Supreme Court of India
MD. FIROZ AHMAD KHALIDversusTHE STATE OF MANIPUR & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 535
- Decided
- 22 April 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M M SUNDRESH
Holding
Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the Wakf Act, 1995 must be interpreted to make the tenure of a Muslim Bar Council member on the Waqf Board co‑terminous with his membership in the Bar Council, so the member ceases to be on the Board when his Bar Council term ends.
Summary
The appellant, a Muslim member of the Manipur Bar Council, was appointed to the State Waqf Board under Section 14(1)(b)(iii) of the Wakf Act, 1995. After a former board member (respondent No.3) lost his Bar Council seat, he challenged the appointment, arguing that Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) only applies to MPs and legislators, not Bar Council members, and therefore the appellant’s tenure should not be affected by his Bar Council term. The High Court Division Bench held that the explanation did not apply to Bar Council members and set aside the appointment. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme, the purpose of the explanation, and the provisos to Section 14(2), concluding that the eligibility to sit on the Board hinges on continued membership in the qualifying body. It held that the explanation must be read purposively to make the Bar Council member’s tenure co‑terminous with his Bar Council membership, and that the High Court’s view contradicted legislative intent. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment, restored the earlier order dismissing the writ petition, and allowed the appeals.
Issues considered
- Whether Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the Wakf Act, 1995 applies to a Muslim member of the Bar Council, requiring his Board membership to cease upon the expiry of his Bar Council term.
- Whether the statutory scheme and the provisos to Section 14(2) imply a co‑terminous tenure for Bar Council members on the Waqf Board.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14
- Wakf Act, 1995s. 14(1)(b)(iii), s. 14(2), s. 14(3)
Subjects
Wakf ActBar CouncilWaqf BoardStatutory interpretationExplanation IICo‑terminous tenureArticle 14Reasonable classificationPurposive constructionExpressio unius est exclusio alterius
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1444 : 2025 INSC 535
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid
v.
The State of Manipur & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 3797 of 2025)
22 April 2025
[M.M. Sundresh* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether a Muslim Member of the Bar Council of the State or the
Union territory (Bar Council), duly elected as a Member of the
Waqf Board (Board) constituted u/s.14 of the Wakf Act, 1995,
can continue to hold the said position, even after the expiry of his
tenure in the Bar Council.
Headnotes†
Wakf Act, 1995 – Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) – Appellant
was elected as a Member of the Bar Council – Thereafter,
he was appointed as one of the members of the 7th Waqf
Board Committee, since earlier member-respondent no.3 had
ceased to be the member of the Bar Council of Manipur –
Respondent no.3 filed writ petition – The challenge was on
the ground that there is no provision under the 1995 Act,
which stipulates that a Member of the Board shall cease to
continue in his position, if he is no longer a Member of the
Bar Council – The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed
the writ petition – However, the Division Bench of the High
Court set aside the order appointing appellant as a member
of the Board – Correctness:
Held: The words “for the removal of doubts” in Explanation II to
s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, throw light on the clarificatory nature
of the said Explanation – Although Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of
the 1995 Act does not explicitly mention that the term of a Muslim
Member of the Bar Council in the Board, is also co-terminus with
their term in the Bar Council, this must be understood to be implied,
upon a reading of the provision as a whole – This is because the
eligibility of persons under the categories listed in s.14(b)(i), 14(b)(ii),
and 14(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act, hinges on their membership in
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1445
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
either the Parliament, or the State Legislative Assembly, or the
Bar Council respectively – Without such membership in the
Parliament, or the State Legislative Assembly or the Bar Council,
the very basis for their membership in the Board ceases to exist –
There is no satisfactory justification to exclude the applicability of
Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to a Member of the
Bar Council – Such an exclusion would, in fact, run contrary to
the legislative intent behind the statute – The implied inclusion,
is also supported by the two provisos appended to s.14(2) of the
1995 Act – Therefore, respondent No. 3, who is no longer holding
the said post of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, cannot be
allowed to contend that even after he had ceased to be a Member
of the Bar Council, he would be entitled to continue as a Member
of the Board – Presently, the appellant is the only Muslim Member
in the concerned Bar Council – There is no dispute with respect to
the appellant’s eligibility to be a Member of the Board by virtue of
his membership in the Bar Council – Thus, the impugned judgment
set aside. [Paras 11, 12, 18, 19]
Constitution of India – Art.14 – Doctrine of reasonable
classification – Applicability on Explanation II to s.14(1)(b)
of the 1995 Act:
Held: Extending the applicability of Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of
the 1995 Act, even to a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, is only
but natural even in light of the doctrine of reasonable classification
that has evolved from the jurisprudence on Art.14 of the Constitution
of India, 1950, which provides for equality before the law and equal
protection of the law – A classification would be reasonable only
when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus
with the object sought to be achieved through the statute – In the
instant case, giving an overreaching interpretation to Explanation
II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to imply that a Muslim Member of
the Bar Council shall continue to hold membership in the Board,
despite losing their position in the former post, would amount
to treating Members of Parliament and Members of the State
Legislative Assembly differently from Members of the Bar Council –
No intelligible differentia is discernible for such a classification from
the scheme of the provision – In fact, it is tantamount to rewriting
the provision in its entirety – Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the
1995 Act must be given a harmonious construction and purposive
interpretation to mean that the term of a Member of the Bar Council
1446 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
serving on the Board, is co-terminus with their membership in the
Bar Council itself. [Para 15]
Interpretation of Statutes – Object of any provision – A proviso
or an explanation may be used for several purposes:
Held: The object of any provision must be seen in light of the
provisions surrounding it, which includes the proviso(s) and the
explanation(s) appended to it – When a right accrues to a person
pursuant to a position that they hold, it ultimately becomes a
qualification – Once such qualification ceases to exist, that person
would not be eligible to hold any other post based on his earlier
position, unless the statute categorically facilitates the same – An
explanation, which is simply in the nature of a clarification as
regards certain categories, cannot be read in a manner which is
violative of the substantive part of the provision – Although normally,
a proviso cannot be used to understand the substantive part of
the provision, there is no absolute bar in doing so, particularly in
cases where the statute is peculiar and the proviso does not create
any exception – For the aforementioned purpose, an explanation
can also be understood through the proviso – In other words, if
a proviso or an explanation, as the case may be, is phrased in
a manner which throws more light on the objective behind the
substantive part of the provision, there would be no difficulty in
appreciating the same – Ultimately, a proviso or an explanation
may be used for several purposes – Therefore, what is required is
that Courts appreciate the context of such usage before rendering
an interpretation to a provision vis-a-vis the proviso or explanation
contained therein. [Para 14]
Legal Maxim – “Expressio unius est exclusion alterius” – Not
applicable. [Para 16]
Case Law Cited
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [1977] 2
SCR 790 : (1977) 2 SCC 548; S. Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman
[1985] 2 SCR 643 : (1985) 1 SCC 591; Government of Andhra
Pradesh v. Corporation Bank [2007] 4 SCR 530 : (2007) 9 SCC
55; Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC
695; Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla [2015] 12
SCR 70 : (2016) 3 SCC 619; Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern
Metals & Ferro Alloys [2010] 10 SCR 779 : (2011) 11 SCC 334;
Asstt. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co. [1973] 1
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1447
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
SCR 822 : (1972) 2 SCC 560; State of Karnataka v. Union of India
[1978] 2 SCR 1 : (1977) 4 SCC 608 – relied on.
The State of Maharashtra v. Shaikh Mahemud & Anr., Civil Appeal
No. 2784 of 2022 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 11652 of 2021 decided on 06.04.2022; Shri Asif S/o. Shaukat
Qureshi v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr., Writ Petition No.
4343 of 2016 decided on 22.12.2016 by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench; Union of India v. B.C.
Nawn and Others, 1971 SCC OnLine Cal 180 : (1972) 84 ITR 526 :
1971 Tax LR 1198; Seaford Court Estates Ld. v. Asher [(1949) 2
K.B. 481] – referred to.
List of Acts
Wakf Act, 1995; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Interpretation to Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the Wakf
Act, 1995; Muslim Member of the Bar Council; Member of Waqf
Board; Waqf Board Committee; Mandatory provision; Clarificatory
nature; Substantive part of provision; “Expressio unius est exclusion
alterius”; Implied inclusion; Contrary to legislative intent behind the
statute; Article 14 of Constitution of India; Doctrine of reasonable
classification; Intelligible differentia; Harmonious construction;
Purposive interpretation; Co-terminus.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3797 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2023 of the High Court
of Manipur at Imphal in WA No. 75 of 2023
With
Civil Appeal No. 3798 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
R Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Karun
Sharma, Ms. Anupama Ngangom, Rajkumari Divyasana, David
Ahongsangbam, S Gunabanta Meitei, Debashish Misra, Rahul
Kumar, Rajeev L Mahunta, Ms. Rajkumari Banju.
1448 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Advs. for the Respondents:
B.P. Sahu, Sr. Adv., Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Karun Sharma,
Ms. Anupama Ngangom, Ms. Rajkumari Divyasana, B. Krishna
Prasad, Mrs. Rajani K Prasad.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
M.M. Sundresh, J.
1. Whether a Muslim Member of the Bar Council of the State or the
Union territory (hereinafter referred to as “the Bar Council”), duly
elected as a Member of the Waqf Board (hereinafter referred to as
“the Board”) constituted under Section 14 of the Wakf Act, 1995
(hereinafter referred to as “the 1995 Act”), can continue to hold the
said position, even after the expiry of his tenure in the Bar Council,
is the short issue that arises for consideration in these appeals.
2. The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows :–
A Gazette notification had been issued by the Bar Council of Manipur
on 26.12.2022, vide which the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3797
of 2025 (hereinafter referred to as the “appellant”), had been
elected as a Member of the Bar Council. Subsequently, an order
was issued by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Minority Affairs),
Government of Manipur, on 08.02.2023, appointing the appellant as
one of the Members of the 7th Waqf Board Committee, in exercise
of powers conferred under Section 14(1)(b)(iii) and Section 14(3)
of the 1995 Act, since respondent No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 3797
of 2025 (hereinafter referred to as “respondent No. 3”), being an
earlier Member of the Board, had ceased to be a Member of the
Bar Council of Manipur.
3. Respondent No. 3 had filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 304 of 2023
before the High Court of Manipur at Imphal, praying for the order
dated 08.02.2023, vide which the appellant had been appointed
to the Board, to be quashed. The challenge to the said order was
on the ground that there is no provision under the 1995 Act, which
stipulates that a Member of the Board shall cease to continue in
his position, if he is no longer a Member of the Bar Council. Vide
judgment and order dated 23.08.2023, the Single Judge dismissed
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1449
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 304 of 2023 as respondent No. 3 had lost
the Bar Council election held on 17.12.2022, and therefore, as per
the mandate of Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act,
he cannot be a Member of the Board, any longer.
4. Vide impugned judgment dated 23.11.2023, the Division Bench of the
High Court, placing reliance on Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of
the 1995 Act, has arrived at the conclusion that the said Explanation
only speaks about instances wherein a Member of the Board, who
ceases to be a Member of Parliament or Member of the State
Legislative Assembly, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have
vacated their position in the Board. The Division Bench has further
concluded that the said Explanation does not apply to a Member of
the Board, who ceases to hold their position as a Muslim Member
of the concerned Bar Council, and that they would continue to hold
their position as a Member of the Board, regardless of them having
ceased to be a Muslim Member of the Bar Council. Consequently, the
order dated 08.02.2023 issued by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary
(Minority Affairs), Government of Manipur appointing the appellant as
a Member of the Board in place of respondent No. 3, was set aside,
and the State of Manipur was directed to continue the services of
respondent No. 3 as a Member of the 7th Waqf Board Committee, till
the completion of the term of his office as stipulated under Section
15 of the 1995 Act.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and learned
counsel appearing for the State of Manipur submit that Section 14 of
the 1995 Act, is clear and unambiguous. Sub-section (1) which deals
with the composition of the Board, stipulates that the Board shall
mandatorily consist of a Chairperson, and amongst other members,
it would comprise Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or
the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Muslim Members of the State
Legislative Assembly, and Muslim Members of the Bar Council.
Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act merely clarifies that
an individual who ceases to be either a Member of Parliament or a
Member of the State Legislative Assembly, from the said community,
would be deemed to have vacated their office as a Member of the
Board. The interpretation as rendered by the Division Bench of the
High Court, vide the impugned judgment, would militate against the
very legislative intent of the substantial part of the provision, and,
therefore, the same ought to be interfered with.
1450 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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6. Per-contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 by
placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in The State of
Maharashtra vs. Shaikh Mahemud & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.2784
of 2022 arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11652 of
2021) decided on 06.04.2022, and the decision of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Shri Asif S/o.
Shaukat Qureshi vs. The State of Maharashtra and Anr. (Writ
Petition No. 4343 of 2016) decided on 22.12.2016, submits that
one shall read the provision as a whole, and not in piecemeal. The
Legislature, in its wisdom, has thought it fit to apply Explanation II
to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, only to a Member of Parliament,
or a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, who ceases to
hold the said posts. Placing reliance on the maxim, “expressio
unius est exclusio alterius”, he submits that there is a conscious
omission on the part of the Legislature to the effect that a Member
of the Bar Council is excluded from the purview of Explanation II.
In such view of the matter, there is no need for interference in the
impugned judgment.
7. On a conspectus of the arguments advanced by both the sides, we
deem it fit to firstly extract Section 14 of the 1995 Act:
Section 14 of the 1995 Act
“14. Composition of Board.- (1) The Board for a State
and the National Capital Territory of Delhi shall consist of-
(a) a Chairperson;
(b) one and not more than two members, as the State
Government may think fit, to be elected from each of the
electoral colleges consisting of-
(i) Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or, as
the case may be, the National Capital Territory of Delhi;
(ii) Muslim Members of the State Legislature;
(iii) Muslim members of the Bar Council of the
concerned State or Union territory:
Provided that in case there is no Muslim member of the
Bar Council of a State or a Union territory, the State
Government or the Union territory administration, as the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1451
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
case may be, may nominate any senior Muslim advocate
from that State or the Union territory, and
(iv) mutawallis of the auqaf having an annual income of
rupees one lakh and above.
Explanation I - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that the members from categories mentioned in
sub-clauses (i) to (iv), shall be elected from the electoral
college constituted for each category.
Explanation II. - For the removal of doubts it is hereby
declared that in case a Muslim member ceases to be
a Member of Parliament from the State or National
Capital Territory of Delhi as referred to in sub-clause
(i) of clause (b) or ceases to be a Member of the State
Legislative Assembly as required under sub-clause (ii)
of clause (b), such member shall be deemed to have
vacated the office of the member of the Board for
the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi, as the
case may be, from the date from which such member
ceased to be a Member of Parliament from the State
National Capital Territory of Delhi, or a Member of the
State Legislative Assembly, as the case may be;
(c) one person from amongst Muslims, who has
professional experience in town planning or business
management, social work, finance or revenue, agriculture
and development activities, to be nominated by the State
Government;
(d) one person each from amongst Muslims, to be
nominated by the State Government from recognised
scholars in Shia and Sunni Islamic Theology;
(e) one person from amongst Muslims, to be nominated
by the State Government from amongst the officers of the
State Government not below the rank of Joint Secretary
to the State Government;
(1-A) No Minister of the Central Government or, as the
case may be, a State Government, shall be elected or
nominated as a member of the Board:
1452 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Provided that in case of a Union territory, the Board shall
consist of not less than five and not more than seven
members to be appointed by the Central Government from
categories specified under sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (b)
or clauses (c) to (e) in sub-section (1):
Provided further that at least two Members appointed on
the Board shall be women:
Provided also that in every case where the system of
mutawalli exists, there shall be one mutawalli as the
member of the Board.
(2) Election of the members specified in clause (b) of
sub-section (1) shall be held in accordance with the
system of proportional representation by means of a
single transferable vote, in such manner as may be
prescribed:
Provided that where the number of Muslim Members
of Parliament, the State Legislature or the State Bar
Council, as the case may be, is only one, such Muslim
Member shall be declared to have been elected on
the Board:
Provided further that where there are no Muslim
Members in any or the categories mentioned in
sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section
(1), the ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, the State
Legislature or ex-member of the State Bar Council, as
the case may be, shall constitute the electoral college.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,
where the State Government is satisfied, for reasons to
be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable
to constitute an electoral college for any of the categories
mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of
sub-section (1), the State Government may nominate such
persons as the members of the Board as it deems fit.
(4) The number of elected members of the Board shall,
at all times, be more than the nominated members of the
Board except as provided under sub-section (3).
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1453
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
(6) In determining the number of Shia members or Sunni
members of the Board, the State Government shall have
regard to the number and value of Shia auqaf and Sunni
auqaf to be administered by the Board and appointment
of the members shall be made, so far as may be, in
accordance with such determination.
(8) Whenever the Board is constituted or re-constituted,
the members of the Board present at a meeting convened
for the purpose shall elect one from amongst themselves
as the Chairperson of the Board.
(9) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the
State Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. Section 14 of the 1995 Act, as extracted above, has two parts
to it. While Section 14(1) of the 1995 Act concerns itself with the
composition of the Board, and lists out the eligibility criteria for
membership to the Board, Section 14(2) of the 1995 Act provides
for the mode of election, and the eventualities in case of a lack of,
or unavailability of eligible Muslim Members as provided for under
Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act. Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act
facilitates for one and at the most two Members each to be elected
from the electoral colleges comprising (i) Muslim Members of
Parliament, (ii) Muslim Members of the State Legislative Assembly
and (iii) Muslim Members of the Bar Council. Only in the event that
there is no Muslim Member of the Bar Council available, the State
Government or the Union territory administration, as the case may
be is given the discretion to nominate any Senior Muslim advocate to
the electoral college. As is evident from the language of Section 14
of the 1995 Act, this is a mandatory provision.
9. Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act merely clarifies that
in case a Member of the Board ceases to be a Member of Parliament
or a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, such Member shall
be deemed to have vacated the office of the Member of the Board
from the date on which they ceased to be a Member of Parliament
or Member of the State Legislative Assembly, as the case may be.
The difficulty herein has arisen on account of the fact that a Muslim
Member of the Bar Council serving as a Member of the Board, does
1454 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
not find a specific mention in Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the
1995 Act with respect to their deemed vacation of office, pursuant
to ceasing to be a Member of the concerned Bar Council.
10. To interpret a legislative provision, what must be primarily considered
is its substantive part. An explanation simply performs a clarifying
function. In other words, the substantive part of a provision cannot
be understood solely from the point of view of an explanation.
