Supreme Court of India
NARAYAN DASversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 872
- Decided
- 17 July 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
Section 32‑B does not make the minimum sentence a maximum; courts may impose a higher punishment based on any relevant factor, including the quantity of the narcotic, even if none of the enumerated factors are present.
Summary
Narayan Das was convicted under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act for possession of 236 vials of codeine‑phosphate cough syrups and was sentenced to twelve years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1,00,000. The High Court, while dismissing his appeal, reduced the term to ten years, the statutory minimum, on the ground that Section 32‑B of the NDPS Act required the presence of any of the factors listed in clauses (a) to (f) before a higher sentence could be imposed. The Supreme Court examined whether the language of Section 32‑B makes the minimum punishment a maximum and whether the trial court must rely exclusively on the enumerated factors. It held that Section 32‑B merely adds those factors to the court's discretion and that other relevant considerations, such as the quantity of the drug, may justify a sentence above the minimum even in the absence of the listed factors. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court's reduction of the sentence was not erroneous and dismissed the Special Leave Petition, leaving the ten‑year term in force.
Issues considered
- The interpretation of Section 32‑B of the NDPS Act: whether the enumerated factors (a)‑(f) must be present to impose a punishment higher than the minimum prescribed.
- Whether the minimum punishment under the NDPS Act is to be treated as the maximum sentence in the absence of the Section 32‑B factors.
- Whether the High Court erred in reducing the sentence from twelve years to ten years based on its understanding of Section 32‑B.
Legislation cited
- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985s. 21(c), s. 32-B
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the interpretation of s.32-B of the NDPS Act by the High Court that u/s.32-B minimum punishment is considered as maximum punishment. Headnotes† Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.32-B – Factors to be taken into minimum punishment – High Court’s understanding that u/s.32-B minimum punishment is considered as maximum punishment; and that at the time of imposing sentence the trial court to keep in mind the factors as provided in clauses (a) to (f) of s.32-B – Correctness: Held:
Subjects
Psychotropic substanceMisconception of lawInterpretation of s.32-B, NDPS ActMinimum sentence considered as maximum sentenceRafiq Qureshi’s caseReduction of sentence
Judgment
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 289 : 2025 INSC 872
Narayan Das
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10310 of 2025)
17 July 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the interpretation of s.32-B of the NDPS Act
by the High Court that u/s.32-B minimum punishment is considered
as maximum punishment.
Headnotes†
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 –
s.32-B – Factors to be taken into account for imposing higher
than the minimum punishment – High Court’s understanding
that u/s.32-B minimum punishment is considered as maximum
punishment; and that at the time of imposing sentence the trial
court to keep in mind the factors as provided in clauses (a)
to (f) of s.32-B – Correctness:
Held: Understanding of the High Court not correct – s.32-B provides
that the court in addition to various relevant factors may also
take into account the factors as prescribed in Clauses (a) to (f) –
Thus, in a given case, the trial court may not find it necessary to
consider the factors as prescribed in s.32-B – Having regard to
the quantity of the contraband, the nature of the narcotic or the
psychotropic substance, as the case may be, the antecedents, if
any, etc., may deem fit to impose punishment which can be more
than the minimum – Thus, no good reason for the High Court
to reduce the sentence from 12 years to 10 years relying on
Rafiq Qureshi’s case – Dictum laid down in Rafiq Qureshi’s case
was not understood in its true perspective – This Court in Rafiq
Qureshi’s case clarified that the language of s.32-B inherently
preserves the court’s discretion to consider other relevant factors
beyond those listed – Thus, factors mentioned in s.32-B are in
addition to other relevant facts, and it cannot be said that the
minimum sentence under the NDPS Act is to be considered as a
maximum sentence – However, order of the High Court reducing
the sentence not interfered with. [Paras 14, 17]
290 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Rafiq Qureshi v. Narcotic Control Bureau Eastern Zonal Unit [2019]
7 SCR 248 : (2019) 6 SCC 492 – explained.
Sakshi v. Union of India [2004] Supp. 2 SCR 723 : (2004) 5 SCC 518;
Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 558 – referred to.
List of Acts
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
List of Keywords
Psychotropic substance; Misconception of law; Interpretation of
s.32-B, NDPS Act; Minimum sentence considered as maximum
sentence; Rafiq Qureshi’s case; Reduction of sentence.
Case Arising From
EXTRAORDINARY CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: Special Leave
Petition (Crl.) No. 10310 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.01.2025 of the High Court
of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 349 of 2021
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Ms. Sampa Sengupta Ray, Tushar Mudgil, Ashish Pandey, Piyush
Merani, Ashutosh Bhardwaj, Vikram Kumar, Ali Mohammed Khan.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. Delay condoned.
2. The petitioner was put to trial in the Court of Special Judge
(NDPS Act), Surguja, Ambikapur, District-Surguja (C.G.) in Special
Criminal (NDPS) Case No.04/2019 for the offence punishable under
Section 21(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985 (for short “the NDPS Act”).
3. It is the case of the prosecution that on 20th September, 2018, the
Investigating Officer attached with the Ambikapur, police station
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 291
Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh
received information that two individuals namely Ambika Vishwakarma
and Narayan Das (petitioner herein) were standing on the side of
the main road of Parsa and were in possession of psychotropic
substance in a bag.
4. A search was undertaken of the two individuals and the same resulted
in seizure of R.C. Kuff cough syrup in all 143 vials each containing
100ml, Codectus cough Syrup 70 vials each containing 100ml and
Elderqurex cough syrup 23 vials each containing 100ml with labels
containing a substance Codeine Phosphate. In all 236 vials were
recovered from the possession of the petitioner herein along with
the co-accused.
5. At the end of the trial the petitioner herein stood convicted and was
sentenced to undergo 12 years of rigorous imprisonment with fine of
Rs.1,00,000/-. The petitioner went in appeal before the High Court.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. However, while dismissing
the appeal, the High Court reduced the sentence of 12 years as
imposed by the trial court to 10 years i.e. the minimum as provided
under the NDPS Act.
6. We heard Mr. Ashish Pandey, the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner.
7. This is a legal aid matter.
8. Manifold contentions were raised by the learned counsel to persuade
us to take the view that the entire seizure was vitiated as the same
suffered from serious infirmities.
9. There is no good reason for us to disturb the impugned judgment of
the High Court dismissing the appeal. However, there is something
which we have noticed and must not be ignored. The High Court
seems to be labouring under a serious misconception of law so far
as the interpretation of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act is concerned.
10. The High Court from paragraph 25 onwards has observed thus:-
“25. The last contention that has been raised on behalf
of the appellants is that without assigning any special
reason, the learned trial Court has awarded sentence
for a period of 12 years to the appellants, which is more
than the minimum sentence prescribed for offence under
Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act.
292 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
26. Section 32B of the NDPS Act states about the facts
to be taken into account for imposing higher than the
minimum punishment, which reads as under:
“Where a minimum term of imprisonment or
amount of fine is prescribed for any offence
committed under this Act, the court may, in
addition to such factors as it may deem fit, take
into account the following factors for imposing
a punishment higher than the minimum term
of imprisonment or amount of fine, namely:--
(a) the use or threat of use of violence or arms
by the offender;
(b) the fact that the offender holds a public office
and that he has taken advantage of that office
in committing the offence;
(c) the fact that the minors are affected by
the offence or the minors are used for the
commission of an offence;
(d) the fact that the offence is committed in an
educational institution or social service facility
or in the immediate vicinity of such institution or
faculty or in other place to which school children
and students resort for educational, sports and
social activities.;
(e) the fact that the offender belongs to
organised international or any other criminal
group which is involved in the commission of
the offences; and
(f) the fact that the offender is involved in other
illegal activities facilitated by commission of the
offence.”
27. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rafiq Qureshi
(supra) has held that in a case where the court imposes a
punishment higher than minimum relying on an irrelevant
factor and no other facts as enumerated in Sections 32B(a)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 293
Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh
to (f) is present, award of sentence higher than minimum
can be interfere with and observed in Para-23 & 24 as
under:
“23. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are
of the view that punishment awarded by the trial
court of a sentence higher than the minimum
relying on the quantity of substance cannot be
faulted even though the Court had not adverted
to the factors mentioned in clauses (a) to (b) as
enumerated under Section 32B. However, when
taking any factor into consideration other than
the factors enumerated in Section 32B, (a) to
(f), the Court imposes a punishment higher than
the minimum sentence, it can be examined by
higher Courts as to whether factor taken into
consideration by the Court is a relevant factor
or not. Thus in a case where Court imposes
a punishment higher than minimum relying
on a irrelevant factor and no other factor as
enumerated in Section 32B(a to f) are present
award of sentence higher than minimum can
be interfered with.
24. In the present case The High Court held
that although gross quantity of 8.175 Kg. of
Heroin was alleged to have been recovered
from the appellant but actual quantity of Heroine
which was found to be in possession was only
609.6 gm. The High Court held that since the
appellant was found in possession of Narcotic
Drugs as per the analysis report to 609.6 gm.
which is much higher than the commercial
quantity, punishment higher than the minimum is
justified. The High Court reduced the punishment
from 18 years to 16 years. We, thus, uphold
the judgment of the trial court and the High
Court awarding the punishment higher than the
minimum, however, looking to all the facts and
circumstances of the present case including the
fact that it was found by the High Court that the
294 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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appellant was only a carrier, we find that the
ends of justice will be sub-served in reducing
the sentence from 16 years to 12 years. Thus,
while maintaining the conviction of the appellant
the appellant is sentenced to undergo 12 years
rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2 lakh and
in default of payment of such fine the appellant
shall further undergo for a simple imprisonment
for six months. The appeal is partly allowed to
the extent as indicated above.”
28. As such, in view of discussion made hereinabove, in
light of Section 32B of the NDPS Act coupled with above-
quoted principle of law laid down in Rafiq Qureshi (supra),
since no specific or any special reason has been assigned
by the learned trial Court for awarding sentence higher than
minimum to the appellants for having committed offence
under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act, in the considered
opinion of this Court, while affirming the conviction of the
appellants for offence under Section 20(c) of the NDPS
Act, we deem it appropriate to reduce his sentence of 12
years rigorous imprisonment, as awarded to them by the
learned trial Court, to 10 years rigorous imprisonment.
So far as the default sentence is concerned, the same
is modified to the extent that in case of failure to deposit
the fine amount awarded by the trial Court, the appellants
shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year
instead of three years, as awarded by trial Court. It is
ordered accordingly.
29. Consequently, both the criminal appeals are partly
allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. It is stated
that the appellants are in jail, they shall serve out the
remaining sentence as modified by this Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. According to the High Court if the trial court wants to impose sentence
more than the minimum prescribed under the NDPS Act, then it
is obliged to assign reasons. This according to the High Court is
because of the provision of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 295
Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh
12. Section 32-B of the NDPS Act reads thus:-
“32-B. Factors to be taken into account for imposing higher
than the minimum punishment.—Where a minimum term
of imprisonment or amount of fine is prescribed for any
offence committed under this Act, the court may, in addition
to such factors as it may deem fit, take into account the
following factors for imposing a punishment higher than
the minimum term of imprisonment or amount of fine,
namely:—
(a) the use or threat of use of violence or arms by the
offender;
(b) the fact that the offender holds a public office and
that he has taken advantage of that office in committing
the offence;
(c) the fact that the minors are affected by the offence or
the minors are used for the commission of an offence;
(d) the fact that the offence is committed in an educational
institution or social service facility or in the immediate
vicinity of such institution or faculty or in other place to
which school children and students resort for educational,
sports and social activities;
(e) the fact that the offender belongs to organised
international or any other criminal group which is involved
in the commission of the offence; and
(f) the fact that the offender is involved in other illegal
activities facilitated by commission of the offence.”
13. While interpreting Section 32-B of the NDPS Act, the High Court also
looked into the decision of this Court in the case of Rafiq Qureshi
vs. Narcotic Control Bureau Eastern Zonal Unit, (2019) 6 SCC 492.
According to the High Court, at the time of imposing sentence the
trial court need to keep in mind the factors as provided in Clauses (a)
to (f) of Section 32-B respectively.
14. We are afraid the understanding of the High Court is not correct.
Section 32-B provides that the court in addition to various relevant
factors may also take into account the factors as prescribed in
Clauses (a) to (f).
296 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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15. Therefore, in a given case, the trial court may not find it necessary
to consider the factors as prescribed in Section 32-B. Having regard
to the quantity of the contraband, the nature of the narcotic or the
psychotropic substance, as the case may be, the antecedents, if
any, etc., may deem fit to impose punishment which can be more
than the minimum. In such circumstances, there was no good reason
for the High Court to reduce the sentence from 12 years to 10
years relying on Rafiq Qureshi (supra). The dictum as laid down in
Rafiq Qureshi (supra) has not been understood in its true perspective.
16. In Rafiq Qureshi (supra), this Court observed as follows:-
“12. Section 32-B is also inserted by Act 9 of 2001. It is
useful to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
Amendment Act 9 of 2001 which is to the following effect:
“Statement of Objects and Reasons.— Amendment
Act 9 of 2001.— The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 provides deterrent punishment
for various offences relating to illicit trafficking in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Most of
the offences invite uniform punishment of minimum
ten years’ rigorous imprisonment which may extend
up to twenty years. While the Act envisages severe
punishments for drug traffickers, it envisages
reformative approach towards addicts. In view of
the general delay in trial it has been found that the
addicts prefer not to invoke the provisions of the Act.
The strict bail provisions under the Act add to their
misery. Therefore, it is proposed to rationalise the
sentence structure so as to ensure that while drug
traffickers who traffic in significant quantities of drugs
are punished with deterrent sentences, the addicts
and those who commit less serious offences are
sentenced to less severe punishment. This requires
rationalisation of the sentence structure provided
under the Act. It is also proposed to restrict the
application of strict bail provisions to those offenders
who indulge in serious offences.”
13. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reveals that the
Amendment Act has inserted provisions for rationalisation
of the sentencing structure. Section 32-B is a provision
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 297
Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh
which is brought in the statute to rationalise the sentencing
structure. Section 32-B from clauses (a) to (f) enumerates
various factors for imposing a punishment higher than the
minimum term of imprisonment.
14. The submission made by the counsel for the appellant
is that unless in the facts of a case, any of the factors
mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) are not present, the Court
cannot impose punishment higher than the minimum term
of the imprisonment. It is submitted that the factors have
been brought in the statute for the purpose of imposing
the punishment higher than the minimum, hence, in the
absence of any such factor only minimum punishment
should be awarded.
15. We have to first see the actual words used in the
statute to find out the object and purpose of inserting
Section 32-B. The court after conviction of an accused
hears the accused and takes into consideration different
circumstances of the accused and the offence for awarding
the appropriate sentence. Section 32-B uses the phrase
“the court may, in addition to such factors as it may
deem fit, take into account the following factors for
imposing a punishment higher than the minimum
term of imprisonment”.
The above statutory scheme clearly indicates the following:
15.1. The court may where minimum term of punishment
is prescribed take into consideration “such factors as it
may deem fit” for imposing a punishment higher than the
minimum term of imprisonment or fine.
15.2. In addition, take into account the factors for imposing
a punishment higher than the minimum as enumerated in
clauses (a) to (f).
16. The statutory scheme indicates that the decision to
impose a punishment higher than the minimum is not
confined or limited to the factors enumerated in clauses (a)
to (f). The Court’s discretion to consider such factors as
it may deem fit is not taken away or tinkered. In case a
298 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
person is found in possession of a manufactured drug
whose quantity is equivalent to commercial quantity, the
punishment as per Section 21(c) has to be not less than ten
years which may extend to twenty years. But suppose the
quantity of manufactured drug is 20 times of the commercial
quantity, it may be a relevant factor to impose punishment
higher than minimum. Thus, quantity of substance with
which an accused is charged is a relevant factor, which
can be taken into consideration while fixing quantum of the
punishment. Clauses (a) to (f) as enumerated in Section
32-B do not enumerate any factor regarding quantity of
substance as a factor for determining the punishment. In
the event the Court takes into consideration the magnitude
of quantity with regard to which an accused is convicted,
the said factor is relevant factor and the court cannot
be said to have committed an error when taking into
consideration any such factor, higher than the minimum
term of punishment is awarded.
17. This Court in Sakshi v. Union of India [Sakshi v. Union
of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1645], held
that it is a well-settled principle that the intention of the
legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language
used, which means that attention should be paid to
what has been said as also to what has not been said.
A construction which requires for its support addition or
substitution of words has to be avoided. In para 19 of the
judgment the following was laid down: (SCC p. 537)
“19. It is well-settled principle that the intention of
the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the
language used, which means that attention should
be paid to what has been said as also to what has
not been said. As a consequence a construction
which requires for its support addition or substitution
of words or which results in rejection of words as
meaningless has to be avoided. It is contrary to
all rules of construction to read words into an Act
unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Similarly
it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting
some other words for words of the statute. It is equally
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 299
Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh
well settled that a statute enacting an offence or
imposing a penalty is strictly construed. The fact that
an enactment is a penal provision is in itself a reason
for hesitating before ascribing to phrases used in it
a meaning broader than that they would ordinarily
bear. (Justice G.P. Singh: Principles of Statutory
Interpretation, pp. 58 and 751, 9th Edn.)”
