Holding

A confession recorded under Section 15 of the TADA Act, complying with the statutory procedure, is admissible and may be used to convict the maker and co‑accused for offences under any law, even if the accused is acquitted under TADA, and need not be corroborated if the court is satisfied of its probative value.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the validity of confessions recorded under Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) in a murder‑conspiracy case. The appellants argued that their confessions were involuntary, obtained while in police custody, and later retracted, and that no corroborative evidence existed to prove conspiracy under IPC s.120B. The Court held that once the statutory requirements of Section 15 and Rule 15 are satisfied, the prosecution bears the initial burden to prove voluntariness; thereafter the burden shifts to the accused. A confession thus recorded is admissible against the maker and co‑accused for offences under TADA as well as other statutes, even if the accused is acquitted of the TADA charge, and may be the sole basis of conviction if its probative value is sufficient. The trial court’s reliance on the confessions and the corroborative material was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The admissibility of confessions recorded under Section 15 of TADA for conviction under other statutes, including IPC, despite acquittal under TADA.
Whether the confessions were made voluntarily given the circumstances of police custody and recording by supervising officers.
The effect of a retracted confession on its admissibility and evidentiary value.
The necessity of corroborative evidence to sustain a conviction based on a confession, especially against co‑accused.
The sufficiency of evidence to establish a criminal conspiracy under IPC s.120B.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 27
Bombay Police Act, 1951s. 135
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 15, s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 30
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 114, s. 120, s. 120A, s. 120B, s. 302
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987s. 12(1), s. 12(2), s. 15, s. 3(1), s. 3(3), s. 3(5)

Subjects

TADASection 15 confessionadmissibilityvoluntary confessionconspiracyIPC 302IPC 120Bcorroborationcriminal appeal

Judgment

[2008] 16 S.C.R. 155

MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH A
& ANR.
v.
C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
(Criminal Appeal No. 473 of 2007)
B
NOVEMBER 18, 2008
[8.N. AGRAWAL AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.]

TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES
(PREVENTION) ACT, 1987: C
s. 15 - Confession - HELD: A confession recorded in
accordance with the provisions of s. 15 and r. 15 is admissible
and can be used in the trial of the maker as also the co-
accused, abettor or conspirator not only for an offence under 0
the Act but also for an offence under /PC or other enactments
provided that such co-accused, abettor or conspirator is
charged and tried in the same case - Conviction can be
based on such confession without its corroboration, if the
Court is convinced of its probative value independently - In E
the instant case, the trial court has rightly relied upon the
confessions - Besides, prosecution has also led sufficient
corroborative evidence and the trial court did not commit
any error in recording the conviction- Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Rules, 1987 - r.15 - Penal Code,
1860 - ss. 3021120-Bl114 /PC. F

s.15 - Confession - HELD: If an accused challenges
his confession as having not been made voluntarily, then
the initial burden is on the prosecution to prove that all
requirements uls 15 and r. 15 have been complied with - G
Once this is done, burden shifts on the accused to prove his
a/legations - In the instant case, there was total compliance
of the mandate of law in recording the confessions -
Evidence - Burden of proof.
155 H'
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A s. 15 - Confession - HELD: A confession cannot be
held to be inadmissible merely because before recording
the same the accused was in police custody or that the
statement was recorded by the officer supervising the
investigation.
B PENAL CODE, 1860:

ss. 3021120-B, 3021120-81114, and s. 120-B - Conspiracy
and murder - HELD: To prove a charge of conspiracy, it is
not necessary that all conspirators know each and every detail
c of the conspiracy, so long as they are co-participants in the
main object of conspiracy - It is also not necessary that all
conspirators should participate from the inception of
conspiracy to its end - If there is unity of object or purpose,
all participating at different stages of the crime will be guilty
D of conspiracy - In the instant case, the trial court did not
commit any error in recording a finding that charges of ..
conspiracy and murder are proved against appellants - Arms
Act, 1959 - s.27 - Bombay Police Act, 1951 - s.135.
-
The appellants (A-4 to A-8, A-10 and A-11) seven in
E number, along with 4 others were prosecuted for
commission of offences punishable ulss 3(1), 3(3) and 3(5)
of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1987, s.120-8 read with s.302 IPC, s.302 read with s.114
and s.120-8 IPC and s.27 of the Arms Act, 1959. The
F prosecution case was that one 'AL' and his gang had
gunned down an illicit liquor supplier· and 8 others on
3.8.1992, and planned to make surreptitious surrender of
some unimportant members of their party so that the real
culprits could go scot free. This was opposed by one 'RV'
G who was a former Rajya Sabha Member and General
Secretary of the State unit of a political party. 'AL' and his
gang decided to eliminate 'RV' and create terror among
the people so that no one could dare oppose their plan.
The task was entrusted to 'R' Party, and his gang of
H which A-5, A-7, A-8 and A-11 were members, and they shot
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN 157
SHAIKH & ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
' -----
dead the said 'RV' who at the time of occurrence was A
accompanied by PW-28. The Designated Court on the
basis of the prosecution evidence, the confessions made
by the accused-appellants u/s 15 of the Act as also the
statements made by them u/s 313 Cr PC found the
charges of conspiracy and murder established and B
~ convicted A-4 to A-8, A-10 and A-11, inter alia, u/s 302 read
withs. 120 IPC and/or u/s 302 read with ss. 114 and 120-
B IPC and sentenced all of them to imprisonment for life.
It acquitted all the accused of the charges under the TADA
Act. c
In the instant appeals, it was contended for the
accused-appellants that they were subjected to physical
torture in order to extract confessions and, as such, the
confessions alleged to have been made were not
... voluntary; and that the prosecution did not produce any D
~

evidence to prove .an agreement or meeting of mind to
commit the murder and, therefore, the charge of
conspiracy was not established and the appellants could
not have been convicted u/s 302 read with s.120-B IPC.
E
Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. It must be treated as settled law that even
.#'
if a person is acquitted of the charge under the Terrorist
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, a
confession recorded u/s 15 thereof can be used for F
convicting him of an offence under other enactments
including IPC. [Para 13] [180-F]

Prakash Kumar vs. State of Gujarat 2005 (1 ) SCR 408
= 2005 (2) SCC 409 and State through Superintendent of G

' Police, CBI/SIT vs. Na/ini and Others 1999 ( 3) SCR 1 = 1999
(5) sec 253, relied on.

Bilal Ahmad Ka/oo vs. State of A.P. 1997 (7) SCC 431;
Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi vs. State of Gujarat 1997 (7)
H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A sec 744 and Gurprit Singh VS. State of Punjab 2002 (10)
sec 201, overruled.
'
2.1. A confession recorded u/s 15 of the Act is
admissible in the trial of the maker as also the co-
B accused, abettor or conspirator not only for an offence
under the Act but cllso for offence(s) under other
enactments, provided that the co-accused, abettor or
conspirator is charged and tried in the same case along
with the accused dnd the Court is satisfied that
1
requirements of the A ct and the Terrorist and Disruptive
C Activities (Prevention) Rules, 1987 have been complied
with. Whether .such f?Onfession requires corroboration
depends on the facts of the given case. If the Court is
convinced that the probative value of the confession is
such that it does not require corroboration then the same
D can be used for conv)cting the maker and/or co-accused
under the Act and/or other enactments, without
corroboration. [Para 127] [191-F-H;192-A-B]

Gurdeep Singh ;s. State (Delhi Admn.) 2000 (1) SCC
E 498; S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir and Others 2000 (2) SCC 254;
Lal Singh vs. State ot Gujarat 2001 (3) SCC 221; Devender
Pal Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi 2002 (5) SCC 234;
Jameel Ahmad vs. State of Rajasthan 2003 (9) SCC 673;
Jayawant Dattatray Suryarao vs. State of Maharashtra 2001.
F (10) SCC 109 and Abdulvahab Abdul Majid Shaikh vs. State
of Gujarat, 2007 (9) SCC 293, referred to.

2.2. If a person accused of committing an offence
under the Act challenges his confession on the ground
that it was not made voluntarily, then the initial burden is
G on the prosecution to prove that all requirements u/s 15
of the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules have been complied 'I
with. Once this is done, the burden shifts on the accused
and it is for him to prove that the confession was not
made voluntarily or that the same is not truthful, and if
H he adduces evidence during the trial to substantiate his
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN 159
SHAIKH & ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
)~

allegation that the confession was not voluntary then the A
Court has to carefully scrutinize the entire evidence and
surrounding circumstances and determine whether or
not the confession was voluntary. [Para 27) [192-B-D]
2;3. Confession made by a person u/s 15 of the Act
should not be rejected only on the ground that at the B
.. •
-~
relevant time he was in police custody. Nor should a
confession be treated as non-voluntary on the ground
that the same was made before the officer who was
supervising the investigation. In the instant case, the
prosecution evidence shows that the confessing c
appellants were brought to Delhi pursuant to transit
warrant granted by the competent court at Ahmedabad.
Therefore, the Investigating Officers were bound to keep
their custody till the end of the period specified in the
transit warrant and they could not have transferred the D
-'
. custody of the accused to any other person. It was
during the period of their custody with the Investigating
Officers that each of the accused appellants A-4 to A-8
and A-1 O volunteered to confess their role in the
commission of crime. Accordingly, they were produced E
before two Superintendents of Police, CBI, and their
confessions were recorded strictly in accordance with
the manner and the procedure prescribed in Section 15
of the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules. Further, neither A-10
when he was produced before Chief Metropolitan F
Magistrate, Delhi, nor at the end of the period specified
in transit warrants when all the confessing appellants
were produced before the Magistrate concerned at
Ahmedabad with an application for their remand to
judicial custody, any of them made any grievance of ill-
G
... treatment, torture (physical or mental), inducement or
allurement by the Investigating Officers or supervising
officers, nor did any of them claim that he had made
confession under any other type of compulsion.
Therefore, the confessions of A-4 to A-8 and A-10 cannot
H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 16 S.C.R.
.r {
A be held inadmissible on the premise that before
recording of confessions they were in police custody or
that the statements were recorded by the officers
supervising the investigation. [Para 43, 44, 46 and 48]
[220-E, F, G; 221-E; 223-F; 224-D-E; 226-C-D]
8 Gurdeep Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.) 2000 (1) SCC
'
·1
498; S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir and Others 2000 (2) SCC 254
and Lal Singh vs. State of' Gujarat, 2001 (3) SCC 221; relied
on.

c 2.4. Appellants A-4 to A-8 were not produced before ,
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate because their confessions
were recorded before the judgment of Kartar Singh's ·
case*, but A-10 was so,produced on 25.7.1996 as per the
guidelines laid down in Kartar Singh's case. It is thus
evident that there was total compliance of the mandate
D
of law in recording the confessions of six appellants. ~

[Para 43] [221-C-D]
*Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab 1994 (2) SCR 375 =
1994 (3) sec 569 - referred to.
E
Raja Khima vs. State of Saurashtra AIR 1956 SC 217;
Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC
637; Shankaria vs. State of Rajasthan 1978 (3) SCC 435;
Aloke Nath Dutta vs. State of West Bengal 2006 (13) Scale
467 and State of Rajasthan vs. Ajit Singh 2007 (12) Scale
F 451, held inapplicable.

2.5. The confessions of A-4 to A-8 and A-10 cannot
be discarded on the .allegation that the same had been
retracted on the first available opportunity. The only
G statement made by A-10 before Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Delhi on 25.7.1996 was that he had not made
any confession. However, he did not contest his
signatures on the confessional statement made before
PW-103. When the appellants were produced before the '
Magistrate concerned at Ahmedabad, none of them gave
H
MOHMED AMIN@ AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN 161
SHAIKH & ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
""'\
' out that he had not made confessional statement or that A
his signatures had been obtained on the blank paper or
that he was made to sign on the prepared statement or
that he had been subjected to torture, or any threat or
allurement was given to him to make confession. While·
they were in jail, none of the confessing appellants made B
't- any application to the Court that he wants to retract the
confession. [Para 49] [226-E-G]
2.6. If the confessions of the appellants are
scrutinized in the light of the factors mentioned in various
applications made on their behalf and their statements c
made u/s 313 CrPC, it becomes clear that the allegations
made by them regarding coercion, threat, torture, etc.
after more than one year of recording of confessions are
after-thought. The statements made by them u/s 313
CrPC were also the result of after-thought because no D
- '
tangible reason has been put forward by the defense as
• to why A-4 to A-8 did not retract from their confessions
..ii when they were produced before the Magistrate at
Ahmedabad and thereafter despite the fact that they had
access to legal assistance in more than one way. E
Therefore, the trial court did not commit any error by
relying upon the confessions of A-4 to A-8 and A-10 and
there is no valid ground to discard their confessions.
[Para 51] [227-H; 228-A-C]
• Bharat vs. State of UP. 1971 (3) SCC 950; Pyare Lal F
Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 1094; Paka/a
Narayana Swami vs. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 and Bhuboni
Sahu vs. The King AIR (36) 1949 PC 257, referred to.
3.1. For proving a charge of conspiracy, it is not G
necessary that all the conspirators know each and every
details of the conspiracy so long as they are r.o-
participants in the main object of conspiracy. It is also not
necessary that all the conspirators should participate from
the inception of conspiracy to its end. If there is unity of H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S. C.R.

A object or purpose, all participating at different stages of the
crime will be guilty of conspiracy. [Para 55] (230-F-H]
Yash Pal ;~1ittal vs. State of Punjab 1977 (4) SCC 540
and State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs. Na/ini
and Others 1999 (5) SCC 253, relied on.
B
3.2. In the instant case, the prosecution led evidence
to show that the public was outraged against the police
because it failed to arrest 'AL' and his gang members,
who were perceived as culprits responsible for
c committing murder of nine persons on 3.8.1992, and in
this backdrop 'AL' planned surrender of some
unimportant membe'rs of his gang. The move was
opposed by 'RV', a former Member of Rajya Sabha and
General Secretary of the State unit of a political party.
Therefore, 'AL' and gang decided to eliminate 'RV' and
0,
create terror in the mind of the public. A meeting for this ·-
purpose was organized by 'AL' and the task of killing 'RV'
was assigned to another gang headed by 'R' Party. In
their confessions, A-4, A-7 and A-8 have given details of
E the meeting organized by 'AL', which was attended by
'AL', members of his gang, 'R' Party and associates, the
decision taken in tliat meeting to eliminate 'RV', and
accordingly, murder of 'RV'. Each of the confessing
appellants has candidly acknowledged that he acted as
per the instructions and directions given by the 'R' Party
F for achieving the object of killing 'RV' and how the~· got
in collaboration with each other for accomplishment of
the task. (Para 56] (231-A-E; 233-D-E]
3.3. Although, A-11 has not made confessional
G statement, his role as a collaborator of "R' Party' and his
participation in the conspiracy to kill 'RV' as also his role
in the actual incident of killing 'RV' are proved from the
confessions of A-5,. A-6, A-7 and A-8,, which are candid
and unambiguous. Therefore, keeping (n view the
H provisions of s.15 of the Act, the appellants are guilty of
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN 163
SHAIKH & ANR. v. CB.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
\ -'\
offence under Section 302 read with Section 1208 IPC A
and no independent corroboration is required for
sustaining their conviction. [Para 56) [233-E-G]

Gurprit Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2002 (10) SCC 201;
State through Supreintendent of Police, CB/ST vs. Nalini and B
Others 1999 (5) SCC 253 S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir and
i.. Others 2000 (2) SCC 254 Lal Singh vs. State of Gujarat 2001
(3) SCC 221; Devender Pal Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi
2002 (5) SCC 234 and Jameel Ahmad vs. State of Rajasthan
2003 (9) sec 673, relied on.
c
4. The prosecution has also produced sufficient
corroborative evidence and the trial Court did not commit
any error in relying upon the same to support its
conclusion that the appellants are guilty of offence under ·
Section 302 read with s.1208 IPC and other offences. D
•'
PW 35 who has stated that on 9.10.1992 he saw A-5
~
shooting the deceased while the latter was about to sit
in the car of PW 28, and thereafter fleeing away from the
spot on the scooter driven by A-6. He also identified A-5
and A-6 in the Test Identification Parade. PW 28 is the E
complainant and the eye witness. He gave detailed
account of his coming with the deceased, handing over
of memorandum for the purpose of typing and shooting
of the deceased. In the Test Identification Parade held on
~ 19.8.1993, he identified A-6. PW 29, who was working as F
a labour at construction site near the place of occurrence,
stated that he saw firing of bullets by a person who was
earlier sitting on the pillion of the scooter and then fleeing
away of two persons on the scooter. He also saw that the
person with bullet injuries fell down on the ground and G

.. was taken to the hospital. Besides, PWs 11,44,50,53,
5t58,59,88, 111and116 supported the prosecution case .
[P ra 57] [233-H; 234-A, F, G, H; 235-A-E]

5. No serious infirmity could be pointed out in the
appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S. C.R.

)'- (

A witnesses by the trial court and it has not committed any
error in recording a finding that charges of conspiracy
and murder are proved against the appellants. [Para 57
and 58] [235-E-F]

Case Law Reference :
B
1994 ( 2) SCR ~75 ::. referred to .-- i)ara 4
1999 ( 3 ) SCR 1 relied on para 5
AIR 1956 SC 217 held inapplicable para 6
c AIR 1957 SC 637 held inapplicable para 6
1978 (3) sec 435 held inapplicable para 6

2006 (13) Scale 467 held inapplicable para 6
D 2007 (12) Scale 451 held inapplicable para 6 '
-
2000 (1) sec 498 relied on para 7 ""'
2001 (3) sec 221 relied on para 7

E 2001 110) sec 109 referred to para 7
2002 (5) sec 234 referred to para 7

2003 (9) sec 673 referred to para 7

2001 (9) sec 293 referred to para 7 ·1
F
2005 (1) SCR.408 relied on para 7

1997 (7) sec 431 overruled para 11

1997 (7) sec 744 overruled para 11
G 2002 (10) sec 201 overruled para 11

AIR 1939 PC 47 referred to para 15
AIR (36) 1949 PC 257 referred to para 16
H 1971 (3) sec 950 referred to para 17
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN 165
SHAIKH & ANR. v. C.8.1. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
)
' AIR 1963 SC 1094 referred to para 18 A

2000 (2) sec 254 relied on para 21

1977 (4) sec 540 relied on para 53

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal B
No. 473 of 2007.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.2.2007 in the
Court of Addi. Designated Judge (TADA) at Ahmedabad in
TADA Case Nos. 176 of 1993, 25 of 1996 & 32 of 1996.
c
WITH

Crl. A. Nos. 484, 705 & 582 of 2007.

Kamini Jaiswal, Vimal Chandra S. Dave, Neelam Kalsi,
Dr. Sushil Kumar Gupta, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Lalit Mittal and D
,,
... Satyendra Kumar for the Appellants .

A. Sharan, ASG., Ashok Bhan, Amit Anand Tiwari,
Awadhesh Kumar Singh, Sachit Guru, B.K. Prasad and P.
Parmeswaran for the Respondents. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. These appeals by Mohmed Faruk @
Frauk Baba Alla Rakha Shaikh, Mohmed Umar Majid Ahmed
"" Pathan @ Mohmed Fighter @ Mohmed Pahelwan @ F
Mohmedkhan, Sajidali@ Denny Mohmed Ali Saiyed, Mohmed
Amin @ Amin Choteli Rahim Miyan Shaikh, Iqbal Hussain @
Laliyo Dhabi Kasambhai Shaikh, Salimkhan Sikandarkhan
Pathan @ Azamkhan Pathan and Gulam Mohmed @ Gulal
Kadarbhai Shaikh (hereinafter described as appellant Nos. A- G
4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-10 and A~11 respectively) are directed
~
against judgment dated 6.2.2007 of the Designated Judge
(TADA), Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as 'trial Court')
whereby they were acquitted of charges under Section 3 and
5 of The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A 1987 (for short 'the Act') but were held guilty of different
offences under the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and
sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant Nos.A-5 and A-8
were also convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959
and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine
B of Rs.3,000/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a further period of six months. They were also convicted -~
under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.

2. Background facts
c (i) On 3.8.1992, Hansraj Trivedi, an alleged supplier
of illicit liquor and eight others were gunned down
at Radhika Gymkhana Club, Ahmedabad. Although
the Police registered Criminal Case No.254 of
1992 in connection with that incident but effective
D steps were not taken to arrest Abdul Latif and his
gang members, who were perceived as the
culprits. There was public outcry against the police
inaction. This compelled the concerned officers to
intensify their efforts to arrest the accused. In the
E wake of this development, Abdul Latif and
members of his gang planned surreptitious
surrender of some unimportant members of their
party so that real culprits could go scot-free. For this
purpose, he sought help of a local politician Shri
F Hassankhan Shamsherkhan Pathan @ Hassanlala.
The latter appears to have made efforts to facilitate
~urrendw of <::nme members of Abdul Latif gang but
he could not succeed apparently because Abdul
Rauf Mohmed Bhai @ Rauf Valiullah (former
member of Rajya Sabha and General Secretary of
G
Gujarat Pradesh Congress (I) Committee) who
came to know of this plan stoutly opposed the same
and is said to have prepared a memorandum,
which was to be submitted to the Central
Government to expose criminal-political nexus in the
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 167
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

State. In order to prevent him from doing so, Abdul A
Latif and gang decided to eliminate Rauf Valiullah
and to create terror among the people so that no
one could come forward to oppose the-plan of.
su·rreptitious surrender. The task of'finishing Rauf
Valiullah was entrusted to Rasoolkhan Yakubkhan B
Pathan @ Rasool Party and his gang. Some
members of Rasool Party followed Rauf Valiullah
from 6.10.1992 to 8.10.1992 but they could not
target him. On 9.10.1992, appellant Nos.A-5, A-7,
A-8 and A-11 were deputed to finish Rauf Valiullah. c
They accomplished the task at around 2.30 p.m.
when A 5 fired three shots with 38-bore revolver
from close range at the deceased while he was
entering Maruti car parked outside Madhuban
Building.
, D
(ii) Pradeep Bhai @ Bakkabhai Nautamlal Dave (PW-
28), who had accompanied the deceased to
Madhuban building and was present at the site,
lodged F.l.R. (Exh.179) at Ellisbridge Police Station.
Thereupon, a case was registered under Section E
302 read with Section 120B IPC, Section 25(1) (a)
and (b) of the Arms Act and Sections 3 and 5 of
the Act.

(iii) The investigation of the case was initially ronducted F
by a police team headed by Assistant
Commissioner of Police, 'D' Division, Ahmedabad,
Mr. Makbulahmed Mohd. Hanif Anarwala, but in
furtherance of Notification dated 12.2.1993 and
corrigendum dated 17 .2 .1993 issued by the
Government of India under Section 5 of the Delhi G
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, with the
consent of the Government of Gujarat, the case was
entrusted to the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI). After completing investigation and obtaining H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A sanction from Commissioner of Police,
Ahmedabad, the CBI filed charge-sheet under
Section 3(1), 3(3) and (5) of the Act, Section 1208
read with Section 302 IPC, Section 302 read with
Sections 34 IPC, Section 302 read with Section 114
B IPC, Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms
Act. The case was committed to Designated Court
and was numbered as TADA Case No.176 of
1993. Subsequently, two more charge-sheets were
submitted and the same were numbered as TADA
c Cases No. 25 of 1996 and 32 of 1996. All the
cases were consolidated and were tried together.

(iv) The charges were framed on 2.7.1998 against 11
accused. All of them pleaded not guilty. The
prosecution examined 124 witnesses and
D produced 147 documents. which were duly
exhibited. Thereafter, statements of the accused
were recorded under Section 313 of Code of
Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). They alleged that the
police has foisted false cases against them to· avoid
E embarrassment for having failed to solve the
mystery surrounding the murder of Rauf Va1iullah
and that confessions were extracted from them by
using coercion and threats.

F 3. After analyzing the evidence produced by the ·•
prosecution and considering the confessions made by the
appellants except appellant No.A-11, under Section 15 of the
Act as also the statements made by them under Section 313
Cr.P.C., the trial Court concluded that the prosecution has been
G able to establish· the charges of conspiracy and murder and
held Javedkhan@ Jaid Azizkhan Pathan, Mohd. Taslim Mohd
Umar Shaikh, appellant Nos.A-6, A-7, A-8 and A-10 guilty >--
under Section 1208 and Section 302 read with Section 1208
IPC. Appellant Nos.A-4 and A-11 were held guilty of offence
punishable under Section 114 read with Section 1208 IPC and
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 169
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
' ." Section 302 read with Section 114 IPC. Appellant Nos.A-5 and A
A-8 were held guilty under Section 27 of the Arms Act and
Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. Abdul Khurdush was
acquitted of all the charges but was found guilty under Section
176 IPC. However, all the accused were acquitted of the charge
under Sections 3 and 5 of the Act. Abdul Khurdush was B
sentenced to one months imprisonment with a fine of Rs.500/
- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment of one
month. Appellant Nos.A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-10 and A-11
were sentenced to life imprisonment. Each of them ·was also
directed to pay fine of Rs.5000/- and in default to undergo c
rigorous imprisonment for one year. Appellant Nos.A-5 and A-
8 were sentenced to 3 years imprisonment for offence under
Section 27 of Arms Act and in default to undergo 6 months
simple imprisonment. For offence under Section 135(1) of
Bombay Police Act, appellant Nos.A-5 and A-8 were awarded [)
.. sentence of one month with fine of Rs.500/- and in default to
).
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month.

Arguments

4. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the E
impugned judgment is liable to be set aside because the
findings recorded by the trial Court on the charges of conspiracy
and murder are not based on legally admissible evidence. They
emphasized that the prosecution did not produce any evidence
to prove the ingredients of conspiracy i.e. an agreement or F
meeting of mind to commit the murder of Rauf Valiullah and
argued that in the absence of such evidence the appellants
could not have been convicted under Section 302 read with
Section 120-B IPC. Learned counsel submitted that the
language of confessions made by all the appellants is identical
G
and this should have put the trial Judge on guard and a deeper
scrutiny was required to be made on the issue of voluntary
character of the confessions, which the learned Presiding
Officer failed to do and argued that the appellants could not
have been convicted by relying on confessions ignoring that the
H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

I
'
A same were not voluntary. Learned counsel extensively referred
to the statements made by the appellants under Section 313
Cr.P.C. to show that they were subjected to physical torture for
the purpose of extracting confession and submitted that the
same should have been rejected by the trial Court because,
B
(i) All the appellants were brought from Ahmedabad
to Delhi within 24 hours of their arrest and they were
compelled to make confessions without giving
them adequate time to ponder over the
consequences.
c
(ii) The appellants were throughout kept in the custody
of Shri O.P. Chatwal, Deputy Superintendent of
Police and Investigating Officer (for short 'the
Investigating Officer') and were deprived of the legal
D assistance.
~
(iii) The appellants were produced before Shri A.K.
Majumdar, PW-104 and Shri Harbhajan Ram, PW-
103 (both Superintendent of Police, CBI) for the
purpose of recording their confessions despite the
E
fact that they were directly supervising the
investigation and were in a position to dominate the
will of the appellants.

(iv) After preliminary questioning, .the concerned
F Superintendent of Police handed over the
appellants to the Investigating Officer, who again
produced them for the purpose of making statement
and confessions of the appellants were recorded
under the dictates of the officers.
G
(v) Shri A.K. Majumdar and Shri Harbhajan Ram did
not follow the guidelines laid down by this Court in
Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab [1994 (3) SCC
569], except in the case of appellant No.A-10,
inasmuch as they were not produced before Chief
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 171
ANR. v. C.BJ THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

Judicial Magistrate, Delhi. A

(vi) Copies of the confessional statements were
supplied to the Investigating Officer even before the
same were dispatched to the concerned Court.

(viii) The appellants had retracted their confessions on B
the first available opportunity.

5. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel for appellant
Nos.A-7, A-8 and A-11 placed reliance on the judgment of this
Court in State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs. C
Na/ini and Others [1999 (5) SCC 253] and argued that the trial
Court committed serious error by convicting the appellants
without requiring the prosecution to produce some evidence to
corroborate the confessions. She laid considerable emphasis
on the alleged failure of prosecution to explain as to why the D
appellants were taken from Ahmedabad to Delhi in the guise
of conducting Polygraphic test when the facility for that test is
available at Ahmedabad and CBI officers of the rank of
Superintendent of Police are also stationed at Ahmedabad and
argued that the confessions made by the appellants (except E
appellant No.A-11) ought to have been discarded only on this
ground notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution had made
an endeavour to show compliance of Section 15 of the Act and
Rule 15 of the TADA Rules, 1987 (for short 'the Rules). She
invited the Court's attention to the averments contained in Crl.
• Misc. No.2160 of 1994 filed before the High Court on behalf F
of Abdul Khurdush, Abdul Ghani Khan Sheikh and appellant
Nos.A-1, P. ~. l\-7 and A-8, which was dismissed on 6.2.1995
and SLP (Crl.) No.1582 of 1995 to show that her clients had
retracted the confessions at the first available opportunity,
reiterated the same in the statements made under Section 313 G
Cr.P.C. and argued that such type of confessions could not be
made basis for convicting them on the charge of murder.

6. Shri Vimal Chandra S. Dave, counsel appearing for
appellant Nos.A-4 and A-10 argued that the confessions of the H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A appellants are liable to be rejected because both Shri A.K.
Majumdar and Shri Harbhajan Ram, Superintendents of Police,
CBI, who were actively supervising the investigation, had
successfully tutored the minds of the appellants and induced
them to make confessions. Shri Dave submitted that all the
B accused were kept in the custody of the Investigating Officer
for 10 days before their confessions were recorded but this
aspect has been ignored by the trial Court while deciding the
issue of voluntary character of the confessions. Shri Dave
pointed out that appellant No.A-10 retracted his confession on
c 25.7.1996 itself when he was produced before Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Delhi and argued that the trial Court committed
serious illegality by relying upon the retracted confession. Dr.
Sushil Gupta argued that there is no evidence to link accused
with the conspiracy allegedly hatched by Rasool Party and the
D learned Trial Judge committed serious error by convicting them.
In support of their arguments learned counsel relied upon the
judgments of this Court in Raja Khima vs. State of Saurashtra
[AIR 1956 SC 217), Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of
Punjab [AIR 1957 SC 637), Shankaria vs. State of Rajasthan
[1978 (3) SCC 435), Aloke Nath Dutta vs. State of West
E Bengal [2006 (13) Scale 467) and State of Rajasthan vs. Ajit
Singh [2007 (12) Scale 451).

7. Shri Amarjit Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor
General relied upon Section 15( 1) of the Act (as amended in
F 1993) and the judgments of this Court in Gurdeep Singh vs.
State (Delhi Admn.) [2000 (1) SCC 498], Lal Singh vs. State
of Gujarat [2001 (3) SCC 221], Jayawant Dattatray Suryarao
vs. State of Maharashtra [2001 (10) SCC 109), Devender Pal
Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi [2002 (5) SCC 234], Jameel
G Ahmad VS. State of Rajasthan [2003 (9) sec 673) and
Abdulvahab Abdul Majid Shaikh vs. State of Gujarat [2007
(9) sec 293) and argued that the confessions made under the
Act is a substantive piece of evidence and can be used not
only against the maker but also against co-accused, abettor or
H conspirator. He submitted that the trial Court did not commit any
MOHMED AMIN@AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 173
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J]

illegality by relying upon the confessions of the appellants A
because the same were recorded strictly in accordance with
the procedure laid down in Rule 15 of the Rules. On the issue
of voluntary character of confessions of the appellants, the
learned Additional Solicitor General argued that recording
thereof at Delhi under the supervision of Shri AK. Majumdar B
and Shri Harbhajan Ram cannot lead to an inference that the
same were not voluntary. Shri Sharan laid considerable
emphasis on the fact that by virtue of order passed under
Section 268 Cr.P.C., the Court had given custody of the
appellants to the Investigating Officer and argued that he alone c
could have produced them before the concerned
Superintendent of Police for the purpose of recording
confession. Shri Sharan submitted that handing over of the
accused to the Investigating Officer after recording of
preliminary statement under Rule 15(1 ), cannot be dubbed as
0
illegal because in terms of the order passed by the competent
Court, Investigating Officer was duty bound to keep the custody
of the accused. Learned Additional Solicitor General then
submitted that the statements contained in discharge
application filed before the trial Court and the SLP filed before
this Court are per se contradictory arid same cannot be relied E
upon for declaring the confessions to be non-voluntary. Shri
Sharan then referred to the judgment of the Constitution Bench
in Prakash Kumar vs. State of Gujarat [2005 (2) SCC 409] and
argued that the conviction of the appellants under Section 302
read with Section 1208 IPC cannot be faulted on the ground F
that they were acquitted of the charge under the Act. In the end,
he argued that para 2 of the guidelines laid down by this Court
in Kartar Singh's case which requires that the person who
makes confession under Section 15(1) of the Act should be
produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief G
Judicial Magistrate to whom the confession is required to be
sent under Rule 15(5) of the Rules along with original statement
of confession, is not attracted in the present case because
confessions of the appellants except appellant no.A-10 were
recorded prior to 11.3. 1994 i.e. the date of judgment and H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A insofar as appellant no.A-10 is concerned, he was produced
before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi on the date his
confession was recorded i.e. 25.7.1996.

8. We have given serious thought to the entire matter.
Section 15 of the Act, as amended by Act No.43 of 1993 and
8
Rule 15 of the Rules which have bearing on these cases read
as under:-

Section 15 of the Act

c "Certain confessions made to Police Officers to be taken
into consideration- (1 )Notwithstanding anything in the
Code or in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1of1872), but
subject to the provisions of this section, a confession made
by a person before a police officer not lower in rank than
D a Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police
officer in writing or on any mechanical device like
cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which sounds
or images can be reproduced, shall be admissible in the
trial of such person or co-accused, abettor or conspirator
for an offence under this Act or rules made thereunder:
E
Provided that co-accused, abettor or conspirator is
charged and tried in the same case together with the
accused.

. F (2) The police officer shall, before recording any
confession under sub-section (1 ), explain to the person
making it that he is not bound to make a confession and
that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against
him and such police officer shall not record any such
confession unless upon questioning the person making it,
G
he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.

Rule 15 of the Rules

Recording of confession made to police officers.- A
H confession made by a persons before a police officer and
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 175
ANR. v. C.BJ THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

recorded by such police officer under Section 15 of the Act A
shall invariably be recorded in the language in which such
confession is made and if that is not practicable, in the
language us·ed by such police officer for official purposes
or in the language of the Designated Court and it shall form
part of the record. B

(2) The confession so recorded shall be shown, read or
played back to the person concerned and if he does not
understand the language in which it is recorded, it shall be
interpreted to him in a language which he understands and C
he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his confession.

(3) The confession shall, if it is in writing, be-

(a) signed by the person who makes the confession;
and D
(b) by the police officer who shall certify under his
own hand that such confession was taken in his
presence and recorded by him and that the record
contains a full and true account of the confession
made by the person and such police officer shall E
make a memorandum at the end of the confession
to the following effect:

"I have explained to (name) that he is not
bound to make a confession and that, if he does F
so, any confession he may make may be used as
evidence against him and I believe that this
confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my
presence and hearing and recorded by me and was
read over to the person making it and admitted by G
him to be correct, and it contains a full and true
account of the statement made by him.

Sd/- Police Officer''

(4) Where the confession is recorded on any mechanical H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C. R.

A device, the memorandum referred to in sub-rule (3) in so
far as it is applicable and a declaration made by the
person making the confession that the _said confession
recorded on the mechanical device has been correctly
recorded in his presence shall also be recorded in the
B mechanical device at the end of the confession.

(5) Every confession recorded under the said Section
15 shall be sent forthwith to the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate having
jurisdiction over the area in which such confession has
c been recorded and such Magistrate shall forward the
recorded confession so received to the Designated Court
which may lake cognizance of the offence."

9. The challenge to constitutional validity of the Act was
D rejected in Kartar Singh's case. While doing so, the Court took
note of the apprehension expressed by some of the learned '
_..,.
counsel that the provisions of the Act are likely to be misused
for coercing the accused to make confession and laid down
the following guidelines:-.
E
"(1) The confession should be recorded in a free
atmosphere in the same language in which the person is
examined and as narrated by him;

(2) The person from whom a confession has been
F recorded under Section 15(1) of the Act, should be
produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the
Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the confession is
required to be sent under Rule 15(5) along with the original
statement of confession, written or recorded on
G mechanical device without unreasonable delay;
j....
(3) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial
Magistrate should scrupulously record the statement, if
any, made by the accused so produced and get his
signature and in case of any complaint of torture, the
H
MOHMED AM1N @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 177
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J]
--'<

person should be directed to be produced for medical A
examination before a Medical Officer not lower in rank than
of an Assistant Civil Surgeon;

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, no police officer below the rank B
1r of an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the Metropolitan
cities and elsewhere of a Deputy Superintendent of Police
or a police officer of equivalent rank, should investigate any
-Offence punishable under this Act of 1987.

This is necessary in view of the drastic provisions of this c
Act. More so when the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
under Section 17 and the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act,
1956 under Section 13, authorise only a police officer of
a specified rank to investigate the offences under those
.. .,
'f
specified Acts . D

(5) The police officer if he is seeking the custody of any
person for pre-indictment or pre-trial interrogation from the
judicial custody, must file an affidavit sworn by him
explaining the reason not only for such custody but also for
E
the delay, if any, in seeking the police custody;

(6) In case, the person, taken for interrogation, on receipt
of the statutory warning that he is not bound to make a
confession and that if he does so, the said statement may
be used against him as evidence, asserts his right to F
silence, the police officer must respect his right of
assertion without making any compulsion to give a
statement of disclosure."

10. Although the Constitution Bench observed that the G
_._, Central Government may take note of the guidelines and
incorporate them by appropriate amendments in the Act and
the Rules, necessary amendments have not been carried out
so far.
H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A 11. The question whether a confession recorded under
Section 15 of the Act can be used for convicting an accused
for an offence under other enactments like IPC despite his
acquittal of the charge framed under the Act, was considered
and answered in negative by a two-Judges Bench in Bilal
B Ahmad Kaloo vs. State of AP. [1997 (7) SCC 431]. The same
view was reiterated in Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi vs. State
of Gujarat [1997 (7) SCC 744] and Gurprit Singh vs. State of
Punjab [2002 (10) SCC 201]. However, in Nalini's case, a
three-Judges Bench held that if a person is tried simultaneously
c for offences under the Act along with other enactments his
acquittal in respect of an offence under the Act is not sufficient
to discard the confession recorded under Section 15 of the Act
and the same can be used for conviction under other
enactments. The three-Judges Bench referred to the earlier
D judgments in Bilal Ahmad's case (supra), Rambhai Nathabhai
Gadhvi's case (supra), Gurprit Singh's case (supra) and
observed:

"Section 12 of TADA enables the Designated Court to
jointly try, at the same trial, any offence under TADA
E together with any other offence "with which the accused
may be charged" as per the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Sub-section (2) thereof empowers the Designated Court
to convict the accused, in such a trial, of any offence "under
any other law" if it is found by such Designated Court in
F such trial that the accused is found guilty of such offence.
If the accused is acquitted of the offences under TADA in
such a trial, but convicted of the offence under any other
law, it does not mean that there was only a trial for such
other offence under any other law.
G
Section 15 of TADA enables the confessional statement
of an accused made to a police officer specified therein
to become admissible "in the trial of such a person". It •
means, if there was a trial of any offence under TADA
together with any other offence under any other law, the
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 179
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

admissibility of the confessional statement would continue A
to hold good even if the accused is acquitted under TADA
offences."

12. The correctness of the above extracted portion of the
Nalini's judgment was doubted by a two-Judges Bench in
B
\,. Prakash Kumar's case (supra). When the matter was placed
before a three-Judges Bench, the same. was referred to five-
Judges Bench. The larger Bench rejected the argument of the
appellant's counsel that the words "for an offence under this Act"
employed in Section 15 makes the confession admissible only
for an offence under the Act and not for other offences and c
approved the ratio of Nalini's case on the issue of use of
confession recorded under Section 15 for convicting an
accused under other enactments. For the sake of clarity,
paragraphs 33, 35 and 36 of the judgment of the larger Bench
•' are extracted below:- D
f
"33. A conjoint reading of ihe two sections as a whole
leaves no manner of doubt that one provision is to be
construed with reference to the other provision and vice
versa so as to make the provision consistent with the object E
sought to be achieved. The scheme and object of the Act
being the admissibility of the confession recorded under
Section 15 of the Act in the trial of a person or co-accused,
abettor or conspirator charged and tried in the same case
together with the accused, as provided under Section 12 F
of the Act.

35. Section 12(1) as quoted above authorises the
Designated Court to try offences under TADA along with
another offence with which the accused may be charged
under CrPC at the same trial. The only embargo imposed G
on the exercise of the power is that the offence under
TADA is connected with any other offence being tried
together. Further, Section 12(2) provides that the
Designated Court may convict the accused person of
offence under that Act or any rule made thereunder or H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

'
A under any other law and pass any sentence authorised
under that Act or the Rules or under any other law, as the
case may be for the punishment thereof, if in the course
of any trial under TADA the accused persons are found to
have committed any offence either under that Act or any .
B rule or under any other"law.

36: The legislative intendment underlying Sections 12(1) .
and (2) is clearly discernible, to empower tfie Designated
·· Court to try and convict the accused for offences committed
under any other·law along with offences.committed under ·
c the Act, if the offence is connected with such other offence. •·
The language "if the offence is connected with such other
offence" employed in Section 12(1) of the· Act has great ·
· significance. The necessary corollary is that once the other
offence is connected·v11ith the offence under TADA and if ·
D '•
the accused is charged under the Code and tried together
in the same trial., the Designated Court is empowered to
convict the accused for the offence under any other law,
notwithstanding the fact that no offence under TADA is
made out. This could be the only intendment of the
E legislature. To hold otherwise, would amount to rewrite or
recast legislation and read something into it which is not
there."

13. In view of the last mentioned judgment of the larger
F Bench, it must be treated as settled law that even if a person
is acquitted of the charge under the Act, a confession recorded
under Section 15 can be used for convicting him for an offence
under other enactments including IPC.

14. At this stage, we may notice some judgments in which
G law relating to confessions has been generally discussed.

15. In Paka/a Narayana Swami vs. Emperor [AIR 1939
PC 47] Lord Atkin elucidated the meaning and purport of the
expression "confession" in the following words:
H
MOHMEDAMIN@AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 181
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

• "' "confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at A
any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the
offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even
a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself a
confession ..... "
B
16. In Bhuboni Sahu vs. The King [AIR (36) 1949 PC
257], the Privy Council interpreted Section 30 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, 'the 1872 Act') and held:

"9. This section was introduced for the first time in the
Evidence Act of 1872, and marks a departure from the C
Common Law of England. It will be noticed that the section
applies to confessions, and not to statements which do not
admit the guilt of the confessing party. In the present case
the. Courts in India appreciated this, and ruled out
statements made by certain of the accused which were D
self-exculpatory in character. The statement of Trinath was,
however, a confession. Section 30 seems to be based on
the"view that an admission by an accused person of his
own guilt affords some sort of sanction in support of the
truth of his confession against others as well as himself. E
But a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence
of a vety weak type. It does not indeed come within the
definition of "evidence" contained in S.3 Evidence Act. It
is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence
of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross- F
examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than
the evidence of an approver which is not subject to any
of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the
Court may take the confession into consideration and
thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the Court G
may act; but the section does not say that the confession
is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other
evidence. The confession is only one element in the
consideration of all the facts proved in the case; it can be
put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence.
H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 16 S.C.R.

A Their Lordships think that the view which has prevailed in
,.
most of the High Courts in India, namely that the confession
of a co-accused can be used only in support of other
evidence and cannot be made the foundation of a
conviction, is correct."
B
[Emphasis .supplied]

17. The same view was reiterated in Raja Khima's case,
and it was held that confession made by a person accused of
an offence can beirelied upon for convicting him only if the Court
c is satisfied that the same was made voluntarily. Applying this
principle in Bharat vs. State of U.P. (1971 .(3) SCC 950]. the
Court observed that "the voluntary nature of the confession
depends upon whether there was any threat,- inducement or
promise and its truth is judged in the context of the entire
D prosecution case.and that the confession must .fit into the
proved facts and not run counter to them." The C9urt held that '•
"when the voluntary character of the confession and jt~ truth are -+
accepted it is safe to rely on it. Indeed a confession, .jf it is
voluntary and true and not made under any inducement or threat
E or promise, is the most patent piece of evidence against the
maker. The Court also dealt with the issue of retracted
confession and held that "a court may take into account the
retracted confession, but it must look for the reasons for the
making of the confession as well as for its retraction, and must
F weigh the two to determine whether the retraction affects the
voluntary nature of the confession or not. If the court is satisfied
that it was retracted because of an after thought or advice, the
retraction may not weigh with the court if the general facts
proved in the case,,and the tenor of the confession as made
and the circumstances ofits making and withdrawalwarrant its
G
user........ Therefore, it can be stated that a true confession
made voluntarily may be acted upon with slight evidence to
corroborate it, but a retracted confession requires the general
assurance that the retraction was an after thought and that the
earlier statement was true."
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 183
ANR. v. C.BJ THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J]
• ~
18. The legal position on retracted confession was clarified A
in Pyare Lal Bhargava vs. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1963 SC
1094] in the following words:

"A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a
conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and was
B
voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court shall not
base a conviction on such a confession without
corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only rule of
prudence. It cannot even be laid down as an inflexible rule
of practice or prudence that under no circumstances can
such a conviction be made without corroboration, for a
c
court may, in a particular case, be convinced of the
absolute truth of a confession and prepared to act upon it
without corroboration; but it may be laid down as a general
rule of practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession,
much less on a retracted confession, unless the court is D
satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily
+ made and has been corroborated in material particulars."

CASES UNDER TADA
E
19. While enacting the Act, the legislature designedly made
a departure from the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and 1872 Act
and declared that confession made by a person before a police
officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or above, shall
be admissible in the trial of such person as also \he co-
+ accused, abettor or conspirator for an offence under the Act F
or rules made thereunder. In order to ensure that this provision
is not misused for extracting confession from a person accused
of committing an offence under the Act, the legislature also
specified certain safeguards in sub-section (2) of Section 15
of the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules. In Gurdeep Singh's case, G
this Court interpreted the provisions of Section 15 of the Act in
contra-distinction to Section 25 of the 1872 Act and held:

"15. The legislature has conferred a different standard of
admissibility of a confessional statement made by an H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A accused under the TADA Act, from those made in other
criminal proceedings. While under Section 15 of the TADA
Act a confessional statement by an accused is admissible
even when made to a police officer not below the rank of
Superintendent of Police, in other criminal proceedings it
B is not admissible unless made to a Magistrate. Section 25
of the Indian Evidence Act debars from evidence a
confession of an ace.used to a police officer, except what
is permitted under Section 27.

20. So the crux of making a statement voluntarily is, what
c is intentional, intended, unimpelled by other influences,
acting on one's own will, through his own conscience. Such
confessional statements are made mostly out of a thirst to
speak the truth which at a given time predominates in the
heart of the confessor which impels him to speak out the
D truth. Internal compulsion of the conscience to speak out
the truth normally emerges when one is in despondency
or in a perilous situation when he wants to shed his cloak
of guilt and nothing but disclosing the truth would dawn on
him. It sometimes becomes so powerful that he is ready
E to face all consequences for clearing his heart.

23. Whenever an accused challenges that his
confessional statement is not voluntary, the initial burden
is on the prosecution for it has to prove that all
requirements under Section 15 and Rule 15 under tlie
F
TADA Act and Rules have been complied with. Once this
is done the prosecution discharges its initial burden and
then the burden shifts on the accused person. Then it is
for him to prove through facts that the confessional
statement was not made voluntarily. If such fact was
G pleaded and brought on record during trial the court must
test its veracity, whether such fact constitutes to be such
as to make his confessional statement not voluntarily
·made."

H [Emphasis supplied]
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 185
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J)

" -\
20. In Nalini's case the majority of three-Judges Bench held A
that by virtue of non-obstante clause employed in Section 15,
the provisions of the 1872 Act and Cr.P.C. stand excluded.
Wadhwa, J. with whom Quadri, J. concurred noticed the
background in which the Act was enacted and held that,
"Confession of the accused is admissible with the same force B
in its application to the co-accused who is tried in the same
'f case. It is primary evidence and not corroborative. When the
legislature enacts that the Evidence Act would not apply, it
would mean all the provisions of the Evidence Act including
Section 30. By judicial interpretation or judicial rigmarole, as c
we may put it, the court cannot again bring into operation
Section 30 of the Evidence Act and any such attempt would
not appear to be quite warranted. Reference was made to a
few decisions on the question of interpretation of Sections 3
and 30 of the Evidence Act, foremost being that of the Privy
D
Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R. and though we note this
•
decision, it would not be applicable because of the view which
1
we have taken on the exclusion of Section 30 of the Evidence
Act."

In his concurring judgment Quadri, J. highlighted the E
distinction between Section 30 of the 1872 Act on the one hand
and Section 15 of the Act on the other hand and observed that
while under the former, the Court is given discretion to take into
consideration the confession against the maker as well as
.j. against those who are being tried jointly for the same offence, F
the latter provision mandates that confession of an accused
_, recorded thereunder shall be admissible in the trial of the maker
or co-accused, abettor or conspirator provided that each of
them is charged and tried with the accused in the same case.
His Lordship then held that in view of the express exclusion of G
the application of Sections 24 to 30 of the 1872 Act to a
-1 confession recorded under Section 15(1) of the Act, the
requirements of Section 30 of 1972 Act cannot be read into
Section 15 of the Act. Some of the observations made by
Quaari, J. are extracted below:- H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

,.. •
A "On the language of sub-section (1) of Section 15, a
confession of an accused is made admissible evidence
as against all those tried jointly with him, so it is implicit
that the same can be considered against all those tried
together. In this view of the matter also, Section 30 of the
B Evidence Act need not be invoked for consideration of
confession of an accused against a co-accused, abettor
or conspirator charged and tried in the same case along
with the accused.
>
'
The amendments effected in Section 15(1) and Section
c 21 ( 1) of the TADA Act by Act 43 of 1993 may be noticed
here. The words "co-accused, abettor or conspirator'' and
the proviso are added in sub-section (1) of Section 15;
clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 are
deleted. Before.the amendment of Sections 15 and 21, the
D sweep of the legal presumption contained therein was that
in a prosecution for any offence under sub-section (1) of •
Section 3 of the TADA Act on proof of the facts mentioned ""
in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section
21, it was mandated that the Designated Court shall
E presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused
had committed·such offence. Clauses (c) and (d), which
are d\')leted from sub-section (1) of Section 21 by Act 43
of 1993, related to a confession made by a co-accused
that the accused had committed the offence and to the
F confession made by the accused of the offence to any
person other than a police officer. The effect of the said
clauses was that in the event of the co-accused making
confession inculpating the accused or in the event of the
accused himself making an extra-judicial confession to any
G person other than a police officer, the legal presumption
that the accused had committed such offence would arise.
~--

I have already pointed out the difference in the phraseology
of Section 15 of the TADA Act. Parliament used the
expression "shall be admissible in the trial of such person
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 187
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
•' \ or co-accused, abettor or conspirator" in Section 15 which A
is different from the language employed in Section 30 of
the Evidence Act which says that the court may take into
consideration such confession as against such other
person as well as against the person who makes such
confession. It has to be presumed that Parliament was B
aware of the interpretation placed by the courts including
y the Privy Council and the Supreme Court on Section 30
of the Evidence Act but chose to frame Section 15
differently obviously intending to avoid the meaning glven
to the phrase "the court may take into consideration such c
confession as against such other person ... " used in
Section 30 of the Evidence Act. On the language of
Section 15(1 ), it is clear that the intention of Parliament is
to make the confession of an accused substantive
evidence both against the accused as well as the co- D
accused."
•
f 21. In S.N. Dube vs. N.B. Bhoir and Others (2000 (2) SCC
254], the Court referred to the judgment of the Constitution
Bench in Kartar Singh's case and observed that Section 15 is
an important departure from the ordinary law and must receive E
that interpretation which would achieve the object of that
provision rather than frustrate it.

