MANOJ RAMESHLAL CHHABRIYAversusMAHESH PRAKASH AHUJA & ANR.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 282
- Decided
- 27 February 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
A High Court must examine the prima facie case, consider all material on record, apply its mind, and grant leave to appeal under Section 378(3) when arguable points exist, and in this case the Supreme Court held that leave must be granted and the appeal remitted for merits.
Summary
The appellant, brother of the deceased, challenged the Bombay High Court's refusal to grant leave to appeal an acquittal of Mahesh Prakash Ahuja for murder. The trial court had acquitted the accused due to lack of reliable circumstantial evidence and inconsistencies in witness testimonies. The High Court denied leave without recording reasons, prompting the Supreme Court to examine the parameters for granting leave under Section 378(3) of the CrPC. Relying on State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar and Sita Ram v. State of U.P., the Court held that a High Court must assess whether a prima facie case exists and apply its mind to the material on record, without re‑appreciating evidence at this stage. Finding that arguable points were raised and the High Court had not provided a reasoned order, the Supreme Court granted leave and remitted the matter for a merits‑based appeal. The appeal was therefore allowed and the criminal appeal against the acquittal is to be heard on its merits.
Issues considered
- What parameters must a High Court consider when deciding an application for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the CrPC?
- Whether the Bombay High Court erred in refusing leave to appeal in the present acquittal case?
- Whether the principle of a right to appeal, grounded in the doctrine of human fallibility, applies to appeals filed by the State or a private informant
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 372, s. 378(3)
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 27
Headnote
Issue for Consideration What are the parameters that a High Court should keep in mind while granting or refusing a leave to appeal filed under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. Headnotes† Criminal Law – Section 378(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Leave to appeal against should primarily see whether prima facie case is made out based on the materials on record while considering application for grant of leave under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Cr.P.C and thereafter should adjudicate the appeal on merits. [Paras 12-13] High Court to apply judicial mind
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1433 : 2025 INSC 282
Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya
v.
Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1048 of 2017)
27 February 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
What are the parameters that a High Court should keep in mind
while granting or refusing a leave to appeal filed under Section
378(3) of the Cr.P.C.
Headnotes†
Criminal Law – Section 378(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 – Leave to appeal against acquittal order:
Held: High Court should primarily see whether prima facie case
is made out based on the materials on record while considering
application for grant of leave under sub-section (3) of Section 378
of the Cr.P.C and thereafter should adjudicate the appeal on merits.
[Paras 12-13]
High Court to apply judicial mind to discern whether arguable
points have been raised – No reappreciation of evidence to
be done at the stage of Section 378(3) of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973:
Held: Court relied on State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh
Poyarekar (2008) 9 SCC 475 wherein it was held that while it
cannot be said that all applications seeking grant of appeal must
be allowed, the High Court also does not reappreciate the evidence
at this stage to ascertain whether the judgment appealed against
is perverse or not – It was further held that in cases where leave
is refused, High Court must consider all materials on record
including witness testimonies and pass a reasoned order reflecting
application of mind by High Court so that its order is free from any
illegality – At the same time if materials on record reveal any need
for reappreciation of evidence to decipher viability of the order
sought to be challenged, leave must be granted and appeal must
be heard on merits. [Para 7]
1434 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Right to appeal – Life and liberty – Human fallibility:
Held: Court relied on Sita Ram v. State of U.P. (1979) 2 SCC
656 which held that at least one right to appeal is imperative so
that the guarantee of life and liberty is ensured because humans,
including judges, are not infallible – It also held that such a right
of appeal ensures that before any irreversible deprivation of life
or liberty is done, a given case is relooked into both factually and
legally to ensure fairness.
