Supreme Court of India
MURLIDHAR AGGARWAL (D.) THR. HIS LR. ATUL KUMAR AGGARWALversusMAHENDRA PRATAP KAKAN (D.) THR. LRS. AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 564
- Decided
- 24 April 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
Bona‑fide need for personal occupation of the landlord, including that of his dependent family members, is established and the eviction order is upheld.
Summary
The appellant, a landlord, sought eviction of a tenant who had occupied a cinema building in Allahabad since 1952 under a ten‑year lease that had long expired. The Prescribed Authority had allowed eviction on the ground of bona‑fide need, noting the landlord's limited income, his crippled son’s dependence, and the tenant’s failure to secure alternative premises. The Appellate Authority reversed that order, claiming the landlord’s claim of no other business was untrue, and the High Court affirmed the reversal. The Supreme Court held that bona‑fide need must be liberally construed, that Section 21(7) permits the landlord’s heirs to continue the claim, and that the tenant had not shown any effort to obtain alternative accommodation. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order, reinstated the eviction, and directed the tenant to vacate by 31‑December‑2025.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 to the landlord’s claim of personal requirement.
- Whether the landlord’s bona‑fide need is established despite the appellant’s alleged other business interests.
- Whether the tenant’s long tenancy and lack of alternative accommodation constitute a comparative hardship that outweighs the landlord’s claim.
- Whether Section 21(7) allows the legal representatives of a deceased landlord to pursue the eviction on the basis of their own need.
Legislation cited
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the order passed by the High Court confirming the order of the appellate authority which had reversed the order passed by the prescribed authority granting eviction of the respondent-tenant on the ground Headnotes† Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 – ss.21(1)a, 21(7) – Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 – r.16(2) – Proceedings for release of building under
Subjects
Eviction petitionBona fide needFilm distribution businessLease deedComparative hardshipAlternative accommodationAppellate authorityPrescribed authorityPersonal requirementExpiry of lease
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1753 : 2025 INSC 564
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal
v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 4275 of 2017)
24 April 2025
[M.M. Sundresh and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the order passed by the High Court
confirming the order of the appellate authority which had reversed
the order passed by the prescribed authority granting eviction of
the respondent-tenant on the ground of bona fide need.
Headnotes†
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1972 – ss.21(1)a, 21(7) – Uttar Pradesh
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Rules, 1972 – r.16(2) – Proceedings for release of building
under occupation of tenant – Release on ground of personal
requirement – Respondents entered the suit property by a
lease deed for 10 years in 1952 – Predecessor-in-interest of
the appellant purchased the suit property in 1962 – Appellant
sought eviction, and the Prescribed authority ordered the
eviction of respondent-tenant on grounds of bona fide need
and comparative hardship – Appellate authority set aside the
said order – High Court affirmed the order of the appellate
authority – Sustainability:
Held: Bona fide requirement for occupation of the landlord has to
be liberally construed and, as such, even the requirement of the
family members would be covered – Appellate authority did not
give convincing reasons for dislodging the independent findings
arrived at by prescribed authority that the need of the appellant
was bona fide – Elaborate reasons adduced and cogent finding
recorded by prescribed authority that the bona fide need was
found established – Son of the appellant is crippled and has
no other source of income or any other business, need of the
appellant clearly established – Bona fide need as on the date of
eviction petition or taking subsequent events into account, bona
* Author
1754 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
fide need is made out – Respondents who own several businesses
managed to cling on to the premises for the last 63 years, after
the expiry of the 10-year lease – Nothing on record to show that
the tenant after the expiry of the lease, made any attempt to seek
any alternative accommodation and to show that he was unable to
get one – Furthermore, nothing on record to show that business of
appellant’s family is so vast as to neutralize their bona fide claim
to evict the respondents from the property – Impugned order set
aside – Respondents to vacate the premises and deliver the vacant
and peaceful possession. [Paras 12, 13, 23-30, 33]
Case Law Cited
Sheshambal (D.) Thr. LRs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building
and Ors. [2010] 2 SCR 960 : (2010) 3 SCC 470 – distinguished.
Mohd. Ayub and Anr. v. Mukesh Chand [2012] 1 SCR 12 : (2012)
2 SCC 155; Ganga Devi v. District Judge, Nainital and Ors. [2008]
8 SCR 538 : (2008) 7 SCC 770; Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur (Smt)
and Anr. (1991) Supp. 2 SCC 300; Sushila v. IInd Addl. District
Judge, Banda and Ors. [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 286 : (2003) 2 SCC
28; Nidhi v. Ram Kripal Sharma (D.) Thr. LRs [2017] 1 SCR 897 :
(2017) 5 SCC 640 – referred to.
List of Acts
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972; Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972; U.P. (Temporary) Control
of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.
List of Keywords
Eviction petition; Bona fide need; Film distribution business; Lease
deed; Comparative hardship; Objection to maintainability; Alternative
accommodation; Appellate authority; Prescribed authority;
Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant;
Release on ground of personal requirement; Expiry of the lease.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4275 of 2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.01.2013 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in WA No. 8508 of 1999
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1755
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Balbir Singh, Sr. Adv., Naman Tandon, Ms. Shivali Singh, Vedant
Kohli, Soayib Qureshi.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Anand Varma, Ms. Apoorva Pandey, Ramendra Mohan Patnaik.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. The present appeal calls in question the correctness of the Judgment
and Order dated 09.01.2013 in Writ-A No. 8508 of 1999 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. By the said Judgment and
Order, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition of the appellant and
confirmed the order of the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority
had reversed the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 20.12.1983
by which the Prescribed Authority had allowed the application of
the appellant and ordered the eviction of the respondent-Ram Agya
Singh on the ground of bona fide need.
BRIEF FACTS: -
2. On 13.10.1952, the respondents entered the suit property by virtue of
a lease deed executed by one Ram Swarup Gupta, the then owner
of the suit property. The lease was for a period of 10 years. The
predecessor-in-interest of the present appellant, one Shri Murlidhar
Aggarwal purchased the suit property on 26.03.1962. The suit
property is a Cinema building situated at 31, Shiv Charan Lal Road,
Allahabad, popularly known as Mansarovar Palace, along with its
furniture, fixture and fittings.
3. There is a previous round of litigation which requires a brief
mention. Case No. 124 of 1965 was instituted by Murlidhar Aggarwal
seeking eviction under Section 7A of the U.P. (Temporary) Control
of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (for short ‘1947 Act’). An order of
eviction was made by the Additional District Magistrate which was
confirmed by the Additional Commissioner. On a revision filed under
1756 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Section 7F of the 1947 Act, the tenants succeeded in getting the
eviction order set aside by filing a representation before the State
Government. Though the learned Single Judge at the behest of Shri
Murlidhar Aggarwal quashed the order of the State Government, the
Division Bench reversed the order and this Court, by a judgment
reported in Murlidhar Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1974) 2 SCC
472, confirmed the order of the Division Bench. The net result was
that the proceedings came to an end and the tenants continued to
occupy the premises.
4. On 09.10.1975, Murlidhar Aggarwal, the predecessor-in-interest of
the appellant herein filed Case No. 301 of 1975 under Section 21(1)
(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short ‘Act of 1972’). Though Rajkumar
Aggarwal was applicant no. 2 before the Appellate Authority, it is not
in dispute that he has since relinquished his claim.
5. As is clear from the order of the Prescribed Authority, it was specifically
pleaded in the application that the said Shri Murlidhar Aggarwal was
living at the mercy of his father; that he has his wife and children to
look after; that there was no independent business which they are
doing and that in spite of their father’s repeated advice to start some
business they are not able to get a place to start the business; that
the opposite party is refusing to vacate the premises in spite of the
expiry of the lease; that the opposite party has other places where he
is carrying on business apart from their own residential house; that
the opposite party has cinema business in Gazipur and Varanasi and
are also doing film distribution business. It was specifically pleaded
that there was no independent income for the applicants, and they
are in bona fide need of the property. It was also pleaded that their
need was pressing, bona fide and genuine.
6. In response, the respondent-tenant (Ram Agya Singh, the predecessor
of the respondents) pleaded that he has spent around Rs. 30,000/-
over the property, that the applicants are in joint family business with
their father Radhey Shyam Aggarwal; that Radhey Shyam Aggarwal
is running his business in the name of Ajanta Talkies; and that the
wife of Murlidhar Aggarwal, Prem Lata is a co-licensee with her
father-in-law in the Ajanta Talkies business. It was also pleaded that
the applicants have share in the firm Murlidhar Gyanendra Kumar
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1757
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
and that the monthly income was more than sufficient for applicant
No. 1 to maintain himself, his wife and children. As far as their own
business in Gazipur was concerned, it was contended that it was in
the name of the predecessor of the respondent(s) and the premises
of Gazipur were tenanted. The running of the film distribution business
in the name of Chitra Lok Films was admitted. It was disputed that
the need of the applicant is bona fide and it was pleaded that a lot
of employees were dependent on the income from the Cinema which
is being run in the suit premises.
7. The Prescribed Authority held that in the earlier round, bona fide
requirement was found and the said finding was not disturbed
throughout. It independently examined the bona fide need in the
present application. The Prescribed Authority disbelieved the
contention that the applicant Murlidhar Aggarwal was part of the
joint family business with his father Radhey Shyam Aggarwal.
The Prescribed Authority held that no proof was adduced by the
respondent(s) to show that the Ajanta Talkies business was inherited
by the applicants.
8. The Prescribed Authority found that the applicant was getting a
salary of Rs. 1200/- from Ajanta Talkies business and Rs. 500/- per
month from Radhey Shyam and Sons and this was the only source
of income of applicant no. 1-Murlidhar Aggarwal.
9. The Prescribed Authority found that the respondent tenant could not
dispute the bona fide need of the applicant. The Prescribed Authority
further found that the applicant no.1-Murlidhar Aggarwal had only
some casual income which came from some speculative business
and the income was Rs. 11,142/- in 1975-76 and Rs. 9115/- in 1976-
77 and the applicant had a loss of Rs. 10,118/- in 1974-75. It was
concluded that the applicant no. 1-Murlidhar Aggarwal was possessing
wealth in the negative. In the end, the Prescribed Authority recorded
the following findings:-
“In the present case the income of applicant No1 does
not exceed more than Rs.11,000/-. The applicant No 2
income does not exceed more than Rs. 10,000/-. They
are hardly paying income Tax. The applicant No 2 has no
other business to do. His only income is from the interest
on deposits. They have wealth in minus. The opposite
party stated in his written statement in para No 2 that the
1758 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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premises are purchased for doing profiteering. Applicant
No1 is married have children to look after. The applicant
are (sic) his demand for the release of the premises for
doing the Cinema business. The premises are not released.
If applicant started to earn his bread himself and for his
family by doing speculation and doing service elsewhere.
It does not mean (sic) they have no bona fide need of
premises. The applicant has to look for the avenues of
income to support his family. It is not the requirement
of law that applicant should sit idle till his premises are
not released. The opposite party failed to establish that
there is deceit in the need of the applicants. It appears
that premises are honestly and in good faith required by
landlord for carrying out his business as applicant No 2
is still out of business. There is felt need on the part of
landlord for the release therefore; they are passing his
claim from 1965. The element of deceit is absent.
Therefore, I reach at conclusion that the premises in dispute
are bona fide required by the landlord. There is felt need
on the part of landlord for carrying the business.”
10. Thereafter, the aspect of comparative hardship was appreciated. The
Prescribed Authority recorded the following findings: -
“The three sons of the opposite party got the 2 proprietors
(sic.) at Ghazipur by a Will which is paper No Annexure
Paper No 27/A. the one property is Regal Talkies and other
property is not disclosed. The opposite party inherited
the ancestral property as only father of opposite party
bequeathed the self acquired property of his 3 grand
sons. Thus the sons of opposite party are well settled. The
opposite party is man of substance and running several
Cinema Houses and paying 7 lacks Tax to Government.
He is man of 76 year and confined to bed as admitted in
the Court. His all daughters are married. He is also running
the business of film distribution.
I am putting on the weighing scale the need of both the
parties to Judge the comparative hardship. On one hand
the opposite party Ram Agya Singh is man of substance
running several Cinema Houses in U.P doing also film
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1759
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
distributing business. His all the three sons are well settled.
He is owner No50/B/51/B and 36/A. He has no wordly
liabilities to discharge on his shoulders. His all daughters
are married. He is man of 76 years old and confined to
bed. Fast approaching toward the point of eternal sleep
fixed for every human being.
The applicant No 1 is married and started to do service in
Ajanta Talkies and M/s Radhey Shyam and sons on the
monthly salary due to forced circumstances to maintain his
family. He has no other business to do. His income hardly
exceeds Rs. 1000/- per year. He started to do speculation
business to look after his family which is no longer a good
job. He has to discharge the wordly liabilities that are to
perform the marriages of his daughter. He is man of 40
years age and have to long face the world. His sons are
not settled and pursuing the studies.