18. The specific words used in Section 32-B that court
may, in addition to such factors as it may deem fit clearly
indicates that court’s discretion to take such factor as it may
deem fit is not fettered by factors which are enumerated
in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 32-B.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on
a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Kumar
Bajpaee v. Union of India [Raj Kumar Bajpaee v. Union of
India, (2016) 95 ACC 896]. A Single Judge of the Allahabad
High Court referring to Section 32-B of the Act stated the
following in paras 39 and 40:
“39. After going through the impugned judgment
and order very carefully, I find that the trial court
while imposing higher than the minimum punishment
prescribed under the NDPS Act on conviction under
Sections 8/20 of the NDPS Act, upon the appellants
has failed even to advert to the factors enumerated
in Section 32-B of the NDPS Act. In fact, no reason
whatsoever is forthcoming in the impugned judgment
which lead the trial court to impose higher than the
minimum punishment prescribed under the Act upon
the appellants.
40. After going through the evidence on record, I am
satisfied that in the present case none of the factors as
spelt out in Section 32-B of the Act exist which could
have prompted the trial court to award higher than
the minimum punishment prescribed under the Act.
The sentence awarded to the appellants thus cannot
be sustained. While maintaining the conviction of the
appellants under Sections 8/20, I allow this appeal
in part and modify the sentence awarded to them by
300 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
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the trial court by the impugned judgment and order
to 10 years’ RI and a fine of Rs 1 lakh and in default
of payment of fine the appellants shall be liable to
undergo further simple imprisonment for one month.
The impugned judgment stands modified accordingly.”
20. Although in the above judgment it has not been
categorically held that punishment higher than the minimum
cannot be awarded unless any of the factors spelt out in
Section 32-B are present but the Court proceeded to set
aside the award of higher punishment on the above ground.
There are two other judgments of the learned Single Judges
of the Allahabad High Court which have been brought to
our notice. First is the judgment of the Single Judge in
Krishna Murari Pal v. State of U.P. [Krishna Murari Pal
v. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 4909], where the
learned Single Judge in para 13 has considered Section
32-B in the following words: (SCC OnLine All)
“13. The trial court has awarded the sentence of 12
years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1 lakh
to the appellant-accused under Sections 8/20(b)
(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act on the ground that huge
quantity of the said contraband (ganja) has been
recovered from the possession of the appellant-
accused. There is nothing on record to show that
the appellant-accused had committed any act which
may lie under any of the clauses of Section 32-B of
the NDPS Act hereinabove mentioned. But that does
not mean that the Court cannot award the sentence
more than the minimum sentence in the absence of
any of the above conditions mentioned in clauses
(a) to (f) because these conditions are in addition to
the factors as the Court may deem fit in awarding
higher punishment to the accused. In the case at
hand, there is nothing on record to show that the
appellant-accused and previous criminal history or
he is a previous convict and that the appellant is
now advanced in years and is aged about 56 years
as mentioned in the supplementary affidavit filed on
behalf of the appellant-accused. Undisputedly the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 301
Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh
appellant-accused had licence of the retailer shop of
bhang. Thus, regard being had to all the facts and
circumstances of the case I think that reduction of
sentence of 12 years’ rigorous imprisonment awarded
to the appellant to the period of imprisonment already
undergone by him and in default of payment of fine,
reduction of sentence of one year imprisonment to
six months’ simple imprisonment would meet the
ends of justice.”
21. Another case which has been relied by the counsel
is in Ram Asre v. State of U.P. [Ram Asre v. State of
U.P., 2017 SCC OnLine All 2891], where a learned
Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court after referring
to Section 32-B made the following observation: (SCC
OnLine All para 61)
“61. … In opinion of this Court, if the said section be
read with greater attention, it would reveal that the
words used in it are “it may deem fit”, therefore word
“may” would indicate that it would be discretionary
for the Court to take the grounds into consideration
which are mentioned in sub-sections (a) to (f) of
the said section, while awarding punishment higher
than the minimum prescribed. Therefore there is no
force found in the argument in this regard made by
the learned amicus curiae that in the case at hand
the punishment awarded needs to be curtailed
keeping in view that the lower court did not take into
consideration the above factors.”