Case Law Cited
State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar [2008] 13 SCR
750 : (2008) 9 SCC 475; Sita Ram v. State of U.P. [1979] 2 SCR
1085 : (1979) 2 SCC 656 – relied on.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
List of Keywords
Section 378(3) CrPC; Leave to appeal; Appeal against acquittal
order; Circumstantial evidence; Prima facie case; Perverse;
Universal application; Application of mind; Relevant material;
Speaking order; Reappreciation of evidence; Life and liberty;
Human infallibility; Remand; Section 372 CrPC.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1048 of 2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2013 of the High Court
of Bombay in CRLA No. 207 of 2013
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Gaurav Agrawal, Sr. Adv., C. George Thomas, Ms. Kaarunya
Lakshmi, Nakul Patwardhan, Ansh Mittal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
R. Basant, Sanjay Kharde, Sr. Advs., Satyajit A. Desai, Pravin
V. Khandare, Shubham Singh, Siddharth Gautam, Abhinav K.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1435
Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr.
Mutyalwar, Sachin Singh, Ananya Thapliyal, Naman Vashishtha,
Akash Rajeev, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Aaditya Aniruddha Pande.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. This appeal is at the instance of the original first informant brother
of the deceased, seeking to challenge the order passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Application No.207 of 2013,
dated 22nd of August 2013, by which the High Court in an appeal filed
by the State against the judgment and order of acquittal, declined
to grant leave under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as, “Cr.P.C.”).
2. We are conscious of the fact that the acquittal appeal was at the
instance of the State. As leave came to be declined, the State
could have come before us by way of an appeal. However, the
State has though fit not to question the order passed by the High
Court, declining to grant leave and in such circumstances, it is the
brother of the deceased (original first informant) who has thought fit
to question the order passed by the High Court.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent no.1 herein,
was put to trial in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kalyan
in Sessions Case No.132 of 2011 on the charge of having committed
murder of his wife i.e. the deceased. It is the case of the prosecution
that on the date of the incident i.e., 02.04.2011 India was playing World
Cup final against Sri Lanka in Mumbai. After India won the match and
the World Cup, the respondent accused started celebrating by firing
shots in the air from his licensed pistol. Later, he is alleged to have
fired a shot at his wife. The wife succumbed to the firearm injuries.
Their fifteen years old son was an eyewitness to the incident.
4. The Trial Court acquitted the respondent no.1 of the charge of
murder. The State preferred acquittal appeal before the High Court.
The High Court thought fit, not to grant leave to appeal. The High
Court has observed thus:-
“6. PW.3 - Umesh (son of the deceased), the sole witness
with regard to the last seen, was declared hostile as he
1436 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
did not support the prosecution case. PW.3 - Umesh has
in his evidence stated, that he was informed by his mother
and sister, that the Respondent/accused had gone out of
station for show room work, since the morning of 2nd April,
2011. The said witness has denied the portions marked “A
to C” i.e. portion ‘A’ “after India winning the Cricket match,
my father took out pistol from the cupboard, put bullets
in it, fired in air by going down stairs”; portion ‘B’ i.e. “my
father accused Mahesh again came to house and started
watching Awards Programme on T.V.; portion ‘C’, i.e. ”that
there was quarrel between my mother and father in the
bed room, after some time heard noise of firing bullet and
my father came from the bedroom in frightened condition.
At that time his shirt was soaked with blood and there was
blood on his hand”. It has come in the evidence of PW.3-
Umesh, that he had seen one person passing near the
staircase when he was going towards the lift and when he
went to his house he saw that his mother was bleeding. He
has further stated, that when police came home, they had
taken with them a jean pant and a shirt from the balcony
which was exclusively attached to the bedroom where the
incident took place. In his cross-examination, he has stated,
that Gladish Anthony was his teacher who use to come to
their house for teaching him and that she was about 55
years of age. It is pertinent to note that PW.3 – Umesh’s
statement came to be recorded on 8th April, 2011 where
as the incident had occurred on the intervening night of
2nd and 3rd April, 2011. In fact PW.9 PSI – Ghuge has
admitted in his evidence that when he went to the spot
immediately after the incident PW.3 – Umesh was present
and that he had not recorded the statement of any person
in the ADR enquiry.
7. In the light of the evidence, that had come on record,
the Trial Court rightly discarded his evidence and put his
evidence in the category of neither fully reliable nor wholly
unreliable. Although the prosecution examined PW.1-
Manoj i.e. brother of the deceased and PW.4 – Dhanwanti
Chhabriya, mother of the deceased, the Trial Court found
that there were several inconsistencies, material omissions
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1437
Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr.
and improvements in their evidence and therefore did not
think it fit to reply on their testimony, regarding alleged
disclosures made by PW.3 – Umesh, to them regarding
the presence of the Respondent at the relevant time with
the deceased in the bedroom. The Trial Court also found
that there was a delay of 3 to 4 days in recording the
statement of PW.4- Dhanwanti which is another factor
which weighed while evaluating her evidence.
8. The Trial Court did not rely on the testimony of PW.1-
Manoj for the following reasons:-i) that the delay in lodging
the FIR was not explained by PW.1-Manoj, though the
police were present at the scene of incident. It is pertinent
to note, that PW.1 – Manoj did not disclose anything to the
police on the spot; despite the alleged disclosures made
by PW.3-Umesh to PW.1-Manoj soon after the incident,
before the police arrived; and despite the fact that he was
present at the time of the spot-cum-inquest panchnama
prepared by PW.9-PSI Ghuge. Infact, there is reference of
suicide having been committed by the deceased Reena/
Bhavana, in the spot cum inquest panchnama, which was
recorded in his presence and within the hearing of PW.1-
Manoj. In view of the said discrepancies, the Trial Court
rightly found the evidence of PW.1 – Manoj, unworthy of
credence. The Trial Court also found the evidence of PW.4-
Dhanwanti as unsafe to rely upon as there were several
material omissions with regard to the disclosures made by
PW.3 - Umesh to her, with regard to the incident. The Trial
Court observed, that the onus was on the prosecution to
lead such evidence, which would show that the Respondent
was at his residence at the time of the incident, so as
to attract the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act. It was further observed that the evidence on record
showed, that in addition to the Respondent, respondent’s
father, his wife and brothers of the Respondent and their
wives were also residing in the same bungalow and in
the absence of any evidence to show that they were not
having access to the house of the Respondent, situated
on the third floor, Section 106 of the Evidence Act could
not be invoked.
1438 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
9. The Trial Court, has therefore, rightly come to the
conclusion, that there was no evidence of last seen against
the evidence of PW.9-PSI Ghuge, that ADR no.24 of 2011
came to be registered, on the basis of information received
from one Rajkumar Govindram Ahuja, who however has
not been examined by the prosecution. It also appears
from the evidence of PW.9-PSI Ghuge, that the Control
Room had received a call regarding suicide by a girl in
the Ahuja Bungalow on 3rd April, 2011 at 12.45 a.m. The
prosecution had also examined PW.6-Dattatraya Ware, a
watchman at the Bungalow at the relevant time. The said
witness also has not supported the prosecution and has
been declared hostile with regard to the evidence of last
seen. The Trial Court, therefore, rightly concluded that
in the absence of any reliable evidence, the prosecution
had failed to prove the last seen theory. The prosecution
had also failed to prove as to when the deceased had
her last meal and that in the absence of any evidence
to show that the deceased was last seen alive in the
company of the respondent, found it difficult to come
to a conclusion that it was the respondent who was the
author of the crime.
10. The Trial Court has also rightly disbelieved the
evidence of recovery of the blood stained clothes of the
Respondent, bullet and license of pistol at the instance
of the Respondent under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
for the following reasons : - i) PW.5 – Nasir Khan, the
panch to the recovery did not support the prosecution and
had turned hostile; (ii) that the clothes of the Respondent
were found in the balcony adjacent to the bedroom. It
had come in the evidence of PW9 – PSI Ghuge that he
had drawn the spot-cum-inquest panchanama on 3rd April,
2011 and had taken an exhaustive search of the bedroom
and therefore it was incomprehensible that PW.11 – P1
Dilip Patil could not see or find the incriminating articles in
the house, till the alleged disclosure statement was made
by the Respondent on 8th April, 2011; (iii) that the three
buttons form the shirt allegedly recovered were found
to have been missing, however no broken buttons were
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1439
Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr.
found, at the time of the spot-cum-inquest panchnama,
which is at Exhibit-78. iv) that it was highly improbable, that
the Respondent would after committing the murder of his
wife keep the blood stained clothes on a shoe rack in the
balcony, adjacent to the room. v) although the C.A report
shows that the clothes had blood stains of the deceased,
the prosecution had failed to prove that the articles were
kept in a sealed condition and were not tampered with, till
they were either identified or sent to the Chemical Analyzer.
