MUZAFFAR HUSAINversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR.

                          [2022] 7 S.C.R. 939                              939


                       MUZAFFAR HUSAIN                                     A
                                   v.
            STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2022)
                             MAY 06, 2022                                  B
         [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD AND
                     BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
       Judiciary: Subordinate judiciary – Disciplinary action
against judicial officer – Judicial officer-appellant took voluntary
retirement from service and joined the tribunal as member –                C
Allegations of misconduct against him, while he was discharging
his duties as judicial officer – Charges levelled against him,
departmental enquiry conducted and charges found proved – Full
Court of the High Court resolved to punish the appellant with
curtailment of 90% of his pensionary benefits with immediate effect        D
– State sanctioned withholding of 90% from the pension of the
appellant – Challenge to, by the appellant – High Court reduced
the curtailment of pensionary benefits to the extent of 70% in place
of 90% – On appeal, held: Power of judicial review conferred on
the constitutional Court is not that of appellate authority but confined
only to the decision-making process – If the inquiry has been fairly       E
and properly conducted, and the findings are based on evidence,
the adequacy of the evidence or reliability of evidence would not
be a ground to interfere with the findings recorded in the
departmental enquiries – On facts, there was a regular disciplinary
proceedings conducted against the appellant after serving him the          F
chargesheet and giving him full opportunity of hearing – Further,
the appellant had not made any allegation with regard to violation
of principles of natural justice or contravention of any statutory
rules or regulations having occasioned during the course of enquiry
proceedings or in the decision-making process – Also, there was
enough evidence and material to show that the appellant had                G
misconducted himself while discharging his duties as a judicial
officer, and had passed the judicial orders in utter disregard of the
specific provisions of law, to unduly favour certain parties, and
that such orders were actuated by corrupt motive. – Thus, the
subjective satisfaction arrived at by the High Court on the
                                                                           H
                                  939
940            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     administrative side, and the impugned order passed by the High
      Court on the judicial side did not warrant any interference – High
      Court justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction u/Art. 235
      – U.P. Govt. Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 - r. 3 – Civil Services
      Regulations – Art. 351(A) – Constitution of India – Art. 235.
B           Dismissing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 The power of judicial review conferred on the
      constitutional Court is not that of an appellate authority but is
      confined only to the decision-making process. Interference with
      the decision of departmental authorities is permissible only if
C     the proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of
      natural justice or in contravention of statutory regulations
      regulating such proceedings or if the decision on the face of it is
      found to be arbitrary or capricious. The Courts would and should
      not act as an appellate Court and reassess the evidence led in
      the domestic enquiry, nor should interfere on the ground that
D     another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry
      has been fairly and properly conducted, and the findings are based
      on evidence, the adequacy of the evidence or reliability of
      evidence would not be a ground to interfere with the findings
      recorded in the departmental enquiries. [Para 8][952-B-D]
E           1.2 Regular disciplinary proceeding conducted against the
      appellant after serving him the chargesheet and giving him full
      opportunity of hearing. Thereafter, pursuant to the enquiry report
      submitted by the Enquiry Officer, Full Court of the High Court
      had resolved on 02.09.2006 to accept the said enquiry report
F     and punish the appellant with curtailment of 90% of pensionary
      benefit with immediate effect. The order of punishment passed
      by the respondent-State on the basis of the said recommendation
      made by the full court of the High Court, was challenged by the
      appellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The High
      Court dropped the charge nos. 1 to 3 and upheld the charge nos.
G     4 to 11 against the appellant, and reduced the punishment to the
      curtailment of 70% in place of 90% of his pensionary benefits.
      [Para 11][953-F-H; 954-A]
           1.3 Pertinently, the appellant had not made any allegation
      with regard to violation of principles of natural justice or
H
     MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                          941
                    AND ANR.

contravention of any statutory rules or regulations having              A
occasioned during the course of enquiry proceedings or in the
decision-making process. Therefore, in absence of any such
allegations, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the High Court
on the administrative side, and the impugned order passed by
the High Court on the judicial side did not warrant any interference
                                                                        B
of this court. When the Enquiry proceedings have been found to
have been conducted in proper and legal manner, and when the
High Court on administrative side as well as on judicial side, has
accepted the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer qua the
charge nos. 4 to 11 levelled against the appellant as “proved”,
holding him guilty of having committed “misconduct”, this court         C
was not expected to sit as an appellate authority and revaluate
the adequacy or reliability of the evidence adduced before the
Enquiry Officer. [Para 12][954-B-D]
       1.4 The submission that the disciplinary proceedings could
not be initiated against the judicial officers merely because the       D
judgment or orders passed by them were wrong, is accepted,
nonetheless, in the instant case the appellant was found to have
conducted the proceedings in the manner which had reflected on
his reputation and integrity. There was enough evidence and
material to show that the appellant had misconducted himself while
discharging his duties as a judicial officer, and had passed the        E
judicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law,
to unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands
who had no right to claim compensation, and that such orders
were actuated by corrupt motive. Under the circumstances, the
High Court was perfectly justified in exercising its supervisory        F
jurisdiction under Art. 235 of the Constitution. Showing undue
favour to a party under the guise of passing judicial orders is the
worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct. The extraneous
consideration for showing favour need not always be a monetary
consideration. It is often said that “the public servants are like
fish in the water, none can say when and how a fish drank the           G
water”. A judge must decide the case on the basis of the facts on
record and the law applicable to the case. If he decides a case for
extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in
accordance with law. [Paras 14 and 15][955-D-H]
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942          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A          Agra Development Authority, Agra Vs. State of UP and
           Ors. 2004 SCC Online All 269; Union of India & Ors.
           Vs. Iqbal Singh (1976) 1 SCC 570 : [1976] 2 SCR 988;
           Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller
           of Estate Duty (1980) 2 SCC 1 : [1980] 2 SCR 315;
           Food Corporation of India Vs. Kailash Chand 2014
B
           (1) ADJ 379 (DB); Soran Singh Vs. Collector & Ors.
           2018 SCC Online All 5936; UP Jal Nigam, Lucknow
           Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. (1996)
           3 SCC 124 : [1996] 1 SCR 683; Meera Sahni Vs. Lt.
           Governor Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 : [2008] 10 SCR
C          1012; Krishna Prasad Verma (Dead) Thr Legal Vs. State
           of Bihar & Ors. (2019) 10 SCC 640 : [2019] 12 SCR
           861; Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
           (2020) 11 SCC 760; Abhay Jain Vs. High Court of
           Judicature of Rajasthan & Anr. (2022) SCC Online SC
           319; Sarvepalli Ramaiah (D) Tr. Lrs Vs District Collector
D
           Chittoor (2019) 4 SCC 500: [2019] 5 SCR 372; Union
           of India vs. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56 : [1993] 1
           SCR 296; C. Ravichandran Iyer Vs. Justice A.M.
           Bhattacharjee & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 457 : [1995] 3
           Suppl. SCR 319; High Court of Judicature At Bombay
E          Vs. Shashikant S. Patil And Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 416 :
           [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205; State Bank of Bikaner &
           Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 :
           [2011] 3 SCR 589 – referred to.
                            Case Law Reference
F     [1976] 2 SCR 988              referred to             Para 3(iii)
      [1980] 2 SCR 315              referred to             Para 3(iii)
      [1996] 1 SCR 683              referred to             Para 3(iv)
      [2008] 10 SCR 1012            referred to             Para 3(iv)
G
      [2019] 12 SCR 861             referred to             Para 3(vi)
      (2020) 11 SCC 760             referred to             Para 3(vi)
      [2019] 5 SCR 372              referred to             Para 4(ii)
      [1993] 1 SCR 296              referred to             Para 4(v)
H
     MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                              943
                    AND ANR.

