MAYA DEVI & ANR.versusSTATE OF HARYANA

                     [2015) 11 S.C.R. 903


                      MAYA DEVI &ANR.                             A
                               v.
                     STATE OF HARYANA
              (Criminal Appeal No.1263 of 2011)
                                                                  B
                    DECEMBER 07, 2015
       [VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND R.K. AGRAWAL, JJ.]
      Penal Code, 1860:

        ss. 3048 and 498A - Dowry death - Prosecution of C
  accused-husband, accused-mother-in-law and their other
  relatives - Trial court convicted appellants-accused
  (husband and mother-in-law) while acquitting the other
  accused -Appeal by the convicted accused and revision by
                                                                   0
· the complainant - High Court upheld the conviction of
  appellants-accused altering their sentence of life
  imprisonment to 10 years RI - Acquittal of other accused
  was upheld- On appeal, held: It is clear from the record that
  the appellants-accused m~Jtreated, harassed and subjected E
  the deceased to cruelty soon before her death, for and in
  connection with demand for dowry, who died within her
  matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage
  otherwise than in normal circumstances - Thus the provisions
  u/ss. 3048 and 498A were fully attracted- Conviction justified · F
  - Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 1138.

      s. 3048 - Offence under- Constituents of- Discussed.

     Evidence Act, 1872 ~ ·s. 1138 - Presumption under -
                                                                  G
Nature of- Held: It is mandatory.

      Words and Phrases- 'Dowry Death'- Meaning of, in
fhf! context of s.3048 /PC.

                                                                  H
                              903



                                                         (
904       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

        HELD: 1. In order to convict an accused for the
  offence punishable under Section 3048 IPC the
  following essential·s must be satisfied: (1) the death of a
B woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury
  or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (i1) such
  death must have occurred within seven years of her
  marriage; (iit) soon before her death, the woman must
  have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
C husband or any relatives of her husband; and (iv) such
  cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with,
  demand for dowry. When the above ingredients are
  established by reliable and acceptable evidence, such
  death shall be called dowry death and such husband or
D his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death.
  [Para 14] [924-8-E]

          2. If the ingredients are attracted in view of the
     special provision, the court s~all presume and it shall
 E record such fact as proved unless and until it is
     disproved by the accused. However, it is open to the
     accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such
     conclusive presumption as the burden is unmistakably
     on him to do so and he can discharge such burden by
 F · getting an answer through cross-examination ·of the
     prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on the
     defence side. [Para 14] [924-F-G]

         Bansi Lal vs. State of Haryana 2011 (1) SCR 724
G        : (2011) 11 SCC 359; Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh
         vs State of Maharashtra 2012 (7) SCR 560 :
         (2012) 11 sec 397- relied on.

       3. The expression "soon before her death" used
H in Section 3048 IPC and Section 1138 of the Evidence
       MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                 905
                                        .
Act is present with the idea of proximity test. However,   A
the expression "soon before her death" has not been
defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the
determination of the period which can come within the
term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the
courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of      B
each case. However, the said expression would normally
imply that the interval should not be much between the
cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in
question. There must be existence of a proximate and
live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry     C
demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident
of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough
not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman
concerned, it would be of no consequence. [Para 16]
                                                           0
[926-A; C-F]

     4. In view of the Explanation to section 3048 IPC
the word "dowry" has to be understood as defined in
Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Section
3048 IPC does not categorise death as homicidal or E
suicidal or accidental. Any death occurring "otherwise .
than under normal circumstances" can, in a given case,
be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Therefore, if all
the other ingredients of Section 3048 IPC are fulfilled, F
any death (homicidal or suicidal or accidental) whether
caused. by burns or by bodily injury or occurring
otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per
the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and
the woman's husband or his relative "shall be deemed G
to have caused her death". The section clearly specifies
what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also
identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who
has or have caused the dowry death. [Paras 15 and
21][925-D; 932-C-E]                                       H
906      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015) 11 S.C.R.

                   •
A       5. The key words under Section 1138 of the
   Evidence Act, 1872 are "shall presume" leaving no option
  with a court but to presume an accused brought before
   it of causing a dowry death guilty of the offence.
   However, the redeeming factor of this provision is that
B the presumption is rebuttable. Section 1138 of the Act
  enables an accused to prove his innocence and places
  a reverse onus of proof on him or her. In the present case
  accused persons failec!. to prove beyond reasonable
  doubt that the deceased died a natural death. The
C presumption under Section 1138 of the Act is mandatory
  may be contrasted with Section 113A of the Act which
  was introduced contemporaneously. Section 113A of the
  Act, dealing with abetment of suicide, uses the
  expression "may ~resume". [Para 22] [932-F-H;933-E-F]
0
        6. There is ample evidence in the present case that
  the deceased was harassed, maltreated. and was
  subjected to cruelty, for and in connection with the
  demands for dowry by the accused. Admittedly,
E appellant No. 2 did not attend to his wife at the relevant
  time. DW-2, (the doctor to whom the dece"ased was taken
  by the accused for treatment of depression) was
  apprised by the deceased about the harassment and the
                                 a
F maltreatment by her in-laws month prior to her death
  when she was taken to the aforesaid doctor for the
  alleged treatment. The testimony of DW-2 shows that the
  accused had created such a charged environment in her
  matrimonial home that the deceased developed suicidal
G tendencies. Except appellant No.1, all were living in the
  matrimonial house. Appellant No.1 herein was a frequent
  visitor to that house and she herself admitted this fact in
  her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Thus, it is very
  much clear that accused persons maltreated, harassed
H and subjected the deceased to cruelty, after the
         MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                 907


  solemnization of her marriage with the appellant No. 2, A
· during her life time and soon before her death, for and in
  connection with the demands for dowry, who died at her
  matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage
  otherwise than in normal circumstances. Thus, the
  provisions of Sec:tions 3048 and 498A of the IPC will be B
  fully attracted. [Paras 20 and 22] [931-D-H; 932-A-B;
  934-B]

      Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of
      Maharashtra 1985 (1) SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC             C
      116; Durga Prasad and Another vs. State of
      Madhya Pradesh 2010 (7) SCR 104: (2010) 9
      SCC 73; Satvir Singh and Others vs. State of
      Punjab and Another2001 ( 3) Suppl. SCR 353 :
      (2001) 8 SCC 633 - referred to.                        D
                     Case Law Reference
 1985 (1) SCR 88                referred to:   Para 5
 2040 (7) SCR 104               referred to.   Para 7
                                                             E
 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 353        referred to.   Para 8
 2011 (1) SCR 724               relied on.     Para 17
 2012 (7) SCR 560              relied on.      Para 18
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal               F
 Appeal No. 1263 of 2011
       From the Judgmentand Order dated 14.01.2010 of the
 Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
 Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 488 DB of 1999          · G
      T. S. Doabia, Samir B., Jagjit Singh Chhabra for the
 Appellants.   ·

     Narender Hooda, Manoj Dwivedi, Ramesh Kumar,
 Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondent.                       H
    908         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


    A          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

                R.K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against
          the judgment and order dated 14.01.2010 passed by the High
          Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal
.   B     No. 488-DB of 1999 whereby the Division Bench of the High
          Court dismissed the appeal.

               2. Brief facts:

               (a) As per the prosecution story, the marriage of Kavita
    c          @ Kusum (since deceased) was solemnized with
               Karamvir. son of Mahavir, resident of House No. 36, Type
               II, M.D. University Campus, Rohtak according to Hindu
               rites and ceremonies on 17.07.1994. After 20-25 days
               of the solemnization of the marriage, Karamvir (appellant
    D
               No. 2 herein), his mother Maya Devi (appellant No. 1
               herein), brothers Dharamveer and Paramveer and Sister
               Sonika@Pinki started harassing, maltreating and
               beating Kavita (since deceased) on account of dowry.
    E          Despite all efforts, the attitude and relations of her in-
               laws towards her went from bad to worse.               -

               (b) On 26.09.1996, the police got a telephonic message
               from a stranger at 3:30 a.m. that the dead body of a
               woman was lying in House No. 36, Type II, M.D. University
    F
               Campus, Rohtak. On coming to know about the incident,
               Kanwar Singh (the complainant) - father of Kavita
               reached the spot and identified the body to be that of his
               daughter.
    G          (c)Acomplaintwas lodged by KanwarSingh (PW-3) at
               the P:S. Civil Lines, Rohtak regarding the incident on
               27. 09 .1996 alleging torture and harassment meted out
               to the deceased on account of demand of dowry who
               had committed suicide by consuming some poisonous
    H
  MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                      909
            [RK.AGRAWAL, J.]

substance. On the basis ofthe said complaint, FIR No.      A
466 of 1966 was registered under Sections 498A, 304B,
306/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the
IPC'). After investigation, charges under Sections 498A
and 304B read with Section 34 of the IPC were framed
against the accused persons.                               B

 (d} The case was committed to the Court of Sessions
 and numbered as 11/10.04.1997 and Maya Devi-mother-
.in-law of the deceased (appellant No. 1 herein}, Karamvir-
 husband of the deceased (appellant No. 2 herein) and C
 Dharamveer and Paramveer-brothers of Karamvirwere
arrayed as accused.

(e) The Court of Sessions Judge, Rohtak, by order dated
22/27. 09.1999, while acquitting Dharamveer and D
Paramveer -brothers of Karamvir, convicted the
appellant Nos. 1 and 2 herein for the commission of
      ,,
offence under Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC and
sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment (RI) for
life under Section 304B of the IPC. Both the accused E
were further sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment (RI) for 2 (two) years, along with a fine of
Rs. 500/- each, for the offence under Section 498A of
thelPC.
                                                           F
(f) Being aggrieved, the appellant herein filed Criminal
Appeal No. 488-DB of 1999 before the High Court.
Kanwar Singh-the complainant also filed Criminal
Revision No. 208 of 2000 before the High Court for
setting aside the judgment and order dated 22/ G
27.09.1999 to the extent of acquittal of Dharamveer and
Paramveer.

(g} The Division Bench of the High Court, by order dated
14.01.2010, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants   H
910         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A          '1erein while modifying the sentence of life imprisonment
           co that of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for the
           offence under Section 3048 while maintaining the
           sentence in respect of other offence. The Division Bench
           also dismissed the revision filed by the complainant. ·
 B
           (h) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants have
           preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this
           Court.

c           3. Heard Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel forthe
      appellants and Mr. Narender Hooda, learned senior counsel
      for the respondent-State.