11. The Trial Court rightly held, that although the dog squad
and finger print expert were called and the report of the
dog squad and the finger print expert were received, the
same were not produced by the prosecution and therefore
drew an adverse inference as against the prosecution. The
Trial Court with regard to abscondence of the Respondent
has observed that the Respondent had stated in his 313
statement that he had gone to Nashik, Sinnar in connection
with his business and after coming to know of the incident
in question, was frightened and surrendered to the police
only on 5th April, 2011. The Trial Court rightly observed,
that although falsity of the defence is also an incriminating
circumstance, the mere act of abscondence, alone does
not necessarily lead to a conclusion regarding the guilt
of an accused as even an innocent person may become
panic stricken and try to evade arrest, when suspected
wrongly of having committed a grave crime.
12. It is pertinent to note that PW.7 Chandrashekhar,
Manager of the Ramkrishna Restaurant and Lodge was
examined by the prosecution to prove that the respondent
stayed at the lodge on 3rd April, 2011. However, the
said witness did not support the prosecution and was
declared hostile. The said witness did not identify the
respondent/accused as having stayed in the lodge. The
Trial Court, therefore, in the absence of any evidence to
show that the respondent stayed in the lodge discarded
the said evidence. The prosecution had also failed to
examine the respondent’s friend who allegedly stayed
with him in the said lodge and also failed to prove that
the entries in the lodge register (Article-14) were written
1440 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by the respondent. The prosecution had not even taken
the opinion of the handwriting expert, on the entries in
the lodge register.
13. With regard to motive, that the Respondent was
allegedly having an affair with one lady, Gladish Anthony,
the trial court observed that the prosecution had failed
to adduce any evidence with regard to the same. An
omission regarding the name of Gladish Anthony was also
brought on record, in the FIR lodged by PW.1-Manoj and
the evidence of PW.1-Manoj. The Trial Court found that
the evidence of PW.1-Manoj and PW.4 – Dhanwanti was
contrary and inconsistent with each other on the point
of the alleged illicit relationship of the Respondent with
Gladish and therefore the said evidence of motive has
rightly been rejected by the Trial Court.
14. It appears, that the medical evidence and ballistic
evidence with respect to firing of a bullet on the deceased
has been accepted and the Trial Court has come to a
conclusion that the two bullets were fired from the licensed
pistol out of which one was lodged in the body of Reena/
Bhavana.
15. It appears that the Medical Officer, PW.10-Dr. Khandare
has in his cross-examination, admitted the possibility of
both suicidal and accidental death and in the postmortem
notes (Exhibit-83) has opined that it was an unnatural
death. The Trial Court concluded after considering the
medical and ballistic evidence, that the prosecution had
proved that Reena/Bhavana died a homicidal death.
However, considering the evidence on record, the Trial
Court has rightly held that the prosecution had failed to
prove the chain of circumstances to show that it was the
Respondent and Respondent alone who was responsible
for the death of his wife Bhavana and therefore rightly
extended the benefit of doubt to the Respondent.
16. Having gone through the Judgment and the evidence
with the assistance of learned APP, we find that the view
taken by the trial court is a possible view, taken on the
basis of the evidence on record. We do not notice any
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1441
Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr.
perversity in the reasoning of the trial court, to warrant any
interference in this Appeal against Acquittal.
17. Consequently, this application fails and is dismissed.
Leave refused.”
5. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before
this Court with the present appeal.
6. We have heard Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. R. Basant learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondent No.1.
7. The question as to how the application for grant of leave to appeal
filed under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. should be decided by the
High Court and what are the parameters which the High Court
should keep in mind remains no longer res integra. This issue was
examined by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh
Poyarekar reported in (2008) 9 SCC 475. C.K. Thakker, J. speaking
for the Bench held in paras 19, 20, 21 and 24 respectively as under:
“19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of
appeal by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3)
declares that no appeal “shall be entertained except with
the leave of the High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary
for the State where it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal
recorded by a Court of Session to file an application for
leave to appeal as required by sub-section (3) of Section
378 of the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be
registered and heard on merits by the High Court only after
the High Court grants leave by allowing the application
filed under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question
whether requisite leave should or should not be granted,
the High Court must apply its mind, consider whether a
prima facie case has been made out or arguable points
have been raised and not whether the order of acquittal
would or would not be set aside.
