MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.versusRAJENDRA ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.

876                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    3 S.C.R. 876               [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.
                                        v.
        RAJENDRA ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.
                         (Civil Appeal No. 5894 of 2019)
B                                MAY 18, 2022
             [AJAY RASTOGI AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
             Hindu Succession Act, 1956: s.14 – Property of a female
      Hindu to be her absolute property – Hindu widow – Right to hindu
      undivided property – Held: Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is
C
      a tangible right against the property which flows from the spiritual
      relationship between the husband and the wife – Where a Hindu
      widow is found to be in exclusive settled legal possession of the
      HUF property, that itself would create a presumption that such
      property was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of
D     maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener did
      not earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-
      existing right of maintenance – Word “possessed by” and
      “acquired” used in s. 14(1) are of the widest amplitude and include
      the state of owning a property – It is by virtue of s.14(1), that the
      Hindu widow’s limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an
E
      absolute right, when such property is possessed by her whether
      acquired before or after the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of
      her right to maintenance – On facts, defendant no.1-hindu widow
      was staying in the suit property before the death of her uncle-in-
      law, and after his death was in possession and in charge of the said
F     property, and was paying the house tax prior to 1956 and was
      collecting the rent from the tenants in the suit property prior to and
      after 1956 – In view of her pre-existing right to maintenance from
      the estate of the HUF of her husband and in view of her exclusive
      settled possession of the suit property prior to and after the
      commencement of the 1956 Act, the defendant no.1 had acquired
G
      the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance,
      and that she had held the suit property as the full owner and not
      limited owner by virtue of s. 14(1) – Thus, the High Court rightly
      held that defendant no 1 had pre-existing right to maintenance in
      the suit property that had ripened into full ownership by virtue of s.
H     14(1) of the Act.
                                       876
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                877
           ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS.

      Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                A
      HELD: 1.1 From the plain reading of Section 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 along with the Explanation thereto,
it emerges that in order to become a full owner and not a limited
owner, of a property by virtue of Section 14(1), a female Hindu,
before or after the commencement of Act of 1956, must be in           B
possession of the property, and it must have been acquired by
her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of
maintenance, or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person,
whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage or by
her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in
any other manner whatsoever, or any such property must have           C
been held by her as stridhana immediately before the
commencement of the Act. [Paras 10-11][889-H; 890-A-B]
      1.2 In the instant case, the concern is with the claim of
defendant no.1 of having become the full owner in respect of the
suit property on the ground that she was in settled legal             D
possession of the suit property before and after the
commencement of the Act, in lieu of her pre-existing right of
maintenance, and such limited ownership right had fructified into
full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). The Hindu Women’s
Rights to Property Act, 1937 conferred right on Hindu widow to        E
the property of her husband, who died after the commencement
of the said Act of 1937 and not prior thereto. Defendant no.1’s
husband having expired in 1936, the said Act of 1937 would not
be applicable to facts of the case. However, prior to the said Act
of 1937, the right to maintenance of Hindu widow was recognised
in Shastric law. [Para 12][890-C-F]                                   F

      1.3 Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property
of her husband or of the husband’s HUF, she has a right to be
maintained out of the said property. She is entitled to retain the
possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance.
Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto envisages liberal           G
construction in favour of the females, with the object of advancing
and promoting the socio-economic ends sought to be achieved
by the said legislation. The words “possessed by” used in Section
14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state
                                                                      H
878            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     of owning a property, even though the Hindu woman is not in
      actual or physical possession of the same. Of course, it is equally
      well settled that the possession of the widow, must be under some
      vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not
      contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any
      right or title. [Para 14][895-B-D]
B
            1.4 In the instant case, the husband of defendant no.1
      expired in 1936, GN, the father-in-law of defendant no.1 expired
      in 1938 and HR, the brother of GN died in 1953. Plaintiff was
      adopted by SB in the year 1916. HR, GN and SB had common
      ancestor GP. It is also not disputed that the suit property was an
C     ancestral property in the hands of HR and GN. It is also not
      disputed that defendant no.1 was staying in the suit property before
      the death of HR, and after his death she was in possession and in
      charge of the said property, and was maintaining herself by
      collecting rent from the tenants who were occupying part of the
D     suit property. [Para 15][895-D-F]
             1.5 It clearly emerges that defendant no.1 was paying the
      house tax prior to 1956 and was collecting the rent from the
      tenants prior to and after 1956. Pertinently from the document
      Exhibit-54, it emerges that in 1940 defendant no.1, when she
E     was staying with her in-laws, had no source of maintenance, and
      therefore she was granted Rs. 2.50 per month by way of
      maintenance, by the Punya Department of the Government. She
      claiming to be a PARDANASHEEN lady had authorised the
      plaintiff to collect the said amount of maintenance. The said
      document clearly shows that defendant no.1 was residing in the
F     suit house since 1940. It was well established that defendant no.1
      was in possession of the suit house before and after the death of
      HR in 1953 and had continued to remain in possession thereafter
      and was collecting rent from the tenants who were in occupation
      of part of the suit premises since 1955, till the date of filing of the
G     suit in 1965 by the plaintiff. [Para 17][896-C-E]
            1.6 It is clearly established that defendant no.1 had long
      settled possession of the suit property, which she had acquired
      in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, prior to the
      commencement of the Act of 1956, which entitled her to become
H
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                879
           ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS.

