MOHAN SINGH GILL & ORS. ETC.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. ETC.
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 261
- Decided
- 25 March 2015
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- ANIL R DAVE
Holding
Land may be acquired only for the purpose expressly stated in the notification; acquisition of surplus land for undisclosed commercial use is not a public purpose and such notification is void.
Summary
The appellants challenged two land acquisition notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the construction of a road (Missing Link‑II) and a residential urban estate in Ludhiana. They argued that a large portion of the land was intended for commercial development, a purpose not disclosed in the notifications, thereby depriving them of a fair opportunity to object under Section 5‑A. The Supreme Court held that land can be acquired only for the purpose expressly stated; acquiring surplus land for undisclosed commercial use is not a public purpose and the first notification was set aside. The Court found the realignment of the road was properly approved and the master‑plan provisions of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 were complied with. The second notification was not examined in detail, but the Court granted the appellants liberty to make representations to the government. The appeals were partly allowed.
Issues considered
- The validity of acquiring land beyond that required for Missing Link‑II for commercial purposes under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
- Whether the failure to disclose the commercial purpose violated Section 5‑A and the principles of natural justice.
- Whether the realignment of the road complied with the master‑plan amendment provisions of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995.
- The legality of the second notification for development of a residential urban estate and the adequacy of the oustees policy.
- Whether the extent of land acquired was arbitrary or excessive.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17, s. 4, s. 5A, s. 6
- Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995s. 76, s. 77
Subjects
Judgment
[2015) 5 S.C.R. 542
A MOHAN SINGH GILL & ORS. ETC.
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. ETC.
B (Civil Appeal Nos.3177-3178 of 2015)
MARCH 25, 2015
[ANIL R. DAVE AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.)
c Lan.d Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4, 5A, 6 and 17 -
Realignment of road and planning of bypass by
Government - Acquisition of large chunk of land vide two
notifications - Vide first notification, land acquired for
development of proposed road-Missing Link-II on the route
D - By the second notification, land acquired for the
development of residential urban estate along with the
proposed road, mainly to adjust oustees of the said road -
Award passed - Writ petition challenging the Notifications
- Plea that land not utilised entirely for construction of the
E said proposed road but large portion of the acquired land
used for commercial purpose not stated in the Notification
- Dismissal of writ petition - On appeal, held: Need of land
for construction of Missing Link-II duly established - In the
F Notification, land is acquired for development - From
reading the notification, a common person with reasonable
prudence cannot visualise that the part of land is sought to
be exploited for commercial development as well - With no
such specific stipulation, landowners were deprived of an
G effective opportunity to file the objections uls. 5-A - Hidden
purpose for acquiring 'surplus' land, apart from constructing
Missing Link-II, was to develop it as commercial area so that
the finances could be arranged for construction of road
cannot be treated as public purpose - Notifications to the
H
542
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 543
extent they acquire land over and above which is needed A
for construction of Missing Link-II, thus, bad in law and set
aside - As regards, second notification, since the eligible
land owners/structure holders of Missing Link-II road as well
as urban estate would be considered for allotment of plot
house as per oustee policy of the Government, as also other B
reasons, validity of the challenge made not gone into -
However, as to the extent of land that needs to be acquired
for this purpose; and which particular piece of land is more
suited, is to be looked into by the Government and not the C
Court - Appellants given liberty to make suitable
representation to the Government - Punjab Regional and
Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 - s. 77.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1 There have been due deliberations by
the competent authorities deciding upon the
realignment of the road leading to proposed Missina
Link-II. There is no arbitrariness in the exercise done at
the highest level inasmuch as the Chief Minister himself E
approved the revised plans. [Paras 14, 15] [555-D-E]
1.2 A perusal of Section 76(1) of Punjab Regional
and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 clearly
indicates that the Master Plan can be amended at any F
time after the date on which the Master Plan for an area
comes into operation and not after 10 years from such
date. Even otherwise, the High Court was of the view
that, in the instant case, Section 76 of Punjab Act has G
no applicability and in fact the realignment has been
done under Section 77 of the Punjab Act and, thus, there
is no violation of the provisions of the Punjab Act. The
findings arrived at by the High Court is concurred with.
From plans, an attempt is made to demonstrate that at H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 5 S.C.R.
A no point of time there is any variation in the alignment
of Missing Link-II between the pl>rtions f 1 to G, be it
Master Plan, Revenue Plans or Zonal Development
Plan. The only change in alignment has been made
between the portion F and F1 which was necessitated
8 during the implementation of the Master Plan to avoid
the area in which there was heavy construction existing.
The realigned road between Point F and f 1 is passing
through open areas avoiding the constructed areas.
C Thus, the plea of the appellants that the alignment of the
road between Points F and G from Traffic &
Transportation Plan of the Master Plan has been shifted
by about 3 - 4.5 kms on the Northern side is not correct
As a consequence, insofar as need of land for the
D construction of Missing Link-II is concerned, the same
stands duly established and for acquisition of this
chunk of land, there cannot be any exception. [Paras 16,
17, 18, 19) [556-H; 557-A-B; 558-A-E]
E 1.3 In the notification issued, public purpose is
stated is "Missing Link-II for development Thus, the land
owners were informed that the land is sought to be
acquired for the construction of Missing Link-II. From
the reading of this notification, it is difficult to visualize
F by a common person with reasonable prudence that the
part of land is sought to be exploited for commercial
development as well. Obviously, when the purpose
stated is construction of Missing Link-II, the objections
would be filed by land owners having focus on the said
G stated purpose in mind. Had the land owners been told
that major part of the land is going to be utilised for
commercial purpose as well, they would have filed their
objections to th~ proposed move. With no specific
H stipulation in this behalf in the notification under Section
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 545
4 of the Act, the persons whose land was sought to be A
acquired were deprived of an effective opportunity to file
the objections u/s. 5-A of the Act. Filing of objections u/
s. 5-A is, in substance, the only procedural safeguard/
right given to the land owners. It is for this reason that
violation of Section 5-A of the Act has been treated as B
fatal by this Court in number of cases as it becomes
violative of principles of natural justice. [Para 23] [560-
D-H; 561-A-B]
1.4 Appellants are deprived of proper and C
reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities
concerned to spare that part of the land which is not
required for construction of Missing Link-II but is
intended to be used for commercial purpose. The
0
arguments of the respo1ndents that in the drawings
which were kept for in~pection, this part of land is
shown for commercial development is not influencing.
First of all, it is disputed by the appellants and nothing
is produced on record by the respondents to E
substantiate this plea. In any case, such a drawing by
itself would not meet the mandatory requirement of the
Act in the absence of specific stipulation in this behalf
in the notification itself. There is strength in the
submission that the hidden purpose for acquiring F
"surplus" land, i.e. the land apart from what is required
for constructing Missing Link-II, was to develop it as
commer:cial area (which is not stated in the acquisition
notification) so that the finances could be arranged for
constr~ction of road or for some other purpose. This G
cannot ~e treated as public purpose. If the land was to
be utUis'ed for commercial purpose, there has to be a
proper pt.nning into it and it needs to be demonstrated
accordif\gly. It is not so in the instant case. [Para 25, 26) H
[571-D-H;, 572-A·B]
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A 1.5 From the very beginning, the authorities had in
mind to use the extra chunk of land for commercial
purpose but the same was not even stated ·in the
notifications issued under Sections 4 or 6 of the Act. It
is stated that insofar as notifications are concerned,
B purpose mentioned is construction of Missing Link-II,
and in this scenario, the authorities cannot acquire
more land than what is required for construction of
Missing Link-II. The notifications to the extent they
C acquire land over and above which is needed for
construction of Missing Link-II are, thus, bad in law and
set aside. [Para 27] [572-D-F]
1.6 The defence pot up by the respondent
authorities, that the purpose of acquisition of this land
0
is not only to accommodate the oustees of the land
owners whose land was acquired for construction of
Missing Link-I, the acquired land shall be used to
provide shelter to the appellants and others who will be
E divested of their land, appears to be attractive. As per
the oustees policy of rehabilitation, all persons who
have built up structures over the land, would be entitled
for allotment of plot. There were 128 structures on the
Missing Link-II and 36 structures in the urban estates.
F Therefore, 164 structure holders would be entitled for
allotment of plots. Besides this, all 949 land owners
would be entitled for allotment of plots as per the
oustees policy. As per the plan for the area which is
placed by the appellants at the time of hearing, there are
G in total 452 residential plots only in the urban estates
which would be, by and large, sufficient for
rehabilitation of the eligible allottees. The Government
is providing free registration/zero stamp duty if the land
H owners purchase land within Punjab, equal to the
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 547
amount of compensation received, within two years A
from the date of receiving of compensation. Several land
owners, who have received compensation, had already
availed this benefit. Thus, the validity of challenge made
to the second notification is not gone into. [Para 32, 33)
[572-E-F; 576-A-E] B
1.7 An attempt was made by the appellants to show
that there is vacant agricultural land nearby which is
more suitable for the purpose for which appellants land
is sought to be acquired. On this basis, a suggestion C
was mooted that the Government should consider
acquiring the said land nearby. The acquisition is for a
far greater area than what was required even as per the
stated public purpose. It is not for this Court to decide
0
as to what should be the extent of land that needs to
be acquired for this purpose; and that as to which
particular piece of land is more suited for acquisition by
the authorities. It is for the Government to look into
these aspects. Liberty is given to the appellants to make E
a suitable representation to the respondents in this
behalf. However, the said benefit would not enure to
those who have not approached this Court. It is
expected that the Government would take a pragmatic
view and would not consider the representation with F
closed mind. While deciding the representation, the
authorities would particularly consider the aspects
stated therein. [Para 34] (576-F-H; 577-A-F]
Tulsi Co-operative Housing Society, Hyderabad etc. v. G
State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. 1999 (2)
Suppl. SCR 354: (2000) 1 sec 533; Narpat Singh
etc. v. Jaipur Development Authority and Another 2002
(3) SeR 365: (2002) 4 sec 666; Delhi Administration
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others 2000 (2) Suppl.
SCR 496 : (2000) 7 SCC 296; Usha Stud and
Agricultural Farms Pvt. Ltd. and others v. State of
Haryana and Others 2013 (5) SCR 645 : (2013) 4
SCC 210; Women's Education Trust and another v.
B State of Haryana and others (2013) 8 SCC 99;
Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi 1992
(1) SCR 657: (1992) 2 SCC 168 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
c
1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 354 Referred to. Para 21
2002 (3) SCR 365 Referred to. Para 21
2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 496 Referred to. Para 22
D
2013 (5) SCR 645 Referred to. Para 23
(2013) 8 sec 99 Referred to. Para 24
E 1992 (1) SCR 657 Referred to. Para 28
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
3177-3178 of 2015 etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2011 of the
F High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in C. W. P.
Nos. 12292 & 13801 of 2010 (O&M).
WITH
G C. A. Nos. 3179-3180, 3181, 3182 of 2015.
Rakesh Kumar Khanna, ASG, Nidhesh Gupta, M. L.
Saggar, Neeraj Kumar Jain, Nidhi Gupta, Seeraj Bagga, S.
Janani, Tarun Gupta, Ravneet Joshi, Ugra Shankar Prasad,
H Rachana Joshi lssar, Ambreen Rassel, Kuldip Singh, Jagjit
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 549
Singh Chhabra, for appearing parties. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. Leave granted.
2) These appeals arise out of the common judgment B
dated April 29, 2011 passed by High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh whereby number of writ petitions
which were filed challenging the acquisition of land measuring
192.75 acres vide two notifications, both dated 10.08.2009, C
issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') were dismissed. As a
consequence, validity of the notifications has been upheld,
holding that acquisition for public purpose for development of
Missing Link-II from Dhandra Road to Sidhwan Canal via o
Malerkotla Road, Ludhiana as well as for development of
residential urban estate along proposed road from Dhandra
Road to Sidhwan Canal via Malerkotla Road, Ludhiana, is
just and proper.
E
3) It is clear from the above that two notifications were
issued on the same day i.e. on 10.08.2009. Vide first
notification, land was acquired for development of Missing
Link-II on the route mentioned above. By the second
notification, land was sought to be acquired for the F
development of residential urban estate along with the
proposed road, mainly to adjust oustees of the above said
road. Land acquired by the first notification was 192.75 acres
whereas by the second notification, land measuring 59 acres
1 kanal 12 marlas was acquired. After the aforesaid G
notifications under Section 4 of the Act, two notifications both
dated 10.08.2009 under Section 6 of the Act were issued and
consequent thereupon, Award No.4 dated 07.08.2010
pertaining to the first notification and Award No.3 dated H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A 07.08.2010 pertaining to the second notification were passed.
Validity of all these notifications was the subject matter of the
writ petitions.
4) In order to appreciate the present dispute in its correct
B perspective, it is necessary to consider some important
background facts pertaining to construction of what has been
termed as 'Missing Link-I' - which is inextricably linked to the
present acquisition. It is a matter of record that a bypass is
being constructed to connect Ferozepur Road to Sidhwan
C Canal aiming at decongesting Ludhiana City of the traffic
problems. Major portion of the road had already been
constructed, which were shown in the site plan filed in the High
Court as Annexure R/117. From point A to point D and again
from point E to point F, these portions had already been
0
constructed. However, there were two Missing Links namely
between point D to point E and point F to point G. Missing
Link from point D to E has been shown as 'Missing Link-I'.
The respondent-State had issued the notification dated
E 12.05.2003 under Section 4 read with Section 17(4), followed
by the notification dated 13.05.2003 under Section 6, to
acquire land measuring 11 acres 3 kanal 9 marlas for.
construction of Missing Link-I. Pursuant thereto, the land was
acquired vide Award No.1 dated 24.08.2005. This acquisition
F was challenged but the said challenge failed as writ petitions
were dismissed and decision of the High Court was upheld
by this Court as well.
5) It is in this scenario, for providing road from point F to
G point G (Missing Link-II), the impugned notification dated
10.08.2009 was issued for the aforesaid public purpose. As
per the Government, the bypass had been planned and
realignment done keeping in view the availability of the land
so that it may not affect the existing buildings and in order to
H
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB ' 551
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
solve the increasing traffic problems in future so as to ensure A
free and smooth flow of the traffic. The realignment was
approved by the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Board (hereinafter referred to,as the 'Board')
in its meeting dated 06.08.2009. That led to the passing of
Award No.4 dated 07.08.2010. B
6) Simultaneously, second set of notifications were issued
for acquisition of land for development of residential urban
estate to adjust oustees of the above said road. According
to the Government, with the acquisition of the land to complete C
Missing Link-II, the residents of the said land had to be
ousted. In order to adjust those oustees, it became
necessary to acquire the land for development of residential
urban estate to rehabilitate such oustees.
D
7) Insofar as first notification is concerned, it was
challenged on various grounds including the plea that the said
acquisition for proposed road i.e. Missing Link-II, is an
inviable option and there is total lack of application of mind
on the part of the respondent-Government in acquiring the land E
in question. It was also argued that land was not utilised
entirely for the construction of the aforesaid proposed road
i.e. Missing Link-II but a large portion of the acquired land was
used for other purpose viz. commercial purpose which is not F
the purpose stated in the notifications. Number of other
technical and legal objections were taken including the
objection that the proposed bypass road has not been shown
in the master plan and, therefore, the same could not be
developed by acquiring the land without first making G
amendments in the master plan. However, none of these
arguments have found favour with the High Court. Insofar as
second notification is concerned, there is not much discussion
in the impugned judgment and the counsel for all the parties
H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A agreed that this Court itself should decide the issue on merits.
8) Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel who
appeared in three appeals out of four, targeted the judgment
of the High Court, insofar as it relates to the first acquisition
B namely acquisition of land for Missing Link-II is concerned, by
raising following arguments:
In the first place, he pleaded that the land in question was
utilised for the purposes different from what is stated in the
c notification. It was the submission that though the purpose
was Missing Link-II for development (Dhandra Road to
Sidhwan Canal via Malerkotla Road, Ludhiana), as a matter
of record, a large part of the acquired land was used for a
totally different purpose viz. commercial purpose, which
D according to him is impermissible in law. He referred to the
replies filed by the official respondents wherein the factum of
land being used for commercial purpose had been admitted.
He pointed out that the width of Missing Link-II had been kept
at 450 feet whereas the proposed road is only 200 feet and
E on both the sides two commercial pockets of 100 feet and
150 feet respectively are going to be developed. He also
pointed out that objections were submitted under Section 5-
A of the Act which related to tile stated public purpose only.
F As the use of part of the land for the commercial purpose was
not stated in the notification and the appellants were kept in
dark, they could not file objections to the same and were
thereby deprived of their legitimate right to file effective
objections. He pleaded that it amounted to violation of the
G provisions of Section 5-A of the Act by depriving the appellants
from giving opportunity to submit their objections to the
aforesaid use of land which was not stated in the impugned
notifications. He further argued in this behalf that the utilisation
of land for purpose other than the purpose stated not only
H
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 553
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
defeats the right available under Section 5A of the Act but the A
consequence thereof would be to acquire the land under
Section 17 of the Act viz. in exercise of emergent powers and
that could not be done without following the procedure
contained in that section. Related submission of Mr. Nidhesh
Gupta was that utilising the major chunk of land for developing B
commercial area clearly showed that the land of the appellants
was acquired to finance the project of constructing the road.
According to him, such an action is per se arbitrary as land
of the appellants could not be acquired for such a purpose C
thereby depriving them of their right to livelihood. He took this
argument on a higher pedestal by submitting that such an act
amounted to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.
9) Another submission of Mr. Nidesh Gupta was that the
0
proposed road (Missing Link-II) and the changes made
therein are contrary to the master plan inasmuch as master
plan does not show such a road and, therefore, there could
not be any construction of any road without there being a
provision made in the master plan. He referred to Section E
77 of Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development
Act, 1995 which prescribes the mandatory procedure that has
to be followed without making the changes in the master p:an
and submitted that the construction of the road amt:>unted to
violation of this provision as well. F
10) Ms. S. Janani, who appeared for the other appellant
led by Mr. M.L. Saggar, senior advocate, also highlighted the
aforesaid contentions argued by Mr. Nidhesh Gupta and
elaborated the same with facts and figures from the record. G
In addition, another thrust of their submission was that
alignment of the road was changed thereby creating Missing
Link-II and, this was not only arbitrary but without appiication
of mind as well.
H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A 11) Mr. Rakesh Khanna, learned Additional Solictor
General, argued the matter on behalf of respondent No.3,
namely Greater Ludhiana Area Development Authority
(GDADA), strongly refuting the aforesaid submissions of the
appellants. He referred to the various meetings that had taken
B place before the final decision was taken in respect of the
realignment of the road. He was at pains to submit that it was
a bona fide policy decision taken to complete the Missing
Link-II inasmuch as other route for completing this road would
C have resulted in uprooting the settled habitation in much more
substantial measure. In order to demonstrate it, learned
senior counsel had drawn our attention to various maps as
well. He also referred to the judgment of the High Court where
this material has been noted and discussed elaborately, while
o upholding the acquisition.
12) It is clear from the aforesaid that in so far as the first
notification is concerned, where the land is acquired for the
purpose of constructing Missing Link-II, it has two facets. First
E relates to the construction of the road itself, popularly known
as Missing Link-II. Second facet thereof is the permissibility
of the utilisation of the part of the land for commercial purpose
which was not so stated in the impugned notifications.
F 13) Insofar as first aspect is concerned, we find from the
impugned judgment that the High Court has dealt with this
aspect very lucidly with precision. As pointed out above,
attempt of the counsel was to demonstrate that there already
exist enough links and it was not necessary to propose the
G road. It was also argued that the realignment was not a wise
decision.
14) Attempt was also made to point out that this purpose
for which land was acquired had become redundant in the
H changed circumstances. However, after going into the matter
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 555
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
in depth and examining the records, we are satisfied that the A
High Court has correctly concluded that it is for the authorities,
who are engaged in the development and planning of a city,
to ascertain the need to acquire the land for creating
infrastructure, such as roads etc. It is a matter of record that
their exists a road from point A to point D and again from point B
E to point F. There are two Missing Links namely Missing
Link-I from point D to point E and Missing Link-II from point F
to point G. The land which was acquired for Missing Link-I,
almost in similar circumstances, was subject matter of C
litigation but the attempts of the landholders failed right upto
this Court as the challenge to the said notification was
thwarted.
15) We also find that there have been due deliberations
0
by the competent authorities deciding upon the realignment
of the road leading to proposed Missing Link-II. We do not
find any arbitrariness in the exercise done at the highest level
inasmuch as the Chief Minister himself approved the revised
plans. It is not the function of this Court to compare the E
Missing Link-II with alternate route suggested by the
appellants and to come to the conclusion which out of the two
would be more appropriate.
16) Insofar as argument predicated on the master plan F
is concerned, the High Court has brushed aside this very
argument with the following discussion:
"Further the argument of the learned counsel for the
appellants that the proposed Bye Pass road has not
G
been shown in the Master Plan and therefore, the
same cannot be developed by acquiring the land is
without any force. As shown by the learned counsel
for the respondents the realignment of the Missing
Link-II which falls in Zonal Plan-I has been notified as H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 5 S.C.R.
A per the provisions of the Punjab Act vide notification
No.1379 dated 24.02.2011 Annexure R-1/8 and the
same has been shown in the Zonal Plan of zone No.1
Annexure R-1/9. The argument of the learned counsel
for the appellants that the alleged realignment of the
B road has not been done in accordance with the
provisions of Section 76f77 of the Punjab Act, is also
without any merit. From the facts established on
record, it is clear that the changes have been
necessitated which have arisen out of implementation
c of the proposals as made in the master plan and such
realignment has been made in public interest and
after notification of the same which is clear from
Annexure R-1/8. Interpretation as given by learned
D counsel for the appellants of Section 76 of Punjab Act
cannot be accepted. Section 76 of Punjab Act reads
as follows:
"Amendment of Master Plan- (1) At any time after
E the date on which the Master Plan for an area comes
into operation, and at least once after every ten years,
after that date, the Designated Planning Agency shall
after carrying out such fresh surveys as may be
considered necessary or as directed by the [State
F Government] prepare and submit to the [State
Government], a Master Plan after making alterations
or additions as it considers necessary.
(2) The provisions of (sections 70 and 75] shall
G mutatis mutandis as far as may be possible, apply
to the Master Plan submitted under sub-section (1)."
A perusal of Section 76( 1) of Punjab Act clearly indicates
that the Master Plan can be amended at any time after the
H date on which the Master Plan for an area comes into
MQHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 557
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
operation and not after 10 years from such date as argued A
by the learned counsel for the appellants. Even otherwise,
the High Court is of the view that, in the present case, Section
76 of Punjab Act has no applicability and in fact the
realignment has been done under Section 77 of the Punjab
Act and, thus, there is no violation of the provisions of the B
Punjab Act.
17) We are in agree~ent with the aforesaid findings
arrived at by the High Court; We would like to record here
that in the affidavit dated May 06, 2014 filed by the C
respondent-authorities, it is specifically averred that the
alignment of the Missing Link-II between the Railway line and
Sidhwan Canal/crossing Malerkotla Road has never been
changed. Just below the point where the Missing Link-II
0
crosses the Malerkotla Road is an angular curve near village
Gil (in Hadbast 263). This is explained by pointing out that
in the map filed the 10 km long road is divided into 6
segments: A-B already constructed, B-C already constructed,
C-0 already constructed. 0-E is Missing Link-I which has E
since been constructed in the year 2012-13. E-F already
constructed and F-G is the Missing Link-II. Missing Link-II is
further divided into points F and F1 i.e. the road between
Dhandra Road to Railway Crossing, F-1 to F-2 the Missing
Link-II road between existing Railway Crossing and F
Malerkotla Road and F2 to G i.e. between Malerkotla Road
and Sidhwan Canal. Point G is just near Lohara village. It is
also pointed out that in the blown-up portion of the Traffic &
Transportation plan {which is not revenue based) of the Master
Plan again this road from Firozepur Road till Sidhwan Canal G
is marked as Points A, B, C, 0, E, F, F1, F2 and G The road
crosses the Railway Line at point F1, the existing railway
crossing. The Missing Link-II road crosses Malerkotla Road
at point F2 just above point H, the curved road of Gill Village H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A at point H and ends at Point G, just near Village Lohara. The
deponent has also filed Aks Shajra map, zonal plan of the
area, and plan showing alignment of Missing Link-II. From
these plans, an attempt is made to demonstrate that at no
point of time there is any variation in the alignment of Missing
B Link-II between the portions F1 to G, be it Master Plan,
Revenue Plans or Zonal Development Plan. The only change
in alignment has been made between the portion F and F1
which was necessitated durin~ the implementation of the
C Master Plan to avoid the area in which there was heavy
construction existing. The realigned road between Point F
and F1 is passing through open areas avoiding the
constructed areas.
18) We are, thus, satisfied on the basis of the records
D that the plea of the appellants that the alignment of the road
between Points F and G from Traffic & Transportation Plan
of the Master Plan has been shifted by about 3 - 4.5 kms on
the Northern side is not correct.
E 19) As a consequence, insofar as need of land for the
construction of Missing Link-II is concerned, the same stands
duly established and for acquisition of this chunk of land, there
cannot be any exception.
F 20) This leads us to the second facet of this notification.
As noted above, the width of road for Missing Link-II is 200
feet. However, the land acquired is 450 feet. Land beyond
200 feet on either side is sought to be utilised by constructing
G shops on both sides of the road. We have already recorded
the submissions of the appellants on the basis of which this
part of acquisition is questioned. To recapitulate the same
briefly, it was argued :
(a) such a purpose is not stated in the notification
H
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 559
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
which mentions the acquisition only for the A
purpose of construction of Missing Link-II.
