Holding

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 did not prescribe a limitation period before Section 24A, and the Limitation Act does not apply; even assuming applicability, the complaint was not time‑barred.

Summary

The appellants, promoters of an apartment complex, sold a flat to the respondent’s minor daughter for Rs. 2,10,000 and delivered possession in September 1985 but failed to execute a sale deed. The respondent filed a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 on 19 June 1992 seeking specific performance and compensation for sub‑standard construction. The District Forum dismissed the complaint on the ground of limitation; the State Commission allowed the appeal and directed specific performance, a decision affirmed by the National Commission. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Limitation Act, 1963 should apply and that the complaint was time‑barred. The Court held that before the insertion of Section 24A (effective 18 June 1993) the Consumer Protection Act prescribed no limitation period and the Limitation Act was not applicable; even assuming its applicability, the complaint was within the period prescribed by Article 54 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without costs.

Issues considered

Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to complaints filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for the period before Section 24A was introduced.
Whether the respondent’s complaint filed on 19 June 1992 was barred by limitation.

Legislation cited

Consumer Protection Act, 1986s. 24A
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 54, s. Section 2(j)

Subjects

Consumer Protection ActLimitation ActSection 24Aspecific performancesale deedconsumer complaintlimitation period

Judgment

MR. FRANCE B. MARTINS AND ANR. A
v.

-
MRS. MAF AIDA MARIA TERESA RODRIGUES

AUGUST 24, 1999

[S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.] B

Consumer Protection Act, 1986-Section I I-Complaint under-
Applicability of provisions of Limitation Act, Limitation Act, 1963-Artic/e
54.
c
The appellants were promoters/developers of an apartment. The
respondent purchased a flat from appellant in the name of her minor daughter
for a total consideration of Rs. 2,10,000. The possession of the flat was
delivered to the respondent on payment of the entire consideration money in
September, 1985. The appellants, however, failed to execute any sale deed in
favour of the respondent By a notice dated 30.8.1991, the appellants required D
the respondent to pay Rs. 20,000 within 15 days failing which the appellants
claimed that they would charge interest on the balance sum.

Being aggrieved by the non-execution of the sale deed, the respondent
filed a complaint under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act on
19.6.1992. The complaint was dismissed by the District Forum on the ground E
of limitation.

The respondent filed an appeal which was allowed by the State
Commission and the matter was remitted back to the District Forum
permitting the respondent to amend her complaint.
F
The District Forum again dismissed the complaint on the ground of
limitation. The appeal filed by the respondent against the order of the District
Forum was allowed by the State Commission and the appellants were directed
for specific performance of the agreement between the appellants and the
respondent. The revision filed by the appellants before the National G
Commission was dismissed. Hence the appellants filed the present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. No period of limitation had been prescribed in the
Consumer Protection Act before insertion of Section 24A vide amendment
685 H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A made w.e.f. 18th June, I 993. The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have
not been specifically made applicable to the proceedings under the Consumer
Protection Act. [687-G; 688-A)

1.2. When the Legislature, in its wisdom, thought it appropriate not to
prescribe the period of limitation for proceedings under the Consumer
B Protection Act, the courts cannot apply the provisions by implication. The
addition of Section 24A in the Consumer Protection Act reflects the mind
of the Legislature that they had initially not intended to prescribe any period
of limitation for filing the complaints under the Consumer Protection Act.
1688-C; G)

c New India Assurance Co. ltd. v. Shri B.N. Sainani, JT (1997) 6 SC
211, distinguished.

2.1. Even assuming (without holding) that the provisions of the
Limitation Act were applicable, the claim preferred by the respondent-
D complainant was not barred by time. 1689-F)

2.2. At no point of time the appellants denied their liability to execute
the sale deed in favour of the respondent No period for specific performance
of Agreement had been prescribed by the parties. The respondent-complainant
could, at worst, assume on 30th August, 1991 (when notice was sent to the
E respondent by the appellant) that the appellants were not interested in the
specific performance of the contract between the parties. Even if the period
is computed from that date, the complaint was filed well within time in terms
of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. 1689-G; 690-CI

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7593 of
F 1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.2.95 of the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in R.P.No. 441 of 1994.

