MR. R.S. MADIREDDY AND ANR. ETC.versusUNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.

                 [2024] 6 S.C.R. 934 : 2024 INSC 425

                   Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc.
                                   v.
                       Union of India & Ors. etc.
                  (Civil Appeal No(s). 6473-6476 of 2024)
                                 16 May 2024
                [B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       (i) Whether respondent No.3(AIL) after having been taken over
       by a private corporate entity could have been subjected to writ
       jurisdiction of the High Court; (ii) Whether the appellants herein
       could have been non-suited on account of the fact that during
       pendency of their writ petitions, the nature of the employer
       changed from a Government entity to a private entity; (iii) Whether
       the delay in disposal of the writ petition could be treated a valid
       ground to sustain the claim of the appellants even against the
       private entity.
                                  Headnotes
       Constitution of India – Art.226 – Whether respondent No.3(AIL)
       after having been taken over by a private corporate entity could
       have been subjected to writ jurisdiction of the High Court:
       Held: In the instant case, there is no dispute that the Government
       of India having transferred its 100% share to a private limited
       company-T, ceased to have any administrative control or deep
       pervasive control over the private entity and hence, the company
       after its disinvestment could not have been treated to be a State
       anymore after having taken over by the private company – Thus,
       unquestionably, the respondent No.3(AIL) after its disinvestment
       ceased to be a State or its instrumentality within the meaning
       of Article 12 of the Constitution of India – Once the respondent
       No.3(AIL) ceased to be covered by the definition of State within
       the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it could not
       have been subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
       Constitution of India – The respondent No.3(AIL), the erstwhile
       Government run airline having been taken over by the private
       company-T, unquestionably, is not performing any public duty
       inasmuch as it has taken over the Government company Air
       India Limited for the purpose of commercial operations, plain and
* Author
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                              935

      Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


     simple, and thus no writ petition is maintainable against respondent
     No.3(AIL). [Paras 32, 33 and 37]
     Constitution of India – Art.226 – Whether the appellants herein
     could have been non-suited on account of the fact that during
     pendency of their writ petitions, the nature of the employer
     changed from a Government entity to a private entity:
     Held: The respondent No.3(AIL)-employer was a government entity
     on the date of filing of the writ petitions, which came to be decided
     after a significant delay by which time, the company had been
     disinvested and taken over by a private player – Since, respondent
     No.3 employer had been disinvested and had assumed the character
     of a private entity not performing any public function, the High
     Court could not have exercised the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction
     to issue a writ to such private entity – The Division Bench of the
     High Court has taken care to protect the rights of the appellants to
     seek remedy and thus, it cannot be said that the appellants have
     been non-suited in the case – It is only that the appellants would
     have to approach another forum for seeking their remedy – Thus,
     the question is decided against the appellants. [Para 38]
     Constitution of India – Art.226 – Whether the delay in disposal
     of the writ petition could be treated a valid ground to sustain
     the claim of the appellants even against the private entity:
     Held: The delay in disposal of the writ petitions could not have
     been a ground to continue with and maintain the writ petitions –
     Because the forum that is the High Court where the writ petitions
     were instituted could not have issued a writ to the private respondent
     which had changed hands in the intervening period – Hence, the
     question is also decided against the appellants. [Para 39]

                              Case Law Cited
     Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology
     [2002] 3 SCR 100 : (2002) 5 SCC 111; Andi Mukta Sadguru
     Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak
     Trust and Ors. v. V.R. Rudani & Ors. [1989] 2 SCR 697 : (1989)
     2 SCC 691; Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [2003] Supp. 4
     SCR 121 : (2003) 10 SCC 733 – relied on.
     Kalpana Yogesh Dhagat through Legal Heirs v. Reliance Industries
     Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 10186; Asulal Loya v. Union of
     India and Ors., ILR (2009) I Delhi 450; Tarun Kumar Banerjee v.
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       Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. and Another, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom
       1899 – approved.
       Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders [1975] 3
       SCR 958 : (1975) 1 SCC 770; Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P. and
       Ors. [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 530 : (2003) 1 SCC 726; Rajesh D.
       Darbar and Others v. Narasingrao Krishnaji Kulkarni and Others
       [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 273 : (2003) 7 SCC 219; Kaushal Kishor
       v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. [2023] 8 SCR 581 : (2023) 4
       SCC 1; Binny Ltd. and Anr. v. V. Sadasivan and Ors. [2005] Supp.
       2 SCR 421 : (2005) 6 SCC 657 – referred to.
       Mahant Pal Singh v. Union of India and Others, 2009 SCC OnLine
       Bom 2554; Padmavathi Subramaniyan and Others v. Ministry of
       Civil Aviation Government of India rep by its Secretary and Others,
       2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1706; Ashok Kumar Gupta & Ors. v. Union
       of India & Ors. (2007) SCC OnLine Cal 264 – referred to.
       Regina (Beer(trading as Hammer Trout Farm)) v. Hampshire
       Farmers’ Markets & Ltd. [2004] 1 WLR 233 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Constitution of India.
                                List of Keywords
       Public limited company taken over by Private limited company;
       Company after its disinvestment; Article 12 of the Constitution
       of India; Instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the
       Constitution of India after disinvestment of public limited company;
       Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;
       Extra ordinary writ jurisdiction to issue a writ; Non-suited; Delay
       in disposal of writ petition.
                                Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 6473-6476 of
       2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 20.09.2022 of the High Court of
       Judicature at Bombay in WP No.1770 of 2011, WP No.1536 of 2013
       and WP Nos. 123 and 844 of 2014
       With
       Civil Appeal Nos. 6477 and 6478 of 2024
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                        937

       Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


                                   Appearances for Parties
      Sanjay Singhavi, Sr. Adv., Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Ms. Rohini
      Thyagarajan, Ms. Shanvi Punamiya, Nishant Sharma, Akshay Arora,
      Swapnil Anil Walde, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Karan Nagrath, Ambuj Tiwari,
      R. Gopalakrishnan, R Sudhinder, Dattatray Vyas, Shashank Dixit,
      Advs. for the Appellants.
      Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, S. Niranjan
      Reddy, R Balasuramanian, Sr. Advs., Ms. B.L.N. Shivani, Ms. Manisha
      Chava, Shashwat Parihar, Amrish Kumar, Avishkar Singhvi, Aishwarya
      Singhvi, Ms. Rukmini Bobde, Amit Kumar Mishra, Azeem Samuel,
      Ms. Mitakshara Goyal, Kunal Chatterji, L Nidhiram Sharma, Kaustubh
      Seth, Akhil Kumar Kulshrestha, Ms. Akhila, Shivam Singhania,
      Ms. Yashika Nagpal, Vivek Kumar, Naved Ahmed, Amlan Kumar,
      Santosh Kumar Pandey, Santosh Kumar Vishwakarma, Debashish
      Mishra, Mohit Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                         Judgment
      Mehta, J.
1.    Leave granted.
2.    The present appeals are filed challenging the common impugned
      judgment and order dated 20th September, 2022 passed by the
      Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay thereby dismissing
      four writ petitions instituted by the appellants being the former
      employees of respondent No.3 i.e. Air India Limited (hereinafter
      referred to as ‘AIL’) as members of its cabin crew force. Appellants
      came to be employed in AIL in the late 1980s and all of them retired
      between 2016 and 2018.
3.    Writ Petition Nos. 123 of 20141 and 844 of 20142 were filed for
      alleged stagnation in pay and non-promotion of the employees. Writ
      Petition No. 844 of 2014 additionally raised issues of anomalies
      in the fixation of pay arising out of and for implementation of the




1    Filed on 30th August, 2013
2    Filed on 09th October, 2014
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       report of the Justice Dharmadhikari Committee3. Writ Petition Nos.
       1770 of 20114 and 1536 of 20135, pertained to the delay in payment
       of wage revision arrears and the withdrawal of eight out of the
       seventeen allowances already paid to the employees retrospectively.
       In each of the writ petitions, violation of Articles 14, 16, and 21 of
       the Constitution of India, 1950, was pleaded. The Division Bench
       of Bombay High Court, vide common judgment and order dated
       20th September, 2022 disposed of the above writ petitions denying
       relief as claimed therein on the ground of non-maintainability of
       the writ petitions owing to the intervening event of privatisation of
       respondent No. 3(AIL). Nevertheless, liberty was granted to the
       employee petitioners to seek their remedies in accordance with law.
       Brief Facts: -
4.     Air India was a statutory body constituted under the Air Corporations Act,
       1953. With the repeal of the Act of 1953 by the Air Corporations(Transfer
       of Undertakings) Act, 1994, Air India merged with Indian Airlines
       and upon incorporation, respondent No. 3(AIL) became a wholly
       Government owned company and, thus, came under the category of
       ‘other authorities’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
       of India. This status of Air India continued to subsist on the date
       when the subject batch of writ petitions (supra) under Article 226 of
       the Constitution of India were filed before the High Court invoking
       writ jurisdiction, against respondent No.3(AIL).
5.     However, on 08th October, 2021, the Government of India announced
       that it had accepted the bid of Talace India Pvt Ltd. to purchase its
       100% shares in respondent No. 3 (AIL). Subsequently, on 27th January,
       2022 pursuant to the share purchase agreement signed with Talace
       India Pvt. Ltd., 100% equity shares of the Government of India in
       respondent No. 3(AIL) were purchased by the said private company
       and respondent No. 3(AIL) was privatised and disinvested. Therefore,
       the writ petitions were maintainable on the date of institution but the
       question that arose before the High Court was whether they continued
       to be maintainable as on the date the same were finally heard.



3    Constituted by the respondent No.1 i.e. Union of India(through its Ministry of Civil Aviation) to harmonize
     the differential service conditions of AIL and Indian Airlines Ltd, which came to be merged.
4    Filed on 14th June, 2011
5    Filed on 19th March, 2013
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       Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


