Holding

The Supreme Court held that the unexplained, inordinate delay in granting sanction and initiating prosecution violated the appellant's right to a speedy trial, warranting the quashing of the proceedings.

Summary

Mahendra Lal Das, an executive engineer, was charged under Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for possessing disproportionate assets of Rs. 50,600. An FIR was lodged in 1988, but the investigating agency failed to obtain sanction for prosecution for more than 12 years, despite multiple proposals. The High Court dismissed Das's petition to quash the FIR, holding that the delay did not prejudice him. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the unexplained, inordinate delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial under Article 21 and that in corruption cases the amount involved is immaterial. Since the prosecution could not justify the delay and the sanction was deemed futile, the Court quashed the proceedings as a travesty of justice.

Issues considered

Whether a delay of over twelve years in granting sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act violates the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Whether the proceedings can be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay and lack of justification by the prosecution.
Whether the quantum of assets involved is material to the assessment of the right to speedy trial in corruption cases.
Whether the court may intervene at the investigation stage to protect the right to speedy trial.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 21
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 5(1)(e), s. 5(2)

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption Actright to speedy trialArticle 21sanction for prosecutiondelay in investigationquashing of FIRcorruptionjudicial intervention

Judgment

MAHENDRA LAL DAS A
v.
STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

OCTOBER 12, 2001

[M.B. SHAH AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.] B

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947-Sections 5(J)(e) and 5(2)-FIR
lodged-Non-grant of sanction and non-initiation of prosecution even after 12
years of lodging FIR-Opinion of Government authorities that sanction could
be futile-Failure of prosecution to explain the delay-Quashing of proceed-
ings sought-Held, in the .facts of the case proceedings quashed-In cases of
c
corruption the amount involved is not material but speedy justice is the
mandate of Constitution-Right to speedy trial encompasses all the stages viz.
Investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial-inordinate long
delay can be taken as proof ofprejudice-Constitution of India, 1950-Section
21. D

FIR was lodged against appellant under Sections 5(2) and S(l)(e) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for having misappropriated Rs.
50,600. After investigation, when Investigating Officer submitted a pro-
posal for grant of sanction the authorities felt that the grant of sanction
E
would prove to be a futile attempt on the part of the Department. When
no prosecution was launched against the appellant even after 12 years, he
filed writ petition for quashing the proceedings. High Court dismissed the
petition on the ground that mere delay in granting sanction had not
prejudiced the appellant. Hence this appeal.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case the proceedings against the appellant ne quashed, as permitting
further prosecution would be travesty of justice and a mere ritual or G
formality so far as the prosecution agency is concerned, and unnecessary
burden as regards the courts. [161-H; 162-A]

1.2. In the present case the prosecution has failed to explain the
delay in granting the sanction for prosecution of the appellant-accused.
H
157
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A The auth!>rities of the respondent-state also appear to be not satisfied
about the merits of the case and were convinced that despite granting of
sanction the trial would be a mere formality and exercise in futility.
(161-C]

1.3. In cases of corruption the amount involved is not material but
B
speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitut~on being in the interests of
the accused as well as that of the society. Cases relating to corruption are
to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay. As and when delay
is found to have been caus~d during the investigation, inquiry or trial, the
concerned appropriate authorities are under an obligation to find out and
c deal with the persons responsible for such delay. The delay can be
attributed either to the connivance of the authorities with the accused or
used as a lever to pressurise an1 harass the accused as is alleged to have
been done to the appellant in this case. [161-D-E] -

D Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR (1994) SC 948,
relied on.

2.1. The ·right to speedy trial encompasses all the stages, namely,
stage of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. While
determining the alleged delay, the court has to decide each case on its
E facts having regard to all attending circumstances including nature of
offence, number of accused
. . and witnesses, the work-load of the court
concerned, prevailing local conditions, etc. Every delay may not be taken
as causing prejudice to the accused but the alleged delay has to be
considered in the totality ·or the circumstances and the general conspectus
F · of the case. Inordinate long delay· can be taken' as a presentlve proof of
prejudice. [160-H; 161-A·B]

2.2. It is true that interference by the court at the investigation
stage is not called for. However, it is equally true that the investigating
age 0 cy cannot be given'the latitude of protracting the conclusion of the
G
investigation without any limit 'or time. It is in the inte~t of all con·
cerned that guilt or innocence ofthe accused is determined ~ quickly as ·
possible in the circumstances. (160-F-G]

A'bdul Re_hman Antulay & 01S. v. R.S. Nayak & Am:, [i992] 1 SCC
'
H 225, referred to. .
MAHENDRA LAL DAS v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 159
CRIMINAL A~PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1038 A
of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.7.2000 of the Patna High Court
in Crl. W.J.C. No. 378 of 2000.

S.B. Sanyal, Alok Kumar, Rajesh Pathak for Ms. Naresh Bakshi for the B
appellant.

Saket Singh for B.B. Singh for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c
SETID, J. Leave granted.

The appellant who, at the relevant time, was an Executive Engine'er,
Public Engineering Department, Mechanical Division, Ranchi, has prayed for
quashing of the FIR registered on 20.5.1988 again&t him under Sections 5(2)-
D
read with Section 5(l)(e) of the Prevention of Ccrruption Act, 1947 wherein
it was alleged that the appellant was in possession of disproportionate assets
to the extent of Rs. 50,600. The FIR was sought to be quashed mainly on the
ground that despite expiry of over 12 years, the respondent-State had not
granted the sanction which amounted to the violation of his right of life and E
liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The petition, filed
by the appellant, was dismissed vide the order impugned on the ground that
mere delay in granting the sanction has not prejudiced the appellant in any
manner particularly when he is already on anticipatory bail.

F
It appears that one Smt. Usha Punindre Narayan Sinha, filed a FIR in the
Vigilance Thana, Division and District, Patna, alleging that the appellant while
holding different posts during the years 1961-62 to 1982-83 acquired dispro-
portionate assets by misusing his official position and adopting corrupt means.
During investigation, the appellant gave details of his income and expenses, on
the basis of which the IO concluded that the appellant was in possession of Rs. G
50,600 as· unaccountable money. As no prosecution was launched against the
appellant till the year 2000, he moved the High Court for quashing the proceed-
ings and his prayer was rejected vide the order impugned.

In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-State it is H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R
A submitted that a case of disproportionate assets of Rs. 50,600 was registered
against the appellant as P.S. No. 0017 /88 under the provisions of Prevention
, of Corruption Act and detailed enquiry held by the then Deputy Superintendent
of Police. After four years of investigation, the IO submitted a proposal for
a
granting sanction for prosecution of the appellant for which letter was sent
B to the Secretary, PH Engineering Depru.1ment, Patna through the Vigilance
Department on 6.1.1992. The Department of PHED as well as the Law Depart-
ment, after the scrutiny of the allegations made against the appellant, arrived
at the conclusion that the case could not be proved in the court. They further
concluded that the grant of sanction would prove to be a futile attempt on the
part of the Department, The Advocate General of the State also opined that no
c case for sanction was made out on the basis of the material collected during
the investigation of the case registered against the appellant. The file was also
sent to the Chief Minister through Chief Secretary. The Chief Secretary sug-
gested that the attention of the investigating agency be drawn to the defects and
after obtaining its opinion appropriate orders be passed. Again in the year 1992,
D the then Investigating Officer submitted a proposal for granting sanction for
prosecution of the appellant put till the time the petition was disposed of by
the High Court, no orders were passed on the proposal seeking the grant of
sanction. Even in the affidavit filed in this Court on 27.'11.2000, it is submitted ··
that "A fresh letter for sanction of prosecution against accused Mahendra Lal
E Das was sent by Vigilance Department to Dy. Secretary, PHED vide letter No.
SRO 17/88 Vig. 794 C.~. dated 17.11.2000. Now the matter is under consi~
eration and opinion by the parent department". However, during the arguments
we were informed that ultimately sanction has been granted after filing
of the SLP in this Court.

F It is true that interference by the court at the investigation stage is not
called for. However, it is equally true that the investigating agency cannot be
given the latitude of protracting the conclusion of the investigation without any
limit of time. This Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak &Am:,
f 1992] I SCC 225 while interpreting the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution
G held that every citizen has a right of speedy trial of the case pending against
him. The speedy trial ~as considered alsc in public interest as it serves the
social interest also. It is in the interest of all concerned that guilty or innocence
of the. accused is determined as qu_ickly as possible in the circumstances. The
right to speedy trial encompasses all the stages, namely, stage of investigation,
H enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. While determining the alleged delay,
MAHENDRA LAL DAS v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 161
the c0urt has to decide each case on- 'its facts having regard: to all atteni;lin~ A
circumstances including nature of offence, number o( accus~a and witnesses,
1

the work-load of the court concerhed, prevailing Ideal cond.itions', etc. Every
delay may not be taken as causing prejudice to the accused but the alleged
delay has to be considered ii! the totality of the circumstane<es and the.general
conspectus of the C(lse_: foprdinate long delay can be taken as a presentive _proo_f ' :.. ~

of prejudice.
B

In this.case the prosecution has miserably failed to explain the delay of
more than 13 years by now, in granting the sanction for prosecution of the
appellant-accused of possessing disproportionate wealth of about Rs. 50,600.
The authorities of the respondent-State also appear to be not satisfied about the C
merits of the case and were convinced that despite granting of sanction the trial
would be a mere formality and exercise in futility.

In cases of corruption the aniount involved is not material but speedy
justice is the mandate of the Constitution being in the interests of the accused
as well as that of the society. Cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with D
. swiftly, promptly and without delay. As and when delay is found to have been
caused during the investigation, inquiry or trial, the concerned appropriate
authorities are under an obligation to find out and deal with the persons
responsible for such delay. The delay can be attributed either to the connivance
of the authorities with the accused or used as a lever to pressurise and harass E
the accused as is alleged to have been done to the appellant in this case.
The appellant has submitted that due to registration of the case and pendency
of the investigation he lost his chance of promotion to the post of Chief
Engineer. It is common knowledge that promotions are withheld when pro-
ceedings with respect to allegations of corruption are pending against the
incumbent. The appellant has further alleged that he has been deprived the F
love, affection and the society of his children who were residing in foreign
country as on account of the pendency of the investigation he could not afford
to leave the country.

This Court in Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR
(1994) SC 948 quashed the investigation against the accused on account of not
G
granting the sanction for more than 13 years. The facts of the present case are
almost identical. No useful purpose would be served to put the appellant at trial
at this belated stage.

Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are H
. l62 ..: SUPREME'COURT REPORfs•· · [200l]'SUPP:'4S.C:R.
A\ incliited to'quasti~the .proceedings -againsMhe appelliffinls<permittiitg flirther
prosccution·would be·the.travesty. ofjustice and"a mere ritual or formality so·
fat as the prosecution·agen'Cy 'is concerned; 'and: unnecessary. burden as·regards'
the·oou.rts.

This appeal is· accordingly allowed by setting aside the order impugned
It~ and'quashing the proceedings initiated against the appeallaitt orHhe basis.of
·PS:Nol•0017/88.. under the provisions>of Prevention.of Corruption ·Act.
K;K:t.:· Appeal'. allowed.

. \