Under the garb of this notification, the
respondents cannot utilise the part of the land
for commercial purpose.
B
(b) In the absence of any such purpose mentioned
in the notification issued under Section 4 of the
Act, the appellants were deprived of purposeful
and effective opportunity to file objections under
Section 5-A of the Act. C
(c) The hidden purpose of utilising the major chunk
of land for developing commercial area shows
that the land of the appellants was acquired to
finance the project of constructing the road. D
According to the appellants, it is clearly
impermissible.
21) Learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the
judgment of this Court in Tutsi Co-operative Housing E
Society, Hyderabad etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and
others etc. 1 , wherein this Court while upholding the
acquisition, had directed that lands had to be utilised for the
purposes for which they were acquired. For the same
proposition, judgment in Narpat Singh etc. v. Jaipur F
Development Authority and Anothe~ was relied upon.
22) The respondents have attempted to meet this
challenge by explaining that in the notifications it was
categorically stated that plans of the land may be inspected G
in the office of the Land Acquisition Collector (LAC). The plans
which were displayed in the office of the LAC and filed on
record, show that this part of the land to be utilised for the
1 c2000) 1 sec 533 H
2. c2002) 4 sec 666
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A commercial purpose. The land owners were, therefore, fully
made aware of the use of the land. They were given an
opportunity to file their objections under Section 5-A of the Act.
However, no objection was submitted by the affected persons
alleging that development of commercial area along side of
B Missing Link-II was improper or should not be done. On that
basis, it is argued, relying on the decision of this Court in the
case of Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and
Others3, that those claimants who had not filed objections to
C the Section 4 notification cannot now be permitted to contend
before Court that the Section 5-A inquiry is vitiated.
23) We have pondered over this issue in depth with
reference to the record and find force in the submissions of
the learned counsel for the appellants. It is clear from the facts
D noted above that in the notification dated 10.08.2009 issued
under Section 4 of the Act, public purpose which is stated is
"Missing Link-II for development (from Dhandra Road to
Sidhwan Canal via Malerkotla Road), Ludhiana .... ". Thus, the
E land owners were informed that the land is sought to be
acquired for the construction of Missing Link-II. From the
reading of this notification, it is difficult to visualize by a
common person with reasonable prudence that the part of land
is sought to be exploited for commercial development as well.
F Obviously, when the purpose stated is construction of Missing
Link-II, the objections would be filed by land owners having
focus on the said stated purpose in mind. Had the land
owners been told that major part of the land is going to be
utilised for commercial purpose as well, they would have filed
G their objections to the proposed move. With no specific
stipulation in this behalf in the notification under Section 4 of
the Act, the persons whose land was sought to be acquired
were deprived of an effective opportunity to file the objections
H under Section 5-A of the Act. It hardly needs to be mentioned
3 c2000) 1 sec 2sa
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 561
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
that filing of objections under Section 5-A of the Act is, in A
substance, the only procedural safeguard/right given to the
land owners. It is for this reason that violation of Section 5-A
of the Act has been treated as fatal by this Court in number
of cases as it becomes violative of principles of natural
justice. The importance of objections under Section 5-A of B
the Act has been highlighted in Usha Stud and Agricultural
Farms Pvt. Ltd. and others v. State of Haryana and
others" as under:
"23. Section 5-A, which embodies the most impor- c
tant dimension of the rules of natural justice, lays
down that any person interested in any land notified
under Section 4(1) may, within 30 days of publication
of the notification, submit objection in writing against
D
the proposed acquisition of land or of any land in the
locality to the Collector. The Collector is required to
give the objector an opportunity of being heard either
in person or by any person authorised by him or by
pleader. After hearing the objector(s) and making E
such further inquiry, as he may think necessary, the
Collector has to make a report in respect of land
notified under Section 4(1) with his recommendations
on the objections and forward the same to the Gov-
ernment along with the record of the proceedings held F
by him. The Collector can make different reports in
respect of different parcels of land proposed to be
acquired.
24. Upon receipt of the Collector's report, the appro- G
priate Government is required to take action under
Section 6(1) which lays down that if after consider-
ing the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2), the
appropriate Government is satisfied that any particu-
4 (2013) 4 sec 210
H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A lar land is needed for a public purpose, then a dec-
laration to that effect is required to be made under
the signatures of a Secretary to the Government or
of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders.
This section also envisages making of different dec-
B larations from time to time in respect of different par-
cels of land covered by the same notification issued
under Section 4(1). In terms of Clause (ii) of the pro-
viso to Section 6(1), no declaration in respect of any
particular land covered by a notification issued under
c Section 4(1 ), which is published after 24.9.1989 can
be made after expiry of one year from the date of
publication of the notification. To put it differently, a
declaration is required to be made under Section 6( 1)
D within one year from the date of publication of the
notification under Section 4(1).
25. In terms of Section 6(2), every declaration made
under Section 6(1) is required to be published in the
E Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers having
circulation in the locality in which the land proposed
to be acquired is situated. of these, at least one must
be in the regional language. The Collector is also
required to cause public notice of the substance of
F such declaration to be given at convenient places in
the locality. The declaration to be published under
Section 6(2) must contain the district or other territo-
rial division in which the land is situate, the purpose
for which it is needed, its approximate area or a plan
G is made in respect of land and the place where such
plan can be inspected.
26. Section 6(3) lays down that the declaration made
under Section 6(1) shall be conclusive evidence of the
H
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 563
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
fact that land is needed for a public purpose. A
27. After publication of the declaration under Sec-
tion 6(1), the Collector is required to take order from
the State Government for the acquisition of land and
cause tt to be measured and planned (Sections 7 and B
8). The next stage is the issue of public notice and
individual notice to the persons interested in the land
to file their claim for compensation. Section 11 en-
visages holding of an enquiry into the claim and pass-
ing of an award by the Collector who is required to c
take into consideration the provisions contained in
Section 23.
28. In Munshi Singh v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC
337, this Court emphasised the importance of Sec- D
tion 5-A in the following words:
"7 .... Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A makes it obliga-
tory on the Collector to give an objector an opportu-
nity of being heard. After hearing all objections and E
making further inquiry he is to make a report to the
appropriate Government containing his recommen-
dation on the objections. The decision of the appro-
priate Government on the objections is then final. The
declaration under Section 6 has to be made after the F
appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consider-
ation of the report, if any, made by the Collector un-
der Section 5-A(2). The legislature has, therefore,
made complete provisions for the persons interested
G
to file objections against the proposed acquisition
and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in
cases of urgency that special powers have been
conferred on the appropriate Government to dis-
pense with the provisions of Section 5-A." H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A 29. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC
471, the Court observed as under:
"16 .... it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a
man's property is a serious matter and the smaller
B the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him
before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-
emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this adminis-
trative fairness is constitutional anathema except for
good reasons. Save in real urgency where public
c interest does not brook even the minimum time
needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities
should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19),
burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act. Here
a slumbering process, pending for years and sud-
D
denly exciting itself into immediate forcible taking,
makes a travesty of emergency power."
30. In Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1993) 4
SCC 255, this Court reiterated that compliance of Section 5-
E A is mandatory and observed:
"10 .... The decision of the Collector is supposedly
final unless the appropriate Government chooses to
interfere therein and cause affectation, suo motu or
F on the application of any person interested in the land.
These requirements obviously lead to the positive
conclusion that the proceeding before the Collector
is a blend of public and individual enquiry. The per-
son interested, or known to be interested, in the land
G
is to be served personally of the notification, giving
him the opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and
awakening him to such right. That the objection is to
be in writing, is indicative of the fact that the enquiry
H into the objection is to focus his individual cause as
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 565
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
well as public cause. That at the time of the enquiry, A
for which prior notice shall be essential, the objector
has the right to appear in person or through pleader
and substantiate his objection by evidence and argu-
ment."
B
31. In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat's case, this Court referred
to the judgments in Munshi Singh v. Union of India, (1973) 2
SCC 337, State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC
471, Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1993) 4 SCC
255, Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14, C
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627, Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P.,
(2011) 5 sec 553 and observed:
"39. In this context, it is necessary to remember that D
the rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the
scheme of Section 5-A with a view to ensure that be-
fore any person is deprived of his land by way of
compulsory acquisition, he must get an opportunity
to oppose the decision of the State Government and/
E
or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the par-
ticular parcel of land. At the hearing, the objector can
make an effort to convince the Land Acquisition
Collector to make recommendation against the ac- F
quisition of his land. He can also point out that the
land proposed to be acquired is not suitable for the
purpose specified in the notification issued under
Section 4(1). Not only this, he can produce evidence
to show that another piece of land is available and G
the same can be utilised for execution of the particu-
lar project or scheme.
40. Though it is neither possible nor desirable to
make a list of the grounds on which the landowner H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015) 5 S.C.R.
A can persuade the Collector to make recommenda-
tions against the proposed acquisition of land, but
what is important is that the Collector should.give a
fair opportunity of hearing to the objector and objec-
tively consider his plea against the acquisition of
B land. Only thereafter, he should make recommenda-
tions supported by brief reasons as to why the par-
ticular piece of land should or should not be acquired
and whether or not the plea put forward by the ob-
jector merits acceptance. In other words, the recom-
c mendations made by the Collector must reflect ob-
jective application of mind to the objections filed by
the landowners and other interested persons."
D 32. In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal
(supra), this Court again considered the scope of Section 5-
A and observed:
"13. Section 5-A(1) of the LAAct gives a right to any
person interested in any land which has been notified
E under Section 4(1) as being needed or likely to be
needed for a public purpose to raise objections to the
acquisition of the said land. Sub-section (2) of Sec-
tion 5-A requires the Collector to give the objector an
F opportunity of being heard in person or by any per-
son authorised by him in this behalf. After hearing the
objections, the Collector can, if he thinks it necessary,
make further inquiry. Thereafter, he has to make a
report to the appropriate Government containing his
G recommendations on the objections together with the
record of the proceedings held by him for the deci-
sion of the appropriate Government and the decision
of the appropriate Government on the objections shall
be final.
H
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 567
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
14. It must be borne in mind that the proceedings un- A
der the LAAct are based on the principle of eminent ·.
domain and Section 5-A is the only protection avail-
able to a person whose lands are sought to be ac-
quired. It is a minimal safeguard afforded to him by
law to protect himself from arbitrary acquisition by B
pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia, that
the important ingredient, namely, "public purpose" is
absent in the proposed acquisition or the acquisition
is mala fide. The LA Act being an expropriatory leg-
islation, its provisions will have to be strictly con-
c
strued.
15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is
necessary to enable the Collector to deal effectively
D
with the objections raised against the proposed ac-
quisition and make a report. The report of the Col-
lector referred to in this provision is not an empty
formality because it is required to be placed before
the appropriate Government together with the E
Collector's recommendations and the record of the
case. It is only upon receipt of the said report that the
Government can take a final decision on the objec-·
tions. It is pertinent to note that declaration under
Section 6 has to be made only after the appropriate F
Government is satisfied on the consideration of the
report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-
A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Ltd., the appropriate Government while
issuing declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act is G
required to apply its mind not only to the objections
filed by the owner of the land in question, but also to
the report which is submitted by the Collector upon
making such further inquiry thereon as he· thinks nee-
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A essary and also the recommendations made by him
in that behalf.
16. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the LA Act makes
a declaration under Section 6 conclusive evidence that
B the land is needed for a public purpose. Formation of
opinion by the appropriate Government as regards the
public purpose must be preceded by application of mind
as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejec-
tion of irrelevant ones. It is, therefore, that the hearing
c contemplated under Section 5-A and the report made
by the Land Acquisition Officer and his recommenda-
tions assume importance. It is implicit in this provision
that before making declaration under Section 6 of the
LA Act, the State Government must have the benefit of
D
a report containing recommendations of the Collector
submitted under Section 5-A (2) of the LA Act. The rec-
ommendations must indicate objective application of
mind."
E 33. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments is that Section
5-A(2), which represents statutory embodiment of the rule of
audi alteram partem, gives an opportunity to the objector to
make an endeavour to convince the Collector that his land is
F not required for the public purpose specified in the notifica-
tion issued under Section 4(1) or that there are other valid
reasons for not acquiring the same. That section also makes
it obligatory for the Collector to submit report(s) to the appro-
priate Government containing his recommendations on the
G objections, together with the record of the proceedings held
by him so that the Government may take appropriate deci-
sion on the objections. Section 6(1) provides that if the ap-
propriate Government is satisfied, after considering the re-
port, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A that
H
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 569
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
particular land is needed for the specified public purpose then A
a declaration should be made. This necessarily implies that
the State Government is required to apply mind to the report
of the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed
by the landowners and other interested persons. Then and
then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1). B
24) The aforesaid dicta was reiterated recently in
Women's Education Trust and another v. State of
Haryana and others 5 emphasising the importance of
Section 5-A in the following words: c
"5. The principles which can be culled out from the
above-noted judgments.are as under:
5.1. The rule of audi alteram partem engrained in the D
scheme of Section 5-A of the Act ensures that before
depriving any person of his land by compulsory ac-
quisition, an effective opportunity must be given to him
to contest the decision taken by the State Govern-
ment /competent authority to acquire the partiqular E
parcel of land. '
5.2. Any person interested in the land, which has
been notified under Section 4(1) of the Act, can file
objections.under Section 5A(1) and show that the F
purpose specified in the notification is really not a
public purpose or that in the guise of acquiring the
land for a public purpose the appropriate Government
wants to confer benefit upon private persons or that
the decision of the appropriate Government is arbi- G
trary or is vitiated due to mala tides.
5.3. In response to the notice issued by the Land Ac-
quisition Collector under Section 5A(2) of the Act, the
s (2013) a sec 99 H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A objector can make all possible endeavours to con-
vince the Land Acquisition Collector that the acquisi-
tion is not for a public purpose specified in the noti-
fication issued under Section 4(1); that his land is not
suitable for the particular purpose; that other more
B suitable parcels of land are available, which can be
utilized for execution of the particular project or
scheme.
5.4. The Land Acquisition Collector is duty bound to
c objectively consider the arguments advanced by the
objector and make recommendations, duly supported
by brief reasons, as to why !he particular piece of land
should or should not be acquired and whether the plea
put forward by the objector merits acceptance. In
D
other words, the recommendations made by the
Land Acquisition Collector should reflect objective
application of mind to the entire record including the
objections filed by the interested persons.
E 5.5. The Land Acquisition Collector is required to sub-
mit his report and the recommendations to the State
Government along with the record of proceedings to
enable the latter to take final call on the desirability,
propriety and justification for the acquisition of the
F
particular parcel(s) of land.
5.6 The declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act can
be issued only if the appropriate Government, on an
objective application of mind to the objections filed
G
by the interested persons i11cluding the landowners
and the report of the Land Acquisition Collector, is
satisfied that the land is needed for the particular
purpose specified in the notification issued under
H Section 4( 1) of the Act.
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 571
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
6. It is unfortunate that despite repeated judicial pro- A
nouncements. the executive authorities entrusted with
the task of acquiring private land for any specified
public purposes have time and again exhibited total
lack of seriousness in the performance of their duties
under the statute. Often they do not comply with the B
mandate of Section SA of the Act. which is sine qua
non for making a valid declaration under Section 6(1)
of the Act. This batch of appeals is illustrative of the
malady that has afflicted the State authorities who are
keen to acquire private lands in the name of planned
c
development of various urban areas, but do not
bother to comply with the relevant statutory provisions
and the rules of natural justice."
D
[Emphasis Supplied]
25) We, thus, are of the opinion that appellants are
deprived of proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading
the authorities concerned to spare that part of the land which
is not required for construction of Missing Link-II but is E
intended to be used for commercial purpose. We are not
influenced by the arguments of the respondents that in the
drawings which were kept for inspection, this part of land is
shown for commercial development. First of all, it is disputed F
by the appellants and nothing is produced on record by the
respondents to substantiate this plea. In any case, we are of
the view that such a drawing by itself would not meet the
mandatory requirement of the Act in the absence of specific
stipulation in this behalf in the notification itself. G
26) In the aforesaid backdrop, we find strength in the
submission of the appellants that the hidden purpose for
acquiring "surplus" land, i.e. the land apart from what is
required for constructing Missing Link-II, was to develop it as H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A commercial area (which is not stated in the acquisition
notification) so that the finances could be arranged for
construction of road or for some other purpose. This cannot
be treated as public purpose. If the land was to be utilised
for commercial purpose, there has to be a proper planning
B into it and it needs to be demonstrated that utilisation of the
land serves some public purpose. We do not find it to be so
in the present case.
27) Mr. Khanna had cited certain judgments in support
C of his submission that even if the land is acquired for one
particular purpose, the authorities are empowered to utilise
the same for another public purpose. However, it is
permissible in those circumstances where the original
purpose for which the land was acquired had to be changed
0
for some valid reasons. Even that is not the case herein.
From the very beginning, the authorities had in mind to use
the extra chunk of land for commercial purpose but the same
was not even stated in the notifications issued under Sections
E 4 or 6 of the Act. It is stated at the cost of the repetition that
insofar as notifications are concerned, purpose mentioned is
construction of Missing Link-II, and in this scenario, the
authorities cannot acquire more land than what is required for
construction of Missing Link-II. The notifications to the extent
F they acquire land over and above which is needed for
construction of Missing Link-II are, thus, held to be bad in law
and set aside.
28) This brings us to the validity of second notification.
G As already mentioned above, 55.41 acres of land has been
acquired vide notification No.3 dated 07.08.2010 and the
public purpose stated is "Development of Urban Estate,
mainly to adjust oustees of Missing Link-II (Dhandra Road to
Sidhwan Canal via Malerkotla Road, Ludhiana)". The main
H plank of attack of the appellants to this notification is that land
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 573
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
of the appellants could not be acquired to rehabilitate other A
persons, and in the process rendering the appellants
homeless and landless. Such an action was arbitrary and
illegal which also amounted to depriving the appellants of their
livelihood. It was also argued that in the process, the changes
which made were much more serious violating the master B
plan. It was also argued that the aforesaid stated purpose is
totally vague, since it only says that the same is for the
development of a residential urban estate. It was argued that
the public purpose of "residential" has been held by this Court C
to be vague in Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd.
Shafi6 :
14. Apart from the defect in the impugned notification.
as noticed above. we find that even the "public
D
purpose" which has been mentioned in the schedule
to the notification as "residential" is hopelessly vague
and conveys no idea about the purpose of acquisition
rendering the notification as invalid in law. There is
no indication as to what type of residential E
accommodation was proposed or for whom or any
other details. The State cannot acquire the land of a
citizen for building some residence for another, unless
the same is in 'public interest" or for the benefit of the
"public" or an identifiable section thereof. In the F
absence of the details about the alleged "public
purpose" for which the land was sought to be
acquired, no-one could comprehend as to why the
land was being acquired and therefore was
prevented from taking any further steps in the matter. G
[Emphasis Supplied]
29) It was also submitted that the notification acquiring
land for the Missing Link road is for an area of approx. 74.52 H
6 (1992) 2 sec 168
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A acres. Yet, more than 55.41 acres of land has been acquired
for adjusting the oustees of the said road. Thus, the
acquisition is for a far greater area than what was required
even as per the stated public purpose inasmuch as 55.41
acres of land was sought to be given to those from whom
B 74.52 acres of land was taken.
30) Mr. Gupta concluded his arguments with the
submission that such an acquisition was not at all necessary,
apart from being illegal, unfair, unjust and against the
C principles of natural justice as the appellants are being ousted
from their land in order to accommodate, adjust and
rehabilitate others who are similarly situated as the appellants.
In other words, the appellants are being rendered oustees in
order to accommodate other oustees. Such a patently unjust
0
and unfair action cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
termed as 'public purpose' as grave harm, loss and injustice
is being caused to the appellants for no sustainable reason.
He also emphasised that the land from which the appellants
E are being ousted, in order to accommodate other oustees,
is the sole source of livelihood for the appellants. Part of the
acquired land is agricultural, part of it is inhabited and part of
it has functioning industries. As such, there is no rationale
whatsoever in uprooting well established livelihoods merely
F to accommodate others. The respondents action evidences
absolutely no application of mind as there is vacant agricultural
land nearby where the oustees could have been adjusted. It
is argued that the real reason behind present acquisition is
that in actual fact the respondent-government intends to use
G the acquired land for profit-making purposes. It is submitted
that the respondents are planning to use the major part of the
land under acquisition for commercial purposes.
31) The aforesaid arguments of the appellants was
H sought to be negated. by Mr. Rakesh Khanna with the
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE.OF PUNJAB 575
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
submission that the specific stand was taken by the A
respondents that the eligible land owners I structure holders
of Missing Link-II road as well as urban estate both will be
considered for allotment of plot/house as per oustee policy
of the State Government. It was submitted that there are 949
land owners involved in this acquired land for Missing Link-II B
and urban estate. Firstly, it is only 48 of them who are before
this Court. Therefore, 901 of them have no objection to the
acquisition. Secondly, even out of the 48 owners, only 33
appellants were parties before the High Court and 15 have C
filed SLP for the first time being SLP No. 14124 of 2012. Two
of them being appellants in SLP No. 15365 of 2012, have
since withdrawn the SLP.
32) After considering the submissions of counsel for the
0
parties on either side and on going through the records, we
find force and merit in the case set up by the respondents.
The defence put up by the respondent authorities, as noted
above in the submissions of Mr. Rakesh Khanna, appears to
be attractive wherein it is stated that the purpose of E
acquisition of this land is not only to accommodate the
oustees of the land owners whose land was acquired for
construction of Missing Link-I, the acquired land shall be used
to provide shelter to the appellants and others who will be
divested of their land. In this behalf, it is stated that all 949 F
land owners will be entitled for allotment of plots as per the
oustees policy.
33) It is also to be borne in mind that out of 949 land
owners, whose land is sought to be acquired by the instant G
impugned notification, majority of them, numbering 901
persons, have raised no objection to the acquisition and even
accepted the coml'ensation. Only 48 affected persons
challenged the notification before the High Court. After the
High Court dismissed the challenge vide impugned judgment, H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 5 S.C.R.
A out of these 48 only 15 had preferred to come to this Court.
We have also noted that as per the oustees policy of
rehabilitation, all persons who have built up structures over the
land, will be entitled for allotment of plot. There were 128
structures on the Missing Link-II and 36 structures in the urban
8 estates. Therefore, 164 structure holders will be entitled for
allotment of plots. Besides this, all 949 land owners will be
entitled for allotment of plots as per the oustees policy. As
per the plan for the area which is placed by the appellants at
C the time of hearing, there are in total 452 residential plots only
in the urban estates which will be, by and large, sufficient for
rehabilitation of the eligible allottees. It was also brought to
our notice that the Government is providing free registration/
zero stamp duty if the land owners purchase land within
o Punjab, equal to the amount of compensation received, within
two years from the date of receiving of compensation. Several
land owners, who have received compensation, had already
availed this benefit. For all these reasons, we would not like
to go into the validity of challenge made to the second
E notification.
34) At the same time, it is necessary to reflect upon some
pertinent aspects of the case which were highlighted by the
appellants. An attempt was made by the appellants to show
F that there is vacant agricultural land nearby which is more
suitable for the purpose for which appellants land is sought
to be acquired. On this basis, a suggestion was mooted that
the Government should consider acquiring the said land
nearby as there is vacant agricultural or barren land nearby.
G It was also argued that the notification acquiring land for the
Missing Link road is for an area of approx. 74.52 acres. Yet,
more than 55.41 acres of land has been acquired for adjusting
the oustees of the said road. Thus, the acquisition is for a
H far greater area than what was required even as per the
MOHAN SINGH GILL v. STATE OF PUNJAB 577
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
stated public purpose inasmuch as 55.41 acres of land are A
sought to be given to those from whom 74.52 acres of land
was taken. However, it is not for this Court to consider as to
which particular piece of land is more suited for acquisition
by the authorities. Likewise, though, prima facie, it appears
that acquisition of 55.41 acres of land to rehabilitate the B
oustees whose land acquired measuring 74:52 acres is quite
substantial, it is not for this Court to decide as to what should
be the extent of land that needs to be acquired for this
purpose. It is for the Government to look into these aspects. C
For this purpose, we give liberty to the appellants to make a
suitable representation to the respondents in this behalf within
a period of 30 days from today. If such a representation is
preferred, the same shall be considered in accordance with
law and decision thereupon shall be taken within 2 months o
from said representation. However, this liberty of making
representation is going only to the appellants herein, which
benefit shall not enure to those who have not approached this
Court. We also expect that the Government shall take a
pragmatic view and would not consider the representation with E
closed mind. While deciding the representation, the
authorities will particularly consider the following aspects:
(a) Whether the land of the appellants herein, keeping in
view the total area involved, be released as not F
required if the remaining land is sufficient for the
purpose for which the said land is acquired?
(b) Even if some more land is needed for the stated
purpose, whether it would be possible to release the G
land of the appellants and acquire vacant agricultural
or barren land nearby which may be more suitable?
(c) It may also be kept in mind that the land of the
appellants is not only Abadi land, the appellants have H
. ..,_
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 5 S.C.R.
A their residential houses or industrial/commercial
premises as well.
(d) The authorities may also keep in mind the location of
the land of the appellants and consider as to whether
8 different chunks of land owned by the appellants are
scattered in between rest of the land acquired and on
that count, is it possible or not to hive off the land of
the appellants?
c 35)-However, we make it clear that while affording this
opportunity to the appellants to make a representation, we are
not providing fresh cause of action to the appellants, though,
we expect the respondents to consider the representation with
open mind.
D
36) The upshot of the aforesaid discussion would be to
allow these appeals partly in the manner indicated above.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
E Nidhi Jain Appeals partly allowed.
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