MS. XversusMR. A AND OTHERS

                 [2024] 3 S.C.R. 947 : 2024 INSC 216

                                   Ms. X
                                     v.
                             Mr. A and Others
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1661 of 2024)
                               18 March 2024
      [B.R. Gavai,* Rajesh Bindal and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings
       by exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C in a complaint
       alleging offences under Sections 354D, 376(2)(n), 504 and 506
       read with 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)
       (s), 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(v-a) of the Scheduled Castes and
       Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

                                  Headnotes
       Crime Against Women – Sexual intercourse based on
       promise of marriage – The Appellant-prosecutrix believed
       that the accused would marry her leading her to consent
       to establishing a sexual relationship with the accused –
       Subsequent pregnancy of the Appellant –Termination of
       pregnancy at the instance of the accused – Refusal of the
       appellant to marry the Appellant [Paras 3 - 3.4]
       Crime Against Women – Narrative given by the prosecutrix
       in initial statement qua the abortion undergone – Changed
       substantially in the restatement – Version of events as given
       by the prosecutrix in the FIR totally contrary to the restatement
       [Paras 9, 15].
       Crime Against Women – Sexual intercourse based on promise
       of marriage – Consideration of material on record by the
       High Court – The High Court referred to pertinent documents
       including the original complaint, restatement, medical reports
       of the prosecutrix and the statement of the doctor while
       quashing the proceedings [Para 8].
       Panel Code, 1860 – s.375 – Legal concept of “consent” in
       relation to Section 375, IPC – Engagement in sexual activity
       based on a false promise to marry – Propositions to be
       established – For the promise to marry to be false, it ought
* Author
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       to be given in bad faith per se and must also bear a direct
       nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act
       [Para 11].
       Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 – s.482 – Guidelines for
       exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C – Power to be
       exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to
       secure the ends of justice – Categories of cases illustrated –
       Powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C should be exercised only
       in exceptional cases where there is no sufficient ground for
       proceeding against the accused [Paras 17-18].
       Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 – s.482 – Quashing of
       Proceedings under – The High Court quashed the proceedings
       under IPC and the SC/ST Act citing insufficiency of evidence
       and material contradictions in the statements of the prosecutrix
       – Allegations in FIR and in the restatement of the prosecutrix
       do not prima facie indicate a false promise to marry by the
       accused – No infirmity in the approach adopted by the High
       Court – Appeal dismissed [Paras 15-19].
       Held: Relying on Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
       Another, [2022] 7 SCR 156, wherein on similar facts the court came
       to the finding that the relationship between the parties was purely
       of a consensual nature. Present case would squarely fall under
       the guidelines given by this court in State of Haryana and Others
       v. Bhajan Lal and Others, [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735, for exercising
       of powers under Section 482, CrPC - In the present case, even
       if the allegations made in the FIR and the material on which the
       prosecution relies, are taken at its face value, there were no sufficient
       grounds for proceeding against the accused [Paras 11, 15- 19]

                                  Case Law Cited
             Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another,
             [2022] 7 SCR 156 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032;
             Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and
             Another, [2019] 11 SCR 423 : (2019) 9 SCC 608; State
             of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, [1992]
             Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp (1) 335 – relied on.
             Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra
             and Others, [2018] 13 SCR 920 : (2019) 18 SCC 191
             – referred to.
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                          949

                        Ms. X v. Mr. A and Others


                               List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
     (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Code of Criminal Procedure,
     1973.

                            List of Keywords
     False promise of marriage; Consent; Sexual relationship; Forced
     abortion; Quashing of proceedings; Mini trial; Abuse of process of
     law; Miscarriage of justice.

                           Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1661
     of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 03.09.2022 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No.8468 of 2021
                        Appearances for Parties
     Naman Dwivedi, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, C Kranthi Kumar, Danish
     Saifi, Sabarish Subramanian, Advs. for the Appellant.
     M Yogesh Kanna, Raghunatha Sethupathy B, S. Sabari Bala Pandian,
     Santhosh K, Ms. Monica Saini, Advs. for the Respondents.
                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                   Judgment
     B.R. Gavai, J.
1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present criminal appeal challenges the order dated 3rd September
     2022, passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
     Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Petition No. 8468 of 2021,
     whereby the High Court allowed the petition filed under Section 482
     of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’ for short) preferred
     by the accused persons and quashed the entire proceedings pending
     against them before the 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge,
     Chitradurga (hereinafter referred to as ‘trial court’) in Special Case
     (SC/ST) No. 1 of 2021.
3.   Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal are as
     under:
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       3.1. The prosecution case is that in the year 2016, while the
            complainant/appellant was still a minor, having been born on
            12th September 1998, accused No.1 after becoming acquainted
            with the complainant/appellant while they both were preparing
            for the competitive examination, made her fall in love with him.
            Thereafter, they entered into a relationship and were intimate with
            each other. Subsequently, in the year 2019, accused No. 1 took
            the complainant/appellant to his aunty’s house in Chitradurga
            whereupon he had sexual intercourse with her, after leading
            her to believe that he would marry her. A few days thereafter,
            accused No. 1 took the complainant/appellant to his house
            near the Gate of Siddapura Village in order to introduce her
            to his parents. In his family’s absence, accused No. 1 forcibly
            engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant/appellant
            on multiple occasions. As a consequence, the complainant/
            appellant got pregnant. Six months into the pregnancy, upon
            gaining knowledge of the same, accused No.1 and his brother
            accused No.2 forcibly took her to Krishna Nursing Home,
            Challakere and compelled her to undergo an abortion.
       3.2. Subsequently, accused No. 1 reiterated his promise to marry her,
            however, he stated that such marriage would take place only
            after he finished his preparation for the Karnataka Administrative
            Service Examination. He further compelled her to maintain
            silence by threatening her that if she discloses any information
            about the termination of her pregnancy to her parents, he would
            kill her and would also kill himself by consuming poison. Accused
            No.3 and accused No.4, parents of accused No. 1 also assured
            the complainant/appellant that she and accused No. 1 would
            get married after the latter finished with his studies.
       3.3. On 22nd September 2020, after the complainant/appellant’s
            parents became aware of her relationship with accused No. 1
            and the termination of her pregnancy, the complainant/appellant
            along with her parents visited the house of the accused persons
            with the request that the complainant/appellant and accused
            No. 1 be married to each other. However, the accused persons
            turned down the request and asserted that no such marriage
            would be possible since the complainant/appellant was a
            prostitute belonging to the Scheduled Caste, Madigha.
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                       951

                        Ms. X v. Mr. A and Others


     3.4. While this version of events was brought out in her original
          complaint, which was the basis of the First Information Report
          (“FIR” for short) being Case Crime No. 456 of 2020, lodged
          on 1st October 2020 at Police Station Challakere, District
          Chitradurga, the complainant/appellant in her restatement
          (Annexure P-6) made before the Dy. S.P., Challakere, changed
          the narrative with respect to the manner in which the termination
          of pregnancy had been carried out. She clarified that she
          had not been taken to Krishna Nursing Home. She stated,
          instead, that accused No. 1 upon gaining knowledge of her
          pregnancy, had informed her that he would like to continue
          with his studies and had thereafter brought her Ayurvedic
          medicine which would cause the termination of her pregnancy.
          Upon the said medicine being administered to the complainant/
          appellant by accused No.1, her pregnancy was terminated.
          The complainant/appellant requested that the restatement be
          made a part of her original complaint. Accordingly, the relevant
          alteration was made in the original complaint, which fact is
          reflected in the brief summary of the case contained in the
          charge-sheet, subsequently filed.
     3.5. After the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came
          to be filed before the trial court on 22nd December 2020 against
          all the accused persons for the offences punishable under
          Sections 354D, 376(2)(n), 504 and 506 read with 34 of the
          Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short) and Sections 3(1)
          (r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(v-a) of The Scheduled
          Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
          1989 (“SC/ST Act” for short).
     3.6. On the charge-sheet being filed, the trial court took cognizance
          of the charges and initiated criminal proceedings against the
          accused persons vide Special Case (SC/ST) No. 01 of 2021.
     3.7. Being aggrieved thereby, the accused persons preferred a
          petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court,
          praying for quashing of the proceedings pending before the
          trial court. The High Court, by the impugned order, allowed the
          petition and quashed the afore-stated proceedings in respect
          of all the accused persons.
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4.     Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been filed by the
       original complainant.
5.     We have heard Shri Naman Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing on
       behalf of the appellant and Shri M. Yogesh Kanna, learned counsel
       appearing on behalf of the respondents.
6.     Shri Dwivedi submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court
       has grossly erred in quashing the proceedings. It is submitted that the
       learned Single Judge almost conducted a mini-trial while considering
       a petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the
       learned Single Judge of the High Court ought to have taken into
       consideration that the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
       was permissible only when the material placed on record along with
       the charge-sheet was sufficient enough to come to a conclusion that
       the case, even if it went to trial, would not culminate into conviction.
       It is submitted that from the statement of the prosecutrix as well as
       the witnesses, the prosecution has prima facie shown that accused
       No.1, on the false promise of marriage, had entered into a forcible
       relationship with the victim. It is submitted that the material placed
       on record was also sufficient to prima facie point out that accused
       No. 1 had forced the complainant to undergo abortion when the
       complainant had become pregnant.
7.     Per contra, Shri Kanna submitted that the learned Single Judge of
       the High Court has considered the material placed on record to come
       to a conclusion that the prosecution case, even if taken at its face
       value, does not constitute the ingredients of the offences charged
       with. The learned counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge
       of the High Court, relying on the judgments of this Court in the cases
       of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and
       Others1 and Shambhu Kharwar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
       Another2, has rightly held that there was no material placed on
       record to constitute the offences punishable under Section 376 of
       IPC. He submitted that no error could be found with the finding of
       the High Court that permitting the continuation of the proceedings
       would become an abuse of process of law and result in miscarriage
       of justice. It is submitted that the prosecutrix has gone to the extent


