Holding

Interim bail may be granted for a limited period to a candidate to campaign, subject to conditions, despite serious charges and statutory restrictions.

Summary

Mohd. Tahir Hussain, an under‑trial accused in multiple FIRs including rioting and the murder of an IB official, has been in custody since March 2020 and sought interim bail to contest and campaign in the 2025 Delhi Assembly elections. The Delhi High Court allowed only a custodial parole for filing his nomination, prompting a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether a purpose‑based interim bail for electioneering is permissible, noting that the right to campaign is not a fundamental or statutory right and that granting such bail could open a flood‑gate of litigation. While Justice Pankaj Mithal held that interim bail for contesting elections should be denied, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, emphasizing the petitioner’s prolonged detention, lack of conviction and constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 21, granted a limited interim bail with strict conditions. The petition was therefore modified to allow the petitioner interim bail until 4 February 2025, subject to conditions, and the matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further consideration.

Issues considered

Whether a purpose‑based interim bail can be granted to a candidate to contest or canvass in an election
Whether the right to campaign or canvass is a fundamental or statutory right
Whether the seriousness of the charges and the statutory restrictions on bail preclude interim bail

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. Section 480(3)(b), s. Section 482(2)(ii)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 436-A
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 21
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. Section 62(5)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether a purpose based interim bail can be granted to contest the election or for canvassing as the petitioner himself is one of the candidates. Headnotes Interim Bail – To contest election or for canvassing/campaigning – FIRs against the petitioner and murder of an official of IB – Sought interim bail to participate and contest Delhi Assembly Elections, 2025 – Disallowed by the High Court – Challenge to: Held: [Per Pankaj Mithal, J.] Interim bail is not permissible for contesting elections, much less for campaigning

Subjects

Interim BailPurpose based interim bailInterim bail to contest electionInterim bail to canvass/campaignInterim bail to contest Delhi Assembly Elections, 2025Delhi riotsMurder of an official of Intelligence Bureau (IB)Right to campaign or canvassMultiple FIRsConstitutional RightTrial prolonged

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 911 : 2025 INSC 100

Mohd. Tahir Hussain
v.
State of NCT of Delhi
(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 856 of 2025)
22 January 2025
[Pankaj Mithal* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether a purpose based interim bail can be granted to contest
the election or for canvassing as the petitioner himself is one of
the candidates.

Headnotes
Interim Bail – To contest election or for canvassing/campaigning –
FIRs against the petitioner inter alia for rioting and murder of
an official of IB – Sought interim bail to participate and contest
Delhi Assembly Elections, 2025 – Disallowed by the High
Court – Challenge to:
Held: [Per Pankaj Mithal, J.] Interim bail is not permissible
for contesting elections, much less for campaigning – Right
to campaign or canvass is neither a fundamental right nor a
constitutional or a human right or even a statutory right – There
is no provision for interim bail under the law but lately it has
become an acceptable mode of grant of bail in certain special
contingencies – If interim bail is made permissible on the ground
of contesting elections, it will open a Pandora’s box – The
allegations made against the petitioner along with the chargesheet
in connection with the rioting and the murder of the official of
IB are serious – High Court rightly refused interim bail to the
petitioner – No case made out for any indulgence. [Paras 6, 7, 9, 12]
[Per Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.] Merely because a statute
imposes limitations on grant of bail, the same per se does not
oust the jurisdiction of a Constitutional Court to grant bail –
Though, the allegations and the evidence against the Petitioner
are grave and reprehensible but the magnitude and gravity of the
offence alleged are no grounds to deny bail, moreso when trial
is prolonged – Petitioner’s rights u/Articles 14 and 21 cannot be

* Author
912 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

lost sight of – He is in custody since March, 2020 – As on date,
no Court of Law has convicted the Petitioner – He has secured
bail in a majority of the cases – Considering these factors, in the
facts and circumstances specific of the case, Petitioner granted
interim bail for a limited period subject to conditions – Impugned
judgment modified to that extent – In view of difference of opinion,
matter to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.
[Paras 26, 27, 29]

Case Law Cited

In the Order of Pankaj Mithal, J.
Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement [2024] 7 SCR 2363 :
(2024) 9 SCC 577 – distinguished.
Anukul Chandra Pradhan, Advocate Supreme Court v. Union of India
and Ors. [1997] Supp. 1 SCR 641 : (1997) 6 SCC 1 – referred to.
Athar Pervez v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6662 – referred to.

In the judgment of Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
Union of India v. K A Najeeb [2021] 1 SCR 443 : (2021) 3 SCC
713; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [2024] 7
SCR 992 : (2024) 9 SCC 813 – relied on.
State of Haryana v. Dharamraj [2023] 11 SCR 705 : 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1085; Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote
[1980] 3 SCR 15 : (1980) 2 SCC 559; Vilas Pandurang Pawar v.
State of Maharashtra [2012] 8 SCR 270 : (2012) 8 SCC 795;
Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher [2024] 8 SCR 753 :
(2024) 10 SCC 753; Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2024]
2 SCR 134 : (2024) 5 SCC 403; Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [2024] 7 SCR 1054 : (2024) 8 SCC 293; Jalaluddin
Khan v. Union of India [2024] 8 SCR 633 : (2024) 10 SCC 574;
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau [2024] 7 SCR 97; Sanjay
Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2023] 4 SCR 939 : 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 610 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution
of India.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 913

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

List of Keywords
Interim Bail; Purpose based interim bail; Interim bail to contest
election; Interim bail to canvass/campaign; Interim bail to contest
Delhi Assembly Elections, 2025; Delhi riots; Murder of an official
of Intelligence Bureau (IB); Right to campaign or canvass; Multiple
FIRs; Constitutional Right; Trial prolonged.