22. The views expressed by the learned Single Judges
in Krishna Murari Pal [Krishna Murari Pal v. State of U.P.,
2015 SCC OnLine All 4909] and Ram Asre [Ram Asre v.
State of U.P., 2017 SCC OnLine All 2891] correctly notice
the ambit and scope of Section 32-B.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
view that punishment awarded by the trial court of a
sentence higher than the minimum relying on the quantity
of substance cannot be faulted even though the court had
302 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
not adverted to the factors mentioned in clauses (a) to
(f) as enumerated under Section 32-B. However, when
taking any factor into consideration other than the factors
enumerated in Sections 32-B(a) to (f), the court imposes
a punishment higher than the minimum sentence, it can
be examined by higher courts as to whether factor taken
into consideration by the court is a relevant factor or not.
Thus in a case where the court imposes a punishment
higher than minimum relying on an irrelevant factor and
no other factor as enumerated in Sections 32-B(a) to (f)
is present, award of sentence higher than minimum can
be interfered with.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. The seminal issue in Rafiq Qureshi (supra) revolved around the
interpretation of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act. In other words,
whether the absence of any factors enumerated in Section 32-B in
Clauses (a) to (f) restricts the trial courts from imposing sentence
higher than the minimum prescribed. This Court in Rafiq Qureshi
(supra) clarified that the language of Section 32-B inherently
preserves the court’s discretion to consider other relevant factors
beyond those listed. Specifically, the quantity of the narcotic
substance was deemed a pertinent factor warranting a sentence
above the statutory minimum, despite the absence of any enumerated
aggravating factors in Section 32-B. Referring to Sakshi vs. Union
of India, reported in (2004) 5 SCC 518, this Court emphasized the
principle that legislative intent is derived from the explicit language
of the statute, avoiding the insertion of words not present. Since
Section 32-B uses “may deem fit” in addition to the enumerated
factors, it does not restrict the courts to only those factors but allows
broader discretion in sentencing.
18. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Gurdev Singh vs.
State of Punjab, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 558. In the said case, it
was held that the court should be guided by the factors mentioned
in Section 32-B of the NDPS Act and other relevant factors while
imposing a sentence higher than the minimum. Therefore, factors
mentioned in Section 32-B of the NDPS Act are in addition to other
relevant facts, and it cannot be said that the minimum sentence
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 303
Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh
under the NDPS Act is to be considered as a maximum sentence.
It was observed at page 564:
“7. Therefore, while imposing a punishment higher than the
minimum term of the imprisonment or an amount of fine,
the court may take into account the factors enumerated in
Section 32-B of the Act referred to hereinabove. However,
it is required to be noted ( 2025:HHC:2309 ) that Section
32-B of the Act itself further provides that the court may,
in addition to such factors as it may deem fit, take into
account the factors for imposing a punishment higher than
the minimum term of imprisonment or amount of fine as
mentioned in Section 32- B of the Act. Therefore, while
imposing the punishment higher than the minimum term
of imprisonment or amount of fine, the court may take
into account such factors as it may deem fit and also the
factors enumerated/mentioned in Section 32-B of the Act.
Therefore, on fair reading of Section 32-B of the Act, it
cannot be said that while imposing a punishment higher
than the minimum term of imprisonment or amount of fine,
the court has to consider only those factors which are
mentioned/enumerated in Section 32-B of the Act.
xx xx xx xx xx xx
10. Therefore, the quantity of substance would fall into
“such factors as it may deem fit” and while exercising its
discretion of imposing the sentence/imprisonment higher
than the minimum, if the court has taken into consideration
such factor of larger/higher quantity of substance, it cannot
be said that the court has committed an error. The court
has a wide discretion to impose the sentence/imprisonment
ranging between 10 years to 20 years and while imposing
such sentence/imprisonment in addition, the court may
also take into consideration other factors as enumerated
in Sections 32-B(a) to (f). Therefore, while imposing a
punishment higher than the minimum sentence, if the
court has considered such factor as it may deem fit other
than the factors enumerated in Sections 32-B(a) to (f), the
High Court has to only consider whether “such factor” is
a relevant factor or not.”
304 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
19. It appears that the understanding of the High Court so far as Section
32-B of the NDPS is concerned is that the minimum sentence
should be considered as maximum sentence. That is not the correct
understanding of Section 32-B of the NDPS Act.
20. Be that as it may. We do not want to interfere with that part of the
order of the High Court reducing the sentence.
21. However, we do not find any merit in this petition. The petition,
accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed.
22. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
Result of the case: Special Leave Petition dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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