Holding

The High Court’s grant of bail was unsustainable as it was passed without applying mind or providing reasons, and therefore the bail was cancelled and the order set aside.

Summary

The case concerned an appeal by Meena Devi, the wife of a murder victim, against the Allahabad High Court’s order granting bail to the convicted accused, Shivraj Singh alias Lalla Babu, under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had exercised its discretionary power judiciously, given the accused’s grave offence (murder under S.302 IPC) and extensive criminal antecedents. It held that the High Court’s order was cryptic, lacked any reasoning, and failed to consider material such as the accused’s history of 37 pending cases, thereby violating the principle of applying judicial mind. The Court reiterated the established criteria for granting and cancelling bail, emphasizing that orders must be reasoned, especially in non‑bailable offences. Consequently, the bail was cancelled, the High Court’s order set aside, and the accused directed to surrender. The appeal was disposed of in favour of the petitioner.

Issues considered

The adequacy of reasoning in the High Court’s order granting bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C.
Whether the High Court exercised its discretion judiciously in granting bail to a convicted murderer with multiple pending cases.
The applicable principles for granting and cancelling bail in non‑bailable offences.
Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with a High Court bail order on the ground of non‑application of mind.

Legislation cited

Arms Acts. 1959
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 439
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 149, s. 302, s. 364, s. 506
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Acts. 1989
Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Acts. 1970
Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti‑Social Activities (Prevention) Acts. 1986

Subjects

bailSection 439 Cr.P.C.grant of bailcancellation of bailnon‑bailable offencemurderdiscretionary powerreasoned orderapplication of mindcriminal antecedents

Judgment

[2022] 4 S.C.R. 23 23

MEENA DEVI A
v.
THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
(Criminal Appeal No. 808 of 2022)
MAY 13, 2022 B
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD AND
HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s 439 – Bail – Grant/
cancellation of – When – Held: Power of the High Court u/s. 439 is
C
wide – Exercise of the said discretionary powers vested in the Court
when considering grant of bail ought to be in a judicious manner
and not as a matter of course – If an order is passed without proper
application of mind or in contravention of directions of this court,
it would be susceptible to interference – When it comes to assessing
an application seeking cancellation of bail, the appellate court looks D
out for, amongst others, supervening circumstances or any violation
of the conditions of bail imposed on the person who has been
accorded such a relief – On facts, the impugned order enlarging
the accused on bail is cryptic and non-speaking demonstrated non-
application of mind – High Court erred in not offering any reason,
E
good, bad or indifferent and mechanically recorded the submissions
– Thus, looking at the gravity of the offence committed by the
respondent no.2 u/s. 302 and the award of life imprisonment, and
also having regards to his criminal antecedents that he is a hardened
criminal with several cases registered against him, the bail is
cancelled. F
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The power to grant bail under Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is wide ranging.
Nonetheless, the exercise of the said discretionary powers vested
in the Court when considering grant of bail, ought to be in a G
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. [Para 16][32-D]
1.2 Ordinarily, this Court would refrain from interfering with
an order passed by the High Court, either granting or rejecting

H
23
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A the relief of bail to an accused. However, wherever it is noticed
that such a discretion has been exercised by the High Court
without proper application of mind or in contravention of the
directions issued by this Court, such an order shall be susceptible
to interference. [Para 17][33-D-E]
B 1.3 The considerations that weigh with the appellate court
when called upon to examine the correctness of an order granting
bail is not on the same footing when it comes to examining an
application moved for cancellation of bail. The yardstick for
testing the correctness of an order granting bail is whether the
court below has exercised its discretion in an improper or arbitrary
C manner thereby vitiating the said order. When it comes to
assessing an application seeking cancellation of bail, the appellate
court looks out for, amongst others, supervening circumstances
or any violation of the conditions of bail imposed on the person
who has been accorded such a relief. [Para 21][36-C-D]
D 1.4 A glance at the impugned order passed by the High
Court is to state the least, cryptic and non-speaking, amply
demonstrating non-application of mind. The High Court appears
to have shut its eyes to the common submissions that the
respondent No.2 is a hardened criminal with several cases
E registered against him. List of cases registered against the
accused reveals that he has faced/is still facing trial in the thirty-
seven cases registered against him under the IPC, Arms Act,
1959, Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986, U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970,
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
F Atrocities) Act, 1989, etc., where the offences are grave in nature.
[Para 24][39-D-F]
1.5 In the past decade, six cases more have been registered
against the respondent No.2, The list that has been furnished to
this Court by the respondent No.1-State, does not mention eleven
G cases that had been mentioned in the list of cases pending against
the respondent no.2. If the said cases are added to the current
list of thirty-seven criminal cases registered against the accused,
the number of criminal cases registered against the him would
swell to fifty. [Para 27][42-G-H; 43-A]
H
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 25

1.6 The High Court failed to factor in the relevant material A
before passing an order enlarging the respondent No.2 on bail.
The High Court also seriously erred in not offering any reason,
good, bad or indifferent, for exercising its discretion in favour of
the said respondent. There is no reference made to any particular
element that persuaded the High Court to pass the impugned
B
order granting bail to the respondent No.2. Mechanically
recording the submissions made by the counsel for the accused
and the complainant and noting the protest of the counsel for the
State and thereafter proceeding to release the respondent No.2
on bail by pre-fixing the operative para of the order with the words
“in view of the aforesaid”, can hardly reflect application of judicial C
mind by the Court. As an appellate court, this Court is completely
at seas to discern the factors that have weighed with the High
Court to enlarge the respondent No.2 on bail. [Para 28][43-B-D]
1.7 Looking at the gravity of the offence committed by the
respondent No. 2 under Section 302 IPC for which he has been D
convicted by the trial court and awarded a sentence of life
imprisonment and noting that the period of custody undergone
by him is only for nine months and further, having regard to his
criminal antecedents, the impugned order passed by the High
Court is quashed and set aside. The bail bonds of the respondent
No.2 are cancelled and he is directed to surrender forthwith. [Para E
32][44-G-H; 45-A]
Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh And Others
(2002) 3 SCC 598 : [2002] 2 SCR 526; Mahipal v.
Rajesh Kumar Alias Polia and Another (2020) 2 SCC
118 : [2019] 14 SCR 529; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. F
Ashis Chatterjee and Another (2010) 14 SCC 496 :
[2010] 12 SCR 1165; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav and Another (2004) 7 SCC
528; Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat and
Another (2008) 13 SCC 584 : [2008] 6 SCR 1149; G
Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. Central Bureau of
Investigation and Another (2012) 4 SCC 134 : [2012]
3 SCR 278; Abdul Basit Alias Raju and Others v. Mohd.
Abdul Kadir Chaudhary and Another (2014) 10 SCC

H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A 754 : [2014] 10 SCR 571; Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another (2014) 16 SCC 508 : [2014] 12
SCR 453; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)
and Another (2018) 12 SCC 129 : [2017] 11 SCR 195;
Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia and Another
(2020) 2 SCC 118 : [2019] 14 SCR 529; Jagjeet Singh
B
and Others v. Ashish Mishra Alias Monu and Another
(2022) SCC Online SC 453; Ms. Y. v. State of Rajasthan
and Another (2022) SCC OnLine SC 458; Ms. P. v.
State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Criminal Appeal
No.740 of 2022 decided on 05.05.2022; Prakash
C Kadam and Others v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta and
Another (2011) 6 SCC 189 : [2011] 6 SCR 800; Imran
v. Mohammed Bhava and Another 2022 SCC Online
SC 496; Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla
Babu And Another (2012) 9 SCC 446 : [2012] 7 SCR
584; Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338 : [2001] 3
D
SCR 432 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2002] 2 SCR 526 referred to Para 16
[2019] 14 SCR 529 referred to Para 18
E
[2010] 12 SCR 1165 referred to Para 19
(2004) 7 SCC 528 referred to Paras 20 and 30
[2008] 6 SCR 1149 referred to Para 20
[2012] 3 SCR 278 referred to Para 20
F
[2014] 10 SCR 571 referred to Para 20
[2014] 12 SCR 453 referred to Para 20
[2017] 11 SCR 195 referred to Para 20

G [2019] 14 SCR 529 referred to Para 20
[2011] 6 SCR 800 referred to Para 21
[2014] 12 SCR 453 referred to Para 22
[2012] 7 SCR 584 referred to Para 26
H [2001] 3 SCR 432 referred to Para 29
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 27

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. A
808 of 2022.
Arising Out of Petition for Special Leave To Appeal (Criminal)
No. 5102 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.09.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application B
Nos. 609 and 610 of 2018.
Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Ankit Mishra, Advs. for the Appellant.
Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Gautam Kumar, Prabhat Kumar Rai, Ajay
Kumar Pandey, Mrs. Revathy Raghavan, Ms. Divya Singhvi, Advs. for C
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. Leave granted.
D
2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 19th September,
2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad
in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 609 of 2018 whereunder
the application filed by the respondent No. 2 under Section 439 of the
Criminal Procedure Code1 was allowed and he was enlarged on bail
subject to certain conditions stipulated therein. The original complainant, E
wife of the deceased has preferred this appeal by way of special leave
against the said order before this Court.
3. Initially, petitions for special leave to appeal were filed against
two respondents namely, Shivraj Singh alias Lalla Babu [respondent No.
2] and Sonu [respondent No. 3]. However, by an order dated 2 nd July, F
2019, the petition qua the respondent No. 3 was dismissed and notice
was issued in respect of the second respondent while taking note of the
fact that vide judgment dated 20th December, 2012, passed by this Court
in Criminal Appeal No. 1416 of 2012, bail granted to the said respondent
had been cancelled. As a result, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal G
(Crl.) No. 5103 of 2019 filed by the respondent No. 3 was disposed of.
4. On the basis of a complaint made by Smt. Meena Devi, wife of
the deceased, FIR No. 173 of 2012 was registered at P.S. Civil Lines,
District Badaun for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
1
For short ‘the Cr.P.C.’ H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A Indian Penal Code2. It was stated by the appellant/complainant that when
she and her husband, Narain Singh were returning home on a motorcycle
in the evening of 16th June, 2012, after having visited Badaun where he
was to appear in the Court in a case pending trial against the respondent
No. 2 herein, four out of the five accused persons came in a Jeep,
intercepted them and started firing gunshots at Narain Singh on point
B
blank range. Though the complainant’s brother, Sanjeev Kumar Singh
accompanied by one Hari Singh, who were following the deceased and
his wife, had tried to save him and take him to the District Hospital, he
succumbed to the injuries on route. The complainant stated that the dispute
between the parties related to the ownership of a school namely, Janta
C Junior High School, Madhukar Police Station, Tehsil Shahbad, where
her husband was employed as the Head Master. Earlier, on
13th December, 2011, the same set of the accused persons had abducted
her husband from Asafpur Railway Station, Faizganj, Behata.
Respondent No. 2 who claimed ownership of the aforesaid school was
instrumental in the said abduction. A case relating to the said abduction
D
was pending trial in a Court in Badaun where the deceased was the
prime witness. While in detention in jail at Badaun, respondent No. 2
had hatched a conspiracy with four co-accused persons and planned to
eliminate the deceased against whom he bore a grudge of having deposed
against him as a witness in the kidnapping case.
E 5. After the investigation was complete in FIR No.173 of 2012,
the respondent No.2 was charged with the offence under Section 302
read with 149 and 120B IPC. Charges were framed against him and the
co-accused persons on 3rd January, 2014. During the trial, respondent
No.2 was admitted to bail. Vide common judgment dated 6 th January,
F 2018, the Sessions Court held the respondent No. 2 and the other co-
accused persons as guilty for the offence under Section 302 read with
Sections 149 and 120B IPC. Respondent No.2 was sentenced to undergo
life imprisonment. Resultantly, bail granted to the respondent No. 2 and
three other co-accused was cancelled.
G 6. The role of the respondent No. 2 in having hatched a conspiracy
with the other co-accused persons of shooting down the deceased, has
been elaborately dealt with in paras 53 to 55 of the judgment dated
6th January, 2018 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Badaun wherein the testimonies of the three eye witnesses namely,

H 2
For short ‘the IPC’
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 29
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

P.W.-1, the appellant/complainant herein, P.W.-2, Sanjeev Kumar Singh A
(brother of the complainant) and P.W.-3, Hari Singh who was
accompanying P.W.-2, were considered extensively and it was observed
that there was a past history of enmity between the deceased and the
respondent No.2 relating to the management of the school. The deceased
had even lodged a complaint of his attempted abduction against the
B
respondent No.2. Respondent No. 2 had also got FIR Nos. 343/2003
registered against the deceased under Sections 420, 468, 469 and 471
IPC and the latter was even arrested by the police in the said case.
Reference was also made by the trial Court to a letter sent by the
respondent No. 2 from jail, threatening to eliminate the deceased. Thus
motive to eliminate the deceased due to the past grudge was established C
against the respondent No. 2 who was indicated in the crime alongwith
the other co-accused who were closely related to him.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
passed by the trial Court, respondent No. 2 herein and the other accused
persons preferred appeals before the High Court, registered as Criminal D
Appeal Nos. 609 and 610 of 2018. Accompanying the said appeals, were
applications moved by them for grant of regular bail. In the impugned
order, the High Court has recorded the following submissions made by
the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 :-
“The contention of counsel for the appellant is that the E
appellant was on bail during the trial and he has not abused or
misused the liberty of bail granted to him. However, he has a
criminal history of 28 cases including the present two cases which
have been explained in paragraph 36. The further contention is
that if the prosecution story is believed to be true in toto, the only
role assigned to the appellant is of hatching a conspiracy. The F
further contention is that the role of conspiracy has also been
assigned only after the letter was received after three days of the
incident and that is also a photostat copy. The original letter has
not seen the day of light. There is no explanation regarding the
original letter.” G
8. The said bail application was vehemently opposed by the learned
counsel who appeared for the appellant/complainant herein and made
the following submissions before the High Court:-
“The learned counsel for the complainant submitted that
the appellant is a hardened criminal but he does not dispute the H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A fact that the only role assigned to the appellant is that of hatching
a conspiracy and that too from a jail. The appellant is hereby
restrained to approach the complainant or his family members to
threaten them. If threat is extended to the complainant or his family
members, liberty is given to the complainant to move a bail
cancellation application before this Court.”
B
9. After noting the submissions of learned counsel for the
respondent No. 2 and counsel for the complainant and recording that the
learned counsel for the State had also opposed the prayer for bail, the
High Court proceeded to pass the following order: -
“In view of the aforesaid, let the appellant - Shivraj Singh
C alias Lalla Babu convicted and sentenced in S.T. No. 523 of 2013
arising out of Case Crime No. 605 of 2012 under Section 302/
149, 120B IPC, Police State Civil Lines, District Badaun be
released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond with two sureties
each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned.”
D 10. Assailing the impugned order, Ms. Abha R. Sharma, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant/complainant has submitted that the
High Court failed to offer any reasons for exercising its discretion in
favour of the respondent No.2 and granting him bail; that there was
sufficient evidence brought on record before the trial Court which would
E leave no manner of doubt that the appellant’s husband had been shot
dead in broad daylight on account of a conspiracy hatched by the
respondent No.2 with the co-accused persons who were closely related
to him, while he was still in jail; that the deceased had suffered six firearm
injuries at the hands of the other co-accused persons who had acted
specifically on the instructions of the respondent No.2; that the High
F Court has overlooked the fact that the respondent No. 2 is a history-
sheeter who is involved in several criminal cases; that the trial Court
having held the respondent No. 2 as guilty for the offence under Section
302 read with 149 IPC, there was sufficient material on record for
declining him the relief of bail. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant/
complainant handed over a copy of FIR No.517 of 2019 registered at
G
P.S. Shahabad District Rampur against the respondent No. 2 and four
others stating that he had extended a threat to one of the eye witnesses
in the case namely, Hari Singh [P.W. 3] on 24th November, 2019 when
he was going with his wife to the local market and he was warned not to
appear and depose against respondent No.2 in the abduction case of the
H deceased Narain Singh, that was pending trial.
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 31
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

11. Respondent No.1-State has filed a counter affidavit and an A
additional affidavit supporting the present appeals by way of special
leave. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, learned counsel for the State has pointed
out that the impugned order is a cryptic one and unsustainable as the
High Court has failed to consider the nature of the accusations levelled
against the respondent No.2, the gravity of the crime and the severity of
B
the punishment imposed upon him and the fact that there is reasonable
apprehension to the life of the appellant and the other eye witnesses.
Learned counsel alluded to a case registered against the respondent
No.2 at P.S. Shahbad, District Rampur, under Sections 364 and 506 IPC
bearing FIR No. 450 of 2019 and stated that the bail application moved
by him in the said case was rejected by the court of the learned Additional C
Sessions Judge, Badaun, taking note of the fact that he is a history-
sheeter and involved in a number of criminal cases. Thereafter, respondent
No. 2 had filed Bail Application No. 28461 of 2011 before the High
Court and vide order dated 26th April, 2012, he was enlarged on bail.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, Ash Mohammed, the complainant in
D
the said case, had filed Criminal Appeal No.1456 of 2012 before this
Court which was allowed vide order dated 20th September, 2012 and the
bail granted to the respondent No. 2 was cancelled.
12. With the additional affidavit filed by the respondent No.1-
State, in terms of the order dated 16th March, 2022, dilating upon the
criminal antecedents of the respondent No.2 described in the counter E
affidavit as a hardened criminal with 25 criminal cases of serious nature
registered against him in different police stations of different districts in
the State of Uttar Pradesh, a tabulated statement of 37 criminal cases
registered against the said respondent in different districts across the
State of Uttar Pradesh has been filed. Learned State counsel has thus F
urged that bail granted in favour of the respondent No.2 ought to be
cancelled forthwith.
13. On the other hand, Ms. Revathy Raghavan, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent No. 2 seeks to defend the impugned order
stating that the same has been passed being mindful of his advanced age G
and the fact that he is suffering from several old age ailments. She
submitted that there are no special supervening circumstances that would
justify cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent No.2 who had
fully cooperated during the trial. She further stated that from out of the
list of 37 criminal cases registered against the respondent No.2, as
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A furnished by the respondent No.1 – State, he has been acquittal in quite
a few and some are still pending trial and that he has a good case on
merits even in the pending appeal where he has been extended the benefit
of bail by virtue of the impugned order. Therefore, the discretion exercised
by the High Court in favour of the respondent No. 2 does not deserve
any interference.
B
14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions of learned counsel for the appellant – complainant, respondent
No.1 – State and the respondent No. 2 – accused and have carefully
examined the record.
C 15. This Court is called upon to decide as to whether the High
Court has rightly exercised the power conferred under Section 439 of
the Cr.P.C for granting bail in favour of the respondent No. 2 in the
given facts of the case.
16. It cannot be gainsaid that the power to grant bail under Section
D 439 Cr.P.C. is wide ranging. Nonetheless, it has been consistently
emphasized in several judicial verdicts that exercise of the said
discretionary powers vested in the Court when considering grant of bail,
ought to be in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. In Ram
Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh And Others 3, a Division Bench
of this Court had laid down the following guiding principles while
E exercising the power to grant bail:-
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order – but, however,
calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and
not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent
reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that
F the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the
matter being dealt with by the court and facts, however, do always
vary from case to case…… The nature of the offence is one of
the basic considerations for the grant of bail – more heinous is the
crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though,
G however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.
4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed to
be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this juncture,
though however, the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive,
neither there can be any. The consideration being:
3
H (2002) 3 SCC 598,
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 33
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the A
nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if
the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence in
support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered
with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant B
should also weigh with the court in the matter of grant of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought
always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of
the charge. C
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is
only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered
in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of there being some
doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course
of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.” D
17. Holding as above, the Court went on to consider the guiding
factors when called upon to assess the validity of an order passed by the
High Court granting bail and has opined that ordinarily, this Court would
refrain from interfering with an order passed by the High Court, either
granting or rejecting the relief of bail to an accused. However, wherever E
it is noticed that such a discretion has been exercised by the High Court
without proper application of mind or in contravention of the directions
issued by this Court, such an order shall be susceptible to interference.
18. In a recent decision, authored by one of us (Dr. D.Y.
Chandrachud, J.) in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia And F
Another4, a case where the offence committed was under Section 302
of the IPC, trial was pending before the Sessions Court and the bail
application filed by the respondent was rejected by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge but was subsequently allowed by the High Court, the
following pertinent observations have been made :
G
“12. The determination of whether a case is fit for the grant of
bail involves the balancing of numerous factors, among which the
nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment and a prima
facie view of the involvement of the accused are important. No

4
(2020) 2 SCC 118 H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A straitjacket formula exists for courts to assess an application for
the grant or rejection of bail. At the stage of assessing whether a
case is fit for the grant of bail, the court is not required to enter
into a detailed analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime by the accused.
That is a matter for trial. However, the Court is required to examine
B
whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe
that the accused had committed the offence and on a balance of
the considerations involved, the continued custody of the accused
subserves the purpose of the criminal justice system. Where bail
has been granted by a lower court, an appellate court must be
C slow to interfere and ought to be guided by the principles set out
for the exercise of the power to set aside bail.
xxx
14. The provision for an accused to be released on bail touches
upon the liberty of an individual. It is for this reason that this Court
D does not ordinarily interfere with an order of the High Court
granting bail. However, where the discretion of the High Court to
grant bail has been exercised without the due application of mind
or in contravention of the directions of this Court, such an order
granting bail is liable to be set aside. The Court is required to
E factor, amongst other things, a prima facie view that the accused
had committed the offence, the nature and gravity of the offence
and the likelihood of the accused obstructing the proceedings of
the trial in any manner or evading the course of justice. The
provision for being released on bail draws an appropriate balance
between public interest in the administration of justice and the
F protection of individual liberty pending adjudication of the case.
However, the grant of bail is to be secured within the bounds of
the law and in compliance with the conditions laid down by this
Court. It is for this reason that a court must balance numerous
factors that guide the exercise of the discretionary power to grant
G bail on a case-by-case basis. Inherent in this determination is
whether, on an analysis of the record, it appears that there is a
prima facie or reasonable cause to believe that the accused had
committed the crime. It is not relevant at this stage for the court
to examine in detail the evidence on record to come to a conclusive
finding.”
H
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 35
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

19. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee And A
Another5, where the accused was facing trial for an offence punishable
under Section 302 of the IPC and though his persistent bail applications
were rejected by the trial Court, the High Court had granted him bail,
which order was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court, the following
guidelines were enunciated for assessing the correctness of an order
B
passed by the High Court while granting bail:
“9. ………It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail
to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High
Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly
in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of C
decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among
other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had committed the offence; D

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released
on bail; E
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the
accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; F
and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of
bail.”
20. The aforesaid principles have been underscored in several
decisions rendered by this Court including Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. G
Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and Another6, Narendra K. Amin
(Dr.) v. State of Gujarat and Another7, Dipak Shubhashchandra
5
(2010) 14 SCC 496
6
(2004) 7 SCC 528
7
(2008) 13 SCC 584 H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A Mehta v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another8, Abdul Basit
alias Raju and Others v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary and
Another9, Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another10,
Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another11, Mahipal
v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia and Another12, and as recently as in
Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and
B
Another13, Ms. Y. v. State of Rajasthan and Another14 and Ms. P. v.
State of Madhya Pradesh and Another15.
21. At the cost of repetition, it may be highlighted that the
considerations that weigh with the Appellate Court when called upon to
examine the correctness of an order granting bail is not on the same
C footing when it comes to examining an application moved for cancellation
of bail. The yardstick for testing the correctness of an order granting
bail is whether the court below has exercised its discretion in an improper
or arbitrary manner thereby vitiating the said order. When it comes to
assessing an application seeking cancellation of bail, the Appellate Court
D looks out for, amongst others, supervening circumstances or any violation
of the conditions of bail imposed on the person who has been accorded
such a relief. In this context, we may profitably cite the decision of a
Division Bench of this Court in Prakash Kadam and Others v.
Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta and Another16, where it was held thus :
E “18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the court has also
to consider the gravity and nature of the offence, prima facie
case against the accused, the position and standing of the accused,
etc. If there are very serious allegations against the accused his
bail may be cancelled even if he has not misused the bail granted
to him. Moreover, the above principle applies when the same court
F which granted bail is approached for cancelling the bail. It will not
apply when the order granting bail is appealed against before an
appellate/Revisional Court.
8
(2012) 4 SCC 134
9
(2014) 10 SCC 754
10
G (2014) 16 SCC 508
11
(2018) 12 SCC 129
12
(2020) 2 SCC 118
13
(2022) SCC online SC 453
14
2022 SCC OnLine SC 458
15
Criminal Appeal No.740 of 2022 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3564 of 2022) decided
on 05.05.2022.
16
H (2011) 6 SCC 189
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 37
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

19. In our opinion, there is no absolute rule that once bail is granted A
to the accused then it can only be cancelled if there is likelihood
of misuse of the bail. That factor, though no doubt important, is
not the only factor. There are several other factors also which
may be seen while deciding to cancel the bail.”
22. The aforesaid principles guiding the grant of bail have been B
restated in Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh And Another17, in
the following words:
“12. We have referred to certain principles to be kept in mind
while granting bail, as has been laid down by this Court from time
to time. It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is C
granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some
supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have
occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order
granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case,
the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration
while dealing with the application for bail have not been taken D
note of, or bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably
the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail.
Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate
realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the court does
not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the E
supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It,
on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of
the order passed by the court.”
23. In a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in
Imran v. Mohammed Bhava and Another18 it has been held as follows: F
23. Indeed, it is a well-established principle that once bail has been
granted it would require overwhelming circumstances for its
cancellation. However, this Court in its judgment in Vipan Kumar
Dhir v. State of Punjab has also reiterated, that while
conventionally, certain supervening circumstances impeding fair G
trial must develop after granting bail to an accused, for its
cancellation by a superior court, bail, can also be revoked by a
superior court, when the previous court granting bail has ignored

17
(2014) 16 SCC 508
18
2022 SCC Online SC 496 H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A relevant material available on record, gravity of the offence or its
societal impact. It was thus observed:—
“9. …… Conventionally, there can be supervening circumstances
which may develop post the grant of bail and are non conducive
to fair trial, making it necessary to cancel the bail. This Court
B in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana observed that:
“Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and
the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and
dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming
circumstances are necessary for an order directing the
C cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking,
the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and
not exhaustive) are : interference or attempt to interfere with
the due course of administration of Justice or evasion or attempt
to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession
granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the
D court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the
possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason
justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted
should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without
considering whether any supervening circumstances have
E rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the
accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of
bail during the trial.”
10. These principles have been reiterated time and again, more
recently by a 3 Judge Bench of this Court in X v. State of
F Telegana and Another.
11. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s),
bail can also be revoked where the court has considered
irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on
record which renders the order granting bail legally untenable.
G The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal
impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the investigation
is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a
Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the
miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of
criminal justice system…”
H
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 39
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

24. xxxxxxx A
25. xxxxxxx
26. Thus, while considering cancellation of bail already granted
by a lower court, would indeed require significant scrutiny at
the instance of superior court, however, bail when granted can
always be revoked if the relevant material on record, gravity B
of the offence or its societal impact have not been considered
by the lower court. In such instances, where bail is granted in
a mechanical manner, the order granting bail is liable to be set
aside. Moreover, the decisions cited herein above, enumerate
certain basic principles which must be borne in mind when C
deciding upon an application for grant of bail. Thus, while each
case has its own unique factual matrix, which assumes a
significant role in determination of bail matters, grant of bail
must also be exercised by having regard to the above-
mentioned well-settled principles.
D
24. Coming back to the case in hand, a glance at the impugned
order passed by the High Court is to state the least, cryptic and non-
speaking, amply demonstrating non-application of mind. The High Court
appears to have shut its eyes to the common submissions made by learned
counsel for the appellant/complainant and the counsel for the State that
the respondent No.2 is a hardened criminal with several cases registered E
against him. Enclosed with the additional affidavit filed by the respondent
No. 1- State, is a list of cases registered against the respondent No. 2
which reveals that he has faced/is still facing trial in the following thirty-
seven cases registered against him under the IPC, The Arms Act, 1959,
The Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) F
Act, 1986, The U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970, The Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, etc., where
the offences are grave in nature:-

G

H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 41
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

23. 187/88 Rampur -do- 3(1) Gangster Act A.D.J.-5 Acquitted A
P.S.
Shahbad
24. 485/94 Rampur -do- 147/148/324/504/506 A.D.J. – 2 Acquitted
P.S. IPC & 3(1)10 S.S .. T Act
Shahbad
25. 158/97 Rampur -do- 3(1) Gunda Act A.D.M. Closed
P.S.
Shahbad
26. 345/99 Rampur -do- 147/148/149/325/307 IPC J.M. Final Report B
P.S.
Shahbad
27. 169/10 Rampur -do- 147/323/504/506 IPC J.M. Acquitted
P.S.
Shahbad
28. 841/11 Rampur -do- 307/326 IPC J.M. Final report
P.S.
Shahbad
29. 507/11 Rampur -do- 147/506 IPC J.M. Acquitted C
P.S.
Shahbad
30. 623/05 Rampur -do- 302 IPC A.D.J. – 1 Life
P.S. imprisonment
Shahbad
31. 380/19 Rampur -do- 364/323/504/506 IPC A.C.J.M. Final report
P.S. –2 for
Shahbad cancellation
of crime D
32. 450/19 Rampur -do- 147/148/341/279/338/504/307/506 A.C.J.M. Final report
P.S. IPC –2 for
Shahbad cancellation
of crime
33. 499/19 Rampur -do- 147/148/307/506 IPC A.C.J.M. Pending
P.S. –2 investigation
Shahbad
34. 1031/2009 Rampur State Vs. 147/148/149/323/283/ A.C.J.M. Under trial E
P.S. Munna 7-Act –2
Shahbad Lal & District
Ors. Rampur
35. 3633/2016 Rampur State Vs. 420/467/468 IPC A.C.J.M. Under trial
P.S. Shivraj –2
Shahbad Singh
36. 232/2012 Rampur -State Vs. 3(1) Gangster Act A.S.J. Under trial
P.S. Bajraj Gangster
Shahbad Singh Rampur F
37. 195/2021 Rampur State Vs. 304/120-8 IPC Special Under trial
P.S. Sonu & Judge/
Shahbad Ors. S.C.S.T.
Rampur

25. Even if one ignores eighteen cases, out of the aforesaid list of
cases registered against the respondent No.2, fact remains that he is
continuing to face trial in the remaining cases. G
26. In one such case, subject matter of Criminal Appeal No.770
of 2011 registered against the respondent No.2 for offences under
Sections 364 and 506 IPC, the bail application moved by him was rejected
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur. When the respondent
H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A No.2 moved a similar application before the High Court under Section
439 of the Cr.P.C., the same was allowed vide order dated 26th July,
2012. Aggrieved by the said order, the complainant therein, Ash
Mohammed preferred an appeal before this Court registered as Criminal
Appeal No.1456 of 2012. After taking into consideration the involvement
of the respondent No.2 in several crimes, duly extracted in para 27 of
B
the judgment in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu
And Another19, a Division Bench of this Court had questioned the
propriety of the order granting bail to the respondent No.2, and had set
aside the impugned order. Speaking for the Bench, Justice Dipak Misra
(as the then Hon’ble Chief Justice was) held as under:
C “30. We may usefully state that when the citizens are scared to
lead a peaceful life and this kind of offences usher in an impediment
in establishment of orderly society, the duty of the court becomes
more pronounced and the burden is heavy. There should have
been proper analysis of the criminal antecedents. Needless to
D say, imposition of conditions is subsequent to the order admitting
an accused to bail. The question should be posed whether the
accused deserves to be enlarged on bail or not and only thereafter
issue of imposing conditions would arise. We do not deny for a
moment that period of custody is a relevant factor but
simultaneously the totality of circumstances and the criminal
E antecedents are also to be weighed. They are to be weighed in
the scale of collective cry and desire. The societal concern has to
be kept in view in juxtaposition of individual liberty. Regard being
had to the said parameter we are inclined to think that the social
concern in the case at hand deserves to be given priority over
F lifting the restriction on liberty of the accused.”
27. It is also noteworthy that in the past decade, six cases more
have been registered against the respondent No.2, as would be apparent
from a comparison of the list forming a part of the order in the case of
Ash Mohammad (supra) with the current list extracted above. It is
G also relevant to note that the list that has been furnished to this Court by
the respondent No.1-State, does not mention eleven cases that had been
mentioned in the list of cases pending against the respondent No.2 and
extracted in para 27 of the order passed in Ash Mohammad (supra), at
Sr. Nos. 4, 12, 17 and 23 to 30. If the said cases are added to the current
19
H (2012) 9 SCC 446
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 43
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

list of thirty-seven criminal cases registered against the respondent No.2, A
the number of criminal cases registered against the him would swell to
fifty.
28. In the above facts and circumstances, we are compelled to
observe that the High Court has failed to factor in the relevant material
before passing an order enlarging the respondent No.2 on bail. Not just B
that, the High Court has seriously erred in not offering any reason, good,
bad or indifferent, for exercising its discretion in favour of the said
respondent. There is no reference made to any particular element that
has persuaded the High Court to pass the impugned order granting bail
to the respondent No.2. Mechanically recording the submissions made
by the learned counsel for the accused and the complainant and noting C
the protest of the learned counsel for the State and thereafter proceeding
to release the respondent No.2 on bail by pre-fixing the operative para
of the order with the words “In view of the aforesaid”, can hardly
reflect application of judicial mind by the Court. As an Appellate Court,
we are completely at seas to discern the factors that have weighed with D
the High Court to enlarge the respondent No.2 on bail.
29. In Puran v. Rambilas20 pointing out the vice of arbitrariness
in an unreasoned order, this Court held that: -
“8. …Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or
demerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of E
evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case
ha not to be undertaken. What the Additional Sessions Judge ad
done in the order dated 11-9-2000 was to discuss the merits and
demerits of the evidence. That was what was deprecated. That
did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for prima F
facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be
indicated.”
30. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu
Yadav And Another21 it was observed by this Court that: -
“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well G
settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the
stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and
20
(2001) 6 SCC 338
21
(2004) 7 SCC 528 H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.

A elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be
undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for
prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly
where the accused is charged of having committed a serious
offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from
non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting
B
bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors
also before granting bail; they are:
(a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in
case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.
C (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or
apprehension of threat to the complainant.
(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.”
31. Citing the aforesaid decision, in Mahipal (supra), this Court
has stressed the necessity of recording reasons for granting bail in
D offences that are non-bailable in nature in the following words: -
“25. Merely recording “having perused the record” and “on the
facts and circumstances of the case” does not subserve the purpose
of a reasoned judicial order. It is a fundamental premise of open
justice, to which our judicial system is committed, that factors
E which have weighed in the mind of the Judge in the rejection or
the grant of bail are recorded in the order passed. Open justice is
premised on the notion that justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The duty
of Judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the heart of this
F commitment. Questions of the grant of bail concern both liberty
of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution as well as the
interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who
commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice.
Judges are duty-bound to explain the basis on which they have
arrived at a conclusion.”
G
32. In the instant case, looking at the gravity of the offence
committed by the respondent No. 2 under Section 302 of the IPC for
which he has been convicted by the trial Court and awarded a sentence
of life imprisonment and noting that the period of custody undergone by
him is only for nine months and further, having regard to his criminal
H antecedents, we have no hesitation in quashing and setting aside the
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER 45
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

impugned order dated 19th September, 2018 passed by the High Court. A
The bail bonds of the respondent No.2 are cancelled and he is directed
to surrender forthwith. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
33. Before parting with the case, it is clarified that the present
judgment shall not be treated as an expression on the merits of the appeal
preferred by the respondent No.2 against the judgment dated 6th January, B
2018 passed by the Sessions Court, which is pending consideration before
the High Court. It is also clarified that this order shall also not preclude
the respondent No.2 from applying afresh for bail at a later stage, if any,
new circumstances are brought to light.
34. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the High Court C
and the concerned Police Station for perusal and compliance.

Nidhi Jain Appeal disposed of.
(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)

D

E

F

G

H