           Rival Submissions:

D          4. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted
      before this Court that Kavita (since deceased) was suffering
      from mental depression and psychosis and no case has been
      made out for bringing the same within the definition of dowry
      as contained in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Learned
E     senior counsel further contended that she was suffering from
      mental depression even before her marriage. Her brother and
      uncle used to administer anti-depression medicines to her
      secretly. In support of the same, learned senior counsel relied
      upon the deposition of Dr. V.P. Mehla, MD, Consultant
 F    Psychiatric Centre, Civil Hospital, Rohtak who deposed as
      under:-

           "Kavita wife of Karambir remained under my treatment
           and because I have seen her in the OPD on 26.08.1996
G          vide OPD No. 1034/96. Ex. DC is her OPD slip. As per
           my record, patient was suffering from moderate
           depressing episode. The patient suffered from sadness
           of mood, absent mindless, loss of interest in the usual
           activities, decreased sleep and appetite for the last two
H
   MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                         911
             [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

month, when I first saw her. On mental status examination A
by me, she was found lo have said, irritable facets. She
was having depressed mood and expressed pessimistic
ideas and complained against her in-laws and husband.
She also expressed occasional suicidal ideas. Her
Judgment and insight was read to be fair by me. On the B
basis of above findings, I judged her to be suffering from
moderate depressive episode and I had prescribed her
c~psule flute 20 mg./ OD and I have counseled her and
her husband who had accompanied her, regarding the
needful treatment and importance of psychosocial C
support in this disease. History of the patient is contained
in Ex. DB.

XXX'C. Question How much time did you take
examining patient Kavita in this case ? ·                      D

Ans :-1 can give no time in this case but routine I used to
take new patient 20 to 30 minutes. I have not mentioned
any marks of identification or signatures of the patient
Kavita in Ex. DD. Whatever was stated by husband of            E
the patient was recorded in Ex. DD. (Volunteered that
Chief Complaints recorded in Ex. DD were told by
patient's husband and patient herself). I cannot
specifically state as to what was told by the patient and
what was by her husband, Ex. DD contains the mixture           F
of observation of the complaints of patient and her
husband. It is correct that patient only came to me on
26. 08. 1996. There is no pagination in the patient register
but serial no. has been maintained. There is one entry
only on 26. 08.1996 and that is at the fag end of the page.    G
Besides Kavita, who was examined on 26.8.96 as a new
patient, I also examined old patients on the said date
and their registration no is mentioned as 226/94 and 983/
96 by the side of entry no. 1034. Patient had this illness     H
912         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A          as first episode. As per my record there was no family or
           past history of psychiatric illness. Moderate depressing
           episode is a diagnostic category as defined in ICD/10
           as a depressive illness with symptoms of depression with
           moderate intensity. In an expert hand, this disease is
B          100% curable. I did not feel the need of any test of the
           patient. In a predisposed individual any kind of stress
           can lead to the precipitation of a depressive disease
           and illness. It is incorrect to suggest that I have deposed
           falsely."
c
            5. In view of the above, learned senior counsel relied
      upon a decision of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
      vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 wherein it was
      held as under:-
D
           "40. Thus, from the recitals in the letters we can safely
           hold that there was a dear possibility and a tendency on
           her part to commit suicide due to desperation and
           frustration. She seems to be tired of her married life, but
 E         she still hoped against hope that things might improve.
           At any rate, the fact that she may have committed suicide
           cannot be safely excluded or eliminated. It may be that
           her husband may have murdered her but when two views
           are reasonably possible the benefit must go to the
 F         accused. In order to buttress our opinion, we would like
           to cite some passages of an eminenfpsychiatrist, Robert
           J. Kastenbaum where in his book Death, Society and
           Human Experience he analyses the causes, the
           circumstances, the moods and emotions which may drive
G          a person to commit suicide. The learned author has
           written that a person who is psychotic in nature and suffers
           from depression and frustration is more prone to commit
           suicide than any other person. In support of our view, we
           extract certain passages from his book:
H
  MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                       913
            [R.K. AGRAWAL, J ]

"The fact is that some people who commit suicide can        A
be classified as psychotic o_r severely disturbed.

lfwe are concerned with the probability of suicide in very
large populations, then mental and emotional disorder
is a relevant variable to consider.                        B

And it is only through a gross distortion of the actual
circumstances that one could claim all suicides are
enacted in a spell of madness.

Seen in these terms, suicide is simply one of the ways in   C
which a relatively weak member of society loses out in
the jungle-like Mruggle.

The individual does not destroy himself in hope of thereby
achieving a noble post-mortem reputation or a place D ·
among the eternally blessed. Instead he wishes to
subtract himself from a life whose quality seems a worse·
evil than death,

The newly awakened spirit of hope and progress soon         E
became shadowed by a se-nse of disappointment and
resignation that, it sometimes seemed, only death could
swallow,

Revenge fantasies and their association with suicide are    F
well known to people who give ear to those in emotional
distress.

People who attempt suicide for reasons other than
revenge may also act on the assumption that, in a sense,    G
they will survive the death to benefit by its effect.
                 *     *      *

The victim of suicide may also be the victim of self-
expectations that have not been fulfilled. The sense of     H
914     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A      disappointment and frustration may have much in
       common with that experienced by the person who seeks
       revenge through suicide .... However, for some people a
       critical moment arrives when the discrepancy is
       experienced as too glaring and painful to be tolerated. If
B      something has to go it may be the person himself, not
       the perhaps excessively high standards by which the
       judgment has been made .... Warren Breed and his
       colleagues found .that a sense of failure is prominent
       among many people who take their own lives.
c
            41 .. The above observations are fully applicable to the
        case ofManju. Shesolemnly believe!l that her holy union·
      . with her husband would bring health and happiness to
        her but unfortunately it seems to have ended in a
D       melancholy marriage which in view of the circumstances
        detailed above, left her so lonely and created so much of
        emotional disorder resulting from frustration and
        pessimism that she was forced to end her life. There can
        be no doubt that Manju was not only a sensitive and
E       sentimental woman but was extremely impressionate
        (sic) and the letters show that a constant conflict between
        her mind and body was going on and unfortunately the
        circumstances which came into existence hastened her
        end. People with such a psychotic philosophy or bent of
F
        mind always dream of an ideal and if the said ideal fails,
        the failure drives them to end their life, for ttiey feel that
        no charm is left in t~eir life.

         42. Mary K. Hinchliffe, Douglas Hooper and F. John
G      Roberts in their book The Melancholy Marriage observe
       that-

           "Studies of attempted suicide cases have also
       revealed the high incidence of marital problems which
H      lie behind the act. In our own study of 100 consecutive
  MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                        915
            [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

cases (Roberts and Hooper 1969), we found that most A
of them could be understood ifthe patients' interactions
with others in thei_r environment were considered."(p. 5)

   43. Such persons possess a peculiar psychology which
instils extreme love and devotion but when they are faced    B
with disappointment or find their environment so unhealthy
or unhappy, they seem to lose all the charms of life. The
authors while describing these sentiments observe thus:

     "'Hopelessness', 'despair', 'lousy' and 'miserable;     c
  draw attention to the relationship of the depressed
  person 'to his environment. The articulate depressed
  person will often also struggle to put into words the
  fact that not only does there appear to be no way
  forward and thus no point to life - but that the world. D
  actually looks different."(p. 7)

  44. Coleridge in Ode to Dejection in his usual ironical.
manner has very beautifully explained the sentiments of
such persons thus:                                         E

  "I see them all so excellently fair-

  1see, not feel, how beautiful they are;"

   45. At another place the authors (Hinchliffe, Hooper, F
and John) come to the final conclusion that ruptured·
personal relationship~ play a major part in the clinical
picture and in this connection observed thus:

      "Initially we applied these ideas to study of cases G
   of attempted suicide (Roberts and Hooper 1969) and
   although_ we did not assume that they were all
   necessarily depressed, we looked for distal and
 . proximal causes for their behaviour and fpund that
   ruptured personal relationships played a major parl H
916       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015) 11 S.C.R.


A           in the clinical picture."

         The observations of the authors aptly and directly apply
         to the nature, mood and the circumstances of the
         unfortunate life of Manju which came to an end within four
B        months of her marriage."

         6. Learned senior counsel further submitted that Kavita
  had committed suicide on account of the fact that she was
  mentally depressed and no case is made out under Section
C 3048 of the IPC as the requirement of law is that the
  harassment and cruelty should be "soon before her death" and
  no evidence has come on record for this purpose. In order to
  bring home conviction under Section 3048 of the IPC, it will
  not be sufficient to only lead evidence showing that cruelty or
o harassment had been meted out to the victim, but that such
  treatment was in connection with the demand for dowry. The
  phrase, "soon before her death", no doubt, is an elastic
  e_xpression and can refer to a period either immediately before
  her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it.
E But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that
  expression. The legislative intent in providing such a radius of
  time by employing the words "soon before her death" is to
  emphasis the idea that her death should, in all probabilities,
  has been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. There
F should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the
                                        .
  dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her.

         7. In support of the above contention, learned senior
  counsel for the appellants referred to a decision of this Court
G in Durga Prasad andAnothervs. State of Madhya Pradesh
  (2010) 9   sec 73 wherein it was held as under:-

            7. It was pointed out that the only evidence on which
         reliance had been placed both by the trial court, as well
H        as the High.Court, for convicting the appellants, was the
  . MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                        917
              [R.K. AGRAWAL, J.]

evidence of Vim la Bai, PW 1, the mother of the deceased       A
and Radheshyam, PW 3, the brother of the deceased. In
fact, the prosecution story was that since no dowry had
been received from the family of the victim, she had been
beaten and treated with cruelty. There 1s no other eviderice
regarding the physical and mental torture which the            B
deceased was alleged to have been subjected to.

   8. Mr Gupta urged that the marriage of Appellant 1
with the deceased was performed as part of a community
marriage being celebrated on account of the poverty of C
<?Ou pies who couk;f not otherwise meet the expenses of
marriage and that even the few utensils which were given
at the time of such community marriage were given by
the persons who had organised such marriages ..
                                                               D
    9. Mr Gupta submitted that the evidence in this case
 was wholly insufficient to even suggest that the victim had
 been subjected to cruelty or harassment which was
 sufficient to compel her to commit suicide. In support of
 his submissions, Mr Gupta firstly referred to the decision    E
 of this Court in Biswajit Halderv. State of WB. wherein,
 in facts which were very similar, it was held that there
 was practically no evidence to show that there was any
 cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, the
 demands for dowry. There was also no finding in that          F
 regard. It was further observed that this deficiency in
 evidence proved fatal for the prosecution case and even
 otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment was
.not sufficient to attract Section 304-B IPC. It had to be
shown in addition that such cruelty or harassm•=:nt was        G
for, or in connection with, demand of dowry. Mr Gupta
 urged that since the appellants had not been convicted
 under the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961,
the charge under Section 304-B would also fail since           H
918   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2015) 11 S.C.R.


A     the same was linked with the question of cruelty or
      harassment for, or in connection with, the demand for
      dowry.

         14. Ms Makhija then contended that as had been laid
B     down by this Court in Anand Kumarv. State of M.P, in
      order to counter the presumption available under Section
      113-B, which is relatable to Section 304-B, a heavy
      burden has been shifted on to the accused to prove his
      innocence. Having regard to the language of Section
c     113-B of the Evidence Act, which indicates that when a
      question arises as to whether a person has committed
      the dowry death of a woman and it is shown tharsoon
      before her death such woman was subjected to cruelty
      or harassment by such other person or in connection with
D     any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such
      person had caused such dowry death. Ms Makhija urged
      that the aforesaid wording of Section 113-B of Evidence
      Act and the use of the expression "shall" would clearly
      indicate that the court shall presume such death as dowry
E     death provided the conditions in Section 113-B were
      satisfied and it would then be for the accused to prove
      otherwise.

         15. Ms Makhija, thereupon, urged that the order of
F     conviction passed by the trial court holding the appellants
      guilty under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC, confirmed
      by the High Court, did not warrant any interference by
      this Court.

G        16. Having carefully considered the submissions
      made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined .
      to allow the benefit of doubt to the appellants having
      particular regard to the fact that except for certain bald
      statements made by PWs 1 and 3 alleging that the victim
H     had been subjected to cruelty and harassment prior to
    MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                     919
              [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

 her death, there is no other evidence to prove that the A
 victim committed suicide on account of cruelty and
 harassment to which she was subjected just prior to her
 death, which, in fact, are the ingredients of the evidence
 to be led in respect of Section 113-B of the Evidence
 Act, 1872, in order to bring home the guilt against an B
 accused under Section 304-B IPC.

    17.As has been mentioned hereinbefore, in order to
 hold an accused guilty of an offence under Section 304-
 B IPC, it has to be shown that apart from the fact that the C
 woman died on account of burn or bodily injury, otherwise
 than under normal circumstances, within 7 years of her.
 marriage, it has also to be shown that soon before her
 death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
 her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in D
 connection with, any demand for dowry. Only then would
 such death be called "dowry death" and such husband
 or relative shall be deemed to have caused the death Of
 the woman concerned.
                                                             E
    18. In this case, one other aspect has to be kept in
 mind, namely, that no charges were framed against the
 appellants under the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition
 Act, 1961 and the evidence led in order to prove the same
 for the purposes of Section 304-B IPC was related to a F
 demand for a fan only.

     19. The decision cited by Mr R.P. Gupta, learned
  Senior Advocate, in Biswajit Halder case was rendered
  in almost similar circumstances. In order to bring home G
. a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, it will not be
  sufficient to only lead evidence showing that cruelty or
  harassment had been meted out to the victim, but that
  such treatment was in connection with the demand for
  dowry. In our view, the prosecution in this case has failed H
920        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A          to fully satisfy the requirements of both Section 113-B of
           the EvidenceAct, 1872 and Section 304-Bofthe Penal
           Code.

          8. Learned senior counsel further relied upon Satvir
 B    Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab andAnother(2001)
      8 sec 633 which is as under:-

             "21. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry.
          One is before the marriage, second is at the time of
c         marriage and the third is "at any time" after the marriage.
          The third occasion may appear to be an unending period.
          But the crucial words are "in connection with the marriage
          of the said parties". This means that giving or agreeing
          to.give any property or valuable security on any of the
o         above three stages should have been in connection with
          the marriage of the parties. There can be many other
          instances for payment of money or giving property as
          between the spouses. For example, some·customary
          payments in connection with birth of a child or other
E         ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such
          payments are not enveloped within the ambit of "dowry".
          Hence the dowry mentioned in Section 304-B should be
          any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
          given in connection with the marriage.
F
             22. It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was
          caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some
          time, if Section 304-B is to be invoked. But it should have
          happened "soon before her death". The said phrase, no
G         doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period
          either immediately before her death or within a few days
          or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her
          death is the .e_iyo! indicated by that expression. The
          legislative-object in providing such a radius of time by
H         employing the words "soon before her death" is to
         MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                     921
                   [R.K.AGRAWAL, JI

       emphasise the idea that her death should, in all A
       probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or
       harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible
       nexus between her death and the dowry-related
       harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval
       elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or B
       cruelty and her death is wide the court would be in a
       position to gauge that in all probabilities the harassment
       or cruelty would not have been the immediate cause of
       her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts
       and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval C
       in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from
       the concept "soon before her death"."

        9. Learned senior counsel for the appellants further
  contended that so far as Maya Devi-appellant No. 1 herein is D
· concerned, she was not staying at Rohtak at the relevant time
  and she was a teacher in Municipal School at Delhi which is
  apparent from the statement of Smt. Rajbala (DW-3), Head
  Mistress, Nagar Nigam Prathmik Balika Vidyalaya, Ladpur,
  Delhi as also from the investigation and the case of the E
  prosecution. Even, Karamvir-husband of the deceased was
  not preserit in the house when Kavita committed the act of .
  suicide .. He finally contended that there is nothing on record to
  show that any demand for dowry was made and she meted F
  out cruelty or harassment soon before her death. Learned
  senior counsel further contended that even forthe purpose of
  Section 498A the evidence is lacking.
                                                                       •

       10. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the
 respondent-State submitted that there is no dispute that Kavita G
 died on 26.09.1996 in her matrimonial home otherwise than
 under normal circumstances due to poisoning. Admittedly,
 there were persistent demands put up by the accused right
 from the solemnization of the marriage which continued till the H
    922        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015) 11 S.C.R.


    A  date of the death of the deceased. He further contended that
      "the accused had been maltreating, harassing and subjecting
      her to cruelty for the fulfillment of their demands for additional
      dowry. It was next contended that in the present case, besides
       Kavita, the; accused had also humiliated Pankaj (PW-4) -
    B brother of the deceased. When PW-4 visited the house of the
      accused with some ceremonial articles on the day of 'sakrant',
      the accused expressed displeasure upon the articles brought
      by him. He further contended that the claim that the deceased
      was suffering from moderate depressing episode and was
    C having suicidal tendencies prior to her death which had come
      true on 26.09.1996 is hardly of any consequence. A series of
      transac~ions of maltreatment and cruelty which commenced
      just 20-25 days after the solemnization of the marriage of the
      deceased with appellant No. 2 herein and culminated on the
    0
      date of the death of the deceased would go a long way to
      show that she was harassed, maltreated and was subjected
      to cruelty soon before her death for and in connection with the
      demands for dowry. It was further submitted that the deceased
    E was so much depressed as a result of cruelty/harassment
      meted out to her at the hands of the appellants that she
      developed the suicidal tendencies. He further.submitted that
      the accused had created such a vicious and charged
      atmosphere in the matrimonial home that Kavita (since
    F deceased) started picking up the ideas of committing suicide.

              11. Learned senior counsel for the respondent-State
•     ·vehemently contended that all the accused except appellant
       No. 1 were living in a house and the claim of the appellants
    G that there is no point of involvement of Maya Devi in the whole
       incident is wholly irrelevant as she too was a frequent visitor to
       Rohtak as admitted by her in the statement made under
       Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
       'the Code') and there is sufficient evidence on record to show
    H that as and when the demands were put up by the accused to
        MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                    923
                  [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

the complainant party, Maya Devi always accompanied her A
son.

       12. Learned senior counsel for the respondent-State
finally contended that the trial Court rightly convicted and
sentenced the appellants under Section 304B and 498A of        B
the IPC and the High Court upheld the same with some
modification in the sentence. The appellants deserve a
deterrent punishment in the present case.

     Discussion:                                               c
      13. Before considering the prosecution case as well as
the defence pleaded, it is desirable to extract the relevant
provisions of Section 304B which relates to dowry death:

        "3048. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a D
     woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
     otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
     years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before
     her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
     her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in E
     connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
     be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative
     shall be deemed to have caused her death.

        Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section, F
     'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of
     the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28of1961).

         (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished
     with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than G
     seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for
     life."

    The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and
came into force with ·effect from 19.11.1986. There is no      H
924         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2015] 11 S.C.R.


A     dispute about the applicability of the above provision since
      the marriage and the death occurred in the year 1994 and
      1996 respectively.

           14. In order to convict an accused for the offence
8     punishable under Section 3048 IPC, the following essentials
      must be satisfied:

           (1) the death of a woman must have been caused by
           burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
C          circumstances;

           (it) such death must have occurred within seven years of
           her marriage;

           (iit) soon before her death, the woman must have been
D          subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
           any relatives of her husband;

           (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in
           connection with, demand for dowry.
E
          When the above ingredients are established by reliable
  and acceptable evidence, such death shall be called dowry
  death and such husband or his relatives shall be deemed to
  have caused her death. If the above mentioned ingredients
F are attracted in view of the special provision, the court shall
  presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and
  until it is disproved by the accused. However, it is open to the
  accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such
  conclusive presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him
G to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an
  answer through cross-examination of the prosecution
  witnesses or by adducing evidence on the defence side.

       15. Section 1138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 speaks
H about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:
        MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                        925
                  [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

     "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the A
     question is whether a person has committed the dowry
     death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
     death such woman has been subjected by such person
     to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
     demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such 8
     person had caused the dowry death.

     Explanation.-Fo"r the purposes of this section, 'dowry
     death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 3048
     of the Indian Penal Code (45of1860)."                  C

      As stated earlier, the prosecution under Section 3048
IPC cannot escape from the burden of proof that the
harassment or cruelty was related to the demand for dowry
and such was caused "soon before her death". In view of the D
Explanation to the said section, the word "dowry" has to be
understood as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act; 1961 which reads.as under:

        "2. Definition of 'dowry' .-In this Act, 'dowry' meam;     E
     any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
     given either directly or indirectly-

       (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
     marriage; or
                                                                   F
       (b).by the parent of either party to a marriage or by
     any other person, to either party to the marriage \Jr to
     any other person,
     at or before or any time after the marriage in connection
     with the marriage of the said parties. but does not include   G
     dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
     Personal Law (Shariat) applies."

    16. To attract the provisions of Section 3048. one of the
main ingredients of the offence which is required to be            H
 926       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 11 S.C.R.


 A established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected
   to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand
   for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in
   Section 3048 IPC and Section 1138 of the Evidence Act is
   present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, learned senior
 B counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is
   no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment.
   With regard to the said claim, we .shall advert to while
   considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though
   the language used is "soon before her death", no definite
 C period has been enacted and the expression "soon before
   her death" has not been defined in both the enactments.
   Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come
   within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by
   the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of
 0
   each case. However, the said expression would normally imply
   that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or
   harassment concerned and the death in question. In other
   words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link
 E between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and t~e
   death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in
   time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental
   equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no
   consequence.
. F
          17. The aforesaid provisions were considered by this
     Court in Bansi La/vs. StateofHaryana (2011) 11SCC359
     wherein it was held that while considering the case under
     Section 3048 cruelty has to be proved during the close
. G proximity of the time of death and it should be continuous and
     such continuous harassment, physical or mental, by the
     accused should make life of the deceased miserable which
     may force her to commit suicide. This Court further held that
   ' where the cruelty has been proved during the close proximity
  H of the time of death then the provisions of Section 1138 of the
        MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                       927
                  [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 providing for presumption that the      A
accused is responsible for dowry death, have to be pressed
in service. In paras 19 and 20 of the judgment, this Court has
further held as follows:-
        "19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in
                                                                  8
     its wisdom has used the word "shall" thus, making a
     mandatory application on the part of the court to presume
     that death had been committed by the person who had
     subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with
     any demand of dowry. It is unlike the provisions of Section  c
     113-Aofthe Evidence Act where a discretion has been
     conferred upon the court wherein it had been provided
     that court may presume abetment of suicide by a married
     woman. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the
     accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section      o
     113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC, the onus to prove
     shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. The only
     requirements are that death of a woman has been
     caused by means other than any natural circumstances;
     that death has been caused or occurred within 7 years E
     of her marriage; and such woman had been subjected
     to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
     of her husband in connection with any demand of dowry.
        20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such F
    odeath have been established by the prosecution, it is the
     duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused
     has caused the dowry death. It may also be pertinent to
     mention herein that the expression "soon before her ·
     death" has not been defined in either of the statutes. G
     Therefore, in each case, the Court has to analyse ttie
     facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim
     and decide if there is any proximate connection between
     the demand of dowry and act ()f cruelty or harassment
     and the death."                                             H
928        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2015] 11 S.C.R.


A         18. This Court, in Mustafa Shahada/ Shaikh vs State
      ofMaharasl1tra (2012) 11SCC397 held as under:-

             "9. In order to convict an accused for the offence
           punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following
B          essentials must be satisfied:

              (1) the death of a woman must have been caused by
           burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
           circumstances;
c            (it) such death must have occurred within seven years
          of her marriage;                         ·

            (iit) soon before her death, the woman must have been
          subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
D         any relatives of her husband;

            (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in
          connection with, demand for dowry.

             When the above ingredients are established by
E
          reliable and acceptable evidence, such death shall be
          called dowry death and such husband or his relatives
          shall be deemed to have caused her death. If the
          abovementioned ingredients are attracted in view of the
F         special provision, the court shall presume and it shall
          record such fact as proved unless and until it is dispro~ed
          by the accused. However, it is ooen to the accused to
          adduce such evidence for disproving such compulsory
          presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do
G         so and he can discharge such burden by getting an
          answer through cross-examination of the prosecution
          witnesses or by adducing evidence on the defence side.

             11. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, bne of
H         the main ingredients of the offence which is required to
       MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                     929
                 [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

     be established is that "soon before her death" she was A
     subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection
     with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before
     her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-
     B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity
   · test. In fact, the learned counsel appearing for the B
     appellant submitted that there is no proximity for the
     alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard
     to the said claim, we shall advert to the same while
     considering the evidence led in by the prosecution.
     Though the language used is "soon before her death", C
     no·definite period has been enacted and the expression
     "soon before her death" has not been defined in both the ·
   · enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period
     which can come within the term "soon before her death"
                                                                 0
     is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the
     facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said
     expression would normally imply that the ·interval should
     not be much between the cruelty or harassment
     concerned and the death in question. In other words, there E
     must be existence of a proximate and live link between
     the effect of cruelty based on dowry.demand and the
     death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is
     remote in time and has become stale enough not to
     disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, F
     it would be of no consequence. These principles have
     been reiterated in Kaliyaperumal v. State of TN. and
     Yashoda v. State of MP"

    19.ln the case of Ramesh Vithal Patil vs. State of G
Karnataka (2014) 11SCC516 this Court held as follows:-

       "20. Moreover, admittedly the deceased committed
    suicide within a period of seven years from the date of
    her marriage. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is, H
930       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A·        therefore, clearly attracted to this case. Presumption
          contemplated therein must spring in action. This provision
          was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second
          Amendment) Act, 1983 to resolve the diffic;:ulty of proof
          where married women are forced to commit suicide but
B         incriminating evidence is difficult to get as it is usually
          available within the four walls of the matrimonial home ..... "

         20. With these principles in mind, let us analyse the
   evidence led in by the prosecution. The marriage of
C Kavita@Kusum (since deceased) was solemnized with
    Karamvir on 17.07.1994. Kavita died on 26.09.1996 after
  ·consuming some poisonous substance at her matrimonjal
   home. The father of the deceased lodged a complaint against
   the accused persons that he had given dowry on the eve of
D marriage beyond his means but after 20-25 days of marriage,
   Karamvir-appellant No. 2 herein, Maya Devi-appellant No.1
   herein and brothers Dharamveer and Paramveer and sister
   Sonika, started harassing his daughter for more money When
   Kavita visited her father's house, she nan ated the entire tale
E of woes to her parents and brother. When the complainant
   enquired about the matter, the appellants informed the
   complainant that the appellant No. 2 is in need of money and
   they also have to perform the marriage of Sonika. A sum of
F Rs. 20,000/- was paid to appellant No. 2 so that the daughter
   of the complainant is not harassed. It was further stated that
   the complainant receiv~d a letter of his daughter regarding
   continuous demand for dowry and sufferings meted out to her.
   The complainant paid a further sum of Rs. 25,000/- for the
G purchase of refrigerator and gold chain to the appellant No. 2.
   Kavita was sent with her husband on the assurance that the
   accused family would not harass her in future. Even on the
   day of 'sakrant', when the brother of the deceased visited her
   matrimonial home, the accused threatened them that the
H household articles of Kavita will be thrown out. A further demand
        MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                          931
                  [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

of Rs. 30,000/- was made to meet the kitchen expenses by             A
the appellants. Since that demand was not fulfilled, the
deceased was left with her father at Delhi. Subsequently, the
complainant requested to compromise the matter and
tendered his apology in writing. In June 1996, the deceased
was brought to home by the accused persons. After some               B
days, when the complainant visited her matrimonial home at
Rohtak, he was informed that situation has not changed and
whenever she brings money, the peace returns for 10-20 days
otherwise she is beaten mercilessly by the accused persons.
On 26.09.1996, the complainant got the information about the         C
death of his daughter. The case was committed to the Court
of Sessions and the accused were found guilty under Section
3048 and 498A of the IPC. There is ample evidence thatthe
deceased was harassed, maltreated and was s,ubjected to              D
cruelty, for and in connection with the demands for dowry by
the accused. Admittedly, appellant No. 2 was present in his
office on 26.09.1996 located at M.D. University Campus at
Rohtak but he did not attend to his wife at the relevant time.
The assertion made by learned senior counsel for the appellants      E
that the deceased was suffering from moderate depressing
episode and was having suicidal tendencies prior to her death
is of no consequence. Dr. V.P. Mehla (DW-2) was apprised
by the deceased about the harassment and the maltreatment
by her in-laws a month prior to her death when she was taken         F
to the aforesaid doctor for the alleged treatment. According
to DW-2, the deceased was so much depressed as a result of
the act of cruelty meted out to her at the hands of the appellants
that she developed suicidal tendencies. The testimony of DW-
2 shows that the accused had created such a charged                  G
environment in her matrimonial home that she developed
suicidal tendencies. Except appellant No. 1 herein, all were
living in the house at Rohtak. Appellant No. 1 herein was a
frequent visitor to that house and she herself admitted this fact
in her statement under Section 313 of the Code. Thus, it is          H
932         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A     very much clear that accused persons maltreated, harassed
      and subjected the deceased to cruelty, after the solemnization
      of her marriage with the appellant No. 2 herein, during her life
      time and soon before her death, for and in connection with the
      demands for dowry, who died at her matrimonial home within
B     seven years of her marriage otherwise than in normal
      circumstances.

          21. Section 3048 IPC does not categorise death as
  homicidal or suicidal or accidental. This is because death
C caused by burns can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal
  or accidental. Similarly, death caused by bodily injury can, in a
  given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Finally, any
  death occurring "otherwise than under normal circumstances"
  can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
D Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 3048 IPC are
  fulfilled, any death (homicidal or suicidal or accidental) whether
  caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than
  under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative
  mandate, be called a "dowry death" and the woman's husband
E or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused her death".
  The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of
  dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple
  offenders who has or have caused the dowry death.

F       22. The key words under Section 1138 of the Evidence
  Act, 1872 are "shall presume" leaving no option with a court
  but to presume an accused brought before it of causing a dowry
  death guilty of the offence. However, the redeeming factor of
  this provision is that the presumption is rebuttable. Section
G 1138 of the Act enables an accused to prove his innocence
  and places a reverse onus of proof on him or her. In the case
  on hand, accused persons failed to prove beyond reasonable
  doubt that the deceased died a natural death. When Kavita
H allegedly committed suicide, her husband-appellant No.2,
  '

         MAYA DEVI &ANR. v. STATE OF HARYANA                          933
                  [R.K.AGRAWAL, J.]

  though he was not present in the house, was present in his          A
  office at M.D. University, Rohtak at the relevant time but he did
  not make any sincere effort to take her to the hospital which
  was very near to the place of the incident. Similarly, appellant
  No. 2 got the deceased exami_ned by DW-2 in order to create
  an impression that she was struggling with chronic depression       B
  but the truth floated upon the surface when the deceased
  reveals that the accused persons were maltreating her and
  she had started picking up the ideas of suicide. .Lastly,
  appellanf No. 2 falsely informed the court that having learnt
  about the death of his wife Kavita, he left for Delhi to inform     C
  her family members. In fact, the accused never went to Delhi
  and the complainant received a telephonic message from an
  unknown person regarding the death of his daughter. So far
  as Maya Devi-appellant No. 1 herein is concerned, there is no       D
  denying the fact that she was working as a teacher in a
  government school and she was not present at the relevant
  time at the place of incident but it is very much clear from the
·evidence on record that both the accused persons had a
  dominating role in the entire episode and she had always            E
  accompanied her son-appellant No. 2 herein to the house of
  the complainant (PW-3) for the dowry demands. The
  presumption under Section 1138 of the Act is rriandatory may
  be contrasted with Section 113A of the Act which was
  introduced contemporaneously. Section 113A of the Act,              F
  dealing with abetment of suicide, uses the expression "may
  presume". This being the position, a two-stage process is
  required to be followed in respect of an offence punishable
  under Section 304-B IPC: it is necessary to first ascertain
  whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out           G
  against the accused; if the ingredients are made out, then the
· accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman
  but is entitled to rebut the statutory presumption of having
  caused a dowry death. From the evidence on record, we are
  of the opinion that in the present case Kavita died an unnatural    H
934          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2015] 11 S.C.R..


A     death by committing suicide as she was subjected to cruelty/
      harassment by her husband and in-laws in connection with the
      demand for dowry which started from the time of her marriage
      and continued till she committed suicide. Thus, the provisions
      of Sections 3048 and 498A of the IPC will be fully attracted.
 8
            Conclusion:

        23. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the
  opinion that Kavita@Kusum suffered death at her matrimonial
C home, otherwise than under normal circumstances, within
  seven years of her marriage, and the case squarely falls within
  the ambit of dowry death. In the present case, from the
  evidence of the Doctor (OW-2), PW-3 and PW-4, we find that
  the harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce
o her to convince her parents to meet the demands for dowry.

        24. All the above factors clearly established the legal
   requirements for an offence falling under Sections 3048 and
   498A IPC with the aid of ~ection 1138 of the Evidence Act,
 E 1872 against the appellants and the conviction and sentence
   imposed, therefore, do not call for interference. Hence, the
   appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

      Kalpana K. Tripathy                           Appeal dismissed.