After giving the human touch to the whole affair it clear that
balance is in favour of landlord applicant. The premises
were leased out to opposite early for the period of 10
years in year’1952. He is enjoying the premises from last
31 years.
I reach at conclusion on the basis of above findings that
landlord will suffer more hardship if the premises in question
not released in their favour.”
So finding, the Prescribed Authority ordered the eviction of the
respondent and further ordered the payment of Rs. 72,000/- as
equivalent to rent of 5 years as compensation for goodwill and loss
of business.
11. The respondent filed an appeal before the XIth Addl. District Judge
Allahabad, challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority.
Arguments that were already rejected about the alleged multiple
businesses of the appellant were once again canvassed.
12. The Appellate Authority discarded the finding of the Prescribed
Authority insofar as it was held by the said Authority that bona fide
need had already been found in the earlier round of litigation. Be
that as it may, we will keep this aspect of the matter aside since we
find that the Appellate Authority has not given convincing reasons
1760 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
for dislodging the independent findings arrived at in the present
proceedings by the Prescribed Authority that the need for the
appellant was bona fide. The only finding recorded in this regard by
the Appellant Authority is as follows: -
“I fully agree with the contention of the applicants that on
the basis of the evidence the need of the respondents/
applicants for the disputed building is not bona fide. My
above view gets this support from the fact of the applicants
of the application. Appellant No. 1 has stated that he
does not have any business and or his savings and
money have been invested in the purchase of disputed
building for cinema. This fact has not only been denied
by the opposite party but it has also been proved by
the evidence. Appellant has not denied this fact that the
business in the name of M/s Radhey Shyam & Sons and
M/s Murlidhar & Gynander Kumar and M/s Ajanta Talkies
are not in his possession. The opposite party/appellant
in this respect has clearly stated and has also proved
by the evidence that 40% partnership of applicant No. 1
exists in M/s Radhey Shyam & Sons and applicant No. 2
was a student and unmarried person at the time of filing
of application. Thus the applicants has admitted that his
income is also from other sources which includes M/s
Radhey Shyam and Sons, M/s Ajanta Talkies, M/s Murlidhar
Gyanander Kumar and income tax is also being paid by
him. The opposite party/appellant also produced important
documents pertaining to income tax department on the
file by which it becomes clear that admittedly respondent
is having income from the business. Therefore, the case
of the applicants that they are not having any business
becomes completely (sic) proved untrue completely. In
this respect the judgment passed by the Ld. Prescribed
Authority is wholly against the facts. The Ld. Prescribed
Authority has drawn this conclusion that the income of the
applicants is not sufficient whereas the applicants have
taken this stand that they do not have any business. In
view of this the Prescribed authority in fact has found
an additional new case as proved contrary to the stand
taken by the applicants which is wholly against the facts
available on the file.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1761
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
13. We find that this finding is wholly unsustainable. The Prescribed
Authority, after analyzing the documents, has concluded that the
wealth of the applicant was in the negative and the income was
also abysmally low and referred to the documentary evidence as
extracted hereinabove. The only reason given by the Appellate
Authority is that since the appellants took the stand that they have
no other business and the finding of the Prescribed Authority was
that the income is not sufficient, the Prescribed Authority has found
a new case wholly against the facts available on record. This finding
is completely untenable. The Prescribed Authority found that while
there was some income from speculative transactions which was
sporadic, the only consistent income for applicant was his salary
income and concluded that the wealth was in the negative as far
as the applicants were concerned. There is no contradiction, much
less has any new case been made out.
14. The other finding is about the fate of the Ajanta Talkies business after
the death of Radhey Shyam Aggarwal, father of Murlidhar Aggarwal.
The Prescribed Authority had found that the respondents had not
established as to how the applicants have a stake in Ajanta Talkies.
The Appellate Authority has recorded the following finding.
“The finding of the lower court that the onus of proving the
fact that the property of late Radhey Shyam was acquired
by applicants in succession, is against the law and cannot
be accepted. And such type of finding cannot be accepted
and the findings made on this basis that the applicants
are not the owners of Ajanta Talkies is against the facts.”
15. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority dealt with the other businesses
run by the tenant and recorded the following finding: -
“On the other hand the Ld. Counsel of the appellant
disclosed about the above mentioned business according
to which Regal Talkies was in the ownership of late Thakur
Sehdev Singh wherein Late R.A. Singh is a tenant of Rs.
100/- per month after the death of Thakur Sehdev Singh as
per paper No. 11 List 928 all sons of late Shri R.A. Singh
got this building in succession and between the family
members of opposite party in Suit No. 15 of 1972 by way
of paper No. 19A Annexure 15 partition suit is pending
in the Court. It has also been shown that Gazipur is the
1762 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
backward area and two other cinema halls Sahni Talkies
and Subhadra Talkies are also opened which are in better
condition and therefore the business of Regal Talkies is
running in loss. In this respect documents were also made
available on the file in which Regal Talkies running in loss
is shown. Besides this it is also worth mentioning that the
business of Mansarovar Cinema situated at Allahabad
cannot be compared with the business of Regal Talkies
Ghaziabad as clear by the comparative table of income
brought on the file.
Likewise in respect of Chitra Talkies situated at Varanasi
it has been proved that it was taken on rent and the
contract has been expired and now this business is not
being done by the opposite party. In the same manner
it has been shown in respect of Chitralok films that no
business was done by this company and now it is not
in existence. Likewise in respect of income derived from
agricultural land it can be said on the basis of available
evidence that this is not such an income shows upon which
full dependency can be attributed. Likewise on behalf of
applicant it has been told about Allahabad Motor Garage
that the same is also running in loss and it was submitted
that Mansarovar Cinema is only the business of opposite
party and his source of income and thus on the basis of
available evidence the need of disputed building by the
opposite party is real bona fide and urgent and the need
of the applicants cannot be said to be bona fide.”
16. What is clear is that there are several businesses which the family
of respondents run. All that is mentioned is that partition suits are
pending; that Gazipur is a backward area and that certain other
businesses are either on loss or have since closed down. As far
as agricultural income is concerned, it was concluded summarily
that it was not such an income on which full dependency could be
attributed. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority had found that the
respondent could be put to greater hardship if eviction is ordered.
17. It is this finding which has been affirmed by the High Court.
18. Mr. Balbir Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended
that the Prescribed Authority having correctly arrived at the finding
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1763
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
of bona fide need by independently analyzing the evidence in the
case and there were no good grounds for the Appellate Authority to
reverse the said finding. It was also brought to the notice that during
the pendency of the proceeding in the High Court, Murlidhar Aggarwal
died and his son Atul Kumar Aggarwal has filed an affidavit stating
that he has no source of income and that he does not have any other
business. Further it is averred that there is no commercial property
except this suit property and that Atul Kumar is crippled on account
of the malfunctioning of the hip bone and is moving with a limp.
19. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Varma, learned Counsel for the
respondents has reiterated the finding of the Appellate Authority. It
is further contended that legal heirs cannot continue the litigation
on the basis of the need of their father and ought to prefer a fresh
application for release in accordance with law, setting up their own
requirement for release of the premises in question. Learned counsel
for the respondents contended that at no stage of the present
proceedings have the legal heirs of the appellant set up their own
need and requirement for the property in question. According to
the learned Counsel, the legal heirs are already well settled and
have no need for the property. According to the learned Counsel,
Civil Appeal @ Special Leave Petition, which has been filed on the
basis of the need of the appellant i.e. the original applicant, is thus
not maintainable.
20. We have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the
parties and perused the records.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS: -
21. Section 21(1)(a) of the 1972 Act, along with the proviso is extracted
hereinbelow: -
“21. Proceedings for release of building under
occupation of tenant. –
(1) The prescribed Authority may, on an application of the
landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from
the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it
is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely-
(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its
existing form or after demolition and new construction
1764 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by the landlord for occupation by himself or any
member of his family, or any person for whose benefit
it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for
purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where
the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust,
for the objects of the trust;
Provided that where the building was in the occupation of
a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such
purchase being made after the commencement of this
Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds,
mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has
elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord
has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less
than six months before such application, and such notice
may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid
period of three years:
Provided further that if any application under clause (a)
is made in respect of any building let out exclusively for
non-residential purposes, the prescribed authority while
making the order of eviction shall, after considering all
relevant facts of the case, award against the landlord to
the tenant an amount not exceeding two years’ rent as
compensation and may, subject to rules, impose such
other conditions as it thinks fit :
Provided also that no application under clause (a) shall
be entertained-
(i) for the purposes of a charitable trust, the objects
of which provide for determination in respect of its
beneficiaries on the ground of religion, caste or place
of birth;
(ii) in the case of any residential building, for
occupation for business purposes;
(iii) in the case of any residential building, against any
tenant who is a member of the armed forces of the
Union and in whose favour the prescribed authority
under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act
No. IV of 1925) has issued a certificate that he is
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1765
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
serving under special conditions within the meaning
of section 3 of that Act, or where he has died by
enemy action while so serving, then against his heirs:
Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in
cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account
the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the
application as against the likely hardship to the landlord
from the refusal of the application and for that purpose
shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed.
Explanation-- In the case of a residential building :
(i) where the tenant or any member of his family who has
been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him
has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or
has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in
the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no
objection by the tenant against an application under this
sub-section shall be entertained;
Note-- For the purposes of this clause a person shall be
deemed to have otherwise acquired a building, if he is
occupying a public building for residential purposes as a
tenant, allottee or licensee.
(ii) [***]
(iii) where the landlord of any building is –
(1) a serving or retired Indian Soldier as defined in
the Indian Soldiers (Litigation), Act, 1925 (IV of 1925)
and such building was let out at any time before his
retirement; or
(2) a widow of such a soldier and such building was
let out at any time before the retirement or death of
her husband, whichever, occurred earlier;
and such landlord needs such building for occupation
by himself or the members of his family for residential
purposes, then his representation that he needs the
building for residential purposes for himself or the
members of his family shall be deemed sufficient for
the purposes of clause (a), and where such landlord
1766 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
owns more than one building this provision shall apply
in respect of one building only.”
22. Rule 16(2) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as
the “Rules of 1972”) is set out hereinbelow: -
“16. Application for release on the ground of personal
requirement.-
(2) While considering an application for release under
clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect
of a building let out for purposes of any business, the
Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such facts
as the following-
(a) the greater the period since when the tenant
opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the
opposite party is, has been carrying on his business
in that building, the less the justification for allowing
the application;
(b) where the tenant has available with him suitable
accommodation to which he can shift his business
without substantial loss there shall be greater
justification for allowing the application;
(c) the greater the existing business of the landlords
own, apart from the business proposed to be set up
in the leased premises, the less the justification for
allowing the application, and even if an application
is allowed in such a case, the Prescribed Authority
may on the application of the tenant impose the
condition where the landlord has available with him
other accommodation (whether subject to the Act
or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed
business but may serve the purpose of the tenant,
that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to
the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the Prescribed
Authority;
(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced
or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1767
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building
was originally let out, completed his or her technical
education and is not employed in Government service,
and wants to engage in self-employment, his or her
need shall be given due consideration.
23. We must notice, at the outset, in this case that the bona fide need
was found established by the Prescribed Authority by its judgment
of 20.12.1983. Shri Murlidhar Aggarwal died during the pendency of
the proceedings in the High Court. We have carefully scanned the
finding and we find that elaborate reasons have been adduced and
cogent finding recorded. Whether we apply the bona fide need as on
the date of the eviction petition or take into account the subsequent
events, we find that the bona fide need of the appellant on the facts
of the present case is made out on both scenarios.
24. Section 21(7) of the 1972 Act is an important provision which reads
as under: -
“21. Proceedings for release of building under
occupation of tenant –
(7). Where during the pendency of an application under
clause (a) of sub-section (1), the landlord dies, his legal
representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such
application further on the basis of their own need in
substitution of the need of the deceased.”
ANALYSIS AND REASONS: -
25. It is well settled that the bona fide requirement for occupation of
the landlord has to be liberally construed and, as such, even the
requirement of the family members would be covered. [See Joginder
Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 and Dwarkaprasad
v. Niranjan and Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 549]
26. In this case, we have Section 21(7) additionally to reinforce the
position. In the absence of any denial to the facts that Atul Kumar,
the son of Murlidhar Aggarwal is crippled and has no other source
of income or any other business, the need of the appellant has
been clearly established in this case. Hence, the objection to the
maintainability of the special leave petition is rejected.
1768 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
27. The repeated reference to the alleged existence of other businesses
of the appellant does not carry the case of respondents any further. At
the outset, the bona fide need of the appellant is clearly established.