11. The words “for the removal of doubts” in Explanation II to Section 14(1)
(b) of the 1995 Act, throw light on the clarificatory nature of the said
Explanation. Although Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995
Act does not explicitly mention that the term of a Muslim Member of
the Bar Council in the Board, is also co-terminus with their term in the
Bar Council, this must be understood to be implied, upon a reading
of the provision as a whole. This is because the eligibility of persons
under the categories listed in Section 14(b)(i), 14(b)(ii), and 14(b)(iii)
of the 1995 Act, hinges on their membership in either the Parliament,
or the State Legislative Assembly, or the Bar Council respectively.
Without such membership in the Parliament, or the State Legislative
Assembly or the Bar Council, the very basis for their membership
in the Board ceases to exist. There is no satisfactory justification to
exclude the applicability of Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the
1995 Act, to a Member of the Bar Council. Such an exclusion would,
in fact, run contrary to the legislative intent behind the statute.
12. Upon reading the provision as a whole, we find that the implied
inclusion, as aforestated, is also supported by the two provisos
appended to Section 14(2) of the 1995 Act. Section 14(2) of the
1995 Act provides that the election of the Members specified in
Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, shall be held in accordance with
the system of proportional representation by means of a single
transferable vote, in such manner as may be prescribed. The first
proviso makes it clear that where the number of Muslim Members of
Parliament, State Legislative Assembly, or Bar Council, as the case
may be, is only one, the said person shall be declared to have been
elected as a Member of the Board. More pertinently, the second
proviso clarifies that where there are no Muslim Members in any
of the three categories mentioned in Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995
Act, ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, State Legislative Assembly
or ex-Member of Bar Council, as the case may be, shall constitute
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1455
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
the electoral college. In simpler terms, the first proviso reiterates the
fact that there are twin conditions, to be eligible to be a Member of
the Board, namely:
1. The candidate must be from the Muslim community, and
2. The candidate must hold a position either as a Member of
Parliament, or a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, or
a Member of the Bar Council.
The aforementioned conditions are reiterated with further clarity in
the second proviso. The second proviso states that by way of an
exception based on a factual contingency, in the event that there
are no Muslim Members available in any of the categories listed in
Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, an ex-Member of Parliament, State
Legislative Assembly or an ex-Member of the Bar Council, as the
case may be, would constitute the electoral college.
13. This makes it clear that an ex-Member of the Bar Council would
constitute the electoral college only when there is no eligible Member
as provided for in Section 14(1)(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act, and the proviso
contained therein. This means that if there is no serving Muslim
Member in the Bar Council and also no Senior Muslim advocate who
is available, only then would an ex-Member of the Bar Council be
eligible to be a Member of the Board. It is thus, axiomatic to state
that an existing Muslim Member of the Board from the Bar Council,
would cease to be a Member of the Board, upon the completion of
their tenure as a Member of the Bar Council, when there is another
Muslim Member available to replace them from within the Bar Council.
Thus, upon a reading of the entire provision, it is clear that there
is no conscious intention on the part of the Legislature to omit the
applicability of Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to
Muslim Members of the Board elected from the Bar Council.
14. The object of any provision must be seen in light of the provisions
surrounding it, which includes the proviso(s) and the explanation(s)
appended to it. When a right accrues to a person pursuant to a
position that they hold, it ultimately becomes a qualification. Once
such qualification ceases to exist, that person would not be eligible
to hold any other post based on his earlier position, unless the
statute categorically facilitates the same. An explanation, which is
simply in the nature of a clarification as regards certain categories,
1456 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
cannot be read in a manner which is violative of the substantive
part of the provision. Although normally, a proviso cannot be used to
understand the substantive part of the provision, there is no absolute
bar in doing so, particularly in cases where the statute is peculiar and
the proviso does not create any exception. For the aforementioned
purpose, an explanation can also be understood through the proviso.
In other words, if a proviso or an explanation, as the case may be, is
phrased in a manner which throws more light on the objective behind
the substantive part of the provision, there would be no difficulty in
appreciating the same. Ultimately, a proviso or an explanation may be
used for several purposes. Therefore, what is required is that Courts
appreciate the context of such usage before rendering an interpretation
to a provision vis-a-vis the proviso or explanation contained therein.
15. On another footing, extending the applicability of Explanation II to
Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, even to a Muslim Member of the Bar
Council, is only but natural even in light of the doctrine of reasonable
classification that has evolved from the jurisprudence on Article 14
of the Constitution of India, 1950, which provides for equality before
the law and equal protection of the law. A classification would be
reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has
a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the
statute. In the instant case, giving an overreaching interpretation to
Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to imply that a
Muslim Member of the Bar Council shall continue to hold membership
in the Board, despite losing their position in the former post, would
amount to treating Members of Parliament and Members of the State
Legislative Assembly differently from Members of the Bar Council.
No intelligible differentia is discernible for such a classification from
the scheme of the provision. In fact, it is tantamount to rewriting the
provision in its entirety. On this ground also, we find that Explanation
II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act must be given a harmonious
construction and purposive interpretation to mean that the term of
a Member of the Bar Council serving on the Board, is co-terminus
with their membership in the Bar Council itself.
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2
SCC 548
“9. …It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation
is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1457
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt
or ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention of
the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a
label cannot control or deflect such intention. It must
be remembered that the legislature has different ways
of expressing itself and in the last analysis the words
used by the legislature alone are the true repository of
the intent of the legislature and they must be construed
having regard to the context and setting in which they
occur. Therefore, even though the provision in question
has been called an Explanation, we must construe it
according to its plain language and not on any a priori
considerations….”
(emphasis supplied)
S. Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591
“46. …It is now well settled that an Explanation added
to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision
in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of
the word itself shows it is merely meant to explain or
clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the
statutory provision. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes
while dwelling on the various aspects of an Explanation
observes as follows:
(a) The object of an Explanation is to understand the
Act in the light of the explanation.
(b) It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the
original section which it explains, but only makes the
meaning clear beyond dispute. (p. 329)
47. Swarup in Legislation and Interpretation very aptly
sums up the scope and effect of an Explanation thus:
“Sometimes an Explanation is appended to stress
upon a particular thing which ordinarily would not
appear clearly from the provisions of the section. The
proper function of an Explanation is to make plain or
elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision
1458 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and not to add or subtract from it. Thus an Explanation
does not either restrict or extend the enacting part;
it does not enlarge or narrow down the scope of the
original section that it is supposed to explain.... The
Explanation must be interpreted according to its own
tenor; that it is meant to explain and not vice versa.”
(pp. 297-98)
48. Bindra in Interpretation of Statutes (5th Edn.) at p. 67
states thus:
“An Explanation does not enlarge the scope of the
original section that it is supposed to explain. It is
axiomatic that an Explanation only explains and does
not expand or add to the scope of the original section...
The purpose of an Explanation is, however, not to limit
the scope of the main provision.... The construction of
the Explanation must depend upon its terms, and no
theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to
be inferred from the language used. An ‘Explanation’
must be interpreted according to its own tenor.”
49. The principles laid down by the aforesaid authors are
fully supported by various authorities of this Court. To quote
only a few, in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing
Co. of India Ltd. v. CTO [(1961) 1 SCR 902 : AIR 1961 SC
315 : (1960) 11 STC 764] a Constitution Bench decision,
Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court, observed thus:
“Now, the Explanation must be interpreted according to
its own tenor, and it is meant to explain clause (1)(fl) of
the Article and not vice versa. It is an error to explain
the Explanation with the aid of the Article, because this
reverses their roles.”
50. In Bihta Cooperative Development Cane Marketing
Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar [(1967) 1 SCR 848 : AIR 1967
SC 389 : 37 Com Cas 98] this Court observed thus:
“The Explanation must be read so as to harmonise
with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section.
It should not be so construed as to widen the ambit
of the section.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1459
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
51. In Hiralal Rattanlal case [(1973) 1 SCC 216 : 1973
SCC (Tax) 307] this Court observed thus: [SCC para 25,
p. 225: SCC (Tax) p. 316]
“On the basis of the language of the Explanation this Court
held that it did not widen the scope of clause (c). But from
what has been said in the case, it is clear that if on a
true reading of an Explanation it appears that it has
widened the scope of the main section, effect be given
to legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that the
Legislature named that provision as an Explanation.”
*** *** ***
53. Thus, from a conspectus of the authorities referred to
above, it is manifest that the object of an Explanation to
a statutory provision is—
“(a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the
Act itself,
(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the
main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it
consistent with the dominant object which it seems
to subserve,
(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant
object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and
purposeful,
(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or
change the enactment or any part thereof but where
some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of
the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and
advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the
Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment
of the enactment, and
(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with
which any person under a statute has been clothed or
set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an
hindrance in the interpretation of the same.””
(emphasis supplied)
1460 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Corporation Bank, (2007) 9
SCC 55
“12. In construing a statutory provision, the first and
foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. If
the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision,
the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the
other rules of construction. The other rules of construction
are invoked when the legislative intent is not clear. In
Bihta Co-op. Development and Cane Marketing Union
Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar [AIR 1967 SC 389] this Court was
called upon to consider Explanation to Section 48(1) of
the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935.
This Court observed that the Court should not go only
by the label. The Court observed that an explanation
must be read ordinarily to clear up any ambiguity in
the main section and it cannot be construed to widen
the ambit of the section. However, if on a true reading
of an Explanation it appears to the Court in a given
case that the effect of the Explanation is to widen the
scope of the main section then effect must be given
to the legislative intent. It was held that in all such
cases the Court has to find out the true intention of
the legislature. Therefore, there is no single yardstick
to decide whether an Explanation is enacted to clarify
the ambiguity or whether it is enacted to widen the
scope of the main section….”
(emphasis supplied)
Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2025) 1
SCC 695
“66. What can be discerned from the above is that an
explanation must be read so as to harmonise with and
clear up any ambiguity in the main section. It should not
be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section. An
explanation does not enlarge the scope of the original
section that it is supposed to explain. It is axiomatic that
an explanation only explains and does not expand or
add to the scope of the original section. The purpose of
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1461
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
an explanation is, however, not to limit the scope of the
main provision. The construction of the explanation must
depend upon its terms, and no theory of its purpose
can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the
language used. An “explanation” must be interpreted
according to its own tenor. Sometimes an explanation
is appended to stress upon a particular thing which
ordinarily would not appear clearly from the provisions
of the section. The proper function of an explanation
is to make plain or elucidate what is enacted in the
substantive provision and not to add or subtract
from it. Thus, an explanation does not either restrict
or extend the enacting part; it does not enlarge or
narrow down the scope of the original section that
it is supposed to explain. The Explanation must be
interpreted according to its own tenor; that it is meant
to explain and not vice versa. Explanation added to
a statutory provision is not a substantive provision
in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of
the word itself shows it is merely meant to explain or
clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in
the statutory provision.”
(emphasis supplied)
Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619
“31. …The principle of “purposive interpretation” or
“purposive construction” is based on the understanding
that the court is supposed to attach that meaning to
the provisions which serve the “purpose” behind such a
provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is
it designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by
interpretative process the court is supposed to realise
the goal that the legal text is designed to realise. As
Aharon Barak puts it:
“Purposive interpretation is based on three components:
language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes
the range of semantic possibilities within which the
interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter
1462 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning
of the text from among the (express or implied)
semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus
sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the
interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear
in its (public or private) language.” [ Aharon Barak,
Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University
Press, 2005).]
32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language,
purpose and discretion “of the court”, insofar as purposive
component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose
at the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals,
interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to
actualise. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil.
33. We may also emphasise that the statutory interpretation
of a provision is never static but is always dynamic.
Though the literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago,
was treated as the “golden rule”, it is now the doctrine of
purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly
in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve
the purpose or may lead to absurdity. If it brings about an
end which is at variance with the purpose of statute, that
cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers
such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a
grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its
place they offered purposivism, this principle is now
widely applied by the courts not only in this country
but in many other legal systems as well.”
(emphasis supplied)
Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys,
(2011) 11 SCC 334
“25. …The golden rule of interpretation is that the
words of a statute have to be read and understood
in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. Where
however the words used are capable of bearing
two or more constructions, it is necessary to adopt
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1463
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
purposive construction, to identify the construction
to be preferred, by posing the following questions:
(i) What is the purpose for which the provision is
made? (ii) What was the position before making the
provision? (iii) Whether any of the constructions
proposed would lead to an absurd result or would
render any part of the provision redundant? (iv) Which
of the interpretations will advance the object of the
provision? The answers to these questions will enable
the court to identify the purposive interpretation to
be preferred while excluding others. Such an exercise
involving ascertainment of the object of the provision
and choosing the interpretation that will advance the
object of the provision can be undertaken, only where
the language of the provision is capable of more than
one construction….”
(emphasis supplied)
16. We further add that the legal maxim “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius” finds absolutely no application to the instant case, as applying
the same would render an interpretation contrary to the intent of the
provision, resulting in an unreasonable and unjust classification. The
aforesaid maxim is not one of universal and absolute application.
Before the said principle can be applied, the Court must discern
whether a natural interpretation flows from a reading of the provision as
a whole, which in the instant case is possible by reading Section 14(2)
along with Section 14(1) of the 1995 Act.
Asstt. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co., (1972)
2 SCC 560
“30. …This rule flows from the maxim: “Expressio unius
ast exclusio alterius”. But, as was pointed out by
Wills, J., in Colguoboun v. Brooks, [(1888) 21 QBD
52, 62] this maxim “is often a valuable servant, but
a dangerous master….”. The rule is subservient to
the basic principle that Courts must endeavour to
ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then
adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather
than one that may defeat these. Moreover, the rule of
1464 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
prohibition by necessary implication could be applied
only where a specified procedure is laid down for the
performance of a duty….”
(emphasis supplied)
Union of India v. B.C. Nawn and others, 1971 SCC OnLine Cal
180 : (1972) 84 ITR 526 : 1971 Tax LR 1198
“8. The maxim is not of universal application. Crawford
in his book The Construction of Statutes, 1940 edition, at
pages 335-336, has pointed out that this maxim does not
apply to matters “where it clearly appears that something
was expressly mentioned for another reason or merely
because of caution” and “this maxim, or general principle
of construction, as must be apparent, is based upon the
probable intention of the legislature. Hence, where that
intention clearly reveals that the law-makers did not
mean that the express mention of one thing should
operate to exclude all others, of course, the principle is
not applicable. Consequently, when the statutory language
is plain and the meaning is clear, there can be no implied
exclusion. In other words, the principle is to be used
as a means of ascertaining the legislature’s intent
where it is doubtful and not as a means of defeating
the apparent intent of the legislature.
9. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, eleventh
edition, at page 306 observes:
“Provisions sometimes found in statutes, enacting
imperfectly or for particular cases only that which was
already and more widely the law, has occasionally
furnished ground for the contention that an intention
to alter the general law was to be inferred from the
partial or limited enactment, resting on the maxim
expressio unius exclusio alterius. But, that maxim is
inapplicable in such cases. The only inference which
a court can draw from such superfluous provisions
(which generally find a place in Acts to meet unfounded
objections and idle doubts), is that the legislature was
either ignorant or unmindful of the real state of the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1465
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
law, or that it acted under the influence of excessive
caution. If the law be different from what the legislature
supposed it to be, the implication arising from the
statute, it has been said, cannot operate as a negation
of its existence, and any legislation founded on such
a mistake has not the effect of making that law which
the legislature erroneously assumed to be so.”
(emphasis supplied)
State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608
“80. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the
principle relied upon by the plaintiffs learned Counsel
repeatedly, in support of which a passage from Crawford’s
“Statutory Construction” (1940 Edn.) (Paragraph 195 at pp.
334-335) was also cited, as the basis of the submissions of
the learned Counsel, was that what is expressly provided
for by the Constitution must necessarily exclude what
is not so provided for. This reasoning is an attempted
misapplication of the principle of construction
“Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius”. Before the
principle can be applied at all the Court must find an
express mode of doing something that is provided in
a statute, which, by its necessary implication, could
exclude the doing of that very thing and not something
else in some other way. ……..That maxim has been aptly
described as a “useful servant but a dangerous master”
(per Lopes L.J. in Colquhoun v. Brooks [(1888) 21 QBD
52, 65]). The limitations or conditions under which this
principle of construction operates are frequently overlooked
by those who attempt to apply it.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. At this juncture, we take note of Lord Denning’s words of wisdom in
Seaford Court Estates Ld. v. Asher [(1949) 2 K.B. 481]
“…when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold
his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to
work on the constructive task of finding the intention
of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the
1466 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
language of the statute, but also from a consideration
of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of
the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then
he must supplement the written word sc as to give
“force and life” to the intention of the legislature. That
was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in
Heydon’s case, and it is the safest guide to-day. Good
practical advice on the subject was given about the
same time by Plowden in his second volume Eyston
v. Studd. Put into homely metaphor it is this: A judge
should ask himself the question: If the makers of
the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the
texture of it, how would they have straightened it out?
He must then do as they would have done. A judge
must not alter the material of which it is woven, but
he can and should iron out the creases.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. In the case at hand, the State of Manipur has deemed it fit to
accept the membership of the appellant, who is admittedly serving
as a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, to the Board. A Gazette
notification had been issued by the Bar Council of Manipur, stating
that the appellant had been elected as a Member of the Bar Council.
Therefore, as such, a Member of the Bar Council was available, who
was subsequently elected as a Member of the Board, in accordance
with Section 14(1)(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act. Respondent No. 3, who
is no longer holding the said post of a Muslim Member of the Bar
Council, cannot be allowed to contend that even after he had ceased
to be a Member of the Bar Council, he would be entitled to continue
as a Member of the Board.
19. We also note that presently, the appellant is the only Muslim Member
in the concerned Bar Council - a fact that has been rightly taken
note of by the State of Manipur, while appointing him as a Member
of the Board. In any case, there is no dispute with respect to the
appellant’s eligibility to be a Member of the Board by virtue of his
membership in the Bar Council.
20. Based on the aforesaid discussion and reasoning, we are not
inclined to concur with the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench
of the High Court in the impugned judgment. Thus, we hold that the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1467
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
decision rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur
Bench, Nagpur in Shri Asif S/o Shaukat Qureshi Versus The State
of Maharashtra and Anr. (Writ Petition No. 4343 of 2016) decided
on 22.12.2016, is not a good law.
21. Accordingly, the impugned judgment stands set aside, and the
judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court dated
23.08.2023, dismissing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 304 of 2023, stands
restored.
22. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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