[1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 319          referred to              Para 5            A
[1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205          referred to              Para 9
[2011] 3 SCR 589                 referred to               Para 10
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3613
of 2022.                                                                    B
       From the Judgment and Order dated 17.04.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Service Bench
No.496 of 2007.
      Pradeep Kant, Sr. Adv., Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Simranjeet Singh
Rekhi, Javaid Muzaffar, Sajal Singhai, Advs. for the Appellant.             C
     Ms. Charu Ambwani, Pradeep Misra, Suraj Singh, Advs. for the
Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.                                                   D
       1. The challenge in the instant appeal is to the Order dated
17.04.2019 passed by the High Court of judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow
Bench, Lucknow in Writ Petition being no. 496 of 2017 filed by the
appellant challenging the order of punishment issued by the respondent-
State pursuant to the decision of the Full Court of the High Court taken    E
on the report of the Enquiry Officer in respect of the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against the appellant for the alleged misconduct
committed by him as a judicial officer.
      2. Factual Matrix:
      i.     The appellant had joined the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services   F
             in the year 1978 and sought voluntary retirement from the
             said services in September 2003. Immediately after the
             retirement, appellant joined as a Judicial Member, Central
             Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai. On
             19.07.2005, the appellant was informed vide the letter dated   G
             19.07.2005 of the O.S.D (Enquiry), Allahabad High Court,
             addressed to the Principal Registrar, CAT, New Delhi that
             the High Court had initiated a departmental enquiry, being
             no. 26 of 2005 against him. A copy of chargesheet was
             enclosed therewith. There were twelve charges levelled
                                                                            H
944          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A              against the appellant in the said chargesheet. It was alleged
               against the petition inter alia that the appellant, while posted
               as the 11th Additional District Judge, Agra during the period
               from 23.05.2001 to 19.05.2003, had decided a batch of
               matters under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and had
               awarded enhanced compensation which was multiple times
B
               more than the investments made by the subsequent
               purchasers of the acquired lands; that such subsequent
               purchasers had no right to claim compensation for the
               acquired lands; that the appellant had determined the
               compensation in terms of square yards and not in terms of
C              bighas, and had awarded such compensation in flagrant
               violation of the cardinal principles of law and equity and
               against all judicial norms and propriety, with a view to unduly
               favour such subsequent purchasers. It was therefore alleged
               that the appellant had failed to maintain absolute integrity
               and complete devotion to duty, and thereby had committed
D
               a misconduct within the meaning of Rule-3 of U.P. Govt.
               Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The charge no. 12 levelled
               against the appellant pertained to an undue favour shown
               to the son of a Counsel named Shri KC Jain, by exorbitantly
               enhancing the compensation in his favour.
E     ii.      The appellant vide the letters dated 07.09.2005 and
               19.09.2005 denied all the charges levelled against him. On
               20.01.2006, the appellant received the written submissions
               submitted on behalf of the department in the departmental
               enquiry initiated against him and the appellant also submitted
F              his written submissions on 10.02.2006 in the said enquiry.
      iii.     The Enquiry Officer vide his Enquiry report dated 05.04.2006
               held charges no. 1 to 11 as “Proved” and charge no. 12 as
               “Not Proved”. The Enquiry Officer submitted the said report
               to the Chief Justice/Administrative Committee/Full Court
G              for further consideration on the question of quantum of
               punishment. The appellant was called upon and he filed his
               response on 14.06.2006 to the said Enquiry report. The High
               Court of Judicature at Allahabad in its Full Court Meeting
               held that 02.09.2006 accepted the report of the Enquiry
               Officer and resolved to punish the appellant with curtailment
H              of 90% of his pensionary benefits with immediate effect.
        MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                               945
              AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

              Pursuant to the said recommendation made by the Full Court        A
              of the High Court, the respondent-State passed an order
              dated 22.01.2007, sanctioning withholding of 90% from the
              pension of the appellant in view of the provisions contained
              in Article 351(A) of the Civil Services Regulations.
      iv.     The aggrieved appellant challenged the legality of the said       B
              order dated 22.01.2007 by filing a writ before the High Court
              of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. The
              Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned order
              dated 17.04.2019 found that the punishment order in
              reference to the charge nos. 1 to 3 was not sustainable in
              the eye of law as the respondents could not have framed           C
              the charges for the incidences which have taken place 4
              years prior to the chargesheet. However, the High Court
              held that there was no ground to interfere with the findings
              recorded in reference to the charge nos. 4 to 11. The High
              Court considering the overall circumstances reduced the           D
              curtailment of pensionary benefits to the extent of 70% in
              place of 90%. The present appeal is directed against the
              said order passed by the High Court.
      3. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep Kant for the
appellant raised following contentions:
                                                                                E
      i.      The Enquiry against the appellant was initiated on the basis
              of the directions issued by the High Court in Agra
              Development Authority, Agra Vs. State of UP and Ors.1,
              though there was no complaint pending against the appellant.
      ii.     A mere perusal of the charges levelled against the appellant
              in the chargesheet on the face of it revealed that the charges    F
              did not make out even a prima facie case of misconduct
              and that they were neither factually nor legally substantiable.
      iii.    The right to seek compensation is a property right and not
              mere a right to sue, and the same could be legally transferred
              from one person to another as held by the Supreme Court           G
              and High Court in catena of decisions. In this regard, he
              has relied upon Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh2;
              Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller
1
    2004 SCC Online All 269
2
    (1976) 1 SCC 570                                                            H
946                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A                     of Estate Duty3, Food Corporation of India Vs. Kailash
                      Chand4 and Soran Singh Vs. Collector & Ors.5.
             iv.      The compensation was awarded by the appellant on the
                      market value of the land on the date of issuance of
                      notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
B                     It had no relevance to the price offered or investments made
                      by the subsequent purchasers in respect of the acquired
                      lands. In this regard, Mr. Pradeep Kant relied upon UP Jal
                      Nigam, Lucknow Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow
                      & Ors.6; Meera Sahni Vs. Lt. Governor Delhi7 etc.
             v.       Many cases, in which the enhanced compensation was
C                     awarded by the appellant were upheld by the High Court,
                      and in some cases by the Supreme Court and therefore it
                      could not be said that the appellant was actuated by
                      extraneous consideration as alleged.
             vi.      There was no specific charge against the appellant that he
D                     had taken bribe or shown any undue favour to any person
                      or group of persons. Hence, merely because an enhanced
                      compensation was awarded, no inference of extraneous
                      consideration could be drawn. Mere suspicion was not
                      sufficient to prove that the appellant had acted because of
E                     extraneous consideration. In this regard, Mr. Pradeep Kant
                      has relied upon the decisions in the case of Krishna Prasad
                      Verma (Dead) Thr Legal Representatives Vs. State of
                      Bihar & Ors.8, in case of Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State
                      of Uttar Pradesh9, and the latest decision of Supreme Court
                      in case of Abhay Jain Vs. High Court of Judicature of
F                     Rajasthan & Anr.10.
             vii.     The appellant being not held guilty of any grave misconduct
                      or having caused any loss, he could not have been awarded
                      punishment for ‘grave misconduct’.

      3
G       (1980) 2 SCC 1
      4
        2014 (1) ADJ 379 (DB)
      5
        2018 SCC Online All 5936
      6
        (1996) 3 SCC 124
      7
        (2008) 9 SCC 177
      8
        (2019) 10 SCC 640
      9
        (2020) 11 SCC 760
H     10
         (2022) SCC Online SC 319
         MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                   947
               AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

       4. Ms. Charu Ambwani, learned counsel appearing for respondent                A
no. 2 raised the following contentions:
          (i)     The High Court has full control over its judicial officers in
                  the matter of disciplinary proceedings. In the instant case,
                  after holding a regular disciplinary inquiry and after following
                  the due procedure of law, the Inquiry Officer had submitted        B
                  his report before the High Court. The same was placed
                  before the Full Court and collective consciousness of the
                  High Court was shaken, considering the manner in which
                  the appellant had misconducted himself while working as a
                  judicial officer.
                                                                                     C
          (ii)    The scope of judicial review is very limited. As per the
                  settled legal position, the Courts cannot sit in appeal over
                  the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and substitute
                  its own findings, unless any perversity or patent illegality or
                  irrationality in the process was found. The judicial review
                  is permissible not against the decision but against the            D
                  decision-making process only. In this regard, she has relied
                  upon the decision of this Court in Sarvepalli Ramaiah
                  (D) Tr. Lrs Vs District Collector Chittoor11 .
          (iii)   The appellant was given full and fair opportunity during the
                  enquiry proceedings conducted against him and the decision         E
                  was taken by the full Court of the High Court after
                  considering the entire material on record. The punishment
                  imposed was also proportionate to the guilt of the appellant.
          (iv)    Taking the Court to the evidence recorded by the Enquiry
                  Officer, she submitted that the appellant had enhanced the         F
                  compensation manifolds in order to extend undue favour to
                  the subsequent purchasers, who had no right to receive the
                  compensation. She also submitted that the claimants who
                  were the subsequent purchasers, had made a very meagre
                  investments and purchased the right to receive compensation        G
                  and right to sue in place of the original owners, which was
                  totally prohibited under Section 6(e) of the Transfer of
                  Property Act read with the provisions contained in the Land
                  Acquisition Act.
11
     (2019) 4 SCC 500                                                                H
948                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A               (v)     Lastly, she drew our attention to the observations made by
                        this Court in case of Union of India vs. K.K. Dhawan12 in
                        which it has been held that the judicial officer, if acts
                        negligently or recklessly or attempts to confer undue favour
                        on a person or takes a decision which is actuated by corrupt
                        motive, then he is not acting as a judge. Strict rules of
B
                        evidence do not apply to the departmental inquiry.
            5. At the outset, it may be noted that maintenance of high standard
      of conduct and character of the judicial officers has always been a matter
      of great concern for this court. In C. Ravichandran Iyer Vs. Justice
      A.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors. 13, this court emphasizing the need to
C     maintain high standard of integrity, honesty and moral vigour by the judges,
      observed: -
                “Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is,
                therefore, entitled to except that a Judge must be a man of
                high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour,
D               ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial
                influences. He is required to keep most exacting standards of
                propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends to
                undermine public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
                of the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of judicial
                process. Society, therefore, expects higher standards of
E
                conduct and rectitude from a Judge. Unwritten code of
                conduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe
                high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial
                functionary, as wholesome standard of conduct which would
                generate public confidence, accord dignity to the judicial
F               office and enhance public image, not only of the Judge but
                the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic requirement that a
                Judge’s official and personal conduct be free from
                impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard
                of propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is higher
                than expected of a layman and also higher than expected of
G               an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to high
                standards of probity and propriety, higher than those deemed
                acceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to
                seek shelter from the fallen standard in the society.”
      12
           (1993) 2 SCC 56
H     13
           (1995) 5 SCC 457
        MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                             949
              AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

      6. In Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 14, this              A
court reiterated that the judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a
higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity.
          “19. It has amply been reiterated by this Court that the judicial
          officers must aspire and adhere to a higher standard of
          honesty, integrity and probity. Very recently in Shrirang           B
          Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra [Shrirang
          Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC
          144 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] , a Division Bench of this
          Court very succinctly collated these principles and reiterated
          that: (SCC pp. 146-47, paras 5-10)
                                                                              C
                 ‘5. The first and foremost quality required in a Judge is
          integrity. The need of integrity in the judiciary is much higher
          than in other institutions. The judiciary is an institution whose
          foundations are based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore,
          necessary that judicial officers should possess the sterling
          quality of integrity. This Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti            D
          Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held as
          follows: (SCC p. 203)
                 ‘Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart
          from others. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care to
          see that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which    E
          will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system
          resulting in the failure of public confidence in the system. It
          must be remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a larger
          threat than the storm outside.’
               6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exacting           F
          standard, both inside and outside the court. This Court
          in Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad [Daya
          Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1 : 1987
          SCC (L&S) 132] held thus: (SCC pp. 4-5, para 11)
                ‘11. … Judicial officers cannot have two standards, one       G
          in the court and another outside the court. They must have
          only one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They
          cannot act even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy.’

14
     (2020) 11 SCC 760                                                        H
950      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A            7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should
      always remember that he is there to serve the public. A Judge
      is judged not only by his quality of judgments but also by the
      quality and purity of his character. Impeccable integrity
      should be reflected both in public and personal life of a
      Judge. One who stands in judgments over others should be
B
      incorruptible. That is the high standard which is expected of
      Judges.
            8. Judges must remember that they are not merely
      employees but hold high public office. In R.C. Chandel v. High
      Court of M.P. [R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8
C     SCC 58 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 :
      (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 469] , this Court held that the standard
      of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than that of
      an ordinary person. The following observations of this Court
      are relevant: (SCC p. 70, para 29)
D            ‘29. Judicial service is not an ordinary government
      service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges
      hold the public office; their function is one of the essential
      functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and
      duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge
E     holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of
      impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. He
      must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a
      litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that the
      Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justice
      impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The
F     standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than
      an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards
      in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the
      society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical
      firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar’s wife,
G     must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system
      is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracy
      to thrive and the rule of law to survive, justice system and the
      judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must
      discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality and
      intellectual honesty.’
H
     MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                951
           AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

      9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must decide             A
      the case only on the basis of the facts on record and the law
      applicable to the case. If a Judge decides a case for any
      extraneous reasons then he is not performing his duty in
      accordance with law.
      10. In our view the word “gratification” does not only mean             B
      monetary gratification. Gratification can be of various types.
      It can be gratification of money, gratification of power,
      gratification of lust etc., etc.”
       7. It may further be noted that when a disciplinary action can be
taken against the officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers, has   C
also been succinctly laid down by this court in case of Union of India
Vs. K.K. Dhawan (supra): -
      “28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial
      or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in
      order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a
                                                                              D
      Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to
      be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present
      case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of
      the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the
      respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality
      of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be             E
      questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have
      no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded
      from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct
      Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be
      taken in the following cases:
                                                                              F
      (i)     Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect
              on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion
              to duty;
      (ii)    if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or
              misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
                                                                              G
      (iii)   if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a
              government servant;
      (iv)    if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the
              prescribed conditions which are essential for the
              exercise of the statutory powers;                               H
952                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A               (v)     if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
                (vi)    if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however
                        small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long
                        ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is
                        great.”
B            8. It is trite to say that the power of judicial review conferred on
      the constitutional Court is not that of an appellate authority but is confined
      only to the decision-making process. Interference with the decision of
      departmental authorities is permissible only if the proceedings were
      conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice or in
C     contravention of statutory regulations regulating such proceedings or if
      the decision on the face of it is found to be arbitrary or capricious. The
      Courts would and should not act as an appellate Court and reassess the
      evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor should interfere on the ground
      that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has
      been fairly and properly conducted, and the findings are based on
D     evidence, the adequacy of the evidence or reliability of evidence would
      not be a ground to interfere with the findings recorded in the departmental
      enquiries.
            9. In the High Court Of Judicature At Bombay Vs. Shashikant
      S. Patil And Anr.15, this Court held :-
E
                “The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have
                approached the case as though it was an appeal against the
                order of the administrative/ disciplinary authority of the High
                Court. Interference with the decision of departmental
                authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction
F               under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had
                held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural
                justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the
                mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is
                vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and
G               merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority,
                on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that
                no reasonable person could have arrived at such a
                conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we
                cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case
      15
H          (2000) 1 SCC 416
         MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                             953
               AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

          the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge      A
          of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The
          settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on
          which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even
          reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before
          the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of
                                                                               B
          the Constitution.”
     10. Again, in the State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi
Chand Nalwaya16, it was observed in para 7 as under:
          “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
          appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic        C
          enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is
          possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been
          fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
          evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the
          reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
          interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.             D
          Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact
          recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such
          findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
          perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a
          tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such                E
          conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will
          however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if
          principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been
          violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious,
          mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.”
                                                                               F
       11. Reverting to the facts of the case, it may be noted that there
was a regular disciplinary proceedings conducted against the appellant
after serving him the chargesheet and giving him full opportunity of
hearing. Thereafter, pursuant to the enquiry report submitted by the
Enquiry Officer, Full Court of the High Court had resolved on 02.09.2006
to accept the said enquiry report and punish the appellant with curtailment    G
of 90% of pensionary benefit with immediate effect. The order of
punishment passed by the respondent-State on the basis of the said
recommendation made by the full court of the High Court, was challenged

16
     (2011) 4 SCC 584                                                          H
954             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     by the appellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The High
      Court dropped the charge nos. 1 to 3 and upheld the charge nos. 4 to 11
      against the appellant, and reduced the punishment to the curtailment of
      70% in place of 90% of his pensionary benefits.
             12. Pertinently, the appellant had not made any allegation with
B     regard to violation of principles of natural justice or contravention of any
      statutory rules or regulations having occasioned during the course of
      enquiry proceedings or in the decision-making process. Therefore, in
      absence of any such allegations, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by
      the High Court on the administrative side, and the impugned order passed
      by the High Court on the judicial side did not warrant any interference of
C
      this court. When the Enquiry proceedings have been found to have been
      conducted in proper and legal manner, and when the High Court on
      administrative side as well as on judicial side, has accepted the findings
      recorded by the Enquiry Officer qua the charge nos. 4 to 11 levelled
      against the appellant as “proved”, holding him guilty of having committed
D     “misconduct”, this court was not expected to sit as an appellate authority
      and revaluate the adequacy or reliability of the evidence adduced before
      the Enquiry Officer. Nonetheless, this court just for the sake of satisfying
      its conscience, had permitted the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep
      Kant to argue on the merits of the charges levelled against the appellant.
E            13. The bone of contention raised by the learned Senior Advocate
      Mr. Kant was that the charges levelled against the appellant were not
      sustainable factually or legally in as much as the appellant had decided
      the land reference cases as per the law prevailing at the relevant time.
      According to him as held in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh
      (supra), Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller of
F
      Estate Duty (supra), Soran Singh Vs. Collector & Ors (supra), the
      right to seek compensation is a property right and the same could be
      transferred. In the opinion of this court, the said decisions have been
      rendered considering the facts of each case, and have hardly any relevance
      to the facts of the cases decided by the appellant under the Land
G     Acquisition Act. In case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh
      (supra), this court was examining the right of the claimant as a legatee
      under the will executed by a displaced person under the Displaced Persons
      (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. In case of Khorshed
      Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty (supra),
      the question of legality and validity of the notices issued by the Assistant
H
     MUZAFFAR HUSAIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                  955
           AND ANR. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

Controller of Estate Duty, Hyderabad in respect of the compensation             A
received by the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased owner
of the acquired land was under consideration. So far as the charges
levelled against the appellant were concerned, it was alleged that the
appellant had awarded enhanced compensation at an exorbitantly higher
rate in favour of the subsequent purchasers/investors, who had no right
                                                                                B
to receive any compensation, more particularly when Section 6(e) of the
Transfer of Property Act specifically prohibited the transfer of mere
right to sue. The said cases were found to have been decided by the
appellant in flagrant violation of the cardinal principles of law and equity,
and against all judicial norms and propriety, with a view to unduly favour
such subsequent purchasers who had no legal right to receive the                C
compensation.
        14. Much reliance was placed by the learned Senior Advocate
Mr. Kant for the appellant on the decision of this court in case of Krishna
Prasad Verma Vs. State of Bihar (supra), Sadhna Chaudhary Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and Abhay Jain Vs. High Court of                 D
Judicature of Rajasthan & Anr (supra) to buttress his submission that
mere suspicion cannot constitute misconduct, and that any probability of
misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary material.
He also submitted that the disciplinary proceedings could not be initiated
against the judicial officers merely because the judgment or orders passed
                                                                                E
by them were wrong. We completely agree with the submissions made
by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and with the ratio of
judgments relied upon by him. Nonetheless, in the instant case the
appellant was found to have conducted the proceedings in the manner
which had reflected on his reputation and integrity. There was enough
evidence and material to show that the appellant had misconducted himself       F
while discharging his duties as a judicial officer, and had passed the
judicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law, to
unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands who had
no right to claim compensation, and that such orders were actuated by
corrupt motive. Under the circumstances, the High Court was perfectly           G
justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 235 of the
Constitution.
      15. In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the
guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty
and misconduct. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need
                                                                                H
956              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 7 S.C.R.


A     not always be a monetary consideration. It is often said that “the public
      servants are like fish in the water, none can say when and how a fish
      drank the water”. A judge must decide the case on the basis of the facts
      on record and the law applicable to the case. If he decides a case for
      extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordance
      with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesar’s wife, must be above
B
      suspicion.
            16. In that view of the matter, we find no merit in the present
      appeal and the same is dismissed.


C     Nidhi Jain                                                Appeal dismissed.
      (Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)




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