K.B. Sinha, Bhawanishankar V. Gadnis and H.A. Raichura for the
G Appellants.
. .,,.
Ajit Pudussery for the Respondent.

The Judgment of Court was delivered by ·

SETHI, J. The appellants, promoters/developers of Perpetual Apartments,
H agreed to sell a flat in the name of minor daughter of the respondent. According
FRANCE B. MARTINS v. MAFAIDA MARIA TERESA RODRIGUES [SETHI, J.] 687

to the Agreement between the parties, the price of the flat being Rs. 2, l 0,000 A
was to be paid on or before September, 1985. The possession of the flat is
stated to have been delivered to the respondent in September, 1985 on
payment of the whole of the agreed amount. Despite various requests made,
the appellant did not execute the sale deed on false pretexts. In the absence
of the sale deed, the respondent-complainant could not efficaciously enjoy B
the property for which she is stated to have paid the price. It was submitted
that as the construction of the flat was sub-standard, the respondent-
complainant had to incur an expense of Rs. 26,000 for immediate repairs. Her
petition filed on 19.6.1992 was dismissed by the Consumer Disputes Redressal
Forum, Goa (hereinafter referred to as "the District Forum") on the ground of
limitation vide order dated 19. l 0.1992. The appeal preferred by the respondent C
was accepted by the Goa State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
(hereinafter referred to as "the State Commission") and the matter was remitted
to the District Forum permitting the respondent to amend her complaint. The
District Forum again, vi de its order dated 31st March, 1993, dismissed the
complaint as barred by time. The respondent filed an appeal which was
allowed by the State Commission with a direction to the appellants for specific D
performance of the Agreement. The revision filed by the appellants before the
National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as "the National Commission") was dismissed vide impugned order
dated 3 l. l.1994.
E
Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has vehemently argued
that as the complaint filed by the respondent was barred by time, the State
Commission was not justified in issuing the directions which were confirmed
by the National Commission. It is contended that before insertion of Section
24A in the Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the
period of limitation for preferring a claim was such period as is prescribed F
under the Limitation Act and as according to him the complaint was filed by
the respondent after seven years, the same deserved dismissal.

The argument, though attractive ori the face of it, has no substance
when examined in depth. Admittedly, no period of limitation had been G
prescribed in the Act before insertion of Section 24A vide amendment made
w.e.f. 18th June, 1993. Section 24A of the Act, for the first time, prescribed
that the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission
shall not admit a complaint unless the same was filed within two years from
the date on which the cause of action arose. Sub-section (2) of Section 24A
authorises the Commission to entertain complaint even after the period of H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A limitation on the existence of sufficient cause for not filing the complaint
within the statutory period by recording its reasons for condoning the delay.
It is conceded before us that the provisions of the Limitation Act, J 963 have
not been specifically made applicable to the proceedings under th~ Act. The
Limitation Act does not extinguish a right but only bars the remedy after a
B prescribed period of limitation. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act defines the
"period of limitation" to mean the period ·of limitation prescribed for any suit,
appeal or application by the Schedule attached to the Limitation Act and
. "prescriped period" means the period of limitation computed in ·accord~nce
with the provisions of the Act. It is not the case of the appellants that
complaint filed by the respondent was either a suit or an appeal or an
C application within the meaning of the provisions of the Limitation Act. When
the Legislature, in its wisdom, thought it appropriate not to prescribe the
period of limitation for proceedings under the Act, the courts cannot apply
the provisions by implication. It has to be kept in mind that the Act was made
for better protection of interests of consumers and to make provision for the
establishment of Consumer Councils and other authorities for the settlement
D of consumer disputes and matters connected therewith. The Act has been
enacted to promote and protect the rights of consumers such as:

"(a) the right to be protected against marketing of goods which are
hazardous to life and property;

E (b) the right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency,
purity, standard and price of goods to. protect the consumer
against unfair trade practices;
(c) the right to be assured. wherever possible, access to an authority
of goods at competitive prices;
F (d) the right to be heard and to be assured that consumers interest
will receive due consideration at appropriate forums;
...
(e) the right to seek redressal against unfair trade practices or
unscrupulous exploitation of consumers; and
(t) right to consumer education."
G
The addition of Section 24A in the Act reflects the mind of the Legislature
that they had initially not intended to prescribe any period of limitation for
filing the complaints under the Act.

