MUSSTT REHANA BEGUMversusSTATE OF ASSAM & ANR.

962            SUPREME COURT
                         [2022]REPORTS
                                3 S.C.R. 962               [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A                        MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM
                                        v.
                          STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2022)
B                             JANUARY 21, 2022
              [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
                       BELA M TRIVEDI, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code,
      1860 – ss.494, 495 – Appellant-wife filed application u/s.482 for
C
      quashing the complaint filed by second respondent-husband u/
      ss.494 and 495, IPC – Dismissed by Single Judge – On appeal,
      held: As between the appellant and the second respondent the issue
      as to whether she had a subsisting marriage on the date on which
      she entered into a marriage with him is the subject matter of a
D     conclusive finding of the Principal Judge of the Family Court which
      has attained finality – Appellant and the second respondent were
      parties to the decision of the Family Court – No contentious material
      or disputed issues of evidence arise – Thus, allowing the criminal
      proceeding to proceed for an offence u/ss. 494 and 495, IPC would
      constitute an abuse of the process – Single Judge of the High Court
E
      was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the issue as to
      whether the appellant had a subsisting prior marriage was a ‘highly
      contentious matter’ which has to be tried on the basis of the evidence
      on the record – Impugned judgment set aside – Criminal Petition
      filed by the appellant for quashing the complaint is allowed –
F     Complaint quashed – Family Courts Act, 1984 – s.7(1).
            Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing –
      Types of materials High Court can assess – Distinction between
      consideration of materials tendered as evidence and appreciation
      of such evidence – Discussed.
G           Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Family Courts
      Act, 1984 – s.7(1)– Held: Explanation (b) to s.7(1), 1984 Act confers
      the Family Court with jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status
      of a person – s.7(1) grants a Family Court with the status of a
      District Court and s.7(2) confers it with jurisdiction exercisable by
H     a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX of the CrPC, thus
                                       962
     MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM v. STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.                     963


enabling to collect evidence to make such a determination – Thus,     A
relying on the judgement of the Family Court which has jurisdiction
to decide the gravamen of the offence alleged in the criminal
complaint, would not be same as relying on evidentiary materials
that are due for appreciation by the Trial Court, such as the
investigation report before it is forwarded to the Magistrate.
                                                                      B
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 The gravamen of the complaint which has been
lodged by the second respondent is that on 11 January 1996,
when he and the appellant entered into marriage, the appellant
had a prior subsisting marriage as a consequence of which she is      C
guilty of an offence punishable under Section 494 of IPC. From
the record which has been produced before the Court, it emerges
that the appellant moved the Family Court for seeking a
declaration that the divorce which was pronounced by the second
respondent was null and void under Muslim law. In his written
statement, the second respondent specifically supported the           D
purported talaq and the divorce certificate issued by the Sadar
Kazi under the Muslim personal law. In the additional written
statement, the second respondent took the plea that the appellant
did not disclose to him that she had a prior marriage with another
person which was solemnized on 11 June 1987. Evidence was             E
adduced before the Family Court. The second respondent
deposed before the Family Court. The Principal Judge of the
Family Court at Guwahati, by a judgment dated 20 July 2017,
issued a declaration that the divorce which was purportedly
granted by the second respondent to her is null and void. The
said judgment clearly shows that whether (i) the appellant had a      F
prior subsisting marriage with another person; and (ii) the second
respondent had obtained a valid divorce was in issue before the
Family Court. The finding of fact as between the appellant and
the second respondent is that the appellant did not have a
subsisting prior marriage when she married him. The judgment          G
of the Family Court was questioned in MAT Appeal No 47 of
2017. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal
for non-prosecution on 20 June 2019, having noted that on the
previous occasion on 27 May 2019, no one had appeared on behalf

                                                                      H
964            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     of the second respondent in those proceedings. The order of the
      High Court continues to hold the field. Yet, the impugned
      judgement has held that the factum of the subsisting marriage of
      the appellant is a contentious matter and has declined to quash
      the criminal complaint against the appellant. [Paras 11-13][968-
      D-H; 969-B-E]
B
             1.2 In certain circumstances, the High Court is entitled to
      consider other materials before exercising its powers of quashing
      under Section 482 of the CrPC. In the present case the appellant
      and the second respondent were parties to the decision of the
      Family Court. No contentious material or disputed issues of
C     evidence arise. In the above backdrop, allowing the criminal
      proceeding to proceed for an offence under Sections 494 and
      495 of IPC would constitute an abuse of the process. As between
      the appellant and the second respondent the issue as to whether
      she had a subsisting marriage on the date on which she entered
D     into a marriage with the second respondent is the subject matter
      of a conclusive finding of the Principal Judge of the Family Court
      which has attained finality. Explanation (b) to Section 7(1) of the
      Family Courts Act 1984 expressly confers the Family Court with
      jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of a person.
      Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act 1984 grants a Family Court
E     with the status of a District Court and Section 7(2) confers it with
      jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under
      Chapter IX of the CrPC, thus enabling to collect evidence to
      make such a determination. Thus, relying on the judgement of
      the Family Court which has jurisdiction to decide the gravamen
F     of the offence alleged in the criminal complaint, would not be
      same as relying on evidentiary materials that are due for
      appreciation by the Trial Court, such as the investigation report
      before it is forwarded to the Magistrate. Therefore, in this case,
      the Single Judge of the High Court was not justified in coming to
      the conclusion that the issue as to whether the appellant had a
G     subsisting prior marriage was a ‘highly contentious matter’ which
      has to be tried on the basis of the evidence on the record. The
      impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside.
      Criminal Petition instituted by the appellant for quashing the

H
     MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM v. STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.                      965


complaint is allowed. The complaint pending in the Court of            A
SDJM(S) II, Kamrup (M), Guwahati is quashed. [Paras 15,
16][974-F-H; 975-A-C; 976-D-E]
      Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra 2021
      SCC OnLine SC 315; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
      1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259;                 B
      State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy
      (2004) 6 SCC 522 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 147; Pratibha
      v. Rameshwari Devi (2007) 12 SCC 369 : [2007] 9
      SCR 1038; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore
      Gupta (2004) 1 SCC 691 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 672;
      P S Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 1 : [1996] 2            C
      Suppl. SCR 631 – relied on.
                      Case Law Reference
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259            relied on              Para 14
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 147            relied on              Para 14      D
[2007] 9 SCR 1038                  relied on              Para 15
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 672            relied on              Para 15
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 631            relied on              Para 15
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.            E
118 of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2018 of the High Court
of Gauhati (The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Arunachal
Pradesh) in Criminal Petition No.179 of 2016.
                                                                       F
     Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi, Ms. Kanishka Prasad, Ibad Mushtaq, Ms.
Akanksha Rai, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Nalin Kohli, AAG, Ms. Diksha Rai, Ankit Roy, Ankit Agarwal,
Ms. Nimisha Menon, Ms. Ragini Pandey, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                       G
      DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
      1. Delay condoned.
      2. Leave granted.
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966                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A           3. This appeal arises from a judgment of a Single Judge of the
      Gauhati High Court dated 4 April 2018 in Criminal Petition No 179 of
      2016. The Single Judge has dismissed an application filed by the appellant
      under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 19731 for quashing
      a complaint. The complaint, CR Case No 2512 of 2015, is pending in the
      Court of SDJM(S) II, Kamrup (M), Guwahati for offences under Sections
B
      494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code 18602.
             4. The second respondent filed a complaint on 16 October 2015
      before the Chief Judicial Magistrate stating that on 11 January 1996, he
      and the appellant were married in accordance with the tenets of Muslim
      law. According to the complaint, the second respondent came to know
C     that the appellant was previously married to another person by the name
      of Shoukat Ali. The allegation is that during the subsistence of the previous
      marriage, she married the second respondent by suppressing the fact
      that she had a subsisting marriage. According to the complaint, the
      appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 495 of the
D     IPC since she concealed the fact that she had a subsisting marriage
      when she married the second respondent.
             5. The case of the appellant is that she and the second respondent
      got married on 11 January 1996. Alleging matrimonial abuse at the hands
      of the second respondent on account of her failure to fulfill his demands
E     for dowry, the appellant lodged a complaint and a criminal case, namely
      Case No 51/11, under Section 498A of IPC was accordingly registered
      at the ‘All Women Police Station’. On 5 September 2011, the second
      respondent is alleged to have forwarded a purported divorce certificate
      dated 18 August 2011 through the Sadar Kazi, Kamrup, Guwahati to a
      neighbour of the appellant. On 17 September 2011, the appellant instituted
F     proceedings before the Principal Judge of Family Court – I, Kamrup,
      which was numbered as FC (Civil) Case No 545 of 2011 to challenge
      the purported divorce. By a judgment dated 20 July 2017, the Principal
      Judge of Family Court – I declared the divorce purportedly given by the
      second respondent to the appellant as null and void. In the meantime, on
G     11 September 2015, Complaint Case No 149/2015 was registered in
      regard to the allegedly forged certificate produced by the second
      respondent in collusion with the Sadar Kazi for offences punishable under
      Sections 420, 406, 468 and 34 of IPC. On 16 October 2015, the second

      1
          “CrPC”
H     2
          “IPC”
      MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM v. STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.                             967
          [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

respondent lodged a complaint case, being CR Case No 2512 of 2015,             A
alleging that the appellant had committed an offence punishable under
Section 495 of IPC.
       6. The appellant instituted a proceeding under Section 482 of CrPC.
The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition by a judgment
dated 4 April 2018. The High Court has held that “it is highly disputed”       B
whether the appellant had entered into a marital tie with another person
prior to the marriage with the complainant and whether the earlier
marriage had ended in a valid divorce. Moreover, the High Court held
that the appellant had not come up with a specific case that she was
neither married earlier or that there was a divorce. Hence, in the view
of the High Court, the allegation in the complaint involves matter of trial    C
and a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not be entertained. The
petition was consequently dismissed.
        7. Mr Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi, counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, submitted that the complaint which was lodged by the second
respondent was essentially a counter blast to the complaint which was          D
lodged by the appellant that the purported certificate of divorce which is
obtained by the second respondent in collusion with the Sadar Kazi was
forged. Counsel submitted that the complaint alleging that the appellant
had entered into a wedlock with the second respondent during the
subsistence of an earlier marriage was lodged on 16 October 2015, soon         E
after the appellant had lodged a complaint against the second respondent
on 11 September 2015. That apart, it was submitted that the finding in the
judgment of the Family Court that the appellant did not have a subsisting
marriage with Shoukat Ali has attained finality and is binding inter partes.
In this backdrop, it was urged that the continuance of the criminal
proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the court.              F

     8. Notice was issued in these proceedings by an order dated 2
August 2019, which reads as follows:
      “Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied
      upon the finding which was recorded by the Principal Judge, Family       G
      Court-I, Kamrup, Guwahati on 20 July 2017 (Annexure P-4) that
      the second respondent had failed to prove that the petitioner had
      a subsisting marriage when she married him.
      Issue notice on the application for condonation of delay and on
      the Special Leave Petition, returnable in eight weeks.
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968             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A            Until the next date of listing, there shall be a stay of further
             proceedings in CR Case No 2512/2015 pending in the Court of
             SDJM (S)II, Kamrup (M), Guwahati.”
            9. The office report indicates that the second respondent has been
      served. Yet, no appearance has been entered on his behalf.
B
              10. Mr Nalin Kohli, AAG, appears on behalf of the State of Assam
      with Ms Diksha Rai. Opposing the submissions which have been urged
      on behalf of the appellant, the AAG submitted that the issue as to whether
      the appellant had a prior marriage with Shoukat Ali is contentious and
      that this would emerge from the judgment of the Family Court. Hence,
C     the AAG submitted that the allegation in the complaint would raise matters
      of trial and, hence, the High Court was not justified in declining to exercise
      the jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC.
             11. The gravamen of the complaint which has been lodged by the
      second respondent is that on 11 January 1996, when he and the appellant
D     entered into marriage, the appellant had a prior subsisting marriage as a
      consequence of which she is guilty of an offence punishable under Section
      494 of IPC. Now, from the record which has been produced before the
      Court, it emerges that the appellant moved the Family Court for seeking
      a declaration that the divorce which was pronounced by the second
      respondent was null and void under Muslim law. In his written statement,
E
      the second respondent specifically supported the purported talaq and
      the divorce certificate issued by the Sadar Kazi under the Muslim personal
      law. In the additional written statement, the second respondent took the
      plea that the appellant did not disclose to him that she had a prior marriage
      with another person which was solemnized on 11 June 1987. Among the
F     issues which were framed by the Family Court, the second issue read as
      follows:
             “(2) Whether the petitioner was already married to Shoukat Ali,
             s/o Raja Ali @ Bhaiya Ali when getting married to the respondent?”

G            12. Evidence was adduced before the Family Court. The second
      respondent deposed before the Family Court. The Principal Judge of the
      Family Court at Guwahati, by a judgment dated 20 July 2017, issued a
      declaration that the divorce which was purportedly granted by the second
      respondent to her is null and void. The conclusion which has been arrived
      at by the Principal Judge is extracted below:
H
         MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM v. STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.                           969
             [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

         “In view of the above discussions it is clear that the talaq           A
         pronounced by the respondent No.1 is not as per due procedure,
         as no reconciliation took place between the parties and as such
         the talaq is not valid one. It is also found that the respondent has
         failed to prove that the petitioner was already married to Shoukat
         Ali, s/o Raja Ali @ Bhaiya Ali when getting married to the
                                                                                B
         respondent.”
       13. The above judgment clearly shows that whether (i) the
appellant had a prior subsisting marriage with another person; and (ii)
the second respondent had obtained a valid divorce was in issue before
the Family Court. The finding of fact as between the appellant and the
second respondent is that the appellant did not have a subsisting prior         C
marriage when she married him. The judgment of the Family Court was
questioned in MAT Appeal No 47 of 2017. A Division Bench of the High
Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution on 20 June 2019, having
noted that on the previous occasion on 27 May 2019, no one had appeared
on behalf of the second respondent in those proceedings. The order of           D
the High Court continues to hold the field. Yet, the impugned judgement
has held that the factum of the subsisting marriage of the appellant is a
contentious matter and has declined to quash the criminal complaint
against the appellant.
        14. In Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra3, a             E
three-judge Bench of this Courtanalysed the precedent of this Court and
culled out the relevant principles that govern the law on quashing of a
first information report4 under Section 482 of the CrPC. The Court held:
         “57. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the
         decision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir             F
         Ahmad(supra), the following principles of law emerge:
         i)     Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant
                provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in
                Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable
                offences;                                                       G
         ii)    Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable
                offences;

3
    2021 SCC OnLine SC 315
4
    “FIR”                                                                       H
970          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     iii)     However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence
               of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the
               Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
      iv)      The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
               circumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. (The rarest of
B              rare cases standard in its application for quashing under
               Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the norm
               which has been formulated in the context of the death
               penalty, as explained previously by this Court);
      v)       While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
C              sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
               reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
               made in the FIR/complaint;
      vi)      Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial
               stage;
D     vii)     Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a
               rarity than an ordinary rule;
      viii)    Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
               jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State
               operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent
E              power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the
               ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section
               482 Cr.P.C.
      ix)      The functions of the judiciary and the police are
               complementary, not overlapping;
F
      x)       Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would
               result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial
               process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
               offences;
      xi)      Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer
G              an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its
               whims or caprice;
      xii)     The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which
               must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence
               reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is
H
         MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM v. STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.                             971
             [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

                 in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the      A
                 allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete
                 the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the
                 conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does
                 not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse
                 of process of law. During or after investigation, if the
                                                                                  B
                 investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the
                 application made by the complainant, the investigating officer
                 may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned
                 Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
                 Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
         xiii)   The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but            C
                 conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious.
                 It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
         xiv)    However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit,
                 regard being had to the parameters of quashing and
                 the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly             D
                 the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases
                 of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal(supra), has the
                 jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and
         xv)     When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged
                 accused, the court when it exercises the power under             E
                 Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not
                 the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a
                 cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits
                 whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or
                 not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/        F
                 police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.”
                                                       (emphasis supplied)
      The parameters for quashing an FIR have been laid down in State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal5 by a two-judge Bench of this Court. The
Court has held:                                                                   G
             “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
         relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
         principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions

5
    1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 [“Bhajan Lal”]                                          H
972      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
      226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
      we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
      categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
      could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
      court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not
B
      be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
      channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give
      an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
      should be exercised.
             (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
C        or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
         accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
         offence or make out a case against the accused.
            (2) Where the allegations in the first information report
         and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
D        disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
         by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
         except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
         of Section 155(2) of the Code.
            (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
E        FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
         of the same do not disclose the commission of any
         offence and make out a case against the accused.
             (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
         cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
F        no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
         of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
         Code.
            (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
         so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
G        prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
         sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
            (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
         the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which
         a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
H        continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
         MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM v. STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.                             973
             [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

             provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious    A
             redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
                (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
             with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
             instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
             the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and          B
             personal grudge.”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)
      In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy6, a
two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the
High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a distinction               C
between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and
appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails
to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an
FIR. The Court held:
            “5…..Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice         D
         and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce
         injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be
         an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which
         would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In
         exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any             E
         proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to
         abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings
         would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
         disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of
         fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is
         permissible to look into the materials to assess what the                F
         complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made
         out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”
            6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960
         Cri LJ 1239] this Court summarised some categories of cases
         where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the            G
         proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6)
                (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
             against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

6
    (2004) 6 SCC 522                                                              H
974            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A                 (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
               complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety
               do not constitute the offence alleged;
                  (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
               there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
B              adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
                7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear
            in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
            legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
            inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
C           there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
            not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
            under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not
            ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence
            in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable
            appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That
D
            is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt
            should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment.
            Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion
            and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
            consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument
E           in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass
            any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an
            instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution
            and bring about its sudden death…..”
                                                        (emphasis supplied)
F
             15. The precedent of this Court clarifies that in certain
      circumstances, the High Court is entitled to consider other materials
      before exercising its powers of quashing under Section 482 of the CrPC.
      In the present case the appellant and the second respondent were parties
      to the decision of the Family Court. No contentious material or disputed
G     issues of evidence arise. In the above backdrop, allowing the criminal
      proceeding to proceed for an offence under Sections 494 and 495 of
      IPC would constitute an abuse of the process. As between the appellant
      and the second respondent the issue as to whether she had a subsisting
      marriage on the date on which she entered into a marriage with the
      second respondent is the subject matter of a conclusive finding of the
H
      MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM v. STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.                               975
          [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Principal Judge of the Family Court which has attained finality.                 A
Explanation (b) to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act 1984 expressly
confers the Family Court with jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial
status of a person. Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act 1984 grants a
Family Court with the status of a District Court and Section 7(2) confers
it with jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under
                                                                                 B
Chapter IX of the CrPC, thus enabling to collect evidence to make such
a determination. Thus, relying on the judgement of the Family Court
which has jurisdiction to decide the gravamen of the offence alleged in
the criminal complaint, would not be same as relying on evidentiary
materials that are due for appreciation by the Trial Court, such as the
investigation report before it is forwarded to the Magistrate7. An analogous     C
factual matrix came up for determination before this Court in P S Rajya
v. State of Bihar8. This Court quashed an FIR against an accused under
the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 by noticing that the accused had
been exonerated on an identical charge in the relevant departmental
proceedings in light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance
                                                                                 D
Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission. A
two-judge Bench of this Court relied on the principles laid down in Bhajan
Lal (supra) and quashed the FIR by holding:
        “17. At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for
       the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard
       of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far        E
       higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in
       the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present
       case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal
       proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings
       rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result          F
       of it. On these premises, if we proceed further then there is
       no difficulty in accepting the case of the appellant. For if
       the charge which is identical could not be established in a
       departmental proceedings and in view of the admitted
       discrepancies in the reports submitted by the valuers one
       wonders what is there further to proceed against the                      G
       appellant in criminal proceedings…..

7
  Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi, (2007) 12 SCC 369, paras 17-21; State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691, para 13
8
  (1996) 9 SCC 1                                                                 H
976            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A           23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central
            Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High
            Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues
            raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report
            of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant
            of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not
B
            conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already
            held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case,
            the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be
            pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the
            High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order
C           dated 27-3-1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned
            criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)
             Therefore, in this case, the Single Judge of the High Court was
      not justified in coming to the conclusion that the issue as to whether the
D     appellant had a subsisting prior marriage was a ‘highly contentious matter’
      which has to be tried on the basis of the evidence on the record.
            16. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the
      impugned judgment and order of the Gauhati High Court dated 4 April
      2018. Criminal Petition No 179 of 2016 instituted by the appellant for
E     quashing the complaint is allowed. The complaint, CR Case No 2512 of
      2015, pending in the Court of SDJM(S) II, Kamrup (M), Guwahati is
      quashed.
            17. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

F
      Divya Pandey                                                 Appeal allowed.




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