MIS. NEW KENILWORTH HOTEL (P) LTD.versusORISSA STATE FINANCE CORPORATION AND ORS.

             MIS. NEW KENILWORTH HOTEL (P) LTD.                               A
                                     v.
       ORISSA STATE FINANCE CORPORATION AND ORS.

                           JANUARY 20, 1997

            [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.]
                                                                              B

       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Sections 2(9), :1(1) and 104(2}-0rder
39 Rule (1}-0rder 43 Rule (l)(r)-Appellate order-Letters Patent appeal
against-Permissibility of -Suit filed by appellant seeking permanent injunc-
tion restraining respondents from disturbing its possession-Pending suit status C
quo granted by Trial Court-On appeal by respondents a single Judge of the
High Court vacated the status quo orde1~Letters patent appeal prefe1Ted by
appellant before Division Bench held not maintainable-Appeal before
Supreme Court-Held Division Bench of the High Court was right in holding
that Letters Patent Appeal would not- lie against an order of the single D
Judge-Right of appeal is a creature of status--Filing of second appeal having
been expressly prohibited under section 104(2) the right of appeal provided
under clause JO of the Letters Patent was not available to appellant.

     Sukuri Dibya & Ors. v. Hemalata Panda, (1990) 32 OJD 431 (Civil)
and Birendra Kr. Majhi v. Sitamani Bewa, (1992) 34 OJD 473 (Civil),           E
disapproved.

      Resham Singh Pyara Singh v. Abdul Sattar, [1996] 2 SCC 49, relied
on.

      Shah Babula/ Khimji v.Jayaben D.C. Kania & Anr., [1981] 4 SCC 6,         F
explained, and held inapplicable.                                ·

      Madhusudan Vegetable Products Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad v. Bapa Chemi-
cals Vapi & Ors., AIR (1986) Guj. 156 and Firm Chhunilal Laxman Prasad
v. Mis Agarwal and Co. & Ors., AIR (1987) MP 172, approved.
                                                                              G
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 350-352
of 1997.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.96 of the Orissa High
Court in A.H.O. Nos. 40-42 of 1995.                                H
                                  395
    396                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1997] 1 S.C.R.
A          Dr. AM. Singhvi, Additional Solicitor General, Anil B. Diwan, H.N.
    Salve, Y. Das, C. Mukhopadhyay and Rakesh K. Sharma for the Appellant.

         Santosh Hegde, N. Ganpathy, AS. Bhasme and Bibek Mohanti for
    the Respondents.

B         The following Order of the Court was delivered :

          ·Leave granted.

          These appeals by speciial leave arise from the judgment and order of
C   the High Court of Orissa, made on December 16, 1996 in AH.O. Nos.
    40-42/95.

         The admitted facts are that the appellant had filed a suit for decla-
  ration that the steps taken by the respondents under section 29 of the State
  Financial Corporation Act were illegal and sought permanent injunction
D restraining them from disturbing it~ possession. Pending suit, they sought
  ad _interim injunction not to dispossess them from the hotel. The trial Court
  by order dated July 12, 1994 granted status quo whereby the appellant
  remained in possession of the suit premises. On appeal filed by the respon-
  dents, the learned single Judge vacated the status quo order by order dated
E May 18, 1995. Feeling aggrkved the appellant filed Letters Patent Appeal.
  By the impugned order the Division Bench has held that the appeals are
  not maintainable. Thus this appeal by special leave.

         Shri AM. Singhvi, learned Addi. Solicitor General appearing for the
  appellant, contends that under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent an appeal
F would lie against the judgm1~nt of the learned single Judge to the Division
  Bench. Though the order granted status quo by the trial court was vacated
  by the High Court, it is a judgment within the meaning of Section 2 (9) of
  the Code of Civil Prcicedure, 1908 (for short, the 'Code'). Therefore, the
  bar under Sec. 104 (2) of the Code is not attracted by operation of Sec. 4
  (1) of the Code. In support thereof, he placed strong reliance on the
G judgment of the Division Bench of that Court in Sukuri Dibya & Ors. v.
  HemaJata Panda, [1990] 32 OJD 431 (civil) and a Full Bench Judgment of
  that Court in Birendra Kr. Majhi v. Sitamani Bewa, [1992) 34 OJD 473
  (civil), He also contends that though this Court .has considered the non-
  maintainability of an appeal by operation of Sec. 104 (2) of the Code read .
H with Order XLIII Rule l(r), the above distinction was not brought to the
          M/SNEWKEMLWORTIIHOTELv. ORISSASfATEFINANCECORPN.                     397
     notice of this Court and that, therefore, the Full Bench judgment of the         A
     High Court still holds the field. We find no force in the contention.

           It is settled legal position that right of appeal is a creature of the
     statute. Against an interlocutory order, an appeal has been provided under
     Sec. 104 (1) of the Code read with Order XLIII Rule 1. In respect of
     interim injunction, it is covered by Order XLIII Rule 1 (r). In this case,       B
     the order of status quo was passed in an application filed under Order
 _   XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code. Therefore, it is not in dispute that it is an
•·   order passed by the civil Court under Order XXXIX Rule 1 appealable
     under Order XLIII Rule 1 (r) of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 104
     specifically prohibits Second Appeal against such an order postulating that      C
     "No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this Section".
     In Resham Singh Pyara Singh v. Abdul Sattar, [1996] 2 SCC 49 a Bench of
     this Court consisting of K. Ramaswamy and B.L. Hansaria, JJ. has held
     that against an appellate order of a learned single Judge of a High Court
     passed by the Civil Court, a Letters Patent Appeal would not lie by reason
     of the bar created by sub-section (2) of Section 104 of the Code.                D
           Clause 10 of the Letters Patent reads as under :

             "An appeal shall lie ..... from the judgment (not being a judgment
             passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree
                                                                                      E
             or order made in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court
             subject to the superintendence of High CourL .... and not being an
             order made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.....) of one Judge
             of the said High Court ..... and in exercise of appellate jurisdiction
             in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate
             jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said       F
             High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares
             that the case is a .fit one for appeal.. .. "

           It would, thus, be seen that Clause 10 of the Letters Patent consists
     of only two parts. In the first pad, an appeal shall lie from a judgment of G
     a learned single Judge to the Division Bench not being a judgment passed
     in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction. In other
     cases, where the learned single Judge exercises the appellate jurisdiction,
     if he certifies that it is a fit case for an appeal to the Division Bench.
     Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in the latter part of clause 10,
     an appeal would lie. It is seen that the Division Bench in Sukuri Dibya's H
    398                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1997] 1 S.C.R.
A   case (supra) has interpreted Clause 10 and stated that it consists of three    ·"'- '.'.
    components, namely :

            "(i) Judgment of single Judge passed in exercise of original juris-
            diction;

B           (ii) Judgment of a single Judge passed in exercise of appellate
            jurisdiction against a judgment passed by a court subject to the
            superintendence of the nigh Court in exercise of its original
            jurisdiction; and

           . (iii) against judgment of a single Judge passed in exercise of its
c            appellate jurisdiction against the judgment passed by a Court
             subject to the superintendence of the High Court in exercise of its
             appellate jurisdiction;

          The above analysis of the learned Judges in that behalf is not correct
D as we have stated above, The same was repeated by the Full Bench in
    Birendra Kr. Majhi's case (supra).                                              .J
          The. question then is : whether notwithstanding such prohibition,
  though an order of injunction passed by the learned single Judge in the
  appellatejurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 is a judgment, as held
E by this Court in Shah Babula! Khimji v. Jayaben D.C. Kania & Anr., (1981]
  4 sec 8, an appeal would lie on the basis thereof? It is contended that an
  appeal would lie to the Division Bench. We find no force in the contention.
  It is true that the learned Judges composing of the Division Bench as well
  as the .Full Bench of the High Court construed that the ratio in Shah
F Babu/al Khimji's case would attract item (ii) of the analysis of the learned      :..
  Judges and, therefore, an appeal would lie to the Division Bench. We are
  of the view that the learned Judges, with due respect, have not understood
  the scope of the judgment in Shah Babu/al Khimji's case in its proper
  perspective. Therein, the learned single Judge exercising the original juris-
G diction of the High Court passed an order in applications filed under Order
  XL Rule 1 for appointment of a receiver and issue of injunction order
  under Order XXXIX Rule 1.

         the question, therefore, was : whether it was appealable? Since the
  learned Judge had exercised the original jurisdiction and an appeal would
H lie to the Division Bench under Order XLIII Rule 1, this Court considered
     MIS NEW KENILWORTH HOTEL v. OR!SSA STATE FINANCE CORPN.            399
that the order of the learned single Judge was a judgment within the A
meaning of the Section 2(9) of the Code and, therefore, it was appealable.
It is seen that the exercise of power by the learned single Judge was as a
first Judge under the Code and, therefore, the order, though it is one
passed under Order XLIII Rule 1, since it gives a finality as regards that
Court is concerned, was held to be a judgment within the meaning of B
Section 2(9) of the Code. Section 4(1) of the Code does not apply because
it envisages that "In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary,
nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special
or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred,
or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for
the time being in force." Since Section 104(2) expressly prohibits an appeal, C
against an order passed by the appellate Court under Order XLIII Rule 1
read with Section 104(1) no ...... appeal would lie. As a consequence no
Letters Patent Appeal would lie. The view taken in Madhusudan Vegetable
products Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad v. Bapa Chemicals Vapi & Ors., AIR (1986)
Guj. 156 and Fim1 Chhunilal Laxman Prasad v. Mis. Agarwal and Co. & D
Ors., AIR 1987 MP 172 by the two High Courts is correct in law. The view
of the Division Bench in Shashikala v. Hiren, 71 (1991) CLT 197 is correct
in law. Sukuri Dibya's case and the Birendra's case are not good law.

      It is seen that the very object of introducing these amendments was
to cut down the delay in disposal of suits and to curtail spate of remedial E
steps provided under the Code. As held earlier; the right of appeal is a
creature of the statute and the statute having expressly prohibited the filing
of second appeal under sub-section (2) of section 104, the right of appeal
provided under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. would not be available. As
already noted, the main part of Clause 10 clearly indicates that "an appeal F
would lie from the jud!,rment not being a judgment passed in exeq::ise of
appellate jurisdiction". Thereby the judgment from an appellate jurisdiction
stands excluded under the first part of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent itself.
Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court was right in holding that
the Letters Patent Appeal would not lie against an order of the learned
single Judge.                                                                   G

      The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

T.N.A.                                              Appeals arc dismissed.