MUSKANversusISHAAN KHAN (SATANIYA) AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1287
- Decided
- 6 November 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SANJAY KAROL
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by conducting a mini‑trial and quashing the FIR; under Section 482 Cr.PC the court may only quash when no prima facie case exists.
Summary
The appellant, Muskan, married Ishaan Khan in 2020 and later alleged dowry harassment by her husband and his family, filing complaints in early 2023 and an FIR in January 2024 under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 Dowry Prohibition Act. The respondents filed a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.PC seeking quashment of the FIR, arguing that the earlier complaints did not mention two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later added in the FIR. The High Court quashed the FIR on this ground, effectively conducting a mini‑trial, and the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 482, emphasizing that at the quashment stage the court must only determine whether a prima facie case exists and must not assess the credibility of allegations. Relying on precedents such as Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure, the Court held that the High Court’s approach amounted to an impermissible mini‑trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeal, leaving the FIR to proceed in the trial court.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was correct in quashing the FIR on the ground that the earlier complaints omitted the specific incidents of 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, thereby conducting a ‘mini‑trial’ prohibited under Section 482 Cr.PC.
- Whether, at the stage of exercising power under Section 482, the court may examine the credibility or genuineness of the allegations or must limit its inquiry to the existence of a prima facie case.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972s. 155, s. 156, s. 482
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 498A
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 273 : 2025 INSC 1287
Muskan
v.
Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
(Criminal Appeal No. 4752 of 2025)
06 November 2025
[Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal
proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the ground
that the earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents
dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in
the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting a
‘mini trial’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of s.482
of the Cr.PC.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Marriage between the
appellant and respondent no.1 was solemnized in accordance
with Muslim traditions and customs – After 5-6 months of
the marriage, the private respondents started harassing the
appellant for dowry – Due to continuous cruelty faced by the
appellant at the hands of the private respondents, she returned
to her paternal home and registered an FIR u/s.498A of the
IPC and ss.3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against
respondent no.1 (husband), respondent no.2 (mother-in-law),
respondent no.3 (father-in law), respondent no.4 (sister-in-law)
and respondent no.5 (brother-in-law) – It was stated that on
22.07.2021, respondents hurled abuses at her and respondent
no.5 slapped her and asked her to bring dowry – Thereafter,
on 27.11.2022, respondent No.1, her husband, asked her
to bring Rs.50 lakhs from her father – Respondents filed a
petition u/s.482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR – The High Court
quashed the criminal proceedings – Correctness:
Held: On the aspect of the powers of the Courts u/s.482 of the
Cr.PC, it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not
required to conduct a mini trial – Thus, the jurisdiction u/s.482 of the
* Author
274 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Cr.PC with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court
has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available
to proceed against the accused or not – If sufficient material is
available, the power u/s.482 should not be exercised – In the
present case, from the conjoint reading of the complaints and the
FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and
demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High Court quashed
the FIR against the private respondents primarily on the ground
that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the appellant did
not mention the specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021
and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the FIR
only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the legal notice
sent by respondent no.1/husband to the appellant as she was not
coming back to her matrimonial home – This approach adopted
by the High Court, in considered opinion of this Court, amounts
to conducting a mini trial – Accordingly, the present case warrants
interference – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court
is set aside. [Paras 22, 27, 28]
Case Law Cited
State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others [1990] 3
Supp. SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; Daxaben v. State
of Gujarat and Others [2022] 13 SCR 295 : (2022) 16 SCC 117;
State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty and Others [2021] 9 SCR 335 :
(2022) 16 SCC 703; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh
and Others [2023] 2 SCR 819 : (2023) 18 SCC 399; Neeharika
Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and Others
[2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401; State of Telangana v.
Habib Abdullah Jeelani and Others [2017] 1 SCR 141 : (2017) 2
SCC 779 – relied on.
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others [2013]
14 SCR 713 : (2014) 2 SCC 1; Mahmood Ali and Others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2023) 15 SCC 488; Digambar and
Another v. State of Maharashtra and Another [2024] 12 SCR
1533 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3836; Dara Lakshmi Narayana and
Others v. State of Telangana and Another [2024] 12 SCR 559 :
(2025) 3 SCC 735 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 275
Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
List of Keywords
Section 482 of Cr.PC; Quashing of FIR; Mini trial; Jurisdiction
u/s.482 Cr.PC; Dowry; Dowry harassment; Demand of dowry.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
4752 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.07.2024 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in MCRC No. 10695 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Amicus Curiae:
Prakhar Srivastava.