Case Arising From
EXTRA ORDINARY JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No. 856 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.01.2025 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in BA No. 4819 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Adv., Rajiv Mohan, Ms. Tara Narula,
Ms. Sonal Sarda, Ms. Shivangi Sharma, Ms. Noyonika Deori,
Rishabh Bhati, Ms. A. Mitra, Karan Dhalla, Ms. Vismita Diwan,
Sujoy Chatterjee, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Suryaprakash V. Raju, ASG, Annam Venkatesh, Zoheb Hussain,
Rajat Nair, Hitarth Raja, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advs. for the
Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

Pankaj Mithal, J.

1. Heard Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner and Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing for the respondent-State.
2. The petitioner is in custody in connection with FIR No. 65 of 2020
dated 26.02.2020 registered at Police Station Dayalpur, District
North East, Delhi in connection with rioting and murder of one Ankit
Sharma, an official of the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home
Affairs, Government of India. Apart from the aforesaid case, several
other cases relating to riots in Delhi which took place in the month
of February, 2020 and one under PMLA are pending consideration
and the petitioner is allegedly involved in all of them.
914 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

3. The petitioner so far has not been successful in getting bail in
the above case and some other cases, so he applied to the High
Court for grant of interim bail from 14.01.2025 to 09.02.2025 simply
to participate and contest Delhi Assembly Election, 2025 from
Mustafabad Constituency, Delhi. It may be remembered that the
petitioner was earlier a councilor from the ticket of the Aam Aadmi
Party. However, subsequently he left the said party and was given
ticket to contest the Assembly Elections by the All India Majlis-
e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM). He took the ticket to contest the
Assembly Elections fully knowing that he is in jail in connection with
several cases in some of which he may have been granted bail but
continues to languish therein and so he has to participate in the
election remaining behind the bars.
4. The interim bail application moved by the petitioner was considered by
the High Court and was ultimately disallowed by the order impugned
dated 14.01.2025 but he was granted conditional custody parole for
subscribing oath and to complete formalities in respect of filing his
nomination papers to contest the Assembly Elections. In this way,
though the petitioner has no fundamental right to contest the elections
but his statutory right to that effect was duly protected.
5. The petitioner is not satisfied by the grant of custody parole for filing
his nomination enabling him to participate in the election and has
thus preferred this Special Leave Petition contending inter alia that
permitting filing of nomination is meaningless if he is not allowed to
campaign and canvass.
6. It is important to note here that right to campaign or canvass is
neither a fundamental right nor a constitutional or a human right.
It is not even a right recognized under any statute. However, the
petitioner is an Indian citizen and we are conscious that his rights
as a citizen are to be protected. Nonetheless, the involvement of
the petitioner in as many as eleven cases including the present one,
one pertaining to PMLA and nine in relation to Delhi riots of 2020,
dilutes and erodes his position as a law-abiding citizen.
7. The allegations against the petitioner in the present case are not only
in connection with the rioting but also of the murder of the official of
the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. The allegations
made against the petitioner, if considered cumulatively along with
the chargesheet which has been submitted on 02.06.2020 reveals
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 915

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

the seriousness of the charges levelled against the petitioner. The
allegations against the petitioner are also to the effect that his
house/office was being used as the epicenter for the commission
of the aforesaid offences in which murder of one Ankit Sharma is
a sequel. On the rooftop of petitioner’s house/building objects like
stones, bricks, petrol bombs, acid drums etc. were recovered which
were used during the riots, as per material on record. It has come
on record in the order impugned that many material witnesses,
especially in connection with the present FIR No. 65 of 2020 are
yet to be examined.
8. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances and keeping in mind the
submissions of Sh. Siddharth Aggarwal, learned senior counsel for
the petitioner, who has limited/confined his arguments to the grant of
interim bail only, as the regular bail remains pending for consideration
before the High Court, the limited issue before this Court is whether
a purpose based interim bail can be granted to contest the election
or for canvassing as the petitioner himself is one of the candidates.
9. There is no provision for interim bail under the law but lately it
has become an acceptable mode of grant of bail in certain special
contingencies.
10. In Arvind Kejriwal vs. Directorate of Enforcement1 this Court quoted
with approval from Athar Pervez2 case which reads as under:
“20. The expression “interim” bail is not defined in the
Code. It is an innovation by legal neologism which has
gained acceptance and recognition. The terms, “interim”
bail/”interim” suspension of sentence, have been used and
accepted as part of legal vocabulary and are well- known
expressions. The said terms are used in contradistinction
and to distinguish release on regular bail during pendency
of trial or appeal till final adjudication. Applications for
“interim” suspension or bail are primarily moved and
prayed for, when the accused or convict is not entitled
to or cannot be granted regular bail or suspension of
sentence, or the application for grant of regular bail is
pending consideration and is yet to be decided. “Interim”

1 (2024) 9 SCC 577
2 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6662
916 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

bail entailing temporary release can be granted under
compelling circumstances and grounds, even when regular
bail would not be justified. Intolerable grief and suffering
in the given facts, may justify temporary release, even
when regular bail is not warranted. Such situations are
not difficult to recount, though making a catalogue would
be an unnecessary exercise.”
11. The reasons and factors whereunder interim bail may be permitted
may include cases where there is death in the family of the accused
and the cremation has to take place; to attend the wedding of son/
daughter or of any close relative of the accused but such a right
has not been recognized on the plea of contesting or canvassing
for the election.
12. In the event interim bail is made permissible on the ground of
contesting elections, it will open a Pandora’s box inasmuch as in this
country election in some form takes place throughout the year and the
accused persons in jail may take undue benefit of it and even if they
are not serious in contesting elections, they would move interim bail
application for the purposes of participating in the election knowing
fully well they are likely to lose or are not serious contenders. This
will open a flood gate of litigation which ought not to be permitted
so as to widen the scope of grant of interim bail, more particularly
when the regular bail application is pending consideration.
13. Secondly, if right to participate, canvassing and contesting in election is
allowed to be treated as a ground for interim bail, then the necessary
sequel of the same would be that the accused person ought to be
allowed to vote in the election as well. Such a sequel would be in
conflict with the provision Section 62(5) of the Representation of
People Act, 1951 which circumscribe the right to vote by laying
down that no person shall vote in any election, if he is confined in a
prison or is in lawful custody of the police. The grant of interim bail
for contesting elections would mean permitting the accused to cast
his/her vote, which would be antithesis to the provisions of Section
62(5) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.
14. In the case of Anukul Chandra Pradhan, Advocate Supreme Court Vs.
Union of India and Ors.: 1997 (6) SCC 1, the three Judges Bench
of this Court has observed as under:
“8. There are other reasons justifying this classification.
It is well known that for the conduct of free, fair and
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 917

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

orderly elections, there is need to deploy considerable
police force. Permitting every person in prison also to
vote would require the deployment of a much larger
police force and much greater security arrangements in
the conduct of elections. Apart from the resource crunch,
the other constraints relating to availability of more police
force and infrastructure facilities are additional factors
to justify the restrictions imposed by sub-section (5) of
Section 62. A person who is in prison as a result of his
own conduct and is, therefore, deprived of his liberty
during the period of his imprisonment cannot claim equal
freedom of movement, speech and expression with the
others who are not in prison. The classification of persons
in and out of prison separately is reasonable. Restriction
on voting of a person in prison results automatically from
his confinement as a logical consequence of imprisonment.
A person not subjected to such a restriction is free to vote
or not to vote depending on whether he wants to go to
vote or not; even he may choose not to go and cast his
vote. In view of the restriction on movement of a prisoner,
he cannot claim that he should be provided the facility to
go and vote. Moreover, if the object is to keep persons
with criminal background away from the election scene,
a provision imposing a restriction on a prisoner to vote
cannot be called unreasonable.”
15. One of the basic submissions of Sh. Siddharth Aggarwal is that
permitting filing of nomination alone is of no use unless the person
is allowed to campaign and canvass. The argument appears to be
attractive, but, has no force.
16. Canvassing in an election can be done in many ways such as
through newspapers, social media, pamphlets, writing letters and
it is not necessary that it should be in the physical form such as by
holding meetings and by personal contact. Permitting the petitioner
to be released on interim bail for the purpose of canvassing
would amount to permitting the petitioner to hold meetings and to
undertake door to door canvassing. This would necessarily involve
interaction of the petitioner with the people of the locality on personal
basis. Since, the incident mentioned in the FIR took place in the
locality from where the petitioner is contesting, if the petitioner is
permitted to move around freely, there is a very high possibility of
918 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

his tampering with the witnesses who are or local people living in
that locality alone.
17. The argument that the petitioner is entitled to interim bail on the
ground that he has suffered long incarceration for around four years
and that despite submission of chargesheet way back on 20.06.2020
itself, the trial has not progressed and very few witnesses till date
have been examined, is of no assistance for the petitioner for
seeking interim bail. The said argument may be appreciated better
while considering the regular bail, but not an interim bail which
is limited only to the ground whether he should be allowed to be
released temporarily for the purpose of contesting or participating
in the election.
18. This apart, the thrust of the argument is that an interim bail for
canvassing is necessary for effectively contesting the election. It
is well known that a person contesting election has to nurture his
constituency for years together and canvassing for ten or fifteen days
would not suffice the purpose. If he has earned a good reputation
and his services are recognized by the people, the canvassing in the
last days would not be very material. It is also well accepted that a
large number of people in the past have contested elections sitting
behind the bars and they have won without being released for the
purposes of canvassing. Therefore, there is no special circumstance
in the case of the petitioner to grant him interim bail for that purpose.
Most of the times, the campaigning is done by the party or its workers
and if one person in the party or the leader or even the candidate is
debarred from canvassing, it does not in any way affect the legal right.
19. Reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Arvind
Kejriwal (supra) cuts no ice inasmuch as it is distinguishable on facts.
There the petitioner was holding the post of Chief Minister and was
the President of a national party and therefore, the Court opined
that he is one of the main campaigners, which is not the situation
in the case at hand.
20. It may not be out of context to mention that the petitioner is in jail not
only in connection with the case at hand i.e., FIR No. 65 of 2020 but
also in two other cases, including a PMLA case, and a case arising
out of FIR No. 59 of 2020. In those two cases, the petitioner has
not been granted bail. His bail application/interim bail application in
those cases are pending in different courts but the fact remains that
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 919

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

he is not on bail in those two cases, meaning thereby that even if
the petitioner is granted interim bail in the present case, he would
not be out of prison for the purpose of canvassing and campaigning.
Therefore, the entire exercise in this regard will prove to be academic
and futile in nature.
21. It is high time that the citizens of India deserve a clean India, which
means clean politics as well and for the said purpose, it is necessary
that people with tainted image, especially those who are in custody
and had not been granted bail and those who are undertrial, even if
out of jail, be restricted in some way or the other from participating
in the election. The people of India should be given a choice to elect
people with clean image and antecedents.
22. In the case at hand, as stated earlier, the Court is confined as to
whether interim bail for the purposes of election ought to be allowed
or not. The petitioner, on the ground of his long custody or the trial
not being completed for long, may argue for regular bail but that is
not the subject-matter for consideration before this Court today. We
do not intend to usurp the jurisdiction of the High Court, where the
regular bail of the petitioner is pending consideration.
23. In the facts and circumstances of the case, long incarceration of
the petitioner or the fact that some of the other co-accused have
been released on bail or that upon evidence, the entire case of
prosecution will fall to the ground are not relevant, and therefore, I
am of the opinion that the High Court has not committed any error
of law in exercising its decision in refusing the interim bail to the
petitioner and permitting him only custodial parole for the purposes
of subscribing oath and filing of his nomination papers.
24. In simple words, interim bail is not permissible for the purposes of
contesting elections, much less for campaigning.
25. In this view of the matter no case is made out for any indulgence in
exercise of discretionary power of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India and the Special Leave Petition is dismissed with
liberty to the petitioner to pursue his regular bail application before
the High Court where he may seek an advancement of the date of
hearing fixed in the matter concerned, if so advised.
26. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as aforesaid.
920 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

1. With great reverence for the erudite opinion expressed by learned
Brother Pankaj Mithal, J., I express my inability to concur therewith.
2. The factual matrix has been noted by Brother Mithal. I see no need
to repeat the same, except to refer thereto where required.

PRELUDE:
3. The Petitioner seeks interim bail to contest in and canvass for the
upcoming General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of the
National Capital Territory of Delhi. The Petitioner is an accused in
cases relating to the unfortunate riots that took place in Delhi in
February/March, 2020. It is averred that except for three cases i.e.,
2 FIR1s (including the present one) and ECIR2 No.05/STF/2020, the
Petitioner has secured bail in all the other cases, whereas one FIR
has been quashed by the Delhi High Court.
4. The Petitioner approached the High Court which granted ‘Custody
Parole for subscribing the Oath and to complete the formalities in
respect of filing his Nomination Papers’, subject to conditions as
enumerated in the Impugned Judgment3.
5. It is clear that the Petitioner has been permitted to file his nomination
and, consequent thereof, contest in the Election. Therefore, what this
Court is required to consider as to whether or not, in the attendant
facts and circumstances, he can be granted interim bail to campaign/
canvass.
6. The contours on which to examine the grant of bail are no longer
res integra. I may gainfully refer to State of Haryana v Dharamraj,
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085, where this Court cancelled the grant
of anticipatory bail to an accused by the Punjab and Haryana High
Court, but revisited the precedents on grant/cancellation of bail as
under:

1 First Information Report.
2 Enforcement Case Information Report.
3 2025 SCC OnLine Del 111
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 921

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

‘7.…. This Court considered the factors to guide grant of
bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002)
3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan,
(2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles
were restated thus:
‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court
granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it
is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise
its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is
well settled that, among other circumstances, the
factors to be borne in mind while considering an
application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed
the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.’
xxx
11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been elaborately
dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v.
State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila Aggarwalv.
922 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1. Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC
694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial
overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant
that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. More so,
when an order of pre-arrest bail already stands granted
by the High Court.
12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to
be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated
by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative,
and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case
turns on its own facts and merits. In Vipan Kumar Dhir v.
State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518, taking note of Dolat
Ram (supra) and X v. State of Telangana (supra), the Court
cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the accused
therein. Keeping all the aforesaid in mind, we turn our
attention to the facts in praesenti.’
(emphasis supplied)

7. I consciously refrain from discussing in detail the evidence or my
view thereon, following, inter alia, Niranjan Singh v Prabhakar
Rajaram Kharote, (1980) 2 SCC 559; Vilas Pandurang Pawar v
State of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 SCC 795, and; Manik Madhukar
Sarve v Vitthal Damuji Meher, (2024) 10 SCC 753. However, in
view of the elaborate submissions advanced at the Bar, reference
somewhat to the materials on record is necessitated.
8. Yet, before forming an opinion as to whether the prayer for grant of
interim bail, for the purpose presently sought for i.e., to campaign
for the Election for which his Nomination Papers stand submitted,
can be granted, this Court would have to go into the broader merits
of the case, subject to the caveat afore-recorded.

THE PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS:
9. Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, learned senior counsel appearing for the
Petitioner has submitted that he would be confining himself, at this
stage, to attempting to persuade the Court as to whether in the
particular facts and circumstances, the Petitioner would, due to the
non-grant of interim bail, be seriously prejudiced and his Fundamental
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 923

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

Rights as a citizen under the Constitution of India would also be
compromised if he only takes part in the Election as a formality,
inasmuch as even after filing his Nomination Papers and being
declared fit to contest, he would not be allowed to connect with the
people of the constituency concerned, and to satisfy the electorate
as to why he should be elected.
10. The thrust of Mr. Aggarwal’s argument was that the Petitioner has
been in custody for almost 5 years now (reckoned from March,
2020) which is a long period and the democratic process requires
that a candidate should go before the electorate from whom he
seeks votes to represent them in the body for which elections are
going to be held.
11. It was submitted that the Petitioner had an unblemished record as
a Ward Councillor and only because of the unfortunate incidents
which took place in February/March, 2020, the Petitioner due to
certain circumstances was named as an accused in as many as 11
FIRs, out of which in 8, he has been granted bail. What remains
are the instant case and two other cases, including one under the
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as
‘PMLA’). It was submitted that in all the cases, the basic allegation
is that the Petitioner was chiefly an instigator and that he may be
the person who was also instrumental in logistics for the rioters.
However, on identical facts, in the 8 other cases, the Petitioner has
been granted bail and in the remaining cases, his applications for
interim bail as well as regular bail are still pending, without having
been finally considered on merits.
12. Learned senior counsel submitted that under law, the right of an
accused to bail is almost crystallized, in the event that the prosecution
fails to discharge its onus of facilitating a fair and speedy trial, which
is glaring in the present case. He submitted that in the present case,
there are five named Chargesheet prosecution eye-witnesses, out of
which four have already been examined but the fifth witness is yet to
be examined and the ground is that the said witness has been out
of Delhi on the various dates fixed in the trial. It was next submitted
that the Chargesheet was filed/submitted on 02.07.2020 and now,
almost five years have passed. Mr. Aggarwal’s submission was that
without blaming anybody for such situation, including a systemic
failure, there is no real probability of the trial being concluded in the
near future. Asserting that the Petitioner’s rights cannot be curtailed in
924 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

this way, he urged the Court to consider as to whether the Petitioner
deserves to be enlarged on bail even otherwise, albeit without fully
going into the merits.
13. It was submitted even under specific laws, where there are prohibitions
for grant of bail, unless the Court is satisfied that there is no chance
of the petitioner being convicted and/or it would not otherwise be
against public interest, the Courts have held that the same would
not apply in case of granting provisional bail. It was submitted that
such proposition has been dealt with at Paragraphs 12 and 13 in
Arvind Kejriwal v Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 (9) SCC 5774.
Further, it has been contended that even the Petitioner was granted
bail by the Delhi High Court or the Trial Court concerned in a majority
out of the total eleven cases. It was urged that the Petitioner has
been shown to be the villain because he was a Ward Councillor
and naturally people would reach out to him, if they required help
including those from his own community, during the time of the riots.
14. However, learned Senior Counsel took the Court through the
Chargesheet, the reading whereof would indicate that (i) the Petitioner
made repeated calls to the Police Control Room, (ii) the police
arrived late at the spot, and; (iii) the Petitioner’s house was the sole
house which was not vandalised. He submitted that even as per the

4 ‘12.Athar Pervez v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Athar Pervez v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2016 SCC OnLine Del
6662] , a judgment of the Delhi High Court authored by one of us (Sanjiv Khanna, J.), on the power to
grant interim bail in cases registered under the NDPS Act, in addition to the judgments noted, refers
to Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] , which decision leans on the Constitution
Bench judgment in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , and Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath
Ganguly [Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156 : 1986 SCC
(L&S) 429] , and observes : (Athar Pervez case [Athar Pervez v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2016 SCC OnLine
Del 6662] , SCC OnLine Del para 20)
“20. The expression “interim” bail is not defined in the Code. It is an innovation by legal neologism
which has gained acceptance and recognition. The terms, “interim” bail/“interim” suspension
of sentence, have been used and accepted as part of legal vocabulary and are well-known
expressions. The said terms are used in contradistinction and to distinguish release on regular
bail during pendency of trial or appeal till final adjudication. Applications for “interim” suspension
or bail are primarily moved and prayed for, when the accused or convict is not entitled to or cannot
be granted regular bail or suspension of sentence, or the application for grant of regular bail is
pending consideration and is yet to be decided. “Interim” bail entailing temporary release can
be granted under compelling circumstances and grounds, even when regular bail would not be
justified. Intolerable grief and suffering in the given facts, may justify temporary release, even when
regular bail is not warranted. Such situations are not difficult to recount, though making a catalogue
would be an unnecessary exercise.”
13. Power to grant interim bail is commonly exercised in a number of cases. Interim bail is granted in the
facts of each case. This case is not an exception.’
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 925

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

materials, some incriminating articles have been recovered from the
Petitioner’s house but that would not prove that the Petitioner was the
mastermind of the entire plot, as was the version of the prosecution.
Otherwise, advanced the learned senior counsel, in a regular case,
the Courts have always granted bail to the accused within a few
months of incarceration. It was contended that the materials which
have been recovered would not disentitle the Petitioner from favourable
consideration for release on bail.
15. It was submitted that almost five years of incarceration have rendered
the Petitioner out of society and there has been no contact with the
electorate and thus, it is all the more reasonable and fair that the
Petitioner should get a chance for whatever few days remain for
the Election, such that he can attempt to convince the electorate
to exercise their franchise in his favour. Moreover, it was submitted
that the Petitioner’s conduct otherwise, prior to the date of the FIRs
has remained unquestioned. There are no indications that he is a
hardened criminal, for within a few days of the unfortunate incident(s),
he was incarcerated. Learned senior counsel stated that prior in time
to the riots, there is no allegation of the Petitioner being a member
of or otherwise being involved with any organized gang. Attention
was also drawn to the observations made on the Petitioner’s role
by the High Court/Trial Court in the orders which granted him bail.
16. Learned senior counsel submitted that he is tempted, in the above
backdrop, to also go into the main merits, but being conscious that
the present petition is only for an interim bail, that too, for a specific
purpose, he refrains from the same. He submits that his case for
regular bail is pending before the High Court, wherein the next
date for hearing fixed is 20.02.2025. It was informed in the pending
two cases also, the bail applications are next fixed on dates after
conclusion of the elections.

THE RESPONDENT’S REPLY:
17. Per contra, the sole respondent opposed the petition. Mr. S. V. Raju,
the learned Additional Solicitor General5, appearing for the respondent
submitted that the present petition is misconceived. It was submitted
that when on a specific prayer made before the High Court, custody

5 Abbreviated to ‘ASG’.
926 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

parole was granted only to fill up and submit his Nomination Papers,
the matter should have attained finality there itself. It was vehemently
submitted that the right to contest elections is not a Fundamental
Right and the fact that the Petitioner has been allowed to fill up his
Nomination Form indicates that the High Court was indulgent to allow
him to participate in the Election, but a right to campaign would not
be a necessary corollary to the indulgence granted, for the reason
that various other modes of campaigning are available to him apart
from physically eg., by way of pamphlets, etcetera.
18. Learned ASG submitted that even under the relevant electoral laws,
the right to vote is not available to a person who is behind bars. If
the Petitioner, at present behind bars, is allowed to come out, he
would have a right to vote which would be an infringement of the
statutory provision under Section 626 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, especially Section 62(5).
19. Learned ASG stated that the Court should consider the balance of
equity between the parties and in the present case, the same is
heavily tilted in favour of the prosecution, for the reason that in view
of the nature of the allegations levelled against the Petitioner, his
coming out on bail would lead to many other complexities inasmuch
as he would be getting in touch with the witnesses of the cases
and would also be in a position to dominate them under the garb
of a Ward Councillor. Moreover, it was submitted that in the larger
picture, the Court would also consider as to whether inference in

6 ‘62. Right to vote.—(1) No person who is not, and except as expressly provided by this Act, every
person who is, for the time being entered in the electoral roll of any constituency shall be entitled to vote
in that constituency.
(2) No person shall vote at an election in any constituency if he is subject to any of the disqualifications
referred to in Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950).
(3) No person shall vote at a general election in more than one constituency of the same class, and if
a person votes in more than one such constituency, his votes in all such constituencies shall be void.
(4) No person shall at any election vote in the same constituency more than once, notwithstanding that
his name may have been registered in the electoral roll for that constituency more than once, and if he
does so vote, all his votes in that constituency shall be void.
(5) No person shall vote at any election if he is confined in a prison, whether under a sentence of
imprisonment or transportation or otherwise, or is in the lawful custody of the police:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a person subjected to preventive detention under
any law for the time being in force:
Provided further that by reason of the prohibition to vote under this sub-section, a person whose name
has been entered in the electoral roll shall not cease to be an elector.
(6) Nothing contained in sub-sections (3) and (4) shall apply to a person who has been authorised to vote
as proxy for an elector under this Act in so far as he votes as a proxy for such elector.’
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 927

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

the present case would lead to a precedent where similarly-situated
convicts/undertrial prisoners, just to get out of jail, may stand in any
election. Learned ASG expressed an apprehension that given the
position in our country, where elections are held at regular intervals
somewhere or the other, chances of misuse of an order of interim
bail in the present case, are real and not imaginary. It was submitted
that if the Petitioner is so confident of his work and position in society,
he would not be required to physically canvass and if at all, he is
the choice of the electorate, the electorate would be wise enough
and vote for him, and then the consequences may follow. Learned
ASG has also taken us through various judgments in support of the
proposition that the statute prohibits the grant of bail in like cases.
Additionally, it was submitted that the present petition had been
rendered infructuous, and the Court could not prejudge the case,
moreso when the High Court is yet to apply its mind on the merits,
as the regular bail plea is pending. The learned ASG submitted that
the Court ought to refrain from granting interim bail to the Petitioner
as the same would be purely academic, in the background of the
Petitioner still being in custody in two other cases, including one
under the PMLA, in which he is unlikely to be granted relief.
20. Learned ASG distinguished the case of Arvind Kejriwal (supra) on
the ground that he was the President of a National Party, and in the
General Elections to the House of the People, he was required to
campaign for his party. It was urged that such factual element was
missing in the present case, as the Petitioner was elected as a Ward
Councillor on a ticket from the Aam Aadmi Party7, but this time he
is a candidate on behalf of All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen8
(hereinafter referred to as ‘AIMIM’), which is different party. It was
contended that AIMIM as a political party is sufficiently capable to
canvass for him and he is not the only person who is left to campaign.
Thus, his interest to that extent stands safeguarded.
21. Further, it was pointed out that Arvind Kejriwal (supra) has been
distinguished by a 3-Judges’ Bench in Order dated 08.07.2024
passed in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos.7684-7885 of 2024
titled Directorate of Enforcement v Sadhu Singh Dharamsot. It

7 Recognised as a National Party by the Election Commission of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘ECI’).
8 Recognised as a State Party in Telangana by the ECI.
928 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

was submitted that Sadhu Singh Dharamsot (supra) clarified that
the decision in Arvind Kejriwal (supra) ‘was passed, as the matter
was sub judice and for the reasons set out in paragraphs 7, 8 and
15 of the said order.’ It was advanced that, in essence, the appellant
therein occupied the positions of President of a National Party and
Chief Minister.

REJOINDER BY THE PETITIONER:
22. Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Court,
in Sadhu Singh Dharamsot (supra), in fact, refused to interfere
in the bail granted therein. It was submitted that Sadhu Singh
Dharamsot (supra) does not deviate from the principles laid down
in Arvind Kejriwal (supra). Mr Aggarwal, learned senior counsel,
submitted that even the paragraphs from Arvind Kejriwal (supra),
as referred to in Sadhu Singh Dharamsot (supra), would support
the Petitioner.
23. He submitted that as regards the present FIR, eight co-accused are
already on bail, including two of the main assailants, who as per
two eye-witnesses, were the persons who had actually killed the
deceased. On the aspect of recovery of articles, the submission was
that they relate to other cases, where the Petitioner is already on
bail. Qua the PMLA case, it was submitted that out of the prescribed
maximum sentence of 7 years, the Petitioner has undergone
approximately 4 years and 5 months behind bars, and as such,
would be entitled to the benefit of Section 436-A9 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.

9 ‘436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained.—Where a person has,
during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being
an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that
law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment
specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or
without sureties:
Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in
writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period
or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:
Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation,
inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under
that law.
Explanation.—In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of
detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.’
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 929

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
24. Insofar as Sadhu Singh Dharamsot (supra) is concerned, I may record
that the said petition was dismissed as infructuous, although with a
clarification on Arvind Kejriwal (supra), as the interim bail therein was
till 06.06.2024, whilst it was taken up for hearing on 08.07.2024.
25. I do not doubt the propositions of law eloquently recorded in Brother
Mithal’s opinion. I have noted the guiding precedents in the Prelude
and would deal with some more hereafter.
26. The law, as it stands today, is that merely because a statute imposes
limitations on grant of bail, the same would not per se oust the
jurisdiction of a Constitutional Court to grant bail, as held in Union
of India v K A Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 71310. Pertinently, Najeeb
(supra), rendered by a Bench of 3-Judges, was distinguished by a
2-Judge Bench in Gurwinder Singh v State of Punjab, (2024) 5
SCC 403. However, in the Review Petition preferred thereagainst viz.
Gurwinder Singh v State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1777,
the 2-Judge Bench clarified, while dismissing the Review Petition,
that ‘our decision is to be construed on the facts dealt with by us.’
This apart, the exposition in Najeeb (supra) has been reiterated by
another 2-Judge Bench in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v State of
Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813 and Sheikh Javed Iqbal v State
of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 8 SCC 29311.

10 ‘17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per
se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of
the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under
constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts
are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will
melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period
of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an
approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being
used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.’
(emphasis supplied)
11 ‘42. This Court has, time and again, emphasised that right to life and personal liberty enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be
restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal
statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21of the Constitution of India has
been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case
of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean
in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts
of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say
that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our
constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021)
3 SCC 713] being rendered by a three-Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of two Judges like us.’
(emphasis supplied)
930 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

27. I have examined the allegations and the evidence against the
Petitioner. No doubt, they are grave and reprehensible but as of
this moment they are exactly that – allegations. It is settled law that
magnitude and gravity of the offence alleged are not grounds, in and
by themselves, to deny bail [Para 1812 of K A Najeeb (supra) and
Jalaluddin Khan v Union of India, (2024) 10 SCC 574], moreso
when trial is prolonged. The Petitioner’s rights under Articles 1413
and 2114 of the Constitution of India cannot be lost sight of. As on
date, no Court of Law has convicted the Petitioner. The following
passage from Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) is attracted
squarely:
‘18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused; not a convict. The over-arching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to
be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.’
28. Further, I deem it appropriate to advert to the contention urged by
the learned ASG, that the Court ought to refrain from granting interim
bail to the Petitioner as the same would be purely academic, in
the background of the Petitioner still being in custody in two other
cases, including one under the PMLA, in which he is unlikely to be
granted relief. The said proposition, to my mind, if accepted, would
amount to this Court abdicating its responsibility of deciding the
lis before it by being influenced by factors not germane inasmuch
as the consideration for interim bail in the present case cannot be
contingent upon prior grant of similar relief in the two other cases.
Moreso, for the reason that the matter relating to the two other cases
is pending before courts subordinate to this Court. That said, I am

12 ‘18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the
respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold,
we would have outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer. However, keeping in mind the length
of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon,
the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been
made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the
charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of our
Constitution have been well protected.’
(emphasis supplied)
13 ‘14. Equality before law.—The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India.’
14 ‘21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.’
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 931

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

not of the opinion that the lis raised herein is academic or should
await the outcome of cases in the courts subordinate to this Court.
29. The Petitioner is in custody since March, 2020. He has secured
bail in a majority of the cases. The High Court permitted him to
file his Nomination and consequently stand as a candidate. On the
short point of period under custody already undergone as also the
bail secured in the other cases, I am of the considered view that,
subject to appropriate conditions being imposed, the Petitioner can
be granted interim bail for a limited period. Ordered accordingly.
30. The Petitioner is, thus, enlarged on interim bail, however, only
upto the noon of 04.02.2025, imposing the conditions prescribed in
Sections 480(3)(b)15 and 482(2)(ii)16 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023. It is further directed that the Petitioner shall not,
during campaigning, make any reference whatsoever to any of the
pending cases and/or the Delhi Riots of 2020. The Petitioner shall,
during the period of his release, confine himself to the limits of the
Mustafabad Constituency. The Petitioner will deposit his passport,
if any, with the Trial Court. The Trial Court may impose additional
conditions consistent with the above.
31. The Petitioner shall surrender before the concerned jail authorities
at/before the time afore-indicated, failing which coercive steps shall
be resorted to by the respondent. I pondered over whether to issue
a direction to the Petitioner to share his real-time location with the
Investigating Officer, but in view of the pronouncement directly on
point in Frank Vitus v Narcotics Control Bureau, [2024] 7 SCR
9717, am not so inclined.
32. This Special Leave Petition (Criminal) is disposed of accordingly,
modifying the Impugned Judgment pro tanto. Needless to

15 ‘that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected,
of the commission of which he is suspected; …’
16 ‘a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to
any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the
Court or to any police officer;’
17 ‘10.2. Imposing any bail condition which enables the Police/ Investigation Agency to track every
movement of the accused released on bail by using any technology or otherwise would undoubtedly
violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21. In this case, the condition of dropping a PIN on
Google Maps has been incorporated without even considering the technical effect of dropping a PIN and
the relevance of the said condition as a condition of bail. This cannot be a condition of bail. The condition
deserves to be deleted and ordered accordingly. In some cases, this Court may have imposed a similar
condition. But in those cases, this Court was not called upon to decide the issue of the effect and legality
of such a condition.’
932 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

state, observations made are only on the issue which arose for
determination.

SEQUEL:
33. The grant of interim bail vide the present Judgment is not to be
treated as a conclusive opinion on the merits of the underlying bail
application or the main case before the Trial Court, lest it prejudice
either side.
34. Learned Brother Mithal has rightly opined that a Pandora’s Box
cannot be permitted to be opened by letting a horde of convicts and/
or undertrial prisoners seek release for the purpose of trying their luck
at the electoral hustings. Likewise, the learned ASG’s apprehension
that others, whether similarly-situated or not, may seek to (mis)use
this Judgment, is not unjustified.
35. I would therefore, necessarily, insert the caveat that this Judgment
has been passed in facts and circumstances specific to this case.
Were any litigant, in futuro, to cite this in a later case, I am sure the
Court concerned would examine such case on its merits and on its
own factual prism. When any court is called upon to apply and/or
follow precedent, it is for that court to examine whether or not the
precedent is attracted in that particular case. It would not be out of
place to recall the following passage from Sanjay Dubey v State
of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 610:
‘18. ... Yet, as our discussions in the preceding paragraphs
display, the same are inapplicable to the extant factual matrix.
It is too well-settled that judgments are not to be read as
Euclid’s theorems; they are not to be construed as statutes,
and; specific cases are authorities only for what they actually
decide. We do not want to be verbose in reproducing the
relevant paragraphs but deem it proper to indicate some
authorities on this point - Sreenivasa General Traders v. State
of Andhra Pradesh, (1983) 4 SCC 353 and Amar Nath Om
Prakash v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCC 345 - which have
been reiterated, inter alia, in BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC
Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234, and Chintels India Limited v.
Bhayana Builders Private Limited, (2021) 4 SCC 602.’
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 933

Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi

Order
Since our opinions are differing, we direct the Registry to place the
papers immediately before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.

Result of the case: Matter to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief
Justice of India.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey