases where the
    court should deny relief in the event of a settlement. At the highest,
    the offence alleged could be one under Section 326 of IPC. It could
    not be said, on facts, considering all the circumstances that this is
    a crime which has such an harmful effect on the public and that it
    has the effect of seriously threatening the well-being of the society.
    We make it clear that we are saying so on the facts of the present
    case. We are also firmly of the opinion that proceeding with the trial,
    when parties have amicably resolved the dispute in the present case,
    would be futile and the ends of justice require that the settlement
    be given effect to by quashing the proceedings. It would be a grave
    abuse of process to let this trial remain pending under the above
    circumstances, particularly when the dispute is settled and resolved.
21. It should also be borne in mind that this was a case which resulted in
    a closure report from the side of the police. The State has also before
    us, after placing the law, fairly left it to the court to take a decision.
22. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya Kant, J.
    speaking for this court, in a case involving a charge under Section
    326 IPC, while annulling the proceedings, felicitously set out the
    statement of law and applied it to the facts of the said case as under:
           “19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section
           320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the
           compromise between the parties in respect of offences
           “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the
           extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under
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           Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142
           of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and
           bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate
           that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised
           carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings,
           bearing in mind:
           19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience
           of the society;
           19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
           19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused
           and the victim; and
           19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the
           occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant
           considerations.
           20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and
           weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
           two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers
           under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and
           consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals.
           We say so for the reasons that:
           20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals
           can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones
           of criminal proceedings of private nature.
           20.2. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which
           the appellants have been convicted, do not appear to
           exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence
           of such a serious nature that quashing of which would
           override public interest.
           20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries,
           it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants had
           been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand
           dismissed.
           20.4. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without
           any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have
           buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to
           their dispute(s).
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               20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took
               place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively.
               There is nothing on record to evince that either before or
               after the purported compromise, any untoward incident
               transpired between the parties.
               20.6. Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s)
               are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close
               vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance
               peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who
               have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have
               no vengeance against each other.
               20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal
               justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance
               of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or
               resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at
               their present age.”
23.    Considering the special features of the case and taking the settlement
       on record and applying the law, we find that this is a fit case where
       proceedings in complaint case No. 8023 of 2015 arising out of Case
       Crime No. 248 of 1991 pending in the Court of Additional Chief
       Judicial Magistrate, Court No.5, Moradabad should be quashed.
24. In view of the above, we allow the Appeal. The order of the High
    Court in application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 1315 of 2023
    dated 19.01.2023 shall stand set aside and proceeding in Complaint
    Case No. 8023 of 2015 arising out of Case Crime No. 248 of 1991
    pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court
    No. 5, Moradabad shall stand quashed.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



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           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey