Holding

A fresh eviction suit on the ground of bona fide requirement is maintainable; Section 45 and Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) do not bar the second suit as the earlier proceeding was withdrawn without a final decision and the ground is a recurring cause.

Summary

The appellant, a landlord, initially filed an eviction suit under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 on the ground of bona fide requirement, which he later withdrew after the tenant promised to vacate. When the tenant died and his son continued occupying the premises, the landlord filed a second eviction suit on the same ground, alleging that his office needs had increased. The respondent argued that the second suit was barred by Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) of the CPC and by Section 45 of the Rent Control Act, invoking res judicata. The High Court held the second suit untenable, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that bona fide requirement is a recurring cause and that a fresh suit may be instituted when the landlord’s necessity is re‑established. Accordingly, Section 45 does not apply because the earlier suit was withdrawn without a decision, and Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) does not bar a new proceeding on a different factual basis. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s order and restoring the trial court’s decree.

Issues considered

Whether a fresh eviction suit on the ground of bona fide requirement is maintainable after a prior suit on the same ground has been withdrawn.
Whether Section 45 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 bars the second suit on the principle of res judicata.
Whether Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies to a second eviction suit filed after withdrawal of the first.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b), s. Section 151
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961s. 45

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementKarnataka Rent Control Actres judicataOrder XXIII Rule 1(4)(b)recurring causelandlord-tenant

Judgment

N.R. NARAYAN SWAMY A
v.
B. FRANCIS JAGAN

JULY 31, 2001

[M.B. SHAH AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.] B

Rent and Eviction.

Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961: Section 45-Eviction petition-Bona
fide requirement-Eviction petition filed on bona fide requirement withdrawn c
as the tenant promised to vacate suit premises-As the tenant did not vacate,
eviction, petition filed once again on bona fide requirement-Maintainability
of-Held: In eviction petition ground of bona fide requirement is a recurring
cause-(Jenuineness of the ground of bona fide requirement is to be decided
on the basis of the requirement on the date of suit-Therefore, land lord is not D
precluded from initiating fresh proceeding.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Order XXlll Rule 1(4)(b)-Applicability of-To a suit for eviction-On
ground of bona fide requirement-Held: Bona fide requirement is a recurring E
cause-Hence, O.XXlll R.1 (4)(b) has no application in a proceeding initiated
for recovery of suit premises on the ground of bona fide requirement.

The appellant-landlord filed a suit for eviction of the respondent-tenant
on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises. The respondent-
tenant promised that he would vacate the suit premises and hand over vacant F
-· possession. Therefore, the appellant withdrew the eviction petition.

The appellant once again filed an eviction petition on the ground of bona
fide requirement since the respondent did not vacate the suit premises. In the
said suit the respondent filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Order XXlll Rule 1(4)(b) contending that G
as the previous suit was withdrawn, the present suit was not maintainable
and was also barred by principle of res judicata as enunciated in Section 45
of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. The trial court rejected the said
. application.

109 H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 1 S.C.R..

A High Court allowed the revision application filed by the respondent by
holding that the relief claimed by the appellant in the present and previous
proceedings was same and, therefore, second petition for the same cause was
not maintainable and as the previous suit was withdrawn without seeking
permission of the Court, it wlls barred under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) of
B the CPC. Hence this appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. In eviction proceedings under the Karnataka Rent Control
Act, 1961 the ground of bona fide requirement or non-payment of rent is a
C recurring cause and, therefore, landlord is not precluded from instituting fresh
proceeding. In an eviction suit on the ground of bona fide requirement the
genuineness of the said ground has to be decided on the basis of requirement
on the date of the suit Further, even if a suit for eviction on the ground of
bona fide requirement is filed and is dismissed, it cannot be said that once a
question of necessity is decided against the landlord he will not have a bona
D fide genuine necessity ever in future. In the subsequent proceedings, if such
claim is established by cogent evidence adduced by the landlord, decree for
possession could be passed. [112-E-GJ

K.S. Sundararaju Che/liar v. MR. Ramchandra Naidu, (1994) 5 SCC, 14
E and Surajmal v. Radhe Shyam, (1988) 3 SCC 18, relied on.

1.2. Section 45 of Act would have no application as the previous
proceeding for taking possession of the premises was not pressed and stood
disposed of without deciding any issue.

F 2. Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would
have no application in a proceeding initiated for recovering the suit premises
on the ground of bona fide requirement which is a recurring cause. Order
XXllI Rule 1(4)(b) precludes the plaintiff from instituting any fresh suit in
respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim, which the plaintiff
G has withdrawn. In a suit for eviction of a tenant under the Rent Act on the
ground of bona fide requirement even though the premises remains the same,
the subject matter, which is cause of action, may be different. The ground for
eviction in the subsequent proceedings is based upon the requirement on the
date of the said suit even though it relates to the same property. (113-F-GJ

H Val/abh Das v. Dr. Madan/al, 1197011 SCC 761, relied on.
N.R. NARAYAN SWAMYv. B. FRANCIS JAGAN [SHAH, J.] 111

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4800 of A
2001.

From the Judgment and Order date.d 8.12.99 of the Karnataka High
Court in H.R.R.P. No. 845 of 1999.

Ms. Kiran Suri for the Appellant. B
C.V. Babu and T. Raja for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J. Leave granted. c
It is the say of the appellant that he let out suit premises admeasuring
!Oft. x 8 ft. which is part of his residence to the respondent at the rent of Rs.
200 per month. After retiring from service he started practice as an Advocate
in a small room admeasuring 8 ft. x 7 ft. in the rear side of the suit premises
which is let out to the respondent. He filed H.R.C. No. 2757of1992 for bona D
fide requirement on the ground that his son needed it to start a new business
and also for his office purposes as he required -access to his chamber by
providing a door in the common wall and for keeping library books. The
tenant Balraj promised that he would vacate the premises and hand over
vacant possession of the premises. Therefore, by memo dated 6th December, E
1994 the appellant submitted as under:

"The petitioner does not press the petition for the present and he
prays that the petition may be disposed of accordingly."

The tenant Balraj died on 3rd February, 1997 and the premises at
present is occupied by his son, the respondent herein. On 24th August, 1998, F
appellant filed H.R.C. No. I 0292 of 1998 for recovering of possession of the
suit premises on the ground that as his practice has picked up, he wanted
bigger office as present office premises admeasuring 8 ft. x 7 ft. was not
sufficient to accommodate his books as well as clients. In the said suit
respondent filed an application under section 151 CPC read with Order XX III G .
Rule 1(4)(b) contending that as the previous suit was withdrawn, the present
suit was not maintainable and was also barred under section 45 of the
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rent Act').
The appellant submitted written objections contending that the said application
· was misconceived and the suit was neither barred under Order XXllI nor by
principles of res judicata as enunciated in Section 45 of the Rent Act. Relying H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A upon the decision rendered by this Court in Surajmal v. Radhe Shyam, [1988]
3 sec 18, the trial court by judgment and order dated 24th July, 1999
rejected the said application.

Against the said judgment and order, the respondent preferred H.R.R.P.
No. 845 of 1999 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The High
B Court allowed the said revision application by holding that relief claimed by
the appellant in the present and previous proceedings is same and, therefore,
second petition for the same cause was not maintainable and as the previous
suit was withdrawn without seeking permission of the Court, it was barred
under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) of the C.P.C.
c Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the
order passed by the High Court is, on the face of it, illegal. Section 45 of the
Rent Act only bars fresh application if substantially the same issues as have
been finally decided in a former proceeding are involved in the second
proceeding. She further contended that there is total non-application of mind
D by the learned Judge to the provisions of Order XXIII of the C.P.C. As
against this, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that previous suit
was for bona fide requirement and the present suit is also for bona fide
requirement and as the previous suit was withdrawn without leave of the
Court, as provided under Order XXIII, second suit is not maintainable.

E In our view, the High Court ought to have considered the fact that in
eviction proceedings under the Rent Act the ground of bona fide requirement
or non-payment of rent is a recurring cause and, therefore, landlord is not
precluded from instituting fresh proceeding. In an eviction suit on the ground
of bona fide requirement the genuineness of the said ground is to be decided
F on the basis of requirement on the date of the suit. Further, even if a suit for
eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement is filed and is dismissed it
cannot be held that once a question of necessity is decided against the landlord
he will not have a bona fide and genuine necessity ever in future. In the
subsequent proceedings, if such claim is established by cogent evidence
adduced by the landlord, decree for possession could be passed. {Re: K.S.
G Sundararaju Chettiar v. M.R. Ramachandra Naidu, [1994] 5 sec 14 (para
IO)] and Surajmal v. Radhe Shyam, [ 1988] 3 SCC 13. ...
Similarly, reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent-
tenant on section 45 of the Rent Act is also misplaced. Section 45 reads thus:

H "45. Decisions which have become final not to be re-opened. The
N.R. NARA YAN SWAMY v. B. FRANCIS JAGAN [SHAH, J.) 113

court or the Controller ~hall summarily reject any application under A
this Act wh~clr raises, between the same parties or between parties
under whom they or any of them claim, substantially the same issues
as have been finally decided in a former proceeding under this Act
or under any of the enactments repealed by Section 62."

From the aforesaid section, it is apparent that fresh application under B
the Rent Act could be summarily rejected only if (i) if the proceedings are
between the same parties or under whom they or any of them claim, and (ii)
substantially the same issues as have been finally decided in a former
proceeding under the Act are raised. Thus the section as such, incorporates
principles of res judicata. The aforesaid section would have no application as C
the previous proceedings for taking possession of the premises was not pressed
and stood disposed of without deciding any issue.

The next question would be-whether Order XXIII Rule I sub-rule ( 4)
CPC is applicable to the facts of the present case. Sub-rule (4) reads thus:-
D
(4) Where the plaintiff

(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (I), or

(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission
referred to in sub-rule (3 ),
E
he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall
be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such
subject-matter or such part of the claim."

The aforesaid rule would have no application in a proceeding initiated
for recovering the suit premises on the ground of bona fide requirement F
which is a recurring cause. Order XXIII rule 1(4)(b) precludes the plaintiff
from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part .
of the claim which the plaintiff has withdrawn. In a suit for eviction of a
tenant under the Rent Act on the ground of bona fide requirem~nt even
though the premises remains the same, the subject matter which is cause Of
action may be different. The ground for eviction in the subsequent proceedings G
is based upon requirement on the date of the said suit even though it relates
to the same property. Dealing with similar contention in Va//abh Das v. Dr.
Madan/al and Ors., [I 970] I SCC 76 I, this Court observed thus:-

The expression "subject-matter" is not defined in the Civil Procedure
Code. It does not mean property. That expression has a reference to H
l !4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A a right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. That
expression includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. Unless
the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the
same as in the first suit, it cannot be said that the subject-matter of
the second suit is the same as that in the previous suit."

B The Court further observed that the mere identity of some of the issues
in two suits would not bring about identity of the subject matter in two suits.

In this view of the matter, in our view it is not necessary to decide the
further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Rent Act
is a self-contained Code and the provisions of the CPC as a whole are not
C applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Act.

In the result, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. The
impugned order dated 8.12.1999 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in
HRRP No. 845of1999 is set aside and the order dated 24.7.1999 passed by
D the trial court is restored. The trial court to proceed with the matter as early
as possible.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.

...