The reliance of the learned counsel for the appellants on New India
H Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shri B.N. Sainani, JT (1997) 6 SC 211 also appears to
FRANCE B. MARTINS v. MAFAIDA MARIA TERESA RODRIGUES [SETHI, J.) 689

be misplaced inasmuch as this Court in that case had only referred to the A
practice of the Consumer Commissions of applying the provisions of the
Limitation Act. It is important to note that this Court did not approve the
application of the Limitation Act to the complaints under the Act but in the
circumstances of the case found that even on assumption of the applicability
~f the period prescribed for a suit relating to similar relief as preferred under B
the Act, the claim was barred by limitation. This Court held:

"Before insertion of Section 24A in the Act with effect from June 18,
1993 the Act did not prescribe any period of limitation for filing a
complaint. It was, however, not disputed that early to this the consumer
commissions have been applying the Limitation Act, 1963 to find out C
if a complaint was barred by limitation or not. Since at the time when
the complaint in the present case was filed Section 24A was not there,
we therefore, fall back from the provisions of the Limitation Act.
Article 44 of Schedule to the Limitation Act, in relevant part is as
under:
D
Description of suit Period of Time from which period
Limitation begins to run
44 (b) On a policy of insurance Three years The date of the occurrence
when the sum insured is payable causing the loss, or where
after proof of the loss has been the claim on the policy is E
given to or received by the insurers. denied either partly or
wholly, the date of such
denial."
We are, however clear that prior to its amendment the, Act had not
prescribed any period of limitation for filing the complaints by the consumers. F
Assuming, but without holding, that the provisions of the Limitation
Act were applicable, we are of the opinion that the appellants are not justified
in urging that the claim preferred by the respondent-complainant was barred
by time. It is true that the Agreement was executed somewhere in 1983 and
the possession of the premises delivered to the respondent-complainant in G
1985. It is also evident that at no point of time the appellants denied their
liability to execute the Sale Deed in favour of the respondent. No period for
specific performance of Agreement had been prescribed by the parties. The
record produced before the authorities under the Act reveals that the appellant
had upto 30th August, 1991, been acknowledging liability to deliver the legal
possession of the flat to the respondent. Vide a notice sent to the respondent H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A by the appellants through their counsel on 30th August, 1991 had admitted
that the respondent had paid a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 and was liable to pay a '
further sum of Rs. 20,000 which the respondent-complainant disputed. The
complainant was intimated:

"Notice is therefore given to you requiring you to pay the said
B balance sum of Rs. 20,000 within 15 days from the date and take legal
possession of the flat failing which our client shall be at liberty to
. charge you interest at the balance sum payable to him at the rate of
18% per annum from the date of the last payment."

The respondent-complainant could, at worst, assume on 30th August, 1991
C that the appellants were not interested in the specific performance of the
contract between the parties. Even if the period is computed from that date,
the complaint was filed well within time in terms of Article 54 of the Schedule
to the Limitation Act.

D There is no substance in the submission of the appellants that as the
respondent had allegedly not paid the whole amount, she was not entitled to
the directions as were issued by the State Commission. The respondent had
categol'kally stated in para 5 of her complaint that the consideration amount
had been paid which was not denied by the appellants. They had only stated
that a sum of Rs. 20,000 was still recoverable from her regarding which she
E had preferred the claim of compensation for the repairs done to the flat as it
was found to be constructed of the sub-standard material. The findings of
fact arrived at by the State Commission do not require any interference. The
National Commission was also justified in holding that there was no error of
jurisdiction or material irregularity pertaining to the jurisdiction in the order
F of the State Commission requiring any interference.

There is, therefore, no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed
but under the circumstances without any order as to costs.

B.K.M. Appeal dismissed.