21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of
law of universal application that each and every petition
seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of
1442 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the
appellate court and every appeal must be admitted and
decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that
at that stage, the court would not enter into minute details
of the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observing
that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court
could not be said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave
should be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be understood
to have laid down an inviolable rule that no leave should
be refused by the appellate court against an order of
acquittal recorded by the trial court. We only state that in
such cases, the appellate court must consider the relevant
material, sworn testimonies of prosecution witnesses and
record reasons why leave sought by the State should not
be granted and the order of acquittal recorded by the trial
court should not be disturbed. Where there is application
of mind by the appellate court and reasons (may be in
brief) in support of such view are recorded, the order of
the court may not be said to be illegal or objectionable.
At the same time, however, if arguable points have been
raised, if the material on record discloses deeper scrutiny
and reappreciation, review or reconsideration of evidence,
the appellate court must grant leave as sought and decide
the appeal on merits. In the case on hand, the High Court,
with respect, did neither. In the opinion of the High Court,
the case did not require grant of leave. But it also failed
to record reasons for refusal of such leave.”
8. In Sita Ram v. State of U.P. reported in (1979) 2 SCC 656, this
Court held that :
“31. … A single right of appeal is more or less a universal
requirement of the guarantee of life and liberty rooted in
the [concept] that men are fallible, that Judges are men
and that making assurance doubly sure, before irrevocable
deprivation of life or liberty comes to pass, a full-scale
re-examination of the facts and the law is made an integral
part of fundamental fairness or procedure.”
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1443
Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Anr.
9. We are aware and mindful that the above observations were made
in connection with an appeal at the instance of the accused. But
the principle underlying the above rule lies in the doctrine of human
fallibility that “Men are fallible” and “Judges are also men”. It is keeping
in view the said object that the principle has to be understood and
applied. Now, every crime is considered as an offence against the
society as a whole and not only against an individual even though it
is an individual who is the ultimate sufferer. It is, therefore, the duty
of the State to take appropriate steps when an offence has been
committed. (See: Sujay Mangesh (supra)
10. We are not getting into the debate whether the impugned order
could have been questioned by the brother of the deceased (original
first informant) or not. Prima facie, we are not convinced with the
reasonings assigned by the High Court while declining to grant leave
against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial
Court. We are conscious of the fact that the entire case hinges on
circumstantial evidence. We are also conscious of the fact that one
of the prime witnesses, i.e., the son of the deceased aged 15 years
at the relevant point of time, turned hostile.
11. The High Court seems to have taken the view that it would be futile,
granting leave as it didn’t notice any perversity in the reasoning of
the Trial Court.
12. We are of the view that at the stage of considering grant of leave
under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., a prima facie
case should be looked into by the High Court, of course, not ignoring
the materials on record.
13. After hearing Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. R. Basant, the learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondent no.1, we have reached the
conclusion that at least, the High Court should have granted leave and
thereafter the acquittal appeal, on its own merits. We also heard Mr.
Sanjay Kharde, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State.
14. Without saying anything further as any further observations may
cause prejudice to either side, we grant leave to appeal and remit
the matter to the High Court for consideration of the criminal appeal
on its own merits, in accordance with law. The criminal appeal shall
now be registered accordingly.
1444 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
15. We clarify that the criminal appeal against the judgment and order of
acquittal, shall be decided on its own merits without being influenced
in any manner by any of the observations made by this Court in
this order.
16. We also permit the appellant herein (original first informant) if at all
he intends, to file appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the
CrPC. If any such appeal is filed, the same may be clubbed with
the State’s appeal and both the appeals shall be heard together in
accordance with law.
17. The appeal is disposed of, as aforesaid.
18. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Niti Richhariya, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)
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