1    [2018] 13 SCR 920 : (2019) 18 SCC 191
2    [2022] 7 SCR 156 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                        953

                        Ms. X v. Mr. A and Others


     of dragging the entire family only in order to harass the accused
     persons.
8.   The High Court, in the impugned order, has referred to the original
     complaint filed by the appellant, the restatement of the appellant
     (Annexure P-6) made before the Dy. S.P., Challakere and the
     statement of the doctor/Head of the Krishna Nursing Home. After
     considering the material placed on record, the High Court found that
     the complainant has totally changed her version of events in her
     restatement (Annexure P-6) made before the Dy. S.P., Challakere
     from the statement given in the original complaint filed by her.
     The learned Single Judge of the High Court has also referred to
     the report of the medical examination of the prosecutrix dated 19th
     December 2020.
9.   We have also perused the material placed on record along with the
     charge-sheet. It can be seen that though the initial version of the
     complainant is that after she became pregnant, she was taken to
     the Krishna Nursing Home wherein she was compelled to undergo
     abortion, however, the statement of the doctor/Head of Krishna
     Nursing Home would show that the version of the complainant that
     she was brought to the Krishna Nursing Home on 17th August 2020
     to abort her six months pregnancy, was completely false. The doctor/
     Head of Krishna Nursing Home has denied any acquaintance with
     the prosecutrix or the accused persons. The doctor/Head of Krishna
     Nursing Home has also stated that during the relevant period, on
     account of lockdown due to COVID virus, no patient was admitted
     in the hospital. It is further to be noted that the complainant, in her
     restatement (Annexure P-6) made before the Dy. S.P., Challakere,
     has changed her version and stated that she was not taken to the
     Krishna Nursing Home. The prosecutrix has stated that she was
     administered some medicine which was not allopathy which led to
     the termination of her pregnancy.
10. Even the statement of Anitha (CW-6) would reveal that both the
    prosecutrix and accused No. 1 had come together to her house and
    accused No. 1 informed her that the prosecutrix was his relative.
    According to the statement of Anitha (CW-6), six months prior to
    the date of recording her statement, accused No. 1 along with the
    prosecutrix had come to her house in the morning and had taken
    breakfast. After that, Anitha (CW-6) had left the house leaving both
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       of them in the house. Anitha (CW-6) stated that when she came back
       in the room at around 02.00 pm, accused No. 1 and the prosecutrix
       took their meals and in the evening, they went to Challakere.
11. The issue similar to the one which arises for consideration in the
    present matter also arose for consideration before this Court in the
    case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and
    Another3, wherein this Court observed thus:
            “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from
            the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect
            to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned
            deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether
            the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact”
            arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must
            be established. The promise of marriage must have been
            a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of
            being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise
            itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus
            to the woman›s decision to engage in the sexual act.
            19. The allegations in the FIR indicate that in November
            2009 the complainant initially refused to engage in sexual
            relations with the accused, but on the promise of marriage,
            he established sexual relations. However, the FIR includes
            a reference to several other allegations that are relevant
            for the present purpose. They are as follows:
            19.1. The complainant and the appellant knew each other
            since 1998 and were intimate since 2004.
            19.2. The complainant and the appellant met regularly,
            travelled great distances to meet each other, resided in
            each other›s houses on multiple occasions, engaged in
            sexual intercourse regularly over a course of five years
            and on multiple occasions visited the hospital jointly to
            check whether the complainant was pregnant.
            19.3. The appellant expressed his reservations about
            marrying the complainant on 31-1-2014. This led to



3   [2019] 11 SCR 423 : (2019) 9 SCC 608
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                         955

                         Ms. X v. Mr. A and Others


            arguments between them. Despite this, the appellant and
            the complainant continued to engage in sexual intercourse
            until March 2015.”
12. This Court, in the facts of the said case, set aside the judgment of
    the High Court which refused to exercise its jurisdiction under Section
    482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. The Court found that this
    was a fit case wherein the High Court ought to have invoked its
    jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.
13. In the present case also, the facts are almost similar. Even as per the
    version of the complainant, the following facts have been emerged:
     (i)    4 years prior to the FIR being lodged on 1st October 2020,
            accused No. 1 followed the prosecutrix and told her that he
            loved her and she should also love him;
     (ii)   After a period of 2 years, she agreed to love him and both were
            intimate with each other;
     (iii) One year prior to the date of the incident, accused No. 1 took the
           prosecutrix to his aunty’s house in Chitradurga and they stayed
           there. On that day at about 09.00 am, in his aunty’s house, by
           giving trust and belief that he would marry her, accused No. 1
           forcibly made sexual contact with the prosecutrix;
     (iv) Thereafter, accused No. 1 took the prosecutrix to various places
          including his own house and committed sexual intercourse with
          her; and
     (v)    As per the version of the prosecutrix, the first incident has
            taken place in the year 2019. As per Karnataka Secondary
            Education Examination Board Certificate, her date of birth is
            12th September 1998. Even if it is assumed that the incident
            has taken place in January 2019, she would have been over
            the age of 18.
14. After the prosecutrix became pregnant, accused No. 1 caused her
    abortion on 17th August 2020. Though her initial version was that
    she was admitted in the hospital for two days, it is falsified by the
    statement of the doctor/Head of Krishna Nursing Home. After this
    incident, she discussed the matter with her elders in the family and
    decided to lodge the complaint.
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15. We find that, in the present case also like the case of Pramod
    Suryabhan Pawar (supra), the allegations in the FIR so also in the
    restatement (Annexure P-6) made before the Dy. S.P., Challakere,
    do not, on their face, indicate that the promise by accused No. 1
    was false or that the complainant engaged in the sexual relationship
    on the basis of such false promise. This apart from the fact that the
    prosecutrix has changed her version. The version of events given by
    the prosecutrix in the restatement (Annexure P-6) made before the
    Dy. S.P., Challakere is totally contrary to the one given in the FIR.
16. Similar facts arose for consideration before this Court in the case
    of Shambhu Kharwar (supra). In the said case, the prosecutrix
    had filed a complaint that there was love affair between her and
    the accused for a period of three years. The accused had given an
    assurance to her regarding solemnization of marriage. They started
    living under the same roof and also made sexual relationship.
    Thereafter, the accused entered into a ring ceremony with someone
    else. In this background, the prosecutrix had lodged the complaint
    that the accused had forcible sexual intercourse with her on the
    false promise of marriage. After considering the material placed on
    record, the Court observed thus:
             “13. …..Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-
             sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence
             under Section 375 IPC are absent. The relationship
             between the parties was purely of a consensual nature.
             The relationship, as noted above, was in existence prior to
             the marriage of the second respondent and continued to
             subsist during the term of the marriage and after the second
             respondent was granted a divorce by mutual consent.”
17. This Court, in the case of State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan
    Lal and Others4, has observed thus:
             “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
             relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
             the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
             of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
             power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under


4   (1992) Supp (1) 335
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                          957

                         Ms. X v. Mr. A and Others


           Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
           reproduced above, we give the following categories of
           cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
           exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
           court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
           may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
           and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
           rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
           kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
           (1)   Where the allegations made in the first
                 information report or the complaint, even if they
                 are taken at their face value and accepted in
                 their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
                 offence or make out a case against the accused.
           (2)   Where the allegations in the first information
                 report and other materials, if any, accompanying
                 the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
                 justifying an investigation by police officers
                 under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
                 an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
                 Section 155(2) of the Code.
           (3)   Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
                 the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected
                 in support of the same do not disclose the
                 commission of any offence and make out a
                 case against the accused.
           (4)   Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
                 constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
                 only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
                 is permitted by a police officer without an order
                 of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
                 155(2) of the Code.
           (5)   Where the allegations made in the FIR or
                 complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
                 on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
                 reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
                 ground for proceeding against the accused.
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            (6)   Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
                  in any of the provisions of the Code or
                  the concerned Act (under which a criminal
                  proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
                  continuance of the proceedings and/or where
                  there is a specific provision in the Code or the
                  concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
                  the grievance of the aggrieved party.
            (7)   Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
                  attended with mala fide and/or where the
                  proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
                  ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
                  accused and with a view to spite him due to
                  private and personal grudge.”
18. We find that the present case would squarely fall under categories
    (1), (3) and (5) as reproduced hereinabove for the reasons which
    we have already recorded in the earlier paragraphs. No doubt, that
    the power of quashing the criminal proceedings should be exercised
    very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of
    rare cases, it is also equally settled that the Court will not be justified
    in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness
    or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint.
    However, in the present case, even if the allegations made in the
    FIR and the material on which the prosecution relies, are taken at its
    face value, we find that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding
    against the accused. We find that no error has been committed by
    the learned Single Judge of the High Court by holding that permitting
    further proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of
    law and result in miscarriage of justice. The High Court has correctly
    applied the law on the issue and come to a just finding warranting
    no interference.
19. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Headnotes prepared by:                               Result of the case:
       Ankitesh Ojha, Hony. Associate Editor                Appeal dismissed.
       (Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)