Advs. for the Appellant:
Pavani Verma, Mayank Kshirsagar.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Aditya Vaibhav Singh, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Ms. Maitreyee
Jagat Joshi, Gautam Singh, Astik Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar,
Yaduven.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present Appeal has been preferred against the impugned order
dated 19.07.2024 in Misc. Criminal Case No.10695 of 2024 passed
by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore wherein the High
Court has quashed the proceedings emanating from FIR No. 35
of 2024 dated 28.01.2024 registered at Police Station Alot, District
Ratlam, Madhya Pradesh under Section 498A of the Indian Penal
Code, 18601 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 against private respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein.
1 “IPC”
276 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3. At the outset, it will be pertinent to mention that respondent Nos.1 to
5 herein have not entered appearance in the present case and vide
order dated 28.03.2025, this Court appointed Mr. Prakhar Srivastava,
learned counsel, as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court (Pro Bono)
on behalf of the unrepresented respondents.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
4. Brief facts of the present matter are that the marriage between the
appellant and respondent No. 1 was solemnized on 20.11.2020 in
accordance with Muslim traditions and customs. From the marriage,
a son was born. During the initial days of the marriage, the appellant
was treated well by respondent No. 1 and his family members.
5. However, after 5-6 months of the marriage, the private respondents
started harassing the appellant by taunting her that her father had
given nothing in dowry. Her husband and other members of his family
started hurling filthy abuses at the appellant. Further, respondent
No.1, told the appellant to fetch Rs.50 lakhs from her father so that
he can pass the MIC examination. He told her, he will only keep her
if she tells her father to give Rs.50 lakhs.
6. Due to continuous cruelty faced by the appellant at the hands of the
private respondents, she returned to her paternal home and registered
an FIR being FIR No.35 of 2024 registered at Police Station Alot,
District Ratlam, Madhya Pradesh under Section 498A of the IPC and
Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against Ishaan Khan,
respondent No.1 (husband), Irfana Bee, respondent No.2 (mother-
in-law), Ishaaq Khan, respondent No.3 (father-in-law), Aaysha Bee,
respondent No.4 (sister-in-law) and Shahid Khan, respondent No.5
(brother-in-law).
7. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that after 5-6 months of
marriage, all the above-named persons started taunting her for not
giving dowry. It was stated that on 22.07.2021, respondent Nos.1
to 5 hurled abuses at her and her brother-in-law, who is respondent
No.5, slapped her and asked her to bring dowry. Thereafter, on
27.11.2022, respondent No.1, her husband, asked her to bring
Rs.50 lakhs from her father as he wanted to pursue further medical
studies. Pursuant to which, her husband ousted both, the appellant
and their son Iwaan Khan, from the matrimonial house. Thereafter,
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 277
Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
the appellant started residing with her parents. It was further stated
on behalf of the appellant that her father made several attempts to
reconcile differences, but the private respondents were adamant in
their demand for the sum of Rs.50 lakhs.
8. Against FIR No.35 of 2024, respondent Nos.1 to 5 preferred
Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.10695 of 2024, a petition under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 19732, for
quashing of the said FIR registered under Section 498A of the IPC
and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and all
further proceedings arising therefrom.
9. The High Court vide the impugned order dated 19.07.2024 allowed
the Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.10695 of 2024. Being aggrieved
thereby, the present Appeal has been filed.
10. While issuing notice in this matter, this Court passed the following
order on 24.01.2025:
“1. Delay condoned.
2. We have perused the complaint dated 23rd January,
2023, filed by the instant petitioner at the concerned police
station, which is part of the additional documents filed by
the petitioner (page no.6).
3. Prima facie, we are of the view that the matter requires
consideration, more so, in view of the observation made
by the High Court in Para No.10 of the impugned order.
4. Issue notice, returnable on 28.02.2025.
5. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted. Steps for service
be taken within two weeks.”
(emphasis supplied)
This Court noted that this matter requires consideration, more so,
in view of the observation made by the High Court in paragraph 10
of the impugned order.
2 For short, ‘the Cr.PC’
278 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
B. SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned Amicus
Curiae for the unrepresented private respondent Nos.1 to 5 and
learned counsel for respondent No.6-State of Madhya Pradesh.
12. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.6/State
argues that power of quashing should be exercised only in rarest of
rare cases. The High Court while examining an FIR/complaint ought
not to embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability and genuineness
of allegations. It was also argued that merely because the appellant
did not mention the two specific incidents earlier in the complaints
before registration of the FIR, the same could not have been termed
as an afterthought when other specific allegations of harassment
and demand of dowry were mentioned. To bolster his submissions,
reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in Neeharika
Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and Others3
and State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others4.
13. Learned Amicus Curiae appearing on the behalf of the private
respondents submits that a bare perusal of the complaints dated
22.01.2023 and 23.01.2023 lodged by the appellant before the
Women’s Cell in Ratlam and the subsequent FIR dated 28.01.2024
would reveal that there are some inconsistencies in the contents
thereof. The complaints filed before the Women’s Cell in Ratlam
are generic in nature whereby the appellant had inter alia alleged
that since her marriage, she was not being treated properly and was
subjected to abuses and constant taunts for not bringing enough
dowry and respondent No. 2 i.e. the mother-in-law, was not providing
enough food and water to her whilst also keeping her under constant
surveillance. Interestingly, there is no mention of either of the two
dates i.e. 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022. Further, there is no mention
of a crystallized amount of dowry allegedly demanded by respondent
Nos. d1 to 5 in these complaints.
14. It was further argued that the appellant was allegedly ousted
from her matrimonial home on 27.11.2022 by respondent No.1.
Thereafter, she filed a complaint before the Women’s Cell, Ratlam
3 (2021) 19 SCC 401
4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 279
Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
on 22.01.2023 whereas the FIR was lodged after a delay of 1 year
i.e. on 28.01.2024. Further, the contents of the FIR reveal that the
appellant has not made specific allegations against respondent
Nos. 2 to 4 and merely vague and omnibus averments have been
made, which even if relied on their face value, do not constitute the
commission of a cognizable offence.
15. To bolster his submissions, learned Amicus Curiae has relied on
the decisions of this Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of
Uttar Pradesh and Others5, Mahmood Ali and Others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Others6, Digambar and Another v. State
of Maharashtra and Another7 and Dara Lakshmi Narayana and
others v. State of Telangana and Another8.
16. The rival submissions now fall for our consideration.
C. ANALYSIS
17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether the High Court
was right in quashing the criminal proceedings against the private
respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier complaints
did not mention the two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and
27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR and whether the
same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ which is clearly
prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of the Cr.PC.
18. At the outset it will be appropriate to advert to the observations made
by the High Court in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the impugned order:
“9. It is undisputed that prior to filing FIR (Annexure P/5),
a written complaint dated 22.01.2023 (Annexure P/3) was
filed before Mahila Police Station, Ratlam, District Ratlam
(MP) for the alleged harassment meted out to respondent
No.2 from her husband and in-laws (applicants before this
Court). It is also not in dispute that both the parties i.e.
applicant No. 1 and respondent No.2, on their counter
allegations, were advised by Police Mahila Thana, Ratlam
5 (2014) 2 SCC 1
6 (2023) 15 SCC 488
7 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3836
8 (2025) 3 SCC 735
280 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to take recourse of law, but no action was taken on the
above 3 MCRC-10695-2024 complaint by respondent No.2.
In such a situation, if respondent No.2 was aggrieved of
advice dated 23.01.2023 given by Mahila Police Station,
Ratlam, she might have approached the Superintendent
of Police for inaction on the part of the concerned Police
Station on her complaint, but this has not been done.
10. It is also pertinent to note that in the (sic) above written
complaint, there has not been a whisper of the events of
harassment on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, as narrated
in the FIR (Annexure P/5). It manifests that the alleged
incidents of harassment meted out to the complainant
allegedly took place on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 are
afterthought. The contentions raised on behalf of the
applicants that FIR (Annexure P/5) is a counterblast
to notice (Annexure P/1) given by applicant No. 1 to
respondent No.2 also finds support from the above.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. From a bare perusal of the above mentioned paragraphs it can be
seen that one of the important factors that weighed in while allowing
the quashing application of the private respondents was that in
the earlier complaints filed by the appellant, there was no mention
of the events of harassment that happened on 22.07.2021 and
27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR dated 28.01.2024.
Hence, we extract the relevant portion of the complaints dated
22.01.2023 and 23.01.2023 which would clearly indicate prime facie
allegations of harassment and demand of dowry against the private
respondents:
“22.01.2023
…That immediately after the Nikah, the respondents
namely Ishan, father-in-law Ishaq Khan, mother-in-law
Irfana Bi, sister-in law (Nanad) Ayesha, Nandoi Shayid
Khan, Jeth Hemuddin son of Akbar Khan resident of
Ujjain started raising demand of dowry from me. They
are constantly causing physical and mental harassment
for the last two years. A demand of dowry is being raised
every day since the day of my marriage. My father gave
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 281
Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
a Pulsar Bike but I was asked to bring a car. On the
occasion of my sister-in-law’s wedding, they asked me
to ask my father to give an A.C to their daughter Ayesha
in the dowry. My mother-in-law did not allow my husband
to come to the hospital at the time of my delivery. At the
time of my ‘God-Bharai’, she demanded clothes and my
mother-in-law puts restrictions on my eating food and
having breakfast. She asks me to eat the same vegetable
three times a day and asks me not to eat breakfast, she
lets me drink tea once a day, she has installed cameras in
my kitchen. My mother-in-law locks me in the house from
outside. She does not allow me to talk to my husband. My
husband would come to me at 11 o’clock in the night and
would quarrel with me and assault me. My sister-in-law
and brother-in-law would come to Ghosla almost every
day and would scare me and threaten to kill me. They do
not give me my mobile phone, they do not let my family
members come to Ghosla and talk to me even on the
phone. It is the daily routine of my father-in-law to hurl
abuses morning and evening.”
*****
23.01.2023
…. Since after my marriage, I have been tortured and
threatened. Ask your father to give a car and a demand
was raised for an A.C. in my sister-in-law’s marriage.
When the demand could not be fulfilled by my father, I
am being made to eat same vegetable for three days and
they do not allow me to take my breakfast and I am given
tea only once in a day.
My mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law and father-
in-law come together to my room and hurl abuses and
threaten me. My father-in-law hurls abuses in obscene
language and my mother-in-law makes me work the entire
day and does not let me eat anything. My sister-in-law
and brother-in-law everyday tell my mother-in-law to send
him away over the phone. Many times they confine me
in the room and lock the same from outside and I am not
allowed to go out and I am not even allowed to open the
282 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
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window of the house. They have confined me as hostage
in the house for many days. They do not let me talk to my
family on phone and do not even let my family members
meet me. My husband is also involved in all this. He never
gives me even 2 rupees for expenses. They do not even
allow me to visit my relatives. As such, being troubled by
all this, I came to my parents’ house.
….”
It is also apposite that we extract the relevant portions of the FIR so as
to better understand the allegations against the private respondents,
particularly the two specific incidents that happened on 22.07.2021
and 27.11.2022. The relevant extract reads thus:
“…..I kept tolerating their taunts in order to save my
marital life. But on 22.07.2021, my husband Ishan Khan,
mother-in-law Irfana Bee, father-in-law Ishaq Khan, sister-in
law Aaysha Bee and brother-in-law (Nandoi) Syed Khan
hurled abuses to me. My brother-in-law (Nandoi) Syed
Khan slapped me also and asked me to bring dowry from
your father’s house. Despite all this, I kept tolerating their
torture. But on 27.11.2022, my husband Ishan Khan told
me that I have passed the examination of M.B.B.S. and
now I have to pursue M.C.I. Examination, as such, now if
you will bring an amount of Rs. fifty lacs from your father,
only then, I will keep you with me and say this, he ousted
me and my son Iwaan Khan from the house while holding
our hand. Thereafter, I came to my father Zahid Khan’s
house at Alot and narrated the entire incident to my father
and mother Parveen Bee. Since then, I am residing at
Alot alongwith my father. My father made several attempts
to make my husband and in-laws understand but these
people are adamant for their demand of dowry of a sum
of Rs. fifty lacs that unless and until, they are given a
dowry of Rs. fifty lacs, they will not take me with them.
Today, I have come to make a report in the police station
alongwith my father Zahid Khan. I lodge the report, action
may be taken.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 283
Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
20. The classic exposition on law under Section 482 of the CrP.C is
found in Bhajan Lal (supra) wherein this Court elaborated upon the
scope of Section 482 of the Cr.PC. It was held thus:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section
482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we have given the following categories of cases by
way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not
be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
284 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there
is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
21. In Daxaben v. State of Gujarat and Others9, a two-Judge Bench
held as follows:
“26. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC, to interfere with criminal
proceedings is wide, such power has to be exercised with
circumspection, in exceptional cases. Jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC is not to be exercised for the asking.
27. In Monica Kumar v. State of U.P. [(2008) 8 SCC 781 :
(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 649], this Court held that inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the section itself.
28. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process
of the Court, the High Court might in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 quash criminal proceedings.
However, interference would only be justified when the
9 (2022) 16 SCC 117
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 285
Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court
in Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC
686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142 : AIR 1990 SC 494] .
*****
36. Offence under Section 306 IPC of abetment to commit
suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course,
the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482
CrPC is wide and can even be exercised to quash criminal
proceedings relating to non-compoundable offences, to
secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of court. Where the victim and offender have
compromised disputes essentially civil and personal in
nature, the High Court can exercise its power under Section
482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings. In what cases
power to quash an FIR or a criminal complaint or criminal
proceedings upon compromise can be exercised, would
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.”
22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the
Cr.PC, it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not
required to conduct a mini trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr.PC with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as
the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is
available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material
is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised.
23. This Court in the case of State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty and
Others10 held that:
“8.2. It is trite that the power of quashing should be
exercised sparingly and with circumspection and in rare
cases. As per the settled proposition of law while examining
an FIR/complaint quashing of which is sought, the court
cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather
than any ordinary rule. Normally the criminal proceedings
10 (2022) 16 SCC 703
286 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
should not be quashed in exercise of powers under
Section 482 CrPC when after a thorough investigation
the charge-sheet has been filed. At the stage of discharge
and/or considering the application under Section 482CrPC
the courts are not required to go into the merits of the
allegations and/or evidence in detail as if conducting the
mini-trial. As held by this Court the powers under Section
482 CrPC are very wide, but conferment of wide power
requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous
and more diligent duty on the Court.”
24. Further in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan
Singh and Others11, this Court held that at the stage of Section 482
of the Cr.PC, the High Court is not required to conduct a mini trial.
“6. From the impugned common judgment and order [Aryan
Singh v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 4158] passed by the
High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the
proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting
a mini trial and/or the High Court was considering the
applications against the judgment and order passed by
the learned trial court on conclusion of trial. As per the
cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or
quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the
powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required
to conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the common
impugned judgment and order has observed that the
charges against the accused are not proved. This is not
the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are
required to prove the charges. The charges are required
to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence
led by the prosecution/investigating agency.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. This Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited (supra)
gave following directions to the Courts exercising the power under
Section 482 of the Cr.PC:
11 (2023) 18 SCC 399
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 287
Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
“Conclusions
33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether
the High Court would be justified in passing an interim
order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps
to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing
petition under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226
of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and
whether the High Court would be justified in passing the
order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps
to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final
report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173 CrPC, while
dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the
criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers
under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
33.1 ….
33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.
33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report
that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.
33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly
with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the “rarest
of rare cases” (not to be confused with the formation in
the context of death penalty).
33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which
is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint.
33.6 ….
33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
rather than an ordinary rule.
33.8 to 33.11 ….
288 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopedia
which must disclose all facts and details relating to the
offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the
police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits
of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted
to complete the investigation. It would be premature to
pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the
complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that
it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if
the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in
the application made by the complainant, the investigating
officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the
learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
33.13 and 33.14 …..
33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by
the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the
power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider
whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission
of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required
to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the
allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court
has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate
the allegations in the FIR.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. Further, this Court in the case of State of Telangana v. Habib
Abdullah Jeelani and Others12 held that:
“13. There can be no dispute over the proposition that
inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR has to
be exercised sparingly and with caution and when and
only when such exercise is justified by the test specifically
laid down in the provision itself. There is no denial of the
fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide
but it needs no special emphasis to state that conferment
12 (2017) 2 SCC 779
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 289
Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others
of wide power requires the Court to be more cautious. It
casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.
14. In this regard, it would be seemly to reproduce
a passage from Kurukshetra University [Kurukshetra
University v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 451: 1977
SCC (Cri) 613] wherein Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordship
then was) opined thus : (SCC p. 451, para 2)
“2. It surprises us in the extreme that the
High Court thought that in the exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a first
information report. The police had not even
commenced investigation into the complaint
filed by the Warden of the University and no
proceeding at all was pending in any court in
pursuance of the FIR. It ought to be realised
that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary
jurisdiction on the High Court to act according
to whim or caprice. That statutory power has
to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection
and in the rarest of rare cases.” ”
(emphasis supplied)
27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking
upon an enquiry with regard to credibility or otherwise of the allegations
in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it
must be shown that there exists no prime facie case against the
accused persons. In the present case, from the conjoint reading of
the complaints and the FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations
of harassment and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the
High Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents primarily
on the ground that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the
appellant did not mention the specific instances that happened on
22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned
in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the
legal notice sent by respondent no.1/husband to the appellant as
she was not coming back to her matrimonial home. This approach
adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to
conducting a mini trial.
290 [2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
28. Accordingly, in our view, the present case warrants interference by
this Court, and we do so. We hereby set aside the impugned order
passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.10695
of 2024.
29. The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. All contentions and defences
available to the respective parties are kept open which shall be
considered by the Trial Court on its own merits and in accordance
with law.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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