MEKHA RAM AND OTHERS ETC. ETC.versusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ETC. ETC.

                        [2022] 15 S.C.R. 287


            MEKHA RAM AND OTHERS ETC. ETC.
                                  v.
       STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ETC. ETC.
               (Civil Appeal Nos. 2229-2234 of 2022)
                         MARCH 29, 2022
        [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
      Service Law:
       Rajasthan Medical & Health Subordinate Service Rules, 1965
– Restitution – Appellants, working as Auxiliary Nursing & Midwifery
or Lab Technician, Multi-Purpose Worker, Accounts Clerk and other
similarly situated posts, applied for the course of General Nursing
Training, of three years duration – Submission of the applications
as in-service candidates and also applied for study leave – Writ
petitions by the appellants praying that the study leave sanctioned
to them by the competent authority may be treated as on deputation
– Single Judge allowed the petitions – Intra-court appeal –Division
Bench held that the period spent on training course by the in-
service candidates shall not be treated as period on deputation
and be treated only on leave whatever due to the candidates –
During pendency, under threat of the contempt of the judgment
and order passed by the Single Judge,the appellants were paid the
amount – Division Bench directed that the State would be at liberty
to recover the excess amount paid to appellants during their period
of training as a period of leave permissible to him/her in easy equal
installments – On appeal,held : Amount paid in excess to the
appellants was not due to any mistake on the part of the State
authorities – Excess amount was paid pursuant to the order passed
by the Single Judge–No one can be permitted to take the benefit of
the wrong order passed by the court which has been subsequently
set aside by the higher forum/court –No party should be prejudiced
because of the order of the court –Order passed by the Single Judge
has been set aside by the Division Bench of the High Court and
thus, by applying s. 144 CPC also, the amount paid pursuant to the
order passed by the Single Judge which has been set aside by the
Division Bench is to be refunded/returned by the writ petitioners –
Thus, the Division Bench of the High Court justified in reserving
liberty in favour of the State to recover the amount paid in excess to
                                 287
288            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A     the writ petitioners – General Nursing Training Course Rules, 1990
      – Code of Civil Procedure,1908 – s.144.
            State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (2015) 4 SCC 334 :
            [2014] 13 SCR 1343 - held inapplicable.
            Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (2020)
B           8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1; South Eastern Coalfields
            Ltd. v. State of M.P. (2003) 8 SCC 648 : [2003] 4 Suppl.
            SCR 651; Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir (2002) 1
            SCC 319 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 118 - referred to.
                              Case Law Reference
C
      [2014] 13 SCR 1343                 held inapplicable       Para 4
      [2020] 3 SCR 1                     referred to             Para 5.1
      [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 651            referred to             Para 5.1
      [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 118            referred to             Para 6.2
D
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2229-
      2234 of 2022.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 06.05.2016 of the High Court
      of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in DB Special Appeal
E     (Writ) Nos. 1883, 1887, 1990 of 2014, D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.
      289 of 2015, D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1888 of 2014 & D.B.
      Special Appeal (Writ) No. 191 of 2015.
            With
            Civil Appeal nos. 2235-2249, 2250-2251, 2252, 2253-2256 of 2022.
F           R.K. Singh, Mrs. Neeraj Singh, Kumar Gaurav, Ms. Ritu Reniwal,
      Praveen Pathak, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ankur Rastogi, Ms. Priya
      Rastogi, Mrs. Laxmi Arvind, Advs. for the Appellants.
            Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Arpit Parkash, Milind Kumar, Ms.
      Ruchi Kohli, Rohit K. Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
G
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            M. R. SHAH, J.
            1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common
      judgment and order dated 06.05.2016 passed by the Division Bench of
H     the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench Jaipur in D.B.
     MEKHA RAM AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF                                    289
    RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1883/2014 and other connected appeals, by                A
which the Division Bench of the High Court has allowed the said appeals
and has quashed and set aside the respective judgments and orders passed
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and held that the three
years Nursing Course by the in-service candidates could not be treated
as a period on deputation and be treated only on leave whatever due to
                                                                                   B
the candidates and consequently has reserved the liberty in favour of
the State to recover the excess amount paid to the original writ petitioners
treating the period of training as a period of leave permissible to him/her
in easy equal installments, the original writ petitioners have preferred
the present appeals.
       2. That the original writ petitioners are working either as ANM             C
(Auxiliary Nursing & Midwifery) or Lab Technician, Multi-Purpose
Worker, Accounts Clerk or other similarly situated posts. They are the
members of the Rajasthan Medical & Health Subordinate Service Rules,
1965. They applied for the course of General Nursing Training which is
of three years duration and is regulated according to the General Nursing          D
Training Course Rules, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules 1990’).
        2.1 That all the original writ petitioners submitted their applications,
in the prescribed proforma as in-service candidates, seeking admission
to the course of General Nursing as envisaged under Rule 9 of the Rules
1990. That all the in-service candidates were required to be considered            E
eligible to seek admission provided they fulfilled the criterion for admission
and eligibility under Rule 11 of the Rules 1990. All the original writ
petitioners submitted their applications for seeking study leave knowing
it fully well that joining three years Nursing Course cannot be treated on
deputation for the in-service candidates. All the original writ petitioners
completed their course or some of them were either doing their internship          F
or a few, after completion of their internship, filed writ petitions before
the learned Single Judge of the High Court and prayed that the study
leave sanctioned to them by the competent authority may be treated as
on deputation. That the learned Single Judge allowed the batch of writ
petitions with the following directions:                                           G
       “Looking to the aforesaid, these writ petitions are being disposed
       of with the following directions:
       1.     Respondents are directed to comply with the observations
              and expectations of the Hon’ble Apex Court as given in the
              case of Sushil Sharma (supra) [State of Rajasthan vs. Sushil         H
290              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A                  Sharma, Civil Appeal No. 5283/2001, dated 10.08.2001],
                   thereby, they will not allow benefit of deputation allowance
                   to anyone in violation of rule 112 read with rule 97 of the
                   RSR. This is irrespective of the categories of the post in
                   the respondent department;
B           2.     If there is shortage of Junior Specialist, endeavour should
                   be to amend the Rules so that direct recruitment can be
                   made, as presently aforesaid post is filled up by promotion
                   only. However, on the pretext of shortage of Junior
                   Specialist, respondents cannot be allowed to violate or
                   circumvent the rules. This is more so when it goes even
C                  against the observations and expectations of the Hon’ble
                   Apex Court in the case of Sushil Sharma (supra). The
                   respondents will accordingly allow study leave and benefit
                   thereupon as per rule 111 and 112 read with rule 97 of the
                   RSR;
D           3.     Since for many posts, benefit of study leave with full salary
                   has been allowed, hence, to avoid discrimination, respondents
                   have agreed to extend similar benefit to the petitioners also,
                   however, arrangement aforesaid would be limited to those
                   who have already joined the training course of GNM and
E                  now onwards nobody would be allowed study leave benefit
                   in violation of the provision of RSR;
            4.     Compliance of the aforesaid order may be made within a
                   period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this
                   order.”
F            2.2 That thereafter the State preferred intra-court appeals before
      the Division Bench. The Division Bench permitted the State to file review
      applications. The State filed review applications before the learned Single
      Judge, which came to be dismissed.Subsequently, the State again filed
      intra-court appeals before the Division Bench against the judgment(s)
G     and order(s) passed by the learned Single Judge, allowing the writ petitions
      and holding that the original writ petitioners are entitled to treat their
      period of training as the period on leave permissible to him/her. By the
      impugned common judgment and order, the Division Bench of the High
      Court has allowed the intra-court appeals and while approving the earlier
      decision of the learned Single Judge has held that the period spent on
H     training course by the in-service candidates shall not be treated as a
     MEKHA RAM AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF                                291
    RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

period on deputation and be treated only on leave whatever due to the          A
candidates. That as during the pendency of the intra-court appeals, under
threat of the contempt of the judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge, the original writ petitioners were paid the amount and holding
that the period of training is to be treated as period on leave permissible
to him/her, the Division Bench also directed that the State shall be at
                                                                               B
liberty to recover the excess amount paid to the original writ petitioners
during their period of training as a period of leave permissible to him/her
in easy equal installments.
       2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common
judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
reserving liberty in favour of the State to recover the excess amount          C
paid, the original writ petitioners have preferred the present appeals.
       3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that this Court issued
notice in the present special leave petitions/appeals limited to the aspect
of the recovery of the amounts from the original writ petitioners, as
directed in the impugned judgment and in the meanwhile directed stay of        D
recovery. In that view of the matter, the only issue which is now required
to be considered is, whether there shall be recovery of the amounts
from the original writ petitioners, as directed in the impugned judgment
and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court.
       4. Shri R.K. Singh, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the         E
original writ petitioners has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court
in the case of State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih, reported in (2015) 4
SCC 334. Relying upon the aforesaid decision, it is vehemently submitted
that as observed and held by this Court, recovery from the employees
belonging to Class III and Class IV service (Group C and Group D               F
service) is impermissible.
       4.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original writ
petitioners has prayed and submitted that as the respective original writ
petitioners are serving on Class III and Class IV posts, the amount already
paid in excess may not be recovered by the State. In the alternative, it is    G
prayed that the original writ petitioners may be given reasonable monthly
installments to repay the amount which is paid in excess to them.
      5. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the State has submitted that the decision of this Court in the
case of Rafiq Masih (supra), which has been relied upon by the learned
                                                                               H
292             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A     counsel appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners, is not applicable
      to the facts of the case on hand. It is submitted that in the aforesaid case
      the amount was paid to the employees mistakenly by the State/State
      authorities which was sought to be recovered and under those
      circumstances this Court observed and held that the recovery of the
      excess amount paid is impermissible in case of employees belonging to
B
      Class III and Class IV service (Group C and Group D service). It is
      submitted that in the present case, it is not the case where the amount in
      excess was paid mistakenly by the State or the State authorities. Rather
      the excess amount was paid pursuant to the order passed by the learned
      Single Judge, under the threat of the contempt proceedings, which order
C     has now been set aside by the Division Bench. It is submitted that once
      the order passed by the learned Single Judge, pursuant to which the
      original writ petitioners were paid the amount, came to be set aside by
      the Division Bench, the necessary consequences shall follow and on the
      principle of restitution, the State shall be entitled to recover the amount
      paid in excess.
D
             5.1 Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of
      Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal, reported in (2020)
      8 SCC 129 (paragraphs 334 to 336) and the decision of this Court in
      the case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P., reported
      in (2003) 8 SCC 648 (paragraphs 25 to 30), on the principle of restitution.
E
             5.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
      decisions, more particularly the decisions of this Court on the principle
      of restitution, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the State
      has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Division
      Bench of the High Court has not committed any error in permitting the
F     State to recover the excess amount paid. However, the learned Senior
      Advocate has fairly stated that the original writ petitioners may be given
      reasonable installments, which even the Division Bench has observed in
      the impugned judgment.
             6. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
G     at length.
             At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case
      the amount paid in excess to the appellants was not due to any mistake
      on the part of the State/State authorities. The excess amount has been
      paid pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge, which has
H     been subsequently set aside by the Division Bench. Therefore, on
     MEKHA RAM AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF                                 293
    RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

quashing and setting aside the judgment and order passed by the learned         A
Single Judge under which the original writ petitioners were paid the excess
amount, the necessary consequences must follow. Therefore, considering
the fact that the amount already paid in excess was not paid by the State
mistakenly but was paid pursuant to the order passed by the learned
Single Judge which has been set aside subsequently, the decision of this
                                                                                B
Court in the case of Rafiq Masih (Supra) shall not be applicable. The
said decision of this Court may be applicable only in a case where the
amount has been paid by the State/State Authorities mistakenly and it is
found that there was no fault and/or any misrepresentation on the part
of the employee and that the concerned employee is not found responsible
for such excess amount paid mistakenly. The amount paid in excess               C
pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge which has
been set aside by the Division Bench has to be refunded and/or returned
by the original writ petitioners which the State is entitled to recover from
them on the principle of restitution.
       6.1 At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Indore      D
Development Authority (supra) on principle of restitution is required to
be referred to. In the said decision, a Constitution Bench of this Court
after considering the earlier decision in the case of South Eastern
Coalfields (supra) and other decisions on the principle of restitution,
has observed and held in paragraphs 335 to 336 as under:
                                                                                E
      In re : Principle of restitution
      “335. The principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing
      complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be
      placed in the same position but for the litigation and interim order,
      if any, passed in the matter. In South Eastern Coalfields                 F
      Ltd. v. State of M.P. [South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of
      M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648], it was held that no party could take
      advantage of litigation. It has to disgorge the advantage gained
      due to delay in case lis is lost. The interim order passed by the
      court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order,
      passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final      G
      order going against the party successful at the interim stage.
      Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the fountain
      source of restitution. It is rather a statutory recognition of the rule
      of justice, equity and fair play. The court has inherent jurisdiction
      to order restitution so as to do complete justice. This is also on the    H
294      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A     principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping
      it alive and respecting it. In exercise of such power, the courts
      have applied the principle of restitution to myriad situations not
      falling within the terms of Section 144 CPC. What attracts
      applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful
      or mistake or an error committed by the court; the test is whether,
B     on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an
      order held at the end as not sustainable, resulting in one party
      gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned,
      or the other party having suffered an impoverishment, restitution
      has to be made. Litigation cannot be permitted to be a productive
C     industry. Litigation cannot be reduced to gaming where there is
      an element of chance in every case. If the concept of restitution
      is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant
      would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the
      interim order. This Court observed in South Eastern
      Coalfields [South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P.,
D     (2003) 8 SCC 648] thus: (SCC pp. 662-64, paras 26-28)
         “26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of
         this submission. The word “restitution” in its etymological sense
         means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or
         reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in
E        execution of decree or order of the court or in direct
         consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar Khan v. Board
         of Revenue, U.P. [Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P.,
         1984 Supp SCC 505] ). In law, the term “restitution” is used in
         three senses : (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to
         its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits
F
         derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation
         or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black’s Law
         Dictionary, 7th Edn., p. 1315). The Law of Contracts by John
         D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to
         say that “restitution” is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring
G        to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at
         times referring to compensation for the injury done:
         ‘Often, the result under either meaning of the term would be
         the same. … Unjust impoverishment, as well as unjust
         enrichment, is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is guilty
H        of a non-tortious misrepresentation, the measure of recovery
 MEKHA RAM AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF                                   295
RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

    is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as       A
    relative fault, the agreed-upon risks, and the fairness of
    alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable
    to the fault of either party need to be weighed.’
 The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognised in Section
 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 CPC speaks             B
 not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified
 but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The scope of
 the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the
 kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree
 or order. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final
 decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a            C
 party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against
 the party successful at the interim stage. …
    27. … This is also on the principle that a wrong order should
    not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A.
    Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami [A. Arunagiri                         D
    Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, 1970 SCC OnLine Mad 63] ). In
    the exercise of such inherent power, the courts have applied
    the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling
    within the terms of Section 144.
    28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule         E
    confined to an erroneous act of the court; the “act of the court”
    embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court
    may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court
    would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the
    facts and the law. … the concept of restitution is excluded               F
    from application to interim orders, then the litigant would
    stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of
    the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the
    end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the
    opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief
    assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is             G
    entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable
    reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of
    the court withholding the release of money had remained in
    operation.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)       H
296             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A           336. In State of Gujarat v. Essar Oil Ltd. [State of
            Gujarat v. Essar Oil Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 522 : (2012) 2 SCC
            (Civ) 182] , it was observed that the principle of restitution is a
            remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. The Court
            observed : (SCC p. 542, paras 61-62)
B               “61. The concept of restitution is virtually a common law
                principle, and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust
                benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience of the
                court, which prevents a party from retaining money or some
                benefit derived from another, which it has received by way of
                an erroneous decree of the court. Such remedy in English Law
C               is generally different from a remedy in contract or in tort and
                falls within the third category of common law remedy, which
                is called quasi-contract or restitution.
                62. If we analyse the concept of restitution, one thing emerges
                clearly that the obligation to restitute lies on the person or the
D               authority that has received unjust enrichment or unjust benefit
                (see Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 9, p. 434).”
              In the said decision, it is further observed and held that the
      restitution principle recognizes and gives shape to the idea that advantages
      secured by a litigant, on account of orders of court, at his behest, should
E     not be perpetuated.
             6.2 In the case of Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir, reported
      in (2002) 1 SCC 319, it is observed and held that after the dismissal of
      the lis, the party concerned is relegated to the position which existed
      prior to the filing of the petition in the court which had granted the stay.
F
             6.3 Even otherwise, no one can be permitted to take the benefit
      of the wrong order passed by the court which has been subsequently set
      aside by the higher forum/court. As per the settled position of law, no
      party should be prejudiced because of the order of the court.
             7. Even, Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for
G
      restitution. Section 144 of the CPC reads as under:
            “144. Application for restitution – (1) Where and insofar as a
            decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or
            other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted
            for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order shall,
H
    MEKHA RAM AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF                                 297
   RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS ETC. ETC. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      on the application of any party entitled in any benefit by way of        A
      restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will,
      so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they
      would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part
      thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; and,
      for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders
                                                                               B
      for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages,
      compensation and mesne profits, which are property consequential
      on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the
      decree or order.
      Explanation – For the purposes of sub-section (1) the expression
      “Court which passed the decree or order shall be deemed to include,      C

      (a)    Where the decree or order has been varied or reversed in
             exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the Court of
             first instance;
      (b)    Where the decree or order has been set aside by a separate        D
             suit, the Court of first instance which passed such decree
             or order;
      (c)    Where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or
             has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which,
             if the suit wherein the decree or order was passed were           E
             instituted at the time of making the decree or order was
             passed were instituted at the time of making the application
             for restitution under this section, would have jurisdiction to
             try such suit.
      2. No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any          F
      restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application
      under sub-section (1).”
       8. In the present case, the order passed by the learned Single
Judge has been set aside by the Division Bench of the High Court and
therefore by applying Section 144 CPC also, the amount paid pursuant
                                                                               G
to the order passed by the learned Single Judge which has been set
aside by the Division Bench is required to be refunded/returned by the
original writ petitioners.
      Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, narrated
hereinabove, the Division Bench of the High Court is absolutely justified
                                                                               H
298             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A     in reserving liberty in favour of the State to recover the amount paid in
      excess to the original writ petitioners. It is required to be noted that even
      while reserving liberty to recover the amount paid in excess, the Division
      Bench has observed that the same be recovered in easy equal installments.
              9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
B     Division Bench of the High Court has not committed any error in reserving
      liberty in favour of the State to recover the amount paid in excess to the
      original writ petitioners. However, at the same time, considering the prayer
      made on behalf of the original writ petitioners to recover the amount in
      easy equal installments, we direct that whatever amount is paid in excess
      to the original writ petitioners, pursuant to the order passed by the learned
C     Single Judge, be recovered from the original writ petitioners in thirty-six
      equal monthly installments, to be deducted from their salary commencing
      from April, 2022.
            10. The instant appeals are accordingly disposed of in the aforesaid
      terms. No costs.
D

      Nidhi Jain                                                 Appeals disposed of.
      (Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)



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G




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