Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Special Court's order is not interlocutory, the Limitation Act does not apply to the execution application, and the asset‑disclosure directions stand.

Summary

The appellant, Manjit Singh Sodhi, as trustee of Raviraj Housing Corporation, was sued for repayment of a short‑term loan of Rs 25 lakhs taken from Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd (FFSL) which resulted in a decree of Rs 63.86 lakhs in 2003. The custodian appointed under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 filed an execution application, which the appellant contested on the ground that the claim was barred by limitation. The Special Court held that the appellant’s 2018 letter constituted an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and therefore the limitation period was reset, also concluding that the execution petition was not barred. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Special Court’s order was interlocutory under Section 10 of the 1992 Act and whether the Limitation Act applied to the execution proceedings. The Court held that the order was not interlocutory as it decided the substantive limitation issue, and that the Limitation Act does not apply to the Special Court’s execution proceedings, affirming the asset‑disclosure directions. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was directed to disclose his assets within four weeks.

Issues considered

The appealability of the Special Court's order under Section 10 of the Special Court Act, 1992 (interlocutory vs final).
Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the execution application filed by the custodian.
Whether the appellant's 2018 letter amounts to a valid acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act within the limitation period.
Whether Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act excludes its provisions in the context of Special Court proceedings.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. 18, s. 29(2)
Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992s. 10, s. 11, s. 3(2), s. 4(2)

Subjects

limitationexecution of decreeacknowledgment of liabilitySpecial Court Act 1992interlocutory orderasset disclosurecustodian proceedingssecurities transaction offences

Judgment

[2022] 7 S.C.R. 165 165

MANJIT SINGH SODHI A
v.
THE CUSTODIAN & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5126 of 2022)
AUGUST 04, 2022 B
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in
Securities) Act 1992 – ss. 3(2), 4(2), 10, 11 – Limitation Act, 1963 –
C
ss. 18, 29(2) – Directions for disclosure of assets – Third respondent-
corporation, had availed a short term loan of 25 lakhs from FFSL
(Second respondent) and agreed to pay it after 180 days with
20% interest – Central Government appointed first respondent
as custodian under the provisions of Act of 1992 – FFSL instituted
Miscellaneous petition against the third respondent for the recovery D
of an amount of Rs. 25 lakh, together with interest – On 28.03.2003,
the Special Court directed the third respondent to pay to FFSL a
sum of Rs 63.86 lakhs, together with interest – FFSL issued two
notices to third respondent for the payment of decretal amount on
28.04.2003 and 16.12.2011, respectively – By communication dated
E
22.02.2018, the appellant offered to pay the principal amount of
Rs. 25 lakhs and sought a waiver of the interest and pursuant to his
offer, appellant paid an amount of one lakh – The first respondent
moved execution application before the Special Court – Appellant
contested that said application on the ground that it was barred by
limitation – The Special Court passed an F
ad-interim order directing the disclosure of assets of the appellant
and the third respondent – It further held that the appellant clearly
acknowledge the liability, hence, the claim of the first respondent is
not barred by the limitation – On appeal, held: Based on the decision
of Supreme Court in L S Synthetics Ltd, the ultimate directions which
G
were issued by the Special Court cannot be interfered with – The
observations contained in the impugned order were for the purpose
of issuing the directions for a disclosure of assets and would not
preclude the custodian (first respondent) from urging that the Act
of 1963 had no application to the Execution application which was
filed for enforcement of the decree dated 28.02.2003 – Appellant H
165
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A directed to file his disclosure of assets subject to his right to urge
his submissions in Execution application.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. An “interlocutory order” denotes an interim or
temporary order which does not decide the important rights or
B liabilities of the parties. The Special Court in its order dated 6
March 2020 has conclusively held that the execution petition is
not barred by limitation. The determination of the issue of
limitation affects the rights and liabilities of the parties. Thus,
the argument of the first appellant that the appeal is not
C maintainable in view of Section 10 of the Act of 1992 is rejected.
[Para 13][173-D-E]
2. Section 18 of the Act of 1963 stipulates that if an
acknowledgment of liability in writing is made before the
expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in
D respect of any right, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed
from the time when the acknowledgment was signed. Explanation
(c) to Section 18 states that an application for the execution of a
decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in
respect of any property or right. In the present case, the Special
Court has proceeded on the basis that there was an
E acknowledgement of liability by the letter of the appellant dated
22 February 2018. That finding is sought to be assailed by the
appellant by urging that the acknowledgement of liability under
Section 18 of the Act of 1963 has to be within the period of
limitation and in the present case this test is not satisfied. On the
F other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the first respondent
that the premise of the judgment of the Special Court that the
Act of 1963 would stand attracted would run contrary to the decision
of this Court in L S Synthetics Ltd. Based on the decision of this
Court in L S Synthetics Ltd, the ultimate directions which have
been issued by the Special Court cannot be interfered with. The
G observations contained in the impugned order were for the
purpose of issuing the directions for a disclosure of assets and
would not preclude the Custodian from urging that the Act of
1963 had no application to the Execution Application which was
filed for enforcement of the decree dated 28 February 2003. The
H directions for the disclosure of assets and other consequential
MANJIT SINGH SODHI v. THE CUSTODIAN & ORS. 167