22. In Lal Singh's case, the Court referred to the earlier
judgments in Kartar Singh's case, Nalini's case, S.N. Dubey's F
case and held:

"23 .......... Custodial interrogation in such cases is
permissible under the law to meet grave situation arising
out of terrorism unleashed by terrorist activities by persons
residing within or outside the country. The learned counsel G
further submitted that in the present case the guidelines
.....;
suggested by this Court in Kartar Singh (1994 (3) SCC
569) were not followed. In our view, this submission is
without any basis because in the present case
confessional statements were recorded prior to the date H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A of decision in the said case i.e. before 11-3-1994. Further, f

despite the suggestion made by this Court in Karlar Singh
case, the said guidelines are neither incorporated in the
Act nor in the Rules by Parliament. Therefore, it would be
difficult to accept the contention raised by learned counsel
B for the accused that as the said guidelines are not
followed, confessional statements even if admissible in
evidence, should not be relied upon for convicting the
accused. Further, this Court has not held in Karlar Singh
case that if ·suggested guidelines are not followed then
c confessional statement would be inadmissible in evidence.
Similar contention was negatived by this Court in S.N.
Dube v. N.B. Bhoir (2000 (2) SCC 254) by holding that a
police officer recording the confession under Section 15
is really not bound to follow any other procedure and the
rules or the guidelines framed by the Bombay High Court
D
for recording the confession by a Magistrate under Section
164 CrPC; the said guidelines do not by themselves apply
...'
to recording of a confession under Section 15 of the TADA
Act and it is for the court to appreciate the confessional
statement as the substantive piece of evidence and find
E out whether it is voluntary and truthful. Further, by a majority
decision in State v. Nalini ( 1999 (5) SCC 253) the Court
negatived the contentions that confessional statement is
not a substantive piece of evidence and cannot be used
against the co-accused unless it is corrob.orated in
F material particulars by other evidence and the confession
of one accused cannot corroborate the confession of
another, by holding that to that extent the provisions of the
Evidence Act including Section 30 would not be
applicable."
G
23. In Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao's case, the Court
reiterated the rule that if conditions emb9died in Section 15 of r--
the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules for recording confession of a
person by a police officer are complied with, then such
statement is admissible in evidence not only against the maker
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 189
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
~

'
but also against co-accused, abettor or conspirator. The Court A
then observed that "irregularities here and there would not make
such confessional statement inadmissible in evidence. If the
legislature in its wisdom has provided after considering the
situation prevailing in the society that such confessional
statement can be used in evidence, it would not be just B
reasonable and prudent to water down the scheme of the Act
on the assumption that the said statement was recorded under
duress or was not recorded truly by the officer concerned in
whom faith is reposed."

24. In Devender Pal Singh's case majority of three-Judges
c
Bench made a reference to Gurdeep Singh's case, Nalini's
case and held that whenever an accused challenges the
voluntary character of his confession recorded under Section
15(1) of the Act, the initial burden is on the prosecution to prove
that all the condiiions specified in that Section read with Rule D
>
..,.
15 of the Rules have been complied with and once that is done,
it is for the accused to show and satisfy the Court that the
confession was not made voluntarily. The Court further held that
the confession of an accused can be relied upon for the
purpose of conviction and no further corroboration is necessary E
if it relates to the accused himself. However, as a matter of
prudence the Court may look for some corroboration if
confession is to be used against a co-accused though that will
be again within the sphere of appraisal of evidence.
F
25. In Jameel Ahmad's case, two-Judges Bench after
discussing, considering and analyzing several precedents on
the subject, including Oevender Pal Singh's case, culled out
the following propositions:

"(i) If the confessional statement is properly recorded, G
~-\
satisfying the mandatory provision of Section 15 of
the TADA Act and the Rules made thereunder, and
if the same is found by the court as having been
made voluntarily and truthfully then the said
confession is sufficient to base a conviction on the H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
• .....
A maker•of the confession.

(ii) Whether such confession requires corroboration or
not, is a matter for the court considering such
confession on facts of each case.
B (iii) In regard to the use of such confession as against
a co-accused, it has to be held that as a matter of
caution, a general corroboration should be sought
for but in cases where the court is satisfied that the
probative value of such confession is such that it
c does not require corroboration then it may base
a conviction on the basis of such confession of the
co-accused without corroboration. But this is an
exception to the general rule of requiring
corroboration when such confession is to be used
D against a co-accused. '
~-

(iv) The nature of corroboration required both in regard
to the use of confession against the maker as also
in regard to the use of the same against a co-
accused is of a general nature, unless the court
E
comes to the conclusion that such corroboration
should be on material facts also because of the
facts of a particular case. The degree of
corroboration so required is that which is necessary
for a prudent man to believe in the existence of facts
F mentioned in the confessional statement.

(v) The requirement of sub-rule (5) of Rule 15 of the
TADA Rules which contemplates a confessional
statement being sent to the Chief Metropolitan
G Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate who, in
turn, will have to send the same to the Designated t-·
Court is not mandatory and is only directory.
However, the court considering the case of direct
transmission of the confessional statement to the
H Designated Court should satisfy itself on facts of
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 191
ANR. v. C.8.1. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

each case whether such direct transmission of the A
confessional statement in the facts of the case
• creates any doubt as to the genuineness of the
said confessional statement."

[Emphasis supplied]
B
..,
26. In Abdulvahab Abdul Majid Shaikh's case, this Court
rejected the argument raised on behalf of the appellant that the
confession made by him cannot be treated as voluntary
because the same had been retracted and observed:-
c
" ... The police officer was empowered to record the
confessional and in law such a confession is made
admissible under the provisions of the TADA Act. The
mere fact that A-9 Musakhan @ Babakhan retracted
subsequently is not a valid ground to reject the confession. D
•
;:,- The crucial question is whether at the time when the
accused was giving the statement he was subjected to
coercion, threat or any undue influence or was offered any
inducement to give any confession. There is nothing in the
evidence to show that there was any coercion, threat or
E
any undue influence to the accused to make the
confession."

27. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that if a
person accused of an offence under the Act makes a
confession before a police officer not below the rank of F
Superintendent of Police and the same is recorded by the
concerned officer in writing or on any mechanical device like
cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which sounds or
images can be reproduced, then such confession is admissible
in the trial of the maker as also the co-accused, abettor or G
--<. conspirator not only for an offence under the Act but also for
offence(s) under other enactments, provided that the co-
accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried in the
same case along with the accused and the Court is satisfied
that requirements of the Act and Rules have been complied H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A with. Whether such confession requires corroboration depends
on the facts of the given case. If the Court is convinced that the
prpbative value of the confession is such that it does not require
corroboration then the same can be used for convicting the
maker and/or co-accused under the Act and/or other
B enactments without independent corroboration. If a person
accused of committing an offence under the Act challenges his
confession on the ground that it was not made voluntarily, then
the initial burden is on the prosecution to prove that all ·
requirements under Section 15 of the Act and Rule 15 of the
c Rules have been complied with. Once this is done, the burden
shifts on the accused person and it is for him to prove that the
confession was not made voluntarily or that the same is not
truthful and if he adduces evidence during the trial to
substantiate his allegation that the confession was not voluntary
then the Court has to carefully scrutinize the entire evidence and
0
surrounding circumstances and determine whether or not the
confession was voluntary. The confession made under Section
15 of the Act cannot be discarded only on the ground of violation
of the guidelines laid down in Kartar Singh's case because the
same have not been incorporated in the Act and/or the Rules.
E
28. The judgments in Raja Khima's case, Sarwan Singh's
case, Shankaria's case, Aloke Nath's case and Ajit Singh's
case on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel
for the appellants do not have any direct bearing on these
F appeals. In Raja Khima's case, the offence is said to have been
committed during the night of 18/19th May, 1952. The appellant
was arrested on 20th May. On the next day he was sent for
recording confession but the Mngistrate recorded the
confession on 3rd June. The Magistrate, who recorded the
G confession and was examined as PW 21, stated that he gave
1O days time to the appellant for reflection. By making a r--
statement in writing before the committing court, he stated that
while in jail, the police had coerced him to make confessional
statement. He was frightened that if he would not confess the
H crime, the police will beat him and, therefore, he made false
MOHMEDAMIN@AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 193
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

confession as per the dictates of the police. A similar statement A
was made by him under Section 342 Cr.P.C. 1898, which is
equivalent to Section 313 Cr.P.C. This Court discarded the
confession by making the following observations:-

"The appellant was sent to a Magistrate at 8 p.m. on the 8
21st for the recording of a confession but the Magistrate
did not record it till the 3rd of June. He was examined as
PW 21 and explained that he gave the appellant ten days
for reflection. The length of time is unusual but no objection
about its fairness to the accused could reasonably have C
been raised had it not been for the fact that the judicial
lock-up is in charge of a police guard which is under the
direct control, orders and supervision of the very Sub-
Inspector who had conducted the investigation and had
earlier suspected and, according to the accused, actually
arrested three other persons; and two of them are now D
• called as prosecution witnesses to depose against the
appellant about a matter on which the prosecution lay great
importance, namely, the sharpening of an axe. The danger
that they might exaggerate their stories or give false
evidence in their anxiety to avert further suspicion from E
· themselves is one that cannot be overlooked."

In para 11 of the judgment, the Court laid down the
following proposition:-

"Now the law is clear that a confession cannot be used F
against an accused person unless the Court is satisfied
that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether
it is true or false does not arise. It is abhorrent to our notions
of justice and fair play, and is also dangerous, to allow a
man to be convicted on the strength of a confession unless G
it is made voluntarily and unless he realises that anything
he says may be used against him; and any attempt by a
person in authority to bully a person into making a
confession or any threat or coercion would at once
H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

-;.
A invalidate it if the fear was still operating on his mind at
the time he makes the confession and if it "would appear
to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would
gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature
in reference io the proceedings against him": Section 24
B of the Indian Evidence Act.

That is why the recording of a confession is hedged around
with so many safeguards and is the reason why
Magistrates ordinarily allow a period for reflection and why
an accused person is remanded to jail custody and is put
c out of the reach of the investigating police before he is
asked to make his confession."

29. The facts of Sarwan Singh's case were that the
appellant was arrested on 25th November, 1955. His cloths
D were found blood stained. He is alleged to have made
statement which. led to discovery of incriminating articles. On •
-,I_
30th November, he was sent to Magistrate to record his 1-
confessional statement. According to Magistrate, Mr. Grover,
the accused was produced before him at about 2.30 pm. He
E gave him half an hour lime to think. Thereafter, the confessional -~;.;

statement was recorded. This Court noted that the appellant was
taken before the Magistrate by the Sub-Inspector who remained
standing in the verandah outside the Magistrate's office, soon
after the statement the Sub-Inspector went to the Magistrate's
F room and also that even though there were injuries on the person
of the appellant, the Magistrate did not inquire about the same
and held:-

"There can be no doubt that, when an accused person is
produced before the Magistrate by the investigating officer,
G it is of utmost importance that the mind of the accused .,.,
person should be completely freed from any possible r-
influence of the police and the effective way of securing
such freedom from fear to the accused person is to send
him to jail custody and give him adequate time to consider ~
H

Jr.;
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 195
ANR. v. C.8.1. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI; J.]
" whether he should make a confession at all. It would A
naturally be difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as
to the time which should be allowed to an accused person
in any given case.

However. speaking generally, it would, we think, be
B
.,. reasonable to insist upon giving an accused person at least
24 hours to decide whether or not he should make a
confession. Where there may be reason to suspeCt that
the accus.ed has been persuaded or coerced to make a
. confession, even longer period may have to be given to
him before his statement is recorded. In our opinion, in the
c
circumstances of this case it is impossible to accept the
view that enough time was given to the accused to think
over the matter."

30. In Shankaria's case this Court referred to the questions D
".,,. put to the accused during his preliminary examination, look
cognizance of the argument of the learned amicus curiae that
no explanation had been given by the prosecution for bringing
the accused from Ganganagar to Raisinghnagar for getting
confession recorded, keeping the accused in judicial lock-up E
which was contiguous to the police station, giving him less than
20 minutes for reflection before recording his confession and
handing over him back to the Superintendent of Police
immediately after recording the confession, noted the ratio of
-~
Sarwan Singh's case and held as under: F
"It will be seen that how much time for reflection should be
allowed to an accused person before recording his
confession, is a question which depends on the
circumstances of each case. The object of giving such time
for reflection to the accused. is to ensure that he is G.
../ '
completely free from police influence. If immediately before
the recording of the confession, the accused was in judicial
custody beyond the reach of the investigating police for
some days, then such custody from its very nature, may
itself be a factor dispelling fear or influence of the police H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A from the mind of the accused. In such a case, it may not
be necessary to send back the accused person for any
prolonged period to Jail or Judicial lock-up. In the instant
case, the accused was got admitted to the Judicial lock-
up on June 12 for getting his confession recorded under
B Section 164 CrPC, and such admission was made under
the orders of the Magistrate who ultimately recorded his
confession on June 14. The accused was abcut two days
in judicial custody beyond the reach of the police. On June
13, 1974, a written request was made to the Magistrate
c by the police, for recording the confession of the accused.
Even then, the Magistrate postponed the recording of the
confession till the following day, obviously because he
wanted to give the appellant one day more in judicial
custody to ponder over the matter iree from Police
influence. On June 14, notwithstanding the fact that the
D
accused Shankaria was in judicial custody from the . ,
evening of June 12 after the preliminary questioning, the j.
Magistrate allowed 15 minutes more to him for reflection.
Thus considered, Shankaria had, as a matter of fact, about
38 or 40 hours in judicial custody, immediately preceding
E the confession and this was rightly considered sufficient
to secure freedom from fear or influence of the police to
him (Shankaria)."

31. Aloke Nath Dutta's case was not arising out of
F prosecution under the Act. The argument of the counsel for the
appellant which found favour with this Court was that the
confession had not been recorded in accordance with law and
in any case, in the absence of any corroborative evidence, the
confession of a co-accused could not be made basis for
G conviction.

32. In Ajit Singh's case, the Court referred to the judgments
in Kartar Singh's case, Jameel Ahmed's case and held that
the confession of the co-accused cannot be relied upon for
reversing acquittal of the respondents because none had
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 197
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR (G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
'<
admitted that they were aware of the involvement of respondent A
No.1 in the terrorist activities.

33. In the light of the above, we shall now deal with the
arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that
confessions made by their clients were not voluntary and the B
.,_ learned trial Judge committed grave error relying upon the same
for convicting them under Section 302 read with Section 120-
B IPC. It is an undisputed position that appellant Nos.A-4, A-5,
A-6, A-7 and A-8 were produced by the Investigating Officer
before Shri A.K. Majumdar and appellant No. A-10 was
produced before Shri Harbhajan Ram. After preliminary
c
questioning, custody of each of the appellants was given to the
Investigating Officer who again produced them on the dates
fixed by Shri A.K. Majumdar and Shri Harbhajan Ram. After
recording their statements in accordance with the manner
• prescribed under Section 15 of the Act and Rule 15 of the D
~ Rules, the concerned officer immediately sent the same to the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi for onward transmission
to the designated Court at Ahmedabad.

34. In reply to the questions put to him, appellant No.A-4 E
unequivocally stated that he was aware that it was not nec:essary
for him to make confession and that the same can be used
against him and further that he was making confession
voluntarily without any fear, coercion or allurement. The
... questions put to appellant No.A-4 and his answers are extracted F
below:-

"Q1. Kindly tell your name, father's name and address?

A. My name is Mohd. Farukh alias Farukh Baba. My
father's name is Alla Rakha Sheikh and my address G
---{ is House No.1384, Maulki Pole, Dariyapur,
Ahmedabad, Gujarat.

02. Do you know who I am and where are you sitting?
H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

j.
A A. I know that you are S.P./CBI and at this time I am
sitting in your Office at New Delhi.

03. In which offence you have been arrested?

A. I have been arrested by the CBI in the murder case
B of Raufwaliullah. My remand was obtained from
Ahmedabad Court on 21st May. 'f
Q.4 Do you wish to make a confession in this case? If
yes, then why?
c A. Yes. I wish to make confession in this case so that
I am able to tell you everything which I know about
this case?

Q. 5 Are you making this confession voluntarily or
D making this confession under any fear, coercion
and allurement?
f
.A. I am niaki17g this confession on my own and
voluntarily without anyfear, coercion or allurement.
E Q.6 It is not necessary for you to make a confession. If
you make a confession, then itcan be.used against
you?

A. ram very well aware that it is not necessary for me
F to make a confession and that this confession can ...
be used against me. But inspite of this I wish to
make this confession voluntarily."

Thereafter, Shri A. K. Majumdar recorded the following
note:- ·
G
''From the above questions and answers, I am satisfied that )-_

the accused Mohd. Farukh Allah Rakha Sheikh is making
his confession voluntarily. However, I give him more time
till 30.5.1993 again to think over whether he wants to make
H the confession."
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 199
ANR.., v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

" · 35. On 30.5.1993, appellant No.A-4 was again produced A
before Shri Majumdar, who repeated the question whether he
was desirous of making confession. In turn appellant No.A-4
reiterated that he was making confession voluntarily. Shri
Majumdar then recorded his satisfaction that the accused was
ready to make confession voluntarily. The question and answer B
as well as the note recorded by Shri Majumdar on 3oth May,
1993 read as under:

"Q1. What have you thought about giving confession, do
you still want to make confession?
c
A. I have considered thoroughly about giving my
confession. I wish to give my confession voluntarily.

Read over and admitted to be correct."
D
Note:! am satisfied that accused Mohd, Farukh Allah
+ Rakha Sheikh is ready to make his confession
voluntarily without any fear, coercion and allurement.
Hence, I proceed to record his confession under
Section 15 of TADA(P) Act, 1987."
• E
36. Thereafter, Shri A.K. Majumdar recorded the statement
(Ex. 480) of appellant No.A-4, who gave out that after losing
money in gambling, he joined the illegal business of liquor of
Latif in 1988; that Latif gang was known as 'the company'; that
}. the company purchased a new Scooter No. GJ-1 C-2797 for him F
in 1989 from Pappu Bhai of Dilli Darwaja; that initially the colour
of the scooter was blue but, later on, it was changed to brown;
that the scooter was used by other members of the company
including Amin Choteli and Iqbal Dhobi; that at the time of the
seizure by the police, the colour of the scooter was brownish G
and stickers were pasted on the front and rear plates; that it
was rumoured that members of Latif gang were involved in
Radhika Gymkhana murder case; that he wanted 5 persons,
who were not connected with the murders, to be arrested and
he was discussing this matter with the Government of Gujarat
H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A and senior police officers; that after some days of Gymkhana
murder case, a meeting was held in the house of Latif which
was attended by many including Rasool Khan @ Rasool Party;
that he also joined the meeting in which the hurdle created by
Rauf Valliullah was discussed and it was decided to kill him;
B that this task was assigned to Rasool Khan @ Rasool Party;
that on 9.10.1992, he came to know from evening newspaper
of Gujarati language that Rauf Valliullah was murdered; that
after one or two days, the news of involvement of Rasool Khan
and Musharaf Khan came in; that after some days, the name
c of Iqbal Dhabi was also published in the newspaper; that the
names of all members of the company was roped in by the
police in the Radhika Gymkhana case and he remained in
hiding and left Ahmedabad along with Iqbal Dhabi and Amin
Choteli and Ejaj Pahlwan and continued to roam in Baroda,
D Bombay, Poona, Gulbarga and Hyderabad before being
arrested.

37. Appellant Nos.A-7, Mohd. Amin and A-8 Iqbal Hussain
were produced before Shri A.K. Majumdar on 28.5.1993. In
response to the preliminary questions being put to them, both
E the appellants replied that they were aware that they were not
bound to make confessions and that the same could be used
against them. The appellants also declared that they were
making confessions voluntarily without any fear, coercion or
allurement. Both were again produced before Shri A.K.
F Majumdar on 30.5.1993. After asking them whether they had
given thought about making confessions and getting reply that
they wish to make confessions voluntarily, the concerned officer
recorded their statements.

G 38. In his detailed statement, appellant No. A-7 disclosed
the background in which he joined the business of spurious
country liquor and came in contact with Latif and Gang, Rasool
Khan @ Rasool Party and his associates including Sajid Ali
(appellant No A-6), Gulal (appellant No.A-11) and Mohd.
Pehalwan alias Mohd. Umar Majid Pathan (appellant No.A-5)
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 201
ANR. v. C.BJ THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J]

and the hideout of Rasool Khan alias Party at Baluchawad. He A
further disclosed that he knew Rauf Valiullah, a Congress
leader belonging to the Muslim community and that he was
called by Rasool Party through Gula! (appellant No.A-11) five-
six days before the murder of Rauf Valiullah and asked to
remain with Azamkhan (appellant No.A-10) and Sajidali B
(appellant No.A-6), who had been instructed to attack him (Rauf
Valiullah) with knives; that he along with appellant Nos.A-10 and
A-6 pursued Rauf Valiullah at various places but he could not
attack him at Kalupur because of presence of his family
members and at Lal Darwaja due to procession of Hindus; that c
on 9.10.1992 he was instructed by Rasool Party to go on
scooter with Iqbal Hussain@ Laliyo Dhobi (appellant No.A-8)
to Madhuban building where Mohmed Pahelwan (appellant
No.A-5) and Sajidali (appellant No.A-6) had been sent to kill
Rauf Valiullah; and Iqbal Hussain (appellant No.A-8) was 0
instructed to shoot Rauf Valiullah in case appellant No.5 was
unsuccessful. The relevant portions of his statement are
extracted below:-

...... Rasool told me that Rauf Valiullah has gone to his
house in Kalupur and as soon as he comes out of his E
house, Azam and Sajid will attack him with knives. Rasool
asked me to remain standing near the Auta of the Mosque
from where Sajid and Azam were visible in the lane and
Rasool stood on a side little away. Rasool also told me
that when Sajid and Azam attack Rauf Valiullah then I would F
signal Rasool and thereafter Rasool will come and shoot
Rauf Valiullah. We stood on our respective positions as
told by Rasool. We remained standing upto 6.30 p.m.
Thereafter I saw that Sajid and Azam are quickly running
out of lane and upon this I saw towards Rasool and he G
signaled me to come near him. I immediately reached near
Rasool and all four of us went inside the Majahid Ki Pole.
After reaching there, Sajid and Azam told Rasool that Rauf
. Valiullah's family members had come outside to drop Rauf
Valiullah upto car. Therefore it was very difficult to attack H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A him ......

....... Rasool then told me that I should drive the scooter of
.Taslim and Sajid and Azam will sit behind me and all of
us will chase the car of Rauf Valiullah and as soon as Rauf
· Valiullah comes out of his car after reaching his
8.
Navrangpur house, then Azam and Sajid will kill him with
knives. I told Rasool that I do not know the route of Rauf ~-

Valiullah's house. Upon this Rasool said Azam and Sajid
knows the route. Thereafter when we came out of the
Mujahid Ki Pole, we saw that the car of RaufValiullah had
c left from there. Thereafter all three of us left from there on
the scooter.and reached Lal Darwaja via Relief Road. I
vyas driving the scooter and Sajid and Azam were sitting
behind me. One procession of Hindus was passing from
Lal Darwaja and therefore I could not go towards Ellis
D Bridge and ,thereafter I took Nehru Bridge route as told by
Sajid a·nd' reached near the Government flats at
Navrangpura. As soon as I turried my scooter on right side ).
road, I saw that car of Rauf Valiullah was standing inside
the compound of the flat. Upon this Sajid asked me not to
.E stop the scooter and told me to keep moving the scooter.
From there we went to Nehru Bridge and from there
reached Baluchawad .........

....... It was a Friday on 9.10.1992. As soon as I reached
F ·my house at 1.30 p.m., after reading Namaj of Jumma,
Gµlal came to my house and told me that Rasool is calling
me. At that time I was having Scooter No. 2797 belonging
to FarukhBaba. Both .of us went to Rasool in Baluchawad
on the said scooter. Rasool told me to go with Iqbal alias
Lala Dhabi. I cam to Iqbal and thereafter took him to
G
Rasool iriBaluchawad. We met him in the Press of Rasool
and so far I remember Gula I too was there. Rasool told me /'-~

that Rauf Valiullah has gone to Madhuban Building situated
near Ellis Bridge, Under Bridge and told us. to go there.
He also told that he has already sent Mohd. Pahalwan and
H
MOHMED AMIN@AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 203
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G,S. SINGHVl, J.]
-\
Sajid on a scooter for killing Rauf Valiullah. He also told A
us that Mohd. Pahalwan will fire that shot. Rasool gave one
revolver to Iqbal Dhabi also instructed him that if Mohd.
Pahalwan does not succeed in killing Rauf Valiullah, then
Iqbal Dhabi will shoot and kill Rau valiullah ........ ·
B
...... Both of us left Baluchawad on the scooter which I was
driving. We went to Gujarat College, Ellis Bridge Road, via
Nehru Bridge-Navrangpur and Gujarat College ...... We
saw Sajid and Mohd. Pahalwan sitting on gray coloured
scooter of Sajid. Sajid was sitting on the driver seat of the
scooter and Mohd. Pahalwan was sitting behind him.
c
Mohd. was wearing a blue colour check shirt and blue
jeans ...... After alighting from scooter, I went towards Sajid
and Mohd. Pahalwan. Sajid told me that RaufValiullah had
come there in his Maruti car and that he has gone inside
the Madhuban Building. He also showed me the Maruti car D
•.j.- which was standing with its face towards wall.. .....

...... I deCided that it will not be proper to apply grease on
the scooter because Madhuban Building was in front of us.
I decided that number should be covered with sticker or E
grease after purchasing it from some other place.
Thereafter myself and Iqbal crossed Under bridge and
reached B.S. Hospital on the scooter. I purchased one
small roll of bandage from a shop for Rs.5/- and took a
cold lemon water glass from a vendor nearby and F
thereafter tried to paste the bandage on the number plate
behind a tree. But I could not cui the bandage and therefore
I took a poker used for breaking ice from the lemon water
vendor and also asked him to prepare one glass lemon
water for me. I tore the bandage into two pieces with the
G
help of poker and thereafter covered the numbers of
-·~ scooter on both sides .......

....... As soon as I reached near Under Bridge, I saw a huge
crowd of public there and also saw police jeeps and other
vehicles standing there. People were shouting mar diya H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A - mar diya. I couid not find Iqbal there. I became sure that
Rauf Valiullah h.as been shot dead. Since number plate of
my scooter was covered, therefore, I immediately turned
my scooter and parked my scooter in a deserted lonely
place and removed the bandages pasted on the number
B plates of scooter and thereafter went to Rasool in
Baluchawad in my scooter.......

..... After reaching the den of Rasool I found that Rasool,
Mohd. Pahalwan and Sajid were already there. Scooter of
Sajid was parked at some distance. All of them were very
c happy. Rasool. said work has been executed and thereafter
shook hands with me. Thereafter I came back from there
and after some distance I met Iqbal Dhobi and he asked
me about Rasool and I told him that he is in his den .......

D ...... Suddenly Azam came there on scooter No. 515 which
belonged to Rasool. Azam hurriedly said Rauf Valiullah ....
has been killed. He also said S.P. Anarwala has perhaps
seen him and his scooter at the spot. Upon this Rasool
asked Gulal to immediately remove scooter from there.
E Gulal asked me to take away the scooter. But I refused
him. Thereafter both of them left from there on Scooter No.
2797 and I dropped Iqbal near his house. After some time
Gula! came to me on the Scooter of Rasool and asked me
to keep the scooter. I refused to do so and thereafter Gulal
went away from there on the scooter. Later on, I came to
F
know that this scooter was given to Yunus ljjat Khan Patha11
Foreman for changing the colour. Iqbal had told me that
Mohd. Pahalwan had fired the shot upon RaufValiullah and
after firing the shot he left from there on an auto
rickshaw .......
G
..... My name too had come in the Police records along with }--

names of other persons of the company in the murder case
of Audhav. Therefore, all of us feared our arrest by police
and decided that the members of the gang should leave
H Ahmedabad for some days. I along with Farukh Baba,
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 205
ANR. v. C.8.1. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
~
Iqbal and Mohd. Ejaj took a Taxi from Ahmedabad and A
came to Baroda. My in-laws are living in Baroda. We went
there and took our meals. Mehmoob Bhai of the family of
my In-laws arranged our tickets for Bombay on a luxury bus
and in the night we left for Elombay. We reached Bombay
on the next day. We stayed in Hotel Akshar in Bhindi Bazar B
.r where we disclosed our fictitious names as Ghani Khan,
Sultan, Mehmood and Ahmad, Residents of Baroda. After
3-4 days we left Bombay and went to Gulbarga. From there
we made a phone call at Ahmedabad and come to know
that 5 members of the gang have already been caught by c
the police. Thereafter we caught bus from Gulbarga and
went to Pune and stayed there in a Hotel near Railway
Station. Myself and Ejaj came back to Bombay from Pune
in a taxi and again stayed in Hotel Akshar in the names of
Mehmood and Sultan. We stayed there for one day and D
thereafter went back to Ahmedabad in a bus. Thereafter I
.... remained in Ahmedabad and continued to shift places ......

...... On 24th February, 1993, Khurdus came to me and said
that I should surrender before the police and also said that
he will make the necessary arrangements for this or else E
police will itself catch me and if that happens, then the
Company will not help me. Considering the circumstances
prevalent at that time, I decided that I should surrender
before the police as advised by Khurdus. Khurdus told me
that I should reach his house on the night of 27.2.1993 at F
9 p.m. and police will come there and will take him from
there ......

..... On 27.2.1993, myself and one other member of the
gang namely Hafiz went to the house of Khurdus. At about
G
10 p.m. in the night one police gypsy with a red beacon
-~ came there and took away both of us."

39. In his confessional statement, Iqbal Hussain@ Laliyo
Dhobi Kasambhai Shaikh (appellant No.A-8) narrated how he
was acquainted with Rasool Khan @ Rasool Party and Rauf H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S. C.R.

A Valiullah. He then stated that on 9.10.1992, he was called by
Rasool Party through Mohmed Amin @ Amin Choteli Rahim
Miyan Shaikh (appellant No.A-7) who came on scooter No.GJ-
1C-2797 belonging to Mohmed Faruk @ Faruk Baba Alla
Rakha Shaikh (appellant No.A-4) and how he was given
B revolver loaded with six bullets by Rasool Khan with instructions
to murder Rauf Valiullah. Appellant No.A-8 also gave out that
Rasool Khan had also sent Sajidali and Mohmed Pahelwan for
murdering Rauf V,aliullah and that he was to shoot only if the
Mohmed Pahelwan failed in his attempt. The relevant portions
c of his statement read as under:-
"9.10.1992 was a Friday. At about 1.30 p.m. after I had
read my Namaj, Mohd. Amin alias Choteli who is an
employee of the Company came to me on Scooter No.
2797 of Farukh Baba and told me that Rasool Khan alias
D · Party is calling me. I went to Rasool Khan in the Press in
Baluchawad along with Choteli on the scooter. So far I
remember Gula! was also present there along with Rasool
Khan. Rasool Khan gave a revolver to me which was
loaded with 6 bullets. He told me that I have to murder Rauf
E· Valiullah. He also told me that Rauf Valiullah has gone
inside Madhuban Building situated near Under Bridge, Ellis
Bridge. He further told me that he has already sent Sajid
and Mohd. Pahalwan for murdering RaufValiullah. Rasool
told me that myself and Choteli should go to that place on
F the scooter and if Mohd. Pahalwan ~ails in killing Rauf
Valiullah, .then I should shoot and kill RaufValiullah. Choteli
was to drive the scooter. Rasool told us to cover the
number pl!lte of the scooter by applying grease on it after
going out of the Mahalia ........

I saw that Sajid was sitting on his gray colour scooter on
the side of Madhuban Building. Scooter was parked in a
stand and Sajid was sitting on the driver's seat. Behind
him one young boy was sitting, who I had not seen earlier.

H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 207
. ANR v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
.\
After parking scooter, Choteli went towards Sajid and A
came back after talking to him. He told me that Rauf
Valiullah is still inside the buiding and he has not come out
so far. He also told me that Sajid and Mohd. Pahalwan are
also waiting for him to come out of the building ........
B
After 5-10 minutes I saw that Rauf Valiullah who was
'/- wearing a white Kurta Pyjama, came out of the building
and after getting down from the sloppy phootwari started
moving iowards the place where 4-5 cars were parked.
There were 2-3 persons with him. I saw, but I cannot tell,
whether all these persons were with Rauf Valiullah or not.
c
One of the person opened the gate of driver side of Maruti
car and sat inside. Thereafter Rauf Valiullah moved
towards left of the car. The face of car was towards the
wall of Madhuban Building and back side of the car was
towards toad. Suddenly I saw that Sajid drove his scooter D
,... and came just behind the car and thereafter I saw Mohd.
Pahafwan coming towards Rauf Valiullah from the middle
i of road. When Mohd. Pahalwan was at a distance of about
~. 1 Ft. from RaufValiullah, he fired upon him. I think the shots
were filed in head. I heard sounds of 2-3 shots. After E
seeing all this, I started walking towards the sloppy road.
Since I was having revolver with me and Choteli had not
come there by that time, therefore, I feared being caught.
This road after coming out of the Under Bridge goes
towards right side. I traveled a long distance. But I did not F
see Mohd. Pahalwan and Sajid going from that road .......

After some lime Amin Choteli met me on the scooter No.
2797 and asked me whether I have met Rasool there.
Choteli told me that Rasool is in his den. Thereafter I went
G
to the den of Rasool along with Choteli on the scooter.
..,;. Rasool was present in his den (Press). Sajid, Mohd.
Pahalwan and Gulal were also there. I returned back the
revolver of Rasool. Rasool told us that the work has been
executed and asked us to leave. Rasool asked Mohd.
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A Pahalwan to change his shirt. Thereafter I came out of the
Press. Suddenly I saw that Azam Khan who is an
accomplice of Rasool came there on a white colour Bajaj
Scooter No. 515 and said Rauf Valiu/lah has been
eliminated. He further told that Police has seen him and
El his scooter. Although Rasool told Gulal to give the Scooter
No. 515 to Choteli, but Choteli refused to take it. Thereafter
..i·
both left from there on brownish colour scooter No. 2797.
Choteli dropped me near my house. Thereafter I remained
inside my house. I did not see Rasool party thereafter.......
c Since my name had appeared in this murder, therefore, I
stopped .sleeping in my house and started sleeping on the
roofs of other persons. After some days, I came to
Bangalore on a train along with Mohd. Yunus Usman Bhai
whc is residing in Lakhota Pole, Dariapur. Both of us
D stayed in Hindustan Guest House which is near Railway
Station, Bangalore. We stayed there for some days. From +
there we went to Mysore and Ooty also. From Bangalore
we came back to Bombay and lived in the house of t
Yunus's brother Anis in Boriwili for 7-8 days and !thereafter
E we came back to Ahmedabad .......

In the evening of 17th February, 1993, Musharaf asked me
to come to the house of brother-in-law of Khurdas namely
Ghani Bhai and told me that he had a talk with Latif Seth
on telephone and Seth has ordered that Musharaf and
F
myself should surrender before the police in connection
with the murder case of Rauf Valiullah and also said that
we should confess our crime. Since it was an order from
Latif Seth, therefore, we readily agreed to surrender ......
.

G 40. Appellant Nos.A-5 and A-6 were produced before Shri
A.K. Majumdar on 8.9.1993. From the replies given by them. }...
Shri Majumdar felt satisfied that both were willing to make
confessions voluntarily. Accordingly, he recorded note similar
to the one recorded in the cases of all other appellants. Both
H were again produced before Shri A.K. Majumdar on 9.9.1993.
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 209
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
-'>.
on which date their statements were recorded. Appellant No.A- A
5 Mohmed Umar Majid Ahmed Pathan @ Mohmed Fighter@
Mohmed Pahelwan @ Mohmedkhan disclosed how after
leaving studies he started work in 1978-79 and how he joined
Amba Bhai Purani Gym, Kankaria, Ahmedabad, where he met
Hamid Khan Party (brother of Rasool Khan @ Rasool Party). B
~~ \
He then stated that he felt obliged to Rasool Party because the
latter helped him in his dispute with Shyam Sindhi and Bashir
Madrasi and agreed to work for him; that Rasool contacted him
on telephone on 9.10.1992 and told that Gulal (appellant No.A-
11) will give something and after taking the same he should go c
to under-bridge and give it to Azam Khan and another boy, who
will be on a scooter; that Gulal gave him revolver and then he
realized that the work assigned by Rasool was to murder
someone; that after taking revolver he reached under-bridge on
bullet motorcycle bearing No.GAC-6005, where Azam D
• contacted him and took motorcycle; that thereafter he sat on
).. the scooter with the boy who, later on, pointed out that the
person with beard who had come out of Madhuban building is
to be killed; that after shooting the man having beard he fled
on the scooter along with the boy and came to Kakoriwala Ki
E
Pole, where Rasool Party and his gang members were sitting.
The relevant portions of his statement read as under:-

"It was Friday the 9th October, 1992 when Rauf Valiullah
was murdered. After talking my bath etc., I was standing
on the corner of the lane below my house at about 10.30 F
a.m. in the morning. One boy working in the opposite shop
came to me and told me that there is a phone call for me .
...... When I attended the phone, I came to know that it was
the phone call of Rasool. Rasool after wishing me good
day, asked me what I am doing. I told him that I have just G
taken my bath. He asked me whether I have any vehicle
--.\ with me. I replied that I have my own motor cycle. Rasool ·
told me to go to Rosy Cinema hall in Sarangpur and meet
Gulal there ......... Gulal met me outside Rosy Cinema. When
I reached near him, he asked me to park my motor cycle H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 16 S.C.R.

A nearby on one side and therafter took me to the office of
a transport company nearby ........

...........After about 5-10 minutes, Rasool called on the said
telephone. Firstly Gula! attended the said phone and
thereafter Gula! gave the receiver to me. Rasool Khan
B
asked me whether I have seen the under bridge behind .l'
Mangaldas Town, Ellis Brdige. I told him that I have seen
this bridge. Thereupon Rasool told me tha!Gulal will give
me something and I should take that something and go·
to under bridge and give it to Azam Khan and one other
c boy who are on a scooter and will meet me at Teen Rasla
'-
near Gujarat College ahead of the under bridge. I knew
Azam from before because he used to come to Lal
Darwaja for swimming. Rasool also told me that I should
hand over that something to the boy accompanying Azam
D and also hand over my motor cycle to Azam. Rasool told
me that the said boy will execute the work and I should
"""
drive the scooter and after the work is over, I should leave
the place with the said boy on the scooter. However, Rasool
did not tell as to what work is to be executed. Rasool
E asked me whether I will be able to do all this. I said Yes
because I was indebted to him. Thereafter Rasool talked
with Gula! on telephone. After completing the talks, Gulal
gave me a revolver and told me that it is loaded. When
Gulal gave me the revolver, I realized that work means
F murdering someone. I asked Gulal as to who is to be
murdered. Upon which he said I will myself come to know
about it later on. Thereafter I reached under bridge on my
Buie! Motor Cycle No. GAC-6005 via Sarangpur-Raipur-
Ellis Bridge. After crossing the under-bridge, I saw Azam
G sitting on a Bajaj Super Scooter with one boy on the left
side of road. There was no number plate on that scooter. >---
Immediately on seeing me, Azam stood up and came near
me and took my motor cycle. I took Sun glasses of Azam
from him and thereafter Azam went towards Gujarat
H College on my motor cycle. I sat with the boy on his
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 211
ANR. v. CB.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR (G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

scooter. .... A
......... He also told me that they are two persons and out
of them one is having beard and other is wearing white
Kurta Pyjama and that both of them will sit in their Maruti
car after coming out of the big building. He also told me
B
-f that the person wearing Kurta Pyjama is to be murdered.
I do not remember the colour and number of said Maruti
car at present. The said boy asked me whether I have
brought that something with me. Upon which I told him that
I have brought that something with me which is a revolver.
On this he asked me to hand over the revolver to him and c
told me that he will execute the work. I asked him there is
. nothing so and kept the revolver with me. Actually at that
time two things were striking in my mind i.e. firstly that
perhaps we will return back without executing anything and
• secondly that whether I drive the scooter or shoot the D
)._
person, my involvement is sure. In fac;:t, I wanted to repay
obligations done by Rasool upon me. We remaining sitting
there for 1 and 1/2 hours. The said boy, whose name I
came to know later on was Sajid, was wearing a plan Zero
number eye glass ...... E
When more than 1 and 1/2 hours passed and we kept
waiting, then at about 2.30 p.m. Sajid suddenly told me that
they are coming. I saw that two persons, one having beard
J.
and other wearing a white Kurta Pyjama were going
F
towards Maruti Car parked there in front and suddenly I
crossed the road and walked towards Maruti car. Person
with beard opened the door of driver side and sat inside
and the person wearing white kurta-pyjama walked behind
the car and reached the left side door of the car and put
__ _, G,
something in his mouth. By that time, I had reached very ,,
near to him and immediately on reaching there I took out
the revolver which I had tucked in the belt of my pant below
my shirt and fired three rounds continuously on the head
of the persqn wearing white kurta pyjama. In fact, I was so
H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

,<

A nervous at that time that I could not even count the shots ·
which I fired. Suddenly S<:jid brought the scooter from front
and I immediately sat on the back seat of the said scooter
and both of ran away from there on the scooter towards
Ellis Bridge .........
B After running away from there: we passed via Ashram, !TO
~-
Crossing, Wise Crossing, Subhash Bridge, Under Bridge,
Girdhar Nagar Bridge, Dariapur and reached Kakoriwala
Ki Pole to meet Rasool Khan. Rasool Khan and Gula!
were sitting in the Press at that time. After reaching there,
c Sajid parked his scooter outside the Press and thereafter
went inside the Press and told Rasool that the work has
been executed ...... "

The relevant portions of the statement of appellant No.A-
D 6, Sajidali, are extracted below:-

"I was coming to Baluchawad frequently. I was going to
....'
Carom Club L1ere. Ejaj Ahmad, Abdul Rehman etc. I saw
Abdul Latif many times when I came to Baluchawad. He
was doing illegal business of illicit liquor. He is living in
E Mahalia Mand. This gang is called Company. I know
several members of this company who are also resident
of this locality, namely, Sharif Khan, Rasool Khan Party, his
brother Hamid, Abdul Khurdus Baba, Musharaf Gorey
Khan Pathan, Farrukh Baba, Iqbal, Laliya Dhobi, Amin
F Chauteli etc.....

....... While I was living in Baluchawad, I came in contact
with Rasool Khan. Rasool Khan is an accomplice of Latif
and Sharif Khan and he is engaged in illegal businesses.
G He has a house in Kankori Wala Ki Pole and Gula! is also
living in this Pole and he is the key man of Rasool Khan. ,___
Another key man is Azam Khan who is living in Mujahid
Ki Pole, which is at a small distance from my house ..........

•J
Rauf Valiullah was murdered on Friday the 9th October,
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 213
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

1992 and about 7-8 days prior to this murder, when I was A
sitting in my house for taking meals, then Gulal came to
my house in the afternoon and said that Rasool Khan has
called me. He had come on his Scooter No. 515 ....... I met
Rasool in Kankora Wala Ki Pole. Azam Khan was there
from before. Rasool said to me that one bogus person has B
-i-
to be killed and Azam knows that man. I should go with
Azam on my scooter and keep a watch on that man and
as soon as I get a chance, I should kill him by stabbing
with knife. He also told me that if I could not execute the
work, I should come back, because he has already c
explained Azam to execute the work. He also told me that
he will bear all the expenses of scooter and goods. Both
of us were told to keep a watch on that man from next day.

>
On the next day at about 9.30-10.00 a.m., I took my scooter D
),. and went to the house of Azam in Mujahid Ki Pole. Mujahid
is living on the upper floor of house. After some time, Azam
came prepared and gave me a steel knives made of
Japan. This knife was covered. He kept on knife with him.
Both of us concealed our knives in the pants below our E
shirts. Thereafter we came out of Mujahid Ki Pole and went
to Peer Mohammad Shah Dargah Trust on Relief Road. I
was driving the scooter. Azam told me that he has been
keeping a watch on this person since many days and the
said person was coming trust. Azam went inside to search F
for that man and after some time r,ame out of the Trust.
He told me that the person for whom we are searching, is
not there .........

On the next day, I along with Azam again went out on my
G
__, scooter for keeping a watch. Azam again gave the knife
to me. First of all we went to the Trust where Azam went
inside and thereafter we went to Congress Bhawan and
when we found that the car is not there also, we went
behind Gujarat College and saw that Fiat car was standing
H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R

A inside the Compound of the house ....... We kept watch upto
4.00 p.m. and thereafter came back and again Azam Khan
gave a report of our watch to Rasool Khan. Similarly on
third day also,! and Azam first went to Trust and thereafter
Congress Bhawan and thereafter behind Gujarat College
B and again took tea there. We again saw that the car was
standing there upto afternoon. Thereafter both of us came
back for eatin'g our meals. I dropped Azam at the Pole of -j•
Mujahid and thereafter went to my house for taking my
meals. ·······'······ After. some time Azam came there
c hurriedly and told me that the said person has come to the
Karora Ki Pole. After saying so, he went inside the Kankori
Wala Ki Pole near Rasool Khan. After some time, Rasool
Khan signaled me and called me inside. By that time Gulal
had also brought Amin Chauteli there. Rasool asked me,
Azam and Chotel to immediately go to the Karora Ki Pole
D
and also said that he himself is also reaching there. He
had told us that as soon as the said person comes out of
the house, he ,should .be stabbed with knives. Thereafter
.•
all three of us.went to.Karora Ki Pole on the scooter and
after parking the .Scooter outside Karora Ki Pole, we went
E
inside the Pole and distanced ourselves from each other.
Rasool Khan too had reached the Pole and went to the
Mujahid Pole from there. We had reached there at about
4 p.m. and after keeping a watch for long time, we saw
that three persons, one of whom had a beard, two ladies
.F
and 1-2 children came out of the house. Azam asked me
to move and thereafter all three of us went to Rasool in
Mujahid Ki Pole and told him that the work cannot be
executed here because entire family had come out of the
house ........ When we were talking with each other, I saw
G the fiat car going towards Kalupur Tower. One driver was
driving the car and the said person was sitting on the back
seat. On that day I came to know that we have to murder f- -

of Rauf Valiullah ......... We continued to chase the car and
reached Lal Darwaja via Relief Road. There was a huge
H traffic jam there because of a procession of Hindus.
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 215
ANR. v. C.BJ THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

Therefore, we could not cross Ellis bridge and therefore A
took Nehru Bridge route and reached the house of Rauf
Valiullah. At that time the car of RaufValiullah was entering
inside the compound and therefore we could not do
anything ........
B
On the next day i.e. on 9.10.1992 it was Friday. Like before,
-;- after 10 a.m. we again went out on Scooter No. 9655 for
keeping a watch. First of all we went to Trust and Azam
went inside the Trust. One can easily the office of Trust if
he enters the Trust. After some time Azam came back and
asked me to move to Congress Bhawan. When we
c
reached Congress Bhawan, we did not find the car of Rauf
Valiullah there and. then we went to tea vendor outside
house of Rauf Valiullah and took tea and read newspaper
there .......... When we were passing in front of his house,
we saw one blue colour Maruti car standing outside the D
' house. Azam said - perhaps Rauf Valiullah has come out
)..
of the house . ........ After some time i.e. at about 11-11.30
we saw the same blue colour maruti car coming out of the
house of Rauf Valiullah. A bearded person was driving the
car and Rauf Valiullah was sitting on the side of the driver E
in the front seat. Azam asked me to chase the car. I
immediately started my scooter and chased the car. The
car after taking under bridge route, stopped in the parking
on the road outside one 7-8 storey building. I took my
scooter on one side and parked it there. We saw that the F
bearded man was wearing shirt pant whereas Rauf
Valiullah was wearing a white kurta-pyjama and he was
holding a packet in his hand ......

After about 30-45 minutes one Mohd. Fighter came to us G
on a motor cycle ......... Azam had told me his name. Mohd.
Fighter had come on a black colour Bullet motor cycle.
-~
....... After Mohd. Fighter reached there, Azam took his
motor cycle and left Fighter there and went towards Gujarat
College. Fighter was wearing pant shirt and white colour
H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2008] 16 S.C.R.

J-
A sports shoes on that day .......... Fighter sat with me on the
scooter after Azam left us. I had told him that the person
who is to be eliminated has gone inside the building and
he is wearing a white kurta-pyjama and one bearded
person is also with him and both of them had come here
B in blue colour Maruti car. ........

While we were sitting on our scooter, then we saw Rauf -1-
Valiullah and the bearded man coming out of the building
at about 2-2.30 p.m. I do not remember now whether Rauf
Valiullah was holding any packet in his hands or not.
c Immediately after Rauf Valiullah came out, I showed him
to Mohd. Fighter. The bearded man opened the gate of
the car and sat inside whereas Rauf Valiullah Sahib was
going towards the side gate of the car from the right side
and when he had just reached the gate of the car, Mohd.
D Fighter too crossed the road and reached very near to him
•
and immediately I also started my scooter and took my -4.
scooter behind the car and kept my scooter in starting
position. Suddenly I saw Rauf Valiullah putting something
in his mouth. Immediately thereafter Mohd. Fighter fired
E three shots in the head of Rauf Valiullah from a very close
range. These shots were fired quickly one after the other.
Thereafter Fighter immediately sat on my scooter and we
ran towards Ellis Bridge. I did not see bearded man
coming out of the car. I was driving scooter very fast and
therefore I could not hear the noises behind me ........ -\-
F
I parked my scooter outside the Press of Gulal Bhai. Gula I
and Rasool Party were inside the press at that time. Mohd.
Fighter and myself went inside the Press and informed
Rasool that the work has been done. Rasool became very
G
happy and he shook his hands with me and fighter. Rasool
took back ttie revolver from fighter and also took my ~---

scooter and said that now he will keep the same with him
because scooter should not be driven now. After some
time Amin Chauteli and Lalia Dhobi also reached there.
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 217
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

Amin Chotel told Rasool Khan that murder was committed A
within the time when he had gone to cover the number plan
and came back after covering the number plate. After
some time Azam too came there on Scooter No. 515.
Azam immediately on coming said that Rauf Valiullah has
been eliminated i.e. killed. Police has already reached B
there and also said that the police has seen his scooter.
Upon this Rasool asked Gulal to immediately remove away
the scooter from there ......... "

~ 1. Appellant No.A-10 was produced before Shri
Harbhajan Ram on 24.7.1996. In reply to the first question put C
to him, appellant No.A-10 gave out that he was arrested by
ATS from Dani Limra, Ahmedabad on 13.6.1996 and on that
very day he was taken into custody by CBI. In reply to another
question, appellant No.A-10 stated that he was aware of the
fact that he was not bound to give statement and that he was D
voluntarily making confession after having thought about it.
Thereafter, Shri Harbhajan Ram recorded satisfaction about the
voluntary character of the statement made by appellant No.A-
10 expressing his desire to confess his role in the crime.
Appellant No.A-10 was again produced before Shri Harbhajan E
Ram on 25. 7.1996. He reiterated his wish to voluntarily make
the statement. At that stage, Shri Harbhajan Ram recorded note
as per the requirement of Rule 15 of the Rules. Thereafter,
Appellant No.A-10 made statement disclosing his
acquaintance with Abdul Latif and his gang, Rasool Khan @ F
Rasool Party, Mohammad Farukh (appellant No.A-4), Mohmed
Umar @ Mohammad Pahelwan @ Mohammad Fighter
(appellant No.A-5), Sajidali @ Danny (appellant No.A-6),
Mohmed Amin @ Amin Choteli (appellant No.A-7), Iqbal
Hussain@ Lalia Dhobi (appellant No.A-8) and Gulam Mohmed G
@ Gulal (appellant No.A-11), who were members of Rasool
Party gang and were accomplices of Abdul Latif in the business
of illicit liquor. He further stated that about 7-8 days prior to the
killing of Rauf Valiullah, Rasool Party called him and told about
• the decision to eliminate Rauf Valiullah because he was H
21,8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A creating hurdles in the affairs of the company. According to
appellant No.A-10, Rasool Party asked him and Sajidali to
keep strict watch on RaufValiullah and kill him with knives.
Rasool Party also gave scooter belonging to Sajidali for the
purpose of keeping watch on Rauf Valiullah. Appellant No.A-
B 10 also gave details of how he, Sajidali {appellant No.A-6) and
Amin Choteli (appellant No.A-7) tracked the movements of Rauf .
Valiullah but failed to kill him due to the intervening factors. As
regards the incident of 9.10.1992 and his subsequent arrest,
appellant No.A-10 made the following statement:
c · "....... On 9.10.1992, i.e: the day on which Raufwaliullah was
murdered, myself and Sajid Ali were keeping a watch on
Raufwaliullah from the' morning itself on our scooter no.GJ-
IM~9655. We saw a blue coloured Maruti car standing
outside the house of Raufwaliullah behind Gujarat College.
When Raufwaliullah came out of his house along with his
driver Pradip Dave and left in said blue colour Maruti car
No.GCB-4591, we chased him on our scooter and
reached in frontof Madhuban Building. When Raufwaliullah
. and Pradip Dave went inside Madhuban Building, I
E immediately went to a PCO situated at a distance from
Madhuban Building and informed Rasool Khan alias
Rasool Party on telephone. Rasool Party told me that he
is sending his man for murdering Raufwaliullah. I can
accompany and identify the said PCO from where I had
F telephoned Rasool Party.

When myself and Sajid Ali alias Danny were watching
outside Madhuban Building, then Mohd. Umar alias Mohd.
Fighter came there on a black colour bullet motor cycle
No.GAC-6005 and gave me his motor cycle and asked me
G
to take the motor cycle to Rasool party. I took the Motor
Cycle and went to the den of Rasool Party at Baluchawad
and handed over the said Motor Cycle to Rasool Party.
Rasool Party gave me his Scooter No.515 and asked me
to go back again to Madhuban Building. I took the scooter.
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 219
ANR. v. C.B.L THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
But instead of going to Madhuban Building, I went to my A
house. After taking my meal, when I left my house, I found
that there was rampant fear and panic amongst general
public and everyone was discussing murder of
Raufwaliullah. I immediately went to the den of Rasool Party
on the aforesaid scooter. Sajid Ali alias Danny, Mohd. B
Umar alias Mohd. Fighter, Amin Choteli, Gulal and Lalio
·Dhobi were also present there. I told Rasool Party that
Raufwaliullah has been eliminated i.e. killed and handed
over the scooter to Rasool Party. Rasool Party asked me
to go home and instructed me not to discuss/talk with c
anyone about murder of Raufwaliullah ........ .

In June, 1993, after arrest of Mohd. Fighter by the Police,
I went to Bombay for some days to avoid my arrest and in
Bombay I stayed in Gujarat Momin Guest House near
Central Arbi Hotel. After the pressure of Police and CBI D
,. subsided, I came back to Ahmedabad and mostly lived in
...._ the Masjid of my locality and lmambara of Babaji.

On 13.7.1996, when I was in Dani Limra, Ahmedabad,
ATS of Gujarat Police came there and arrested· me ........." E

42. From what has been noticed above, it is crystal clear
that before recording confessions of appellant Nos.A-4 to A-8
and A~10, the two officers viz. Shri A.K. Majumdar and Shri
Harbhajan Ram explained to each of them separately that he
is not bound to make confession and that if he does so, the F
same may be used as evidence against him. The concerned
officers also recorded their satisfaction that the appellants were
making confessions voluntarily and that no threat or allurement
was given to any of them and nobody had coerced them to
make confession. Each of the six appellants was given time to G
think on the issue of making confession and having felt
convinced that they were doing so out of their volition, the
officers recorded their statements. The confessions of six
appellants were typed by the stenographer on Hindi typewriter.
The same were read over to the accused who admitted that H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A the recording contains full and true account of his statement and
then signed it. The officers also recorded their observations
about voluntary character of the confessions and then singed
the same. The statements of the six appellants were
immediately sent to Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi for
B onward transmission to the Designated Court at Ahmedabad.
All this shows that there was total compliance of Section 15 of
the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules.

43. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants
C that the trial Court comn:iitted grave. error in relying upon the
confessions of appellant Nos.A-4 to A-8 and A-1 O for the
purpose of their conviction under Section 302 and 1208 IPC
read with Section 1208 IPC ignoring that at the relevant time
they were in the custody of the Investigating Officer and did not
have access to legal assistance and also because the
D confessions were recorded by the officers who were actively
supervising investigation of the case and were in a position to
influence the appellants, lacks merit and deserves to be
rejected. The prosecution evidence shows that the confessing
appellants were brought to Delhi pursuant to transit warrant
E granted by the competent court at Ahmedabad. Therefore, the
Investigating Officers were bound to keep their custody till the
end of the period specified in the transit warrant and they could
not have transferred the· custody of the accused to any other
person. It was during the period of their custody with the
F Investigating Officers that appellant Nos.A-4 to A-8 and Ac 10
and some other accused, with whose cases we are not
concerned, expressed desire to confess their role in the
commission of crime. Accordingly, they were produced before
two Superintendents of Police, CBI and their confessions were
G recorded in accordance with the provisions of Section 15 of
the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules. At the cost of repetition, it
deserves to be mentioned that before recording confession,
each of the appellants was told by the concerned officers that
he is not bound to make confession and that if he does so, it
H may be used as evidence against him. The concerned officers
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 221
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
~

also recorded their satisfaction in writing that the accused was A
making confession voluntarily. The statements of the confessing
appellants were recorded in a room where no one except the
concerned Superintendents of Police, CBI and stenographer&
were present. After completion of recording, statement made
by the individual accused was read over to him and he B
appended the signatures after finding that the recording was
,. ~

correct. Thereafter, the concerned .officers again noted that the
confessions have been made voluntarily, appended their
signatures and sent confessional statements to the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi for being forwarded to the c
Designated Court at Ahmedabad. Appellant Nos.A-4 to A-B
were not produced before Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
because their confessions were recorded before the judgment
of Kartar Singh's case but appellant No.A-10 was so produced
on 25.7.1996 as per the guidelines laid down in Kartar Singh's
>
D
case. It is thus evident that there was total compliance of the
}-
mandate of law in recording the confessions of six appellants.

44. The question whether confession made by a person
under Section 15 of the Act should be rejected only on the
ground that at the relevant time he was in police custody, was E
considered an answer in negative in Gurdeep Singh's case,
Lal Singh's case and S.N. Dube's case. In Gurdeep Singh's
case, it was argued that the confession of the accused should
be discarded because he was handcuffed andwhile recording
the confession, another policeman was present in the room at F
some distance holding the chain of the handcuff and that armed
guards were outside the room where confession was recorded.
While rejecting this plea, the Court held:-

"Keeping an accused under police custody in what manner
~~
with what precautions is a matter for the police G
administration to decide. It is for them to decide what
essential measures are to be taken in a given case for the
purpose of security. What security, in which manner are a11 ·
in the realm of administrative exigencies and would.
H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.
I
;.·

A depend on the class of accused, his antecedents and
other information etc. The security is also necessary for the
police personnel keeping him in custody or other personnel
of the· police administration including the public at large.
Thus what measure has to be taken is for the police
B administration to decide and if they feel greater security _...
is required in a case of trial under the TADA Act, it is for
them to decide accordingly. The Preamble of the TADA
Act itself reveals that this Act makes special. provisions for
the prevention of and for coping with terrorists and
c disruptive activities. In fact the earlier TADA Act of 1985
was repealed to bring in the present Act to strengthen the
prosecution to bring to book those involved under it without
their filtering out, by bringing in more stringent measures
under it. In this background, we do not find the handcuffing
D of the appellant or another policeman being present in the •
room with the chain of his handcuffs or armed guards ....
present outside the room to be such as to constitute (sic
conclude) that the appellant's confessional statement was
not made voluntarily."
E In Lal Singh's case the Court held:

"In view of the settled legal position, it is not possible to
accept the contention of learned Senior Counsel Mr. Sushi!
Kumar that as the i.!Ccused were in police custody, the
F confessional statements are either inadmissible in
evidence or are not reliable. Custodial interrogation in such
cases is permissible under the law to meet grave situation
arisen out of terrorism unleased by terrorist activities by
persons residing within or outside the country."
G In S.N. Oube's case, the Court observed: Jo~.

"In this case there is nothing on record to show, except that
the confessions were recorded by Shinde in the police
station, that they were not recorded in a free atmosphere.
H No other person was allowed to remain present at that time
-i

MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 223
ANR. v. C.8.1. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
and all the accused were given time to reconsider their A
willingness. After they were produced again Shinde had
ascertained whether they were still willing to make
· confessions. All the accused were previously told that they
were not bound to make a confession. Each one of them
was warned that if he made a confession then it could be B ·
used against him ........ Shinde had tried to ascertain if any
threat or inducement was given to them or whether they
were ill-treated or press'urised. All the accused had ·
categorically stated that no such thing had happened. From
i the answers given by the accused it can be said that c
Shinde had good reason to believe that the accused were
making confessional statements voluntarily ........ lt was not
even the case of the accused that they were not taken to
Shinde for recording their confessions. The only suggestion
that was made in his cross-examination was that he had
0
obtained those confessions after exerting influence,
coercion and physical and mental torture. We have already
pointed out earlier that in the absence of any specific act
suggested by the defence it is not possible to accept the
belated allegation made by those accused that their
·confessions were obtained in that manner. ....... " E

45. In view of the above stated legal position, no fault can
be found in the recording of confessions of appellant Nos.A-4
+ to A-8 and A-10 while they were in the custody of the
Investigating Officer. F

46. The question whether confessions of the. appellant
Nos.A-4 to A-8 and A-10 should be treated as non-voluntary
and held inadmissible on the ground that the same were made
before the officers who were supervising the investigation G
.~ _. deserves to be considered in the backdrop of the following
facts:-

(i) Each of the confessing appellants had volunteered to
confess his role in the crime.
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A (ii) Their confessions were recorded strictly in accordance
with the manner and procedure prescribed in Section 15
of the Act and Rule 15 of the Rules.

(iii) In reply to the questions put by Shri A.K. Majumdar
and Shri Harbhajan Ram, each of the confessing appellants
B
replied that he was aware of the fact that he was under no
-{-
compulsion to make confession and that the same can be
used against him and that there was no threat, coercion
or allurement for making confession.
c (iv) When appellant No.A-10 was produced before Chief •
.~
Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi on 25.7.1996, he did state /"
that he has not made any confessional statement but did
not utter a word about any threat, coercion, inducement or
allurement by Shri Harbhajan Ram (PW-103) for making
D confession. '·

(v) At the end of period specified in transit warrants, all the ...\

confessing appellants were produced before the ~

concerned Magistrate at Ahmedabad with an application
for their remand to judicial custody. None of them made
E
any grievance of ill treatment, torture (physical or mental),
inducement or allurement by the Investigating Officers or
supervising officers or claimed that he had made
confession under any other type of compulsion. Even when
they were in judicial custody, none of the appellants made
F a grievance that he was tortured, threatened or coerced
+
by the Investigating Officers or supervising officers or that
any allurement was given to him to make confession.

(vi) All the confessing appellants were facing trial in number
of other cases [this is evident from the statement of PW-
G
100, Mr. Satyakant, the then Deputy Inspector General of
Police, CID, Crime (Exh.430)] in which they were duly
. -

represented by advocates but till the recording of the
statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., neither they nor
their advocates made a grievance regarding denial of
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 225
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J]

legal assistance or alleged that any threat was given to A
either of them or they were subjected to physical or mental
torture or that undue influence was exercised by the
Investigating Officers or the supervising officers or any
allurement was given for the purpose of making
confession. B
-~
47. Both the Investigating Officers, namely, Shri R.K. Saini
(PW-122) and Shri O.P. Chatwal (PW-123) were subjected to
lengthy cross-examination. Shri R.K. Saini denied the
suggestion that appellant No.A-10, Salimkhan was never willing
to give any confessional statement and his statement was not
c
recorded. He also denied the suggestion that appellant No.A-
10 had complained to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate that
he was ill-treated by the officers while in custody. In his cross-
examination, Shri O.P. Cha!Vi(al (PW-123) categorically denied
, the suggestion that Shri A.K. Majumdar had instructed him to D
>- ill-treat the accused. He further stated that none of the accused
was ill-treated mentally or physically by the CBI. Shri Chatwal
also denied the suggestion that the confessional statements of
the accused were prepared by him and their signatures were
obtained on the same. In reply to another question, he denied E
that the accused had sought for the presence of advocate but
the same was declined.

48. In their statements, PW-103, Shri Harbhajan Ram and
+ PW-104, Shri A.K. Majumdar explained the details of the mode F
and manner in which confessions of the accused were
recorded. Both of them categorically stated that before
recording confession each of the accused was told that he is
not bound to make confession and that the same can be used
against him and whether there was any threat, coercion or
G
_, allurement for making confession. According to the two
witnesses, each of the accused expressed unequivocal
willingness to confess his role in the crime by stating that he
knew that the confession can be used against him, that there
was no threat, coercion or allurement and that he was making
H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A confession voluntarily. According to PWs 103 and 104, the
statements of the accused were recorded by the stenographers
at verbatim and each one of them appended signatures after
satisfying that the same was correctly recorded. In reply to the
suggestion made to him in cross-examination that the accused
B had been subjected to torture, PW-104 categorically stated that
none of the accused was ill-treated by him or any other officer/ ~·
official. The defense had made suggestion about the nature and
extent of supervision exercised by PW 104 but it was not put
to them that either instructed the Investigating Officers to torture
c the accused and forced them to confess their guilt. In this view
of the matter, the confessions of appellant Nos.A-4 to A-8 and
A-10 cannot be held inadmissible on the premise that before
recording of confessions they were in police custody and the
statements were recorded by the officers supervising the
investigation.
0
49. Likewise, there is no substance in the argument of the
learned counsel that the confessions of the appellant Nos.A-4
to A-8 and A-10 should be discarded because the same had
been retracted on the first available opportunity. As mentioned
E above, the only statement made by appellant No.A-10 before
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi on 25.7.1996 was that he
had not made any confession. However, he did not contest his
signatures on the confessional statement made before PW-
103, Shri Harbhajan Ram. When the appellants were produced
F before the concerned Magistrate at Ahmedabad, none of them
gave out that he had not made confessional statement or that
his signatures had been obtained on the blank paper or that
he was made to sign on the prepared statement or that he had
been subjected to torture, or any threat or allurement was given
G to him to make confession. While they were in jail, none of the
confessing appellants made any application to the Court that
he wants to retract the confession.
50. In the bail application dated 21.10.1994 (in paragraph
'L'), filed on behalf of appellant Nos.A-4, A-7, A-8 and Abdul
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 227
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
"" Khurdus Abdul Ganikhan Shaikh, under Sections 437 and 439
'.
A
Cr.P.C. read with Section 20(8) of the Act, it was averred that
the only evidence against them is in the nature of confessional·
statements which are not admissible because the procedure
prescribed for recording of the confessional statement has not
been followed. For the first time an indication of so called torture B
~- was made in.the application dated 23.11.1994 (paragraph 11)
filed. under Section 18 of the Act on behalf of appellant No.A-
5. Therein, it was stated that the confession was recorded
falsely and forcefully to involve the accused in the case. with the
malafide intention. A somewhat similar statement was made c
in paragraph (vi) of the Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1582
of 1995 filed on behalf of appellant Nos.A-4, A-7 and A-8 for
grant of bail. In that paragraph it was averred that the
petitioners were subjected to third degree measures and made
to sign statements which were written at the dictates of the
~
D
police officers. In the discharge application dated 23.8.1996,
J-
filed on behalf of appellant No.A-5, it was averred that his
confession was recorded at Delhi under threats and great
mental and physical torture and the same is not voluntary in
nature and that the confession recorded under the provisions
of the Act cannot be used against him. In the statements made E
by them under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellants made
contradictory statements. Some of them made mention of the
alleged physical and mental torture as also of threats held out
+ by different officers compelling them to make confession. In F
reply to question no.169 put to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,
appellant No.A-7 stated that he was subjected to torture and
was compelled to sign on blank papers. A similar statement
was made by appellant No.A-8 in reply to question no.170. This
is clearly contradicted by statement contained in para (vi) of
SLP (Crl.) No.1582 of 1995, wherein it was stated that the G
·- ~ appellants were made to sign on the statements recorded under •·"·''
·the dictates of the police officer.

51. If the confessions of the appellants are scrutinized in
the light of the above enumerated factors, it becomes clear that H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R

A the allegations made by them regarding coercion, threat, torture,
etc. after more than one year of recording of confessions are
after thought and products of ingenuity oftheir advocates. The
statements made by them under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were also
the result of after thought because no tangible reason has been
B put forward by the defense as to why the appellant Nos.A-4 to
A-8 did not retract from their confessions. when they were
produced before the Magistrate at Ahmedabad and thereafter
despite the fact that they had access to legal assistance in
more than one way. Therefore, we hold that the trial Court did
c not commit any error by relying upon the confessions of
appellant Nos.A-4 to A-8 and A-10 and we do not find any valid
ground to discard the confessions of appellant Nos.A-4 to A-8
and A-10.

52. The stage is now set for considering whether the
D prosecution succeeded in establishing the charge under
Section 302 read with Section 1208 IPC. However, before
adverting to the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we
consider it proper to notice the definition of criminal conspiracy
and its interpretation by the Court. Section 120A IPC, which
E defines criminal conspiracy, reads as under:-

"When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be
done, (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by
illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal
conspiracy provided that no agreement except an
F
agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy .unless some act besides the agreement is
done by one or more parties to such agreement in
pursuance thereof. It is immaterial whether the illegal act
is the ultimate object of such agreement or is merely
G incidental to that object." .~ -.
53. In Yash Pal Mittal vs. State of Punjab [1977 (4) SCC
540], this Court interpreted the term conspiracy and held:-

H "The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 229
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators A
must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as
long as they are co-participators in the main object of the
conspiracy. There may be so many devices and
techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the
conspiracy and there may be division of performances in B
the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end
of which every collaborator must be aware and in which
each one of them must be interested. There must be unity
of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means
sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the c
conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may
be CQmmitted by some of the conspirators even unknown
to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means
adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to
be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even
D
~
though there may be sometimes mis-fire or over-shooting
)- by some of the conspirators. Even ·if some steps are
resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the
knowledge of the others it will not affect the culpability of
those others when they are associated With the object of
the conspiracy." E

54. In Nalini's case the Court analyzed various decisions
on the subject and held:-

+ "In reaching the stage of meeting of minds, two or more
F
persons share information about doing an illegal act or a
legal act by illegal means. This is the first stage where
ea~h is said to have knowledge of a plan for committing
an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Among those
sharing the information some or all may form an intention
to do an illegal act or a legal act byillegal means. Those G
-- ~ who do form the requisite intention would be parties to the
agreement and would be conspirators but those who drop
out, cannot be roped in as collaborators on the basis of
mere knowledge unless they commit acts or omissions
H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A from which a guilty common intention can be inferred. It is
not necessary that all the conspirators should participate
from theinception to the end of the conspiracy; some may
join the conspiracy after the time when such intention was
first entertained ;by any one of them and some others
B may quit from the conspiracy. All of them cannot but be
treated as conspirators. Where in pursuance of the
agreement the conspirators commit offences individually
or adopt illegal means to do a legal act which has a
nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be liable
c for such offences even if some of them have ndt actively
participated in .the commission of those offence ..... "··
. Sections 120-A. and 120-8 make conspiracy a
substantive. offence and render the mere agreement to
commit an offence punishable. Even if an overt act does
not take place pursuant to the illegal agreement, the
D
offence of conspiracy would still attracted. The parties to •
such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy,
though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been
done. The unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment
is the essence of the crime of conspiracy. The gist of the
E offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or
effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed,
not in attempting to do it, nor in inciting before others to
do it, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement
between the parties ......... "·
F
55. The principles which can be deduced from the above
noted judgments are that for proving a charge of conspiracy, it
is not necessary that all the conspirators know each and every
details of the conspiracy so long as they are co-participators
G in the main object of conspiracy. It is also not necessary that
all the conspirators should participate from the inception of
conspiracy to its end. If there is unity of object or purpose, all
participating at different stages of the crime will be guilty of
conspiracy.
H
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 231
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
56. In the present case the prosecution led evidence to A
show that the public was outraged against the police because
it failed to arrest Abdul Latif and his gang members, who were
perceived as culprits responsible for committing murder of nine
persons in Radhika Gymkhana on 3.8.1992 and in this
backdrop, Abdul Latif planned surrender of some unimportant B
members of his gang and for this purpose he took help of the
~-1-
local political leader, Hassankhan Shamsherkhan Pathan @
Hassanlala. Their move was opposed by Rauf Valiullah, a
fomier member of Rajya Sabha and General Secretary of
Gujarat Pradesh Congress (I) Committee. Therefore, Abdul c
Latif and gang decided to eliminate him and create terror in
the mind of the public. A meeting for this purpose was organized
by Abdul Latif and the task of killing Rauf Valiullah was assigned
to Rasool Khan @ Rasool Party. In their confessions, Abdul
KhurdushAbdul Ganikhan Shaikh, appellant Nos.A-4, A-7 and
D
~ A·8 have given details of the activities of Abdul Latif and gang,
)._ Rasool Party and his associates, their nexus in the supply of
illicit liquor, the meeting organized by Abdul Latif which was
attended by members of the company, Rasool Party and
associates and the decision taken in that meeting to eliminate
Rauf Valiullah, who was considered as an impediment in the E
surrender of .unimportant members of Abdul Latif gang in
connection with Radhika Gymkhana murder case. In his
statement, PW-28, Pradeep @ Nautamal Dave has spoken
about the papers prepared by Rauf Valiullah regarding political
+ situation of the State of Gujarat and his decision to go to Delhi F
to submit the same to the high command. In his confession,
appellant No.A-4 disclosed how he joined illegal business of
liquor of Abdul Latif, whose gang was known as company. He
then stated that Abdul Latif and gang purchased a new scooter
bearing No.GJ-1C-2797 for him in 1989, colour of which was, G
·-1 later on, changed. He has also spoken about the meeting held
at the residence of Abdul Latif, the decision taken to eliminate
Rauf Valiullah and assigning of the task to Rasool Party. In his
statement before PW 104, appellant No.A-7 narrated the
background in which he joined the business of spurious liquor H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A and how he came in contact with Abdul Latif gang and Rasool
Party and his associates which included appellant Nos.A-5, A-
6 and A-11 and also about the hide-out of Rasool party at
Baluchawad. He then slated that Rasool party called him
through appellant No.A-11 and instructed him to remain with
B appellant Nos.A-6 and A-10 who were instructed to follow Rauf
Valiullah and kill him with knives. Appellant No.A-7 disclosed
how he along with appellant Nos.A-6 and A-10 followed Rauf
Valiullah at various places including Kalupur and Lal Darwaza
and why the latter failed to attack Rauf Valiullah at the two
c places. He then disclosed that on 9.10.1992, Rasool Party
asked him to go on scooter with appellant No.A-8 to Madhuban
building with an indication that appellant Nos.A-5 and A-6 have
been sent to kill Rauf Valiullah and also that appellant No.A-8
was given revolver with instructions to shoot Rauf Valiullah, in
case appellant No.A-5 was unsuccessful. In their confessions,
0
appellant Nos.A-6 and •A-10 have given an account of
instructions given by Rasool Party to keep a watch over the
movements of RaufValiullah, efforts made by them to kill Rauf
Valiullah and annoyance of Rasool Party due to their failure to
achieve the task. Appellant Nos.A-6 and A-10 have also given
E details of how they followed RaufValiullah and PW 28, Pradeep
Bhai upto Madhuban building and how appellant No.A-10
intimated Rasool Party that Rauf Valiullah is in Madhuban
building. Appellant No.A-8 confessed his acquaintance with
Rasool Party. He stated that on 9.10.1992, Rasool Party called
F him through appellant No.A-7, who came on scooter No.GJ-1C-
2797 belonging to appellant No.A-4. He also spoke about
handing over of loaded revolver by Rasool Party with
instructions to kill Rauf Valiullah in case of failure of appellant
No.A-5. Appellant No.A-5: gave an account of the incidents in
G which Rasool Party obliged him and why he agreed to work for
the latter. He then stated· that at the asking of Rasool Party,
appellant No.A-11, Gulam Mohmed @ Gulal Kadarbhai Shaikh
gave him revolver from which he has learned that he has to kill
someone. He further stated that as per the instructions, he went
H Madhuban building on his own motorcycle which was handed
MOHMED AMIN@AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 233
ANR. v. C.B.I. THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

over to appellant No.A-10 and then he sat on the scooter which A
was with appellant No.A-6. He has also given minute details
of Rauf Valiullah coming out of Madhuban building along with
PW 28, his firing three shots at Rauf Valiullah in succession
and then escaping with appellant No.A-6 on his scooter.
Appellant Nos.A-4 to A-8 and A-10 have also given complete B
account of their going out of Ahmedabad, staying at different
places before return to Ahmedabad and arrest by the police. It
is thus clear that in their cl!lnfessions, appellant Nos.A-4 to A-
8 and A-1 O have not only disclosed their acquaintance with
Abdul Latif and gang and/or Rasool Party and his associates, c
but given the details of conspiracy hatched by Abdul Latif and
gang to eliminate Rauf Valiullah, assignment of this task to
Rasool Party, specific instructions given by Rasool Party to
them and their individual roles in keeping track on the
movement of Rauf Valiullah, pursuing him at different places with D
a view to kill him, as also the actual murder of Rauf Valiullah
on 9.10.1992. Each of the confessing appellant has candidly
acknowledged that he acted as per the instructions and
directions given by the Rasool Party for achieving the object
of killing Rauf Valiullah and how they get in collaboration with E
each other for accomplishment of the task. Although, appellant
No.A-11 has not made confessional statement, his role as a
collaborator of Rasool Party and his participation in the
conspiracy to kill Rauf Valiullah and as also his role in the actual
incident of killing Rauf Valiullah are proved from the confessions
of appellant Nos.A-5, A-6, A-7 and A-8 which, as mentioned F
above are candid and unambiguous. Therefore, keeping in view
the provisions of Section 15 of the Act as interpreted by this
Court in Gurprit Singh's case, Nalini's case, S.N. Dube's case,
Lal Singh's case, Devender Paul's case and Jameel Ahmad's
case, we hold that the appellants are guilty of offence under G
Section 302 read with Section 1208 IPC and no independent-,
corroboration is required for sustaining their conviction.

57. De-hors the above conclusion, we find that the.
prosecution has produced sufficient corroborative evidence and H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A. the trial Court did not·commit any error in relying upon the same
·· to support its conclusion that the appellants are guilty of offence
under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC and other
offences. PW 58, Bhagwan Oas Lalwani (proprietor of K.P.
Auto Consultant), PW 50, Prakash Bhagwan Das Lalwani, PW
B 53, Naresh Chauhan (R:fO Agent), PW 59, Raju Morandani
(employee of.the RTO agent, Naresh Chauhan), PW 44, Vijay
Kumar More (Motor Vehicle Inspector in RTO Office,
Ahmedabad) have given detailed account of the purchase of
Bajaj Scooter bearing No.GJ-1 C-2797 by Abdul Latif under
c fictitious name of Maksood Ahmed, its registration, which was
used by appellant No.A-7 and A-8 as back up party on the date
of incident. PW 72, Jayanti Hira Lal Panchal, Police Sub-
Inspector had .seized scooter No.GJ-1 C-2797 on 14.10.1992
of which possession was taken by the CBI on 23.3.1993. PIN
D 111, Mohd. Khan Pathan, who .is related to appellant No.A-7,
Amin Choteli, has given evidence regarding purchase of four
tickets from S.K. Travels for Amin Choteli and his companions
for going from Baroda to Bombay. PW 112, Sirajuddin
Ajimuddin Sheikh is the owner of S.K. Travels from whom PW
E 111 had purchased four' tickets on 10.11.1992, PW 100, S.K.
Sakia, the then Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID,
Gujarat State furnished details of 14 other cases registered
against appellant No.A-4, 3 cases against appellant No.A-5, 1
case against appellant No.A-6, 18 cases against appellant
No.Ac?, 3 cases against appellant No.A-8, 1 case against
F appellant No.A-10 and 3 cases against appellant No.A-11. PW
35, Rajni Kant Ganpat Patel, who was employed as peon in
Dairy Den India Private Ltd. having office at Madhuban building
has stated that on 9.10.1992 he had seen appellant No.A-5 who
fled after shooting Rauf Valiullah while the latter was about to
G sit in the car of PW 28. He has stated that appellant No.A-5,
Mohd. Fighter fled away from the spot on the scooter driven
by appellant No.A-6. He also identified appellant Nos.A-5 and
A-0 in the Test Identification Parade. PW 28, Pradeep Nautamal
Dave @ Baka Bhai is the complainant and the eye witness.
H He gave detailed account of his coming with Rauf Valiullah to
MOHMED AMIN @AMIN CHOTELI RAHIM MIYAN SHAIKH & 235
ANR. v. C.B.l.THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
the office of Dairy Den India Private Ltd. situated in Madhuban A
building, handing over of memorandum for the purpose of
typing and shooting of Rauf Valiullah while he was sitting on the
car. In the Test Identification Parade held on 19.8.1993, he
identified appellant No.A-6. PW 29, Raju Bhai Nayak, who was
working as a labour at construction site of Western Hotel B
--t opposite to Madhuban building stated that he saw firing of
bullets by a person who was earlier s.itting on the pillion of the
scooter and then fleeing away of two persons on the scooter.
He also saw that the person with bullet injuries fell down on the
ground and was taken to the hospital. PW 11, Parijat N. c
.Damania is the typist to whom Rauf Valiullah had given papers
for typing in the office of Dairy Den India Private Ltd. PW-49,
Govind Bhai Babu Bhai is the person who sold Bullet
Motorcycle No.GAC-6005 to appellant No.A-5 in 1991. He
identified appellantNo.A-5 in the Co\,ul. PW 55, Rajender Singh D
Prem Singh Chawla, PW 88, Rajesh Rajender Nath Mehta, PW
116, Susharta Dutta, General Secretary of Union Power Lifting
Federation have given evidence that appellant No.A-5 was not
a member of the power lifting team which visited Durgapur and
yet he came to the venue of championship on 14.10.1992.
Learned counsel for. the appellants could not point out any E
serious infirmity in the appreciation of the evidence of the afore-
mentioned witnesses by the trial Court.

58. In the result, we hold that the trial Court did not commit
any error in recording a finding that charges of conspiracy and F
murder are proved against the appellants. Consequently, the
appeals fail and are dismissed.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.