MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHIversusKAMLA DEVI AND ANR.

A                 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
                                v.
                       KAMLA DEVI AND ANR.

                                  APRIL 3, 1996

B          (B.P . .TEEVAN REDDY AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.j

          Constitution of India, 1950 : Anicle 136-Apex Cowt-Jwisdictioll
    of-Gross abuse of the process of law and misuse of the legal system-Prevel!-
    tion of                                                                             '
c          The first respondent was the owner of a four storey building in Delhi
    and also of a residential property in Ghaziabad. The appellant Municipal
    Corporation by an order dated January 28, 1991, assessed the said build-
    ing in Delhi to property tax. That order was appealed against before the
    District judge, Delhi on March 8, 1991. However, while that appeal was
D   pending the respondent filed a suit before the Civil Judge. Ghaziabad on
    April 19, 1991 for a declaration that the said assessment order was illegal,
    invalid and void ab initio, and for a prohibitory injunction restraining the
    appellant from attaching her property or taking any other action/proceed-               '
    ings/orders against her or her assets pursuant to the assessment order. It
E   was stated in para 2 of the plaint that the cause of action of the suit arose
    on April 18, 1991 when officials of the appellant visited her residence in
    Ghaziabad and threatened to attach her assets and persisted with their
    illegal acts. The factum of appeal was not disclosed.

          The suit was proceeded with ex parte and the Civil Judge declared
F   the assessrnent order illt!gal, bad ~nd contrary to law. He also restrained     .,. .
    the defendant-appellant and its representatives agents from auctioning
    plaintill's property in Ghaziabad pursuant to the assessment order.

        It was submitted for the appellant that the respondent had
  deliberately concealed the fact of tiling of appeal, that no proceedings for
G recovery were ever taken against her property in Ghaziabad, that the
  allegation in para 2 of the plaint was only a pretence and a total fabrication
  put forward to create jurisdiction in Ghaziabad court, that it had not
    received suit notice from Ghaziabad court, and that this was, thus, a clear
    case of over-reaching the process of law and amounts to a sharp practice.
H
                                        1192
                                 M.C.D. v. K DEVI                            1193

          For the respondents it was submitted that suit summons were served         A
    on the Corporation and the assessing officer, and that it was their duty to
    contest it. Not having done that, and having suffered a decree and allowing
    the limitation for filing appeal to lapse, it was not open to the appellant to
    approach the Conrt directly under Article 136 of the Constitution.

            Allowing the appeal, the Court                                           B
          HELD : 1. It is a clear case of gross abuse of process of court and of
    law. Such practices ought to be put down with a stern hand so that others
>   similarly minded may desist from indulging in those acts. [1197-E; 1199-E]

           2. The averment made by respondent in para 2 of the plaint to the         C
    effect that the offices of the appellant Corporation went to Ghaziabad to
    attach her moveables or of her grand-children to realise the tax under the
    order dated January 28, 1991 is a total falsehood and was a mere pretence
    to create jurisdiction in Ghaziabad court. Not a single document or any
    other scrap of paper has been filed before that court in support of the said     D
    allegation. There is no mention, either, that any demand notice or bill was
    sent to the respondent at her Ghaziabad address. [1197; E-F, 1199-C]

          3. Furthermore, the frame of the suit and the language and terms in
    which the declaration and prohibitory injunction were asked for suggest a
    clear attempt to over-reach the process of court. The object clearly was to      E
    obtain a declaration from a court outside Delhi that the said assessment
    order was illegal and invalid. [1197-F-G]

           4. The fact that the respondent-plaintiff chose to conceal the fact of
    her filing the appeal against the assessment order was also indicative of the.
    malajides on her part. [1197-G]                                                  F
          5. In view of their reprehensible conduct, the respondents (LRs) are
    directed to pay exemplary costs in the sum of rupees fifty thousand.
                                                                      [1199-D]
          Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu [1994] 4 SCC            G
    711, held applicable.

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5339 of
    1996.

            From the Judgment and Order dated 11.9.91 of the Civil Judge,            H
                                                                                    )
                                                                                        I




    1194                 SUPREME COURT RJ?PORTS                  [1996) 3 S.C.R.

A Ghaziabad, U.P. in Suit No. 451 of 1990.
           Ms. Madhu Tewa ti a and Ranbir Yad°hv, for the Appellant.

         A.B. Rohtagi, J.D. Jain, Balbir Singh Gupta and M.R. Vij for the
    Respondents.
B
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted. Heard the counsel for the
    appellant and respondents.

C          This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree of the
    learned Civil Judge, Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh) dated September 11, 1991
    in Suit No. 451 of 1990 in rather peculiar circumstances. Smt. Kamla Devi,
    first respondent herein (who died pending the present appeal and whose
    legal representative have come on record) was the owner of
D   premises/building bearing Property No. 416, Kucha Brijnatb, Chandni
    Chowk, Delhi. By an order dated January 28, 1991 the Deputy Assessor
    and Collector determined the rental value and rateable value of the said
    building (comprising four floors) with effect from April 1, 1993 and also
    determined the property taJ<es payable thereon. Against the order of
    assessment, Kamla Devi filed an appeal before the learned District Judge,
E   Delhi on March 8, 1991. While the appeal was pending, Kamla Devi went
    to Ghaziabad and filed a Suit No. 451 of 1991 against (1) Municipal
    Corporation of Delhi and (2) the Deputy Assessor and Collector (House
    TaJ<) SC-I for a declaration that "the orders dated 28.1.91 passed by
    Defendant No. 2 as illegal, invalid and void ab initio" and for a prohibitory
f   injunction restraining the defendants from "attaching the plainti!Ps proper-
    ty or taking any other action/proceeding/orders against the plaintiff or her
    assets in pursuant to the order dated 28.1.1991 passed by the Deputy
     Assessor and Collector SC-I, MCD". The suit was filed on April 19, 1991.
    In the first paragraph of the plaint, Kamla Devi stated that she is resident
    of C-92, !oder Puri, Loni, Ghaziabad owned by her grand-children. In
G    Para-2, she stated that on April 18, 1991 "three persons claiming to repre-
     sent defendant came to the residence of the plaintiff and threatened to
     attach her assets stating that the rateable value for the purposes of foong
     house taJ< has been increased by Defendant No. 2 in respect to property
     No. 416, Kucha Brijnath, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-6 owned by the plaintifr
H    and that after great persuasion and interference by local respectable per-
                M.C.D. v. K. DEVI [JEEVAN REDDY, J.)                   1195

sons, did the officials postpone their action for a day. Then follow a number A
of paragraphs. Paragraphs 3 to 16, set out the several reasons and grounds
for which the order of assessment dated January 28, 1991 was said to be
contrary to law and illegal. In Paragraph 19 pertaining to cause of action,
she stated that the cause of action for the suit arose on April 18, 1991 when
the defendant sent their officials to C- 92, Inder Puri, Loni, Ghaziabad to B
attach the properties belonging to the plaintiff and also because the defen-
dants were persisting with their illegal acts. It is on the above pleas that
the declaration and prohibitory injunction aforementioned were asked for.
It is significant to note that no document was filed along with the plaint -
or later - showing that any attempt was made by the defendants or their
officials to dis train or attach the plaintiffs movables or other properties at C
Ghaziabad. Among the twelve documents filed by the plaintiff, the last
document is the assessment order dated January 28, 1991. No other docu-
ment subsequent to that date has been filed. It is equally significant to
notice that the declaration asked for is with respect to assessment order
passed by the second defendant (an officer of the appellant-Corporation) D
relating to a house situated in Delhi. More significant is the wide language
in which the prohibitory injunction was asked for. It is worded widely to
restrain proceedings against any of the properties or assets of the plaintiff
(situated anywhere) for recovery of the said tax. Another important fact to
be noticed is that the plaintiff, while setting out in detail the reasons for
which the assessment order aforesaid was said to be illegal, did not disclose E
in her plaint that she had already filed an appeal against the said assess-
ment order before the appropriate authority and it was pending. Suit
 notices were issued to the defendants and were supposed to be served upon
 them. The suit was decreed on September 11, 1991.
                                                                               F
      The judgment sets out the averments in the plaint at length and then
says that though served, the defendants have not filed any reply and that,
therefore, the .case is proceeded with ex parte. Except stating that the
plaintiff has reiterated the averments in the plaint and that "the case of the
plaintiff as stated deserves to be accepted in a one sided matter", no
specific finding is recorded in the judgment that the officials of the appel- G
!ant-Corporation did indeed seek to attach or sell the assets of the plaintiff.
The suit was decreed in the following terms : "it is declared that the
defendant's order dated 28.1.91 are illegal, bad and contrary to law and
that the defendant and his representatives/agents are hereby restrained
from auctioning the property at C-92, Inder Puri Loni, Ghaziabad pursuant H
    1196                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1996] 3 S.C.R.

A to the orders dated 28.1.91". While it is true that the prohibitory injunction
    is confined only to properties at Ghaziabad, yet the declaration that the
    order dated January 28, 1991 is illegal and contrary to law makes it
    unenforceable and ineffective for all purposes.

           In the Present appeal filed by the Municipal Corporation, it is stated
B that having filed an appeal against the assessment order, Kamla Devi filed
    a suit in Ghaziabad deliberately concealing the fact of filing of the said
    appeal and has obtained a decree thereby trying to hoodwink the courts
    below. It is then stated in Para 10 that the Corporation has sent a Bill dated
    July 8, 1991 to the respondent-assessee on the basis of the assessment order
C   dated January 28, 1991 and that it was shocked when it was apprised of an
    order of stay passed by a court in Uttar Pradesh. It is also stated that .the
    Corporation has not received any suit notice from the Ghaziabad court.
    Since the filing of the suit in Ghaziabad court is said to be an abuse of the
    process of court, it is prayed that the said judgment and decree be set aside
D   by this Court.

          Ms. Madhu Tewatia, learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation,
    submitted that the filing of the suit by Kamla Devi was a stark abuse of
    process of court. She submitted that no proceedings for recovery were ever
    taken against her properties in Ghaziabad by the Corporation or its offi-
E   cials and that allegation in Para 2 of the plaint is only a pretence and a
    total fabrication put forward with a view to create jurisdiction in
    Ghaziabad court. It is submitted that property is situated in Delhi, that the
    assessment was made at Delhi by an authority competent in law to do so
    which was indeed question by Kamla Devi by filing an appeal which was
F   pending before the competent authority. Filing of the said suit in the above
    circumstances is said to be a clear case of over~reaching the processes of
    law and amounts to a practice which should be sternly put down by this
    Court. It is submitted that if this type of suits are allowed to be filed
    anywhere outside Delhi, it would be impossible for the Corporation to
    function effectively. She placed strong reliance upon the decision of this
G   Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, [1994) 4
    SCC 711, delivered by a Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJ., A.M.
    Ahmadi, J. and one of us (B.P . .Jecvan Reddy, J.).

           On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents (legal
H    representative of Kamla Devi), submitted that when the suit summons were
                 M.C.D. v. K. DEVI [JEEVAN REDDY, J.]                  1197

served upon the Corporation and the assessing officer by the Ghaziabad A
court, it was their duty to appear before the court and contest it by putting
forward such defences as where open to them in law. Not having done that
an<l having suffered a decree and allowed the limitation for filing the
appeal to lapse, it is not open to the Corporation to approach this court
directly under Article 136 of the Constitution against the judgment and B
decree of the Ghaziabad court. It is submitted that the only manner in
which the said judgment and decree could be avoided by the Corporation
was to file an appeal as provided by law. The several allegations made
against the first respondent are denied and it is submitted that when the
officials of the Corporation wanted to attach their movables at Ghaziabad,
Kamla Devi was obliged to file the suit in Ghaziabad. Counsel also sought C
to argue that the order of assessment dated January 28, 1991 is contrary to
law, excessive and deserves to be set aside. It is also brought to our notice
that the appeal filed by Kamla Devi against the assessment order dated
January 28, 1991 was dismissed for default on September 12, 1994.
                                                                              D
       The first question is whether the filing of this suit by Kamla Devi in
Ghaziabad Court was a proceeding taken bonafide by her or whether it was
only a sharp practice designed to abuse the process of law and to take
unfair advantage over the Corporation. On a consideration_of the facts and
circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that it was a clear case of abuse
of process of court and of law. We are also satisfied that the averment E
made in Para 2 of the plaint to the effect that the officers of the appellant-
Corporation went to Ghaziabad to attach the movables of Kamla Devi or
her grand-children to realise the tax under the order dated January 28,
1991 is a total falsehood and was a mere.pretence to create jurisdiction in
Ghaziabad court. Not a single document or any other scrap of paper has F
been filed before the Ghaziabad court in support of the said allegation.
Moreover, the frame of the suit and the language and terms in which the
declaration and prohibitory injunction are asked for suggest a clear attempt
to over-reach the process of court.· The object clearly was to obtain a
declaration that the assessment order dated January 28, 1991 is illegal and
invalid from a court outside Delhi. The fact that Kamla Devi (plaintiff) G
chose to conceal the fact of her filing the appeal against the said assessment
order is also indicative of the malafides on her part. It is true that the court
has limited the prohibitory injunction only to properties in Ghaziabad but
it has granted a declaration that the very assessment order is void and
illegal which means that it cannot be enforced even within the limits of H
    1198                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1996] 3 S.C.R.

A Delhi Municipal Corporation. In the Special Leave Petition, it is stated by
    the Corporation that the Bill of demand pursuant to the assessment order
    aforesaid was sent only on July 8, 1991 to the respondent whereas the suit
    was filed on April 19, 1991. Once this Court is satisfied that Kamla Devi
    has abused the process of law and misused the legal system, the objections
B   put forward by the respondents' counsel are of no consequence. This.Court
    is entitled to act in such cases to prevent such abuse and misuse.

        In Oil and Naniral Gas Commission, this Court was dealing with a
  case where Engineers India Limited (E.I.L.) acting as consultants for Oil
  and Natural Gas Commission (O.N.G.C.) issued an advertisement in the
C newspapers of the country inviting tenders for a particular work to be
  carried out at Hazira complex in Gujarat. According to the advertisement,
  the tenders were to be communicated to E.I.L. at Delhi. The respondent-
  company (NICCO) having its registered office at Calcutta submitted a
  tender which was considered along with other tenders received at New
D Delhi and was rejected. Tender of another party was accepted. Thereupon,
  NICCO filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court praying that ONGC
  be restrained from awarding the contract to such other party and, if already
  awarded, to cancel the same. In the writ petition, an allegation was made
  by NICCO that it had come to know of the tender from the publication in
  the newspaper 'Times of India' within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High
E Court, that it had submitted its tender from its registered office located
  within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and that further cor-
  respondence in that behalf was also done from its said registered office at
  Calcutta. On the said averments, it was submitted that the Calcutta High
  Court had jurisdiction in the matter. NICCO also asked for and obtained
F certain interim orders which were challenged under Article 136 of the
  Constitution. Before this Court, NICCO relied upon a fax message sent by
  O.N.G.C./E.I.L. to NICCO on its Calcutta address. It was a reply to a letter
  sent by NICCO. It was submitted that in view of the said communication
  along with other facts mentioned in the writ petition, the Calcutta High
  Court did have the jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition. It was
G held by this Court that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken
  as true, it cannot said that a part of the cause of action had arisen within
  the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court pointed out that
  the advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to
  E.1.L. at New Delhi, that they would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that
H the decision to accept or reject would also be taken at New Delhi. (The
                      M.C.D. v. K. DEVI [JEEVAN REDDY, J.]                   1199

     work was, of course, to be carried out in Gujarat). It was further held that A
     merely because NJCCO read the advertisement at Calcutta or that it
     subniitted its tender from Calcutta or that it made representations or that
     a fax message was sent to it on its Calcutta address did not constitute facts
     forming integral part of the cause of action. It was held that NICCO did
     not act bonafide in invoking the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and B
     that the filing of the writ petition was an abuse of the process of court.
     Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the orders of the Calcutta High Court
     were set aside and exemplary costs in a sum of Rs. 50,000 were imposed
     upon NICCO. In our opinion, the principle of the said decision clearly
     applies here. Indeed, the present case is a more gross one. In this case,
,.   there is no mention that any demand notice or bill was sent to Kamla Devi C
     at Ghaziabad address. We have already held that the averment in Para 2
     of the plaint was a mere pretence and a total fabrication.

           Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the
     learned Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh dated September 11, 1991
     in Suit No. 451 of 1990 is set aside. In view of their reprehensible conduct,   D
     the respondents (legal representatives of Kamla Devi, who appeared in this
     court as representing her estate) are directed to pay exemplary costs in a
     sum of Rupees fifty thousand. Such practices ought to be put down with a
\    stern hand so that others similarly mined may desist from indulging in
     ~~M~                                                                            E
           Application for bringing legal representatives of Kamla Devi on
     record is ordered.

     P.S.S.                                                      Appeal allowed.