Holding

The right to exercise the option of a promotion channel under clause 10 is available only at the stage of promotion from Group C to Group B and does not extend to employees directly appointed to Group B, and the provision is not violative of Article 14.

Summary

The Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA) issued Standing Instructions governing promotion channels for its employees. Four Quality Supervisors appointed directly to Group B posts sought to change their promotion channel, but the Executive Committee rejected their request, holding that the option to choose a channel was available only at the stage of promotion from Group C to Group B. The Kerala High Court held that the channel system violated Article 14 of the Constitution and set aside the decision; the Division Bench reversed that judgment. The Supreme Court examined the interpretation of sub‑clauses (2) and (3) of clause 10 of the Standing Instructions and held that the right to exercise the option is confined to employees being promoted from Group C to Group B, not to those directly appointed to Group B, and that the provision does not constitute unlawful discrimination. Consequently, the Court allowed MPEDA’s appeal, set aside the High Court judgments and dismissed the writ petitions.

Issues considered

The validity of clause 10 of the Standing Instructions under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the right to exercise the option of a promotion channel is available to employees directly appointed to Group B posts.
Interpretation of sub‑clauses (2) and (3) of clause 10 – whether they confer a general right to all employees or a specific right to a particular category.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14
Marine Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972s. 7(1), s. 7(4)

Subjects

service lawpromotionchannel of promotionequalityArticle 14standing instructionsadministrative lawMarine Products Export Development Authority

Judgment

A MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
A. GEETHA AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1997

B (S.C. AGRA WAL AND G.T. NANA VA TI, JJ.]

Service Law :

Marine Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972 Sec. 7 (1)-
C Standing Instructions dt. Dec. 15, 1979-Clauses 9 and 10-Promotion-
Quality Supervisor-Group 'B' Posts in Channel I/I-Direct recruits appointed
to the posts making Representation to change the channel as more number
of promotional post available in other channels-Claim Rejected on the
ground that option to change channel available only at the stage ofpromotion
D from Group 'C' to Group 'B' Post-On challenge High Court held that the
Standing instructions are violative of Constitution-On appeal, Held-Right
to option conferred only at the stage of promotion from Group C to Group
B-Sub-clauses (I) to (4) of Clause JO of Standing Instructions to be read
as part of the Scheme-Standing Instructions do not suffer from vice of
di.<crfmination--Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 14.
E
The appellant-Authority was established under the provisions of Marine
Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972. The service conditions of
the employees were governed by Standing Instructions dated Dec. 15, 1979.
The respondents were appointed as Quality Supervisors in Group B Category
F by direct recruitment. Clause 10 of the Standing Instructions provides the
channel of Promotion. The post of Quality Supervisor falls in Channel III
where there were two promotional posts of Asstt. Directors while such
promotional posts were more in number in other channels. Therefore, the
respondents made a representation for exercising option to change their
channel. The representation was rejected by the Executive Committee on the
G ground that under sub-clauses (2) and (3) of Clause 10 of the Standing
Instructions tht> right to choose option was available only at the stage when a
person was promoted from Group C to Group B posts but no such right was
available at the stage of promotion from Group B to Group A, when the
employees had already been appointed in a particular channel. Aggrieved by
H the decision of the Executive Committee, the respondent-employees filed a writ
104
MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. A. GEETHA 105
petition before the High Court The Single Judge of High Court while allowing A
the petition held that the channel system of promotion laid down by Standing
Instructions was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The appeal of the
Authority was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court Hence the
present appeal.

The contention of the appellant was that the right to exercise the option B
for the channel was available to employees falling in Group C who would be
promoted to Group B, and for the purpose of such promotion they could
exercise their option for the channel in which they want to be considered for
promotion to a Group B Post. It was also contended that sub-clauses (2) and
(3) of clause 10 were to be read together and, if so read, the said clauses C
would mean that the right of option was available only to employees referred
to in sub-clause (3) and there was no independent right of option given to
employees other than those referred to in sub-clause (3).

- The contention of the respondents was that the High Court had rightly
construed sub-clauses (2) and (3) of Clause 10 of the Standing Instructions
to mean that under sub-clause (2) a general right had been conferred on all
employees while under sub-clauses (3) a special provision was made with
D

regard to employees who were working on the posts in the pay scale of 425-
700.

Allowing the appeal, this Court
E
HELD : 1. The conferment of right to exercise the option in respect of
the channel of promotion under clause 10 of the Standing Instructions does
not suffer from the vice of discrimination. [113-D)

2.1. Under clause 10 of the Standing Instructions, which deals with the
"channel of promotion'', the right to option has been conferred only at the F
stage of promotion from Group C to Group B. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the respondents who were holding posts in Group B, having been directly
appointed on the post of Quality Supervisor, can exercise the right of option
after they have already been appointed on a post in a particular channel.
• [111-D-EJ G

2.2. A person who is promoted from a post in Group C to a post in Group
B has been given the right to exercise the option to choose the channel of
promotion for the reason that channels of promotion are available in respect
of posts in Group Band Group A only since a person holding a post in Group
C can be promoted to a post falling in Group B, he has been given the right H
'
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to choose the channel for promotion before he is promoted to Group B. No
right to choose a channel is available after he is promoted to Group B. When
a person is directly appointed on a post falling in Group B in one of the
channels he exercises his option by applying for that particular post falling
in the particular channel of promotion. Thus there is no distinction between
B a person who is directly recruited to a post in Group Band a person who is
promoted to a post in Group Bin the matter of exercise of option after .their
appointment to Group B. [113-A-C]

3. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in holding that sub-
clause (2) of clause 10 of the Standing Instructions confers a general right
C of option to all the employees and sub-clause (3) confers such riglit to certain
categories of employees only. Sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause 10 of the
Standing Instructions cannot be read disjunctively as dealing with different
sets of employees. It cannot be accepted that sub-clause (2) is general in nature
covering all employees while sub-clause (3) deals with certain specific
categories of employees mentioned therein, Sub-clause (1) to (4) of clause 10
D have to be read as part of a scheme. If it is held that in sub-clause (2) a general
right of option has been conferred on all the employees irrespective of the
post held by them, sub-clause (3) would be rendered otiose. It is also not
possible to hold that while sub-clause (3) deals with the category of employees
referred to in that sub-clause, the rest of the employees are dealt with in sub-
E clause (2). There is no reason why the employees referred to in sub-clause
(3) should be treated differently from the rest of the employees in the matter
of exercise of the right ofoption. [111-D-A; 110-E-F)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 6260-6262 of
I 997 Etc. Etc.
F
From th.e Judgment and Order dated 26.12.94 of the Kerala High Court
in W.A. Nos. 351, 350 and 357of1994-C

Rajiv Dhawan and M.P. Vinod for the Appellant.

G Ramesh Babu M.R. for the Appellant in C.A. No. 6264/97.

(J. Vellapally, V.B. Sharya) for Mis. Saharya and Co., T.G. Narayanan
Nair, S. Balakrishnan, Subramaniam Prasad and Ms. Revathy Raghavan for the
Respondents.

H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYv. A. GEETHA [S.C. AGRAWAL, l.] } 07
S.C. AGRAWAL, J. Special leave granted. A
These appeals are directed against the judgment of the High Court of
Kerala dated December 20, 1994 in Writ Appeals Nos. 349/1994, 351/1994, 357/
1994 and 362/1994. Writ Appeals Nos. 349/1994, 350/1994, 35111994 and 357/
1994 were filed by Marine Products Exports Development Authority (hereinafter
referred to as 'MPEDA') against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of B
the High Court dated February 18, 1994 in 0.P. No. 2058/91, 9205/90, 7539/90
and 321/91. Writ Appeal No. 362/94 was filed by respondents Nos. 3, 4 and
5 in O.P. No. 7539/90. O.P. No. 2058/91 was filed by K. Sasidharan Nair and
V. I. George, 0.P. No. 9205/90 was filed by K.J. Anthony, O.P. No. 7539/90 was
filed by A. Geetha and O.P. No. 321/91 was filed by K.S. Sreedevi. The C
petitioners in the said petitions, who are respondents in these appeals, shall
hereinafter be referred to as 'the petitioners',

MPEDA is an authority established under the provisions of the Marine
Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972. Section 7 ( 4) of the said
Act empowers MPEDA to appoint officers and employees as may be necessary D
for efficient performance of its functions and pay them such salaries and
allowance as it may determine from time to time, subject to. rules prescribed
by the Central Government. The Central Government has not prescribed any
rules governing the service conditions. MPEDA issued standing Instructions
for that purpose which came into force with effect from December 15, 1979, E
By clause 9 of the Standing Instructions. read with Schedule I the employees
have been classified into four categories in the following manner :-

I. GROUP A [Class I] consists of Joint Director, Project Director,
Deputy Director and Assistant Director, [pre-revised pay scales
of Rs. 700-1300 to Rs. 1500-1800]. F
2. GROUP B [Class 11] consists of Accounts Officer and Quality
Supervisors [Pre-revised scale of Rs. 550-900].

3. GROUP C [Class I] consists of Accountant, Assistant, Senior
Clerk and Junior Clerk [Pre revised scales of Rs. 260-400 to
Rs. 420-700]. G.
4. GROUP D [Class I] consists of Watchmen, Peons, etc. [Pre-
revised scale o( Rs. 196-232].

Clause I 0 of the Standing Instructions, under the caption "Channels of
Promotion", provides as under :- H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A I. The following shall be the channels of promotions :
Channel - Administration.
Channel II - Regional Offices, Marketing Service,
Development, Economics, Publicity and
Statistics.
B Channel III - Quality Control and Inspection
Channel N - Frozen Storage.
Channel v - Shrimp Farming.
The posts under each channel are given in Schedule II.
c
2. For the purpose of implementation of these channels of
promotions, options of individual employees concerned shall be
obtained.

3. Employees presently working in the posts in the scale of pay of
D Rs. 425-700 shall exercise their option of various channels within
60 days of completion of their probation in the post. Employees
not so opting shall be placed in such channels as may be

4.
decided by the Executive Committee.

Options once exercised shall be final."
[
E
The petitioners were all appointed as Quality Supervisors by direct
recruitment. K.S. Sreedevi was appointed on July 28, 1978 and the rest were
appointed in 1981-82, i.e., after the coming into force of the Standing
Instructions on December 15, 1979. The post of Quality Supervisor falls in
F Channel III. In Channel III there are 2 posts of Assistant Directors, while the
number of such posts are three in Channel I, seventeen in Channel II and
twelve in Channel V. The petitioners submitted a representation wherein they
sought to exercise the option regarding change of channel from Channel III
to other channels. The said representation of the petitioners was referred to
the Executive Committee of MPEDA. The Executive Committee, in its meeting
G held on August 13, 1989, decided as follows :-

"The Committee noted the implications of the interpretation of Standing
Instructions clause 10 (2) to (4) and it was clarified with reference to
clause I 0 (2) and (3) of Standing Instructions that the facility to opt
for a particular channel will be available only to employees working
H in posts below the grade of Rs. 1640-2900 and that too for promotion
MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY'· A. GEETHA [S.C. AGRAWAL, J.] } 09
to the grade of Rs. 1640-2900. For this purpose employees working in A
next below feeder grades identified for promotion as feeder category
in the recruitment rules shall exercise their option of channel within
60 days of completion of their probation in the post. The provision
of option therefore will not be available to employees appointed or
promoted into the grade of,Rs. 1640-2900 revised."
B
Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the Executive Committee the
petitioners filed the writ petitions which have given rise to these appeals. The
said writ petitions were heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court.
By his judgment dated February 18, 1994, the learned Single Judge (G.H.
Gutta!, J.) allowed the said petitions and held that the channel system of C
promotion laid down in the Standing Instruction was violative of the right to
equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch
as the channelisation of promotions under the Standing Instructions confines
the petitioners to Channel III where there are only two posts of Assistant
Directors and in contrast the number of posts of Assistant Directors in other
channels are more and as a result officers in those channels have accelerated D
promotions even if they are junior to the petitioners and have lesser experience.
The learned Single Judge further held that the petitioners were wrongly
denied the option to choose the channel on the view that such option was
available only to employees falling under sub-clause (3) of clause 10 of the
Standing Instructions. The learned Single Judge was of the view that sub- E
clause (2) of clause I 0 applies to all employees who have a desire to exercise
the option to choose a channel of promotion and sub-clause (3) cannot be
interpreted to mean that the application of the general provision of sub-clause
(2) is excluded. Appeals filed against the said judgment of the learned Single
Judge by MPEDA as well as by respondents Nos. 3,4 and 5 in 0.P. No. 7539/
90 have been dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the F
impugned judgment. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have construed
the Standing Instructions to mean that under sub-clause (2) of clause 1O the
employees who are already in any of the channels have a legal right to
exercise their option to be considered in the matter of promotion to the post
of Assistant Director in a different channel and that sub-clause (3) of clause G
10 deals with the employees who are outside the channels and are required
to exercise their option within a specified time, in the absence of which they
are to be dealt with by the Executive Committee. The lei:rned Judges have,
however, held that on the said interpretations the provisions of sub-clause
(2) of clause 10 could not be held to be discriminatory. Feeling aggrieved by
the said decision of the Division Bench of the High Court the appellants have H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A filed these appeals.

Dr. Rajiv Dhavan, the learned senior counsel appearing for MPEDA, has
urged that the High Court was in error in construing sub-clause (2) and (3)
of clause of the Standing Instructions. The submission of the learned counsel
B in that the channels of promotion are only in respect of different posts falling
in Group A and B and the right to exercise the option for the channel has
been given to employees falling in Group C who would be promoted to Group
B and for the purpose of such promotion they could exercise their option for
the channel in which they want to be considered for promotion to a Group
B post. It has been urged that sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause 10 have to
C be read together and, if so read, the said clauses mean that the right of option
is available only to employees referred to in sub-clause (3) and there is no
independent right of option given to employees other than those referred to
iri sub-clause (3). Shri M.J. Vellapally, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioners, has, on the other hand, urged that the High Court has
rightly construed sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause 10 of the standing
D Instructions to mean that under sub-clause (2) a general right has been
conferred on all employees while under sub-clause (3) a special provision is
I-
made with .regard to employees who were working on the posts in the pay
scale of Rs. 425-700.

E On a careful consideration of the submissions urged by the learned.
counsel we find considerable merit in the submissions of Dr. Dhavan. In our
opinion, sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause I 0 of the Standirig Instructions
cannot be read disjunctively as dealing with different sets of employees. It
is difficult to accept that sub-clause (2) is general in nature covering all
employees, while sub-clause (3) deals with certain specific categories of
F employees mentioned therein. Sub-clauses (I) to (4) of clause I 0 have to be
read as part of a scheme and, if they are thus read, it would be evident that
in sub-clause (I) the five channels of promotion have been enumerated and
reference is made to Schedule II which enumerates the posts under each
channel. In sub-clause (2) provision is made for obtaining option of individual
G employees concerned for the purpose of implementation of channels of
promotion. Sub-clause (3) prescribes the conditions for exercise of option by
the employees who have been conferred the said right. It Jays down that the
said option will be available only to employees regularly working in the pay
scale of Rs. 425-700 and such employees should exercise their option to
various channels within 60 days of completion of their probation in the post
H and that the employees not so opting shall be placed in such channels as may
MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. A. GEETHA [S.C. AGRAWAL, J.] 111
be decided by the Executive Committee. In sub-clause (4) it is prescribed that A
the options once exercised shall be final. If it is held that in sub-clause (2)
a general right of option has been conferred on all the employees irrespective
of the post held by them, sub-clause (3) would be rendered otiose. Such a
construction would defeat the object underlying sub-clause (3) which in
specific terms indicates that the right to exercise the option is available only B
if the conditions laid down in the said sub-clause are fulfilled. Jn view of the
language used in sub-clause (3) an employee falling in that sub-clause can
exercise the option only in accordance with the requirements of that sub-
clause. He cannot fall back on sub-clause (2). It is also not possible to hold
that while sub-clause (3) deal~ with the category of employees referred to in
that sub-clause, the rest of the employees are dealt with in sub-clause (2). C
There is no reason why the employees referred to in sub-clause (3) should
be treated differently from the rest of the employees in the matter of exercise
of the right of option. We are therefore, unable to agree with the view of the
Division Bench of the High Court that sub-clause (2) of clause I 0 of the
Standing Instructions confers a general right of option to all the employees
and sub-clause (3) confers ~uch a right to certain categories of employees D
only. Having regard to the scheme of clause IO which deals with promotion
from Group C to Group Band the fact that 'Channels of Promotion' only relate
to posts falling in Groups A and B, it must be held that the right of option
that has been conferred under clause 10 is available only at the stage of
promotion from Group C to a post in Group B. On that view it cannot be said E
that the petitioners who were holding a post in Group B, having been directly
appointed on the post of Quality Supervisor, can exercise the right of option
after they have already been appointed on a post in a particular channe I.

Shri Vellapally has pointed out that while the order dated July 26, 1978
relating to appointment of K.S. Sreedevi contains a specific clause to the F
effect that her channel of promotion shall be "Channel III to Quality Control
and Inspection", there is no such condition in the orders of appointment of
K. Sadasivan Nair and V.I. George. It has been pointed out that though his
appointment was on the post of Quality Supervisor, K. Sadasivan Nair was
working in the Sub Regional Office, Goa and thereafter in the Research and G
Product Development Section in Channel II and after eight years of service
in the said section, he was transferred to the Appraisal and Investment
Section, which does not come under any of the channels of promotion. It is
further, Stated that V.I. George was also not posted as Quality Supervisor at
any time but was posted to the Sub Regional Office at Mangalore for three
years and thereafter he was transferred and posted to the Head office at H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Cochin in the Economics and Marketing Service and he was transferred and
-
posted to the Appraisal and Investment Section which does not come under
any of the existing channels of promotion and after service in the said section
for seven years, he was transferred to the Research and Product Development
Section which comes under Channel II of promotion. It is no doubt true that
B in the case of K.S. Sreedevi there is specific mention in the order of appointment
that her channel of promotion shall be "Channel III to Quality Control and
Inspection" and a similar provision is not found in the orders of appointment
ofK. Sadasivan Nair and VJ. George, but in view of the fact that the appointment
of both of these petitioners was made on· the post of Qualit-; Supervisor,
which falls in Channel III under Schedule II referred to in sub-clause (I) of
C Clause IO of the Standing Instructions, it must be held that the appointment
of both these petitioners was made in Channel III. The fact that after their
appointment both these petitioners worked on posts falling in other channels
would not, by itself, mean that their has been a change in their channel for
the purpose of promotion. There is nothing in the Standing Instructions
which may lend support to the view that if a person is posted on a post which
D falls in another channel, there is an automatic change in the channel of
promotion. On the other hand, we find that MPEDA in its meeting held on
June 27, 1985 has taken the following decision :-

"Mobility Within the Channel

E {I) Chairman may transfer officers within channel periodically whenever
found necessary in the interests of efficiency and exigencies of work.

(2) Chairman may transfer officers outside the channels on working
arrangement in the interest of efficiency and exigencies of work.''
F This would show that the Chairman of MPEDA has been empowered
to transfer the officers within channels or outside channels in the interest of
efficient and exigencies of work. Such posting and transfer would not result
in automatic change of channels for the purpose of promotion.

G Shri S. Balakrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for A. Geetha has
submitted that clause I 0 of the Standing Instructions is violative of the right
to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution as found by the
learned Single Judge. It is submitted that there is no rational basis for denying
the right of option to persons who are directly recruited to a post falling in
Group B though such a right is available to a person promoted from a post
H falling in Group C to a post falling in Group B. We find no merit in this
MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY'· A. GEETHA [S.C. AGRAWAL, I.] JJ3
contention. A person who is promoted from a post in Group C to a post in A
. Group B has been given the right to exercise the option to choose the channel
of promotion for the reason that channels of promotion are available in
respect of posts in Group B and Group A only and since a person holding
a post in Group C can be promoted to a post falling in Group B, he has been
given the right to choose the channel for promotion before he is promoted
to Group B. No right to choose a channel is available after his promotion, to B
a person who has Leen promoted to Group B. There is thus no distinction
between a person who is directly recruited to a post in Group Band a person
who is promoted to a post in Group B in the matter of exercise of option after
their appointment to Group B. When a person is directly appointed on a post
falling in Group B in one of the channels he exercises his option by applying C
for the particular post falling in the particular channel of promotion. Similarly
a person holding a Group C post is given the option to choose the channel
of promotion at the stage of promotion to Group B. It cannot, therefore, be
said that the conferment of right to exercise the option in respect of the
channel of promotion under clause 10 of the Standing Instructions suffers
from the vice of discrimination. The contention urged by Sri Balakrishnan D
cannot, therefore, be accepted.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are unable to uphold the impugned
judgment of thr Division Bench of the High Court. The appeals are, therefore,
allowed, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court E
dated December 20, 1994 in W.A. Nos. 349/1994, 350/1994, 351/1994, 357/1994
and 362/1994 as well as the judgment of the learned Single judge dated
February 18, 1994 in O.P. Nos. 7539/1990-Y, 9209/1990-U, O.P. Nos. 321/1991-
. Land 2058/1991-T are set aside and the said writ petitions are dismissed. No.
Order as to costs.
F
S.V.K.I. Appeals allowed.