6.    Learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court,
      while placing reliance upon the decisions of Tarun Kumar Banerjee
      v. Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. and Another 6; Mahant Pal Singh
      v. Union of India and Others7; Padmavathi Subramaniyan and
      Others v. Ministry of Civil Aviation Government of India rep by
      its Secretary and Others8; and few more decisions of the Delhi High
      Court and Gujarat High Court concluded that with the privatisation
      of respondent No. 3(AIL), jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
      226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ to respondent No.
      3(AIL), particularly in its role as an employer, did not subsist and
      disposed of the writ petitions vide common impugned judgment dated
      20th September 2022, which is assailed in the present appeals by
      special leave.
      Submissions and contentions on behalf of the appellants: -
7.    Shri Sanjay Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
      of the appellants submitted that the right to seek remedy stands
      crystallised on the date of institution of proceedings and though
      subsequent events can be considered, it is a well settled tenet of
      law that such subsequent events can be looked at only to advance
      equity rather than to defeat it. Reliance in this regard was placed
      by learned senior counsel upon Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v.
      Motor & General Traders 9; Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P.
      and Ors.10. He urged that different view is permissible only in
      exceptional circumstances and in no event can a party be divested
      of its substantive rights on account of such subsequent event
      as laid down in Rajesh D. Darbar and Others v. Narasingrao
      Krishnaji Kulkarni and Others11. The relevant extract of Rajesh
      D. Darbar (supra) as relied upon by the learned senior counsel
      for the appellants is extracted hereinbelow: -
             “4. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be
             spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second,
             on the nature of the relief and third, on its importance to


6    2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1899
7    2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2554
8    2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1706
9    [1975] 3 SCR 958 : (1975) 1 SCC 770
10   [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 530 : (2003) 1 SCC 726
11   [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 273 : (2003) 7 SCC 219
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       create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of
       the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or
       unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious
       on account of developments subsequent to the suit or
       even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief
       is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated
       facts. Patterson v. State of Alabama [294 US 600 : 79 L
       Ed 1082 (1934)] (US at p. 607) illustrates this position. It
       is important that the party claiming the relief or change of
       relief must have the same right from which either the first
       or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in
       the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive
       rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow
       category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable
       jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have
       already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated
       by subsequent events save where there is a change in the
       law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar
       Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri [1940 FCR 84 :
       AIR 1941 FC 5] falls in this category. Courts of justice
       may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them,
       shape reliefs — cannot deny rights — to make them justly
       relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is
       discretionary, courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid
       injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends,
       under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of
       certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately
       granted, the court, even in appeal, can take note of such
       supervening facts with fundamental impact. This Court’s
       judgment in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General
       Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1409] read in
       its statutory setting, falls in this category. Where a cause
       of action is deficient but later events have made up the
       deficiency, the court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of
       litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding,
       provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these
       are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot
       be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is
       based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change
       in the cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the
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       Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


             court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights
             vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this
             equitable doctrine (see V.P.R.V. Chockalingam Chetty v.
             Seethai Ache [AIR 1927 PC 252 : 26 All LJ 371] ).”
8.    Reliance was also placed by the learned senior counsel on the
      judgment of Ashok Kumar Gupta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.12,
      wherein the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, after adverting to
      the extant principles concerning the maintainability of writ proceedings
      as on the date of the institution, held that an employer which had
      been privatised during the pendency of a writ appeal filed against
      the order rejecting the writ petition would continue to be amenable
      to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
      The relevant portion of Ashok Kumar Gupta (supra) relied upon is
      extracted hereinbelow: -
             “32. It is nobody’s case that the writ petition was not
             maintainable when it was filed. The cause of action for
             filing the writ petition crystallized at a point of time when
             the respondent authority was, admittedly, subject to the writ
             jurisdiction. The said cause of action confers a vested right
             to the writ petitioners to have their grievances adjudicated
             in a writ proceeding. No one can contend that the writ
             petitioners have brought the present situation by their
             conduct. The change of circumstances is not attributable
             to the petitioners.
             33. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that
             the instant appeal is very much maintainable, and the
             preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent
             company cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Therefore,
             the said preliminary objection regarding maintainability
             of this appeal as raised by the respondent company is
             rejected.”
9.    Learned senior counsel further contended that the scope of issuing a
      writ, order, or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
      is much broader than the high prerogative writs issued by the British
      Courts and this position has been recognised by this Court in the case
      of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna


12   (2007) SCC OnLine Cal 264
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       Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. v. V.R. Rudani & Ors.13,
       and following the said decision, Courts in India have consistently
       issued writs even to private persons performing public duties and this
       position has further been reiterated by the recent judgment of this
       Court in the case of Kaushal Kishor vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
       and Ors.14. The relevant portions of Andi Mukta (supra) as relied
       upon by the learned senior counsel are extracted hereinbelow: -
             “16. The law relating to mandamus has made the most
             spectacular advance. It may be recalled that the remedy
             by prerogative writs in England started with very limited
             scope and suffered from many procedural disadvantages.
             To overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner (the Lord
             Chancellor) in pursuance of Section 3(1)(e) of the Law
             Commission Act, 1965, requested the Law Commission
             “to review the existing remedies for the judicial control
             of administrative acts and omissions with a view to
             evolving a simpler and more effective procedure”. The
             Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law
             Commission Report No. 73). It was implemented by Rules
             of Court (Order 53) in 1977 and given statutory force in
             1981 by Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981. It
             combined all the former remedies into one proceeding
             called Judicial Review. Lord Denning explains the scope
             of this “judicial review”:
             “At one stroke the courts could grant whatever relief was
             appropriate. Not only certiorari and mandamus, but also
             declaration and injunction. Even damages. The procedure
             was much more simple and expeditious. Just a summons
             instead of a writ. No formal pleadings. The evidence
             was given by affidavit. As a rule no cross-examination,
             no discovery, and so forth. But there were important
             safeguards. In particular, in order to qualify, the applicant
             had to get the leave of a judge.
             The statute is phrased in flexible terms. It gives scope
             for development. It uses the words “having regard to”.