directions which have been issued are not interfered with in this A
appeal. The appellant is granted four weeks to file his disclosure
of assets subject to his right to urge his submissions in the
execution application. In the meantime, the Court has been
apprised of the fact that an application has been filed for the arrest
of the appellant. Conditional on the appellant making the
B
disclosure of assets within four weeks as directed above, the
application for arrest shall not be pursued until the Execution
Application is decide. [Paras 17-20][176-F-H; 177-A-E]
Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat AIR
1968 SC 733 : [1968] SCR 685 - followed.
C
L S Synthetics Ltd v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd
and Another (2004) 11 SCC 456 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR
109 - relied on.
Fairgrowth Investments Ltd v. Custodian (2004) 11 SCC
472 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 505; Amar Nath v. State of D
Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : [1978] 1 SCR 222-
referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 109 relied on Para 7
E
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 505 referred to Para 8
[1968] SCR 685 followed Para 12
[1978] 1 SCR 222 referred to Para 13
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5126
of 2022. F

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.03.2020 of the Special
Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transaction in Securities) Act, 1992
in Execution Application No.01 of 2019 in Misc Application No. 15 of
2000.
G
Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Ms. Lalita Kohli, Ms. Shahrukh Alam,
Manoj Shukla, Abhishek Swarup, M/s Manoj Swarup and Co., Advs. for
the Appellant.
Arvind Kumar Tewari, Abhishek Tewari, Tushar Upreti, Yosha
Dutt, Anupam Upreti, Advs. for the Respondents.
H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal arises from a judgment dated 6 March 2020 of the
B Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences
Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act 19921. The decision of the
Special Court arises out of an execution application filed by the Custodian,
the first respondent, being Execution Application No 1 of 2019.
3. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd2, the second respondent, is a
C company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act 1956.
Raviraj Housing Corporation, the third respondent, had availed a short
term loan of Rupees Twenty five lakhs from FFSL and agreed to repay
it after 180 days with interest at the rate of 20 percent per annum. The
first respondent is the custodian appointed by the Central Government
under the provisions of the Act of 1992. The custodian notified the second
D respondent as a “notified person” under the provisions of Section 3(2) of
the Act of 1992.3 The assets of FFSL stood attached with effect from 2
July 1992. The case of FFSL was that the third respondent had executed
a promissory note on 14 October 1991 for the repayment of the loan and
a letter of undertaking-cum-indemnity reiterating its commitment to repay
E Rupees twenty five lakhs. FFSL instituted Miscellaneous Petition No 15
of 2000 against the third respondent for the recovery of an amount of
Rupees twenty five lakhs, together with interest at the rate of twenty
per cent. On 28 March 2003, the Special Court directed the third
respondent to pay to FFSL a sum of Rs 63.86 lakhs, together with interest
at twenty per cent on the principal sum of Rupees twenty five lakhs
F from the date of the institution of the petition till payment and/or realization.
4. On 28 April 2003, a notice was issued by FFSL to the third
respondent for the payment of the decretal amount. This was followed
by a notice dated 16 December 2011 by the first respondent. On 22
February 2018, the appellant addressed a communication to the first
G respondent stating that the erstwhile trustee of Raviraj Housing
1
“Act of 1992"
2
“FFSL”
3
Section 3(2) “The custodian many, on being satisfied on information received that any
person has been involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities after the
1st day of April 1991 and on and before the 6th June, 1992, notify the name of such
H person in the Official Gazette.”
MANJIT SINGH SODHI v. THE CUSTODIAN & ORS. 169
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Corporation, who was looking after its affairs, died in 2004 and that the A
appellant became a trustee after his death. By the said communication,
the appellant offered to pay the principal amount of Rupees twenty five
lakhs and sought a waiver of the interest. By a communication dated 10
July 2018 the first respondent stated that the decision on waiver of interest
on the decretal sum rests with the Special Court under the Act of 1992.
B
The Custodian stated that pending the filing of an application before the
Special Court seeking a waiver of interest, the principal amount be sent
to FFSL expeditiously. Pursuant to his offer, the appellant admittedly
paid an amount of Rupees one lakh. However, the advocate for Raviraj
Housing Corporation sent another communication on 19 October 2018
stating that since the appellant became a trustee only in 2005 after the C
death of Mr. LV Whabhi who used to conduct the affairs of the
Corporation, he is not liable to pay the dues of the third respondent. It
was also stated that the third respondent trust does not have any income.
A copy of a nil annual income tax return for the year 2002-2003 was
furnished to substantiate the claims.
D
5. The first respondent moved an execution application4 before
the Special Court. The Execution Application was contested by the
appellant on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The appellant
submitted that though the decree was made in 2003, the first demand by
the custodian was made sixteen years later on 16 December 2011 and
the delay has not been explained. On 14 June 2019, the Special Court E
passed an ad-interim order directing the disclosure of assets of the
appellant and the third respondent. The Special Court, by its judgment
dated 6 March 2020 observed that the appellant has been attempting to
delay the proceedings. The Special Court held that the claim of the first
respondent is not barred by the law of limitation because: F
(i) The appellant in the letters addressed to the Custodian on
22 February 2018 and 11 August 2018 acknowledged the
liability to pay the dues and sought a waiver of interest.
The appellant also remitted a sum of Rs 1,00,000 by demand
draft drawn from the bank account of Raviraj Housing G
Corporation in which the balance is alleged to only be in the
amount of Rs. 15,036. The Bank account has been
selectively used to show minimal balances but funds are

4
Execution application no. 1 of 2019 H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A made available for issuing Demand Drafts. Thus, the
appellant clearly acknowledged liability; and
(ii) Even otherwise, the execution application has been filed by
the Custodian who is entitled and liable to recover the
amounts in accordance with the Act of 1992.
B 6. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr Huzefa A Ahmadi,
learned senior counsel, submitted that:
(i) The appellant was not part of the trust when the decree
was passed, since he had become a trustee only in 2005
and that, in any event, the personal properties of the appellant
C cannot be attached in satisfaction of the decree;
(ii) The appellant’s letter dated 22 February 2018 does not
acknowledge liability, but, in substance, is only a ‘without
prejudice’ offer to pay; and

D (iii) In any event, the acknowledgement which was issued on
22 February 2018 is beyond the period of limitation since
the decree is of 2003 and the limitation which is prescribed
by Article 136 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963 5
would be applicable.
7. On the other hand, Mr Arvind Kumar Tewari, learned counsel
E
appearing on behalf of the first respondent has relied on a decision of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in L S Synthetics Ltd v. Fairgrowth
Financial Services Ltd and Another6 in which it has been held that
the provisions of the Act of 1963 would apply only when a suit is filed or
a proceeding is initiated for recovery of an amount. The judgment holds
F that the Act of 1963 would have no application towards claims pending
before the Special Court for the purpose of the discharge of liabilities of
a notified person in terms of Section 11 of the Act of 1992.
8. Responding to this submission, Mr Ahmadi has urged that the
decision in L S Synthetics (supra) has been explained by a two-judge
G bench in Fairgrowth Investments Ltd v. Custodian7, where the
observations in the earlier decision have been limited to the provisions of