a full owner of the suit property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the   A
said Act. Her exclusive possession of suit property after the death
of HR in 1953 i.e., prior to coming into force of the said Act in
1956, was not only not disputed but was admitted by the plaintiff
in the plaint itself. Her pre-existing right to maintenance from
the estate of the HUF of her husband was also well established.
                                                                      B
Her pre-existing right to maintenance, coupled with her settled
legal possession of the property, would be sufficient to create a
presumption that she had a vestige of right or claim in the
property, though no document was executed or specific charge
was created in her favour recognizing her right to maintenance
in the property. [Para 18][896-E-H; 897-A-B]                          C
      1.7 In the Will executed by HR in favour of the plaintiff,
there was no mention of the suit property. What was stated in the
Will was that whatever movable and immovable property, which
belonged to HR would be devolved upon the plaintiff. It was only
in the Probate proceedings filed by the plaintiff in respect of the   D
said Will, he had shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is
true that the objections raised by the defendant no.1 against
granting of Probate in favour of the plaintiff were not accepted by
the Probate Court, and the alleged Will executed by HR in favour
of the defendant no.1 was also not proved by her in the said
proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing right to        E
maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and in
view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior
to and after the commencement of the Act of 1956, the only
conclusion which could be drawn, would be that the defendant
no.1 had acquired the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing       F
right to maintenance, and that she had held the suit property as
the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of
the said Act of 1956. [Para 19][897-B-E]
      1.8 A Hindu woman’s right to maintenance was not and is
not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a       G
matter of grace and generosity. The Hindu woman’s right to
maintenance is a tangible right against the property which flows
from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife.
Such right was recognized and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu

                                                                      H
880           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     Law, long before the passing of the 1937 and the 1946 Acts. Those
      Acts merely gave statutory backing recognising the position as
      was existing under the Shastric Hindu Law. Where a Hindu widow
      is found to be in exclusive settled legal possession of the HUF
      property, that itself would create a presumption that such property
      was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of
B
      maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener
      did not earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-
      existing right of maintenance. The word “possessed by” and
      “acquired” used in Section 14(1) are of the widest amplitude and
      include the state of owning a property. It is by virtue of Section
C     14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu widow’s limited interest
      gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right, when such
      property is possessed by her whether acquired before or after
      the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.
      The High Court rightly held that defendant no.1 had pre-existing
      right to maintenance in the suit property that had ripened into
D
      full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. [Para
      20, 21][897-E-H; 898-A]
            V. Tulasamma and Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs.
            (1977) 3 SCC 99 : [1977] 3 SCR 261 – relied on.
E           Ram Vishal (Dead) & Ors. by Lrs. v. Jagan Nath & Anr.
            (2004) 9 SCC 302; Dindayal & Anr. v. Rajaram (1970)
            1 SCC 786 : [1971] 1 SCR 298; Sadhu Singh v.
            Gurdwara Sahib Narike (2006) 8 SCC 75 : [2006] 5
            Suppl. SCR 799; Shrimati Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunandan
            Ram & Anr. (1969) 1 SCC 604 : [1969] 3 SCR 789;
F           Mst. Gaumati v. Shankar Lal AIR 1974 Raj. 147; Mool
            Kanwar v. Jeewa Lal AIR 1982 Raj. 267; Bai Vajia
            (Dead) by Lrs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai and Others
            (1979) 3 SCC 300 : [1979] 3 SCR 291; Raghubar Singh
            & Ors v. Gulab Singh & Ors. (1998) 6 SCC 314 : [1998]
G           3 SCR 555 – referred to.
                            Case Law Reference
      (2004) 9 SCC 302            referred to            Para 6(i)
      [1971] 1 SCR 298            referred to            Para 6(vi)
H
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                       881
           ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS.

[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799        referred to              Para 6(vii)          A
[1969] 3 SCR 789               referred to              Para 7
[1979] 3 SCR 291               referred to              Para 7(iv)
[1977] 3 SCR 261               relied on                Para 12, 14
[1998] 3 SCR 555               referred to              Para 13              B
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5894
of 2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 20.07.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in S.B. Civil First
                                                                             C
Appeal No. 120 of 1989.
      Puneet Jain, Mrs. Christi Jain, Harsh Jain, Ms. Yashika Sharma,
Umang Mehta, Ms. Shrusti Singh, Yogit Kamat, Mann Arora,
Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advs. for the Appellants.
      Pallav Shishodia, Rishabh Sancheti, Ms. Padma Priya, Anchit            D
Bhandari, Surya Jain, Ms. Saloni Bhandari, K. Paari Vendhan, Advs. for
the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
                                                                             E
       1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree
dated 20.07.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan,
Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil First Appeal No.120 of 1989, filed by the
Appellants under Section 96 read with Order 41 of CPC, whereby the
High Court while allowing the said First Appeal has set aside the judgment
and decree dated 05.08.1989 passed by the Additional District & Sessions     F
Judge, Class-1, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in
Civil Suit No.56/73, and has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff
Daulalji, the predecessor of the present appellants, against the defendant
no. 1 Bhonri Devi, the predecessor of the present respondent Nos.1 to 3
and others.                                                                  G
      2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the matter, it
would be beneficial to reproduce the genealogical table/pedigree of the
families of the parties.

                                                                             H
882             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A




B




C




D            3. The original plaintiff Daulalji filed the suit being No.56 of 1973
      seeking possession of the suit property alongwith the mesne profits, against
      the original defendant - Smt. Bhonri Devi, widow of Late Shri Dhannalalji
      and against the other defendant Nos. 2 to 12, who were the tenants in
      the suit property. The suit property is the house property bearing No.1875,
      Chokdi Topkhana Desh, Jaipur which was an ancestral property in the
E     hands of Harinarayanji and his brother Ganeshnarayanji. As per the case
      of the plaintiff – Daulalji, he was adopted by Sri Bakshji, who was the
      great-grandson of their common ancestor Gopalji on 11.06.1916. The
      husband of the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi, i.e., Dhannalalji predeceased
      his father Ganeshnarayanji in 1936. Ganeshnarayanji expired in 1938
F     and his brother Harinarayanji died issueless on 11.11.1953. As per the
      further case of the plaintiff Daulalji, Harinarayanji had executed a Will
      on 30.07.1949 in his favour, and upon his death, on 11.11.1953, he had
      become the owner of the suit property alongwith other properties of
      Harinarayanji by virtue of the said Will. Upon the death of Harinarayanji,
      the defendant No.1 – Bhonri Devi started harassing the plaintiff and
G     therefore the plaintiff left the suit property on 25.12.1953, and since then
      the defendant No.1 was in possession of the suit property. The defendant
      Nos.2 to 12 were the tenants in the part of suit property. The plaintiff
      Daulalji claimed that after the death of Harinarayanji, he being the only
      male member in the family as well as the legatee under the Will of
H     Harinarayanji, had become the sole owner of the suit property and,
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                        883
 ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

therefore, was entitled to recover the possession of the suit property        A
from the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi, who had no legal right or interest
in the suit property.
        4. The suit was resisted by the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi by
filing the written statement, denying the averments and allegations made
in the plaint. She also denied any Will having been executed by               B
Harinarayanji in favour of the plaintiff Daulalji and further contended
that Harinarayanji, with a view to take her care, after the demise of her
husband and father-in-law, had started residing with her in the suit
property, however, the plaintiff never resided in the suit property. It was
further contended that the defendant Nos.2 to 12 were giving rent to
her, she being the wife of Dhannalalji and daughter-in-law of                 C
Ganeshnarayanji, and thus, was in possession of the suit property as an
owner and was maintaining herself from the income derived from the
suit property. It was also contended that the limited right vested in her
favour in the suit property, had enlarged into full ownership by virtue of
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which came into force        D
on 17.06.1956. She, therefore, contended that the suit at the instance of
the plaintiff was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. The
defendant Nos.2 to 8 and 10 to 12 had also filed their respective written
statements contending, inter alia, that the defendant No.1 Bhonri Devi
was the owner of the suit property, and they were her tenants and were
paying rent to her only.                                                      E

       5. It may be noted that the original plaintiff Daulalji expired on
10.11.1983 and original defendant No. 1 Bhonri Devi expired on
17.04.1979, pending the suit. Thereafter, the suit was prosecuted by
Munnidevi, daughter of original plaintiff – Daulalji and the legal
representatives i.e. the nephews and niece of defendant No. 1 Bhonri          F
Devi, who were substituted in her place pending the suit. The suit was
decreed by the trial Court on 05.08.1989, against which the First Appeal
being No. 120/1989 was preferred by the legal representatives of the
defendant no. 1 Bhonri Devi. Pending the appeal, Munnidevi, daughter
of original plaintiff Daulalji also expired, and her legal representatives    G
were substituted in her place. The said First Appeal having been allowed
by the High Court vide the impugned order dated 20th July, 2017, the
present appeal has been filed by the heirs and legal representatives of
the said Munnidevi (hereinafter referred to as “the appellants”) against
the respondent nos. 1 to 4 (contesting respondents) and respondent nos.
5 & 6 (Proforma respondents).                                                 H
884                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A              Submissions:
            6. The learned Advocate Mr. Puneet Jain appearing for the
      appellants assailing the impugned judgement passed by the High Court
      made multiple submissions as follows:
               (i)      The High Court had committed an error in holding that after
B                       the death of Shri Ganeshnarayanji in 1938, a limited right in
                        the suit property was created in favour of Bhonri Devi and
                        that the said Bhonri Devi had a right of maintenance even
                        under the old Shastric Law, which had fructified into a full
                        right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
C                       According to Mr. Jain, the Hindu Woman Right to Property
                        Act, 1937 had no application to the facts of the present
                        case, as the suit property was located in the erstwhile State
                        of Jaipur, where the said Act was not applicable. In the
                        State of Jaipur, the Hindu Woman Right to Property Act,
                        1947 which came into force on 24.09.1947, was applicable,
D                       however, Shri Dhannalal having expired in 1936 and
                        Ganeshnarayanji having expired in 1938 i.e., before the
                        commencement of the Act of 1947, no limited right under
                        the Act of 1947 was created in favour of the said Bhonri
                        Devi. Even under Section 3(2) of 1937 Act, right in the joint
E                       family property was created only in favour of the widow of
                        the deceased and not in favour of a daughter-in-law of a
                        pre-deceased son. In this regard, he has placed reliance on
                        the decision of this Court in case of Ram Vishal (Dead) &
                        Ors. by Lrs. Vs. Jagan Nath & Anr1.

F              (ii)     Mere possession of property or a right to maintenance under
                        the old Shastric Law did not give any right to the defendant
                        no. 1 Bhonri Devi under Section 14(1) of the said Act of
                        1956. In this regard, Mr. Jain took the Court to the pleadings
                        of the parties and submitted that there was no specific plea
                        raised by defendant no. 1 in this regard and it was only by
G                       way of alternative contention raised in the written statement,
                        the defendant no.1 had sought to ascertain the plea of her
                        having become full owner under Section 14(1) of the said
                        Act of 1956.

      1
H         (2004) 9 SCC 302
    MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                         885
     ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

         (iii)   There was no limited ownership created in favour of the           A
                 defendant no.1 Bhonri Devi specifically in the suit property
                 and that no presumption of limited ownership as sought to
                 be asserted by her could be raised. The presumption must
                 necessarily flow from some statutory or customary law of
                 inheritance or by instrument or a decree or a device as
                                                                                   B
                 contemplated in the Explanation II of Section 14(1) of the
                 Act.
         (iv)    The possession of suit property was never given to the
                 defendant no. 1- Bhonri Devi in the nature of right to possess
                 in lieu of her right of maintenance creating limited ownership
                 in the suit property. Mere possession without any vestige         C
                 of right in property would not attract Section 14(1). The
                 existence of a pre-existing “limited ownership” is a sine
                 qua non for the application of Section 14(1), inasmuch as it
                 is only the limited ownership which would fructify and
                 blossom into a full ownership under the said provision.           D
                 Where no such “limited ownership” is shown to have existed,
                 Section 14(1) has no application.
         (v)     Right to maintenance is not a “Right in a specific property”
                 but it is a “Right against the properties of the joint family
                 generally.”                                                       E
         (vi)    Mere right to maintenance without acquisition of title also
                 would not be sufficient to attract Section 14. Placing reliance
                 on the decision in case of Dindayal & Anr. vs. Rajaram2,
                 he submitted that before any property could be said to be
                 possessed by a Hindu Woman, as provided in Section 14(1)          F
                 of the Act of 1956, it has to be established that the woman
                 had a right to the possession of the property in question and
                 that she must have been in possession of such property
                 either actually or constructively.
         (vii)   A Hindu Female having a right to maintenance would not
                                                                                   G
                 ipso facto create any charge on the property. A right to
                 maintenance may amount to a legal charge if such charge
                 is created either by an agreement between the parties or
                 by a decree. In this regard, Mr. Jain has relied upon the
2
    (1970) 1 SCC 786                                                               H
886             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A                   provisions of Section 27 of the Hindu Adoption and
                    Maintenance Act, 1956 and the decision in case of Sadhu
                    Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike3.
             (viii) In the alternative, Mr. Jain submitted that the defendant
                    no.1- Bhonri Devi’s claims based on her right to
B                   maintenance could be raised only qua the share of Shri
                    Ganeshnarayanji in the suit property which was to the extent
                    of 1/4th of the suit property, and the remaining 3/4th share in
                    the property belonged to the legitimate right of Daulalji and
                    his heirs, as a consequence of the adoption of Daulalji and
                    the Will dated 30.07.1949 executed by Harinarayanji in his
C                   favour. He also submitted that the probate in respect of the
                    said Will was granted to the plaintiff Daulalji and that the
                    claim of rival Will set up by the defendant no. 1 Bhonri
                    Devi was negated by the Probate Court.
             (ix) Lastly, he submitted that the suit property being an ancestral
D                   property of the appellants, it should have been kept within
                    their family and the present respondents who are the
                    nephews and niece of the deceased Bhonri Devi, could not
                    claim any right in the suit property.
             7. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pallav Shishodia appearing
E     for the contesting respondents, supporting the findings recorded by the
      High Court in the impugned order, made following submissions:
             (i)    The exclusive possession of widow of HUF property itself
                    would create a presumption that such property was
                    earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of
                    maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-
F                   parcener did not earmark any alternative property for
                    recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. In this
                    regard, Mr. Shishodia has invited the attention of the Court
                    to the ratio laid down by this Court in case of Shrimati
                    Rani Bai vs. Shri Yadunandan Ram & Anr 4 and the
G                   judgments of Rajasthan High Court in case of Mst.
                    Gaumati Vs. Shankar Lal5 and Mool Kanwar Vs. Jeewa
                    Lal 6.
      3
        (2006) 8 SCC 75
      4
        1969 (1) SCC 604
      5
        AIR 1974 Raj.147
      6
H       AIR 1982 Raj.267
    MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                        887
     ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

         (ii)    The exclusive possession of defendant Bhonri Devi, after         A
                 the death of Harinarayanji was never questioned by the
                 plaintiff Daulalji. The suit property was only about 1/4 th of
                 the total HUF properties held by Harinarayanji and
                 Ganeshnarayanji, yielding nominal rentals just enough for
                 her sustenance, as compared to much bigger house at Purani
                                                                                  B
                 Basti, two shops at Chandpole and other properties taken
                 away by the original plaintiff-Daulalji.
         (iii)   As regards the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Act of
                 1956, he submitted that the pre-existing right of maintenance
                 in favour of a widow would have remained only a lofty
                 right throughout her life without any vindication, and would     C
                 have remained fettered at the mercy of surviving co-
                 parceners, if the case of the plaintiff was accepted that the
                 said Bhonri Devi enjoyed the suit property only by way of
                 grace and concession of the plaintiff-Daulalji. Otherwise,
                 the very purpose of Section 14(1) of the Act, which was          D
                 enacted to confer absolute ownership on the Hindu widow
                 in settled possession of HUF property in lieu of her pre-
                 existing right of maintenance, would be frustrated. Mr.
                 Shishodia drew the attention of the Court to the various
                 observations made and findings recorded by this Court in
                 case of V. Tulasamma and Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead)             E
                 by Lrs7. According to him, once the pre-existing right was
                 recognized, the consequences of Section 14(1) cannot be
                 denied to a Hindu widow.
         (iv)    The expression “possession” contained in Section 14(1) is
                 required to be given the widest possible meaning to include      F
                 actual as well as constructive possession, like attornment
                 of tenants in the present case. Likewise, the expression
                 “acquire” is also required to be given a widest possible
                 meaning to include acquisition by possession, especially
                 when such possession of widow already satisfied her pre-         G
                 existing right of maintenance. To elaborate his submission,
                 Mr. Shishodia has placed reliance on the decision of this
                 Court in case of Bai Vajia (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Thakorbhai
                 Chelabhai and Others8.
7
    (1977) 3 SCC 99
8
    (1979) 3 SCC 300                                                              H
888               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A           (v)     Till the death of Harinarayanji in 1953, he held HUF
                    properties as karta and the last surviving co-parcener in
                    the direct line. However, all the rights, title and interest of
                    Harinarayanji and his successor were subject to the pre-
                    existing right of maintenance in favour of Bhonri Devi and,
                    therefore, even Harinarayanji could not have bequeathed
B
                    more than whatever right, title or interest he had in the
                    HUF properties, by executing the Will, in view of Section
                    30 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The plaintiff Daulalji,
                    therefore, had also got the suit property as a legatee or co-
                    parcener subject to the limited estate of Bhonri Devi, whose
C                   pre-existing right of maintenance from the suit property,
                    made her absolute owner after Section 14(1) of the Act of
                    1956 came into force.
            Analysis:
             8. Though number of issues were raised by the parties during the
D     course of trial before the Trial Court and during the course of the appeal
      before the High Court, the learned Counsel Mr. Puneet Jain for the
      appellants has not disputed before this court that Bhonri Devi had a right
      of maintenance from the estate of her husband’s joint family. He also
      has not disputed that Bhonri Devi was residing in the suit house since
E     the time Harinarayanji was alive i.e., prior to 11.11.1953, and that after
      the death of Harinarayanji, Bhonri Devi continued to live in the said
      house and was collecting the rent from the tenants who were occupying
      part of the suit premises. However, Mr. Puneet Jain has seriously disputed
      Bhonri Devi’s right to maintenance from the suit property alone. He has
      disputed her claim of acquiring the suit property in lieu of her maintenance
F     for being a full owner, as contemplated in Section 14(1) of the Act.
      According to him, vestige of interest against the property could not be
      said to be the same as the vestige in the property. In absence of creation
      of any charge or execution of a document recognising her right of
      maintenance in the suit property, it could not be said that she had pre-
G     existing or limited ownership in the suit property.
             9. Similarly, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shishodia for the
      concerned respondents has also not pressed into service the contentions
      raised by Bhonri Devi in the suit with regard to the plaintiff Daulalji
      being a stranger to the joint family of her husband, and with regard to his
H     adoption by Sri Bakshji. He has also not pressed into service the issue
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                          889
 ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

with regard to the Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Daulalji.        A
However, Mr. Shishodia urged that all rights, title or interest of
Harinarayanji were subject to the pre-existing right of maintenance of
Bhonri Devi, and he could not have bequeathed by way of Will to Daulalji,
more than whatever right or interest he had in the suit property. Admittedly,
Bhonri Devi was in possession of the suit property and was collecting
                                                                                B
the rent from the tenants occupying part of suit property. Therefore,
according to Mr. Shishodia, her settled possession of suit property in lieu
of her pre-existing right of maintenance, entitled her to become full owner
of the suit property in view of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.
      10. The main issue therefore, whether Bhonri Devi, the
predecessor of the present respondents had become an absolute owner             C
on coming into force the Act of 1956, revolves around the interpretation
of Section 14 thereof. It reads as under:
      “14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—
      (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether                     D
      acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall
      be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited
      owner.
      Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both
      movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu                 E
      by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of
      maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any
      person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her
      marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or
      by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also
      any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before             F
      the commencement of this Act.
      (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any
      property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other
      instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under
      an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument            G
      or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in
      such property.”
       11. From the plain reading of Section 14(1) along with the
Explanation thereto, it emerges that in order to become a full owner and
not a limited owner, of a property by virtue of Section 14(1), a female         H
890             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     Hindu, before or after the commencement of Act of 1956, must be in
      possession of the property, and it must have been acquired by her by
      inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance, or arrears
      of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not,
      before, at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion or by
      purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, or any
B
      such property must have been held by her as stridhana immediately
      before the commencement of the Act.
             12. In the instant case, we are concerned with the claim of Bhonri
      Devi of having become the full owner in respect of the suit property on
      the ground that she was in settled legal possession of the suit property
C     before and after the commencement of the Act, in lieu of her pre-existing
      right of maintenance, and such limited ownership right had fructified into
      full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). The High Court while discussing
      about the right of a Hindu widow to the property, has observed that the
      Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 was in force in the year
D     1937 when Ganeshnarayanji, father-in-law of Bhonri Devi expired in
      1938, and that even prior to the said Act of 1937, the right of Hindu
      widow was recognised as per the old shastric customs prevalent in the
      area. In our opinion, the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937
      conferred right on Hindu widow to the property of her husband, who
      died after the commencement of the said Act of 1937 and not prior
E     thereto. Bhonri Devi’s husband Dhannalalji having expired in 1936, the
      said Act of 1937 would not be applicable to facts of the case. However,
      prior to the said Act of 1937, the right to maintenance of Hindu widow
      was recognised in Shastric law. This court in case of V.Tulasamma
      and other vs. Sesha Reddy(Dead) (supra) has elaborately considered
F     the pre-existing right to maintenance of a Hindu woman while considering
      the provisions of Section 14 of the said Act of 1956. Justice fazal Ali, as
      he then was, after quoting the authorities on the subject and elucidating
      the nature and extent of right of a Hindu wife to maintenance, summarised
      the position in para 62 as under: -
G            “62. We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions
             which we have reached after an exhaustive consideration of
             the authorities mentioned above on the question of law
             involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of Sections
             14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be
             stated thus:
H
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                  891
 ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

    “(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an empty        A
    formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of
    grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property
    which flows from the spiritual relationship between the
    husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure
    Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even by
                                                                        B
    the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu.
    Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right
    against property and the husband has a personal obligation
    to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the
    female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a
    charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said         C
    right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even
    without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a
    pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising
    such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses
    or confirms the pre-existing rights.
                                                                        D
    (2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been
    couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally
    construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object
    of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends sought
    to be achieved by this long-needed legislation.
                                                                        E
    (3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso
    and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation
    of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be
    construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main
    provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a
    way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main              F
    provision.
    (4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments,
    decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new
    titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no
    application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to          G
    confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In
    such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally
    permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere.
    Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises
    a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or             H
892                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A              partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-
               section has absolutely no application and the female’s limited
               interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one
               by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any,
               under the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a
               property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of
B
               maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken
               out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by
               Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers
               of the transferee.
               (5) The use of express terms like ‘property acquired by a female
C              Hindu at a partition’, ‘or in lieu of maintenance’, ‘or arrears
               of maintenance’, etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1)
               clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories
               which have been expressly excepted from the operation of
               sub-section (2).
D              (6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the Legislature in Section
               14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the
               state of owning a property even though the owner is not in
               actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a
               widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree
E              before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but
               had not been given actual possession under a final decree,
               the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by
               force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the
               property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the
               widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right
F              or title, because the section does not contemplate the
               possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.
               (7) That the words ‘restricted estate’ used in Section 14(2)
               are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1)
               and they include not only limited interest, but also any other
G              kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”
            13. Following the said observations made in the case of
      V.Tulasamma (supra), this court in Raghubar Singh & Ors vs Gulab
      Singh & Ors9 held as under:
      9
H         (1998) 6 SCC 314
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                893
 ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

    “22. The judgment in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] has         A
    held the field till date. (See also with advantage: Ram
    Kali v. Choudhri Ajit Shankar [(1997) 9 SCC 613]
    and Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda
    Verrappa [(1997) 10 SCC 673].)
    23. Thus, we find that there is enough authority for the          B
    proposition that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female
    is a pre-existing right, which existed in the Hindu law long
    before the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946 came into force and
    is not a creation of those statutes, which only recognised that
    position. In the words of Fazal Ali, J. in Tulasamma
    case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] : (SCC p. 135, para 62)                    C

          “(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an
    empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a
    matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against
    property which flows from the spiritual relationship between
    the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by        D
    pure Shastric Hindu law and has been strongly stressed even
    by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to
    Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a
    right against property and the husband has a personal
    obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has       E
    property, the female has the legal right to be maintained
    therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a
    female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At
    any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is
    doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring
    or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but     F
    merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.”
    24. Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a
    Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship
    between the husband and the wife and that right in the case
    of a widow is “a pre-existing right”, which existed under         G
    the Shastric Hindu law long before the passing of the 1937
    or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely recognised the position
    as was existing under the Shastric Hindu law and gave it a
    “statutory” backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession
    of the property of her husband, she has a right to be             H
894            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A           maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession
            of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance.
            25. Explaining the meaning of the expression “possessed” as
            used by the legislature in Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act
            in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] this Court held: (SCC
B           p. 136, para 62)
                   “(6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the legislature in
            Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include
            the state of owning a property even though the owner is not
            in actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a
C           widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree
            before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but
            had not been given actual possession under a final decree,
            the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by
            force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the
            property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the
D           widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right
            or title, because the section does not contemplate the
            possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.”
            26. It is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act, that the widow’s
            limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute
E           right notwithstanding any restriction placed under the
            document or the instrument. So far as sub-section (2) of
            Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees,
            awards, gifts, etc., which create an independent or a new title
            in favour of the female for the first time. It has no application
F           to cases where the instrument/document either declares or
            recognises or confirms her share in the property or her “pre-
            existing right to maintenance” out of that property. As held
            in Tulasamma case [(1977) 3 SCC 99] sub-section (2) of
            Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its
            own, without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1)
G           of the Act.”
            14. In view of the above, there remains no shadow of doubt that
      a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance was not and is not an empty
      formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and
      generosity. It is a tangible right against the property, which flows from
H
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                        895
 ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife. The said         A
right was recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law, which
existed even before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those
Acts merely gave statutory backing recognising the position as was
existing under the Shastric Hindu Law. Where a Hindu widow is in
possession of the property of her husband or of the husband’s HUF, she
                                                                              B
has a right to be maintained out of the said property. She is entitled to
retain the possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance.
Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto envisages liberal construction
in favour of the females, with the object of advancing and promoting the
socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by the said legislation. As
explained in V. Tulasamma (supra) case, the words “possessed by”              C
used in Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include
the state of owning a property, even though the Hindu woman is not in
actual or physical possession of the same. Of course, it is equally well
settled that the possession of the widow, must be under some vestige of
a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the
                                                                              D
possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.
       15. The undisputed facts in the instant case are that Dhannalalji,
the husband of Bhonri Devi expired in 1936, Ganeshnarayanji, the father-
in-law of Bhonri Devi expired in 1938 and Harinarayanji, the brother of
Ganeshnarayanji died on 11.11.1953. Daulalji was adopted by Sri Bakshji
in the year 1916. Harinarayanji, Ganeshnarayanji and Sri Bakshji had          E
common ancestor Gopalji. It is also not disputed that the suit property
was an ancestral property in the hands of Harinarayanji and
Ganeshnarayanji. It is also not disputed that Bhonri Devi was staying in
the suit property before the death of Harinarayanji, and after his death
she was in possession and in charge of the said property, and was             F
maintaining herself by collecting rent from the tenants who were
occupying part of the suit property.
       16. Now it appears from the documents on record that the rent
notes (Exhibit A-2 to A-11) executed during the period 1955 to 1965 in
respect of the part of the suit property, were executed in the name of        G
Bhonri Devi. The concerned defendants in the suit had also filed their
written statements, stating that they were paying rent to Bhonri Devi
only. It further appears from the document (Exhibit A-13) that Daulalji
had raised an objection against Bhonri Devi paying the house tax in
respect of the suit property and that the Municipal Commissioner, Jaipur
                                                                              H
896             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A     vide order dated 28.03.1957 had observed that Bhonri Devi was paying
      the tax in the past also. An appeal against the said order was preferred
      by Daulalji before the Administrator of Municipal Council, Jaipur however
      the same was also rejected vide the order dated 28.01.1959. It was
      observed therein that “In this case there is a dispute regarding ownership.
      Municipal Commissioner who is the reversing authority in his judgment
B
      dated 28.03.1957 held that Bhonri Devi who was paying tax to the
      municipality in the past, should pay the tax and for question of title the
      concerned party should seek remedy in the Civil Courts.”
              17. From the said documents it clearly emerges that Bhonri Devi
      was paying the house tax prior to 1956 and was collecting the rent from
C     the tenants prior to and after 1956. Pertinently from the document Exhibit-
      54, it emerges that in 1940 Bhonri Devi, when she was staying with her
      in-laws, had no source of maintenance, and therefore she was granted
      Rs. 2.50 per month by way of maintenance, by the Punya Department
      of the Government. She claiming to be a PARDANASHEEN lady had
D     authorised Daulalji to collect the said amount of maintenance. The said
      document clearly shows that Bhonri Devi was residing in the suit house
      since 1940. Be that as it may, it was well established that Bhonri devi
      was in possession of the suit house before and after the death of
      Harinarayanji in 1953 and had continued to remain in possession thereafter
      and was collecting rent from the tenants who were in occupation of part
E     of the suit premises since 1955, till the date of filing of the suit in 1965 by
      the plaintiff Daulalji.
              18. The afore-stated facts and circumstances clearly established
      that Bhonri devi had long settled possession of the suit property, which
      she had acquired in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, prior to
F     the commencement of the Act of 1956, which entitled her to become a
      full owner of the suit property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act.
      Her exclusive possession of suit property after the death of Harinarayanji
      in 1953 i.e., prior to coming into force of the said Act in 1956, was not
      only not disputed but was admitted by the plaintiff Daulalji in the plaint
G     itself. Her pre-existing right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF
      of her husband was also well established. The submission of Mr. Jain
      for the appellants that mere right to maintenance would not ipso facto
      create any charge on the property and that for creating legal charge
      recognising right of Hindu women to maintenance required execution of
      a document, device or agreement, cannot be countenanced. Her pre-
H
MUNNI DEVI ALIAS NATHI DEVI (DEAD) THR LRS.v. RAJENDRA                        897
 ALIAS LALLU LAL (DEAD) THR LRS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

existing right to maintenance, coupled with her settled legal possession      A
of the property, would be sufficient to create a presumption that she had
a vestige of right or claim in the property, though no document was
executed or specific charge was created in her favour recognizing her
right to maintenance in the property.
        19. It may be noted that in the Will executed by Harinarayanji in     B
favour of Daulalji, there was no mention of the suit property. What was
stated in the Will was that whatever movable and immovable property,
which belonged to Harinarayanji would be devolved upon Daulalji. It
was only in the Probate proceedings filed by Daulalji in respect of the
said Will, he had shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is true that
the objections raised by Bhonri Devi against granting of Probate in favour    C
of Daulalji were not accepted by the Probate Court, and the alleged Will
executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Bhonri Devi was also not proved
by her in the said proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing
right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and in
view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior to and    D
after the commencement of the Act of 1956, the only conclusion which
could be drawn, would be that Bhonri Devi had acquired the suit property
in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, and that she had held the
suit property as the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section
14(1) of the said Act of 1956.
                                                                              E
       20. As stated earlier, Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a
tangible right against the property which flows from the spiritual
relationship between the husband and the wife. Such right was recognized
and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu Law, long before the passing of
the 1937 and the 1946 Acts. Where a Hindu widow is found to be in
exclusive settled legal possession of the HUF property, that itself would     F
create a presumption that such property was earmarked for realization
of her pre-existing right of maintenance, more particularly when the
surviving co-parcener did not earmark any alternative property for
recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. The word “possessed
by” and “acquired” used in Section 14(1) are of the widest amplitude          G
and include the state of owning a property. It is by virtue of Section
14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu widow’s limited interest gets
automatically enlarged into an absolute right, when such property is
possessed by her whether acquired before or after the commencement
of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.
                                                                              H
898              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 3 S.C.R.


A            21. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High
      Court had rightly held that Bhonri Devi had pre-existing right to
      maintenance in the suit property that had ripened into full ownership by
      virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.
             22. The present appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed.
B
      Nidhi Jain                                                 Appeal dismissed.
      (Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)




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D




E




F




G




H