13   [1989] 2 SCR 697 : (1989) 2 SCC 691
14   [2023] 8 SCR 581 : (2023) 4 SCC 1
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                           943

       Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


             Those words are very indefinite. The result is that the
             courts are not bound hand and foot by the previous law.
             They are to “have regard to” it. So the previous law as
             to who are — and who are not — public authorities, is
             not absolutely binding. Nor is the previous law as to the
             matters in respect of which relief may be granted. This
             means that the judges can develop the public law as they
             think best. That they have done and are doing.” [See The
             Closing Chapter by Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, p. 122]
             17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is
             confined only to public authorities to compel performance
             of public duty. The “public authority” for them means
             everybody which is created by statute — and whose
             powers and duties are defined by statute. So government
             departments, local authorities, police authorities, and
             statutory undertakings and corporations, are all “public
             authorities”. But there is no such limitation for our High
             Courts to issue the writ “in the nature of mandamus”.
             Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to
             issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a
             striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226,
             writs can be issued to “any person or authority”. It can
             be issued “for the enforcement of any of the fundamental
             rights and for any other purpose.”
10. He further submitted that equity should prevail over injustice and since
    the appellants have diligently pursued their case in the High Court for
    more than a decade, subsequent events can be accounted for only
    to support and not undermine equity. It was further contended that a
    private body that promises the sovereign to fulfill its obligations and
    liabilities as a public employer towards its employees under Articles
    14 & 16, then performs a public duty to the extent of discharging
    such liabilities. It is not the form, but the nature of the duty imposed
    that is relevant for adjudging whether a writ petition would lie against
    a private body. Reliance in support of this contention was placed
    upon the following extracts from the decision of this Court in Binny
    Ltd. and Anr. v. V. Sadasivan and Ors.15:-



15   [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 421 : (2005) 6 SCC 657
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          “23. The counsel for the respondent in Civil Appeal No.
          1976 of 1998 and for the appellant in the civil appeal arising
          out of SLP (Civil) No. 6016 of 2002 strongly contended
          that irrespective of the nature of the body, the writ petition
          under Article 226 is maintainable provided such body is
          discharging a public function or statutory function and that
          the decision itself has the flavour of public law element and
          they relied on the decision of this Court in Shri Anadi Mukta
          Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti
          Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani [(1989) 2 SCC 691].
          In this case, the appellant was a Trust running a science
          college affiliated to the Gujarat University under the Gujarat
          University Act, 1949. The teachers working in that college
          were paid in the pay scales recommended by the University
          Grants Commission and the college was an aided institution.
          There was some dispute between the University Teachers
          Association and the University regarding the fixation of their
          pay scales. Ultimately, the Chancellor passed an award
          and this award was accepted by the State Government as
          well as the University and the University directed to pay
          the teachers as per the award. The appellants refused
          to implement the award and the respondents filed a writ
          petition seeking a writ of mandamus and in the writ petition
          the appellants contended that the college managed by the
          Trust was not an “authority” coming within the purview of
          Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore the writ petition
          was not maintainable. This plea was rejected and this
          Court held that the writ of mandamus would lie against a
          private individual and the words “any person or authority”
          used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory
          authorities and instrumentalities of the State and they may
          cover any other person or body performing public duty. The
          form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What
          is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body.
          The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation
          owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No
          matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive
          obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied.”
11. Learned senior counsel further contended that when a private
    employer steps into the shoes of a public employer i.e. to perform the
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       Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


      same functions as had previously been performed to the same end
      and substantially in the same manner, then its actions are amenable
      to judicial review. Reliance in support of this contention was placed
      upon the decision of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Regina
      (Beer(trading as Hammer Trout Farm)) v. Hampshire Farmers’
      Markets & Ltd.16.
12. It was further contended that the writ petitions came to be instituted
    on behalf of the appellants herein way back in the year 2011-2013
    and at that point of time unquestionably the employer, i.e. respondent
    No. 3(AIL) was a ‘State’ within the ambit and purview of Article 12 of
    the Constitution of India. The writ petitions were filed with genuine
    and bona fide service-related issues of the appellant employees
    based on substantive allegations of infringement of fundamental
    rights guaranteed under Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of
    India. However, the writ petitions could not be taken up and decided
    for over a period of almost 10 years and thus, the appellants cannot
    be non-suited for the non-disposal of their bona fide lis in a timely
    manner. He thus urged that appellants herein are entitled to the
    relief, as claimed for in the writ petitions because the employer i.e.
    respondent No. 3(AIL), undisputedly was amenable to writ jurisdiction
    at the time the writ petitions were instituted and that it continues to
    discharge public duties even after privatisation.
13. On these grounds, learned senior counsel for the appellants implored
    the Court to accept the appeals; set aside the impugned judgment
    and remand the writ petitions to the High Court for adjudication on
    merits.
      Submission and contentions on behalf of respondent No. 3-AIL: -
14. Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing on
    behalf of respondent No. 3(AIL) contended that a bare reading of
    Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would clearly show that the
    ‘test of jurisdiction’ is to be invoked/applied at the time of issuance of
    the writ by the High Court. It is at the stage of issuance of a writ that
    the High Court actually exercises its writ jurisdiction, and therefore, it
    is at that point of time, the High Court ought to be satisfied that the
    person to whom it is issuing a writ is amenable to the extraordinary
    writ jurisdiction.


16   [2004] 1 WLR 233
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15. Learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the
    High Court of Gujarat in the case of Kalpana Yogesh Dhagat
    through Legal Heirs v. Reliance Industries Ltd.17, wherein a writ
    petition had been filed against Indian Petrochemical Corporation
    Ltd.(“IPCL”) in 2002 which came to be decided in the year 2016.
    In the intervening period, the IPCL was privatized and taken over
    by Reliance Industries Limited(RIL) in 2007. The pertinent issue
    that cropped up for consideration was whether the writ petition filed
    against IPCL was maintainable even after its privatization. Learned
    Single Judge18 of the Gujarat High Court held that the writ petition
    was not maintainable. The relevant portion of Kalpana Yogesh
    Dhagat (supra) as relied upon is extracted hereinbelow:-
              “53. In the case in hand, before the writ application
              could be taken up for final hearing, the status of I.P.C.L.
              changed. The I.P.C.L. once a public sector enterprise is
              no longer in existence, the same has been taken over by
              the Reliance Industries Limited. At no point of time, the
              legality and validity of the amalgamation of the I.P.C.L. with
              the Reliance Industries Limited arose before any Court.
              In such circumstances, I find it extremely difficult to hold
              that this writ application is maintainable and that too by
              applying the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code
              of Civil Procedure. Ultimately, the whole issue boils down
              as to how a writ can be issued against a private entity.”
16. Learned senior counsel further placed reliance upon the decision
    of the High Court of Delhi in Asulal Loya vs. Union of India and
    Ors.19, wherein learned Single Judge20 arrived at the same conclusion,
    while dealing with a writ petition filed against the Bharat Aluminium
    Company Limited(BALCO) in the year 1991 and decided in 2008 i.e.,
    post-privatization of BALCO in 2001. The relevant portions from the
    said judgment as relied upon are extracted hereinbelow: -
              “3. It is fairly well settled that a writ petition is not
              maintainable against a private limited company or a public
              limited company in which the State does not exercise all


17   2016 SCC OnLine Guj 10186
18   HMJ J.B. Pardiwala (as his lordship then was)
19   ILR (2009) I Delhi 450
20   HMJ Sanjeev Khanna (as his lordship then was)
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                             947

      Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


           pervasive control. In Binny Limited v. V. Sadasivan, reported
           in (2005) 6 SCC 657, the Supreme Court has held that a
           writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is normally
           issued against public authorities and can also be issued
           against private authorities when they are discharging public
           functions and the decision which is sought to be corrected
           or enforced must be in discharge of a public function. In
           the present case, the issues and questions involved do
           not relate to public functions.
           ***
           10. In these circumstances, the present writ petition is
           dismissed without going into the merits of the matter
           upholding the preliminary objection raised by the
           respondent company that it is not a State and, therefore,
           not amenable to writ jurisdiction. It is, however, observed
           that the petitioner is at liberty to approach any forum for
           redressal of his grievance, if so advised and the time
           spent by him in these proceedings shall be taken into
           consideration for the purpose of limitation. In the facts
           and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as
           to costs.”
17. Learned senior counsel further submitted that this Court in the case
    of Kaushal Kishor (supra) has held that a writ cannot be issued
    against non-state entities that are not performing any ‘Public Function’.
    He further pointed out that it is the conceded case of the appellants
    that post privatisation, respondent No. 3(AIL) does not perform any
    ‘Public Function’ and in any case running a private airline with purely a
    commercial motive can never be equated to performing a ‘Public Duty’.
18. He further submitted that the issue is not that of a ‘Right’ but of a
    ‘Remedy’ i.e. dismissal of a writ petition filed by the appellants on
    the ground of maintainability would not lead to extinguishment of the
    rights of the appellants and only the forum for adjudication of their
    dispute would change. Any alleged violations of Articles 14 or 16 of
    the Constitution of India are simply grounds for claiming relief which
    can well be agitated before any other appropriate forum.
19. Learned senior counsel further submitted that appellants’ rights, if any,
    are protected by the specific liberty granted to them by the High Court
    vide the impugned judgment and if a Court of competent jurisdiction
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       was to hold in their favour, the same would be enforceable against
       the employer-respondent No. 3(AIL).
20. He further contended that the appellants employees approached
    the writ Court after significant delay, since the cause of action arose
    between 2007 to 2010 and captioned writ petitions came to be filed
    before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court between 2011
    to 2013 and implored the Court to dismiss the appeals.
21. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
    advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have gone through
    the impugned judgment and the material placed on record.
       Questions of law posed for adjudication: -
22. The questions of law presented for adjudication of this Court are:
       (i)    Whether respondent No.3(AIL) after having been taken over
              by a private corporate entity could have been subjected to writ
              jurisdiction of the High Court?
       (ii)   Whether the appellants herein could have been non-suited on
              account of the fact that during pendency of their writ petitions,
              the nature of the employer changed from a Government entity
              to a private entity?
       (iii) Whether the delay in disposal of the writ petition could be
             treated a valid ground to sustain the claim of the appellants
             even against the private entity?
       Discussion and Conclusion: -
23. The thrust of submissions of learned senior counsel appearing on
    behalf of the appellants was based on the judgment of the Division
    Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Gupta
    (supra) wherein, it was held in para 32(reproduced supra) that the
    cause of action crystallized at a point of time when the authority was
    subjected to the writ jurisdiction.
24. Ashok Kumar Gupta’s case (supra) was distinguished by the learned
    Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kalpana Yogesh
    Dhagat (supra). The relevant excerpts from the said judgment are
    reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference: -
              “50. There is no doubt that if the dictum, as explained
              by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Ashok
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                             949

      Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


           Kumar Gupta vs. Union of India, (2007) SCC OnLine Cal
           264) is applied in the case in hand, then probably, the writ
           application could be said to be maintainable. However,
           there are few distinguishing features, which, in my
           view, are important as they go to the root of the matter.
           First, in the case before the Calcutta High Court even
           at the time when the writ application was rejected, the
           company was a public sector undertaking; Secondly,
           even when the appeal was filed, the same was a public
           sector undertaking; and thirdly and most importantly,
           the issue as regards the propriety and legality of the
           privatisation was pending before the Larger Bench of
           the Supreme Court.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
25. In the case of Kalpana Yogesh Dhagat (supra), the learned Single
    Judge of the Gujarat High Court went on to uphold the preliminary
    objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition against
    Reliance Industries Limited (RIL). The relevant excerpts from the
    said judgment are extracted hereinbelow: -
           “19. …..However, the scope of mandamus is determined by
           the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity
           of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private
           body is discharging public function, the pubic law remedy
           can be enforced. The duty cast upon a public body may
           be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such
           power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be
           a public law element in such action. The respondent
           Reliance Petro Investment Limited has nothing to do
           with the public as such. It is a company engaged in
           the business of petroleum products. Neither the Union
           nor the ‘State’ has any control over the respondent
           company. Mere issue of a licence by the Union or State
           Government for the purpose of running the company
           by itself will not make it an instrumentality of a “State”
           or an agency of a “State”.
           ***
           21. The language of Article 226 is no doubt very wide. It
           states that a writ can be issued “to any person or authority”
950                                                         [2024] 6 S.C.R.

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       and “for enforcement of right conferred by Part III and for
       any other purpose”. However, the aforesaid language in
       Article 226 cannot be interpreted and understood literally.
       The Court should not apply the literal rule of interpretation
       while interpreting Article 226. If we take the language of
       Article 226 literally it will follow that a writ can be issued to
       any private person or to settle even the private disputes.
       If we interpret the word “for any other purpose” literally
       it will mean that a writ can be issued for any purpose
       whatsoever, e.g. for deciding private disputes, for grant of
       divorce, succession certificate etc. Similarly, if we interpret
       the words “to any person” literally it will mean that a writ
       can even be issued to the private persons. However, this
       would not be the correct meaning in view of the various
       decisions of the Supreme Court in which it has been held
       that a writ will lie only against the State or instrumentality
       of the State vide Chander Mohan Khanna v. N.C.E.R.T,
       (1991) 4 SCC 578, Tekraj Vasandhi v. Union of India, (1988)
       1 SCC 236 : AIR 1988 SC 469, General Manager, Kisan
       Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. Satrughan Nishad, (2003) 8 SCC
       639, Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas & Co., (2003)
       10 SCC 733, Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute
       of Chemical Biology ((2002) 5 SCC 111) etc. In General
       Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v. Satrughan
       Nishad (supra), the Supreme Court observed that a writ
       will lie against a private body only when it performed a
       public function or discharged a public duty. The ‘R.I.L.’
       is not performing a public function nor discharging
       a public duty. It is only doing a commercial activity.
       Hence, no writ lies against it.
       ***
       58. Even if the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court
       is applied in the case in hand, it is difficult for this
       Court to take the view that as the writ applicant is not
       responsible for the change of circumstances and the
       writ application was maintainable at the time when
       it was filed, a writ can be issued to a private entity
       for the purpose of enforcing the fundamental rights
       of the writ applicant alleged to have been infringed
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                              951

      Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


           by a company, a public sector undertaking at a point
           of time and now no longer in existence. It is also not
           legally permissible to take the view that since the I.P.C.L.
           was a Government of India undertaking, a writ could be
           issued against the Union of India. An employee of a public
           sector undertaking by itself will not be a civil servant or an
           employee of the Union of India. At best, he could be termed
           as an employee of a company owned by the Government.
           Therefore, even ignoring the I.P.C.L., no liability could be
           fastened even on the Government of India at this stage.
           59. I am not impressed by the submission of Mr. Bhatt that
           the writ applicant has no other alternative remedy, except
           invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. According to Mr.
           Bhatt, since the original writ applicant i.e. the employee has
           passed away, it will be legally impermissible for the legal
           heirs to file a civil suit for declaration for the purpose of
           challenging the order of dismissal from service. The legal
           heirs on record can definitely file a civil suit for declaration
           that the departmental inquiry was not conducted in a fair
           and transparent manner and the consequential order of
           dismissal is illegal. Section 14 of the Limitation Act would
           also save the situation. Section 14 of the Limitation Act
           itself is meant for the suits.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)
26. The same controversy was also considered by a learned Single
    Judge of the Delhi High Court in the case of Asulal Loya (supra)
    which was a case involving the termination of services of the writ
    petitioner-employee by the company Bharat Aluminium Company
    Limited (BALCO) which was previously a Government of India
    Undertaking and was privatized pursuant to the tripartite share
    purchase agreement. The employee-writ petitioner filed a writ petition
    before the Delhi High Court to challenge his termination wherein, a
    preliminary objection was raised regarding maintainability of the writ
    petition on the ground that during pendency of the proceedings, the
    company had changed hands and no longer retained the characteristic
    of a ‘State’ or ‘Other authority’ as defined under Article 12 of the
    Constitution of India. The assertion of the writ petitioner was that
    the petition was maintainable against the respondent on the date it
    was filed. As per the writ petitioner, the rights and obligations of the
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       parties stood crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation
       and thus, the reliefs should be decided with reference to the date on
       which the party entered the portals of the Court. The learned Single
       Judge in para 10(reproduced supra) upheld the preliminary objection
       raised against the maintainability of the writ petition and relegated
       the writ petitioner therein to approach the civil Court for ventilating
       the grievances raised in the writ petition.
27. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tarun
    Kumar Banerjee (supra) also took a similar view observing as below: -
            “1. Both the petitions were filed against Bharat Aluminium
            Co. Ltd. when the petitions were filed, it was a Government
            of India enterprise. We are told by the Respondent that
            they had filed an affidavit on 22-3-1996 thereby pointing
            out that Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd. has been privatized
            and share of more than 50% have been transferred
            to Sterlit Industries India Ltd. and as a consequence
            Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd. is not a state and is
            not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court.
            2. In view of this submission we dispose of both the petitions
            while granting the petitioner liberty to approach any other
            forum for redressal of their grievance if so advised. The time
            spent by the petitioners in prosecuting these proceeding
            shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of limitation
            in case the petitioner choose any such remedy where the
            question of limitation would be relevant.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)
28. Further, in the case of Beg Raj Singh (supra), this Court observed
    as below: -
            “7. …. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may
            yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent
            or intervening events, i.e. the events between the
            commencement of litigation and the date of decision.
            The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may
            have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may
            have been rendered incapable of being granted by
            change in law. There may be other circumstances which
            render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over
            the respondents because of the balance tilting against the
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                            953

       Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


             petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on
             the date of judgment….”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
29. It is thus, seen that various High Courts across the country have
    taken a consistent view over a period of time on the pertinent
    question presented for consideration that the subsequent event i.e.
    the disinvestment of the Government company and its devolution
    into a private company would make the company immune from being
    subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
    India, even if the litigant had entered the portals of the Court while
    the employer was the Government. The only exception is the solitary
    judgment of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Ashok
    Kumar Gupta (supra), which was distinguished by the learned Single
    Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kalpana Yogesh
    Dhagat (supra) and rightly so, in our opinion, we have no hesitation
    in holding that the view taken in the judgments of Kalpana Yogesh
    Dhagat (supra) (by the High Court of Gujarat); Asulal Loya (supra)
    (by the High Court of Delhi) and Tarun Kumar Banerjee (supra)
    (by the High Court of Bombay) is the correct exposition on this legal
    issue and we grant full imprimatur to the said proposition of law.
30. We would like to answer the three questions of law enumerated
    above as follows.
31. In order to be declared as “State” or “other authority” within the
    meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it would have to
    fall within the well-recognised parameters laid down in a number of
    judgments of this Court. In this regard, we may refer to the case of
    Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology21
    wherein this Court after taking into consideration the previous
    judgments on this point, observed as follows:
             “27.Ramana [(1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628]
             was noted and quoted with approval in extenso and the
             tests propounded for determining as to when a corporation
             can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the
             Government therein were culled out and summarised as
             follows : (SCC p. 737, para 9)



21   [2002] 3 SCR 100 : (2002) 5 SCC 111
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       “(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital
            of the corporation is held by Government, it
            would go a long way towards indicating that the
            corporation is an instrumentality or agency of
            Government. (SCC p. 507, para 14)
       (2)   Where the financial assistance of the State is so
             much as to meet almost entire expenditure of
             the corporation, it would afford some indication
             of the corporation being impregnated with
             governmental character. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
       (3)   It may also be a relevant factor … whether
             the corporation enjoys monopoly status which
             is State-conferred or State-protected. (SCC p.
             508, para 15)
       (4)   Existence of deep and pervasive State control
             may afford an indication that the corporation
             is a State agency or instrumentality. (SCC p.
             508, para 15)
       (5)   If the functions of the corporation are of public
             importance and closely related to governmental
             functions, it would be a relevant factor in
             classifying the corporation as an instrumentality
             or agency of Government. (SCC p. 509, para 16)
       (6)   ‘Specifically, if a department of Government
             is transferred to a corporation, it would be a
             strong factor supportive of this inference’ of the
             corporation being an instrumentality or agency
             of Government. (SCC p. 510, para 18)”
       40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the
       tests formulated in Ajay Hasia [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid
       Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S)
       258] are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body
       falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be
       considered to be a State within the meaning of Article
       12. The question in each case would be — whether in
       the light of the cumulative facts as established, the
       body is financially, functionally and administratively
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                             955

      Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


           dominated by or under the control of the Government.
           Such control must be particular to the body in question
           and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is
           a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the
           control is merely regulatory whether under statute or
           otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
32. There is no dispute that the Government of India having transferred
    its 100% share to the company Talace India Pvt Ltd., ceased to have
    any administrative control or deep pervasive control over the private
    entity and hence, the company after its disinvestment could not have
    been treated to be a State anymore after having taken over by the
    private company. Thus, unquestionably, the respondent No.3(AIL)
    after its disinvestment ceased to be a State or its instrumentality
    within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
33. Once the respondent No.3(AIL) ceased to be covered by the definition
    of State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India,
    it could not have been subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226
    of the Constitution of India.
34. A plain reading of Article 226 of the Constitution of India would make it
    clear that the High Court has the power to issue the directions, orders
    or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus,
    Certiorari, Quo Warranto and Prohibition to any person or authority,
    including in appropriate cases, any Government within its territorial
    jurisdiction for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part-III of the
    Constitution of India and for any other purpose.
35. This Court has interpreted the term ‘authority’ used in Article 226
    in the case of Andi Mukta (supra), wherein it was held as follows:
           “17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is
           confined only to public authorities to compel performance of
           public duty. The ‘public authority’ for them means everybody
           which is created by statute—and whose powers and duties
           are defined by statute. So government departments, local
           authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings
           and corporations, are all ‘public authorities’. But there is no
           such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ ‘in the
           nature of mandamus’. Article 226 confers wide powers on
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             the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative
             writs. This is a striking departure from the English law.
             Under Article 226, writs can be issued to ‘any person or
             authority’. It can be issued ‘for the enforcement of any of
             the fundamental rights and for any other purpose’.
             ***
             20. The term ‘authority’ used in Article 226, in the
             context, must receive a liberal meaning like the term
             in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose
             of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article
             32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to
             issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights
             as well as non-fundamental rights. The words ‘any
             person or authority’ used in Article 226 are, therefore,
             not to be confined only to statutory authorities and
             instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any
             other person or body performing public duty. The
             form of the body concerned is not very much relevant.
             What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed
             on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of
             positive obligation owed by the person or authority to
             the affected party. No matter by what means the duty
             is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus
             cannot be denied.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
36. Further, in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas22,
    this Court culled out the categories of body/persons who would be
    amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court which are as follows:
             “18. From the decisions referred to above, the position
             that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of
             the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i)
             the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory
             body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a
             company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi)
             a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a


22   [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 121 : (2003) 10 SCC 733
[2024] 6 S.C.R.                                                             957

      Mr. R.S. Madireddy and Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.


           private body discharging public duty or positive obligation
           of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability
           to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it
           to perform such a statutory function.”
37. The respondent No.3(AIL), the erstwhile Government run airline
    having been taken over by the private company Talace India Pvt.
    Ltd., unquestionably, is not performing any public duty inasmuch
    as it has taken over the Government company Air India Limited for
    the purpose of commercial operations, plain and simple, and thus
    no writ petition is maintainable against respondent No.3(AIL). The
    question No. 1 is decided in the above manner.
38. The question of issuing a writ would only arise when the writ petition
    is being decided. Thus, the issue about exercise of extra ordinary
    writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
    arise only on the date when the writ petitions were taken up for
    consideration and decision. The respondent No.3(AIL)- employer
    was a government entity on the date of filing of the writ petitions,
    which came to be decided after a significant delay by which time, the
    company had been disinvested and taken over by a private player.
    Since, respondent No.3 employer had been disinvested and had
    assumed the character of a private entity not performing any public
    function, the High Court could not have exercised the extra ordinary
    writ jurisdiction to issue a writ to such private entity. The learned
    Division Bench has taken care to protect the rights of the appellants
    to seek remedy and thus, it cannot be said that the appellants have
    been non-suited in the case. It is only that the appellants would
    have to approach another forum for seeking their remedy. Thus, the
    question No.2 is decided against the appellants.
39. By no stretch of imagination, the delay in disposal of the writ petitions
    could have been a ground to continue with and maintain the writ
    petitions because the forum that is the High Court where the writ
    petitions were instituted could not have issued a writ to the private
    respondent which had changed hands in the intervening period.
    Hence, the question No.3 is also decided against the appellants.
40. Resultantly, the view taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay
    High Court in denying equitable relief to the appellants herein and
    relegating them to approach the appropriate forum for ventilating
    their grievances is the only just and permissible view.
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41. We may also note that the appellants raised grievances by way of
    filing the captioned writ petitions between 2011 and 2013 regarding
    various service-related issues which cropped up between the
    appellants and the erstwhile employer between 2007 and 2010.
    Therefore, it is clear that the writ petitions came to be instituted
    with substantial delay from the time when the cause of action had
    accrued to the appellants.
42. It may further be noted that the Division Bench of Bombay High Court,
    only denied equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of
    India to the appellants but at the same time, rights of the appellants to
    claim relief in law before the appropriate forum have been protected.
43. We may further observe that in case the appellants choose to
    approach the appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances as
    per law in light of the observations made by the Division Bench of
    the Bombay High Court, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall
    come to the rescue insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned.
44. In wake of the discussion made hereinabove, we do not find any
    reason to take a different view from the one taken by the Division
    Bench of the Bombay High Court in sustaining the preliminary
    objection qua maintainability of the writ petitions preferred by the
    appellants and rejecting the same as being not maintainable.
45. With the above observations, the appeals are dismissed. No order
    as to costs.
46. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan                  Result of the case:
                                                          Appeals dismissed.