5
“Act of 1963"
6
(2004) 11 SCC 456
7
H (2004) 11 SCC 472
MANJIT SINGH SODHI v. THE CUSTODIAN & ORS. 171
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Section 11 of the Act of 1992 and to the proceedings by the Special A
Court under that provision.
9. At this stage, it would be material to note that Mr Tewari
appearing on behalf of the first respondent has sought to challenge the
maintainability of the appeal on the ground that Section 10 of the Act of
1992 excludes an appeal to this Court against an interlocutory order. B
Section 10 is extracted below:
“10. Appeal - (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code (or the
Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or the Arbitration Act 1940, an
appeal shall lie from any judgment [decree] sentence or order, not
being interlocutory order, of the Special Court in the Supreme C
Court both on facts and law.”
10. Responding to the preliminary objection to the maintainability
of the appeal, it has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the Special
Court has, in the present case, concluded the aspect of limitation by
holding that there was an acknowledgement of liability by the appellant D
on 22 February 2018. Learned senior counsel submitted that since the
issue of limitation has been concluded against the appellant, the decision
of the Special Court cannot, in substance, be regarded as interlocutory
in nature.
11. The order which has been passed by the Special Court is for E
the disclosure of assets. For convenience of reference, the operative
part of the directions of the Special Court is extracted below:
“(i). Respondent nos. 1 and 2 are directed to disclose their assets.
Respondent no. 2 is directed to disclose all personal assets,
shares held in jointly and with others as also stocks of limited F
companies bonds, Mutual Funds, National Savings
Certificates, Post Office Savings and other securities all of
which will be disclosed in affidavit to be filed within a period
of two weeks from today.
(ii) Meanwhile respondent no. 2 shall also disclose his
G
Permanent Account number as registered with the Income
Tax Authorities within two weeks from today. If such
disclosure is not forthcoming the concerned Commissioner
of Income Tax shall provide the Custodian with the PAN
based on which Custodian is directed to make all necessary
H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A inquires and seek disclosure of assets from the aforesaid
parties.
(iii) The Custodian shall address letters to NSDL and CDSL
calling upon them to furnish copies of statement of accounts
of all transactions in shares and stocks and bonds and Mutual
B funds that may be held in the name of respondent no. 2 in
his own name and jointly with any third party, respondent
no. 1 and 2 jointly and separately or with any third party,
respondent no. 2. The NSDL and CDSL are directed to
comply with the request of the Custodian within a period of
one week of receipt of such demand along with
C authenticated copy of this order for further directions.
(iv) In the meantime there will be an ad-interim order in terms
of prayer clause( c) which reads as follows :
(c) that pending the final hearing and disposal of the present
D Application, the Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2
and /or his agents, attorneys be injuncted by an order of
this Hon’ble Special Court from selling or transferring or
alienating or in any manner dealing with or disposing or
encumbering or parting with possession or creating any third
party rights in respect of all or such of his properties and
E other movable and immovable assets as are sufficient to
satisfy the decretal amount.
(v) List on 20th March, 2020 for compliance.”
12. A Constitution bench of this Court in Mohan Lal Magan Lal
F Thacker v. State of Gujarat8 differentiated between a ‘final order’
and ‘interlocutory order’ as follows:
“4. The question as to whether a judgment or an order is final
or not has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions; yet
no single general test for finality has so far been laid down. The
reason probably is that a judgment or order may be final for one
G
purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part and
interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words “final”
and “interlocutory” has, therefore, to be considered separately in
relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However,
8
H AIR 1968 SC 733
MANJIT SINGH SODHI v. THE CUSTODIAN & ORS. 173
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the A
principal matter in question is termed final. It may be final although
it directs enquiries or is made on an interlocutory application or
reserves liberty to apply [Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Edn.)
Vol. 22, 742-43]. In some of the English decisions where this
question arose, one or the other of the following four tests was
B
applied.
1. Was the order made upon an application such that a decision
in favour of either party would determine the main dispute?
2. Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute
could have been decided? C
3. Does the order as made determine the dispute?
4. If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to
go on?”
13. An “interlocutory order” denotes an interim or temporary order D
which does not decide the important rights or liabilities of the parties. 9
The Special Court in its order dated 6 March 2020 has conclusively held
that the execution petition is not barred by limitation. The determination
of the issue of limitation affects the rights and liabilities of the parties.
Thus, the argument of the first appellant that the appeal is not maintainable
in view of Section 10 of the Act of 1992 is rejected. E
14. The Special Judge has specifically held against the appellant
on the ground that there was an acknowledgement of liability within the
meaning of Section 18 of the Act of 1963. The finding that there was an
acknowledgement of liability within the meaning of Section 18 is premised
on the hypothesis that the Act of 1963 would stand attracted. However, F
it has also been held in the judgment of the Special Court that in any
event the Custodian is entitled and liable to recover the amount under
the Act of 1992 in view of the decision of this Court in L S Synthetics
Ltd (supra).
15. In L S Synthetics Ltd (supra), the appellant had obtained G
short term loans from a notified party. The Custodian had called upon
the appellant to furnish details of the loan. The notified party initiated
proceedings before the Special Court seeking a direction to the appellant
to pay the Custodian on his behalf. The contention of the appellant was
9
Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A that the claim was barred by limitation since he had furnished the full
details of the amount in question to the Custodian in 1993. On the question
of whether the claim of the notified party is barred by limitation, the
three-Judge Bench of this Court held that provisions of the Limitation
Act have no application, “in so far as directions required to be issued by
the Special Court relating to the disposal of the attached property are
B
concerned”. The relevant extract of the judgment reads as follows:
“37. We may, however, add that the attachment of the properties
of the notified party being for specific purposes, i.e., for the purpose
of discharging his liabilities, the Special Court is bound to pass
appropriate orders in relation thereto. A property once attached
C shall remain under attachment till an appropriate order is passed.
It is, therefore, idle to contend that even in respect thereof the
provisions of the Limitation Act would apply. The Court while
issuing directions to the Custodian in relation to the attached
property for the purpose of discharge of the liability of the notified
D person must pass an appropriate order. So long the claims or
other proceedings initiated before the Special Court as
regard discharge of liability of the notified person continue,
the attachment remains in force. A proceeding before the
Special Court is not a suit for recovery of an amount. The
proceedings before the Special Court are extraordinary in nature.
E Distribution of the assets of a notified person may take a long
time but it would bear repetition to state because all the claims
filed before the Special Court are disposed of, the property of the
notified person stands attached. In other words, the provisions of
the Limitation Act would inter alia apply only when a suit is filed
F or a proceeding is initiated for recovery of an amount and not
where a property is required to be applied towards the claims
pending before the tribunal for the purpose of discharge of the
liabilities of the notified person in terms of Section 11 of the said
Act.
G […]
41 […] We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of the
Limitation Act have no application, so far as directions required to
be issued by the Special Court relating to the disposal of the
attached property, are concerned.”
H (emphasis supplied)
MANJIT SINGH SODHI v. THE CUSTODIAN & ORS. 175
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act stipulates that where a special A
law prescribes a period of limitation for an application different from the
period prescribed in the Schedule of Act of 1963, then Section 3 of the
Act of 1963 shall apply as if such period was prescribed by the schedule,
and the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 shall apply to the extent that it is
not expressly excluded by the special Law. The three-Judge Bench in L
B
S Synthetics Ltd (supra) observed that Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act is not applicable to the Act of 1992 since in ‘terms of the provisions
of the Act, no period of limitation is prescribed’.
16. In Fairgrowth Investments Ltd (supra), the issue before
this Court was whether the Special Court constituted under the Act of
1992 has the power to condone the delay in filing a petition under Section C
4(2) of the Act. In that case, on 23 November 2001, the appellant was
notified under Section 3(2) of the Act of 1992. On 8 October 2002, the
appellant filed a petition of objection to the notification under Section
4(2) of the Act of 1992. The Special Court rejected the application on
the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by D
Section 4(2). Section 4(2) provides that any person aggrieved by a
notification issued under Section 3(2), may file an objection within thirty
days of such notification. This Court rejected the contention of the
appellant that the limitation prescribed under Section 4(2) is directory
and not mandatory and held that Section 4(2) is unequivocal and
unqualified and there is no scope to read in a power of the Court to E
dispense with the time limit. Consequently, in Fairgrowth Investments
Ltd (supra), this Court concurred with the final conclusion in L S
Synthetics Ltd (supra) to the extent that the provisions of the Act of
1963 have no application in relation to a petition under Section 4(2) of
the Act of 1992. It was observed that the decision of this Court in LS F
Synthetics (supra), was limited to a consideration of Section 11 of the
Act of 1992:
“23. The decision by a larger bench in L.S Synthetics Ltd. holding
that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the
Act may not have, by itself, concluded the question formulated by G
us at the outset. That case was, as has been rightly contended by
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, limited to a
consideration of Section11 of the Act and the proceedings by the
Special Court thereunder. It was in that context that the Court
had said that the Act had not provided for any period of limitation.
H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A But for the reasons already stated by us we concur in the final
conclusion reached by the Court in L.S Synthetics to the extent
that the provisions of the Limitation Act 1963 have not application
in relation to a petition under Section 4(2) of the Act.
24. Finally, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act speaks of application
B of the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 “only insofar as,
and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by
such special or local law”. This language, together with our earlier
reasoning, particularly with regard to L.S. Synthetics [(2004) 11
SCC 456: (2004) 7 Scale 427] would answer the further question
raised by the appellant, namely, whether the question of exclusion
C of the provisions of the Limitation Act must be separately
considered with reference to different provisions of a special/
local Act or in connection with the provisions of the special/local
Act, as a whole, by affirmation of the first alternative. We are
therefore not called upon to decide whether claims either preferred
D for the first time before the Special Court or transferred to the
Special Court under Section 9-A(2) would attract the provisions
of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. It is enough for the
purpose of this appeal to hold that Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act, 1963 does not apply to proceedings under Section 4(2) of the
Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in
E Securities) Act, 1992. Since the appellant’s petition of objection
had been filed much beyond the period prescribed under that
section, the Special Court was right in rejecting the petition in
limine. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any order
as to costs.
F 17. At this juncture, Section 18 of the Act of 1963 also needs to be
noted. Section 18 of the Act of 1963 stipulates that if an acknowledgment
of liability in writing is made before the expiration of the prescribed
period for a suit or application in respect of any right, a fresh period of
limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment
G was signed. Explanation (c) to Section 18 states that an application for
the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application
in respect of any property or right.
18. In the present case, the Special Court has proceeded on the
basis that there was an acknowledgement of liability by the letter of the
H appellant dated 22 February 2018. That finding is sought to be assailed
MANJIT SINGH SODHI v. THE CUSTODIAN & ORS. 177
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

by the appellant by urging that the acknowledgement of liability under A
Section 18 of the Act of 1963 has to be within the period of limitation and
in the present case this test is not satisfied. On the other hand, as we
have already noted, it has been urged on behalf of the first respondent
that the premise of the judgment of the Special Court that the Act of
1963 would stand attracted would run contrary to the decision of this
B
Court in L S Synthetics Ltd (supra).
19. Based on the decision of this Court in L S Synthetics Ltd
(supra), the ultimate directions which have been issued by the Special
Court cannot be interfered with. The observations contained in the
impugned order were for the purpose of issuing the directions for a
disclosure of assets and would not preclude the Custodian from urging C
that the Act of 1963 had no application to the Execution Application
which was filed for enforcement of the decree dated 28 February 2003.
The directions for the disclosure of assets and other consequential
directions which have been issued are not interfered with in this appeal.
20. The appellant is granted four weeks to file his disclosure of D
assets subject to his right to urge his submissions in the execution
application. In the meantime, the Court has been apprised of the fact
that an application has been filed for the arrest of the appellant.
Conditional on the appellant making the disclosure of assets within four
weeks as directed above, the application for arrest shall not be pursued E
until the Execution Application is decided. We request the Special Judge
to dispose of the Execution Application preferably within a period of two
months of the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
21. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
22. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of. F

Ankit Gyan Appeal disposed of.
(Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)

G

H