No doubt, Rule 16(2)(c) of the Rules of 1972 does mention that greater
the existing business of the landlords own, the less the justification
for allowing the application. It is also true that comparative hardship
is to be appreciated under the proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of the 1972
Act. We have weighed the evidence on record and found that taking
the case of the respondents at its highest, and even if we believe
each and every averment of the respondents at best, the parties in
financial terms could be said to be equally poised. The respondents
who own several businesses have managed to cling on to the
premises for the last 63 years, after the expiry of the 10-year lease.
28. In Mohd. Ayub and Anr. v. Mukesh Chand, (2012) 2 SCC 155, this
Court, by relying on Ganga Devi v. District Judge, Nainital and
Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 770 and Bhagwan Dass v. Jiley Kaur (Smt) and
Anr., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 300, held that one of the circumstances to
be seen while appreciating the comparative hardship is to examine
whether the tenant has brought on record any material to indicate
that at any time during the pendency of the long drawn-out litigation,
he made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was
unable to get it. This factor will be one of the circumstances to be
taken into consideration while determining whether the claim of the
landlord is bona fide. In this case, nothing is on record to show that
the tenant who has been in the premises for a total of 73 years with
63 years of them after the expiry of the lease, has made any attempt
to seek any alternative accommodation and nothing is brought on
record to show that he was unable to get one.
29. In Sushila v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda and Ors., (2003)
2 SCC 28, interpreting Rule 16 of the Rules of 1972, it was held
as under:-
“10. A bare perusal of Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972,
makes it clear that the Rule only prescribes certain factors
which have also to be taken into account while considering
the application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of
bona fide need. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 quoted earlier
relates to the cases of eviction from an accommodation for
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1769
Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v.
Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
business use. Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) provides, greater
the period of tenancy less the justification for allowing the
application; whereas according to clause (b) in case the
tenant has a suitable accommodation available to him
to shift his business, greater the justification to allow the
application. Availability of another suitable accommodation
to the tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer
period of tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided
under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another
factor which may in some cases be relevant under clause
(c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite
huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business
to be set up, there would be lesser justification to allow
the application. The idea behind clause (c) is apparent
i.e. where the landlord runs a huge business eviction may
not be resorted to for expansion or diversification of the
business by uprooting a tenant having a small business
for a very long period of time. In such a situation if eviction
is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship
to the tenant.
11. In the case in hand we find that even though the period
of tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but availability
of another shop to him where he can very well shift his
business as found by the prescribed authority, neutralises
the factor of length of tenancy in the accommodation in
dispute. We further find that the landlady has no other
shop where she can establish her son who is married and
unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate
that the business of the father of Prem Prakash is so
huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as
to attract application of clause (c) of Rule 16(2). As
observed earlier it is clear that the length of the period
of tenancy as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2)
of Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 is only one of the factors
to be taken into account in context with other facts and
circumstances of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion or
deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant.
Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into
service on behalf of the respondent, we find that according
1770 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to the guidelines provided therein balance tilts in favour
of the unemployed son of the landlady whose need is
certainly bona fide and has also been so accepted by the
respondent before us.”
30. Applying the same, we find that in this case also nothing has been
brought on record to show that the business of the appellant’s
family is so vast as to neutralize their bona fide claim to evict the
respondents from the suit property.
31. In Nidhi v. Ram Kripal Sharma(D.) Thr. LRs, (2017) 5 SCC 640,
the landlady had moved away to a different town after marrying an
officer of the Indian Revenue Service. Notwithstanding that the Court
found her bona fide need had subsisted as she wanted the premise
not just for herself but to accommodate her parents & grandparents
like in the present case, the need for the family was found.
32. In Sheshambal (D.) Thr. LRs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur
Building and Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 470, where the landlady lost
throughout from the Trial Court stage, this Court while confirming
the eviction decree found that none of the married daughters had a
bona fide need for the premises and that the death of the landlady
on facts of that case brought to an end the ground of personal
requirement. The said case is wholly distinguishable from the facts
that are established in the present case.
33. We finally bring the “curtains down” on this long drawn out litigation
concerning the cinema hall. For the reasons stated above, the appeal
is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court dated
09.01.2013 in Writ-A No. 8508 of 1999 is set aside. The respondents
are granted time till 31.12.2025 to vacate the premises and to deliver
vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises, subject to the
respondents filing the usual undertaking and clearing all arrears, if
any, of rent/use and occupation charges, within 4 weeks from today.
No order as to costs.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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