MS.YversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 431
- Decided
- 19 April 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- N V RAMANA
Holding
A bail order that is unreasoned and fails to consider the statutory factors under Section 439 CrPC is arbitrary and must be set aside.
Summary
The appellant State of Rajasthan challenged a High Court order that granted regular bail to respondent No.2, who was accused of repeatedly raping his 19‑year‑old niece and was a habitual offender with nearly twenty pending cases. The High Court’s bail order was found to be cryptic, lacking any reference to the gravity of the offence, the accused’s character, or the statutory factors required under Section 439 of the CrPC. The Supreme Court examined the legal requirement that bail orders be reasoned and that the discretion under Section 439 must be exercised after considering prima facie involvement, nature of the charge, severity of punishment, risk of flight, and likelihood of repeat offence. It held that the High Court’s order was arbitrary, perverse and violated the principle of reasoned judicial decisions. Consequently, the bail was cancelled, the respondent was directed to surrender, and the appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- The High Court exercised its discretion under Section 439 CrPC appropriately in granting bail to the accused.
- Whether a bail order must be reasoned and disclose the factors considered, especially in serious offences.
- Whether an appellate court may interfere with a bail order that is unreasoned or arbitrary.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 439
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 354, s. 354B, s. 354D, s. 376(2)F, s. 376(2)N, s. 450, s. 506, s. 509
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Acts. 18, s. 5L/6, s. 5(N)/6, s. 9N/10
Subjects
Judgment
[2022] 3 S.C.R. 27 27
MS.Y A
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2022)
APRIL 19, 2022 B
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI AND KRISHNA MURARI, J.]
Bail – Necessity of reasoned bail orders, especially in matters
involving serious offences – In the present case, respondent no.2
was accused of committing the grievous offence of raping his young
C
niece of nineteen years – Held: High Court, while granting bail to
respondent no.2, did not consider any of the relevant factors for
grant of bail and did not advert to the actual facts of the case – In
fact, no reasoning is apparent from the order of High Court – Fact
that respondent no.2 was a habitual offender and nearly twenty
cases were registered against him was not even mentioned in the D
order of High Court – Order of High Court was cryptic, and did
not suggest any application of mind, and, accordingly set aside –
Judgment / Order – Reasoned order.
Bail – Interference with – By Appellate forum – Scope – Held:
Once bail has been granted, the Appellate Court is usually slow to E
interfere with the same as it pertains to the liberty of an individual.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Considerations
on basis of which discretion u/s.439, CrPC has to be exercised while
granting bail – Discussed – Held: Grant of bail requires the
consideration of various factors which ultimately depends upon F
the specific facts and circumstances of the case – There is no strait
jacket formula – However, certain important factors that are always
considered, inter-alia, relate to prima facie involvement of the
accused, nature and gravity of the charge, severity of the
punishment, and the character, position and standing of the accused
– At the stage of granting bail, the Court is not required to enter G
into a detailed analysis of the evidence in the case – Such an exercise
may be undertaken at the stage of trial – Bail.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Issue relating to
whether the High Court exercised discretionary power u/s.439 CrPC
H
27
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A in granting bail appropriately – Held: Such an assessment is
different from deciding whether circumstances subsequent to the
grant of bail made it necessary to cancel the same – The first situation
requires the Court to analyze whether the order granting bail was
illegal, perverse, unjustified or arbitrary – On the other hand, an
application for cancellation of bail looks at whether supervening
B
circumstances have occurred warranting cancellation – Bail –
Cancellation of bail.
Judgment / Order – Reasoned order – Necessity of – Held:
Reasoning is the life blood of the judicial system – An unreasoned
order suffers the vice of arbitrariness.
C
Bail – Recent trend of orders granting or refusing to grant
bail, where Courts make a general observation that “the facts and
the circumstances” have been considered and no specific reasons
are indicated which precipitated the passing of the order by the
Court – Such a practice has been disapproved in various judgments
D of the Supreme Court – Judgment / Order – Reasoned order.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The grant of bail requires the consideration of
various factors which ultimately depends upon the specific facts
E and circumstances of the case before the Court. There is no strait
jacket formula which can ever be prescribed as to what the
relevant factors could be. However, certain important factors that
are always considered, inter-alia, relate to prima facie involvement
of the accused, nature and gravity of the charge, severity of the
punishment, and the character, position and standing of the
F accused. At the stage of granting bail the Court is not required to
enter into a detailed analysis of the evidence in the case. Such an
exercise may be undertaken at the stage of trial. Once bail has
been granted, the Appellate Court is usually slow to interfere
with the same as it pertains to the liberty of an individual.
G [Paras 9, 10 and 11][33-B-D]
2.1. In the present case, a bare perusal of the impugned
order passed by the High Court does not suggest that the Court
has considered any of the relevant factors for grant of bail. Apart
from the general observation that the facts and circumstances of
the case have been taken into account, nowhere have the actual
H
MS.Y v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR. 29
facts of the case been adverted to. There appears to be no A
reference to the factors that ultimately led the High Court to
grant bail. In fact, no reasoning is apparent from the impugned
order. [Paras 16, 17][36-C-D; 37-C-D]
2.2. Reasoning is the life blood of the judicial system. That
every order must be reasoned is one of the fundamental tenets B
of our system. An unreasoned order suffers the vice of
arbitrariness. [Para 18][37-D]
2.3. This Court has consistently upheld the necessity of
reasoned bail orders, with a special emphasis on matters involving
serious offences. In the present case, respondent no.2 has been C
accused of committing the grievous offence of rape against his
young niece of nineteen years. The fact that the respondent no.2
is a habitual offender and nearly twenty cases registered against
him has not even found mentioned in the impugned order. Further
the High Court has failed to consider the influence that the
respondent no.2 may have over the prosecutrix as an elder family D
member. The period of imprisonment, being only three months,
is not of such a magnitude as to push the Court towards granting
bail in an offence of this nature. [Para 21][38-E-G]
2.4. The impugned order passed by the High Court is
cryptic, and does not suggest any application of mind. There is a E
recent trend of passing such orders granting or refusing to grant
bail, where the Courts make a general observation that “the facts
and the circumstances” have been considered. No specific
reasons are indicated which precipitated the passing of the order
by the Court. Such a situation continues despite various judgments F
of this Court wherein this Court has disapproved of such a
practice. [Paras 22, 23][38-G-H; 39-A]
2.5. In view of the above, the impugned order passed by
the High Court is set aside. Bail bonds stand cancelled.
Respondent no.2- accused is directed to surrender, failing which, G
the concerned police authorities shall take him into custody.
[Para 24][39-E]
Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India,
(1986) 4 SCC 767 : [1987] 1 SCR 295 – followed.
H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 :
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 454; Gurcharan Singh v. State
(Delhi Administration) (1978) 1 SCC 118 : [1978] 2
SCR 358; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,
(2010) 14 SCC 496 : [2010] 12 SCR 1165; Mahipal v.
Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : [2019] 14 SCR 529;
B
and Jagjeet Singh & Ors. v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu &
Anr. (Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 632 of
2022); Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC
508 : [2014] 12 SCR 453 ; Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6
SCC 338 : [2001] 3 SCR 432; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar
C v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528; and Brij Nandan
Jaiswal v. Munna, (2009) 1 SCC 678 : [2008] 17 SCR
1348 – relied on.
Case Law Reference
[1978] 2 SCR 358 relied on Para 8
D
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 454 relied on Para 9
[1987] 1 SCR 295 followed Para 11
[2010] 12 SCR 1165 relied on Para 12
[2019] 14 SCR 529 relied on Para 13
E
[2014] 12 SCR 453 relied on Para 15
[2001] 3 SCR 432 relied on Para 18
(2004) 7 SCC 528 relied on Para 19
F [2008] 17 SCR 1348 relied on Para 20
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No.649 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.09.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Criminal
G Miscellaneous Bail Application No.14458 of 2021.
Rishi Matoliya, Adv. for the Appellant.
Ms. Vidisha Swarup, Ms. Preeti Thanvi, Milind Kumar, Advs. for
the Respondents.
H
MS.Y v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR. 31
The Judgment of the court was delivered by A
N. V. RAMANA, CJI
1. Leave granted
2. The present appeal has been filed against the final judgment
and order dated 20.09.2021 passed in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail B
Application No. 14458 of 2021 by the High Court of Rajasthan, at Jaipur,
whereby the High Court granted regular bail to respondent no. 2 -
accused.
3. The counsel for the appellant-prosecutrix submits that the High
Court erred in granting bail to the respondent no. 2 - accused in a C
mechanical manner without any reasoning. Learned counsel submits
that the High Court did not consider the facts of the case before it, more
particularly, the gravity of the offences alleged to have been committed
by the respondent no. 2 - accused. Additionally, the High Court did not
consider that the respondent no. 2 – accused is a hardened criminal with
nearly twenty criminal cases pending against him. Under such D
circumstances, this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution and set aside the bail granted to respondent no. 2
- accused.
4. Learned Counsel for respondent no. 1- State supported the
submissions of the appellant and submitted that the impugned order is a E
cryptic one which is liable to be set aside. He submitted that there is a
strong prima facie case against the respondent no. 2 - accused who
committed the heinous offence of rape and sexual assault upon his minor
niece for nearly three to four years. Further, respondent no. 2 - accused
is an infamous criminal who has twenty criminal cases registered against F
him, in some of which he has already been convicted. The list of cases
registered against him include cases relating to murder, attempt to murder,
kidnapping, dacoity, etc. Therefore, the order of the High Court granting
bail to respondent no. 2 - accused should be set aside.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submits that
G
the High Court passed the impugned order granting bail after hearing
the respondent no. 2 - accused and the State. No new materials have
been placed on record before this Court, requiring this Court to interfere
with the impugned order. Further, it is a settled position of law that an
appellate Court must be slow to interfere in an order granting bail to the
accused. H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
7. Before adverting to the submissions made by the parties relating
to the grant of bail, it is necessary to provide a brief conspectus of the
allegations made against respondent no. 2 – accused. As per the
chargesheet dated 29.06.2021 filed in the present case, it is stated that
B the appellant-prosecutrix registered an FIR on 30.05.2021 wherein it
was stated that on the 16-17.05.2021 the respondent no. 2 – accused,
her uncle, had come to her house. At around mid-night to 1 am the
respondent no. 2 – accused had called her to his room and forcibly
raped her on two occasions. Although, initially, she did not narrate this to
anyone because she was scared, some of her relatives noticed her strange
C behaviour. When they asked her why she was sad, she narrated the
entire incident to her family. Even before this incident, the respondent
no. 2 – accused had misbehaved with her. In 2014, he touched her
inappropriately. In 2015, he had attempted to rape her. He used to try to
chat with her and used obscene language, and attempted to establish
D physical relationship with her on various occasions. She had never
disclosed these incidents to anyone as he threatened her. It is in the
background of these allegations that the appropriateness of the impugned
order passed by the High Court granting bail to respondent no. 2 –
accused must be considered.
E 8. This Court has, in a catena of judgments, outlined the
considerations on the basis of which discretion under Section 439, CrPC
has to be exercised while granting bail. In Gurcharan Singh v. State
(Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC 118 this Court has held as to
the various parameters which must be considered while granting bail.
This Court held as follows:
F
“24. …Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have
to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of
granting of bail under Section 439(1) CrPC of the new Code. The
overriding considerations in granting bail to which we adverted to
earlier and which are common both in the case of Section 437(1)
G and Section 439(1) CrPC of the new Code are the nature and
gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed;
the position and the status of the accused with reference to the
victim and the witnesses; the likelihood, of the accused fleeing
from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life
H being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the
MS.Y v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR. 33
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well A
as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view
of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out.”
9. The above factors do not constitute an exhaustive list. The
grant of bail requires the consideration of various factors which ultimately
depends upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case before B
the Court. There is no strait jacket formula which can ever be prescribed
as to what the relevant factors could be. However, certain important
factors that are always considered, inter-alia, relate to prima facie
involvement of the accused, nature and gravity of the charge, severity
of the punishment, and the character, position and standing of the accused
[see State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21]. C
10. At the stage of granting bail the Court is not required to enter
into a detailed analysis of the evidence in the case. Such an exercise
may be undertaken at the stage of trial.
11. Once bail has been granted, the Appellate Court is usually D
slow to interfere with the same as it pertains to the liberty of an individual.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in Bihar Legal Support Society v.
Chief Justice of India, (1986) 4 SCC 767 observed as follows:
“3. … It is for this reason that the Apex Court has evolved, as a
matter of self-discipline, certain norms to guide it in the exercise E
of its discretion in cases where special leave petition are filed
against orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail.…We
reiterate this policy principle laid down by the bench of this
Court and hold that this Court should not ordinarily, save
in exceptional cases, interfere with orders granting or
refusing bail or anticipatory bail, because these are matters F
in which the High Court should normally be the final
arbiter.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. The above principle has been consistently followed by this
G
Court. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496 this Court held as under:
“9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearly
unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail
H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High
Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly
in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of
decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among
other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
B
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
C
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on
bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the
accused;
D (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced;
and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.
E xxx xxx xxx
10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to these
relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it to be illegal…..”
F 13. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 this Court
followed the holding in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) and held as
follows:
“17. Where a court considering an application for bail fails to
consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set
G aside the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to
consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-
application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of
the evidence on record. It is thus necessary for this Court to assess
whether, on the basis of the evidentiary record, there existed a
prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
H
MS.Y v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR. 35
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
committed the crime, also taking into account the seriousness of A
the crime and the severity of the punishment…”
14. Recently, a three Judges’ Bench of this Court in Jagjeet Singh
& Ors. V. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr. in Criminal Appeal No.
632 of 2022, has reiterated the factors that the Court must consider at
the time of granting bail under Section 439 CrPC, as well as highlighted B
the circumstances where this Court may interfere when bail has been
granted in violation of the requirements under the above-mentioned
section. This Court observed as follows:
“28. We may, at the outset, clarify that power to grant bail under
Section 439 of CrPC, is one of wide amplitude. A High Court or a C
Sessions Court, as the case may be, are bestowed with considerable
discretion while deciding an application for bail. But, as has been
held by this Court on multiple occasions, this discretion is not
unfettered. On the contrary, the High Court of the Sessions Court
must grant bail after the application of a judicial mind, following
well-established principles, and not in a cryptic or mechanical D
manner.”
15. It is worth noting that what is being considered in this case
relates to whether the High Court has exercised the discretionary power
under Section 439 CrPC in granting bail appropriately. Such an
assessment is different from deciding whether circumstances subsequent E
to the grant of bail have made it necessary to cancel the same. The first
situation requires the Court to analyze whether the order granting bail
was illegal, perverse, unjustified or arbitrary. On the other hand, an
application for cancellation of bail looks at whether supervening
circumstances have occurred warranting cancellation. In Neeru Yadav F
v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 this Court held as follows:
“12. We have referred to certain principles to be kept in mind
while granting bail, as has been laid down by this Court from time
to time. It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is
granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some G
supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have
occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order
granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case,
the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration
while dealing with the application for bail have not been taken
H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A note of, or bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably
the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail.
Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate
realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the court does
not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the
supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It,
B
on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of
the order passed by the court.”
16. In the present case, it is necessary to determine whether the
High Court while granting bail to the respondent no. 2 - accused has
properly exercised its discretion under Section 439 CrPC by following
C various parameters laid down by this Court. A bare perusal of the impugned
order passed by the High Court does not suggest that the Court has
considered any of the relevant factors for grant of bail. It would be
fruitful to extract the impugned order at this juncture:
“1. The present bail application has been filed under Section 439
D Cr.P.C. The petitioner has been arrested in connection with FIR
No. 319/2021 Registered at Police Station Udhyog Nagar, District
Sikar for the offence(s) under Sections 354, 354B, 354D, 376(2)F,
376(2)N, 450, 506, 509 IPC and Sections 9N/10, 5L/6, 5(N)/6 and
18 of POCSO Act.
E 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
has been falsely implicated in this case. He is behind the bars
since 30.05.2021. Charge-sheet has been filed against the
petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that
during trial, statement of the prosecutrix was recorded by the
F learned trial Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits
that the prosecutrix has made improvement in her statement.
Conclusion of trial may take long time.
3. Learned counsel for the complainant has opposed the bail
application and submitted that the petitioner is a habitual offender
G and he has been booked in PASA.
4. Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the bail application.
5. Considering the contentions put-forth by the counsel for the
petitioner and taking into account the facts and circumstances of
the case and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the
H
MS.Y v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR. 37
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
case, this court deems it just and proper to enlarge the petitioner A
on bail.
6. Accordingly, the bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is
allowed and it is ordered that the accused-petitioner Omprakash
@ Jeevanram @ Oma Thehat S/o Boduram shall be enlarged on
bail provided he furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/ B
- with two sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the
learned trial Judge for his appearance before the court concerned
on all the dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so.”
17. Apart from the general observation that the facts and
circumstances of the case have been taken into account, nowhere have C
the actual facts of the case been adverted to. There appears to be no
reference to the factors that ultimately led the High Court to grant bail.
In fact, no reasoning is apparent from the impugned order.
18. Reasoning is the life blood of the judicial system. That every
order must be reasoned is one of the fundamental tenets of our system. D
An unreasoned order suffers the vice of arbitrariness. In Puran v.
Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 this Court held as under:
“8. …Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or
demerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of
evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case E
has not to be undertaken. What the Additional Sessions Judge
had done in the order dated 11-9-2000 was to discuss the merits
and demerits of the evidence. That was what was deprecated.
That did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons
for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did
not have to be indicated.” F
(emphasis supplied)
19. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528 this Court indicated the importance of reasoning in the matter
concerning bail and held as follows:
G
“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well
settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the
stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and
elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be
H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.
A undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders
reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being
granted particularly where the accused is charged of having
committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such
reasons would suffer from non-application of mind…”
B (emphasis supplied)
20. In Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna, (2009) 1 SCC 678,
which concerned a challenge to grant of bail in a serious offence, this
Court has reiterated the same position as was observed in Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar (supra). ThisCourt has held as under:
C
“12… However, we find from the order that no reasons were
given by the learned Judge while granting the bail and it seems to
have been granted almost mechanically without considering the
pros and cons of the matter. While granting bail, particularly
in serious cases like murder some reasons justifying the
D grant are necessary.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. From the above, it is clear that this Court has consistently
upheld the necessity of reasoned bail orders, with a special emphasis on
E matters involving serious offences. In the present case, respondent no.
2 - accused has been accused of committing the grievous offence of
rape against his young niece of nineteen years. The fact that the
respondent no. 2 - accused is a habitual offender and nearly twenty
cases registered against him has not even found mentioned in the
impugned order. Further the High Court has failed to consider the
F
influence that the respondent no. 2 - accused may have over the
prosecutrix as an elder family member. The period of imprisonment,
being only three months, is not of such a magnitude as to push the Court
towards granting bail in an offence of this nature.
G 22. The impugned order passed by the High Court is cryptic, and
does not suggest any application of mind. There is a recent trend of
passing such orders granting or refusing to grant bail, where the Courts
make a general observation that “the facts and the circumstances” have
been considered. No specific reasons are indicated which precipitated
the passing of the order by the Court.
H
MS.Y v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANR. 39
[N. V. RAMANA, CJI]
23. Such a situation continues despite various judgments of this A
Court wherein this Court has disapproved of such a practice. In the
case of Mahipal (supra) this Court observed as follows:
“25. Merely recording “having perused the record” and
“on the facts and circumstances of the case” does not
subserve the purpose of a reasoned judicial order. It is a B
fundamental premise of open justice, to which our judicial system
is committed, that factors which have weighed in the mind of the
Judge in the rejection or the grant of bail are recorded in the order
passed. Open justice is premised on the notion that justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done. The duty of Judges to give reasoned decisions lies at C
the heart of this commitment. Questions of the grant of bail
concern both liberty of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution
as well as the interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring
that those who commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to
obstruct justice. Judges are duty-bound to explain the basis D
on which they have arrived at a conclusion.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. In view of the above, the impugned order passed by the High
Court is set aside. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed. Bail
bonds stand cancelled. Respondent no. 2 - accused is directed to E
surrender within one week from the receipt of this order, failing which,
the concerned police authorities shall take him into custody.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeal allowed.
F
G
H
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