Holding

The review court exceeded its jurisdiction because it re‑appreciated facts and substituted a view, which is not permitted under Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC.

Summary

The appellant, a daughter of a co-parcener, sought to amend a 2003 preliminary decree in a partition suit to claim a one‑third share under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The trial court dismissed her application, the High Court set aside that dismissal, but the respondent obtained a review order that remanded the matter to the trial court. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's review order fell within the limited scope of review under Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC. It held that the review court had gone beyond permissible grounds by re‑appreciating facts and substituting its own view, which is not allowed in a review proceeding. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned review order, restored the earlier High Court order, and allowed the civil appeal, directing the trial court to dispose of pending applications promptly.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court's review order conforms to the scope of review under Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC
Whether a preliminary decree can be amended to grant a daughter co‑parcener rights under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005
Whether a review court may re‑appreciate facts and substitute its own view

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 47 Rule 1, s. Section 114
Hindu Succession Act (Tamil Nadu Amendment Act), 1989s. Section 29A
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the order impugned conforms to the scope of review of an order u/s.114 and Or.47 of CPC. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.114 and Or.47 – The subject matter of the appeal arises from the steps taken by the appellant in I.A no.1199 of decree in terms of her status as one of the co-parceners and entitling her to an equal share along with the father and the brother – On 08.03.2019, the Trial Court dismissed IA no.1199 of 2018-a petition to amend the preliminary decree dated 25.02.2003 – The appellant filed CRP

Subjects

Review JurisdictionPartitionLimitationsScope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPCAppellate powersCorrection of a mistakeReview court does not sit in appealApparent error of fact or lawAppeal in disguise

Judgment

[2025] 9 S.C.R. 574 : 2025 INSC 1080

Malleeswari
v.
K. Suguna and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 11437 of 2025)
08 September 2025
[Ahsanuddin Amanullah and S.V.N. Bhatti,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the order impugned conforms to the scope of review of
an order u/s.114 and Or.47 of CPC.

Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.114 and Or.47 – The
subject matter of the appeal arises from the steps taken by
the appellant in I.A no.1199 of 2018, praying for amending
the preliminary decree in terms of her status as one of
the co-parceners and entitling her to an equal share along
with the father and the brother – On 08.03.2019, the Trial
Court dismissed IA no.1199 of 2018 - a petition to amend the
preliminary decree dated 25.02.2003 – The appellant filed
CRP No.1439 of 2019 in the High Court against the order
dated 08.03.2019 and the same was set aside – However, the
respondent filed a review application – Through the impugned
order dated 19.10.2024, the review application was allowed –
The High Court remanded the matter to the Trial Court for
fresh consideration – Correctness:
Held: The grounds of review are summed up as follows: i) The
ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is
a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise
of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or
could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree
or order was passed; ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of
the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere
error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the
record – Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong
decision – An error which has to be established by a long-drawn
process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be
two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face
of the record; iii) Lastly, the phrase ‘for any other sufficient reason’
* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 575

Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Another

means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to
those specified in the other two categories – In the instant case,
the impugned order has not adverted to an error apparent on the
face of the record, but has taken up an error on reappreciation
of the case and counter case of the parties – The review order
records a few findings extending far beyond the actual working out
of prayers in a suit for partition – The order impugned has exceeded
the jurisdiction of review by a court – Thus, the order impugned is
set aside, and consequently, the order dated 23.09.2022 in CRP
is restored. [Paras 17.1, 17.2, 17.3, 19]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.47, R.1 – Power of Review –
Review Jurisdiction – Limitations:
Held: i) The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47
Rule 1 of CPC; ii) Review is not to be confused with appellate
powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner
of errors committed by the subordinate court; iii) In exercise of the
jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible
for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected – A review
petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot
be allowed to be an appeal in disguise; iv) The power of review can
be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute
a view – Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified
in the statute governing the exercise of power; v) The review court
does not sit in appeal over its own order – A rehearing of the
matter is impermissible – It constitutes an exception to the general
rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not
be altered – Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of
justice or to correct grave and palpable errors. [Para 15.1-15.5]

Case Law Cited
Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [2020] 10 SCR 135 : (2020) 9
SCC 1; Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [1994] Supp. 5
SCR 503 : (1995) 1 SCC 170; Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam
Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC 389; Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi
[1997] Supp. 4 SCR 470 : (1997) 8 SCC 715; Lily Thomas v. Union
of India [2000] 3 SCR 1081 : (2000) 6 SCC 224; Inderchand Jain v.
Motilal [2009] 11 SCR 252 : (2009) 14 SCC 663; Shivdev Singh v.
State of Punjab, AIR (1963) SC 1909; Hari Vishnu Kamath v.
Syed Ahmad Ishaque [1955] 1 SCR 1104; T.C. Basappa v. T.
Nagappa [1955] 1 SCR 250 : AIR (1954) SC 440; Satyanarayan
576 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [1960]
1 SCR 890 : AIR (1960) SC 137; Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC
OnLine PC 11; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose
Athanasius [1955] 1 SCR 520 : AIR (1954) SC 526 – referred to.

List of Acts
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005; Civil Procedure Code,
1908; Hindu Succession Act (Tamil Nadu Amendment Act), 1989.

List of Keywords
Review Jurisdiction; Partition; Limitations; Scope and ambit of
Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC; Appellate powers; Correction of a mistake;
Review court does not sit in appeal; Apparent error of fact or law;
Appeal in disguise.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11437 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in RA No. 227 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
V.Prabhakar, Sr. Adv., Ms. Jyoti Parashar, Ms. Hameet Kaur,
Ms. E. R. Sumathy.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Dr. G. Sivabalamurugan, Selvaraj Mahendran, C.Adhikesavan,
Harikrishnan P.V, Ms. Ratna Priya Pradhan, Dhass Prathap Singh,
Ms. Shoba Ramamoorthy, Gokula Krishnan, Avinash Ranjan.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

S.V.N. Bhatti, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. Subramani, the husband of the second Respondent, filed OS No.
192 of 2000 in the Court of the District Munsiff at Ponneri for partition
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 577

Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Another

of the suit schedule properties into two equal shares and allot one
such share to him. The suit in question was filed against Munasamy
Naidu, the father of the plaintiff.
3. The original plaintiff and the defendant, since no more, are being
represented by the respective heirs and successors in interest.
To appreciate the relationship of the present array of parties, the
genealogy is stated hereunder:

Munusamy Naidu
(1st defendant)

Muniammal (W/o
1st defendant)

Malleeswari Subramani - 1st
(Appellant/daughter) plaintiff (Son)

Rajalakshmi Aruna (2nd
(petitioner’s plaintiff) (wife of
daughter) 1st plaintiff)

4. The plaint avers that the suit schedule properties are ancestral
properties and are available for partition between the first plaintiff and
the first defendant, being members of the Hindu Undivided Family.
To attribute the character of joint Hindu family property, the plaint
refers to the registered partition deed dated 22.11.1991 executed
between the deceased first defendant and his brother. The suit was
filed admittedly without impleading Malleeswari/Appellant in this civil
appeal, who is the daughter of Munusamy Naidu and Muniammal. On
25.02.2003, the learned Trial Court passed the ex-parte preliminary
decree as prayed for. The first defendant, post the preliminary decree,
executed a registered sale deed dated 27.12.2004 in favour of K
Suguna/first Respondent for item nos. 4 to 7 of the suit property, and
also a settlement deed for item nos. 1 to 3, and 8 to 10 in favour
of the Appellant.
5. On 24.01.2005, the second Respondent filed I.A no. 140 of 2006
to pass a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree dated
578 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

25.02.2003. The first defendant executed a will bequeathing his
share to the Appellant. On 13.05.2011, the first defendant died, and
the Appellant has been impleaded as the legal heir and successor
to the first defendant.
6. The first Respondent, pursuant to final orders in IA nos. 130 and
135 of 2013, has been impleaded as one of the Respondents in the
pending final decree proceedings. The subject matter of the appeal
arises from the steps taken by the Appellant in I.A no. 1199 of 2018,
praying for amending the preliminary decree in terms of her status
as one of the co-parceners and entitling her to an equal share along
with the father and the brother. The application for amendment of the
preliminary decree was opposed by the first and second Respondents.
The Appellant’s case is that the Hindu Succession (Amendment)
Act, 2005 (‘HSA 2005’), grants daughters equal coparcenary rights
by birth. As a daughter of a living coparcener at the time the act
came into force, she is entitled to a 1/3rd share. Thus, she claimed
her father’s 1/3rd share through the Will dated 23.04.2008, bringing
the total to 2/3rd share. The Appellant further contended that the
sale to the first Respondent on 27.12.2004 is invalid as it occurred
after the amendment’s cut-off date of 20.12.2004; thus, violating the
court’s injunction order.
7. In the objection to the reopening of the preliminary decree, it is
contended by the Respondent that the application is barred by
limitation, having been filed over 15 years after the preliminary
decree and 7 years after the petitioner admittedly became aware
of the suit. Further, the Appellant is estopped from challenging the
sale to the first Respondent, as she was an attesting witness to the
sale deed. Moreover, the preliminary decree had already ascertained
and finalized the shares in 2003, before the 2005 amendment came
into force. Consequently, the sale was valid and based on prior
agreements, and the petitioner’s remedy was to appeal the preliminary
decree and not to seek its amendment. Lastly, the settlement deed and
Will favouring the Appellant are invalid as they were executed during
the pendency of the suit, lis pendens, in violation of the injunction.
8. On 08.03.2019, the Trial Court dismissed IA no. 1199 of 2018 – a
petition to amend the preliminary decree dated 25.02.2003.
8.1 It noted that the Appellant was impleaded only as the legal
representative of her deceased father, and that she merely
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 579

Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Another

stepped into his shoes and was only entitled to the share as
determined by the decree dated 25.02.2003.
8.2 It also held that the HSA 2005 was inapplicable, since it could
not be applied retroactively.
8.3 Further, the Settlement Deed dated 27.12.2004 was void since
the deed was created after the suit had been filed and a decree
had been passed. The father was also under a court injunction
not to transfer the property.
8.4 She was also barred by the principle of estoppel since her own
signature was there on the sale deeds as a witness. This proves
that she was aware of and had consented to the transactions.
8.5 Lastly, the Trial Court notes that a preliminary decree is a final
determination of rights, and can only be amended for clerical
errors, and not to change the outcome fundamentally. It also
notes that the proper legal remedy was to file an appeal against
the original decree.
9. The Appellant filed CRP No. 1439 of 2019 in the High Court of
Judicature at Madras against the order dated 08.03.2019. The CRP
was allowed on 23.09.2022, and the order dated 08.03.2019 was set
aside. The first Respondent filed review application no. 227 of 2023
to review the order dated 23.09.2022. Through the impugned order
dated 19.10.2024, the review application was allowed. The High
Court remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration.
Hence, the civil appeal at the instance of the Appellant.
10. Mr. V Prabhakar, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the Appellant,
contends that the High Court fell into a grave and serious error in
not appreciating the review jurisdiction conferred on the Courts by
Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908
(‘CPC’). The consideration and conclusion in the impugned order are
not available to a review court. The scope of judicial review of an
interlocutory order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is
extremely narrow and limited. The review of an order under Article
227 is further conditioned by very few and limited grounds. The order
impugned has recorded fresh findings on facts by overturning the
earlier findings of fact recorded by the High Court. Though the matter
is remitted to the Trial Court, the illegality of the order goes to the
root of the matter and warrants the interference of this Court. The
580 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Appellant is entitled to a share both in terms of Section 29A of the
Hindu Succession Act (Tamil Nadu Amendment Act), 1989 and also
HSA 2005. The prayer in I.A 1199 of 2018 is to pass a preliminary
decree answering the rights of all the eligible co-parceners.
11. Ms. Shobha Ramamoorthy contends that the order impugned does
not transgress the review jurisdiction. The matter is remanded to
the Trial Court. The consideration of a fact or reversing an earlier
finding, if examined carefully by this Court, cannot be termed as in
any manner exceeding the review jurisdiction. The Appellant has
been a silent spectator and cannot reopen the preliminary decree to
claim the settled share of late Munusamy Naidu or her 1/3rd share.
12. Dr. Sivabalamurugan argues that the order dated 23.09.2022 was
patently illegal and erroneous. The Appellant cannot expand the
preliminary decree and should have acted promptly during the
pendency of OS No. 192 of 2000. He prays for the dismissal of the
Civil Appeal.
13. Having heard the learned counsel and perusing the record, the
civil appeal examines whether the order impugned conforms to the
scope of review of an order under Section 114 and Order 47 of
CPC. The exercise or excess of jurisdiction is determinative on the
order under review and the review order. It is convenient to compare
the consideration before the jurisdictional limitations of review are
considered by this Court.

Civil Revision Petition Review Order (Impugned Order)

The issue was whether the The issue centred on whether
Appellant-daughter’s right to claim the CRP order unfairly denied
a share as a co-parcener following the Respondent, pendente lite-
the HSA 2005. transferee, the right to defend her
title against the Appellant’s claim.
The court accepted her claim, Acknowledged the claim but
stating that she was entitled to a renamed it as a third-party claim.
1/3rd share in ancestral properties This was done in relation to the
based on Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh original suit structure, which
Sharma.1 warranted a fresh inquiry at the
trial court level.

1 (2020) 9 SCC 1.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 581

Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Another

As a pendente lite transferee, The finding of the CRP would
Suguna could not have challenged prevent Suguna from defending
the ancestral nature of the her title. Review order affirms her
properties. She would have had to right to raise possible defences in
settle for whatever share her vendor Trial. These defences may include
(the Appellant’s father) was allotted. challenging the ancestral nature of
Her rights were subordinate to the the property.
co-parceners’ shares and flows from
the vendor.
The plea that the properties were not The Review order notes that the
ancestral is not a defence available ancestral nature of the property,
to the Respondent-pendente lite. while asserted by the plaintiff, was
The Property is treated on the not contested by the defendant
admission made by the original (deceased father). It held that an
plaintiff. uncontested assertion should not
bind the Purchaser in the face of
the Appellant’s new claim. Thus,
this question is to be re-examined.
The order explicitly stated that Held that the Appellant’s claim
Appellant’s 1/3 rd share would directly challenges the minimum
diminish Respondent’s interest in interest Respondent had acquired.
the properties she purchased to the Moreover, the review order allows
1/3rd share belonging to her vendor, the Respondent to adjust equities.
the deceased father.
CRP was allowed. The Trial Court The Review Application was allowed.
order dismissing the Appellant’s The CRP order was set aside. The
application was set aside. The entire matter was remanded to
Appellant was permitted to pay the the trial court for a fresh enquiry,
required court fee for her 1/3rd share. allowing the Respondent to raise all
contentions to defend her purchase.

14. In summing up precedents on the point, the judgment may not
be understood as though we are putting an old spin on a classic.
The court notes that there is no infirmity or illegality in entertaining
the review petition; however, the approach to the error pointed out
warrants a review of the precedents on the point.
15. It is axiomatic that the right of appeal cannot be assumed unless
expressly conferred by the statute or the rules having the force of
a statute. The review jurisdiction cannot be assumed unless it is
conferred by law on the authority or the Court. Section 114 and
582 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the power of review of the courts.
The power of review is different from appellate power and is subject
to the following limitations to maintain the finality of judicial decisions:
15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have
to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47
Rule 1 of CPC.2
15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which
may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors
committed by the subordinate court.3
15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC,
it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard
and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has
a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in
disguise.4
15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of
a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be
exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing
the exercise of power.5
15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order.
A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an
exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed
or pronounced, it should not be altered.6 Hence, it is invoked
only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave
and palpable errors.7
16. To wit, through a review application, an apparent error of fact or
law is intimated to the court, but no extra reasoning is undertaken
to explain the said error. The intimation of error at the first blush
enables the court to correct apparent errors instead of the higher
court correcting such errors. At both the above stages, detailed
reasoning is not warranted.

2 Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170.
3 Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389.
4 Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715.
5 Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224.
6 Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663.
7 Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1963) SC 1909.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 583

Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Another

17. Having noticed the distinction between the power of review and
appellate power, we restate the power and scope of review jurisdiction.
Review grounds are summed up as follows:
17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or
evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that,
despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not
within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party
at the time, the original decree or order was passed.
17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be
invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it
must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record.8
Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision.9
An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process
of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two
opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the
face of the record.10
17.3 Lastly, the phrase ‘for any other sufficient reason’ means a
reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those
specified in the other two categories.11
18. Courts ought not mix up or overlap one jurisdiction with another
jurisdiction. Having noted the appellate and review jurisdiction of
the Court, we will apply these principles to the impugned order to
determine whether the High Court was within its power of review
jurisdiction or had exceeded it by reversing the findings, as if the
High Court were sitting in appeal against the order dated 23.09.2022.
We appreciate the above tabulated summary of the view taken in
the impugned order while doing so.
19. The impugned order has not adverted to an error apparent on the
face of the record, but has taken up an error on reappreciation of the
case and counter case of the parties. The review order records a few
findings extending far beyond the actual working out of prayers in a

8 Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, [1955] 1 SCR 1104.
9 T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR (1954) SC 440.
10 Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR (1960) SC 137.
11 Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11 and approved in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar
Poulose Athanasius, AIR (1954) SC 526.
584 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

suit for partition. The order impugned has exceeded the jurisdiction
of review by a court.
20. For the above reasons, the order impugned is set aside, and
consequently, the order dated 23.09.2022 in CRP is restored. Civil
Appeal allowed. No order as to costs.
20.1 The Trial Court is directed to expeditiously dispose of all the
pending applications, preferably within three months from the
date of receipt of this judgment.

Result of the case: Appeal Allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan